The main goal in this paper is to make an in-depth analysis of the regulatory situations that can arise during mergers when political involvement takes place. The research is based on four controversial merger cases of undertakings within the same country (E.On-Ruhrgas), European Union countries (E.On-Endesa, Unicredit-Hypoverein) and between companies from the USA (Boeing-McDonnell Douglas) that have effect on the European market. We analyze the four mergers using Michele Ruta and Massimo Motta models from the paper “A Political Economy of Merger Policy in International Markets” (2008).

By the end of the research we reached the conclusion that due to some lapses in the European Commission Merger regulation at the time of the mergers, as well as due to government involvement in the mergers, they are not always cleared in the benefit of the market competition or consumer welfare, but due to nationalistic interests of governments to have big players on the market or to keep governmental power in certain industries, even with the risk of harming competition. Along with this, from the mergers analyzed here, it becomes clear that local or union authorities scrutinize the foreign acquirers more.