

The essay concerns Berkeley's reaction to Newton's dynamics. While Berkeley admires the usefulness, simplicity and generality of Newton's laws of motion, he is, none the less, concerned with their possible ontological implications. If we interpret Newton in a realist manner, his doctrines seem to imply that physical objects are active and are thus inconsistent with the basic principles of Berkeley's metaphysics, namely with the view that the only sources of activity in the universe are spirits. Berkeley tries to solve this conflict by offering an account of force according to which force is a mathematical hypothesis and which thus avoids metaphysical commitments. The author suggests that there is a tension between different claims that Berkeley makes about force in *De motu* and offers an interpretation of Berkeley's view in which he tries to avoid this tension. According to the offered interpretation, Berkeley's view of force is an instrumentalist one. In the last chapter various aspects of Berkeley's view of force as a mathematical hypothesis are considered. It is argued that even though such a view might seem to be in conflict with Berkeley's semantic and metaphysical views, it needn't be so if certain semantic considerations introduced in Berkeley's *Alciphron* are considered.