The thesis provides an interesting and innovative analysis of the budgetary institutions and their roles in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia. The thesis is concisely written and brings a wealth of material on both institutions and real outcomes of fiscal policy in the two countries. The most valuable feature of the thesis is its creativity with which it approached the intrigue issue of fiscal institutions. Therefore, I recommend the thesis for the defence and suggest grade A ("výborně").

The introductory chapters bring a comprehensive overview of the literature, while the third deals briefly with the EU budget and the Stability and Growth Pact. The fourth chapter analyses Czech and Slovak budgetary process and despite some minor points, it does illustrate how the budgetary institutions in formerly homogenous Czech and Slovak Republics have diverged. One may protest that the chapter is too detailed and not well organised, but the author built a very solid basis for the institutional comparison. There is one disagreement, however. In table 12 and in the text (page 78), the author argues that the Czech president can veto the state budget law or its parts. After reading the Constitution and consulting other experts, I believe that while the former is true (though never used by any Czech president), the latter is not.