

## *Acknowledgments*

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### *Acronyms & Abbreviations*

AL	Arab League
IR	International Relations
ALESCO	Arab League Education, Social and Cultural Organization
CAEU	Council of Arab Economic Unity
GS	General Secretariat
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organization
UN	United Nations
UAR	United Arab Republic
ACC	Arab Cooperation Council
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
AASTMT	Arab Academy for Science and Technology and Maritime Transport
AFESD	Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development
UMA	Arab Maghreb Union
AMF	Arab Monetary Fund - Abu Dhabi
OIC	Organization of the Islamic Conference
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
GNU	Government of National Unity
NCP	National Congress Party
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
CSP	Center for Systemic Peace
IFC	Islamic Charter Front
IDP	Internationally Displaced Person
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization

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***Foreword Concerning Layout:***

This examination is broken down into three Sections. Each Section is mutually dependent on the others for the elucidation of the total Idea and also completely independent in purpose. This is important to note because the outline of the paper does not follow a general format (introduction, body and conclusion) but rather something different. In that regard, *Section One* focuses on the theoretical side and the thematic assumptions that the assessment is establishing. *Section Two* is used to analyze the Arab League and its composite members' empirical attributes and highlight the disfunction in the region. *Section Three* addresses the factors that are Incongruent to AL regional success, summarizes the situation and gives recommendations to the course of action that the League should employ. Because it is an unorthodox manor of framing, understanding the structure of the paper is crucial.

The Arab League is an International Organization that is not unifying the Arab Community.

There are many reasons for this. It has many incongruences in what is necessary to have a unified and successful regional body. Some are infrastructural, some are cultural, some are behavioral, and some are a combination. Most notably the lack of commonality is a key issue especially in the face of a proclaimed Arab identity. That problem is further exacerbated by the polemic rather than academic nature of discourse on Arabism, Islam and the region. Another key problem faced in the region is the multitude of wars. The many wars have created instability, chaos, and an inability to move forward in the region often due to their cyclical nature.

There is nothing uniting the region as a whole, although arab and islamic movements have tried. Nationalism has prevailed as the cohesive unit in the region. In that regard, the nation is the only structure in place to deal with the many crises that the region continues to face. There is no umma and what is more there is no concrete arab identity, it is only based on history. Though there are societal customs and institutions inherited from that history, one of which is the emphasis on honor over acquisition (though not absolute in the region). This makes the pursuit of a union of vested interest difficult because the desire for pride and standing get in the way of cooperation for commercial gain. The societal emphasis on standing was a main reason that the initial debates over the establishment of Arab norms had been centrifugal.

The problems may well be insurmountable, especially due to the different customs and subcultures within the League. The region also seems incongruent with the external system of International Relations as it seems to have filled the void of a modern day political and cultural 'other'. The region is plagued with a multitude of problems and though they could use unity of purpose, it remains to be seen just what that purpose (beyond opposition to Israel) could be.

## **Section 1: International Organization Congruence**

*As for the Arab League, it does little more than organize bad-tempered summits, fend off Western criticism of human-rights abuses by its members and denounce Israel.<sup>1</sup>*

### ***1.1 Assertions***

The Arab League needs an overhaul. It has been ineffective at creating a sense of unity for the Arab people. Furthermore, it has been unable to be politically effective within its own region. There are many reasons for this, and those reasons vary in effect. In addition to those problems there are certain attributes that are endemic to the region and certain attributes that are not. Furthermore, there are characteristics endemic to the identity ‘Arab’ that are not characteristics of some, even many, countries in the Arab League. This takes us to the first of five basic assertions.

Assertion 1: *The Arab identity is not based on a commonality of circumstance or interest.* The twenty two members of the Arab League that claim to be Arab are vastly different. That is not to say that working together could not benefit them, indeed it could. However, when we move beyond the moniker, ‘Arab’ we see that the Sudanese, the Saudis, the Jordanians and the Lebanese are not as kindred as the highly popular identity claim would indicate. While it is true that the Arabs share a history, it is just that, history. The perception of an Arab identity comes in between accurate assessment of national needs by citizens and perhaps by national leaders too. Although it would seem that national leaders either understand this already or have their own agendas, otherwise we may have already seen Arab cohesion. It may also be as Solingen points out that the pursuit of Pan-Arabism “was never realized because individual leader’s ambitions dominated the hierarchy of collective objectives throughout the League’s history.”<sup>2</sup> The concessions that would have to be made to a greater regional body would inhibit the leader’s freedoms, which is something they do not desire. Regardless, the perception of Arab identity inhibits debate where debate is gravely needed. Instead, the assessment of the region’s future and best interest is of a polemic rather than an academic nature.

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<sup>1</sup> The world of the Arabs. Economist. Special Section. July 25th, 2009. Vol. 392. Pg. 4.

<sup>2</sup> Solingen, Etel. Genesis, Design and Effects of Regional Institutions. Pg. 280.

Assertion 2: *Arab social culture is honor based rather than appetite or reason based.* Though there is not a concise Arab identity, cultural behaviors endemic to that shared history are present. To that end, pride and honor are commodities regarded much higher than material ones. Additionally, the emphasis on honor over rationale is displayed in the highly polemic nature of regional debate. This becomes crucial in the assessment of the region's international intercourse as it highlights the nature of cooperation as much different and the need for it as much greater. Furthermore the likelihood of disagreement is heightened by the stress put on pride and honor rather than cooperation and mutual gain. Essentially, pride in one's heritage and a strong emphasis on honor are non-functional kinships in that its assessment is dependent on a lesser opposition. Pride implies a superiority that is dependent on an inferiority. The idea presented by Salzman of 'balanced opposition' helps to illustrate this assertion.

Assertion 3: *Certain characteristics are incongruent to intergovernmental organizational (IGO) function.* There are many things that inhibit the successful operation of organizations. If those attributes are present they erode the unity and purpose of a given organization until it ultimately restructures, falls apart or continues to go through the motions of being a governing body while accomplishing little or nothing. Given that, it is important for these attributes be assessed academically and attempted to be rectified if an IGO desires success.

Assertion 4: *Commonality is the most important key to a successful Organization.* Of all the attributes that an IGO can possess, commonality is undoubtedly the most important. There must be an attribute that all members can ascribe meaning to as the unifying ideal or goal. It does not have to be a commonality of characteristic but rather creed. With a unified goal that is trying to be attained, the members of the IGO, NGO or other organization can work towards a common goal and feel accomplishment by marked progress.

Assertion 5: *There is an international community system and there is not.* The international community is comprised of established players and is, in many ways, in opposition to those players that are not members. In this sense there is a community of members (mainly 'Western') and an anarchic other 'non-system' that the community is trying to corral or cajole into compliance. With this system and non-system in place the possibility for cohesion is greatly reduced.

These assertions act as themes that are present throughout the following assessment and are important for framing the issues, statistics and conflicts being presented.

## ***1.2 Theoretical Considerations***

This assessment aims to elucidate those assertions clearly and concisely. However, before breaking-down the causes of the Arab League's failings, it is important to establish what theoretical approaches and considerations are relevant to the methodology of assessment. In that regard the following section will establish a few things. First will be a brief section on organizational design: goals and the role of structural intent. This will be important in establishing the basis for arguing the infrastructural problems of the League's decision-making body. That will be followed by an assessment on the nature of culture and the role of identity. Finally, Richard Lebow's *Cultural Theory* will be explained in order to establish the precepts that will be referred to during the assessment.

### ***1.2.1 Organizational Design***

*People who study, work in, and design- especially design- organizations have some guiding conceptions of the organization. These conceptions tend to be rooted in two sets of assumptions. The first set is about the nature of the people who comprise an organization's membership. The second set is about the nature of the organization itself.<sup>3</sup>*

According to Connor's Organizations: Theory and Design, organizational structures are rooted in their nature (or purpose) and their personage. That being said, what is it that guides coalitions and creators of organizations in establishing their design? First and foremost is the *structural intent*. It is framed by both the over-arching goals of the institution and the objectives of the agent(s) (coalitions, managers, investors, etc.) of its creation.

#### ***1.2.1.a Structural Intent, Origins and Designs of the Arab League***

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<sup>3</sup> Connor, Patrick. *Organizations: Theory and Design*. Science Research Associations. 1980. Pg 19.

Structural Intent is framed by the theoretical goals of the coalitions and the *determinants of structure*. The determinants of structure are the channels and methods of exchange within an organization that go beyond the desired outcome or purpose of an organization's creation and into the method of actualization of those goals. Determinants of structure include "things like degree and type of horizontal differentiation, vertical differentiation, mechanisms of coordination and control, formalization, and centralization of power," among other concepts.<sup>4</sup> Structurally, the League was designed around a similar blueprint to the United Nations, but with some key differences that have led to vastly different organizational outcomes. Two of the most important distinctions are the design goals put forth by the establishing coalitions (the initial actors in creating the League) and the determinants of structure outlined in its Establishment Pact.

First are the design goals of the League. Solingen says, "the most important forces underlying its creation (the Arab League's) were, ironically, ruling coalitions seeking to guarantee their own sovereignty and independence against advocates of Arab unity."<sup>5</sup> Fears of 'Greater Syria' or a unified 'Fertile Crescent' led to the creation of an organization designed to foster regional separateness and state sovereignty.<sup>6</sup> The original goal of the League was to deter regional hegemonies from being established and threatening the sovereignty of neighboring states. In fact the Alexandria Protocol that preceded the Pact specifically eliminated joint defense and foreign policy from proposed committees. So it was not originally meant to provide a format for Arab unity, but rather the opposite: a regional agreement to retain autonomy.

However, things have changed since its creation. In 1950 the Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty was established in the event of external threats (due to the Israeli-Conflict), which drastically changed the function and perception of the League.<sup>7</sup> However, inter-Arab conflict was not addressed in the 1950 Treaty. Though rhetorically the League seems to embrace regional union, the intent at its inception speaks of a very different agenda as the next point illustrates.

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<sup>4</sup> Borgatti, Stephen. Organizational Theory: Determinants of Structure. 2001. Retrieved on 18/03/09 at <http://www.analytictech.com/mb021/orgtheory.htm>

<sup>5</sup> Solingen, Etel. Pg 279.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. Pg 280.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

The determinants of structure are the channels of creating policy and the methodology of an organization. The essential core of an international organization “is not the various administrative or judicial bodies as such, but the rules, regulations and agreed procedures for which the institutions assume responsibility.”<sup>8</sup> Solingen asserts that the league design was both *informal* and *sovereignty-orientated*. The non-unifying themes and attributes of the AL’s functions will be developed in Section 2.2.2 of the Articles of the Establishment Pact to further illustrate this. “A shared language and culture might have obviated more formal arrangements, but intense competition for the mantle of Arabism undermined the development of focal points.”<sup>9</sup> Solingen claims that the inability among the founding coalitions to agree on a “normative convergence over the proper interpretation of Arabism” and the desire among the regional leaders in establishing the normative ‘Arab’ claims lead to sensationalism and centrifugal effects rather than centripetal forces.<sup>10</sup> Each leader desiring to be the source of the normative ideals that the League structured itself around. The debate over what Arab should be is still being waged today, as discussed in Section 2.4.6.

Structural Intent is the mantle that organizes an institution and asserts its capacities for change. The goals and the determinants both play very important roles. Furthermore, determinants are often overlooked and the organization is assessed only *prima facie*. Upon closer examination, the original design of the Arab League, the goals and the determinants of its structure, revolve around state sovereignty and they deter unity. However, the League members maintain that they are seeking common growth and unity within the League’s union. It seems that the interpretations of the League’s goals have changed overtime. The question then becomes, is it a front for political purposes... an illusion on the part of the leaders to retain a sense of unity while maintaining independent control of their states? Or, conversely, do the leaders truly believe that the Arab League is a force for change and unity in the Arab region? In addition, what role does the polemic, rather than academic, nature of debate still play in establishing centrifugal rather than centripetal forces and what is the origin of the polemics? Despite the implications of that question, the importance of intent, origins and design have weighed heavy on the organizational fate of the Arab League.

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<sup>8</sup> Armstrong, David. *The Rise of the International Organization: a Short History*. Macmillan Press. 1982. pg 119.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.* Pg 282.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.* Pg 281.

### ***1.2.2 Culture & Identity***

The other characteristic of an organization outlined by Connor's Organization: Theory and Design is the personage. Postcolonial theory purports that people are all the same and illustrating differences only sets us apart as oppose to bringing us together. This is fundamentally wrong. Culture and identity play a strong role in establishing people's conception of the outside world and in defining their *attribution* associations with the outside world.<sup>11</sup> Salzman defines culture as:

a way of construing the world, the universe, society, and men and women. It is, at the same time, a matrix of meaning, a framework for understanding, and a plan for action. It defines desirable goals, appropriate means, and the broader values to be honored in human action.<sup>12</sup>

Culture, as I see it, differs from identity in how it is established. Culture is something that is innate and born of casual patterns of relationship and the subconscious framing of one's role in his environment. Identity is something different. It is conscious and a choice (based on a finite range of possibilities depending on the society). In that regard, identity is much more present in your thought process. Furthermore, because it is a choice, it is directly subject to human error. While culture guides your subconscious associations, identity is defined by your active associations and decisions. Culture has to do with the customs and social institutions of a particular people. These differences are important in this analysis for multiple reasons. First off, it exhibits how subjective identities are and how they can be established on ill-conceived notions. Furthermore, because identity is a chosen construct, it is closely tied to personal and social self-esteem. As Richard Lebow's Cultural Theory asserts, "Identity 'can be regarded as a vehicle for attaining self-esteem'<sup>13</sup>.

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<sup>11</sup> Attribution Theory asserts that learners (people) are strongly motivated by the pleasant outcome of an event to act in a manor which reflects strongly on them. It incorporates cognitive theory and self-efficacy theory in the sense that it emphasizes that learners' current self-perceptions will strongly influence the ways in which they will interpret the success or failure of their current efforts and hence their future tendency to perform these same behaviors. Retrieved on December 21st, 2009 from <http://tip.psychology.org/weiner.html>

<sup>12</sup> Salzman, Phillip Carl. Arab Culture and Postcolonial Theory. *Israeli Affairs*. Vol. 13. No. 4, October 2007. Pg 838.

<sup>13</sup> Lebow, Richard. *A Cultural Theory of International Relations*. 2009. pg. 2.

The concept of 'Arab' is profoundly affected by this distinction. As Owen points out in his assertions of the period leading up to Arabism's expansion in popularity, "Arabness was just one of a number of possible identities at this time, and usually much less important than that of belonging to a particular family or tribe or region or town."<sup>14</sup> Culture then being the social institutions/structure of tribal relationships and identity being the choice of association. Furthermore, as far as identities, Arabism was competing with "a number of other national, religious or regional identities which had already begun to assume political importance."<sup>15</sup> There were, and still are, a multitude of identities found in the Arab region. One thing that aids in the fruition of one movement or identity over the other is Anderson's concept of the 'imagined community' as outlined by Owens, which is the realization of "certain processes that tie significant groups of people together"<sup>16</sup> (such as the spread of printing, newspapers, etc... i.e.-Al-Jazeera). What is significant is the level to which a person associates themselves to this identity and the role that it plays in conjunction with Culture.

Salzman asserts that the Arab culture inherited the social hierarchical mechanism of 'balanced opposition' which essentially creates unions of people that are adversarially defined. Salzman maintains that culturally speaking (customs and societal institutions), in this society, laws or ideas take a back seat to regional alliances. This is essential when assessing the League. If alliances and self-interest trump laws then any attempt at constitutionalism is bound to fail. Author Elie Kedourie agrees with this claim and says that constitutionalism has failed, which, in part, has led to the triumph of ideological politics in the region.<sup>17</sup> The limited potential for constitutionalism to succeed based on pre-existing tribal associations of governance is an interesting concept. And despite its crude and formulaic nature, it is of value in critiquing the Arab League. Similarly, but with a much broader stroke, Richard Lebow creates a systematic differentiation in cultural behavior.

### ***1.2.3 Richard Lebow's Cultural Theory***

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<sup>14</sup> Owen, Roger. *State, Power and Politics in the making of the Modern Middle East*. Pg. 83.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Kedourie, Elie. *Politics of the Middle East*. Oxford University Press. 1992.

Richard Lebow's book is an insightful and innovative approach to International Relations Theory. It acknowledges the different effects that cultures have in international relations. In his own words:

To theorize about international relations is to say something systematic about the character of relations among the actors that comprise the system, and also about who those actors are and how they become recognized as such by other actors. To develop meaningful insights into these questions we must go outside of international relations because the patterns of interactions among actors is determined not by their number and relative power but by the nature of the society in which they interact. Society also determines who counts as an actor. Any theory of international relations must build on or be rooted in a theory of society and must address the constitution of actors, not only their behavior.<sup>18</sup>

Lebow clearly asserts the important role that culture and identity play in International Relations. With regard to the initial volume of his compendium on the matter three topics play an important role in this analysis. First is his evaluation of the 'other' for states and national identity. Second is his claim that there are *three driving forces in society: appetite, spirit and reason*. Third is his claim that *honor, standing and the satiation of the spirit drive* play a very significant role in international relations. Understanding the role and the characteristics of the honor drive in the spirit based society help to assess the Arab League.

Lebow points out that "different levels of order are sustained by different kinds of norms: groups are thought to be governed by social norms, societies by legal and social norms and regional and international systems primarily by legal norms."<sup>19</sup> Without a concerted agreement on social norms, it is logical that regional and international systems would have to rely on more standard methods of accord. Beyond a lack of norms, "regional and international orders are particularly challenging because they inevitably have competing as well as reinforcing norms and glaring contradictions between norms and behavior."<sup>20</sup> The many different norms, both reinforcing and contradicting, make cooperation, unless *highly motivated*, an illogical outcome. Additionally, infrequent face-to-face social interaction combined with a lack of mutual surveillance make

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<sup>18</sup> Lebow, Richard. *A Cultural Theory of IR*. Cambridge University. 2009. pg. 2.

<sup>19</sup> Lebow, Richard. Pg. 7

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*

effective social control more difficult. However, Lebow asserts that this sort of order can occur and is most successful among “states and societies that subscribe to a common core of values.”<sup>21</sup>

However, regional and international levels are set apart by another important distinction that group and societal levels are only aware of in a limited sense: the ‘us’ and the ‘other’ distinction. Many times throughout history nations have used the other to strive for domestic gains and to retain unity. As Lebow points out, “the price of order at home is conflict among societies” and “the ‘us’ is maintained at the expense of the ‘other’.”<sup>22</sup> Furthermore, international relations, practice and theory, has reinforced this distinction to the point that “the binary of ‘us’ and ‘others’ appears natural, if not progressive” as a development of human society.<sup>23</sup> Although Lebow asserts that “the creation of ‘others’ should properly be seen as only one means of identity construction, *and* one that has the potential to transcend hostile binaries”<sup>24</sup>, the international relations system seems endemic to the establishment of these binaries. Just as “Christian society, which initially excluded Russia and the Ottoman Empire as political and cultural ‘others’” and the distinction between Communism and Capitalism throughout the latter half of the 20th Century.<sup>25</sup> Defining the international system in such terms creates an organic tension between those defined as opposition. Lebow stops just short of claiming that this mentality is flawed beyond retribution when he asserts “the creation of other... has the potential to transcend hostile binaries.”<sup>26</sup>

Perhaps more important to this examination, Lebow asserts, in agreement with Plato and Aristotle, that *spirit, appetite and reason are fundamental drives with distinct objects or ends.*<sup>27</sup> Appetite being the desire for material wealth or possessions, considered dangerous and corrupting. Reason regarded most highly because it seeks to ascertain what a happy life is and could “constrain and educate appetite and spirit to collaborate toward that end.”<sup>28</sup> Spirit being the desire for honor and standing, and being guided by virtue. “It makes us admire and emulate the skills, character and achievement of people considered praiseworthy by our society,” and “by equalling or surpassing them, we gain the respect or esteem of people who matter, and feel good

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid. Pg 9

<sup>23</sup> Ibid. Pg 10

<sup>24</sup> Ibid. Pg 12.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid Pg. 10.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid. Pg 12.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid. Pg 26.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid. Pg 15.

about ourselves.”<sup>29</sup> The spirit, being the drive for honor and standing, is proud and desires autonomy. It responds in anger to any impediment to self-assertion and seeks to avenge all slights and challenges to the freedom of itself or its allies.<sup>30</sup>

Lebow points out that modern IR theory rejects the spirit altogether and is firmly grounded in the assessment of the appetite. “Liberalism and Marxism describe politics as driven by material interests, and Realism acknowledges the appetite’s primacy only after security.”<sup>31</sup> What is more, reason was reduced to, in the words of David Hume, “the slave of the passions.”<sup>32</sup>

Lebow asserts that the spirit gives rise to the universally felt need for self-esteem. Furthermore, he says that nation-states also desire honor and standing. That states--- like people, groups and institutions--- can manifest behavior that desires autonomy and recognition. He points out that often times when states engage in warfare it is because of a slight on their honor or a challenge to their identity and not an issue stemming from material gain or loss. National identities are in that sense often driven by ideas of prestige and conversely shame. Max Weber says, “a nation will forgive damage to its interest but not injury to its honor, and certainly not when this is done in the spirit of priggish self-righteousness.”<sup>33</sup> These slights are intrusions upon the national identity. A national identity that is reinforced by the self-esteem of honor and recognition among its peers or at the very least domestically among its people. However, when the *spirit becomes the primary driving force*, “actors seek self-esteem through honor, standing or autonomy, they are often willing to risk, even sacrifice, themselves or their political units in pursuit of these goals.”<sup>34</sup> States acting in this way may contradict their state’s vested interests, as sometimes seems to be the case.

These three attributes play key roles in the assessment of the Arab League. The region is often regarded as the opposition to order in the rest of the world. This is something that is felt throughout the region and does not help to build cohesion. The Arab League is driven much more by the motivations of *spirit* than *appetite* or *reason*.

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid. Pg. 20.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid. Pg 19.

Oppositional consciousness, or the concept of the other, has been around for a long time, (arguably since the creation of Aristotle's second premise of how to run a successful Oligarchy or Democracy). Additionally, the three types of societies was a notion originally put forth by Plato and Aristotle. However, the thoughtful application to IR theory and the case studies Lebow illustrates in his book help to illuminate a new angle of international relations study. Each of these ties into the assessment of the Arab League in different ways, but essentially, 'Arab' society is spirit based with a very low social self-esteem, and oppositional consciousness is an important factor in assessing the region's worldview. One needs only to quickly assess some of the attributes of 'Arab' society. The polemic over academic debate, the arguments against constitutionalism functioning in the region and the strong associations to religion (pointed out by the Annual Arab Survey). Even the immense pride in their heritage is a manifest desire for honor. The Arab culture is clearly spirit driven.

#### ***1.2.4 Theoretical Summary***

Regional organizations should be measured against a single yardstick: the extent to which they contribute to the political and economic integration of their members... The distance travelled by a regional organization towards that goal determines its success or lack of it.<sup>35</sup>

This is the manor in which the assessment will follow. The theoretical assumptions asserted above are important in understanding the approach taken towards that assessment. They are fundamental in evaluating the Arab League. The *structure* and the *people* make the organization. Organizational structure, based on the goals of the institution and the determinants of its structure, are fundamental in an organization's ability to function properly. Culture and identity are essential pre-determinants in the roles and behaviors of an organization's members. Furthermore, the predisposition of that culture with regard to Lebow's three societal drives can completely change the functionality, and even the desired outcomes of an institution and its members. Perhaps even to the point of incompatibility. It is with regard to these key concepts that this evaluation continues.

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<sup>35</sup> Armstrong, David. Pg. 117.

## SECTION 2: THE ARAB LEAGUE

### Statistics, Attributes & Implications



Arab League Council meeting in Bludan, on July 25th 1946.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> Hourani, Albert. A History of the Arab Peoples. MJF Books. 1991. pg 265.

## 2.1 Arab League Overview and Brief Arab History

Figure

2.1.a<sup>37</sup>




The Arab League is simply a political representation of the Arab world. It was promoted by the British at the end of the Second World War and has twenty-two member states.<sup>38</sup> The League currently boasts a population of approximately 300 million in its 5.25 million square miles (13.59 million square kilometers). Its countries run as far west as the Atlantic coast of Morocco and run the northern coast of Africa across to the most eastern point of the Fertile Crescent. Longitudinally it spans from the northern tip of Iraq all the way down to the island nation of Comoros in the Mozambique Channel. However it is not just large in mass, it is also large in diversity.

<sup>37</sup> Arab League Map. Retrieved on September 3rd 2009 from <http://www.olimpbase.org/worldteam/img/arableag.gif>

<sup>38</sup> Field, Michael. Inside The Arab World. Harvard University Press. 1994. pg 7.

The Arab League is vast and diverse both geographically and culturally. Throughout history its different regions have been controlled by the Greek, Roman, Persian and Ottoman Empires. Colonialism also left its mark with the French (Morocco including West Sahara, Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania), Italian (Libya), and British (Egypt, Sudan, Jordan, Yemen, Qatar, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Israel and Palestinian lands) colonialists all establishing ports for the purpose of controlling the populations and extracting resources(Figure 2.1.b). Though perhaps the most proud heritage is the one that these countries share and not the ones that are unique to each separate area. That heritage being Arabism.

Figure 2.1.b<sup>39</sup>



Different types of foreign control in the Middle East during the interwar period

Another important identity in the region, Islam came from Mecca and later Medina, across the fertile crescent into parts of Asia with the mongols, across the horn of Africa out towards the Atlantic Ocean and pushing into Europe it brought with it a language: Arabic. Claimed to be one of the most beautiful languages, Arabic was the voice of Islam, Algebra and Poetry. There are more than 30 different forms of spoken or colloquial Arabic. A few of these dialects include: Egyptian (spoken by approximately 65 million people and perhaps the most widely understood

<sup>39</sup> Owen, Roger. Pg. 13

due to the popularity of Egyptian made films and TV shows), Algerian (22 million people), Moroccan/Maghrebi (19 million people), Sudanese (19 million people), North Levantine (19 million people), Mesopotamian (14 million people), and Najdi (10 million people).<sup>40</sup> Though spoken in many different dialects today, there are still two forms of Arabic that span the individual nations and cultures to unite the Arab world. The first, known as *Arabia Fusha* is more commonly referred to as Modern Standard Arabic. The other is known as Classical Arabic and is the language of the Qur'an. Scholars of the Qur'an assert that there is no translation that carries the same meanings and messages as those in Qur'anic Arabic. As such, Modern Standard Arabic is used for conversation among the different dialects of Arabic and Classical Arabic is primarily used for reading and reciting Islamic religious texts.<sup>41</sup>

As a result, Islam and Arabic are inseparable. Most of the countries in this region, and consequently the Arab League, are either mostly or totally Muslim and all but Somalia and Djibouti speak Arabic as their native language.<sup>42</sup> In addition to dialects and languages, Muslims are divided into two sects: Sunni and Shiite (with the AL being mainly Sunni).

Briefly, Sunni and Shiite sects of Islam split directly after the prophet of Islam (Mohammed) died. Essentially, and not to oversimplify, the dispute was over who would inherit the Caliphate (which was the ultimate religious, military and political leader) after the prophet's death. Michael Field gives a succinct synopsis of Sunni and Shia:

One party, espoused by the Prophet's three immediate successors, maintained that it should go to whomever was most fitted to the task, this being somebody chosen by the previous leader and the other best-regarded men of the new community. The other party, led by the prophet's greatly respected cousin and son in law, Ali, said that the succession should stay in the Prophet's family. In due course the first faction's supporters became known as Sunnis, after the Arabic word, sunna, tradition, denoting their belief in the established tribal principle of a leader being selected by consensus, while Ali's faction became known as the 'Shia Ali', the party of Ali'.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> Arabic. Language Resources. Accredited Language Services. Retrieved on September 20th, 2009 from [www.alsintl.com/resources/languages/Arabic/](http://www.alsintl.com/resources/languages/Arabic/)

<sup>41</sup> Arabic. Language Resources. Accredited Language Services. Retrieved on September 20th, 2009 from [www.alsintl.com/resources/languages/Arabic/](http://www.alsintl.com/resources/languages/Arabic/)

<sup>42</sup> Field, Michael. Pg 7.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid. Pg. 12.

Though beyond this, the Arab people are bound by more than a shared language and religion, they are bound by a shared history. After Islam and Arabic had spread across the Arabian Peninsula in two directions: one across North Africa and into Spain; the other towards present day Iraq and onward towards central Asia it began to bloom. For two centuries after the conquests there was ‘cultural and scientific prosperity’<sup>44</sup>. Islam and Arabic (as the language of religion, law and government) spread broadly and deeply. Arab scholars “developed the system of counting that uses zeros, invented algebra, advanced the Greeks and Persians in science and built magnificent buildings”<sup>45</sup>. Consequently, Arabs have a much keener memory for their history and are proud to display it as superior to its western counterpart at the time. This history is collectively remembered, collectively embellished and provides a feeling of ancestral pride for all under the large umbrella of the Arab identity. Field asserts, “An Arab in Morocco and an Arab in Oman can learn the same lessons in school or watch the same Egyptian-produced historical drama on television and each can say to himself ‘ah, that invention, those buildings, that victory, that civilization, were the works of my ancestors’”<sup>46</sup>.

However, as warm as that shared sense of historical accomplishment and nostalgia has been for the Arab peoples it has been unfortunately misinterpreted as a shared *contemporary* identity, despite much evidence to the contrary. As will be established in the following sections, upon close examination, the different subcultures and identities that compose the Arab League become dramatically apparent. Furthermore, relying so heavily on an identity that is (at times) contrary and counterproductive to the goals and needs of the independent states and individual subcultures, undermines the possibility for positive growth. The member states of the Arab League differ in terms of both simple quantifiable statistics and more notably vested interests abroad and domestically. As will be established, national interests almost always trump pan-regional identities or characteristics (real or perceived) as sources of domestic and national policy-making. But what about the implications of a shared identity? What are the cultural affects of the moniker ‘Arab’? Is the Arab Identity’s sense of bravado and kinship keeping fruitful disagreement from taking place? Furthermore is the kinship of *Islam*, one of the greater umbrellas of identity in the region, preventing fruitful disagreement by establishing a kinship from an entity that is impenetrable to scrutiny? If so, are the characteristics of these cultural

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<sup>44</sup> Field, Michael. Pg 8.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

identities detrimental to cooperation? Lastly, what other possible road blocks to effective regional governance are in place?

First lets look to the *Establishment Pact* and any *article conflicts*, then the *empirical characteristics* of the member states of the Arab League (some comparative differences and similarities) and lastly to the myriad *conflicts* since the Establishment Pact was first signed. Both the empirical section and the conflicts section will end with a summary and a brief assessment of the implications of the data assessed.

## **2.2 Charter**

The study of charters and establishment documentation can be of significant value in determining the function, structure and limits of an organization. Section 1.2.1 exhibited how the origins and designs of organizations have profound consequences for their effects. The Arab League's Charter is especially worth noting for two reasons: first, the overtly vague and powerless nature of its articles on its members and secondly, because its articles have been transgressed multiple times. Perhaps correlated assertions, these transgressions were not merely slights of behavior and the reactions caused among the Arab countries and within the League were at times quite prodigious. However, prior to exemplifying those reactions, it is important to see the assertions of the League's duties in its founding charter. The following twenty Articles are not as they appear in the translated copy of the Establishment Pact, but rather the author's own summary for clarity and brevity. The Establishment Pact in its entirety is in Appendix B.

### **2.2.1 Article Interpretations**

Establishment Pact:

Introduction: it has been established to better the Arab region out of public support, etc...

Article 1: Composition: the league will be comprised of willing independent Arab states who apply.

Article 2: Objectives: the aim is to safeguard sovereignties and draw closer relations especially in the areas of:

1. Economics/Finances
  - 1.1. Trade, customs, currency, agriculture and industry
2. Communications
  - 2.1. Railways, roads, aviation, navigation, posts and telegraphs
3. Cultural Matters
4. Nationality Matters
  - 4.1. Passports, visas, execution of judgements and extradition
5. Social Welfare Matters
6. Health Matters

Article 3: Organization: There will be a council where each country has one vote. The Council will determine the function, purpose and supervise the execution of the decisions made in the body. It will also decide how to collaborate with existing and future international organizations in charge of peace, security, economic organization and social affairs.

Article 4: Subcommittees: Subcommittees will be established from Article 2's topics. These subcommittees will form drafts for the head council's consideration and may be comprised of delegates of the council, but the council has final say about this. (probably so that there isn't too much power in one person's hands, i.e.- establishing a draft and then arguing its behalf in the council)

Article 5: Mediation: The council can not force member states to agree, but if the states dispute is not concerned with either state independence, sovereignty, or territorial integrity and they ask for the Council to mediate the issue then the Council's decision will be effective and obligatory. If that case were to occur, the states involved could not participate in deliberation. Additionally the council can mediate a disagreement between member states or member states and a non-member states in order to conciliate them. These decisions will be reached by majority vote.

Article 6: War: If a member state is attacked, the Council can meet immediately to decide how to respond to the attack. The decision will be meet unanimously. If the aggressor is a member state then they will not count towards the unanimity. The Council can meet without the delegate present at the request of the delegate or another delegation.

Article 7: Resolutions: Unanimous votes will be binding on all states while majority votes will be binding on only the countries that voted for them. The states will be responsible for the implementation of those votes.

Article 8: Mutual Respect: No member state will act in a way to undermine the legitimacy and integrity of any other member state's government.

Article 9: Member State Treaties: Member states can establish their own pacts among themselves and those pacts past or future will not be binding on other member states.

Article 10: Headquarters: The permanent Head Quarters of the League shall be in Cairo, however the League may meet at any other location.

Article 11: Meetings: The Council will meet biannually in March and October and any other time that at-least two nations deem it necessary.

Article 12: Structure: The league will have a permanent General Secretariat comprised of a Secretary-General (GS) and other Assistant Secretaries and an 'adequate number of officials.' The GS will be appointed by the Council with a two-thirds majority vote. The assistants will be appointed by the GS and approved by the Council. The GS will be ranked Ambassador and have an internal organization established by the Council. The first GS will be designated in an annex to the Establishment Pact.

Article 13: Money: The GS shall prepare the budget and submit it to the Council prior to each fiscal year. The Council will determine each member-states dues and can revise them as it sees fit.

Article 14: Diplomatic Immunities: All the officials of the League will receive diplomatic privileges and immunities while in exercise of their duties.

Article 15: Chairmanship: The Egyptian Government shall convene at the first meeting but after that it will be the GS. Chairmanship in ordinary session will be rotated among the states.

Article 16: Administration: Majority rule shall be sufficient in: a) matters concerning officials; b) budget approval; c) the internal organization of the GS, Council and committees; and d) the termination of the sessions.

Article 17: External Treaties: all treaties shall be filed with the League.

Article 18: Membership Problems: One years notice shall be given in the event of withdrawing from the League and any member state not adhering to the Pact can be voted out of the league by unanimous vote.

Article 19: Amendments: The Pact can be amended with two-thirds majority as long as the amendments purpose is to strengthen the ties of member states, create an Arab Court of Justice and to regulate the relations of the League with international organizations that is designed to ‘guarantee security and peace.’ An amendment can only be voted in the session following its proposal. If a state does not approve of said amendment it can withdraw from the league at the onset of the amendment coming into effect without adhering to the previous Article.

Article 20: Ratification: Each state must ratify the Pact and its method must be filed with the League. It must be ratified within 15 days of the first four countries ratification. This Pact was written in Cairo on March 22nd 1945 in Arabic and deposited with the GS. A certified copy will be sent to each member state.

### ***2.2.2 Article Conflicts:***

As established above, the Charter of the Arab League is worth analysis for two main reasons. The first reason was to establish its vague and impotent nature. This is especially important in reference to the organizational design and structural intent discussed in Section 1.2.1 and is highlighted here by Solingen:

Article 5 prohibited the use of force to resolve disputes and proposed mediation. However, even unanimous decisions against aggressors would not be binding on disputes over states’ “independence, sovereignty or territorial integrity.” The Pact thus foreclosed

even the mildest forms of intervention in a crucial category of conflict. Article 8 codified nonintervention in domestic systems of government.<sup>47</sup>

The second was to observe the frequent transgressions of the articles. A compendious example follows.

Here are four examples of transgressions of the Establishment Charter, there are others, but these four exemplify the variety of Articles breached. In 1979 Egypt was expelled from the Arab League after signing the Camp David Accords (1978) that acknowledged the existence of Israel.<sup>48</sup> The Arab League saw this as conciliatory to the Israeli enemy and moved the headquarters from Cairo, Egypt to Tunis, Tunisia: a direct violation of Article 10 which asserts that the permanent headquarters of the Arab League would be in Cairo. Later, after diplomatic relations were reestablished with the AL and Egypt, a resolution was passed by the League to again name Cairo the official HQs. Interestingly, the resolution was passed concurrent with the transgression of another Article violation.

The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990 was in direct violation of Article 8 which establishes mutual respect among the member states and expressly prohibits any act that does not “respect the form of government obtaining in the other States of the League” and states that each member states will “pledge itself not to take any action tending to change that form.”<sup>49</sup> Additionally Article 5 concerning mediation was never allowed to be implemented because neither Kuwait nor Iraq approved of the sub-committee charged with the task. A third example, Article 11 has been violated multiple times as it stipulates bi-annual meetings (sometimes meetings are suddenly canceled or not held for years at a time). A fourth and final example, Article 8 was violated during 2006 when the UN was quicker to police inter-Arab malfeasance than the League itself. Section 4 of UNSCR 1680 points out:

4. Strongly encourages the Government of Syria to respond positively to the request made by the Government of Lebanon, in line with the agreements of the Lebanese national dialogue, to delineate their common border, especially in those areas where the border is uncertain or disputed and to establish full diplomatic relations and

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<sup>47</sup> Solingen, Etel. Pg. 279.

<sup>48</sup> Field, Michael. Pg. 70

<sup>49</sup> Establishment Pact of the Arab League. Established on March 22nd 1945. Retrieved on November 3rd, 2009 from [www.mideastweb.org/arableague.htm](http://www.mideastweb.org/arableague.htm)

representation, noting that such measures would constitute a significant step towards asserting Lebanon's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence and improving the relations between the two countries, thus contributing positively to the stability in the region, and urges both parties to make efforts through further bilateral dialogue to this end, bearing in mind that the establishment of diplomatic relations between States, and of permanent diplomatic missions, takes place by mutual consent;<sup>50</sup>

The UN resolution attempted to establish sovereign and territorial respect of Lebanon by Syria during the 2006 Lebanon War, both founding League members.

The transgressions however, may not be avoidable. When taking a cursory sample of other International and Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs) that were established in this region it quickly becomes apparent how very likely they are to fail. In stark contrast to Europe, the Arab world has seen very little formal integration, especially at the inter-state level.<sup>51</sup> As noted in an Economist article just this past summer, many 'regional acronyms have come and gone sometimes acrimoniously'<sup>52</sup>. The United Arab Republic (UAR), which Egypt and Syria formed in 1958, lasted only three years. Thanks to Saddam's invasion of Kuwait, the ACC (the Arab Co-operation Council of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and North Yemen) survived only a year after its birth in 1989. The Arab Maghreb Union has been a flop. The Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), consisting of Saudi Arabia and its five Gulf satellites, has fared better. But this and other projects have been held back by rivalries.<sup>53</sup>

Alternatively, a successful body in the region, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) is a noteworthy institution. It is composed of forty-five members with a ratified charter established in 1972. The OIC is suppose to hold summits tri-annually, have annual gatherings of ministers of foreign affairs and a GS to attend to current business.<sup>54</sup> In those ways it is somewhat similar to the Arab League, however where this body differs is in its core guiding principle. It has both in its charter and manifold activities: the consolidation of Islamic solidarity at state level.<sup>55</sup> In that, the AL and the OIC differ in intent and the clarity of that intent. It is any easier task to organize people around a common religion than a common set of ideals,

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<sup>50</sup> UNSC Resolution. [www.un.org/docs/sc/unsc\\_resolutions06.htm](http://www.un.org/docs/sc/unsc_resolutions06.htm)

<sup>51</sup> The world of the Arabs. Economist. Special Section. July 25th, 2009. Vol. 392. Pg. 4.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

<sup>54</sup> Landau, Jacob. The Politics of Pan-Islam Ideology and Organization. Clarendon Press. pg. 289.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

characteristics or goals. Because all can agree on the importance of the religion without necessarily agreeing on the specifics of it or its implementation. Furthermore, the muslim identity (at least not the Sunni sect<sup>56</sup>) does not carry with it the same shame as that of the national or cultural identities that have been embarrassed by failures in the region. Religion on the other hand is hard wired with the pride of God's absolution.

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<sup>56</sup> The Shiite sect of Islam annually celebrates the martyrdom of Imam Hussein (Mohammed's grandson) who sacrificed his life at the hands of Sunni Muslims in an attempt to regain the Muslim religion and set it on its path. The battle is a shame on the Shiite community, who did not come together, in affect leading to Imam Hussein's death.

## 2.3 Member States (with brief AL history)

*The 1970's... marked the beginning of the fourteenth century of the Hegira, a period of Islamic revival, purification, and strengthening, as at the onset of each new century. Indeed, in the next two decades an authentic cultural/religious revolution spread throughout Muslim lands, sometimes victorious, as in Iran, sometimes subdued, as in Egypt, sometimes triggering civil war, as in Algeria, sometimes formally acknowledged in the institutions of the state, as in the Sudan or Bangladesh, most times establishing an uneasy coexistence with a formally islamic nation-state, fully integrated in global capitalism, as in Saudi Arabia, Indonesia or Morocco.<sup>57</sup>*

The last half of a century has seen relative kindness, horrific difficulty and just about everything in between for the different twenty-two members of the Arab League. On one side of this spectrum there is the nation of Iraq: involved in multiple wars throughout the years and throughout the region, from Iran to Kuwait to two major domestic conflicts. On the other side of the spectrum there is the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia which has lived in relative peace and prosperity as guardian of the two most significant religious sites for the Muslim people (Mecca and Medina) and inheritor of billions of dollars of wealth in the form of oil revenue. The division of good and bad circumstance is even present within some of these countries as we have seen with Sudan: involved in one of the most awful and bloody genocidal conflicts in the north, compared with the most fertile and productive lands in the whole Arab region in the south. The circumstances for these twenty-two members are anything but shared, however it is perceived abroad and among them that they share much.

The original members were brought together with encouragement from the British just after the Second World War, concurrent with the United Nations establishment. The original seven member states of the Arab League were Egypt, Iraq, Jordan (then Transjordan), Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen. They signed the Establishment Pact in Cairo on March 22nd, 1945. Today there are twenty-two member states. Countries that joined later are: Algeria (1962), Bahrain (1971), Comoros (1993), Djibouti (1977), Kuwait (1961), Libya (1953), Mauritania (1973), Morocco (1958), Oman (1971), Qatar (1971), Somalia (1974), Southern Yemen (1967),

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<sup>57</sup> Castells, Manuel. *The Power of Identity*. Blackwell Publishing 2004. pg 14.

Sudan (1956), Tunisia (1958), and the United Arab Emirates (1971).<sup>58</sup> It was rumored that the three states that joined after the 1973 spike in oil prices did so in hope of aid that might flow as a result of that spike, considering their rather ‘doubtful Arab credentials’.<sup>59</sup>

Initially the AL focused on supporting independence movements against former colonial powers including France and even Great Britain.<sup>60</sup> After Israel’s establishment in 1948 and the subsequent Arab defeat, the AL focused on supporting Palestinian nationhood at all costs. In 1950 they established a mutual defense treaty. In the 1960s they worked to establish the Arab Common Market which was designed to facilitate inter-Arab trade, though in-fighting has kept this trading bloc far from realized.<sup>61</sup> In 1968 the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD) was established with the intent to help develop social and economic projects within the Arab world. Its headquarters was built in Kuwait instead of Cairo, mainly due to Kuwaiti funds. AFESD began to function in 1974 and played a very limited (almost non-existent) role in financing projects in the region.<sup>62</sup>

In 1964 the AL had its first Summit convened by Egypt’s president Nasir where it first established a Palestinian entity (the PLO) and then established a Palestinian Army.<sup>63</sup> However the complete, swift and public defeat in the 6-day war (1967) destroyed any illusions of Arab military might. This defeat, along with members establishing opposing alliances during the Cold War hampered the possibility of a unified Arab position. The region was further divided when Egypt made concessions in the form of recognition of Israel after the Yom Kippur War (1973) and the subsequent signing of the 1978 Camp David Accords. Egypt was expelled from membership for ‘abandoning the Palestinian cause’. It was later re-admitted in 1989, just in time for Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990.<sup>64</sup> A renewed sense of hope for Arab unity was quickly erased as “some countries supported Baghdad, while others supported the US-led efforts to force

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<sup>58</sup> The Arab League. Arab German Consulting. Retrieved on September 14th from <http://www.arab.de/arabinfo/league.htm>

<sup>59</sup> Field, Michael. Pg 7.

<sup>60</sup> Al Zohairy, Doha. Regional Crisis Hound Arab League. Al Jazeera. Retrieved on December 15th, 2009 from <http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/2009/03/200932210293629611.html>

<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

<sup>62</sup> Total Loans Committed, 1974-2008. AFESD webpage. Retrieved on December 13th, 2009 from [www.arabfund.org/ENINDEX.HTM](http://www.arabfund.org/ENINDEX.HTM)

<sup>63</sup> Background: Arab League and Arab League Summit. China View News website. Retrieved on December 13th, 2009 from [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-03/30/content\\_11101510.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-03/30/content_11101510.htm)

<sup>64</sup> Al Zohairy, Doha. Regional Crisis Hound Arab League. Al Jazeera. Retrieved on December 15th, 2009 from <http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/2009/03/200932210293629611.html>

Saddam Hussein to withdraw.”<sup>65</sup> Summits throughout the 1990s were almost non-existent. In an emergency summit held in October of 2000, the League representatives voted to make summits an annual event, held in the Spring. Each year since there has been a summit. During the onset of the 2003 Iraq war, Arab disunity was again on display which is outlined in Section 2.4.6.

### ***2.3.1 Empirical Assessment***

The AL is composed of twenty-two very circumstantially different member states. Common ground is difficult to reach for a multitude of reasons. In the following Section different attributes will be compared to elucidate the lack of situational commonality. However, that is not to say that other forms of unity can not be established beyond situational commonality. It is just important to fully expose the lack of common attributes or common political situations among the Arab League considering the perceptions of analogy. In addition it will show how different circumstances can cause disunity. What is more, because of this disunity they tend to face their problems alone.

In the following four tables multiple attributes of the different member states will be compared. Typology of government, religious composition, median age, population, population growth, national GDP, GDP per capita, main commodities exports and languages will all be compared. Tables 1, 2 and 3 are used to show clear differences in the various nations (arguably what sometimes seem like entirely different cultures), while Table 4 compares attributes that initially seem like similarities, but upon closer examination display a clear sign of deviation among the member states. Additionally, Tables 1, 2, and 4 list countries in order of their admittance into the Arab League, while Table 3 lists the countries in order of population as is relevant to the information relayed in the data.

#### ***2.3.1.a Structure of Governance***

There are many different governmental styles in the world today, many of which are on display in the Arab world. According to the CIA World Fact Book, the Arab League’s twenty-two members have a combined twelve different types of governments or a lack therein. Some of these different types are only present in the League and subsequently their own country. Among

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<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

two of the most interesting cases are Libya's *Jamahiriya* and Sudan's power share government that was established by the CPA in 2005 to halt the civil wars between North and South Sudan.<sup>66</sup> The hopes of the CPA have only become more ill-fated with the emergence of genocide in the country's western region of Darfur in 2003. This displaced nearly two million people and caused an estimated 200,000 to 400,000 deaths.

There are also examples of non-governments. Palestine being an easy example, but Somalia as well. After the Somali regime collapsed in 1991, the northern clans tried to secede and were even successful to create a parliament with elections. However much civil and regional fighting has caused the UN and neighbors to intervene. After much work in 2004, the TFG was established as an interim ruling authority with five years to create a new Somali constitution and transition to a representative government with elections. It has since asked for more time but appears to be making progress towards its new goal of 2011.

However, they are not all unique cases and conversely not all the unique governing structures are ineffective. Some of the not so unique are the republics and monarchies. As Figure 2.3.1.a points out, the most prevalent government type in the region is that of republic, boasting seven countries, followed by constitutional monarchies with three. One of the more interesting governing structures is the UAE with its federation of emirates. Alternatively, there is a consensus of religion in the region, which is also fundamentally important to methods of governance. The Islamic faith plays a key role in the region.

Figure 2.3.1.a: Member State Governments and Religious Composition

	<b>Government Type</b>	<b>Religion</b>
<b>Egypt</b>	republic	90% Muslim (mostly Sunni), 9% Coptic
<b>Iraq</b>	parliamentary democracy	97% Muslim (Shia 60-65%, Sunni 32-37%)
<b>Jordan</b>	constitutional monarchy	92% Sunni Muslim, 6% Christian
<b>Lebanon</b>	republic	59.7% Muslim (Shia, Sunni, etc.) 39% Christian
<b>Saudi Arabia</b>	monarchy	100% Muslim
<b>Syria</b>	republic under an authoritarian military dominated regime	74% Sunni Muslim, 16% other Muslim, 10% Christian
<b>Yemen</b>	republic	99% Muslim (55% Sunni, 42% Shia)*

<sup>66</sup> Jamahiriya is a theocratic governing system created by Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi.

<b>Sudan</b>	3 Part Power sharing government established by the CPA (GNU, NCP, SPLM)	70% Sunni Muslim, 5% Christian, 25% indigenous beliefs
<b>Libya</b>	Jamahiriya (theocracy) governed by the people local councils- AUTHORITARIAN state	97% Sunni Muslim
<b>Morocco</b>	constitutional monarchy	98.7% Muslim, 1.1% Christian
<b>Tunisia</b>	republic	98% Muslim, 1% Christian
<b>Kuwait</b>	constitutional emirate	85% Muslim (70% Sunni, 30% Shia) 15% Christian
<b>Algeria</b>	republic	99% Sunni Muslim, 1% Christian and Jewish
<b>Bahrain</b>	constitutional monarchy	81% Muslim (Shia & Sunni), 10% Christian
<b>Qatar</b>	emirate	77.5 % Muslim, 8.5% Christian
<b>Oman</b>	monarchy	75% Ibadhi Muslim, 25% other Muslim
<b>UA Emirates</b>	federation	80% Sunni, 16% Shia, 4% Christian & Hindu
<b>Mauritania</b>	military junta	100% Muslim
<b>Somalia</b>	transitional	100% Sunni Muslim
<b>Palestine</b>	NA	Sunni Muslim
<b>Djibouti</b>	republic	94% Muslim, 6% Christian
<b>Comoros</b>	republic	98% Sunni Muslim, 2% Roman Catholic

Information from CIA World Factbook<sup>67</sup> (\*-alternate source<sup>68</sup>)

The secular state is blasphemous to a wholly devout muslim. So the secular notion of a separation of religion and government is not an altogether popular idea. Considering then that such a large population of the Arab League is muslim, it is a surprise that there are as many republics as there are and not more theocracies. It would seem that the frequency of republics is attributed to some other characteristic, possibly the legacy of colonialism. That is not to say that republics are necessarily incongruent with Islam, however republics trust men where a theocracy could be wholly established on the will of god as it was revealed to the prophet Mohammed and thus have stronger fortifications to the shifting wills or whims of the people. Having said that, the religious trend of the Arab League is not surprisingly Muslim. With only Lebanon having less than a sixty percent Muslim majority, and not by much, the Arab League is mainly comprised of Sunni-Muslims. Of the fourteen members whose data differentiated a sect of Islam, only Iraq and Oman had countries with a higher majority of non-Sunni muslims. This is

<sup>67</sup> CIA World Factbook. Retrieved on September 24th from [www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/](http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/)

<sup>68</sup> Only Exception to CIA World Factbook. Nationmaster website. Middle East- Yemen- Religion. Retrieved on September 24th 2009 from [www.nationmaster.com/country/ym-yemen/rel-religion](http://www.nationmaster.com/country/ym-yemen/rel-religion)

not surprising though considering that the majority of Muslims in the world are Sunni with estimates ranging from sixty-five to eighty-five percent in favor of Sunnis.<sup>69</sup> However, the fact that Islam purports to be a total system, it will always trump the will of a nation (in policy, laws or wars) to the devout. In addition to the theories for establishing governance, the personage plays a key role in regional and domestic function.

### **2.3.1.b Population Demographics**

The nature and size of a nation's populace also plays a key role in defining its character. Table 2.3.1.b is concerned with the disparity in population sizes, demographic statistics and trends. The size of a country's population has a large effect on how it operates. The difference of population sizes among Arab League members is substantial. Ranging from as small as three quarters of a million people in the island cluster of Comoros to the ancient and empiric Egypt with well over eighty million, there are remarkably diverse population sizes.

Figure 2.3.1.b: Member State Populations, Age and Growth Rate

	<b>Population</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>Growth Rate</b>
<b>Egypt</b>	83082869	24.8	1.64
<b>Iraq</b>	28945657	20.4	2.51
<b>Jordan</b>	6342948	24.3	2.26
<b>Lebanon</b>	4017095	29.3	1.107
<b>Saudi Arabia</b>	28686633	21.6	1.848
<b>Syria</b>	20178485	21.7	2.129
<b>Yemen</b>	23822783	16.8	3.453
<b>Sudan</b>	41087825	19.1	2.143
<b>Libya</b>	6310434	23.9	2.17
<b>Morocco</b>	34859364	25	1.479
<b>Tunisia</b>	10486339	29.2	0.98
<b>Kuwait</b>	2691158	26.2	3.547
<b>Algeria</b>	34178188	26.6	1.196
<b>Bahrain</b>	727785	30.1	1.285
<b>Qatar</b>	833285	30.8	0.957
<b>Oman</b>	3418085	18.8	3.138
<b>UA Emirates</b>	4798491	30.1	3.689
<b>Mauritania</b>	3129486	19.2	2.399
<b>Somalia</b>	9832017	17.5	2.815

<sup>69</sup> Nationmaster website. Islam statistics. [www.nationmaster.com/cat/rel-religion](http://www.nationmaster.com/cat/rel-religion)

<b>Palestine</b>	NA	NA	NA
<b>Djibouti</b>	516055	18.1	NA
<b>Comoros</b>	752438	18.8	2.766

Information from CIA World Factbook<sup>70</sup>

The population size of a country affects its economy and is at the crux of most all government realities and decisions. It is crucial in rural and urban planning and development. Additionally, the population's demographics and trends can be equally important in defining its nature and direction. If the country is comprised of a mean age over sixty or under twenty-five it will be entirely different. Furthermore, it will need much different types and levels of assistance from the government. The two hypothetical demographics present differences in psychological and physiological make up and as a result would engage in nationhood, government and society much differently.

Developmental Psychologists assert that there are different phases or stages in life and that they have corresponding characteristics. Interestingly, all of the demographic statistics provided indicate that almost all AL countries are in either the 'early adolescent stage' of development and into the 'later adolescent stage'.<sup>71</sup> The early adolescent stage is generally defined as exhibiting expressions of rebellion and identity seeking.<sup>72</sup> The later adolescent stage is characterized by further attempts to establish an identity and attempts to form meaningful relationships.<sup>73</sup> These stages are both marked by instability. But, beyond Developmental Psychology, immaturity simply begets rash and impetuous interaction with the world. And the citizens of the Arab region are young.

Beyond the behavioral aspects of a young citizenry, there is the susceptibility to large-scale unemployment (as will be represented in the next section pertaining to Algeria). This is because of a large disparity between the demand and supply of work. In addition, that labor is either unskilled or inexperienced. Compound this with the fact that many of the main industries in the

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<sup>70</sup> CIA World Factbook. Retrieved on September 24th from [www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/](http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/)

<sup>71</sup> Newman, Barbara & Phillip. Development Through Life: A Psychosocial Approach. Wadsworth Cengage Learning. 2008.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid. Pg. 316

<sup>73</sup> Ibid. Pg. 364

region (Table 3) concern exporting raw materials (outside of the League) to be refined at factories in other countries, shipping possible jobs along with them.

It is no mystery why unemployment would cause civil unrest and poverty but what is also a factor here is the vibrance and vitality of a young populace who is economically burdened and in need of ‘identity formulation’.<sup>74</sup> What kind of identity can be formed of vitality and desperation? What about the future of these countries?

Population growth rate is an indicator of where a country is going. A composite of migration statistics and birth/death ratio, the growth rates for these countries show a significant disparity among them.<sup>75</sup> Rises in these statistics can be attributed to a heavy flow of immigration or to a sharp rise in the birth rate. Because of this, it is not only important how high or low the statistics are, but why they are where they are. A high inflow in immigration is definitely at work in countries like UAE and Kuwait where the employment market, until the global economic downturn, had been highly productive. However the high growth rate in Somalia is not the result of financial opportunities but rather due to a very high increase in the birth rate, which is currently listed as the seventh highest birth rate in the world.<sup>76</sup> The United Arab Emirates and Somalia both have high growth rates but they are going to have to make very different decisions as a nation to deal with their changing populations (or suffer the consequences of doing nothing). As was asserted before, these twenty-two different members of the Arab League all have their own needs and circumstances. As it seems here despite the similar statistical value, the UAE and Somalia have very different circumstances within their respective countries. I would argue that in many ways they share little more than the moniker ‘Arab’.

### ***2.3.1.c Economic Considerations***

To further highlight the vast differences in circumstance that UAE and Somalia were an example of, Table 3 is a grouping of statistics on The League member’s population, GDP and GDP per

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<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>75</sup> The growth rate (as defined by the CIA World Factbook) is a factor in determining how great a burden would be imposed on a country by the changing needs of its people for infrastructure (e.g., schools, hospitals, housing, roads), resources (e.g., food, water, electricity), and jobs. Rapid population growth can be seen as threatening by neighboring countries.

<sup>76</sup> CIA World Factbook. Somalia: People: Birth Rate. Retrieved on September 27th 2009 from [www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html](http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html)

capita. It exhibits the inequality that exists between the states in this region, most of which is created by oil wealth. As the table flows top to bottom in descending order of population size the GDP noticeably spikes five times. Those spikes are Algeria, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Qatar. These five countries' highest commodities export, not unlike many other countries in this region, is some form of hydrocarbons. However, the pertinent detail is in the different amounts. These five countries are all either in the top 10 of oil production or natural gas production.<sup>77</sup> If one were to do a Gini coefficient comparison of the region we would see a very unequal Arab League. With such disparity of wealth, the Arab League countries have one less thing in common. However, one thing that makes this disparity a bit hollow is the fact that, as was pointed out, the wealth was achieved because of territorial assets and not secondary industry like refining or manufacturing. In that sense they are the beneficiaries of local raw materials with high external values. Because of this they have not had to change their country or culture dramatically to assimilate to external demands for success. This is important for two reasons: the first is that it creates a division with the outside world (namely the industrialized world) in respect to the internal structures of labor and subsistence; and secondly the management of that financial gain can be a good indicator of national planning techniques.

Some countries (The UAE & Saudi Arabia) have made strides to diversify their markets to remain competitive in a world without high oil prices. The UAE has pursued diversification in areas such as aviation, port facilities, tourism, finance and telecommunications.<sup>78</sup> They have also increased integration through the pursuit of various trade and investment agreements within the Gulf region and with the rest of the world. In addition, the UAE has established free trade zones wherein foreign companies are allowed one hundred percent ownership.<sup>79</sup>

Kuwait and Algeria are on the other end of this spectrum. With Algeria's lack of diversification having much to do with government red tape<sup>80</sup> and Kuwait's lack of diversification, according to Ahmed Al-Kawaz, rooted in a failure to exploit globalization and multilateral trade agreements<sup>81</sup>.

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<sup>77</sup> The CIA World Factbook.

<sup>78</sup> World Bank Praises UAE Diversification. The Emirates Economist. April 25 2005. Retrieved November 21st 2009 from [www.gulfnews.com/Articles/BusinessNF.asp?ArticleID=161873](http://www.gulfnews.com/Articles/BusinessNF.asp?ArticleID=161873)

<sup>79</sup> Ibid.

<sup>80</sup> Chikhi, Lamine. Imports, Red Tape Stifle Algeria Diversification. Reuters Online US Edition. News & Markets. April 6th, 2009. Retrieved on November 22nd, 2009 from [www.reuters.com/article/idUSL2193638](http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL2193638)

<sup>81</sup> Al-Kawaz, Ahmed. Economic Diversification: The Case of Kuwait with Reference to Oil Producing Countries. Journal of Economic Cooperation Among Islamic Countries, July 2008

His article is very thorough and he goes on to say that Kuwait's economy is 'characterized by economic concentration phenomenon rather than diversification'<sup>82</sup>. He concludes by offering policy recommendations for pursuing diversification.

Algeria, on the other hand, shifted from a more centralized economic planning system in the 1990's, but "bureaucratic foot-dragging, antiquated banking and poor training have forced non-oil industries into a steady decline"<sup>83</sup>. In the article written by Lamine Chikhi, Algerian metal fittings and cutlery factory worker Fertas Salah says, "the demand is huge, but we can't respond because we are not investing," in order to compete with the Chinese rivals. Fertas is the general manager of the state-owned Saniak plant 280 km (175 miles) east of Algiers. He goes on to say, "Our equipment is aged -- the government hasn't bought any since 1994." He claims that this is condemning Algeria's young men to idleness which is substantiated by a twelve percent unemployment rate (at the time of the interview), rising to seventy percent among the young<sup>84</sup>.

Figure 2.3.1.c: Population & Gross Domestic Product.<sup>85</sup>

	Population, m	GDP, \$bn	GDP per per person \$' 000
EGYPT	76.5	188	2.5
SUDAN	39.1	52	1.3
ALGERIA	35.3	129	3.6
MOROCCO	31.9	85	2.7
IRAQ	31.2	69	2.2
SAUDI ARABIA	25.5	370	14.7
YEMEN	23.9	29	1.2
SYRIA	20.4	53	2.6
TUNISIA	10.4	40	3.8
SOMALIA*	8.5	na	na
LIBYA	6.3	63	9.9
JORDAN	5.9	22	3.6
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	4.9	215	43.9
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES	3.9	6	1.7
LEBANON	3.8	31	8.1
KUWAIT	3.5	106	30.0
MAURITANIA	3.1	3	1.0
BAHRAIN	2.8	43	15.0

<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

<sup>83</sup> Chikhi, Lamine. Imports, Red Tape Stifle Algeria Diversification.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid.

<sup>85</sup> The World of the Arabs. Economist. Special Section. July 25th 2009. Vol. 392. Pg. 4.

OMAN	2.8	43	15.0
QATAR	1.2	100	81.9
DJIBOUTI	0.8	1	1.4
COMOROS	0.7	0.5	0.8

Sources: IMF estimates; Economist Intelligence Unit

Even the IMF (source for Table 3 data) agrees with Fertas' assessment of Algeria, as was made clear by a public information notice put out in February of 2009 which asserts that, "sustained efforts are needed to diversify the economy and reduce dependence on the hydrocarbon sector, improve productivity and the business climate"<sup>86</sup>.

The circumstances are varied among the Arab League member states, as are the approaches to these different national blessings and burdens. However they do have certain things that make them notably Arab and one of those as we pointed out earlier was their language.

### ***2.3.1.d Commonalities***

As Table 4 points out, all of the member states, barring Somalia and Djibouti (both members with 'shaky arab credentials'), have Arabic as their official language. But that has already been established. What is important here is to notice all the different languages that are either official, secondary or tertiary languages. Colonialism is immediately present: English nine times; French six times and Italian twice. There are a number of indigenous languages present and even hybrids such as Comoros' Snikomoro, which is a blend of Swahili and Arabic. Each language represents at least one subculture. There is a different array of languages from central Asia in Urdu, Farsi and Persian to Kurdish and Armenian in the north and many different African languages. The subcultures represented here have extremely varied histories and customs, easily as much or more so than any other IGO excepting the UN. This is important in again pointing out the lack of substantiated identity commonality among the League members' different subcultures. Though cultural commonality is not the only factor for a unified IGO. The other commonality displayed in Table 4 is the reliance on hydrocarbons as an export.

### Figure 2.3.1.d: Commonalities: Exports and Languages

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<sup>86</sup> Chikhi, Lamine. Imports, Red Tape Stifle Algeria Diversification.

	<b>Main Commodities Exports</b>	<b>Languages</b>
<b>Egypt</b>	crude oil & petroleum, cotton	Arabic, English & French
<b>Iraq</b>	crude oil 84%, non-fuel crude materials 8%	Arabic, Kurdish
<b>Jordan</b>	clothing, fertilizers, potash, phosphates	Arabic, English
<b>Lebanon</b>	petroleum products, cars, medicinal products, clothing	Arabic, French, English, Armenian
<b>Saudi Arabia</b>	petroleum and petroleum products	Arabic
<b>Syria</b>	crude oil, minerals, petroleum products, fruits and vegetables	Arabic, Kurdish, Armenian, Aramaic
<b>Yemen</b>	crude oil, coffee, dried and salted fish	Arabic
<b>Sudan</b>	oil and petroleum products, cotton, sesame, livestock	Arabic & English
<b>Libya</b>	crude oil, machinery, semi-finished goods, food	Arabic, Italian, English
<b>Morocco</b>	clothing and textiles, electric components, inorganic chemicals	Arabic, Berber, French
<b>Tunisia</b>	clothing, semi-finished good & textiles, agricultural products, hydrocarbons, mech. goods	Arabic, French
<b>Kuwait</b>	oil and refined products, fertilizers	Arabic, English
<b>Algeria</b>	crude oil & petroleum products	Arabic, French
<b>Bahrain</b>	petroleum and petroleum products, aluminum, textiles	Arabic, English, Farsi & Urdu
<b>Qatar</b>	liquified natural gas, petroleum products, fertilizers and steel	Arabic, English
<b>Oman</b>	petroleum, reexports, fish, metals, textiles	Arabic, English, Baluchi, Urdu
<b>UA Emirates</b>	crude oil, natural gas, reexports, dried fish, dates	Arabic, Persian, English
<b>Mauritania</b>	Iron ore, fish, gold, copper, petroleum	Arabic, Pulaar, Soninke, Wolof
<b>Somalia</b>	livestock, bananas, hides, fish, charcoal, scrap metal	Somali, Arabic, Italian, English
<b>Palestine</b>	NA	NA
<b>Djibouti</b>	foods, beverage transport equipment, chemicals, petroleum products	French, Arabic, Somali, Afar
<b>Comoros</b>	rice, food, consumer goods, petroleum products, cement, trans. equipment	Arabic, French, Snikomoro

Information from CIA World Factbook<sup>87</sup>

Of the twenty-one assessable member states, fourteen have some form of hydrocarbons as their chief export commodity with only three members not having it listed as a top export. Hydrocarbon exports is one of the main economic exports for the overwhelming majority of League members, but similarity in exports does not transfer to political unity. Furthermore, as will be seen in the following section concerning AL conflicts the high priced nature of this commodity has resulted in war (Iraqi invasion of Kuwait) among the Arab League's own

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<sup>87</sup> CIA World Factbook.

members. The Arab League has some commonality that it can build on, but as of yet it has not transferred to a well functioning Arab League.

### ***2.3.2 Section Summary***

The member states of the Arab League differ in terms of both simple quantifiable statistics and more notably vested interests abroad and domestically. Simply put, the twenty-two different member states have different needs and circumstances.

In the preceding four tables many different attributes of the member states were compared. Typology of government, religious composition, median age, population, population growth, national GDP, GDP per capita, main commodities exported and languages were all compared. Tables 1, 2 and 3 showed clear differences in these nations, even to the extent that they were revealed to be different sub-cultures under the moniker ‘Arab’.

Table 1 pointed out the lack of structural similarities among the governing styles with the twenty-two member states. The trend of islamic unity was also scrutinized for being ‘non-secular’, which relegates government to the whims of theistic inspection and approval. Table 2 exhibited both the present and the future of these separate member state demographics and posed the question do Somalia’s seventeen year old (mean age) parents of the seventh largest birth rate have much in common with the people of the UAE, or the Berber people of Magreb (Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria) or the Saudis? Table 3 was used to display the enormous disparity of wealth among the countries. The roots of GDP disparity were assessed as well as the different member state’s approaches to dealing with that wealth. It was thus revealed that not only are there disparities of wealth but also very different approaches to wealth management among the different League members, with reference to UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Algeria. Table 4 then displayed not only how even the characteristics that the member states do have in common are simply masks of unity hiding a myriad of subcultural identities and backgrounds (language) but also how certain commonalities (hydrocarbon exports) have been the source of war for profit and not unity.

### ***2.3.3 Implications and Polemic Debate***

While there is no doubt that an Arab identity exists, just what does it really stand for? And how productive has it been at creating a sense of unity that goes beyond colloquial interaction into the realm of effective and productive regional leadership? That is to say, does the feel good nature of being ‘Arab’ transfer to results of consequence for the different regions, countries and citizens under its organizational umbrella the Arab League? Furthermore are there any impediments that the ‘Arab’ moniker creates to good governance and unity? This is not an altogether new quandary as Roger Owen points out:

The fact that the vast majority of newly independent states contained largely Arab-speaking populations and that they consciously identified themselves as Arab has played a major role in 20th century Middle Eastern politics. But attempts to try to define this role and to work out whether the practice of intra-Arab state relations differ markedly from that between other groups of states in, say, Latin America or East Asia, have not proved markedly successful. For one thing, much of the writing on the subject has always been highly political and concerned to make polemical rather than academic points.<sup>88</sup>

Owens goes beyond the question of whether this perceived attribute makes inter-regional relations more productive to remark on the lack of successful attempts to define this effect and its regional affect. What Owen brings up is very important for the assessment of what he refers to as ‘intra-Arab state relations’. He asserts that attempts to distinguish Arab unions from other regional unions have been highly unsuccessful due, in part, to the ‘polemic rather than academic’ nature of its assessment. Landau, in his book The Politics of Pan-Islam, points out the role that post World War II independence played in this debate. With such a large number of newly established independent Muslim states, spanning the Middle East and North Africa (South and South-East Asia as well) there was a rebirth of the ancient goal of Pan-Islam or the *umma*.<sup>89</sup> However this was curtailed by other interests, namely national and local. “Nationalism competed increasingly with Islam, in the altered circumstances of nation states concerned with their own specific problems and interests, frequently incompatible with those pertaining to a universal concept of Islamic unity and union.”<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>88</sup> Owen, Roger. Pg 81.

<sup>89</sup> The umma is a united islamic society and governance structure. It is theoretical.

<sup>90</sup> Owen, Roger. Pg 81.

Landau goes on to exemplify the many conflicting voices on the subject: some believing that nationalism could lead to Pan-Islam and others believing that it was an obstacle to it, even that it was a tool of colonialism.<sup>91</sup> Since the establishment of states in the region was the result of colonialism, it is not hard to argue that nationalism is a result of colonialism (however the extent to which the creation of nations in the relinquishing of colonial power was avoidable is debatable). Though one thing is clear: with this new opportunity of independent Arab states came a new struggle for priorities. The debate was muddy and little progress, if any, was made.

But the original question remains: why does Arabism generate such acrimonious rather than academic assessment? I would argue that it is two fold: the unity, infallibility and necessity of Islam to the devout Muslim (coupled with the debate on how to get there i.e. Pan-Islam) and the ‘non-identity identity’ among the Arabs based more on a *feeling* than any set of actual shared circumstances.

In his book, Islam in Foreign Policy, Adeed Dawisha outlines the effect that Islam can have on the international dealings of muslim countries. He writes, “Islam, unlike Christianity, does not prescribe the separation of religion from politics. Indeed, devout Muslims argue that Islam is a complete social, political, legal and cultural system.”<sup>92</sup> Given that Islam as a ‘complete system’, there is little room for conflicting, non-muslim ideas in formulating policy decisions (in the eyes of the devout). Dawisha continues, “In the shari’a, the Muslims have a law that deals with all constitutional and legal matters, and as such is treated, in strict Islamic theory, as the only legally acceptable code.”<sup>93</sup> For the devout muslim it is the only acceptable legal code. So the shari’a (translated as ‘the way’) is unquestionably the path and is infallible. With such a concise affirmation of right, there leaves no room for academic scrutiny, (at-least for the devout). As was said earlier, it would be almost blasphemous to have academic discourse concerning matters that may contradict the path as defined by the shari’a. So there is a religious precept, a pattern or blueprint for polemics rather than scholastic interpretations woven into the fibers of the devout muslim identity. “To the devout Muslim, there can be only one legitimate rule, and that is through Islam, and there can be no disjunction between political and religious discourse.”<sup>94</sup> The way has been defined and is static in its righteousness but not necessarily in its interpretation.

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<sup>91</sup> Ibid- Maududi

<sup>92</sup> Dawisha, Adeed. Islam in Foreign Policy. Cambridge Univesity Press. 1983. pg. 3.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid.

There are multiple interpretations of Islam, like all other religions: Islam is the way, but which Islam is Islam? “The historical, social and economic differences existing between the various Muslim countries have given Islam ‘a different coloring’, a different resonance in each of them; so that even groups with ostensibly similar programs find themselves playing a different political role.”<sup>95</sup> The identity is Muslim (as the Annual Arab Survey pointed out) but what defines that is confused among its members. As Dawisha puts it, “there still exists an ideological force called Islam that has a symbolic value, ranging from nebulous to significant, among people who call themselves Muslims.”<sup>96</sup>

The identity of Arab has even less to stand on. The historical accomplishments of the people that compose the Arab region cannot be denied. However, as was established in the preceding tables, the commonalities of the ‘Arab’ people are much harder to establish today. Even those that do have clear similarities such as Sunni Islam and high levels of hydrocarbon exports have aspects (conflicting definitions of Islam and deviations in the approaches to wealth management) that detract from those commonalities. However, as was pointed out in the first section, Salzman’s concept of ‘balanced opposition’ could be used to explain this phenomenon. He writes:

Many Middle Easterners are led by the frame of ‘balanced opposition’ to focus more on who their enemies are—whether another lineage, another tribe, a different Islamic persuasion, or despised infidels— than what possible commonalities they have with their alleged enemies and what benefits might accrue from cooperation by building on those **commonalities**. With mobilizing against alleged enemies the highest priority, what falls by the wayside is serious attention to the needs and desires of one’s own people, to people’s potential and its effective development.<sup>97</sup>

If Salzman’s assertions are correct, and they offer plausible explanation here, then there appears to be a cultural commonality after all. The commonality of ‘balanced opposition’ could create a sense of unity where there is none, but only in situational opposition, not ideological. Then, it could be argued that the oppositional void could be filled by anything. Perhaps a western

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<sup>95</sup> Ibid. pg. 4.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid.

<sup>97</sup> Salzman, Pg. 842.

political system (as put forth by Maududi), an Israeli & Western military threat, or one of numerous other things, but it must be present for the theory to explain the 'non-identity identity'.

The impenetrable and infallible Islamic identity (theoretical) and the misplaced *feeling* of Arab unity create a vacuum for academic policy discussion, and lead instead to a polemic debate. These are clear impediments to good governance and question the foundations of Arab unity. The murky arab identity exposed by the lack of shared circumstances and the lack of academic debate is not the only problem that the region faces. Other issues plague the region, namely military conflicts. The wars and events that the Arab League has had to deal with during its sixty year history have been more than enough to render any regional body hopeless.

## 2.4 Conflicts

According to the Policy Research Report put out in 2003 by the World Bank, "The Middle East and North Africa region has had a stable and high incidence of civil war since the late 1960s" (Figure 2.4.a in Figures Section).<sup>98</sup> Comparatively speaking, the region's thirty percent peak in the late 1980s and early 1990s shows a higher spike than any other of the regions recorded except South and East Asia in Oceania in the middle of the 1990s. (The other regions recorded were: Latin America & the Caribbean; East Europe & Central Asia; and Sub-Saharan Africa. Graphs depicting the incidence of civil war in all of these regions are in the Figures Section: Figures 2.4b-e) In addition to civil war, the Arab region has witnessed a multitude of other forms of conflict ranging from bloodless coups (Libya in 1969 and Qatar in 1995) to full scale international warfare, as was on display during the Iran-Iraq War during the 1980s (claiming the lives of over half a million people). This high level of conflict has had a profound effect on the region and on the Arab League.

The Center for Systematic Peace (CSP) established a data set spanning the duration from the end of the Second World War to the present date, compiling statistics on "major episodes of political violence"<sup>99</sup>. According to the CSP, "major episodes of political violence" involve at least 500 "directly-related" fatalities and reach a level of intensity in which political violence is both


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<sup>98</sup> Collier, Paul. *Breaking The Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*. World Bank & Oxford University Press. 2003. Pg. 114

<sup>99</sup> Marshall, Monty G. *Major Episodes of Political Violence 1946-2009*. Center for Systemic Peace. Retrieved on November 13th, 2009 from [www.systemicpeace.org/warlist.htm](http://www.systemicpeace.org/warlist.htm)

systematic and sustained (a base rate of 100 "directly-related deaths per annum"). Episodes may be of any general type: inter-state, intrastate, or communal; they include all episodes of international, civil, ethnic, communal, and genocidal violence and warfare.<sup>100</sup>

Figure 2.4.f



Using CSP's data set, *Major Episodes of Political Violence (1946-2009)*, with supporting information from the CIA World Fact-book, four types of conflict will be assessed within the Arab region. Civil Conflicts, Outer-Organizational Conflicts-Solitary (OOCs), Outer-Organizational Conflicts-Cooperative (OOCc) and Inter-Organizational Conflicts (IOC) will be the typologies discussed. Civil Conflicts being anything that happens domestically (including coups, civil war, domestic attacks of dissident groups, etc...). Outer-Organizational Conflict being between one (solitary) or many member states (cooperative) and the outside world. Inter-

<sup>100</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>101</sup> Center for Systemic Peace. Retrieved on December 14th, 2009 from [www.systemicpeace.org/warlist.htm](http://www.systemicpeace.org/warlist.htm)

Organizational conflicts occur among members of the Arab League. These different types of conflict affect the member states of the Arab League and surrounding region very differently. In that regard they are assessed independently in terms of their frequency and their ramifications. The two tables created based on these specific findings using the CSP are in the Figures Section marked Figures 2.4.h and 2.4.i.

According to the data retrieved from the CSP (and additional data on Libya from the CIA World Fact-book), Since the end of the Second World War, Arab League countries have been involved in a total of fifty-three conflicts (not including the over twenty coups in Comoros which was exempted from the data, due in part to its numerous coups). Some of these conflicts were questionably one type or the other and they are as follows: the Palestinian-Israeli conflict that has been fully waged since (according to the CSP) 1965 and taken roughly twenty one thousand five hundred lives (it will be referenced as OOCS because of the other-- and separate-- clear examples of neighbor countries intervention); the Jordanian civil conflict against the Palestinians in 1970 was at one point a quasi-united Palestinian guerilla campaign with a complicit Jordan sheltering the guerillas until the Jordanians cracked down on the lawless rebels resulting in the period known as Black September (it is listed as a civil disagreement here); and also the PLO faction fighting in 1978 could be seen as a Lebanon-Israeli conflict but since the PLO and Lebanon fought against Israel it will be regarded as an OOCC; the First Lebanon War in 1982 and the Second Lebanon War in 2006 will also be treated as OOCC because of Israel targeting Palestinian militant groups who engaged in reprisal attacks but the targeting of Lebanon creating Lebanese involvement. Since Palestine has no country it cannot have a military, but organizations like the PLO, Hamas and more recently Hezbollah have attempted to give protection to the Palestinian people and even civil order in the way of public works projects.<sup>102</sup> Since most events involving Palestinian militant groups could be either OOCS or OOCC it is worth noting the distinctions made above.

### ***2.4.1 Civil Conflict***

The bulk of the conflicts were Civil disputes, totaling thirty. Starting with Algeria's rebellion in 1946-7, then to Nasser's Coup in Egypt in 1952, all the way until the Southern Sudanese

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<sup>102</sup> Shatz, Adam. In Search of Hezbollah. The New York Review of Books. April 29th, 2004. Retrieved on December 13th, 2009 from [www.nybooks.com/articles/17060](http://www.nybooks.com/articles/17060)

communal violence pitting the Lou-Nuer against the Murle in 2008-9, the region has seen much domestic conflict. “Most wars are now civil wars” points out Paul Collier in the World Bank Study, *The Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*. “Even though international wars attract enormous global attention, they have become infrequent and brief.” “Civil wars usually attract less attention, but they have become increasingly common and typically go on for years.”<sup>103</sup> This being the case it is not surprising that the majority of conflicts in the Arab region are domestic. Clearly civil wars cause substantial problems during the war years and because the wars are much more isolated they tend to go on for much longer. They deteriorate society’s infrastructure and often times spillover into neighboring regions. Civil wars also leave a very unstable wake for countries attempting to pursue peace. One specific legacy of war is the military lobby as Collier points out:

During wars military spending obviously rises, and during the typical civil war the military budget increases by nearly 50 percent. Reducing this spending in the early post conflict period is not easy. There is often a widespread awareness of continued risks of conflict, and as with any powerful lobby, the military will be reluctant to see its budget cut. Furthermore, the government sometimes needs to integrate rebel forces into the army, which creates pressures for expansion.<sup>104</sup>

The aftermath of a civil war creates special circumstances, one of which being the need to integrate rebel factions and militias into the regular forces. Additional circumstances especially unique to civil war conflicts are localized distrust and external networks of reliance (that in the pursuit of peace need to be localized) and residual hatreds of other factions or identities. As opposed to externally fought wars or wars fought against foreign fighters, the enemy combatant can be vilified without disruption to daily life, civil wars however can pit neighbor against neighbor thus making reunification that much more difficult. Collier and company get at this point in their report and insist that the likelihood for war after a war has been fought is much greater than even the period just preceding the outbreak of war.<sup>105</sup> Additionally one of the legacies of a civil war is ‘population displacement’<sup>106</sup>. While wars fought on an international level create displaced persons, civil war is frequently due to ethnic tensions and started locally. Because of this the need to flee ethnic violence creates more refugees and IDPs. Ethnic violence

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<sup>103</sup> Collier, Paul. Pg. 87.

<sup>104</sup> Collier, Paul. Pg. 86.

<sup>105</sup> Collier, Paul. Ibid. Pg. 83.

<sup>106</sup> Collier, Paul. Ibid. Pg 17.

was directly responsible for eight of the twenty-nine civil conflicts recorded by the CSP among League members and indirectly responsible for others. As an example of the lasting effects of conflict, Sudan, which was the location of an ethnic civil war waged from 1956 to 1972 that was responsible for half a million deaths is now again dealing with the toils of war in its western region of Darfur.

An equal amount of the civil disputes (nine- equal to the number of ethnic conflicts) were rebellions against reigning governments (defining rebellions as attempts to forcibly overthrow the government). Rebellions at the least undermine the legitimacy of a ruling authority and at the most undermine all of the institutions left in place by the vanquished regime. In either case, the governance is severely hindered and subverted causing temporary to sustained breakdowns in institutional and bureaucratic function.

#### ***2.4.2 Outer-Organizational Conflict- Solitary***

Similar to the rebellions against reigning local government is rebellion to gain independence from exterior powers. Colonial powers leave behind different structural and cultural institutions as well as a multitude of different sociological interpretations of those institutions by the general public. The effects of those variables can be clearly seen with the multitude of government styles present in the League. Though these types of conflict make transition to peace relatively easier because the enemy combatant is often no longer present after the conflict has ended, organizational infrastructure and government generally need to be rebuilt. Four of the OOCS events were for independence (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and the ouster of Saddam Hussein in 2003 with its subsequent sectarian violence), each of which left behind a substantial void in government legitimacy and infrastructural integrity. The other forms of OOCS were either ethnic conflict between states, strategic territorial gain (Suez War) or foreign involvement as with the UK/US air-strikes of Iraq leading up to the second invasion of Iraq by American forces.

The main legacies of OOCS events then depend on their nature. In the event of the OOCS being for independence, the legacy of delegitimized governing structures leaves a massive need for new governing organizational structures and infrastructural hierarchies to be established, especially in the void left by colonial powers. The argument has been made that the cultural patterns and social institutions of the people of the region, ‘balanced opposition’, create

incompatibilities with central governance models such as the types they inherited from the vanquished colonial powers. The acquiescence to the status quo may have been due to many factors but most likely it was the result of a lack of sincere planning and forethought. The initial colonial intervention and establishment of norms and structures of governance made the simplest option to replicate a system with which they were familiar and already had an infrastructure for, rather than create an entirely new one. It is no surprise then that Algeria and Tunisia formed republics, similar to the model of government already in place, while Morocco established a constitutional monarchy, taking part from its cultural history of established regional caliphates and part from its recent colonial history with its adoption of a constitution.

In the event of the OOCS being for the purpose of strategic gain, as the Suez war or Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the legacy would simply be the use of that specific gain and what Lebow referred to as the, "universally felt need for what we call self-esteem."<sup>107</sup> Conflict then has a secondary affect, in that it legitimates the power and prowess of a given nation and society. As Lebow's argument was made clear earlier, the national spirit and societies that are spirit driven hold honor and self-esteem in the highest regard. Territorial gain would give credence to the legitimacy of that group or nation. Conversely, the intervention of foreign powers in the form of OOCS would do much to delegitimize the power and prowess of a given nation. In this regard, the Realist and neo-Realist emphasis on power is relevant in its relation to national legitimacy and national pride.

#### ***2.4.3 Outer-Organizational Conflict-Cooperative & Self-Esteem***

The third type of conflict assessed is OOC. The Arab League has shared a formal or informal alliance for a combined seven major military disputes. *All of those alliances have been against Israel on behalf of the Palestinians.* However the nature and breadth of these alliances among member-states has changed drastically over the sixty years of the League's history. Initially they were collectively agreed to in the emergency sessions of the League and enacted by official state sponsored armies (the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict of 1948-9, The 6-Day War and the Yom-Kippur War) . As these attempts were never very successful, they have been replaced more recently by militant factions striking in guerilla fashion and being sheltered by countries with relative sympathies to the Palestinian cause or countries with relative inability to control their

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<sup>107</sup> Lebow, Richard. A Cultural Theory of International Relations. Pg. 15.

territorial borders. Generally there seems to be a trend towards smaller groups with larger sacrifices. These groups are being more and more localized and stamped out even among countries with large sympathy bases. This could again be explained by Landau's assertion that, "While Islam has been an ingredient in both domestic politics and external conflicts (Cyprus, Lebanon, Israel, India, Pakistan and other causes), policy decisions have generally been made and implemented in the light of national, rather than religious considerations."<sup>108</sup> That is to say that, despite sympathetic feelings and compassion, these neighboring countries have their own national interests to consider.

As opposed to the method of these conflicts, one thing however has remained constant pertaining to the alliances of the member states against Israel on behalf of the Palestinians: failure. As was pointed out, the military intervention and later the guerilla insurgent tactics have never produced a political success for the Palestinian cause. Failure to establish a Palestinian state, failure to gain sustained political concessions from Israel and a general failure to rally sustained and collective support of the Palestinian people in the region has taken its toll in two very significant ways. First were the blows to the confidence of Arab unity. Especially after the unity and resolve of the Arab Community had gathered behind Egypt's Nasir which culminated in a stunning defeat in the 6-day war of 1967. The consolidation for Pan-Islam was at its highest preceding this conflict, making the defeat a devastating one to the self-esteem of not only the Pan-Islamic movement, but to the possibilities of its vehicle: Pan-Arabism. The Arab League was also dealt a blow with this defeat because it was at the center of this debate. The closest thing to success was the subsequent Yom Kippur War in 1973, which had initial successes in battles, mainly due to the surprise attacks by Syria and Egypt, but concluded with successful counterattacks by Israel gaining new territory.

Nations and their armies also suffered a blow as a result of these failed wars, becoming seen as impotent forces. This in turn gave rise to unrest and the eventual rise of militant Islamic movements. As Lebow points out, "individuals, groups and institutions who are denied the respect to which they believe they are entitled often engage in deviant and disruptive behavior."<sup>109</sup> Alternatively, he goes on to say, "they can pursue the more creative and difficult strategy of trying to change the reward structures of their societies."<sup>110</sup> Furthermore, Lebow

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<sup>108</sup> Landau, Jakob. Pg. 252.

<sup>109</sup> Lebow, Richard. Pg 16.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid.

points out this response to incongruent internal and external appraisals is not unique only to individuals, groups or institutions:

Historically we associate the goals of honor and standing with dynastic political units, but nationalism indicates that they are at least as important for modern democratic, industrial and postindustrial states. Drawing on psychological research, recent work on nationalism contends that people manifest strong desires for group membership and identification because they provide a 'heightened level of self-worth.' My argument goes a step further to contend that people who identify with nationalities or nations to some degree seek vicarious fulfillment and enhanced self-esteem through their victories, and suffer a corresponding loss of esteem, even humiliation when they suffer setbacks.<sup>111</sup>

I would take Lebow's argument one step further and assert that beyond just nationalism, this phenomenon exists whenever an individual or group attaches its identity to some exterior entity. It was widely speculated that one of the most significant reasons for Egypt's pursuit of peace after its minimal concessions in the Yom Kippur War was due the psychological gains of the initial successes in battle. The fact that they had proved their self-worth by taking on this regional enemy satisfied their need for vindication of the shameful residue that the previous military campaigns had left behind. Within five years Egypt had officially recognized Israel, giving a substantial blow to the regional political and commercial boycott of Israel, and in 1978 they signed the Camp David Accords.<sup>112</sup> If this is an accurate assessment, then national self-esteem can have a profound effect on international relations.

#### ***2.4.4 Inter-Organizational Conflict***

Over the course of the sixty year Arab League history there have been five violent conflicts among league members. Three coming from the Maghreb region in the form of border disputes, all of those three involving Morocco, once with Algeria in 1963-4 and twice with Mauritania, once in 1957-8 and again from 1975-89. Egypt and Somalia also engaged in some international violence in 1963 (though technically before Somalia was accepted into the AL) resulting in approximately one thousand casualties.<sup>113</sup>

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<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.* Pg. 17.

<sup>112</sup> Hourani, Albert. Pg. 418.

<sup>113</sup> Center for Systemic Peace.

The final IOC was the 1990 invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. Arguably the most significant of the IOCs for the Arab League because it was a direct display of aggression with the intent of disrupting the sovereignty of Kuwait by Iraq. As opposed to a border dispute, where the opposing governments quarrel over territorial ownership, the invasion of Kuwait was done with the intent to take the country and the resources over. As asserted in the Charter Conflicts Section, this is a direct violation of Article 8 of the Establishment Pact, that asserts that no country will disrupt the sovereignty or legitimacy of another government. Furthermore, it exhibited the powerlessness of the League to intervene among its own members. On August 3rd of 1990 the Arab League passed a resolution (just after UN resolution 660 condemned the war and called for Iraqi troop removal) calling for a solution to the conflict from within the League, and warned against outside intervention. On August 6th UN Resolution 661 placed economic sanctions on Iraq.<sup>114</sup> Session 94, on March 30th, 1991 was the first session back with all the members since the beginning of the Gulf War and it was not until Session 98 more than two years later that any formal action by the League was taken.<sup>115</sup> On April 20th in 1993 the league established a committee to negotiate between Iraq and Kuwait.<sup>116</sup> Both Iraq and Kuwait disapproved of the committee. Foreign intervention occurred, further exhibiting the inability of the Arab League to take care of problems in its own region and to make good on any threats by the League against outside intervention. The conflict caused even more tension among the members, which continued to escalate as the failures piled up and the blaming continued. The arguing continued up and through the start of the Second Gulf War (2003), with different leaders of different Arab countries ardently supporting different strategies for the AL.

#### ***2.4.6 Discord Concert***

With the run up to the Second Gulf War and the possibility of foreign intervention again proposed, the Arab League again resisted and again threatened recourse. Officially the Arab League voted in favor of continuing the weapons inspections, not military intervention for fear of

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<sup>114</sup> UN Resolutions Resources Page. Security Council Resolutions 1990. Retrieved on December 17th 2009 from [www.un.org/Docs/scres/1990/scres90.htm](http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1990/scres90.htm)

<sup>115</sup> Haynes, Ed. Sessions of the Arab League. Virtual Jewish Library. Retrieved on December 13th 2009 from [www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsourc/Peace/legsess.html](http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsourc/Peace/legsess.html)

<sup>116</sup> Ibid.

the regional destabilization.<sup>117</sup> Two Articles published by the news source CNN highlight the period leading up to the war in articles published on February 17th and March 2nd of 2003:

Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak called Friday for an emergency summit, which state-run media said would be held the week of February 22, but the Arab League decided to conduct consultations and decide in the next two days about whether to hold one. At the meeting, held at Arab League headquarters in Cairo, Syria said it would like Arabs to condemn any military action against Iraq. Syria said it feels the Arab countries should adopt a position that reflects Arab public opinion, rather than the position of the United States. But Egypt, backed by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, said it wanted the onus to be put on Iraq to intensify its cooperation with U.N. weapons inspectors. There was also talk Sunday about possibly assembling a high-level Arab delegation to go to Baghdad and urge President Saddam Hussein to cooperate with the inspectors, but no decision on that matter was made.<sup>118</sup>

The conflicting attitudes highlight a division among the member states along the lines of Anti-American countries and pro-American countries, though Richard Seymour, in his article *Strength in Numbers*, would argue that this is not a new trend, "in the past, the League was split along the lines of who was pro-American and who was pro-Soviet," and he goes on to say "there now exist fissures separating the more moderate states from the others."<sup>119</sup> In an excerpt from CNN's Special Report on March 2nd, the AL SG Amr Moussa had this to say:

We are 100 percent for the full implementation of Security Council resolutions," said Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa. "Here we shall not hesitate to say anything that shall lead to full implementation of the Security Council resolutions." The Arab leaders also said that they wanted to see the inspections regimen given more time to work -- and that no military action be taken without the approval of the U.N. Security Council. Moussa said the Arab leaders were keen to stop the drive for war. "If whatever we are doing .... is not enough, so what can we do?" he said. "We shall definitely oppose the war. We cannot be a part of it or contribute to it or sympathize with it." "What's the hurry to conduct a war that is extremely unpopular in the region, in the world, and

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<sup>117</sup> Seymour, Richard. *Strength in Numbers*. Current Affairs. The Middle East. 2006. Pg. 26.

<sup>118</sup> Wedeman, Ben. Arab League Split Over Stance on Iraq. CNN. February 17, 2003. Retrieved on September 18th 2009 from

<http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/02/16/sprj.iraq.arab.league/index.html?iref=allsearch>

<sup>119</sup> Seymour, Richard. Pg. 27

unjustified?" Moussa added. "We don't understand why." The declaration fell short of a statement the league's foreign ministers issued last month, in which they condemned Arab nations for "facilitating" military action by hosting U.S. bases.<sup>120</sup>

As a testament to the blaming and discord that the Arab League has become the CNN article continues to discuss the inner workings of the Summit:

The summit nearly broke into chaos when Libyan President Moammar Gadhafi blamed the Middle East's problems on the presence of U.S. troops in the region. Then Gadhafi blamed their presence on Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and others for involving the United States in the Gulf War 12 years ago. Gadhafi's remarks prompted Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah and the Iraqi and Syrian delegations to walk out while Libya's foreign minister ran after them to explain Gadhafi had meant no harm. The Egyptian broadcast network televising the proceedings briefly pulled the plug. "The danger with Iraq, with the present regime, is of a threat in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia," Gadhafi said. "And America is responsible to defend, as the region is very important to oil and resources.

The kingdom of Saudi Arabia is not an agent of imperialism," the Prince Abdullah retorted, wagging a finger at Gadhafi. "Don't try to impose your opinion in this conflict if you're not aware of facts." Gadhafi was not the only one to denounce the United States.

Syrian President Bashar Assad delivered a particularly strong speech, saying the situation in Iraq was about colonialism, and warned that the rest of the Arab world was next in line.

Earlier, the United Arab Emirates caused a stir when it submitted a written proposal calling for Saddam Hussein to surrender power and leave Iraq. "The Arab League, in cooperation with the U.N. secretary-general, should supervise the situation in Iraq for an interim period during which all necessary measures are taken in order to return the situation to its normal situation according to the will of the brotherly Iraqi people," the proposal said. It also called for "a general, complete amnesty... for all Iraqis inside and outside Iraq." Submitted on behalf of his delegation by United Arab Emirates President Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan al-Nahyan, it stipulated that Saddam leave Iraq within 14 days

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<sup>120</sup> Al-Sheikh, Sharm. Arab Leaders Declare Opposition to War in Iraq. CNN Special Report. March 2, 2003. Retrieve on September 18th 2009 from <http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/03/01/sprj.irq.arab.ministers/index.html?iref=allsearch>

of accepting the proposal. Moussa said the proposal was not considered an official request and "was excluded from the consideration of the council." "This has nothing to do with the Security Council resolution," he said. "We don't see the justification of going beyond the Security Council."

The Iraqis responded angrily. In New York, Mohammed Aldouri, Iraq's ambassador to the United Nations, said Saddam's relinquishing power was "not at all" likely. Inside the chambers, the Iraqi representative said that Iraqis "have the right to defend ourselves" and will be led by God to victory. "The people of Iraq have decided to stand by as one man against the aggressors," said Dizzat Ibrahim, deputy chairman of Iraq's Revolutionary Council. "They will fight and defend Iraq."<sup>121</sup>

The Arab League has thus become a mouth piece for this concert of splintering theories of what exactly the Arab identity should stand for and what it should do. But it was born of the same conflict over norms. In its sixty years it still cannot agree on itself.

#### ***2.4.7 Section Summary***

Because of the frequency of conflict in the region, it has been unable to enjoy the development of social and civil rehabilitation that peace can offer. The conflict can be attributed to many causes and has many implications. Part of the reason that the region is so mired in violence is because conflict often begets more conflict, as Collier pointed out in the IMF study. That trend applies not only to civil disputes but to international disputes as well, particularly in that it "changes the balance of assets in the society, reducing the value of those that are useful during peacetime and increasing the value of those that are useful only for violence."<sup>122</sup> These changes in societal assets combined with intensified hatreds create a fertile setting for conflict as Collier points out:

The violence-specific assets are partly physical, such as armaments; partly human, such as the skills to use weapons and the reduced regard for human life and dignity; and partly organizational, such as the hierarchical rebel management structure and established commercial ties with arms suppliers and natural resource traders. The owners of these assets are unlikely to sit on the sidelines while their value collapses. They do well out of

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<sup>121</sup> Al-Sheikh, Sharm. Arab Leaders Declare Opposition to War in Iraq. CNN Special Report. March 2, 2003. Retrieve on September 18th 2009 from

<http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/03/01/sprj.irq.arab.ministers/index.html?iref=allsearch>

<sup>122</sup> Collier, Paul. Pg. 87

war and would like to get back to it. Another likely feedback mechanism is that violent conflict leaves a legacy of atrocities. As a result, hatreds build up during periods of violence, leaving the society polarized. People of both sides want vengeance for atrocities committed during the conflict and these may supplant any prior grievances.<sup>123</sup>

With the infrastructure built up and hatreds intensified, recruitment is not difficult. Warfare becomes institutionalized. The setting is ripe for renewed engagement which continues the cyclical problem. Beyond just pre-existent conflict, domestic and international strife can derive from many sources between many different types of actors.

As pertaining to the Arab League, the regional conflicts were broken down into four main sub-groupings: Civil, Outer-Organizational Conflict-Solitary, Outer-Organizational Conflict-Cooperative and Inter-Organizational Conflict. Civil and OOCs deal with national issues which destabilize the region. OOC and IOC exhibit League members warfare directly affecting one another through alliance or aggression. Both IOC and OOC forms of conflict have been damaging to the League, IOC directly and OOC indirectly.

With the continued failings of their cooperative efforts, the Arab League's legitimacy as the unified voice of the Arab world was tarnished and shamed. Combined with different national agendas this shame has led to division among its members. Conflicts in and among the AL have destabilized the region and overwhelmed an ill-equipped Arab League. Furthermore an overemphasis on Palestine (due to shame) and a preoccupation with blame (either another state or region in the world) has led to almost total paralysis on all other fronts.

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<sup>123</sup> Collier, Paul. Pg. 87

### Section 3: Assessments and Alternatives

Having taken all of these attributes and circumstances into consideration, many things can be deduced concerning the Arab League as an IGO. The following section discusses first the attributes that are incongruent to IGO success, then encapsulates the analysis and finally offers recommendations for the Arab League based on these findings.

#### **3.1 Functional Incongruences**

The problems facing the Arab region and the Arab League are numerous. These problems are *infrastructural (I)*, *cultural (C)*, *behavioral (B)* or a combination. Infrastructural problems pertain to rules, regulations and procedures, and as such are the easiest to address. Behavioral problems are problems only in how they are managed and as such need to be approached differently. Cultural problems are the most difficult because they deal with issues that are ingrained into the social institutions and customs of a group of people. Furthermore, they often require an inspired, new vision of one's self and place in society. Having said this, the incongruences thus vary in their aptitude for change. Some of these issues could be addressed with some national policy changes and some realistic expectations. Others could possibly never be alleviated. However, certain attributes, as they exist now, guarantee that the AL will never properly function. These attributes are incongruent in that they are incompatible or inharmonious with its proper function (which is 'to contribute to political and economic integration').<sup>124</sup> As I see it, there are thirteen major issues standing in the way a successful Arab League. These incongruences confine the Arab League to a static entity and constrict its possible growth. They are listed in Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1.a

	<b>Type Incongruence</b>
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<sup>124</sup> Armstrong, Pg. 117.

1	I	Impotent Ruling Authority
2	I	Merky agenda
3	B	Oil wealth
4	B	International coercion
5	C	Cultural conflicts
6	C	Identity
7	C	Non-secular
8	C	Pan Arab/Pan Islam movements
9	BI	Politics over function
10	BI	Weak states
11	BCI	Wars
12	BCI	Non-common market of goods
13	BCI	Diversity (colonial, islamic, government structures, demographics, cultural)

There are two *infrastructural* incongruences to AL successes. First off, the lack of a binding authority for a majority in the voting procedures make the league unable to impose collective, but not total, opinion in any regard (other than to begin or adjourn a session). The idea that all votes are required to accomplish anything gives all countries a permanent veto. There is no reason to have an IGO if each member has a permanent veto on all affairs, especially a regional body with no military capabilities. Second, the twenty articles that outline the objectives of the Arab League are overtly vague. Arguably only Articles 2, 3 and 4 directly express what the aim of the union is and how it will go about achieving that end. Article 3 states that the council will determine the function, purpose and supervise the decisions made by the body. So it will be up to the League to decide what the League wants to do. Article 2 at least establishes the areas it would like to see Arab unity specifically enhanced. Article 4 decrees that subcommittees will be created based on Article 2's realms. That is the extent to which the objectives of the league are established. Without a clear and competent outline of the goals and the methods of organizational intercourse the League will continue to be informal and ineffective. Essentially because its Articles are vague and powerless, it is vague and powerless.

There are two incongruences that are problems only in how they are managed, that is they could be assets if the behavior in relation to them were altered. The AL is hindered by international coercion in its region and by its vast amount of oil wealth. Inherited wealth can lead to a lack of

progress or adaptation. Beyond the potential for a static culture, countries of the AL have a substantial opportunity to help their region and potentially inflict global chaos if it changed its behavior in regard to its oil wealth. In fact, the AL's oil reservoirs are what kept it from being aggressively counterattacked after the 1973 Yom Kippur War by Israeli forces:

Part of the reason for the intervention of the powers was the use by the Arab states of what appeared to be their strongest weapon - the power to impose an embargo on the export of oil. For the first and perhaps the last time, this weapon was used successfully. The Arab oil-producing countries decided to cut down their production so long as Israel remained in occupation of Arab lands, and Saudi Arabia imposed a total embargo on exports to the USA and The Netherlands, which was regarded as the most favorable to Israel of western European countries and was also a center of the free market in oil.<sup>125</sup>

Had the ceasefire not been arranged so swiftly, the Yom Kippur War may have ended much differently, causing a much different outcome for Syria, Egypt, the Arab League as a whole and today's Middle East. Additionally, because the League countries banded together in this way they were able to manipulate the will of other countries and exercise their influence as opposed to being at the mercy of international coercion. Coercion by the international community of the Arab region has been a mainstay over the past hundred years. The problem for nations in the AL in regards to cooperation with western powers is either: a) to work with them alienates the nation and can result in embargoes, or b) assisting western powers can tarnish those governments in the eyes of their people. If they banded together more decisively, international coercion would certainly decrease and alleviate this problem.

Cultural Incongruences have much deeper roots. The idea is reminiscent of Huntington's controversial concepts outlined in his book Clash of Civilizations, and later attacked by post colonial theorists. The different dispositions of culture play a very substantial role in regional politics. There are four incongruences that are solely cultural: governance familiarities, non-secular ideals, conflicting identities (of populace) and the multitude of factional Pan-Arab or Pan-Islamic movements. Governance familiarities is perhaps the biggest issue. The Arab region has historically been governed very differently than it is today. Brought in and left by the colonial powers, state structures and centralized government are extremely new to the region.

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<sup>125</sup> Hourani, Albert. Pg 418.

Salzman addresses the adversity to these centralized governance structures and their inherent differences compared to the 'tribal Arab culture' in his claims about balanced opposition:

Balanced opposition, a decentralized system of defense and social control characterized by self-help, is a 'tribal' form of organization, a tribe being a regional organization of defense based on decentralization and self-help. Tribes operate quite differently from states, which are centralized, have political hierarchies, and have specialized institutions—such as courts, police, and an army, with tax collectors providing the means for support—to maintain social control and defense. While tribes tend to operate democratically, states in the Middle East, and elsewhere until modern times, have tended to rule tyrannically. Those who governed did so in their own interest, and usually at the expense of the general populace. Thus states expanded whenever possible, bringing in more loot for the rulers and their followers, more bodies for their armies, and more peasants to tax. Members of tribal societies understandably resisted being incorporated into states, preferring their independent and egalitarian communal lives to exploitation by an arrogant and brutal elite. 'Tribal' is thus used here primarily in a descriptive sense. If any evaluation were intended, it would not be disparaging, for it is not difficult to prefer independence to oppression, equality to hierarchy, and self-help to suppression.<sup>126</sup>

If 'balanced opposition' truly is a cultural phenomenon in the region, and a static characteristic at that, then these governments will naturally be doomed to deficiency. However, because sociological patterns are generally of an adaptive nature and cultural phenomenon are not entirely static but maladaptive, I would argue that if anything, this is a transitioning period of resistance based on religious and perceived cultural attributes. In that sense, culture can systemically adapt. However, it has been widely asserted that this adaptation, or lack thereof, is the problem that the region and modernity fail to coexist peaceably. And so the question has emerged, how can this region move forward? Hourani gets at this question from a different angle, he writes, "should the Arab peoples tread a path marked out for them from outside, or could they find in their own inherited beliefs and culture those values which could give them a direction in the modern world?" The indecision to move forward has created a static society.

If the decision to move forward were to be made, there are certainly roadblocks to finding a path that is congruent with the modern world. One such example is *non-secularism*. In the global

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<sup>126</sup> Salzman, Phillip Carl. Pg. 840

system today there is no place for a religious statehood, especially one that would impose itself onto other states, which all theologies in power do (democracy, communism, Catholicism, etc). That being said, any such state would have to overthrow the current system and establish an entirely new one. Additionally the vast multitude of *movements* (either pan-Arab, pan-Islam or other) muddies the water. As each movement must proclaim its superiority, in-fighting and fractionalization further isolate the communities and deter unity. As established in section 2.3.3, there have been many Pan-arab, Pan-muslim and nationalist movements. The heated debate that Landau refers to has much to do with the *conflicting identities* that exist among residents of the region. Nowhere is this more apparent than the Annual Arab Survey. The survey focused on establishing a uniquely arab identity and asked a range of questions concerning: media sources used, economic outlook and questions of personal cultural identity. When the respondents were asked which of the following was their most important identity given the options of *a) citizen of their country, b) arab, c) muslim and d) citizen of the world* it was a relative three way split between a, b and c.<sup>127</sup> Arab leaders represent a population that is conflicted, and they reflect this conflict.

Two institutional *and* behavioral issues are the ALs tendency to pursue *politics over function* and the multitude of *weak states*. The tendency for the AL to play politics can partly be blamed on the organizational design of the AL as discussed earlier. The league's vague intent, open forum and universally shared veto make it easily subverted. Not to mention that it was originally designed to deter unity. However, the members of the Arab League are ultimately responsible for the functioning of it and are capable of making the necessary changes in their demeanor and the League's structure. Weak states pose a very large problem that stemming both from infrastructure and behavior. Although changes made here are extremely complex, which can be mainly attributed to residual wars and ineffectual governance. Weak states cause a black hole in the region absorbing the potential for unity and political and financial resources. This leaves lawlessness and discord instead.

The final three incongruences to a successful AL are a blend of behavioral, cultural and infrastructural issues: *Wars, Diversity and Non-Common Markets*. The issue of Wars ,as discussed in Section 2.4, is a huge problem. Conflicts have a great reach into all extremities of

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<sup>127</sup> Telhami, Shibley. Annual Arab Survey. University of Maryland & the Brookings Institute. May 2009. Retrieved on December 12th 2009 from [www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/events/2009/0519\\_arab\\_opinion/2009\\_arab\\_public\\_opinion\\_poll.pdf](http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/events/2009/0519_arab_opinion/2009_arab_public_opinion_poll.pdf)

the region and leave a legacy that is deep rooted. In addition they inhibit any social or commercial growth. It is perhaps the most crippling of all the negative effects experienced by League members. Diversity is also discussed at great lengths in Section 2.3. The lack of commonality among the members of the League isolates them in many ways. The League is composed of different subcultures and the identity concept of Arab is not enough to overcome this.

Non-Common Markets is a very interesting issue that the region faces. The idea is simply that there is no common market to create a motivation for cooperation among the members. Unlike the EU which was established out of a desire for commercial exchange (the European Coal and Steel Community), the AL was originally established to dissuade unity. Now some time has passed and the goals of the AL have rhetorically changed, but what motivation do they have to actually change? As the Solingen article points out, the Arab trade pattern “is mainly with the outside world,” and not among other Arab countries.<sup>128</sup> In this regard there is no commercial motivation for cooperation among the heads of state. Conversely, it seems that a very real motivation for framing intercourse within the League is nationalist unity. The Saudi Prince and Muammar Qaddafi have nothing to gain by being friendly, but by standing firm for the position of their national respect and identity they have much to gain. As Assertion 2 points out in Section 1.1, the Arab social culture is honor based rather than appetite or reason based. The lack of commercial motivation for cooperation combined with a proclivity for honor and standing (which is culturally ingrained) results in discord. Even without Assertion 2, it is clearly more advantageous for Arab leaders to bulk up national unity at the cost of regional unity because they have nothing to lose and little to gain (in the short run).

If the AL members had something to gain by working together, a clear motivation for cooperation, the outcome of these Summits would be very different. However, without such motivation why change? The reason that a common market can be such an asset is that it can provide motivations in the ways of more jobs and national financial gain. However, given the customs and social institutions in place in the Arab region, can such a system ever be established? A commercial market mandates a consumer society. Furthermore, the *commercial structure* of raw materials being exported from the region to be refined and/or manufactured

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<sup>128</sup> Solingen, Pg 280.

elsewhere (another legacy left by colonialism) stands in the way of regional change. Can the AL members break down the system currently in place and would they want to?

Common markets create commonality where there might not otherwise be one, and it is a commonality not defined by ideals, but rather appetite and reason. That means there is no debate other than value or exchange. Without a common motivation the AL leaders will continue to garner national unity at the expense of regional organization. The problem of non-common markets is infrastructural, behavioral and very clearly cultural.

These thirteen characteristics of the AL or the region inhibit the proper function of it. Some of them may very well never change, either by negligence or lack of motivation and desire. Some may never change because they are not seen as a hinderance but rather an asset. Perhaps they are. But not to the Arab League. These attributes are incongruent with the proper function and the success of the Arab League and maybe even to the Arab world.

### ***3.2 Conclusion***

The Arab League is an International Organization that is not unifying the Arab Community. There are many reasons for this. It has many incongruences in what is necessary to have a unified and successful regional body. Some are infrastructural, some are cultural, some are behavioral, and some are a combination. I listed thirteen important incongruences to AL success. Most notably the lack of commonality is a key issue especially in the face of a proclaimed Arab identity. That problem is further exacerbated by the polemic rather than academic nature of discourse on Arabism, Islam and the region. Another key problem faced in the region is the multitude of wars. The many wars have created instability, chaos, and an inability to move forward in the region often due to their cyclical nature. Despite referencing these two specifically, all of the incongruences are hampering progress in the region.

Furthermore there is nothing uniting the region, although arab and islamic movements have tried. The reality remains that the hardships faced by a young war-torn African Somalia are much different than the influx of migrant workers that the UAE is faced with. The two countries have seemingly nothing to gain from attempting cooperation, and no common goal for which to strive. Without a common vested interest these nations will 'continue to face the outside world and the

challenges posed by the region itself, individually and alone.”<sup>129</sup> And, despite the fact that “the yearning for a united *umma* has maintained its appeal... in the final reckoning national interests have generally determined foreign relations.”<sup>130</sup>

Nationalism has prevailed as the cohesive unit in the region. In that regard, the nation is the only structure in place to deal with the many crises that the region continues to face. There is no *umma* and what is more there is no concrete arab identity, it is only based on history. Although there are societal customs and institutions inherited from that history, one of which is the emphasis on honor over acquisition (though not absolute in the region). This makes the pursuit of a union of vested interest difficult because the desire for pride and standing get in the way of cooperation for commercial gain. The societal emphasis on standing is a main reason that the debates over the establishment of Arab norms have been centrifugal rather than centripetal.

The problems may well be insurmountable, especially due to the different customs and subcultures within the League. The region also seems incongruent with the external system of international relations as it seems to have filled the void of a modern day political and cultural ‘other’. The region is plagued with a multitude of problems and though they could use unity of purpose, it remains to be seen just what that purpose (beyond opposition to Israel) could be.

### **3.3 Recommendations**

One of the many themes of this analysis has been the different needs, conditions and circumstances of the separate members of the AL. It is not, however, to say that the nations could not all benefit from a union. However, changes would have to be made, both large and small, to create an Arab League that could take on the numerous and difficult tasks that the region is faced with. Changes not only to the *Arab League* itself, but changes made by the *member states as nations* and changes made by the *people of the region*. In this regard the following section is broken down into three subsections accordingly. However, before making any suggestions, it is important to assert what these suggestions would hope to beget, what the ideal outcome would be. First off, as asserted in Section 1.2.4:

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<sup>129</sup> The UN Arab Human Development Report. 2002. Pg. 1

<sup>130</sup> Landau, Jakob. Pg. 252.

“Regional organizations should be measured against a single yardstick: the extent to which they contribute to the political and economic integration of their members... The distance travelled by a regional organization towards that goal determines its success or lack of it.”<sup>131</sup>

Furthermore, it is assumed that the member states would want the Arab League to create ‘economic and political integration’. This is important to note, because as was asserted in the Incongruence Section dealing with Common Markets, the members have very little motivations for regional success in the short-term. It may be the case that the members wish to retain the status quo, as it affords them the luxury of seeming to back Pan-Arabism (perhaps even Pan-Islam) while being able to argue for national integrity and assert their vision of what Arabism should be. Thus, not being hampered by foreign meddling in their domestic dominance but appearing to appease the desires of the public calls for unity. Essentially having their cake and eating it too. For the Arab League to have any real success the member states would have to relinquish at least some control to the regional body. Otherwise it would remain a mouth piece as opposed to a source of united policy and governance. That being said, this section hopes to offer some ideas of where to begin.

### ***3.3.1 Recommendations to the Arab League***

The first recommendation to the Arab League is to *rewrite the charter*. Since its inception, the charter’s vagary and weakness has left the body unable to do much but argue. Because of this, the League cannot govern and can only intimate at regional association. The new charter should be based on established norms of what ‘Arab’ is and what the League specifically will do, sub-section by sub-section, to foster unity and cooperation. It will need to show exactly how it will create ‘economic and political integration’. It should insist on being secular and should attempt to establish international regimes (defined as principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area).<sup>132</sup> converging around specific issues of united interest. These regimes would hopefully build the bonds of familiarity among league nations which would lead to more frequent and familiar intercourse among members. Hopefully, their success could foster more exchange in methodology and the

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<sup>131</sup> Armstrong, David. Pg. 117.

<sup>132</sup> Krasner, Stephen D. Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variable. *International Organizations*. Vol 36. No. 2 Spring 1982. Pg. 185.

implementation of regional programs and projects beyond what the AFESD is currently trying to do.

Either concurrently or subsequently, a *common market place* needs to be established among the members or the 1960s common market needs to be renovated. First and foremost is the establishment of common exchange of goods among the members by replacing existing commodities exchanges with foreign markets to domestic ones where applicable and non-debilitating. In addition to rearranging the import/export market, they need to shift their foreign policies concerning hydrocarbons and use their vast resource as leverage internationally as they did after the Yom Kippur War, under a united banner. They will need to establish realistic goals to alleviation regional problems and work at them according to timetables. They should work diligently in an effort to establish success and foster confidence in the organization as a unifying body.

And perhaps most important, the Arab League needs to work towards the betterment of its people in a united fashion. There should be a sense of symbiosis among its members if they truly wish to use their common heritage as a vehicle for good in the region. In that regard, they should recognize the multitude of countries under their banner that are in significant violent conflict, beyond Palestine, and work towards their alleviation. And in reference to Palestine, they should meet once a year to address only Palestine. That way it will get the attention that it needs without becoming the distraction that it too often becomes. With this emphasis on symbiosis and with a new Charter that outlines its new jurisdiction and sway, the League will be able to enact real change in the region.

### ***3.3.2 Recommendations to the Member States***

Foremost for the member states is a desire for the League to work in compliance with the aforementioned ideas. The member states must compromise and cooperate in an effort to integrate and form a common voice. Once they fight through the process of establishing norms of Arab identity and what the priorities of the organization are, then the arguing will have a shot at being productive. Beyond wanting and working for change regionally, the independent nations must make a multitude of changes domestically. Basically domestic change needs to

happen in two major arenas: first stopping violence and lawlessness, and second establishing development and growth.

The nations need to inhibit warfare in their prospective countries, avoid spillover from neighboring regions by working with neighbor countries, and clamp down on guerilla movements all together. Violent guerilla movements undermine regional governance and development. In the vein of growth, the nations ought to mandate military/community service for a period of time to help provide employment to youth and to assist in regional development. The nations should invite foreign assistance and investment as well as develop industries like tourism to display their heritage to the international community. Additionally, they should embrace education and must stop corruption. It should all be done publicly to garner the support of the population.

While all of these suggestions are activities that all governments need to participate in and are very general, they are still of the utmost importance in this region because of their prolonged absence. The region needs a clear direction and needs all of its members to be embraced by the international community while it establishes itself.

### ***3.3.3 Recommendations for the 'Arab' People***

For the people of the region there are two main issues that they face. First they need to establish the commonality that they proclaim to have. They need to find, beyond that illustrious shared history, something that brings them together, a set of ideals perhaps or a concept. Hourani put it well when he asked, “what was the moral bond between them, by virtue of which they could claim to be a society and a political community?”<sup>133</sup> What is more it should not be based around Islam. As the Syrian philosopher Sadiq al-ʿAzm offered the rejection of religious thought, the people of this region need to realize the power but also the danger in putting too much emphasis on religious notions. As Sadiq claimed, it is incompatible with authentic scientific thought and was unreconcilable with it.<sup>134</sup> To paraphrase further, it supports the existing order of society and those who control it, and so prevent a genuine movement of social and political liberation.<sup>135</sup>

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<sup>133</sup> Hourani, Albert. *A History of the Arab Peoples*. Pg. 443.

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid.* Pg. 444.

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.*

The Caliphate will not return. The comedy of nations must be a secular place where ideas and common ideals are not threatened by impositions of absolutism.

The second issue the region needs to face is the need to be reconciled with modernity. To move forward, in some direction, having a relationship with the international community and the present day. To pose another question by Hourani, “Should the Arab peoples tread a path marked out for them from outside, or could they find in their own inherited beliefs and culture those values which could give them a direction in the modern world?”<sup>136</sup> The answer to this has to unequivocally be both. The proclivity of honor and standing puts them at odds with following another’s path and as such they need to blaze something that is uniquely theirs, though it should take note of and run parallel to the paths set out by the international community. To these ends, I offer the following suggestions.

Make your peace with modernity and find your place in it. Realize that honor is important but should be conjoined with appetite and reason as societal drives. As asserted in Section 1.2.3, “when the spirit is dominant, when actors seek self-esteem through honor, standing or autonomy, they are often willing to risk, even sacrifice, themselves or their political units in pursuit of these goals.”<sup>137</sup> In that regard be logical and work towards your vested interests. Abandon pan-movements and focus on local identity and local interest. Hopefully this will help to abandon polemic debate and in its place academic scrutiny could follow. Finally, my suggestion to the world is to be patient and help the region move forward, it stands to benefit everyone. The Arab region cannot recede into nothing. It must move forward.

Essentially what I have recommended, after long deliberation, is an aggressive move towards the centralization of power at both the state and regional level. Though ‘balanced opposition’ argued that this is not the pattern of governance that the region is accustomed to. While that may be, it is the only way forward. All other roads lead backward and are incompatible with the International system of today. What is more, through this consolidation of power the region will have strength in a way it has not previously known. However, it is yet to be seen as to whether the cultural legacy and customs can be over-ruled by the necessity of adaptation. I believe that

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<sup>136</sup> Ibid. Pg. 443.


<sup>137</sup> Lebow, Richard. Pg. 19.

they can and inherently will. Only time will tell if I am right. Hopefully the Arab League can heed this advice and move from rhetoric to action.

*Appendix A: Figures Section:*

Figure 2.4.a


**Figure 4.17 The incidence of civil war in the Middle East and North Africa, 1950–2001**



*Note:* Proportion of countries in civil war by year.  
*Source:* Gleditsch and others (2002).

Figure 2.4.b


**Figure 4.16 The incidence of civil war in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 1950–2001**



*Note:* Proportion of countries in civil war by year.  
*Source:* Gleditsch and others (2002).


Figure 2.4.c & Figure 2.4.d

**Figure 4.15 The incidence of civil war in Latin America and the Caribbean, 1950–2001**



*Note:* Proportion of countries in civil war by year.  
*Source:* Gleditsch and others (2002).


**Figure 4.14 The incidence of civil war in South and East Asia and in Oceania, 1950–2001**



*Note:* Proportion of countries in civil war by year.  
*Source:* Gleditsch and others (2002).

Figure 2.4.e

**Figure 4.18 The incidence of civil war in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1950–2001**



*Note:* Proportion of countries in civil war by year.  
*Source:* Gleditsch and others (2002).

Figure 2.4.h Violent Conflicts and Disputes from 1946-2009 in AL Countries

No.	Year	Name	Type	Casualties (thousands)
1	1946-47	Rebellion	Civil	6
2	1948-49	Palestine-Israel	O OCC	10
3	1952	Nasser Coup	Civil	1
4	1952-54	Tunisia Independence	O OCS	3
5	1953-56	Morocco Independence	O OCS	3
6	1954-62	Algeria Independence	O OCS	100
7	1956	Suez	O OCS	3
8	1956-72	Sudan Ethnic War	Civil	500
9	1957-58	Border Dispute	I OC	1
10	1958	Lebanon Conflict	Civil	2
11	1958	Iraqi-Coup	Civil	2
12	1959	Iraq	Civil	2

No.	Year	Name	Type	Casualties (thousands)
13	1978-87	Chad-Libyan Conflict	OOCS	-
14	1961	Tunisia Colonial	Civil	1
15	1961-93	Iraq-Kurds	Civil	150
16	1962-63	Algeria Rebellions	Civil	2
17	1963	Military Coup-Iraq	Civil	5
18	1963-64	Somalia-Egypt	IOC	1
19	1963-64	Border Dispute	IOC	1
20	1964	Somalia-Ethiopia	OOCS	2
21	1965-2009	Palestine-Israel	OOCS	21.5
22	1967-70	6-day war	OOCC	75
23	1970	Jordanian War	Civil	10
24	1970-75	Dofhar Rebellion	Civil	3
25	1973	Yom-Kippur War	OOCC	16
26	1974-75	Shatt-el Arab	OOCS	1
27	1975-89	West Sahara	IOC	15
28	1975-91	Ethnic- Lebanon	Civil	100
29	1976	ICF	Civil	1
30	1978	PLO Faction	OOCC	5
31	1978	Military Factions	Civil	0.5
32	1978	Yemen PDR	Civil	0.75
33	1978-79	Yemen AR & PDR	Civil	1
34	1979-82	Muslim Brotherhood	Civil	25
35	1979-98	Ethnic Violence (Shia)	Civil	25
36	1980-88	Iran-Iraq War	OOCS	500
37	1982	Israel, Syria	OOCC	1
38	1982-90	First Lebanon War	OOCC	50
39	1986-87	Yemen PDR	Civil	10
40	1989	Reciprocal-Senegal	OOCS	0.5
41	1990-91	Gulf War	OOCC	100
42	1991-94	Frud Rebellion	Civil	1
43	1991-2004	Islamic Militants	Civil	60
44	1994	Southern Yemenies	Civil	3
45	1996-98	Iraq-Kurds	Civil	2
46	1998-2003	US/UK Airstrikes	OOCS	1
47	2003-09	Ouster & Sect. Violence	OOCS	150
48	2003-07	Islamic Militants	Civil	0.7
49	2003-09	Darfur	Civil	300

No.	Year	Name	Type	Casualties (thousands)
50	2004-09	Ali Huthi followers	Civil	3
51	2006	2nd Lebanon War	O OCC	1.5
52	2007	Islamic Militants	Civil	0.5
53	2008-09	Communal Violence	Civil	0.95

Figure 2.4.i Conflicts by Country in the AL

	Conflicts
Egypt	2, 3, 7, 18, 22, 25
Iraq	11, 15, 17, 26, 35, 36, 41, 45, 46, 47
Jordan	2, 22, 23
Lebanon	2, 10, 28, 30, 38, 51, 52
Saudi Arabia	48
Syria	2, 22, 25, 34, 37
Yemen	32, 33, 39, 44, 50
Sudan	8
Libya	13
Morocco	5, 9, 19, 27
Tunisia	4, 14
Kuwait	41
Algeria	1, 6, 16, 19, 43
Bahrain	-
Qatar	-
Oman	24
UA Emirates	-
Mauritania	9, 27, 40
Somalia	18, 20, 31
Palestine	21, 23, 30, 51, 52
Djibouti	42
Comoros	*Over 20 Coups* exempted



## ***Appendix B: Establishment Pact***

Pact of the Arab League States

His Excellency the President of the Syrian Republic,  
His Royal Highness the Emir of Transjordan,  
His Majesty the King of Iraq,  
His Majesty the King of Saudi-Arabia,  
His Excellency the President of the Lebanese Republic,  
His Majesty the King of Egypt, the King of Yemen,

With a view to strengthen[ing] the close relations and numerous ties which bind the Arab States, And out of concern for the cementing and reinforcing of these bonds on the basis of respect for the independence and sovereignty of theme Stated, And in order to direct their efforts toward[s] the goal of the welfare of all the Arab States, their common weal, the guarantee of their future and the realization of their aspirations, And in response to Arab public opinion in all the Arab countries, Have agreed to conclude a pact to this effect and have delegated as their plenipotentiaries those whose names are given below:

Who, after the exchange of the credentials granting them full authority, which were found valid and in proper form, have agreed upon the following:

Article 1.

The League of Arab States shall be composed of the: independent Arab States that have signed this Pact. Every independent Arab State shall have the right to adhere to the League. Should it desire to adhere, it shall present an application to this effect which shall be filed with the permanent General Secretariat and submitted to the Council at its first meeting following the presentation of the application.

Article 2.

The purpose of the League is to draw closer the relations between member States and co-ordinate their political activities with the aim of realizing a close collaboration between them, to safeguard their independence and sovereignty, and to consider in a general way the affairs and

interests of the Arab countries. It also has among its purposes a close co-operation of the member States with due regard to the structure of each of these States and the conditions prevailing therein, in the following matters:

- (a) Economic and financial matters, including trade, customs, currency, agriculture and industry;
- (b) (communications, including railways, roads, aviation, navigation, and posts and telegraphs;
- (c) Cultural matters;
- (d) Matters connected with nationality, passports, visas, execution of judgments and extradition;
- (e) Social welfare matters;
- (f) Health matters.

#### Article 3.

The League shall have a Council composed of the representatives of the member States. Each State shall have one vote, regardless of the number of its representatives.

The Council shall be entrusted with the function of realizing the purpose of the League and of supervising the execution of the agreements concluded between the member States on matters referred to in the preceding article or on other matters. It shall also have the function of determining the means whereby the League will collaborate with the international organizations which may be created in the future to guarantee peace and security and organize economic and social relations.

#### Article 4.

A special Committee shall be formed for each of the categories enumerated in article 2, on which the member States shall be represented. These Committees shall be entrusted with establishing the basis and scope of co-operation in the form of draft agreements which shall be submitted to the Council for its consideration preparatory to their being submitted to the States referred to. Delegates representing the other Arab countries may participate in these Committees as members. The Council shall determine the circumstances in which the participation of these representatives shall be allowed as well as the basis of the representation.

#### Article 5.

The recourse to force for the settlement of disputes between two or more member States shall not be allowed. Should there arise among them a dispute that does not involve the independence of a State, its sovereignty or its territorial integrity, and should the two contending parties apply to the Council for the settlement of this dispute, the decision of the Council shall then be effective and

obligatory. In this case, the States among whom the dispute has arisen shall not participate in the deliberations and decisions of the Council. The Council shall mediate in a dispute which may lead to war between two member States or between a member State and another State in order to conciliate them. The decisions relating to arbitration and mediation shall be taken by a majority vote.

#### Article 6.

In case of aggression or threat of aggression by a State against a member State, the State attacked or threatened with attack may request an immediate meeting of the Council. The Council shall determine the necessary measures to repel this aggression. Its decision shall be taken unanimously. If the aggression is committed by a member State the vote of that State will not be counted in determining unanimity. If the aggression is committed in such a way as to render the Government of the State attacked unable to communicate with the Council, the representative of that State in the Council may request the Council to convene for the purpose set forth in the preceding paragraph. If the representative is unable to communicate with the Council, it shall be the right of any member State to request a meeting of the Council.

#### Article 7.

The decisions of the Council taken by a unanimous vote shall be binding on all the member States of the League; those that are reached by a majority vote shall bind only those that accept them. In both cases the decisions of the Council shall be executed in each State in accordance with the fundamental structure of that State.

#### Article 8.

Every member State of the League shall respect the form of government obtaining in the other States of the League, and shall recognize the form of government obtaining as one of the rights of those States, and shall pledge itself not to take any action tending to change that form.

#### Article 9.

The States of the Arab League that are desirous of establishing among themselves closer collaboration and stronger bonds than those provided for in the present Pact, may conclude among themselves whatever agreements they wish for this purpose. The treaties and agreements

already concluded or that may be concluded in the future between a member State and any other State shall not be binding on the other members.

Article 10.

The permanent seat of the League of Arab States shall be Cairo. The Council of the League may meet at any other place it designates.

Article 11.

The Council of the League shall meet in ordinary session twice a year, during the months of March and October. It shall meet in extraordinary session at the request of two member States whenever the need arises.

Article 12.

The League shall have a permanent General Secretariat, composed of a Secretary-General, Assistant Secretaries and an adequate number of officials. The Secretary-General shall be appointed by the Council upon the vote of two-thirds of the States of the League. The Assistant Secretaries and the principal officials shall be appointed by the Secretary-General with the approval of the Council. The Council shall establish an internal organization for the General Secretariat as well as the conditions of service of the officials. The Secretary-General shall have the rank of Ambassador; and the Assistant Secretaries the rank of Ministers Plenipotentiary. The first Secretary-General of the League is designated in an annex to the present Pact.

Article 13.

The Secretary-General shall prepare the draft of the budget of the League and submit it for approval to the Council before the beginning of each fiscal year. The Council shall determine the share of each of the States of the League in the expenses. It shall be allowed to revise the share if necessary.

Article 14.

The members of the Council of the League, the members of its Committees and such of its officials as shall be designated in the internal organization, shall enjoy, in the exercise of their duties, diplomatic privileges and immunities. The premises occupied by the institutions of the League shall be inviolable.

Article 15.

The council shall meet the first time at the invitation of the Head of the Egyptian Government. Later meetings shall be convoked by the Secretary-General. In each ordinary session the representatives of the States of the League shall assume the chairmanship of the Council in rotation.

Article 16.

Except for the cases provided for in the present Pact, a majority shall suffice for decisions by the Council effective in the following matters:

- (a) Matters concerning the officials.
- (b) The approval of the budget of the League.
- (c) The internal organization of the Council, the Committees and the General Secretariat. .
- (d) The termination of the sessions.

Article 17.

The member States of the League shall file with the General Secretariat copies of all treaties and agreements which they have concluded or will conclude with any other State, whether a member of the League or otherwise.

Article 18.

If one of the member States intends to withdraw from the League, the Council shall be informed of its intention one year before the withdrawal takes effect. The Council of the League may consider any State that is not fulfilling the obligations resulting from this Pact as excluded from the League, by a decision taken by a unanimous vote of all the States except the State referred to.

Article 19.

The present Pact may be amended with the approval of two-thirds of the members of the League in particular for the purpose of strengthening the ties between them, of creating an Arab Court of Justice, and of regulating the relations of the League with the international organizations that may be created in the future to guarantee security and peace. No decision shall be taken as regards an amendment except in the session following that in which it is proposed. Any State

that does not approve an amendment may withdraw from the League when the amendment becomes effective, without being bound by the provisions of the preceding article.

Article 20.

The present Pact and its annexes shall be ratified in accordance with the fundamental form of government in each of the contracting States. The instruments of ratification shall be filed with the General Secretariat and the present Pact shall become binding on the States that ratify in fifteen days after the Secretary-General receives instruments of ratification from four States.

The present Pact has been drawn up in the Arabic language in Cairo and dated 8 Rabi al Thani 1364 (March 22, 1945), in a single text which shall be deposited with the General Secretariat. A certified copy shall be sent to each of the States of the League.<sup>138</sup>

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<sup>138</sup> Retrieved on December 19th, 2009 from <http://www.mideastweb.org/arableague.htm>

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*Declaration of Authenticity*

I, Daniel Barrett Crisp, being of sound mind and sound body, do solemnly swear that the work hereunto is mine and mine alone. All external sources were cited as such.

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Name

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Date