

Title: Phenomenology of mediality in Husserl and Fink – Fink’s implicit criticism on Husserl’s transcendental Phenomenology in “Presentification and Image” and “VI. Cartesian Meditation”

Summary: Our study is devoted to the task of showing, on the basis of Fink’s early works, that Fink’s account of transcendental phenomenology could be considered not as a simple elaboration of Husserlian projects, but as its prolongation which presupposes Fink’s internal criticisms on Husserl’s central conceptions. Fink’s criticism could be summarized in the following two points: a.) Husserl’s account of the transcendental constitution and theory of evidence is operated by a naïve theoretical assumption of the priority of certain modes of the experiencing (for example, perception) to other modes (for example, consciousness of image, phantasy). According to the early Fink, both modes of experiencing are mediated into each other. b.) Husserl’s method of transcendental phenomenological reduction lacks the ontological reflection on the status of the transcendental subjectivity, because Husserl tends to ignore the very question of Fink’s *VI. Cartesian meditation* –what makes possible the phenomenologising itself, what is the medium of phenomenologising? Our reflection on Fink’s criticisms makes possible a new philosophical proposition according to which the transcendental phenomenology will be characterized as the phenomenology of transcendental mediality.