

**Abstract**

In this study, we deal above all with the problem of the inner relationship between the problematic of value-analysis in Husserl's pre-war ethics and that of person-analysis in his post-war ethics. The introduction of the concept of person into the discussion leads us to the exposition of the constitution of value objects through passive activities of consciousness such as typifying apperception, as well as to the exposition of the institution of value objects as idealities in the personal surrounding world (*Lebensumwelt*). Our research confirms that a phenomenological analysis of valuing acts can be nothing other than an abstract moment of the phenomenological analysis of the totality of personal life in the surrounding world. Accordingly, the problem of the foundation of a non-formalistic value-ethics leads us necessarily to the problem of personalism. We establish also that the problem of the relationship between the concept of value and the concept of person in Husserl originates from the movement of his own phenomenological thinking about the ethical question, and that the concept of person plays a crucial role in bridging theory and praxis as well as transcendental and mundanity in Husserl's transcendental phenomenology.