The orientation of Czech Foreign and Security Policy: A Durable Atlanticist?

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DECLARATION:

I hereby declare that this thesis is my own work, based on the sources and literature listed in the appended bibliography. The thesis as submitted is 282,054 keystrokes long (including spaces), i.e. 163 manuscript pages.

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Abstract

The aim of this dissertation is to investigate into the causes and the long term durability of Atlanticism in the Czech Republic. During the Iraq War the Czech Republic was labeled as part of ‘New’ Europe, a title given to all those states who sided with America over the European powers led by France and Germany. Over the past 6 years the Czech Republic has been subject to the process of Europeanization while major changes in the external environment have occurred. The research methods employed to answer the effect of these changes of the orientation of Czech Foreign and Security policy consisted of a wide review of the relevant literature, case studies and open ended interviews with policymakers and academics involved in the process. The findings of the research are that Czech Atlanticism is rooted in the nation’s geo-political history but is also a strategic calculation on the part of Czech elites. However with a decline in Atlanticism has already begun to take place within Czech society as a result of decreased American interest in the CEE region and Russian activities in its near abroad. In conclusion current trends point to a future decline of Atlanticism in the Czech Republic the extent to which will be determined by four key variables, What type of EU emerges, which political party/coalition is in power, EU’s ability to tackle the Russian question and US policies towards Central Europe and the wider world.

Key Words: Atlanticism, Czech Republic, Security, ESDP, Russia
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### Glossary of Terms

#### Political Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ČSSD</td>
<td>Česka strana socialně demokraticka (Czech Social Democratic Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSD – SMS</td>
<td>Hnuti za samospravnou demokracii – Společnost pro Moravu a Slezsko (Movement for Self-Government Democracy – Union for Moravia and Silesia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDU</td>
<td>Křesťanska a demokraticka unie (Christian and Democratic Union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDU – ČSL</td>
<td>Křesťansko-demokraticka unie – Československa strana lidova (Christian Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People’s Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDS</td>
<td>Křesťanska demokraticka strana (Christian Democratic Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KSČ</td>
<td>Komunisticka strana Československa (Communist Party of Czechoslovakia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KSČM</td>
<td>Komunisticka strana Čech a Moravy (Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSU</td>
<td>Liberalně – socialni unie (Liberal Social Union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Občanska demokraticka aliance (Civic Democratic Alliance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODS</td>
<td>Občanska demokraticka strana (Civic Democratic Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OF</td>
<td>Občanske Forum (Civic Forum)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPR – RSČ</td>
<td>Sdružení pro republiku – Republikanska strana Československa (Union for the Republic – Czechoslovak Republican Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SZ</td>
<td>Strana zelenych (Green Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>Unie Svobody (Freedom Union)</td>
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#### Other

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>CEE</td>
<td>Central Eastern Europe</td>
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Chapter 1 - Introduction

1.1. Background

At the 2002 Prague Summit British writer Timothy Garton Ash asked having just received their invitations to NATO would be states of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) still be such stanch Atlanticists in 8 years time? Today 2 years shy of the 10 years landmark it seems high time to seek to answer Ash’s query.

A successful investigation into Ash’s question would be an important contribution to the discourse on the European Union in the realm of foreign and security policy. As the world moves away from a system of American Uni-polarity and towards a more Multi-polar world order the issue of what sort of power the European Union will emerge as in the external realm will have major ramifications for both Europe and for the future world order. With China, India and to a lesser extent Brazil and Russia all emerging forces in a new Multi-Polar world order countering US hegemony questions remain whether the European Union will take its seat amongst the major global players or instead let other powers control.

Back in March the European Union’s new representative for foreign affairs and security policy Catherine Ashton stated ‘If we pull together we can safeguard our interest…if not others will make decisions for us’. Yet despite the passage of the Lisbon treaty creating the post of high Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security and giving the EU more powers in the security realm major doubts about the EU’s potential capacity in this realm remain. Since its inception the European Union has made great advances in its 1st pillar (economic integration). The Maastricht treaty in 1992 created a 2nd pillar as part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) but while advances have been made in the soft areas of foreign policy (human rights, democracy, foreign aid) little progress has been made in the hard security policy areas (Force projection, territorial defense).

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Differences of opinion exist among policymakers and academics as to why such a lack of progress has been made in this area, some cite national policymakers reluctance to give up decision making power in this delicate field requiring intergovernmental co-operation, others feel that the security umbrella and security guarantee’s provided by the United States under Article 5 of NATO has resulted in sense of comfort and safety amongst the European public who feel safe and lack the appetite for advancement in this area. More recently an idea that increasingly is gaining credence is that Europe lacks of common Security Culture with the most notably divide emerging between New and Old Member states.

In order for Europe to form a coherent Security Culture a consensus among its 27 strong members has been cited as a necessary prerequisite. In particular the divide between Czech Republic and the Central/Eastern and West European states in terms of security culture and position towards America has been cited as a gap that needs to be narrowed. These two separate approaches can be loosely pooled as Europeanist and Atlanticist. The different Europeanist and Atlanticist approaches to European security came to the fore in 2003 in the run-up to operation freedom Iraqi when the CEE states decided to adapt a pro-American pro war in Iraq stance and agree to send forces into the coalition of the willing. In contrast the major European powers France and Germany were the war’s most ardent critics and vetoed such a war at the UN Security Council meeting.

This division between the Franco-German backbone of the European Union and the candidates from CEE was articulated by the then US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s controversial provocation that Europe had become divided into two blocs, Old and New Europe. These divisions between the Europeanist and Atlanticist wings have become further highlighted in the debates over issues like Iraq, the future of NATO in European security, development of a common policy towards Russia and more recently the case of Missile Defense.

In this thesis I will ask the question of whether Europe really can be boxed into ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Europe by focusing on ‘New’ Europe and whether its security preferences are that different from Old Europe. Rather than focus on the heterogeneous CEE (Central and Eastern Europe) region this thesis will concentrate on one CEE state within the region the Czech Republic.
In a report written by Marcin Zaborowski (2003) he asked the question whether EU membership would lessen the Atlanticist orientation of Poland the regions most ardent Atlanticist.\(^2\) In response Zaborowski said the contrary would happen and outlined three reasons why he felt as such. The first reason had to do with Poland’s Eastern frontier a region where the US and not the EU would be influential ‘the EU is not so interested in developing an active policy towards the European parts of the former Soviet Union, whilst the US has been far more involved in the region’. The second was that Poland would not support the French model for the EU as an external actor which involved ‘turning the EU into a counterweight for NATO’ and finally because Poland’s transition to democracy ‘instilled into Polish elites a great sense of gratitude and loyalty, which would not be instantaneously swept aside once Poland became an EU member’. If there is one aspect this report especially highlights it is how quick things change in International Relations. Indeed Zaborowski’s three main reservations are to a stronger or lesser extent no longer viable as we have seen over the past 7 years the EU take on a more active role in its Eastern neighborhood, the French idea of Europe as a counterweight diminish and also Poland’s sense of gratitude and loyalty begin to decline, swept away by the Obama administrations prioritizing of relations with Russia over Central Europe and reversal on missile defense. Thus in 2010 a new investigation into whether EU membership has and will continue to lessen the Atlanticist orientation of CEE countries is important. Has there been a decline of Atlanticism in the Czech Republic or is Atlanticism still as strong as it was back in 2002?\(^3\) Should Atlanticism be considered as temporary phenomenon that pass as the Czech Republic integrates and ‘socialize’ themselves further into the European Union’s decision making bodies. Or should Atlanticism be considered a phenomenon that is so deeply rooted in geo-political history and national interest of the Czech Republic that it is here to stay?.

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3 Ash, T.G. (2002), ‘Speech at the NATO Transformation’ conference organized by the Aspen Institute and the Prague NATO Summit Host committee, Prague 20, November
1.2. **Research Focus**

The primary focus of this research is on the orientation and preferences of Czech foreign and Security policy between the Brussels, NATO and Washington.

By focusing on this question I hope in a broader context to shed light on the strength of Atlanticism among many CEE countries and how the Atlanticism versus Europeanism debate will influence the development of the ESDP in the future. Thus my hope is that this research will be to aid to the current discourse on one of the factors cited as preventing the emergence of a strong European Security and Defense project by focusing on one issue, Atlanticism versus Europeanism, within one country (Czech Republic) within one artificial bloc of European countries (Visegrad states).  

1.3. **Overall Aim and Individual Research Objectives**

**My Research objectives are**

- To identify how a small state in the International system such as the Czech Republic attempts to maximize their security in the current international system
- To account for Czech preferences for alliances over neutrality
- To explore whether the Czech Republic has a strategic culture and if so to identify what are the main determinants influencing Czech Security culture.
- To critically account for the origins and motivations behind Prague’s strong sense of Atlanticism in security policy.
- To critically assess of strength of Czech Republic’s Atlanticism and gauge its durability.
- To critically access if Czech support for the ESDP project is increasing and what the future position of the Czech Republic towards the ESDP is likely to be.

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4 European states are often split into artificially created groups which tend to have commonalities, eg Visegrad countries, Benelux countries, etc.
Two main vehicles will be exploited to facilitate this study: an indebt review of relevant literature and the collection and analysis of empirical data.

1.4. Scholarly contribution

This research is valuable in that it is one of the few pieces of research aimed specifically at trying to ascertain the security culture of the Czech Republic. Indeed on the whole there is a lack of research into the security cultures of the CEE states with the most notable exception being Zaborowski who has explored the security culture of the Czech Republic. While a true investigation of this topic is something for a PHD thesis identifying the basic themes of CZ strategic culture is beneficial. The need for research into this issue is in fact probably best represented by the fact that many of the policymakers and academics interviewed during the research expressed the need for research and their interest in doing further research into the topic.

This research is also valuable in that the basic security preferences of the CEE states have been understudied since their accession into the EU (2004). Prior to this much research was done of the security preferences of these countries and how this would impact of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). However, over the past 6 years little research has been done. This is especially surprising considering that during this time the CEE countries have been subject to Europeanization and also there has been considerable changes in the external environment. This thesis will aim to bridge this gap in academic research.

Also, the timing and the recent and ongoing nature of events such as Obama’s ‘reset strategy’ towards Russia demands investigation. Only last month a conference was held in Prague between President Obama and 11 Central European leaders. While only last weekend the 2010 Czech general elections were held. This research aims to give an academic underpinning to issues that have only thus far being looked at through the lens of the media.

My research strategy and empirical date of interviews in that they go some way towards compensating for the lack of a recent Czech Security Strategy. This is important in that Czech Security strategy was written in 2003 and has not been updated since. Thus, without an

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5 The author is considering doing further investigation into this topic for his PHD
updated Security Strategy interviews with academics and policymakers are the best way to
gauge changes since the last Security document was written.

I also hope to bring a modest contribution to the analysis of Czech security culture, the
differences in preferences and security cultures in New and Old Member states and a broader
reflection on the convergence of European strategic cultures.

1.5. Methodology

This research employs a combination of methods including a theoretical considerations
section, a review of the existing literature written on the topic, case studies and qualitative
interviews.

In my theoretical considerations section in Chapter 2 focuses on two areas related to security.
The first involves a general look at how the dominant realist theory of International Relations
(IR) looks at security and the second being theories of statecraft.

In my theories of IR section attention will be given to the dominant realist theory of IR with a
constructivist framework also employed as an added explanatory lens. Through a
constructivist lens I will look at the security culture of a given state. Security Culture is an
under researched and undervalued explanatory variable in IR, by investigating into the Czech
state’s security culture I felt I could bring additional understanding complementing realist
theories.

In my theories of statecraft section attention will be given to how small states seek to
maximize security in the International system.

In order to gain an insight into Czech security preferences vis-à-vis the US and vis-à-vis the
CFSP case studies will be utilized. In looking at the Atlanticism orientation of Czech security
I will focus on two case studies the Operation Freedom Iraqi and the Missile Defense project.

In analyzing Czech security preferences vis-à-vis the CFSP a case study of the Czech EU
presidency will be utilized. Focus will be given to this case study as the EU presidency gives
the holding state the opportunity to define the EU agenda for a 6 month period and is a clear
indication of state preferences with the CFSP.

Also utilized will be interviews with leading foreign policy experts in the Czech Republic
from both academic and practitioner backgrounds. These interviews provide a good account
of partisan positions of foreign policy issues and also provide the opportunity to cross check the credibility of my assessment.

This method of collecting empirical data through interviews with members of the Czech elite is focal because foreign and security policy in the Czech Republic at present currently is dominated by elites in the Ministry of Defense (MOD), The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and leaders in the main political parties. Much less attention is given to public opinion than would be the case in many Western democracies and is not as major a variable influencing foreign and security policy. Thus in order to fully understanding Czech foreign policy actions and the likely future orientation of Czech security in depth interviews with the members of the elite who deal with these issues on a day to day basis is a far more effective strategy than a broader list of interviews with the general public attempting to gauge public opinion.

1.6. Thesis Map

Chapter 1 - Introduction
This chapter provided background information on the topic itself, on the value and focus of my research and on the methods I intend to employ in this research.

Chapter 2 - A theoretical considerations chapter
2.1 This chapter will begin with a review of the dominant theory of International Relations, realism and what realist literature says about state security. This theory will later by complemented with a constructivist approach to International security.
2.2. This section will also look at theories of statecraft and how small states in International Relations seek to maximize security. Here focus will be given to alliances and alliance theory formation.
2.3. This section will look at the concept of strategic cultures. Security Culture is a very fluid concept and in this section I will come up with my own variables which best explain the Atlanticist orientation of Czech security policy post 1989. Special focus will be given to Czech Republic’s geo-political history and how formative experiences in Czech history have impacted on current Czech security policy.

This chapter will test my first hypothesis which states that ‘Czech Republic’s security policy Atlanticist orientation is rooted in its geographical position, historical experience but also a
strategic calculation on the part of Czech elites with the primary objective of Czech security policy being keeping American military commitments to the region alive and credible’

Chapter 3
3.1. This section will involve researching into Czech Atlanticism from 1999 onwards through the lens of three case studies the Kosovo war, the Iraq war and the missile defense system. The position of the main political parties and the divide within Czech society over these issues will also be looked at.
3.2. This section will look at Czech Preferences vis-à-vis the CFSP through the case study of the Czech EU Presidency. This chapter will test my second hypothesis which states that ‘Given the geo-political and historical context, Czech Republic still sees Russia as a major security threat to its sovereignty and independence and has developed its security strategies towards the US, NATO and European Defense to check direct Russian influence in its affairs’.

Chapter 4
4.1. The beginning of this chapter will look at the impact of Obama’s ‘reset strategy’ towards Russia on the orientation of Czech Security policy. Here I will show that we are beginning to see a re-alignment of Czech security policy with increasing support for the CFSP project as a realization of it being a second pillar of which to base security. With events being of very recent nature tangible gains might not be immediately apparent however by looking at Czech preferences in the negotiations on the New NATO strategic concept and the position of Poland a regional leader in the CEE region one can see evidence of a normalization of relations with the US and increasing support for the ESDP.
4.2. The second part of this chapter and the conclusion of this thesis will make predictions as to the future position of the Czech Republic towards the ESDP, NATO and Washington. My argument here will be that Atlanticism is likely to decline in the future with the extent depending on a number of key variables the first of which is which political party is in power. This variable will becomes increasingly important in the future because as Czech democracy matures we are likely to see parliament play an increasingly important role in foreign policy making and also political parties in the future will be less inclined to go against a Czech public opinion than they have in the past.
The two key variables that will decide how big a change will occur will be what type of ESDP emerges and the US’s position towards Central Europe. With regards the ESDP I will argue that CZ attitudes will depend very much on what type of ESDP emerges over the coming years. Czech's preference will be for a strong ESDP which should seek to complement Washington and will not seek to challenge American hegemony. Within the ESDP a need to find a consensus on how to deal with Russia will be highlighted as the key factor with the position of Germany towards Russia being of key importance. Future American policy towards the region and the global scene will also be significant, with an increasingly accommodating approach towards Russia and a Unilateralist policy likely to speed up Czech shifts towards the ESDP.

This chapter will also test my hypothesis which states that ‘Atlanticism in the Czech Republic will decline in upcoming years with the Czech Republic becoming a greater supporter of the European defense project however the extent of the decline will be dependent on three key variables, which political party is in power, the type of EU that emerges and the degree to which Czech interests are supported by the European defense project’.
Chapter 2: Theoretical Considerations Outline

2.1. Introduction

This chapter is a theoretical considerations chapter rather than a literature review. The motivation behind a theoretical considerations rather than a literature review chapter is that I am not adopting or testing a single theory (e.g. balance of power) to explain the orientation of Czech Foreign and Security Policy but instead I am using very case specific approach. My research is an inductive one and involves working towards proving my own three hypothesis rather than testing others. While much academia has been written on how small states aim to maximize security little has been written directly in relation to the Czech Republic. Thus in this Chapter I will begin by evaluating the main literature of how small states aim to maximize security in the dominant realist field and also the Constructivist approach. Later in this chapter I will relate it back to the Czech Republic. My aim is that at the end of this chapter I will have established my own variables system which contribute to current Czech security culture and can be used later in this research when we discuss the long term durability of Czech Atlanticism and involvement in the ESDP. This theoretical considerations chapter focuses on objectives 1 and 2 and 3 as set out in sub section 1.3. of this chapter.  

(The, third fourth and fifth objectives of this study will be met through the vehicle of empirical data collection and also derived as the result of the findings of objective 1 and 2)

This theoretical considerations chapter will examine the main issues in Czech Foreign and Security Policy by adapting both a realist and a constructivist framework in a complementary fashion. The first section of this chapter will adopt a realist framework and will look at both how small states in International Relations traditionally aim to maximize their security according to the realist theory of International Relations. Geo-political considerations will also be looked at with the integration of the Czech Republic into these structures being looked also from the broader global geo-political perspective. Alliances are a fundamental aspect of how small states in International Relations aim to maximize security thus the realist literature

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6 To investigate into whether the Czech Republic has a strategic culture and if so to identify what are the main determinants influencing Czech Security culture, e.g. history, geography, rationalist explanation.

To explore how a small state in the International system such as Czech Republic believes it can maximize its own security through alliances. (The role that the Czech Republic sees for both the ESDP and NATO in their security will be looked at here)
on alliances and in particular the work of prominent authors such as Kenneth Waltz and Stephan Walt will be considered. However this thesis is aimed at accessing the long term orientation of Czech Foreign and Security policy, understanding Czech motivations in joining NATO and the EU back in 1999 and 2004 are helpful in this broader task yet with so many other important variables needing consideration whether Czech alliance behavior can be explained by bandwagoning or balancing will be looked at only briefly and not in the same depth as a literature review chapter dedicated entirely to alliances would produce.

In order to look at Czech security and foreign policy it is necessary to also take into account non-material as material factor something which the dominant neo-realist framework of International Relations fails to do. Focus will be given to material factors but also non material factors such as ideas, beliefs and perceptions which are overlooked as part of the Neo-Realist theory of IR but a fundamental part of the growing Constructivist theory of International Relations. The first question I seek to answer is how can one account for Czech preferences for joining the NATO alliance rather than staying neutral. In answering this question attention will also be given to Reiter’s theory of learning which argues that Individual experiences of a state are powerful determinants of alliance preferences and that the alliance choices of minor powers in the 20th century were determined mainly by lessons from their formative national experiences. This theory has lots of explanatory power in explaining Czech preferences for alliances and rejection of neutrality as an option. The theory also advances the notion that states form certain preconceptions about other states during this formative experiences which impacts on their alliance formation afterwards.

By adopting elements of a constructivist approach I also aim to research into the idea of a nation having its own unique strategic culture. In this section I will look at what security culture is, why it matters and what implications a nation’s security culture will have on its security and alliance policy. After completing my review of the literature written on security culture I will later in the chapter identify the main elements of Czech Security culture. In creating my own variables to analyze Czech security culture I will focus on the nation’s history, size, it’s geographical setting but domestic political setting. History as a factor in current Czech security preferences will be used very critically but I will identify certain key moments/ formative experiences which impact on Czech security preferences today and will likely be factors in the future. A successful research into the main aspects of Czech security culture would provide an excellent lens through which to identify the Czech origins and
motivations behind Atlanticism but also towards objectives 4 and 5 on future durability of Czech Atlanticism and attitudes towards the ESDP. At the end of this section it is hoped that a critical understanding of the key issues involving alliances and security culture will have been exhibited, that the reader will be better informed in these areas and that there will emerge a clear focus and justification for empirical research and qualitative interviews in order to answer the questions raised in objectives four and five.

A sensible starting point of the chapter is to look at the existing literature on how small states in IR traditionally seek to maximize their security. This will be followed by research into the concept of security culture. Before moving on to this I will first outline my level of analysis. While IR theories have addressed the foreign policies of great powers they have largely ignored small states. Moreover when they do refer to weak states, systemic rather than domestic factors are accorded casual primacy. This chapter will reject both these approaches and show why there is a need to study small states in International Relations and why concentrating on systemic factors while totally overlooking domestic factors leads to a poor analysis. One that is is especially weak in the case of the Czech Republic where one must take into account domestic considerations.

2.2. *Level of analysis – the Limitations of Neo-Realism*

This section will challenge the current existing wisdom that domestic considerations are largely irrelevant in explaining small state behavior. While mainstream IR has ignored the study of weak states, scholars have suggested that we can account for the behavior of small states by focusing on the international system. The reason according is Elman is ‘since small states are more preoccupied with survival than are the great powers, the international system will be the most relevant system of analysis for explaining foreign policy choices. The general wisdom and one promoted by neo-realist scholars such as Waltz is that domestic determinants will be less salient when studying small state behavior because external constraints are more severe and the international situation is more compelling\(^8\). Including

\(^7\) Elman, Miriam ‘The foreign policies of small states: challenging neorealism in its own backyard’, British Journal of Political Science, April 1995: 172

\(^8\) Waltz, Kenneth, ‘International Politics’, 194-195
domestic affairs in our analysis would only detract from an already satisfactory explanation based on the small states position in the International system and its interaction with the great powers. Changes in small state foreign policies are considered tiny in comparison to fluctuations in the structure of the international system and the degree of threat posed by the great powers. 9

Neo-realism assumes that international constraints influence state behavior. In general international pressures override domestic interests, internal political struggles and the characteristics of particular states in foreign policy decision making. 10 A state’s behavior is viewed as a response to the constraints and incentives of its aggregate power (Distribution of capabilities) relative to others or the degree of aggressive intent on the part of the external actors. (Balance of Threat). Neo-realists assume that statesmen will respond rationally to these preconditions and will choose that foreign-policy course which is most likely to maximize security benefits and to minimize security risks. While neo-realists recognize that systemic/ structural factors may prevent statesmen for pursuing optimal strategies, it is presumed that elites are domestically unconstrained. 11 According to neo-realism all states can be ‘black boxed’ because whatever their internal characteristics, all states nonetheless act in a similar way to ensure their security in this self help world.

In contrast domestic level of analysis theories expect that state attributes and societal conflicts will affect foreign policy choices. It is assumed that foreign policy will not always reflect national security interests or structural imperatives. Rather the characteristics of particular states and ideologies or local interests will often render statesmen incapable of responding to exigencies of the international environment. 12

In contrast to the existing conventional wisdom I will argue that whether external or domestic factors matter more is an empirical question and should not be assumed a priori. In a contest between levels of analysis neither domestic nor international agreements automatically win and in the case of the Czech Republic both need to be studied simultaneously. In this thesis I

9Waltz : opt cit 184-185

10Waltz : opt cit: 72-73

11 Waltz: opt cit: 74

12 Waltz: opt cit: 74
will show how factors such as the institutional setting, the political parties in power as well as the external environment influence Czech military strategy. If I can successfully prove that domestic politics matters even in these instances where we would expect it should not, then I will have provided a strong argument and support for domestic level theorizing. Thus a successful refutation of received wisdom on the dominance of neo-realism in small state behavior in this dissertation would do much to legitimize domestic level approaches while simultaneously diminishing neo-realisms claims to have explanatory primacy in the study of IR. I will be countering the neo-realist discourse and echoing the view of Snyder who notes that ‘Realism must be recaptured from those who look only at politics between societies, ignoring what goes on within societies’.

- **Second Image Reversed**

In order to explain the foreign policy of the Czech Republic it is necessary to pay attention to international as well as domestic development. The interaction between the international and domestic politics is thus responsible for the resultant foreign policy of the state and this linkage requires that both levels (International and Domestic) should be examined simultaneously. Neither level alone is sufficient to explain Czech Foreign and Security Policy and both levels need to be approached simultaneously to understand the situation. This thesis will thus use a second image reversed level of analysis and will examine the relationship between the external environment and domestic institutions and politics. In this work I will follow the level of analysis proposed by Gourevitch who concludes that ‘The international system is not only a consequence of domestic politics and structures but a cause of them. Economic relations and military pressures constrain an entire range of domestic behaviors, from policy decisions to political forms. International relations and domestic politics are therefore so interrelated that they should be analyzed simultaneously as whole’.

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13 Also the analysis of alliance choices in this dissertation is limited only to small states. Greater simplicity of minor powers foreign interests means that experiences can be more easily decoded as successes or failures, as a minor power focuses mainly on the question of how its alliance or neutrality affected the national security and territorial integrity of the homeland.

Alliances or neutrality

One of the questions that also will be dealt with in this chapter will be how one account for state preferences for alliance above neutrality can. An alliance is defined as ‘A formulated mutual commitment to contribute military assistance in the event one of the alliance partners is attacked’. Whether a state choose alliance or neutrality is likely to depend on whether it believes that alliances pose too great a risk of involvement or it believes that international cooperation is necessary to protect its security. When deciding whether to enter an alliance or remain neutral, a nation must consider that entering an alliance in peacetime provides the benefits of extended deterrence and military assistance in the event of a war, at the expense of raising the risks of being involved in wars of no direct interest to the nation. Neutrality offers the benefit of decreasing the changes of involvement in wars of other nations, with the cost that the nation has no allies to help deter potential aggressors or defend against attacks. This is a choice for which there is no universal, indisputable answer; neither neutrality nor alliance is a logically dominant strategy for all times.

Here it is interesting to compare Czech Republic’s strong commitment towards alliances with Austria’s position of neutrality. Considering that both countries have a roughly equal population and similar geographically position in Central Europe why is it that preferences of the two states differ so much? The main factor behind this I will argue has to do with non material factors with both countries having very different historical experiences and very different perceptions of what constitute a threat (Different perceptions of Russia). Czech Republic drew lessons from its formative events that impacted on its decision to pursue alliance strategy in protecting its national security after 1989.

2.3. Combining Realist and Constructivist theories of Security

In analyzing Czech security interests towards the ESDP and America I will in this upcoming section adopt a combination of realist and constructivist theories. In particular great emphasis will be given to the concept of security culture. In this section I will argue that realist and Constructivists approaches rather than contrasting one another can be used in a

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complementary fashion. In supporting a Constructivist lens I will be supporting the work of Constructivists who explicitly accept that power matters in International Relations. In this thesis I will depart from realist authors and argue that Czech security policy has a ‘social’ as well as a material basis. While realism focuses on capabilities a Constructivist tool allows one to look at non material factors. Social Constructivism will not be considered a theory but rather a ‘metha-theoretical approach offering an ontology that is different from rationale choice’.  

Also emphasis will be given to what constitutes a threat. Indeed threat assessment is central to the notion of security. According to Wolfers ‘Security in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked’. Realist theories have identified different assessments of what can be considered as a threat, for Waltz structural position predominates, for Morgenthau state capacity to yield power must be considered while Walt looks at a states ‘hostile intentions’ While Walt departs from the materialist foundations of realism he does not adequately explain what shapes the perception of what constitutes of threat.

In the academic debate, strategic culture plays a role as an intervening variable in foreign policy analysis and helps understand a states behavior in security affairs. It relevance can be best understood from a moderate constructivist perspective within international relations, which puts focus on the role of ideas, norms, identities and worldviews for understanding how actors interpret social reality and construct their interests in international affairs and EU institutions through their cognitive lenses. Strategic culture writers do not dispute material circumstances, such as anarchy in the International system and differences in the distribution of power capabilities but also suggest that these factors taken on their own are insufficient for understanding states’ behavior in foreign affairs. In understanding Czech threat assessment

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16 Constructivist studies stress the importance of socially constructed meaning in International politics. Drawing upon the sociology of Max Weber, they assert that cultural structures (i.e. norms, identities, values) shape the signification actors lend to material elements. In applying Constructivist studies to International Relations and more specifically security studies, Katzenstein emphasized the influence of ‘ideational and institutional variables’ in shaping security interest and behavior as well as security politics.  

17 Wolfers: 1952

though one needs to take into account constructivist considerations as Czech threat assessment is strongly linked to its socio-historic contexts. As I will show later in this chapter Czech threat assessment of Russia but also its reluctance towards domination of France and Germany over the ESDP are strongly linked to history and the country’s perception of what constitutes a threat. For example Russian actions in Europe’s greater neighborhood do not constitute a threat to Austria but are viewed as such by the Czech Republic.

In order to understand why two states of similar populations and geographical location at the heart of Central Europe have such different perceptions of the same act one needs to take into account beliefs and ideational factors something which Walt and other realist theorists fall short on but security culture can adequately explain.

2.4. Realist Theories of Statecraft

Although the history and the debt of gratitude towards the United States in defeating communism is often shared as the best explanation of Atlanticism among elites and the public in the Czech Republic, this thesis will take the view that this position on its own is overly simplistic and those not give due emphasis to pragmatic power considerations and strategic calculations on the part of the Czech elites. Therefore without downplaying the importance of history, a theoretical framework of small states and an analysis of their foreign policy behavior of small states in the international system will be introduced in the beginning of this section as a complementary factor to understand the strong pro American stance of CEE states. In doing so, the chapter will first define the concept of a small state in International relations. Next I will look at what foreign policy patterns of behavior are traditionally exhibited by small states and later try to compare them with the Czech Republic.

2.4.1. What are small states in International Relations and how do they seek to maximize their security

What is a small state in International Relations?

Before beginning my analysis I feel it is important first to outline what a small state in International Relations is considered to be. The lack of an agreed definition of small states has
marked the body of literature that might be termed small state studies. Indeed Small states are defined more by what they are not (Big Powers) rather than what they are.  

The formalization of the categories of small versus large states stems from the historical experience of the 19th and 20th century when a number of small states increased dramatically as a consequence of breakup of empires. In the literature of international relations size has long been an integral and inseparable part of world politics. Size is generally seen as directly connected to a nation’s capabilities and influence. Whilst being big is correlated with power, being small has been viewed as a handicap to adequate actions and even state survival. According to Rothstein ‘a small state is a state which recognizes that it cannot obtain security primarily by the use of its own capabilities and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions, processes or developments to do so’ In an attempt to formulate ‘objective’ makers of smallness references are frequently make to the absolute size of a state’s resources, whether in terms of size, territory, population, military capacity, etc. The distinction between small and large states in the European context is often referred to as the population of the size of the Netherlands (16 million) as a benchmark to define ‘smallness’. According to B Thorhallsson all states with a population above 38 million and above are considered as large states, and all states with a population below 16 million are considered as small states. Czech Republic has a population of 10 million and thus can be placed in the small state category.

Small states are usually depicted by the following characteristics and patterns of behavior.

1. Low levels of overall participation in world affairs

2. Avoidance to use force as a technique of statecraft

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19Elman : opt cit

20Elman, Miriam ‘ The foreign policies of small states: challenging neorealism in its own backyard’,


22 Rothenstein: opt cit: 29

3. Avoidance of behavior and policies which tend to alienate the more powerful states in the International system

4. Frequent utilization of moral and normative positions on international issues

5. High levels of support for international legal norms and institutions

6. Narrow functional and geographical range of concern in foreign policy actions

In virtually every pattern indicated above, small states exhibit a low-profile course of minimum action, minimizing their perceived risk. In terms of risk, Stanley Hoffmann has summarized this point well: ‘At all times, the line separating smaller from larger powers has corresponded to two different attitudes towards risk. Small powers are forced by their resources, their location and the system, to be satisfied with establishing a hierarchy of risks and attempting to minimize the risks that they consider serious.’

2.4.2. How small states seek to maximize security: Realist Alliance Theory

In this section I will look at how small states in International Relations seek to maximise security in the current international system. This analysis will be dominated by alliance theory. Here I will first introduce the theory and later see if it has much explanatory power in explaining Czech Atlanticism. I will begin by outlining the main academic literature of the dominant realist theory on alliances with two particular theories given the most attention, Waltz’s balance of power and Walt’s balance of threat. Here I will show that the realist theory has some explanatory with regards the actions of the Czech Republic on the international arena and that the strong Atlanticist orientation of the Czech Republic can be seen as a form of balancing against Russia but also balancing against domination of France and Germany over the European Union. However the weakness and the limitations of this theory as an explanatory of Czech Atlanticism will also be looked at.


The dominant theory of international relations is realism. Waltz description of two alliances behavior for great powers in the face of a threat – buck passing (loosening commitments) and chain ganging (tightening alliance commitments) closely reflects the decisions faced by minor powers. Like neutrality buck passing entails decreasing the chances of successful deterrence and defense in order to decrease the chance of entanglement with alliance while chain ganging entails increasing the chances of successful deterrence and defense at the expense of increasing the chances of entanglement. Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder argue that Waltz neo-realism is insufficiently specified to predict whether buck-passing or chain ganging is more likely. They add a new variable to structural realism and concede that it is beliefs about the offence/ defense balance, a parameter clearly outside the sparse structure of structural realism. That determines whether chain-ganging or buck passing prevails, as opposed to the objective state of the defense/ offence balance.  

A variant on realism that avoids reliance on beliefs to make predictions about alliance choice of minor powers is Stephan Walt’s balance of threat theory. Walt explored the question of whether a state, when faced with an external threat, would ally against the source of the threat (balance) or with the source of the threat (bandwagon). Walt outlined a number of hypotheses predicting when states would be more likely to balance or bandwagon and found that balancing is more prevalent than bandwagoning. Walt also provided an answer as to why states seek to join alliances at all: they do so as a response to a perceived threat, since, as threat increases, the probability of alliance increases; and as threat decreases, the probability that new alliances will form decreases and the probability that existing alliances will break apart increases. As applied to the structural realist dichotomy of buck passing and chain ganging, Walt’s argument that threats motivate alliances implies that chain ganging dominates buck passing.

**Balancing versus Bandwagoning**

Balance of power theory has traditionally struggled to predict whether a state should balance or bandwagon. (Waltz: 1979: 190). But Waltz in his research offers a series of factors that can be seen as explanatory factors in explaining whether a state is more likely to adopt one of

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28 Walt: opt cit: 28-30
these policies. For example there is a general consensus that the weaker the state the more likely it is to bandwagon with great powers. This is because there lack of power makes it unlikely that they could tilt the balance between the two groups of states. 29 Also the non material benefits such as status and prestige that might be powerful influences for certain powerful states to choose balancing over bandwagoning are not likely to be relevant for small states. 30 Also the literature on small states in IR argues that small states are especially likely to bandwagon when a powerful state can offer economic incentives 31 This has been cited as being a motivation for the Czech Republic and other CEE states in joining the American alliance in Iraq. Many saw Czech and especially Polish participation in the stabilization efforts in Iraq as a way to secure substantive reconstruction contracts, and in some case recover debts. However as I will show in the next chapter when I discuss the Czech Republic material benefits or ‘bandwagoning for profit’ does not seem to have been a major motive for Czech Republic.

Balance against regional powers

Russia

Czech actions can also be seen as bandwagoning against a powerful country from outsider their immediate geographical area in order to balance against regional powers. 32 CEE bandwagoning can be viewed as a form of balancing against a Russia threat. 33 Particularly during the Iraq war CEE countries were certainly influenced by Russia’s decision to join France and Germany and not the US on the issue. Many Central European countries were wary of Russia intentions towards the CEE region and Russia’s alliance with two major European powers was interpreted by them as potential isolation of the US in Europe. CEE countries feared such an alliance because in the medium and short term, it could weaken US willingness to remain engaged in Europe, something that the smaller states in the region could not accept.

29 Bawley: 2004: 82
30 Ambrosio: 2005
31 (Schweller: 1994)
33 Elkin 2003/ Budryte 2005
France and Germany

Some have also interpreted Czech and Central European countries actions as a form of balancing against France and Germany. Again this approach has been used to explain Czech and CEE states actions in siding with the US in the intra-Alliance versus intra-EU divide over Iraq. What is also telling is that these countries joint Western European powers such as Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom who similarly were not pleased with the overtly strong role played by France and Germany within the EU. It was apparent that these countries did not to desire to have the Franco-German axis speaking of behalf of the entire European Union. For Grigorescu Central European states also wanted to show to France and Germany that they were not going to be intimitated once the joined the EU, an institution perceived by them as being overtly dominated by the Franco-German axis.

Security Guarantees

In explaining Czech preferences for Atlanticism over ESDP one also needs to take into account security guarantees for which the realist theory has much explanatory power. According to Grigorescu one must consider the difference between the security guarantees that these countries expected from the US as opposed to the teak secutity and primary economic benefits that they could expect from membership of the EU. Realist theories, including those of the balance of power, emphasise that, states will choose policies that alleviate their security concerns over those that bring them primary economic benefits. This suggests that when faced with a choice to back the NATO or the ESDP traditional balancing versus bandwagoning arguments would indeed have predicted that CEE countries would support the world’s sole remaining superpower.

Overall we can see that realist theory has explanatory power in explaining CEE Atlanticism. However as will be shown in the next section one also needs to complement this with certain constructivist elements and take into account Ideas and perceptions in order to get a greater understanding.


35 Johnstone 2005; opt cit

36 Grigorescu: opt cit:
2.5. Constructivism in International Relations – additional explanatory lens

This second half of this chapter will adapt a Constructivist theory of International Relations. Here I will first begin with an overview of what constructivism is and how it differentiates from realism. In using a constructivist framework I do not hope to remove realism from the analysis but instead to complement the realist theory on threat evaluation and alliance building. The great advantage of using this constructivist framework is that it allows me to bring in the additional understanding brought by constructivism in combination with and not replacing the dominant rationalist theories. This framework will allow me to go beyond materialist considerations in accounting for the security interest of the Czech Republic.

In the first chapter I outlined one of my research objectives to be to account for the Czech Republic’s decision to join alliances following the Cold War rather than staying neutral. Earlier in this chapter I gave a brief introduction to the realist theory literature on alliance and the entrapment versus abandonment dilemma faced by small states in decided whether to join alliances. In this section I will bring non materialist factors into the equation and argue that Czech preferences for alliances can be better explained by a learning theory framework as advanced by Reiter. Here I will argue that Czech alliance preferences following the Cold War are in accordance with the lessons drawn from their formative experiences. The theoretical background of Reiter’s learning theory will be given early in this section while later in the chapter when I discuss formative experiences in Czech Security policy I will test the theory’s accuracy when applied to the Czech Republic.

2.5.1. Constructivism in IR - Reiter’s learning theory

This section will outline the theoretical basis of Reiter’s learning theory. Later in the chapter I will test realist predictions for alliance behavior against those of learning theory, which is emerging as an alternative conceptual framework to traditional realism. Whereas realism proposes that states ally in responses to changes in the level of external threat (Balance of threat), the learning theory supported in this section proposes that states ally in accordance to lessons drawn from their formative experiences. The evidence that will be presented later in this chapter will point to learning as the principal explanation of Czech Republic’s alliance choice, with variations in the level of external threat having only a marginal effect on alliance behavior. For Czech Republic I will concentrate on two formative experiences that impacted
on their alliance policy the 1938 Munich Conference, the 1968 Soviet invasion with focus on 1938.

In order to understand the world politics question of how foreign policy is made, it is necessary to ask the broader social science question, how do decision makers in IIR cope with uncertainty? One answer to this according to Reiter is that decision makers draw experiences from past experiences to help cope with difficult choices. The basic learning proposition of Reiter’s learning theory is that lessons are drawn from significant foreign policy experiences: continuity follows success, while innovation follows failure. According to Reiter ‘the basic learning proposition is that lessons are drawn from significant foreign policy experience, continuity of policy follows success while innovation follows failure’ According to Reiter’s model ‘nations can draw one or two lessons from a formative event: either that neutrality best protects national security or alliance best protects national security’. In terms of learning theory itself, the tendency for decision makers to learn simple lessons argues for keeping the set of possible lessons limited. Learners tend to keep analogies simple, the more complex the analogy the more difficult its application in a different context. For example the lesson from the Munich Conference for the Czech Republic must be simple ‘aggressors must be opposed to prevent future aggression’.

For Reiter systemic wars are the primary/only formative events. World War 1, World War 2 and the Cold War were the systemic wars of the modern era for which the choice of alliance or neutrality was most important for minor powers. However he does concede that ‘there is some limited support for the proposition that great power crises can serve as formative events for minor powers, but the effect is not nearly as large as it is for world wars as formative events’. In this research I will extend Reiter’s theory and apply it to great power crises in addition to systemic wars. This limited support for minor crises in very strong in the Czech case with some of the key formative experiences being great power crises.

37 Reiter, Dan, opt cit,


39 Reiter: opt cit: pg 270

40Reiter: opt cit., pg 269
Another possibility not currently given much focus in the discourse in IR but discussed in Reiter's theory is that minor powers instead learn about specific nations as allies. If minor powers did learn about specific nations, then we would expect that from a formative experience they would draw lessons about which nations are the most powerful allies and which allies can be deemed as unreliable and untrustworthy. The impact of systemic wars and great power crises and the impression that they left about specific allies will be discussed later in the Chapter. Here it will become apparent that past experiences have left an impression on the Czech elites about certain allies with distrust of major European powers to provide security to the continent and an overall positive impression of America.

2.5.2. Security Culture

Next I will move on the concept of security cultures. I will begin by giving a brief introduction to the subject of security cultures and how the concept of security culture can be used as an explanatory variable. Later in the chapter I will apply this research to the Czech Republic. Here I will focus on the aspects that I consider most important in accessing Czech Security Culture. While doing this particular attention will be given to Czech Republic’s history and formative experiences and how this has impacted on its current security preferences. Focus will also be given to geographical factors with Czech Republic’s geographical location at the heart of Central Europe and its close proximity to Russia. The concept of strategic culture also offers other major additional advantages; it allows one to consider changes in strategic preferences (especially through socialization). For this reason it has been used by several scholars in their research of ESDP and CFSP and will be used by the author in Chapter 4 when the impact of Europeanization on Czech Security Policy will be looked at.

It is widely understood that considering the complexity of world politics, state actors behaviors cannot be understood just by analyzing their rational choices. According to Robert Keohane, ideational factors should be taken into consideration as well. Stemming from Keohane’s argument scholars of strategic culture seek to engage and go beyond rational choice analysis by reasserting the significance of cultural, ideational and normative influences on the motivations of states and their leaders. 41 The strategic culture approach challenges the a

historical, non cultural, neorealist framework for analyzing strategic choice rather than rejecting rationality per se as a factor in strategic choice. 42

In his a decisive article, Jack Snyder, who is one of the first wave of strategic culture scholars described it as ‘the sum of ideas, conditioned emotional responses and patterns of habitual behavior that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other’. 43 The most recent wave of strategic culture scholars consider other aspects of state policy not just military factors. Since the late 1970s, the concept of strategic culture has been applied in several cases to examine the main aspects of a particular state’s security policies. By applying the notion of strategic culture to certain case studies, scholars attempt to explain contunity and change in national security policies. Moreover, the study of strategic culture has also been used to create a framework which can give answers as to why certain policy options are pursued by states. By analyzing strategic cultures one can understand the beliefs, attitudes, and practices regarding the use of force, which, though historical process, gradually evolve over time. Strategic culture analysis is regarded as a very analytical tool to find out the impact of values and beliefs on the foreign and security policies of states. 44

It is believed that analysis of the cultural context allows one to investigate how the formative experiences of the state and its cultural characteristics shape strategic interests. Strategic culture is shaped by formative episodes in times of crises and is influenced by past experience. 45 Moreover it can change fundamentally or gradually overtime. Beliefs, feelings, fears, aims and ambitions are the unobservable aspects of each strategic culture and compromise the core values that give strategic culture its quality and characteristics. These foundational elements create each nation’s strategic culture and are derived from ‘formative experiences and have been internalized, creating a consensual or centripetal nature to the strategic culture’. 46

42 Coskun: opt cit: 74
43 Jack Synder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for limited nuclear operation, Santa Monica: Rand Publication cited in Coskun: opt cit
44 Coskun: opt cit 73-75
45 Cadier David: opt cit: 7-11
46 Cadier, David: opt cit: 7-11
In analyzing Czech Republic relationship to Russia, the US and EU strategic culture allows one to account for the peculiarity of socio-historical perceptions. In sum, it is argued by strategic culture scholars that strategic culture affects policy behavior by providing the foundations and predispositions of a state’s attitude towards particular security issues. Strategic culture sets the boundaries of normal behavior and provides a blueprint for the possible policy tools available. 47

Before I move on to analyzing Czech strategic culture in the next section I will first give my definition of strategic culture which I will use throughout my analysis. Strategic culture can be defined as ‘socially transmitted ideas, attitudes and traditions, habits of mind, preferred methods of co-operation and perceptions of the International environment that are more or less specific to a particular geographically based security community that has a necessary unique historical experience’. 48 49 50 Thus in plainer English, strategic culture frames both the perception of the threat and choice of response.

2.6. Czech Security Culture

In this section I will analyze Czech Foreign and Security policy and its orientation through the lens of strategic culture. In order to properly access Czech foreign and security policy it is important to know first where exactly to look and what variables to utilize. Security culture is beneficial in this respect in that it is an openly fluid concept thus allowing the author to include norms, ideas and perceptions in the analysis and come up with one own variables which explain Czech security. In this section I produce three core variables which when

47 Longhurst and Zaborowski: 2005: 7
49 Gray’s definition does not include ‘national policymakers perceptions of the international environment’. This thesis will follow the lead of Giegerich 2006 in European Security and Strategic Culture: 2006 and supported by Cadier (2008) which includes ‘national policymakers perceptions of the international environment’ in the analysis.
50 The Czech Republic does not have a united full blown security culture in that the security community is relatively new (20 years) and that a consensus is not shared among the general population. However within the security community there is a general consensus both on the perceived threat and also the agreed response to
combined with rationalist realist theories based on power are most important variables in explaining the orientation of Czech Security policy from 1989 until the present. The first and most important variable looked will be history. Here I will show how a history of occupation by foreign powers has impacted on the thinking of Czech elites. Attention here will be given to the formative moments in Czech history and the lesson that was learned from these experiences. As will be shown a strong correlation can certainly be identified between history and Czech security policy post 1989. The next factor looked at will be geography and the geopolitical context of being a small state surrounded by small states in Central Europe. This factor overlaps with history but is also a major determinant. Here I will show that Czech Republic due to its geographical proximity to Russia has a great fear of Russia, a major motivation behind Its Atlanticist orientation. Also important to consider is Czech skepticism towards Europe and the ESDP which is linked to the fear historical that Central Europe is a playing ground for the larger powers and that the European project will become to overtly dominated by the larger European states of France and Germany. Here the Atlanticist orientation and preference for allying with an ally 3,000 kilometers away can be explained by geo-historical factors and kind of balancing against Russia and the strong European states. The final variable looked at will be the Czech domestic political setting. This will involve a discourse on the main political parties but also a look at the institutional setting such as the influence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defense. Also reviewed will be public opinion and the Czech electoral system.

Czech Republic A reversed security culture?

For some security culture scholars such as Meyer security culture implies that the sentiment is shared among the broader population however in Czech Republic it is more accurate to say there exists a reverse security culture. By this we can see that there is a relatively small group of people the security elite, either politicians or security experts, who form security policy and shape the broader strategic culture according to this.

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this threat. My aim here is to outline the main elements of Czech Security culture.
Chart 1 - Map of Czech Security Culture - a further explanation is given in the Appendix B
3.6.1. History, formative and normative experiences

‘In Central Europe, perceptions of history, its public role and functions are marked by historicism, propensity to project the present into the past, to see history as a weight in the present that obscures prima facie inappropriate historical precedents, and to assume that answers to the present will be found in the past, that the present is best understood through the past’.  

Historically the Czech Republic has been dominated by larger more powerful neighbors, first by the Habsburg Empire of Austria then in the 20th century by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Until 1989 the only modern experience of independent statehood came in the interwar period, 1918-1938, when a democratic Czechoslovak Republic was created from the ruins of the Austro-Hungarian empire and then again briefly after WW2, from 1945 until Communist rule in 1948. The legacy of external domination was then reinforced by Warsaw pact military intervention to crush the ‘Prague Spring’ reform movement in 1968. In origins of the alliances Alexandr Vondra and Ronald Asmus argue that the Atlanticism of CEE countries originates in a specific set of historical experiences these countries have had with the United States over the past century. The articles emphasize on history as an important explanatory variable has been supported by qualitative interviews and my review of relevant literature and has much explanatory power for Czech Republic. Of these formative experiences the ones which I have chosen to focus on will be the creation of the Czech state, Czech encounters with both the NAZI and Communist totalitarian regimes, the recognition of the leading role played by the US in toppling Communism and in facilitating the integration of these countries into Euro-Atlantic Institutions. Thus as a dateline the years 1918, 1938, 1968 and the 1989-1999 period will be reviewed. In looking at these years I will first give a brief background on the event in question, on the lesson learned from that event and on how this event impacts on the preferences of today’s Czech security policy.

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53 Vondra, Alexandr and Asmus, Ronald, D ‘The origins of the atlanticism in Central and Eastern Europe’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Volume 18, Number 2, July 2005

54 Rather than focus on the Czech Republic the article refers to the entire Central European region

55 Strangely, in those years ending in 8, 1918, 1938, 1948 and 1968 the Czech people strove either to gain, maintain or regain their independence.
2.6.1.1. 1918: Creation of the Czechoslovak State

Background

In 1918 the Czechoslovak state was created out of the ruins of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. For almost 400 years, the Czech people had been living under the rule of foreign occupiers under the form of the Austro-Hungarians. The Czechoslovak state became part of the Habsburg Empire in 1526 with the Czechs attempting to defend their privileges and independence against the Habsburgs, who sought to transform the lands they ruled into a centralized and absolute Catholic monarchy. This provoked the Czech nobility’s rebellion in 1618 and at the battle of White Mountain in 1620 the Czechs were severely defeated. One of the most important causes of the defeat was insufficient support from abroad. Following the Battle of White Mountain the Czech lands gradually became a province of the Hapsburg Empire and their security depended on the foreign policy made in Vienna, on which the Czechs had no influence.

In 1914 World War 1 broke out with the Czechs a member of the Austro-Hungarian Empire they had no option but to side with the German – Austro-Hungarian alliance. Czechs rejected the idea of further Germanisation of their lands and began to struggle for complete independence from the Habsburg Empire and the creation of an independent Czech state. Thomas Masaryk launched himself into the campaign for Czech independence at the beginning of the war with the objective being the creation of a common Czech and Slovak state, to be called Czechoslovakia. The existence of the new Czechoslovakia state was to be based on a new system of International Relations and relied on the victory of the Entente powers.

For Czechoslovakia the creation of Poland and Yugoslavia would be significant with Czechoslovakia connecting their own security with their neighborhood. Thus Czechoslovakia wanted to have a common border with Poland and Yugoslavia. For Czechoslovakia it was also significant that other small nationalities like themselves would receive their

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56 Czech Republic become part of the Austrian empire in 1526
57 Vesely: opt cit: 681
58 Vesely: opt cit: 681
59 Vesely: opt cit: 682
60 Unterberger, Betty Miller, The United States, revolutionary Russia and the rise of Czechoslovakia, University of North Carolina Press, 1989
independence. During the War the Czechoslovak foreign resistance had attempted to contribute militarily to the Entente’s victory. The Czechoslovak legion which by the end of the war numbered 90,000 men was formed and fought alongside allied powers in the War.  

It is important to also take into consideration that the Czechoslovak state was declared in Washington and came about largely as a result of US President Woodrow Wilson’s determination to have ‘self determination for all nations’. Indeed Vondra and Asmus profess that ‘without Woodrow Wilson’s idealism and activism, Czechoslovakia would never have gained independence at least not in 1918’ Thomas Masaryk the founding father of the Czech state was a regular visitor the United States during the war. He also married an American and from his viewpoint saw the US as an important protector of the smaller nations such as Czechoslovakia in their fight against domination by foreign powers. In his book ‘The makings of a state’ Masaryk wrote ‘The American state is different from the European states programme inherited from the institutions of the old regime… I devoted much time thinking to the idea that the Czechoslovak state would resemble America in that we too have no dynasty of our own and dislike foreign dynasty’.

Lesson

- America a liberator and promoter of democracy in Czech eyes

1918 was important in so far as in Czech eyes America came to be seen as a liberator rather than an oppressor. Woodrow Wilson’s determination to have ‘self determination for all nations’ created a positive impression of the United States who came to be seen as a protector and defender of small nations. This is in contrast to European powers with which Czech people had just spent 400 years under foreign occupation. This negative impression of European powers was further embedded in the national consciousness in 1938 and 1968 when I discuss Czech experiences in these formative periods. Also this positive impression of America as a liberator rather than an oppressor has lasted to a certain extent until the present.

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61 Vesely: opt cit: 683

62 Vondra: opt cit:

63 Masaryk is largely considered as a hero to the Czech people, In a poll conducted in 2005 by Czech TV and which garnered 68,000 votes he was voted as second greatest Czech of all time, http://www.radio.cz/en/article/67495

64 Diary of Thomas Masaryk cited in Vondra and Asmus: opt cit
day and will be seen when we discuss Czech motivations for having the US place their missile radar base here. In the discourse on the radar those on the pro-radar side were keen to point out that America unlike the ‘other powers’ has never had hegemonic ambitions in Czech Republic. America and the image of America in Czech Republic as a democracy committed to promoted democratic values has resulted in a positive image of itself. Although this is partly due to its geographical location 3,000 km from the Czech Republic it is also because America helped create the Czech state and has never had any imperialistic ambitions in the region.

- **Sovereignty can be achieved with support of the major powers**

1918 also showed to Czech elites that sovereignty can be achieved with the aid of great powers. It showed that with the right support from another state sovereignty and independence is possible. Czech’s Atlanticist orientation post 1989 has an element of this thinking, with elements determined to preserve Czech sovereignty keen to ally and gain support of the world’s major power. (US). ‘The fact that Masaryk went to America during the war shows something. Why did he go there? He had to think that the America regime was somehow going to help to work towards an Independent Czechoslovakia and it did help because America immediately did recognize free Czechoslovakia in 1918 so of course you can draw parallels between 1918 and now’. 66

2.6.1.2. Munich 1938 : Abandoned by its allies

**Background**

At the Munich Conference on September 29th, 1939 the representatives of Great Britain, Germany, Britain, France and Italy decided that in the interests of preserving peace Czechoslovakia should surrender in the border regions. In March 1939 Hitler forced Slovakia to declare independence. He then immediately ordered the occupation of the Czech lands and annexed them as a protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. The Western powers, which had guaranteed the continued existence of the remains of Czechoslovakia after the Munich

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65 This pro-American sentiment is not shared by all elements of the Czech Population. During Missile Defence negotiations X % of the population had

66 Interview: Marat Neuman, May 15th 2010

67 Vesely: opt cit: 682
agreement, betrayed the country a second time when their only reaction to Hitler’s latest aggression was to protest.

Lesson

- *Keep American commitments to Europe alive and credible*

In Western European elites and the general public often suggest that the continent is exposed too much to American influence and domination. This view is not shared in the Czech Republic and can be traced back to the interwar period and America’s withdrawal from Europe and move towards isolationism. Vondra and Asmus reflect that ‘Many Czech’s look back at their experience in the 20th century and especially 1938 and conclude that the problems they faced were the result of too little as opposed to too much America’. 68 In their article they state that ‘It was with greater regret and trepidation that Czech and Central European leaders and diplomats watched American withdrawal from European politics in the 1930s, leaving them to fend for themselves against the backdrop of depression, rising nationalism and predatory geopolitics. In Central European eyes, it was America’s retreat from European politics in the 1920s that paved the way for the rise of Hitler and Stalin and eventual destruction of their independence’. 69

Today for Atlanticists only a solid link and credible commitment on the part of the United States provides Czech Republic and the other CEE countries with a strong sense of security, something confirmed by a statement by former Polish President Kwasniewski (1997)‘With Poland’s history in mind, in particular the historical experience connected with the causes and the courses of both world wars, we oppose attempts to marginalize the presence of the United States in the process of European unification. It is in this sense that we shall pursue our policy within the region and outside it… the two world wars proved to the peoples of Europe and American that without a US presence in Europe, European security is unlikely to be achieved’. 70

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68 Vondra and Asmus: opt cit: 204

69 Vondra and Asmus: opt cit: 205

This can explain the strong preference of the Czech Republic for maintaining an American military presence in Europe something which will be looked at in more detail when I discuss the Czech motivations behind placing the radar base in Czech Republic and concerns over Obama’s ‘reset strategy’. Indeed the primary objective of Czech Security policy today as stated in my hypothesis in Chapter 3 is to keep American commitments to Europe alive and credible.

- Maintain credible alliances that cannot be broken

The failure of the little Entente and the League of Nations to protect the Czechoslovak territory showed the importance of being part of credible alliances for the Czech Republic. It also showed the weaknesses of international organizations to provide security. While the League of Nations spoke about maintaining peace throughout the world in reality it lacked the military instruments and will to do so without the United States and with limited commitment from other powers. For Jiri Schneider of the Prague Institute of Security Studies the main lesson from 1938 was pretty simple ‘you better be part of a credible alliance, not to be left alone’. Interviews with officials inside the Ministry of Defense give further backing to Schneider’s comments with one official stating ‘the lesson of 1938 was to seek alliances which can’t be broken’.

Since 1989 the Czech Republic has made great efforts to maintain alliances and keep them credible. Bi-laterally there is a great effort to ensure that the bi-lateral relations with US cannot be broken the way relations akin to the Little Entente 1938. This will be looked at in more detail in the next chapter through a case study of the missile defense system but the basic premise is that if an important ally asks for a favour there is no reason to say no. Similarly although the Czech public are no great supporters of out of area missions far away from the Czech homeland a feeling remains that this missions are an important way in which to keep the NATO alliance credible.

Czech Republic’s strong attachment towards NATO can be seen in Article 20 of the Czech Security Strategy which states ‘NATO remains the core security organization in the Euro-Atlantic area. It embodies the transatlantic link that plays an indispensible role in Euro-

71 Interview: Schneider

72 Interviews inside ministry of Defence conducted on X, officials requested that the remained anonymous
Atlantic security and stability’. While its commitment to keeping the alliance credible can be seen in Article 11 ‘The Czech Republic has undertaken to improve its defense capabilities as part of the alliance’s commitment to enhance and develop its military capabilities. To this end, the Czech Republic is gradually building a fully professional, highly mobile, and flexible army with modern equipment, capable of participating in a broad range of Alliance missions and other international operations, including operations conducted outside the Czech Republic’s territory’. This approach is based on the unquestionable value of collective defense and co-operative security provided by international organizations and multilateral arrangements. For Czech Republic the pillar of collective defense is NATO

- Do not rely on European powers alone

During this period the Czechoslovaks were very much left down by fellow European powers. France unsuccessfully attempted to stand up to Hitler’s increasing aggression by working with the USSR to create a collective security policy. Under the influence of Great Britain however France eventually chooses a policy of concessions towards Hitler. Both France and Great Britain reckoned that Hitler could be satisfied and another world war thereby averted. Thus a policy of appeasement towards Hitler was pursued by the European powers at the Czechoslovaks expense.

The experience of 1938 has made Czech Republic very skeptical about Western Europe’s willingness to defend the other Europe without material help and moral pressure from the United States. What is also notable about 1938 is that it formed a negative conception of certain European allies and a mistrust of the ability of European powers to defend the Czech Republic against invasion by foreign powers. For Nick Hynek 1938 created a certain mistrust towards certain European countries ‘These are discursive moments saying that you can’t trust certain countries and you need to be careful of whom to trust because of experiences, by this I refer especially to Britain and France’. While Czech Republic there is in no sense any

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73 Czech security strategy 2003

74 Czech security strategy 2003

75 Interview: Nik Hynek , Date X
hostility towards France or Britain there is an underlying sentiment that certain powers cannot be trusted in the realm of hard security. 76

- Do not rely on Multilateral Institutions or International Law for your security

While Czech Republic is a great supporter of the United Nations and international institutions it also recognizes the weaknesses of these institutions in the military realm and thus places great emphasis on gaining protection from America, either through bi-lateral relations or through the NATO framework. German occupation of Czech territory came despite great efforts to preserve their state following independence. Multi-lateral relations were one of the main methods used to ensure the security of the Czechoslovak state. The main architect of the country’s foreign policy the foreign policy minister Edward Benes was aware that the state’s security was dependent on the larger system of International Relations. 77 Therefore ever since its accession he was an active member of the League of Nations, an international organization setup to act as a guarantee of peace and security. Czechoslovak sought to improve its position in the International system through active engagement and activity in the League of Nations. 78 Benes believed that for small states the most effective means to ensure security was through the League of Nations. Today Czech Republic supports multi-lateral institutions such as the UN and believes they provide a good framework to work towards the prevention of security threats such as weapons disbarment however it is unwilling to rely on these institutions for its security.

- Deal with threats at an early stage

A further defining tenet of Czech security culture, is a disposition of favoring pro-active engagement. Again this is rooted in history and derives from an enduring facet of Czech identity as being victims of Western European pacifism (French and British appeasement towards Hitler and the concessions made to Hitler at the Munich Conference). As a result there is a preference for dealing with perceived military threats in their early stages and at a great distance from Czech territory. The rationale of this according to Khol this is based on the conviction and historical experience that they may materialize sooner or later and that a

76 Vesely: opt cit: 684

77 Vesely: opt cit: 684

78 Vesely: opt cit: 684
good mix of defensive and offensive measures should be directed against them.’ This disposition directly influences current Czech policy and was a factor behind Czech support for NATO action in Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan and also its active policy towards its Eastern neighborhood.

- **Fear of being excluded from crucial decisions**

At the Yalta Conference the Czech Republic and other CEE states were largely ignored with Stalin and the allied powers agreeing to divide up the European continent. For Marcin Zabrowski WW2 and the Yalta Conference left an ‘indelible impression’ on the Central European states and a fear of being excluded from crucial decisions.

- **Revisiting Reiter: Biggest Lesson of 1938: Alliance not neutrality**

As Reiter’s theory at the beginning of the chapter argues states continue policies of success and change policies of failure. Czech Republic’s preference for an alliance can be traced by to its formative experience in 1938 when it’s purely defensive policy failed to protect Czechoslovakia from Nazi Germany. For Khol Czech Republic’s decision to reject neutrality as an option post 1989 can be traced back to 1938 ‘Both the concrete historical experience, and comparative examples of the neutral status of several European states being easily violated both during the first and second world war, bode ill for the neutral policy option, which has no viable tradition here (Czech Republic).’

Conceptually this approach is well expressed in the following relevant passage in the Security Strategy of the Czech Republic

‘The security policy of the Czech Republic emancipates from the principle of the indivisibility of security. The Czech Republic’s security is inseparable from that of the Euro-Atlantic region and the global security situation. Therefore a permanent interest of the Czech Republic

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79 Khol: opt cit: 473

80 What is also telling about the 1938 experience is that it overshadowed the Yalta experience when Czech Republic was overlooked by America as a pawn in the broader go-political game between America and the Soviet Union. At Yalta Conference in 1945 America failed to stand up for the Czech Republic and CEE states and de facto accepted the Soviet sphere of influence in Central Europe. Yet despite this as Vondra and Asmus conclude that ‘ America was nonetheless seen as a benign and positive force….The bitterness of Yalta in 1945 was still somehow overpowered by the bitterness of Munich and a memory of betrayal by former allies in 1938’

81 Khol: opt cit : 473
is the maintenance of an effective role for the United Nations and the strengthening of unity in the Euro-Atlantic security sector. The Czech Republic cannot be indifferent to the fate of other peoples, countries and regions, and therefore it is prepared, in accordance with its capabilities and international partnership to work for the resolution of security problems to mitigate their consequences.  

Learning theory is a better explanatory of Czech Alliance policy post 1989 than balance of threat. Balance of threat theory focuses on short term reactions to changes in the international environment, while learning theory explains how long term ideas about grand strategy are formulated. After a formative event, learning theory predicts that a state that has learned a lesson favoring alliance would prefer alliance with a great power even if there is no current threat to the international environment, because such an orientation is in accord with a broad belief in utility of alliance in dealing with threats when they arrive. This is reflective of the Czech post Cold war situation when Czech elites immediately pushed for inclusion into NATO. This can be seen as part of a broader belief among Czech elites that their security interests are best protected as part of an alliance that is credible. NATO with its article V security guarantee provided this. Also it is important to consider that Russia actions had little impact of this way of thinking as it was part of a broader goal of gaining accession to alliances. In response to this balance of threat advocates might say because different states have different views on how to address future threats, then this would beg the question of where these different views come from, which learning theory answers by proposing the past experiences determine how states come to view the best way of dealing with future threats. In Czech Republic’s accession to NATO it is noteworthy that the country’s entry did not come under the pressure of an immediate threat to its existence but still pushed hard for accession.

2.6.1.3. 1968 – Invaded by a former ally

Background

In 1968 the Communist regime began to democratize conditions in Czechoslovakia. The programme was intended to be a path out of the regime’s crises and simultaneously an attempt

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82 Security Strategy of the Czech Republic passed December 10th 2003

83 Reiter: opt cit: 243
to end a non-Soviet model of socialism.  

On the night of August 20-21 1968, the military forces of five Warsaw Pact countries invaded Czechoslovakia. Although the Western nations officially and publically condemned the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia they essentially accepted it as a fait accompli and considered it largely an Eastern bloc internal matter. M Couvre de Murville, French Prime Minister described the invasion as ‘a small incident on the way to détente’.  

As Vesely ferments ‘ there was a bitterly ironic parallel between the years 1938 and 1968…in the former year Czechoslovak’s allies abandoned it, in the latter they attacked and occupied it’.

Lesson

- Be part of a democratic alliance

In 1968 Czech Republic was invaded by its former ally. The lesson to be gathered from this was that you better be part of a democratic security alliance like NATO and make efforts to keep it credible. Similarly interviews inside the Ministry of Defense would confirm this theory with one of the interviewees responding ‘the big lesson of 1968 is that the Czech Republic must make every effort to ensure that this never occurs again’.

This experience is manifested today in Czech preferences for promoted democracy across the globe. This foreign policy thinking of promoting democracy and human right can be seen in the Czech Republic security policy post 1989 (Especially under the Presidency of Vaclav Havel) and can be linked to this formative experience and period in Czech history. Soon after becoming President Havel emphasized human rights and democracy promotion principles as one the pillars which Czech Foreign and Security Policy should be based on.

‘Many years of living under communism gave us certain experiences that the non communist West (fortunately) did not have to go through. We came to understand (or to be precise some of us did) that the only genuine values are those which one is capable, if necessary, of sacrificing something. The traditional values of Western civilization – such as democracy,

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84 Vesely: opt cit: 688

86 Vesely: opt cit: 668

87 Interview Schneider, Interview Weiss
respect for human rights and the order of nature, the freedom of the individual, and the inviolability of his property, the feeling of co-responsibility for the world, which means the awareness that if freedom is threatened anywhere, it is threatened everywhere- all of these things become values with moral, and therefore metaphysical, underpinnings. Without intending to, the communists taught us to understand the truth of the world not as a mere information about it, but as an attitude, a commitment and a moral imperative’

The Czech Republic’s is a very active promoter of human rights across the globe. The Czech Republic’s active approach can be seen in its criticism of human rights violations of Cuba in the UN and in its approach towards Belarus.

2.6.1.4. 1989-1999 Fall of Communism and integration into Euro-Atlantic Institutions

*Background*

- **1989 - 1992 Fall of Communism**

In 1989 Gorbachev began a policy of perestroika. Soon the Communist regimes in the CEE region began to fall down. The Velvet Revolution of November 1989 ended Communist rule in Czechoslovakia and launched Czechoslovakia on the road to democracy. In particular America rather than Western Europe was accredited with bring down communism. Specifically the emphasis placed on human rights under Jimmy Carter and the rhetoric and military buildup of Ronald Reagan are seen as the core causes. As Vondra states ‘If you ask West Europeans who deserves credit for bringing down communism they will likely name Gorbachev or Brandt while leaders in Czech Republic and CEE, will point to two American president Jimmy Carter and Ronald Regan’.  

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89 It is important to note that a key factor influencing Havel’s foreign policy views was the political thinking of the previously discussed pro – American Masaryk, whose political philosophy was deeply rooted in the Universalist tradition emphasizing humanity and the importance of moral values in politics.  

90 Vondra and Asmus: opt cit
Also in the debate over which methods to use in bringing down Communism the American preference for supporting opposition groups and placing pressure on communist governments proved a much more successful approach than the Western European governments who opted for engagement. The support for the US style of supporting opposition leaders and putting emphasize on human rights can be seen once again in the Czech Republic’s strong approach towards Belarus.

Lesson

- Return to the West- Retrieving Western Identity

Immediately after the collapse of Communism the primary aim of the Czech Republic was a return to West. In this ‘Return to the West’ it is important to note that Czech Republic and other CEE countries always viewed NATO and the EU as complement and never in competition. In the Czech Republic at the time of integration the description of the primary foreign policy goal was integration into ‘Euro-Atlantic’ structures, which basically meant the twin goal of acceding to both the EU and NATO without hierarchy. NATO because of its focus on military structure has never been seen as an alternative to the EU but rather as a complement to it. From the point of view of the Czech Republic NATO was to be in charge of hard security, while the EU focuses on economic matters.

Thus historically Czech Republic never faced a dilemma of having to choose between Western Europe and the US. According to Lukac and Gyarfosova ‘For Central European countries, the classic dilemma throughout modern history has always been one of ‘the West or the East’’. For Czech Republic and CEE countries the East was represented by Russia which was largely viewed as authoritarian and imperialistic. The West was not viewed merely in geographical terms but more represented the idea of ‘Europe’ which they saw as a united, prosperous and secure. In the Interwar period Czechoslovakia’s foreign policy orientation was according to Hahn ‘an expression of its cultural solidarity with the Western civilization’.

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91 An immediate cause of this was that after 1989 the Czech elites that emerged on the scene such as Havel came from opposition groups such as Charter 77 were pro-American grateful for the part American played in bringing down communism and the support they received when in opposition. 91

92 Lukac and Gyarfasova: opt cit: 18

93 Hahn opt cit: cited in Lukac and Gyarfasova: opt cit: 18
With the emergence of the ESDP, the perception remained that NATO should focus on hard security areas while Europe can serve a function as a soft power working on Civilian areas. This Czech views of the two organizations as complementary remains today and can be seen in Article 40 of the Czech Security strategy ‘The Czech Republic seeks to enhance the transatlantic link, in this context it supports the complementary development of the capabilities of NATO and the EU. It also stresses the need to strengthen the NATO/ EU partnership as the backbone of Euro-Atlantic security architecture’. 94

The existence of these twin goals plays a crucial role in examining the transatlantic dimension of foreign policy adjustment. It was one of the key factors in describing the foreign policy of the EU countries as ‘Atlanticist’. Precisely because NATO and EU accession were viewed as complementary and equally important in the 1990s, it was difficult for the political elites that supported both processes to recognize possible controversies between them. The question that will be looked at from now is whether a foreign policy consensus exists today after the twin goals of Euro-Atlantic integration have been achieved? Having returned to the West are NATO and ESDP still seen as entirely complementary. The future of NATO and the ESDP as two competing or complementary organizations will be looked at in more detail in the final chapter.

2.6.1.5. 1993-1999 Integration into Euro-Atlantic Institutions

Background

After 1989 Czechoslovakia had to fundamentally alter its approach to maintaining security as almost overnight it had left its membership in the old Communist bloc. The aim was set that being integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. NATO was given priority with the idea of neutrality never considered. Czechoslovakia did not favor a Central European regional security organization in concert with Hungary and Poland.

The inclinations of many democratic leaders to CEE to look towards the US for security were reinforced by experience of these countries in the 1990s with NATO and EU and the contrasting positions of the US compared to some of the major European powers. France

94 Czech Security strategy: 2003
especially was reluctant with French President Mitterrand commented in that he thought it would be ‘decades and decades’ before CEE could join EU, created shock. In 1991 he proposed a plan for a European Confederation as a way to keep Prague or Warsaw out of EU core, was met with resentment. Europe turned out to be quite reluctant, it took four years and the Copenhagen Conference until Czech Republic saw any real commitment and even then the criteria set was quite strict’.  

In contrast the Czech Republic found great support in Washington in its overarching goal to integrate into Euro-Atlantic Institutions. Within Washington there was a strong lobby (especially strong in the Polish case) among both Democrats and Republicans pushing for the countries of the CEE region to be integrated into Euro-Atlantic institutions. Strong personal connections between leaders on both sides of the Atlantic were also a big factor with strong personal relationships between American President Bill Clinton, the Czech born Madeline Albright (At the time US ambassador to the United States and later US Secretary of State) and Czech President Vaclav Havel. For Schneider the importance of personalities and friendships during this period should not be downplayed ‘Personalities matter…What made US to open NATO would end up in very important impulse from Havel towards Clinton- Clinton came back from a meeting (in Washington Holocaust museum) and said we should let them in…Of course in Washington helpful.. Of course Albright was helpful but personalities matter and you have to pull strings’

Lesson

- America a champion of the Czech cause

As a formative period 1993 – 1999 was very influential. Czech leaders and the general public viewed America as once again the champion of their cause, standing up to Russia pressure and overcoming reluctance of Western Europe. For Khol the current preferences of Czech Security policy are rooted in this period ‘the current preferences of the Czech republic in security and defense policy are clearly determined by the formative experience of its

95 Vondra and Asmus: opt cit:
96 Interview with Marek Neuman
97 Vondra and Asmus: opt cit:
98 Schneider Interview
aspirations for NATO membership in the 1993-1999 period, the actual evolution of the Alliance's stance on this issue and the strong attachments to the US, including its top politicians such as Bill Clinton and Secretary of State. The conduct of the NATO enlargement process therefore contributed to the self-declared belonging of the Czech Republic to the informal pro-Atlanticist group both in the Alliance and in Europe as a whole. Khol further elaborates that the Czech Atlanticist leaning is strongly linked to this period. In many issues of the Intra Alliance debate Prague could be counted on to support the pro-Atlanticist viewpoint, partially as a result of a combination brought about as a result of its interest in a vibrant Atlantic alliance based on a continued American military presence in mainland Europe, and its gratitude for the role played by the US in bringing about NATO enlargement.

While Germany initially raised the issue of NATO enlargement from the period 1993-1999 it was an issue dominated by the US. As Vondra and Asmus highlight it was America who pushed the issue. Washington became a driving force both politically and intellectually in overcoming opposition and moving the alliance to open its doors to new members as well as to embrace a robust open door policy to ensure the enlargement would continue in spite of strong Russian opposition. This strong American leadership on NATO issue also put pressure on EU to keep pace.

All those interviewed agreed that EU membership which came in 2004 would not have come about without joining NATO in 1999. Similarly the consensus among Czech leaders was that EU accession would never have come about without NATO accession. While it may appear that the two organizations worked in coordination, the reality was the EU proved to be much more hesitant while NATO was determined to take concrete steps toward European unification in the EU. This greater determination is largely attributed to the United States.

- Atlanticism can transcend geo-political dilemma of living in central Europe

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99 Khol, Radek, ‘Czech Republic: Prague’s Pragmaticism’ Contemporary Security Policy, Vol 26, No 3 (December 2005), 47-485


101 Vondra and Asmus: opt cit: 208

102 NATO criteria is a lot less strict as NATO membership involved joining a military political alliance while the EU is a supra-national organization with multi-level governance.
In reflecting on the lessons Czech Republic has learned over the past 100 years Asmus and Vondra lament ‘History thought us never be caught in a dark alley between Russia and Germany or rely on France or UK for national salvation’ In this sense Atlanticism also offered the Czech Republic the opportunity to escape geographical burdens that had plagued the country of the past 100 years. For the Czech Republic America was considered the only reliable actor to be able to keep in check German Central European ambitions and from dissuading Russia from having territorial ambitions in the region. Also the Czech Republic due to its size is reconciled to the notion that it is unable to provide its own security but if they must accept a hegemony in the International system their preference is for a hegemony that is not a nearby state. ‘Thanks to American leadership they were able to transcend the dilemma of living in a geo-political no-man’s land between Germany and Russia and obtain the same level of security taken for granted in Western Europe’. ‘

As shown previously security cultures are subject to change. One area where Czech security culture has undergone a major shift is in its perceptions of Germany. According to Eva Hahn a Czech Historian ‘From the Czech viewpoint, the position of Germany on Czech maps of Europe represent a bigger problem than their own placement there’. However over the last 20 years Czech Republic has largely come to terms with the German question a process strongly aided by European integration. This perception of Germany has changed over the last 20 years however and the feeling that Germany as a threat that needs to be balanced against no longer exists. Increasingly today the Czech Republic is viewing Germany as a partner rather than a competitor. Indeed in my case studies there is little to no evidence of Czech actions been representative of the Czech Republic somehow viewing Germany as a threat. Also Germany was a great supporter of Czech integration into NATO in the 1990s and proposed this; while America is remember as the power that pushed forward the accession process the support from Germany has not been forgotten. Although elements of Euro skepticism remain in the Czech Republic especially within the ODS party and best manifested by the attitudes of Czech president Klaus this sentiment is more reflective of concern about the course of European integration rather than seeing Germany as a threat with hegemonic ambitions in the Czech Republic.

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103 Vondra: opt cit:

104 Hahn, E, Cesí a imaginári hranice medzi Zapadom a Východom Evropá’, Prague 1997 cited in Lukac and Gyarsova: opt cit: 18
2009 Obama’s Reversal on Missile Defence and ‘reset’ strategy with Russia

In 2009 the Obama administration cancelled a proposed planned missile defense project, a reversal on the Bush administration’s policy. The background to this, whether it can be considered a formative experience and if so what are the lessons learned will be looked at in my Chapter 4.

2.6.2. Geographical position

The geographical position of Czech Republic at the heart of Central Europe and surrounded by great powers has a major impact on its security preferences. To properly understand the difference of Czech security culture with that of the Western powers one needs to take into account geographical factors. Geographical factors are intrinsically intertwined with historical factors. The Czech Republic’s position between Germany and Russia/ Soviet Union has in the past 100 years been a source of threat to the Czech state and the cause of two invasions of Czech territory, 1938 and 1968. This turbulent history coupled with its position as a small state sandwiched between larger states means that Czech security policy remains concerned with territorial defense.

Lesson of geography

- Strong attachment towards territorial defense.

In terms of strategic culture the Czech Republic due to its geographical location and historical experience of invasion can be seen to have a strong attachment towards territorial defense something shared by all CEE states. In terms of territorial defense the Czech Republic is not ready to rely on international institutions or weak defensive organizations such as the ESDP for its protection, given the poor track record of these organizations in the key formative

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105 Having briefly looked at Czech history over the past 100 years one can see that Czech Republic has found itself at the centre of geo-political conflict. The geography of the Czech Republic wedged between Germany and Russia and living next to more powerful aggressive neighbors has led to a negative national experience. In contrast negative experience with great European powers however has not been shared with America. According to Vondra and Asmus ‘If there is one largely positive experience the region has in common, it has been the United States….In the eyes of most central and Eastern Europeans, the United States is one of the major Western power that has never constituted a threat to them’. 105 One the contrary to US was seen as central in the creation of the Czech Republic as well as liberation from communist rule and later Soviet dominated communist rule.
events of 1938 and 1968, when the sovereignty of the Czech Republic was threatened by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Institutions such as the League of Nations and the present United Nations are strongly supported but are seen as being ineffective in preventing conflicts. As a result of its attachment to territorial defense there remains a strong preference in Czech Republic for an American led NATO, which is prepared to execute article V of the treaty in the event of an attack. Czech attachment towards territorial defense is linked to Czech perceptions of Russia as a threat. This threat perception will now be looked at.

**Impact of Geographical Proximity to Russia – Perceptions of Russia threat**

In this section I will look at Czech perceptions of Russia as a threat however before I do this I first would like to outline the divergent approaches among European member states over whether Russia constitutes a threat and also how best to deal with Russia (Engagement or Containment) and also Russia’s divergent approaches towards ‘Old’ and ‘New’ member states and its actions in its ‘near abroad’.

*Contrasting East West Approaches towards Russia*

The question of how to deal with Russia has replaced relations with US as the most divisive issue among European states and one in which we see great divergence among member states. In a comprehensive report of each countries relations towards Russia Leonard and Popescu referred to Russia as the ‘new Rumsfeld’. The deeper meaning behind the term not only lies behind Rumsfeld assertion during the lead up to the Iraq war but also reflects how the divide over the Russian issue draws similar parallels between ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe.

During the 1990s the EU members generally agreed on a common approach to Russia and they developed a strategy of democratizing and Westernizing Russia. However today this common strategy no longer exists. Furthermore the divisions between the EU members over Russia are much more complex than a split between old and new member states. The European Council of Foreign Relations (ECPR) report entitled ‘Power audit of EU 27 – Russian relations’ shows that the EU is split in two approaches: At one end of the spectrum are those who view Russia as a potential partner that can be drawn into the EU’s orbit through a process of ‘creeping integration’. At the other end are member states that see and treat

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Russia as a threat. According to them, Russian expansionism and contempt for democracy must be rolled back through a policy of ‘soft containment’ that involves excluding Russia from the G8, expanding NATO to include Georgia, supporting anti-Russian regimes in the neighborhood, building missile shields, developing an ‘Energy NATO’ and excluding Russian investment from the European energy sector.  

In Leonard and Popescu’s report they identified 5 distinct groups who all had different approaches towards Russia. The Czech Republic is identified as a ‘frosty pragmatist’ who focus on business interests but are less afraid than others to speak out against Russian behavior on human rights and other issues. Czech are not as strong in this opposition as Lithuania and Poland on the other hand, who are identified as new cold warriors, who have overtly hostile relationship with Moscow and are willing to use their veto to block EU negotiations with Russia. On the whole most New Europeans have shown a more cautious stand vis-à-vis Russia compared to their Western counterparts. For them, integration into the EU is a way to defend their interests as independent and sovereign states and nullify the potential influence of Russia in their domestic affairs.

Czech Republic has not refrained from criticizing Russia while keeping their business interests high on the agenda. The differences in the strategies of Poland and the Czech Republic regarding Russia according to Coskun ‘clearly shown that in spite of similarities of historical memories regarding the Soviet Union, they have not developed similar policy lines towards Russia’ However as is in the case of Russian most of the CEE and Baltic states including Czech Republic have adjusted their policies within the context of their respective strategic cultures as well as their economic and political considerations regarding Russia.

The impact of Czech’s geographical position and perception of Russia on Czech strategic culture can be seen in its Eastern policies which are quite distinct from its Western European counterparts. With Russia in mind in external relations it unsurprisingly puts emphasis on the Eastern neighborhood and energy security within the CFSP. Its active approach to raising

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107Leonard and Popescu: opt cit: 2

108It should be taken into consideration that within Czech Republic itself there is great division over how best to deal with Russia. These divisions exist among academics and policymakers but also among the main political parties. In particular the CSSD tends to adopt a more pragmatic approach towards Russia and emphasizes the economic relationship. The ODS is much more anti-Russian in its Rhetoric and in its actions.

109Coskun: opt cit: 83
democracy and human rights across the globe can also be linked to Russia. These issues will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.

- Russia’s different approach to ‘Old’ and New Member states- ‘Divide and Rule tactics’

Divisions over Russia between East and West have to do with different perceptions that are rooted in geography and history. However these divisions have been deliberately exacerbated by a Russian strategy of ‘divide and rule’ towards member states. Russia has sought to bi-lateralize its energy deals with EU member states which make the individual EU member state weaker and challenges EU solidarity. As Leonard and Popescu point out ‘It (Russia) mounts charm offensives to seduce the political and economic leaders of big member states while coercing the weaker neighbors with political and economic pressure’.  

Russia’s preference for dealing with states bi-laterally rather than through EU framework can be summarized by the statement of Konstantuin Kosachev chair of the Dumas’ international relations committee ‘We are sick and tired of dealing with Brussels beaurocrats. In Germany, Italy, France we can achieve much more. The EU is an institution that contributes to our relationship, but an institution that slows down progress’.  

Russia’s charm offensive towards Western Member states are in sharp contrast towards it actions towards New Member states. Russia uses Europe’s dependence on gas and oil to attain its goals including the establishment of a ‘privileged relationship’ with Germany. In Central Europe Russia tries to control gas downstream in an attempt to obtain a political tool over them. In July 2008 Russia significantly cut oil supplies to the Czech Republic. An decision that coincided with Czech Republic signing the missile defense treaty. This was not the first time though in 2003 it interrupted oil supplies to Latvia and to Lithuania in 2006 symbolic of Russia’s willingness to use coercive methods towards CEE states. In a study of cuts offs or threatened cut offs of Russia energy to EU members Robert Larsson found a total of 55 separate instances from 1992-2006. While technical problems or accidents were offered by way of explanation by Russia as the cause behind the cut offs, the study concluded that

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110 Leonard and Popescu: opt cit: 14
111 Interview with ECFR Moscow, July 4th 2007 cited in Leonard and Popescu
112 Federov, Yuri: opt cit: 37
these events occurred at times when Russia wanted to achieve some political or economic objectives. 113

Dividing ‘New’ and ‘Old’ Europe is one of the strategic goals of Russian policy towards Europe – particularly in Central Europe. It’s aim is to “enfeeble European solidarity and stimulate divisions with the EU and NATO, and to establish its influence upon security related-decision making in the Eastern part of Central Europe”. 114 Those are integral elements of Moscow’s ‘grand strategy’, which sees a ‘fragmentation of the West’ and a capitalization on discrepancies between the US, EU and other European countries as a principal condition and tool of strengthening Russia’s global position. 115 The Medvedev foreign policy doctrine presumes that the former Soviet-bloc members are within Russia’s region of ‘privileged interests’ which consists of countries with which Russia shares ‘special historical relations’, to which it is bound together as friends and good neighbors’ and which it has ‘built friendly ties’. 116 This doctrine is used in reference not only to the former Soviet Republics but also to the former Soviet bloc members. According to Federov ‘it may mean that in the longer term the Visegrad states are seen as an area for Russian geopolitical and economic expansion, or at least a zone of influence’. 117 Russian reactions to the Czech missile defence plans signal that Russia wants to dictate security and defense related issues in the former Warsaw pact.

For Czech Republic the fear of Russia is shaped by geo-historical experience. Today politicians in Czech Republic do not fear an attack but they fear the Russia political-economic complex that considers the Czech Republic to be their patrimony and behave accordingly. As shown more aggressively than they would dare in Western Europe. 118

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115 Federov’ Yury : opt cit: 36
116 Interview with Dimitri Medvedev to television channels One, Rossia and NTV, cited in Federov opt cit
117 Federov, Yuri : opt cit: 37
118 Interview Weiss; Interview Král
Back in 2003 and 2004 the Orange and Rose revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia were seen as evidence of Russia’s declining influence in the ‘near abroad’ region. However 6 years on the balance certainly seems to have shifted back towards Russia. As Leonard and Popescu point out ‘Contrary to what many in Europe think, Russia’s neighborhood policy is better co-ordinate, better developed and better implemented than the EU’s. Russia devoted more political, economic and military resources to influencing its neighborhood than the EU does’. Also Russia has plenty of carrots to offer these states the strongest being cheap energy. In Ukraine and Moldavia Russia has exerted great economic pressure and influenced domestic groups through Russian sponsored media, NGO’s, youth groups and political actors. The policy definitely seems to have paid dividends in Ukraine as on April 29th 2010 New Ukrainian president Victor Yanukovych signed into law a deal extending Russia’s naval base in Crimea in return for 30 per cent cheaper gas imports. When carrots don’t work Russia is not afraid to employ sticks, with the invasion of South Ossetia sending a clear signal that Russia is not afraid to use force to protect its interests in its ‘near abroad’

2.6.3. Domestic System

Introduction

Beyond size, history and geopolitics, Czech security policy and strategic culture is also influenced by a number of domestic factors. In this section I will look at the internal political setup in the Czech Republic. Here I will begin with a discourse on the two main political parties the ODS and the ČSSD and their attitudes and policies towards Brussels, NATO and Washington. Also reviewed but in less detail will be the smaller political parties such as the Green party, the KDU and the Communist party. New political parties such as Top 09 and UU will not be reviewed here. Although these parties look likely to gain access into Parliament in the upcoming elections it is too early to access how they will act should they join government.

119 Leonard and Popescu: opt cit: 17

120 The need to review the positions of the small political parties is due to the constitutional setup in the Czech Republic (PR electoral system) which in practice inevitably tends to lead to weak coalition government. Thus

under this system the influence of small parties on foreign policy tends to be magnified. Also looked at will be the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense, institutions which have impacted on foreign policy making since 1989 and tend to be Atlanticist in nature.

**Discourse of the Main Political Parties - Assessing the Orientation of Czech Political Parties**

The object of this section is to study the security policy orientation of the main political parties in the Czech Republic and review the attitudes of the main parties towards the US, the ESDP and NATO. In terms of methodology I will look at the position of the main parties when issues linked to these topics were discussed but also official party documents such as elections manifesto’s and public statements by politicians. Here particular attention will be given to a comprehensive study carried out by the Europeum Institute on Atlanticism in the Czech Republic in 2008 which looked at the position of the main political parties in the Atlanticist-European divide in the 2006 election. The political parties’ position in 2006 will be compared with that in 2010 in order to access if any changes have taken place over the resulting four years. Before I begin I will first define the terms Atlanticist and Europeanist and how these ideological pools tend to be applied to the main political parties. Later in the next chapter when I look at issues such as the missile defense, the Iraq war and the Czech EU presidency I will test the accuracy of how these definitions generally applied towards the main parties.

- **Defining the Terms Atlanticist and Europeanist**

In their study by Drulak, Koran and Ruzicka identified four basic ideological pools of the Czech Republic towards security, internationalism, autonomism, Europeanism and Atlanticism. These four ideological groups ‘contribute to foreign policy making and foreign policy public debates, while sharing some basic normative assumptions about international relations and a desirable foreign policy orientation’.

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122 This research was submitting just prior to the outcome of the May 2010 elections


124 Drulak P, Koran M and Ruzicka J: opt cit:
The ‘Europeanist’ camp are those who agree on the need to strengthen and deepen political integration. They tend to be lukewarm with regard the US often even opposing its foreign policy. Their view of Russia is more pragmatic and focuses on the development of their economic policies. \(^{125}\) This orientation is strong in ČSSD and very strong in Greens.

‘Atlanticist’ according to Koran represents ‘mirror image of Europeanists’. \(^{126}\) For Atlanticists emphasis is placed on developing relations with the US (Bi-laterally or multi-laterally) and in strengthening NATO. On the whole Atlanticists tend to be guarded about deeper EU integration with a preference for widening over deepening. They are critical of the EU’s plans for a common and defense policy, a goal which they see as incompatible with transatlantic defense. To a varying degree Atlanticists are rather hesitant with regard Russia, perceiving it as a potential threat and prefer instead to place stress on the political rather than the economic dimension. \(^{127}\) The ODS tends to adopt this position they support Czech membership to the EU but have serious doubts about it at the same time. For Atlanticists the EU is based on economic benefits while NATO is based on common values. \(^{128}\)

A ‘Sovereignist’ or ‘Autonomist’ approach is one which involves not allying with the US or any other actor. The Communist party adopts such a position and would like Czech Republic to leave NATO and is very hesitant towards the EU. \(^{129}\)

‘Internationalists’ deem the EU and the US to be equally important and see no paradox between having a strong NATO and a strong European defense capabilities. They see both as providing further socio-economic and liberal development as well as security and therefore the US and Germany are considered as essential partners. In the event of a clash between the US and the EU such as the war in Iraq Internationalists tend to avoid a strong stance towards either side. Also internationalists tend to be active promoters of human rights and democracy.


\(^{126}\) Ibid.

\(^{127}\) Koran: opt cit: 28

\(^{128}\) Koran: opt cit: 28

\(^{129}\) Koran: opt cit: 28
throughout the world. This position is best represented in the Czech Republic by the Christian Democrat KDU party. ¹³⁰

These definitions give an outline of the main dividing lines and approaches of Czech Republic to security. However it is impossible to separate these entirely and instead often best to deal with these approaches on a case by case basis. As will be shown parties do not always line up under these approaches but as a general rule parties do accord to these positions¹³¹. Example of a break away from these ideological can be seen in the ODS under Klaus certainly which shows elements of a sovereignist approach especially in its Euro-Skeptic attitude.

Also it is important to take into consideration the distinction between government and opposition as parties tend to speak and act much differently when in power compared to out of power. In opposition parties are much freer to criticize in the knowledge that they are not liable. In Czech Republic the difference between government and opposition is particularly strong with the populist nature of party leaders something that needs to be taken into consideration. This difference between government and opposition will be seen later in my analysis when I look at the CSSD’s position towards the war in Iraq and also the missile defense.

Position of the Political Parties

- Czech political parties relationship with NATO and the ESDP

With regards NATO support for the alliance raises as you go from left to right with the Communist’s calling for its dissolvement and the ODS being the most supportive. The same applies the other way around towards the ESDP with support rising from right to left. ¹³² ¹³³

The ODS’s position towards these two organization can be seen in the party documents during the 2006 election campaign. In the election programme of 2006 the ODS state that the ESDP must develop not a substitute for NATO. ¹³⁴ The party does support some precisely defined tasks for the ESDP without the US however only if this is done not at the expense of

¹³⁰ Koran: opt cit: 29
¹³¹ The party programmes of the 2006 and 2010 elections clearly reflect these positions
¹³² The exception is the communist party who do not support the ESDP
¹³³ For a diagrammatical representation of this please see illustration 4 attached at the end of the text
¹³⁴ ODS 2006
creating duplicity. The ODS is also against the creation of the European army. In the ODS documents Czech army reform and ensuring interoperability with NATO missions is considered the main imperative with involvement in the ESDP seen as not being important.\textsuperscript{135} It also rejects the EU defense clause among EU members and feels strongly that the EU should not develop into a defense union.

In the 2010 election campaign the clearest change in position compared to 2006 can be seen in the ODS party. Those who advocated the usefulness of European Integration in the security realm have gained weight over the past four years. One an individual level the biggest change has been the partial retreat of Jan Zahradil and the rise of Alexandr Vondra (Named shadow foreign Minister of the ODS in election campaign). MEP Jan Zahradil is a strong Atlanticist and is vocally against political integration of the EU in the foreign policy field. Although Mr. Vondra is a very sound Atlanticist, he is more Internationalist than Zahradil and is more open to co-operation with the EU. Vondra’s switch to a more internationalist position in recent times can be linked to his role as deputy Prime Minister of EU affairs during the Czech EU presidency (Socialization factors) and also America’s decline in interest in Central Europe.

ODS thinking can be linked to the weak nature of the ESDP. The ODS election document of 2006 highlights low military spending among EU countries with only 5 out of 15 member states spending more than 2% of GDP on defense.\textsuperscript{136} Petr Necas leader of the ODS and possible next Prime Minsiter is also one of the leading defense experts within the party and also drafted large parts of the agenda on foreign policy. In the documents he highlights the defense technology capability gap between the US and European allies, including overall defense spending. In light of this he argues the EU will not be able to develop to replace NATO in the near future.\textsuperscript{137}

The long term programme of the CSSD attaches ‘great importance to the construction of effective foreign and security policy of the European union which is a necessary precondition for enhancing the EU’s role in the international community and an important instrument for

\textsuperscript{135} Kral D, Weiss, T and Rihacova V: opt cit: 74
\textsuperscript{136} Kral D, Weiss, T and Rihacova V: opt cit: 74
\textsuperscript{137} Kral D, Weiss, T and Rihacova V: opt cit: 74
crises and conflict prevention as well as for effective management of existing conflicts’ 138 It calls of member states of the EU to create a united, internally co-ordinated and legislatively anchored defense system. The position of the Social Democrats is built on a long vision which sees Czech security as being built on two pillars the ESDP and NATO. However it is clear from a discourse of the party’s documents that the CSSD party is much more enthusiastic about an independent role for the EU in foreign policy.

Among the smaller parties the KDU-CSL who in previous election gained 7 per cent of the vote and 13 seats in the Chamber of Deputies acknowledge the dominant role of the US in NATO but claims that in the event of local conflicts in Europe- European capabilities should be developed and by deployed. The party manifesto supports transatlantic link and advocates more responsibility for European NATO member however it rules out any steps that would run counter to NATO and weaken the organization. 139

For the Green party deepening of the ESDP is an indispensible part of European integration. For the Green party the long term goal is that the European defense capabilities replace NATO in Europe. It calls on EU member states to be more assertative in their relations with the United States, including NATO, and to take into account the interests of the EU as defined by the EU CFSP, especially should the US policy remain as unilateral and controversial as it has after 9/11. 140

The Communist party remains true to their sovereignist orientation and call for a Czech withdrawal from NATO military structures. There is no direct reference to the ESDP in the party documents but it is safe to assume that the party also has a negative stance towards ESDP and would not support an active Czech approach within the ESDP. 141

- Position towards Europe

As far as attitudes towards the EU are concerned it must be acknowledged that this is a highly complicated political position and that all parties support the EU with different degrees of

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139 Kral D, Weiss, T and Rihacova V: opt cit: 76
140 Kral D, Weiss, T and Rihacova V: opt cit: 77
141 Kral D, Weiss, T and Rihacova V: opt cit: 77
enthusiasm. The ODS especially when Klaus was ruler was seen as quite a Euro-skeptic party and the relationship between the ODS and EU being seen more as a ‘marriage of convenience’.¹⁴² The ODS is opposed to ‘more Europe’ in Czech affairs and instead of majority voting prefers looser alliances. However since 2006 evidence suggests that the party is becoming more ‘Europeanist’, especially the EU Presidency seems to have affected the party and begun a ‘Europeanization’ process within the party.

In contrast then CSSD tends to be much more positive towards the EU.¹⁴³ Its position is often closely in line with the Socialists parties in the European institutions.

- US military Presence in Europe

Although election manifesto’s and party document rarely make direct reference to the desirability to maintain an American military presence in Europe a divergence between parties can be seen. In the ODS election manifesto of 2006 it stated ‘American engagement in Europe is a necessary pre-condition for it is absolutely essential and that ‘only the transatlantic link is a guarantee of our civilization’.¹⁴⁴ Similarly Jan Zahradil ODS leader in the European parliament argues that ‘ American engagement in Europe into the NATO framework is the best guarantee of the general interests of the Euro-Atlantic civilization and is in the long term, a necessary pre-condition of European security and stability.¹⁴⁵ This position has remained the same over the last four years. When asked during the election campaign if he would be happy if America were to withdraw from Europe, Vondra said he would not support any such moves and that the Czech Republic must make every effort to maintain a US presence.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴² Europeum document


¹⁴⁵ ODS 2006 cited in Kral D, Weiss, T and Rihacova V: opt cit: 71

¹⁴⁶ Vondra, Alexandr, ‘Symposium Czech Foreign Policy’, 3-5 May 2010, Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs
The CSSD long term programme contains a relatively extensive chapter on foreign, security and defense policy yet no direct reference to the issue of US military presence in Europe. Instead most emphasis is placed on the European Security and Defense project.

Similarly the KDU-CSL and the Green party make no direct reference to the issue of US military presence in Europe in their manifesto’s either. The autonomist communist party calls for the removal of US troops from Europe. 147

Before beginning this section I asked the question if a consensus existed among the main parties on foreign policy issues now that the twin goals of NATO and EU integration had been achieved. From this we can see that the consensus that dominated Czech foreign policy in the 1990s and early 2000s that pushed for integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions has largely disappeared and that the Czech political scene is clearly polarized. When it gets down to attitudes towards the US-EU-NATO the division of the Czech political scene along the right-left axis is clearly visible. This short introduction of the position of the political party’s confirms the hypothesis of Kral, Weiss and Rihacova and the ideological pools of Koran which show that the more the party is to the right the more it tends to follow a closer alignment with the US, the further left the more likely to are to partake in a more Anti-American stance. Thus a clear left-right distinction is clearly visible in the Czech political scene. This divide between Atlanticist and Europeanist positions will be elaborated upon in the next Chapter in the case studies.

Chart 2 Positioning of Czech Parties on the left = right axis

Summary of Different approaches to foreign policy issues among two main parties

Position towards US

147 Kral D, Weiss, T and Rihacova V: opt cit: 71
ODS – Czech Republic should make every effort to formulate strong relationship with US either through NATO or direct bi-lateral relationship

CSSD – Relations with US should be through the EU or NATO framework

**Russia**

CSSD – much more pragmatic – tends to emphasize economic benefits over ideological

ODS – much more Russia skeptic

**ESDP**

ODS – ESDP must not develop as a substitute to NATO

CSSD – Supports to development of a strong ESDP

**NATO**

ODS – NATO primary vehicle for European defense

CSSD- Supports NATO but tends to be more enthusiastic about ESDP

**Deeper European Integration**

ODS – has skeptical elements in the party – those surrounding Klaus see it as a threat to Czech sovereignty

CSSD – Pro-Strong European integration

**Continuity and Change?**

Despite this distinction between the main political parties Czech foreign policy tends to show a large degree of continuity and stability. This can be explained by three factors, the electoral system in the Czech Republic, the strong role played by the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign affairs and that parties tend to act differently in government then when in opposition.

**Electoral system**

Another factor often overlooked but still a determinant which very much impacts of Czech Foreign and Security policy is the electoral system of the country. The current electoral
system of the Czech Republic inevitably leads to weak, divided, coalition governments. The result of this is that decisions in foreign policy are often a result of consensus of the coalition parties and leads to a dilution and moderation of policies. Thus the government position on foreign policy issues where the EU-NATO-US triangle is more likely to be moderate that the individual partisan positions of the senior coalition parties – the CSSD and ODS. The impact of the electoral system and coalition governments will be looked at in more detail when I discuss the multi-lateralizing of the missile defense project in the next chapter.

Government versus Opposition

Parties tend to act much differently when in opposition compared to in power. For example the CSSD tends to be much less critical of the US when in power than in opposition. This will be shown in the next chapter when we discuss the missile defense case. Also the ODS tends to adopt more pro-European policies than its programme documents. How much of this to do with a gradual process of ‘Europeanization’ taking place within the party or just a pragmatic approach given that they meet European leaders in Brussels much more often that the US remains is hard to gauge.

Institutional Stickiness – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Czech Republic places much power in the executive branch which compromises mainly the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign affairs. Both these institutions tend to be Atlanticist be nature. The MoD is traditionally more strongly orientated towards NATO and is viewed as a stable institution for safeguarding Czech security interests. The Ministry of Foreign affairs tends to be more sensitive to the position of member states within the EU. These ministries have been very influential in key foreign policy making over the past 20 years but have begun to see a marginal decline in influence in the more recent years. We can also see that Parliament over the last number of years has become increasingly assertive in holding substantial debates on topics such as international treaties, major military procurement and participation in international military operations. Already we are beginning

148 This Europeanisation process seems have been very strong within the ODS party during the EU Presidency
149 Khol, Radek, ‘Czech Republic and the ESDP in 2004’, Fredrich, Egbert, Stiftung Prague 2004
150 Khol: 2004 opt cit:
to see power shift more and more towards the Parliament\textsuperscript{151}. The large influence of the MFA and MOD in foreign and security policy is as much due to the expertise of its staff compared to the Parliament. The actual influence of these ministries is derived from their interrelationship with the relevant actors and the issues at play. According to Koran ‘In the regard, the recent development is not exactly favorable for retaining the MFA’s privileged position in foreign policy affairs’. \textsuperscript{152} Already the declining influence of the MFA can be seen in the creation of the role of the Vice Prime Minister of European Affairs during the Czech EU Presidency a move designed to give the Presidency a more ODS based focus and decline the influence of the Ministries in this areas.

\textbf{Conclusion}

At the beginning of the chapter I asked the question whether a consensus exists on foreign and security policy issues exists now that the Czech Republic has become a member of NATO and ESDP. From my analysis it is clear that a consensus does not exist and that Czech Republic’s Atlanticist orientation is supported by the ODS party and the Ministries but not shared by the more left wing CSSD.

Also this chapter showed that Czech Republic’s Atlanticism is linked to geo-political factors and also a strategic calculation on the part of Czech elites thus proving my Hypothesis prepared at the beginning of the chapter.

\textsuperscript{151} Recent efforts by NATO secretary general Rasmussen to get Czech Republic to send more troops to Afghanistan were blocked by the Social Democrats in the parliament and highlights parliaments influence\textsuperscript{151}

\textsuperscript{152} Koran, Michal, opt cit: 35
Chapter 3 - Case Studies

‘It is not about the size of a nation or its territory but rather the relationship of the people to its territory. There are many examples of this throughout history…..A nation must develop its own tactics. Switzerland has neither coal nor iron, but it is the foremost industrial country after England’ 153 T G Masaryk

3.1. Introduction

Chapter 2 gave a brief introduction to the concept of security culture and the specifics of Czech security culture. In this next section I will be analyzing Czech national security strategy in relation to the ESDP and America through case studies. Part 1 of this chapter is dedicated to Czech-American relations from 1999 onwards. Here my hypothesis will say that the primary motivation of Czech security policy is to ‘keep American military commitments to the region alive and credible’ and that Czech actions since 1999 have reflected this. In this section I will use two case studies the Iraq War and the proposed missile defense system in the Czech Republic that represent Czech Republic’s pro-Atlanticist viewpoint but also the polarization that exists between the Czech political parties and elites in these issues. In particular the Missile Defense system will be studied in depth. Particular focus will be given to the missile defense system because the project is revealing of Czech strategic culture. By analyzing Czech reactions to the missile defense project, this section purports to bring better understanding both of Czech attitudes towards the CFSP and the US but also their standpoints towards Russia. As I will show in this Chapter the Atlanticism orientation of the Czech Republic as highlighted in the case studies of Iraq and Missile defense has had perceptions of Russia as an underlying motive.

In part two of this chapter I will look at Czech preferences within the CFSP. Here a case study of the Czech Republic EU presidency will be utilized. By examining the core priorities of the Czech EU Presidency, transatlantic co-operation, energy security and Eastern Partnership again the Russia motivation will be highlighted.

These case studies will allow me to test Hypothesis two of my thesis which states ‘Given the geo-political and historical context, Czech Republic still sees Russia as a major security threat to its sovereignty and independence and has developed its security strategies within the European defense, NATO and bi-lateral ties with the United States to check direct Russian influence in its affairs’.

The case studies have been chosen to explore Czech preferences vis-à-vis NATO/US and the ESDP. In light of this I will not go into great detail with regards the background and happens in the event but instead look at how they impacted upon the orientation of Czech security between Washington, NATO and Brussels. Thus in each of the case studies I will look at the positions of the main political parties with regards the conflicts and situations. By doing this I will highlight that although Czech Republic did follow a certain path the attitude among the main parties was very divergent and thus is no guarantor that Czech Republic will follow the same path if a similar event occurs in the future. Furthermore the case studies will also offer the opportunity to test the aforementioned ideological pools of Atlanticist and Europeanist which Czech parties fit into. Also highlighted will be public opinion during these proceedings. With regards Public opinion it will be shown in the case studies that the Atlanticist orientation of Czech elites has on the whole been at odds with Czech public opinion.

3.2. Case Study 1: War in Iraq

In this section I will look at Czech motivations in joining Operation freedom Iraqi. My focus here will not be on the event itself but the motivations and positions of the main political parties. Iraq represents a good example of parties acting according to their ideological pools, with the ODS as expected adopting a more Atlanticist approach than ČSSD. The case study will also highlight how parties tend to act differently in power than in opposition, with the ČSSD support of the war reflecting this. Later I will briefly look at Slovakia and show how the Iraq war affected Slovak security policy orientation with a shift away from Atlanticism. By reflecting on the situation in Slovakia my aim is to show that the Atlanticist orientation of the CEE countries is not set in stone and given the right circumstance has the potential to change. Here I hope to demonstrate that had the right wing ODS rather than the ČSSD been in power at the time of the Iraq war then it is possible than one would likely have seen the first emergence of a genuine debate in Czech Republic on its security orientation amongst the Czech public post 1989.
Efforts to develop a common European foreign and security policy were given a major setback with the intra-European split that emerged in early 2003. During the Iraqi crises, the behavior of the prospective EU members confirmed the Old Members prejudices that the newcomers would be pro-American. Most of the CEE states supported the war and responded to the US calls for the enforcement of UN Security Council Resolution 1441. The Czech Republic along with Hungary, Poland, Denmark, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Britain signed the ‘letter of eight’ to call for European unity in the Security Council on the enforcement of Resolution 1441. In the Czech Republic the signing of the letter caused debates on the national consensus since the letter was signed by Former President Vaclav Havel three days before leaving office. Havel said he signed the letter because he agreed with its content and because it did not contradict the official position of the government.  

The Atlanticist orientation of the Czech Republic during the split resulted in a strong reaction from some European states most notably France. According to French President Jacques Chirac the actions of the Czech Republic and other pro-Atlanticist states was ‘dangerous, reckless, not well behaved and that ‘they had missed a great opportunity to shut up’. While the Czech Republic contributed troops in Iraq, it also avoided making public statements of support for the war. This position reflected a desire to repair the relationship with France and Germany damaged in the lead up to the war. This new position as referred to by Czech Prime Minister Vladimir Spidla was ‘precisely in the middle between the EU and the US’  

The repositioning also reflected the removal of President Havel from office, a Pro-Atlanticist who had signed the Letter of Eight without consulting the government. Thus according to Marek and Baun the rebalancing on the Iraq War was ‘Inevitable after the government was bounced into its initial strong support for the US by a lame duck President’.

Public Opinion

Public support for the war was affected by the fact that the operation in Iraq did not go through the UN Security Council. Prior to the war support was split 50-50 provided it went through the UN Security Council in 2002. A poll conducted by CVVM agency in March 2003

154 Kral D, Weiss, T and Rihacova V: 70
155 Baun, Michael and Marek, Dan, ‘ Czech Foreign policy and EU membership’, Conference paper presented April 23-25, 2009
156 Baun and Marek: opt cit
showed the falling support with just 12% of the population now saying they would support the was without the backing of the UN Security Council and 12% without UN Security Council support. 157

Position of the Main political parties on Iraq

The Czech involvement in Iraq shows deep divisions not just between parties but within parties and other constitutional actors as well. Generally speaking the ODS who were in opposition at the time supported the war but were critical of the government’s handling of it. The major exception was outspoken honorary chairman and current President Vaclav Klaus who criticized many aspects of the operation.

Within the Social Democrats there was a much greater division than within the ODS over Iraq. With the party several strong dividing lines emerged, between the members of the cabinet (including Prime Minister Spidla and Minister of Defense Tvrdik) and CSSD parliamentarians, but also between the wider partisan base of the CSSD and members holding office. 158 The ministers of the CSSD had to balance between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Defence 159 both of which adapted a pro-Atlanticist pro American approach supporting Czech involvement in the operation and the majority of the CSSD party base who were against Czech involvement. 160 CSSD Chairman of the foreign affairs committee Vladimir Lastuvka was a very vocal critic of the government’s position and in his view the government should have aligned themselves much closer to the Europeanist position of France and Germany. At the CSSD party Congress in MARCH 2003, the party overwhelmingly adopted an anti-war resolution, initiated by Lastuvka, Richard Falbr (then senator current MEP) and Jan Kavan (senator and former Minister of Foreign affairs) which condemned the ‘war conducted by the USA, Great Britain, and the so called alliance against Iraq, which was initiated without the consent of the international community and according to the Congress, is thus conducted contrary to international law’ 161. In an interview with the left wing daily Pravo

158 Kral D, Weiss, T and Rihacova V:: opt cit: 84
159 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was pro-war in Iraq further proof of their Atlanticist orientation.
160 Kral D, Weiss, T and Rihacova V:: opt cit: 84
Falbr stated ‘It is necessary for the CSSD congress to do it (condemn the war). Either they are socialists or they are not. Either they believe in the American babble on the preventative war or they believe in a collective security system that has been built over decades’. The divide within the CSSD over the war in Iraq and the ambivalent attitude of Social Democrat Ministers and mainstream party members showed just how the party is not cohesive when it comes to foreign policy issues involving the US and the EU.

**Impact of the Iraq War on the orientation of Slovak foreign and security policy**

Since 2003, New Europe’s willingness to support the US in order to enhance its national security has been challenged domestically. In Iraq while the governments continued to support Washington, their policies were increasingly divorced from the general population. Throughout the Visegrad states Centre left parties were in power and became the standard bearers of the war. The one exception to this rule however was Slovakia, where a centre right coalition led by Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda had held power since 1998. When they sided with Washington over Iraq the main opposition party Smer was handed an opening. As Valasek states ‘a relatively young and new entity, Smer had no personal attachment to the policies of the first post-Cold War generation of Slovak politicians; a veiled anti-American tone also resonated well with its left leaning base’. The party called on a radical re-evaluation of Slovakia’s security policy, drawing on earlier statements of Smer chairman and current prime Minister Robert Fico from March 2003 when he dubbed the Dzurinda government ‘reckless, un-European, warlike and undermining the authority of the UN’. The party moved closer to the Franco-German non-interventionist position on Iraq, and has begun to consistently place emphasis on the European dimension of security. While remaining pro-NATO in principle the Smer party, also tended the view the NATO alliance as a vehicle to restrain the actions of the United States. During the 2004 elections to the European parliament, for the first time in the history of any V4 state, the European Union’s foreign and security policy itself appeared in campaign rhetoric, with Smer calling on the EU to counter ‘US Hegemony’.

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162 Falbr interview with Pravo cited in Kral et al: opt cit: 85

163 Valesek: opt cit: 221

164 Valesek: opt cit: 222
In Czech Republic the Iraq controversy did not spark as much controversy in the electoral discourse that might have been expected. The reason behind this lies in the composition of the government in the Czech Republic with the country being governed by a centre left coalition at the time. It was the Social Democrats in coalition with the KDU and US DEU who found themselves forced to take sides in the run up to the Iraq War. According to Kral, Rihackova and Weiss ‘They did so in conformity with the Czech Republic’s long standing foreign policy course and against their better instincts’. Thus the left wing parties became the standard bearers for the war in Iraq. The right wing opposition party in keeping with their foreign policy preferences, tended to be as pro-war as governments if not more.  

Thus the result of the left wing governments in three out of the four Visegrad states meant that ‘The Iraq debate in Prague, Warsaw and Budapest was generally limited to the technicalities of the government’s handling of the crises rather than the broad principles, thus sheltering the governments and their foreign policy course from criticism.’ However the swiftness by which Smer in Slovakia disposed of 15 years of Slovak foreign policy questions how firmly Atlanticism entrenched is in the Foreign and Security policies of the CEE states and suggests that the Czech Republic given the right circumstances is not inherently immune to a repeat of the Slovak scenario.

3.3. Case Study 2 Missile Defense

The Missile Defense project is an issue that touches upon the very roots of the roots of post 1989 Czech Security policy, key strategic interests relating to US presence in Europe and the perception of a new strategic environment. It is arguably the most controversial issue concerning relations with the US since 1989 and once again shows the divide and lack of consensus among and between the main political parties within Czech society. In the missile defense issue the difference between the two main parties the ODS and CSSD is clearly visible At the heart of the issue is the debate whether the project should be part on a bi-lateral security arrangement between the US and the Czech Republic creating a ‘special relationship’

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165 Kral D, Weiss, T and Rihacova V:opt cit: 70
166 Valesek: opt cit
167 Valesek: opt cit: 221
or kind or instead the Czech Republic should adopt a much more multi-lateral approach under the NATO framework and with the support of its EU counterparts.\footnote{168}

- Brief Background

The Bush administration decided to go ahead with the plan of placing the so-called third pillar of the US National Defense (BMD) by placing its components in the Czech Republic (X band radar) and Poland (ten ground-based, exo-atmospheric interceptors).\footnote{169} The issue of the third pillar of the BMD was originally discusses on a purely bi-lateral basis between the US government and the Czech and Polish governments. Although Washington as well as Warsaw preferred this format from the very beginning, the effect of Czech pressure (mainly due the preferences of the Green party, a junior coalition member of the minority government at the time) led to the so called NATO-isation / multi-lateralization of the project\footnote{170}. According to Hynek this was a logical move from a strategic point of view, as the BMD was to become a complementary part of the NATO’s Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense project. \footnote{171} The resulting form was designed to provide for a complex defense of all types of ballistic missile threats. The process of NATO-isation was officially embraced at the Bucharest Summit Final Declaration issued in April 2008. However it is clear that prior to the Bucharest Conference the Czech Republic strove to keep the BMD project as bi-lateral as possible and they started to seek NATO endorsement only after domestic pressures by the green party in the minority government. The formal declaration was crucial as it forged an uneasy consensus

\footnote{168}{The security strategy is also interesting in that although written in 2003 it gives indications of what Czech policy towards the MD project is likely to be. (Feasibility studies and negotiations for MD began in 2002). The paper argues that Czech Republic must find ways to secure its protection of WMD and missile technology, ‘As WMD and missile technology proliferation continues, and some countries refuse to respect their international obligations, the government will create conditions for joining projects or systems able to secure protection of Czech territory against this threat’\footnote{169}}

\footnote{169}{Hynek:}

\footnote{170}{The Green party supported the project but conditioned their support of the missile defence on several factors the strongest being a guarantee that the base wil come under NATO command once the missile defence system of the Alliance was operational}

\footnote{171}{Hynek, Nik, ‘ ‘Mezinarodni vztahy’, 43 \{4\}, 5 – 31}
at the multilateral level, suppressing previous criticisms of the third pillar of the BMD by the European allies. 172

Motivations of the Radar Base

In this section I will discuss the motivations of the radar base for the Czech Republic. Within Czech society and within the media discourse there seems to have been a mix-up as to what the radar meant and the motivations behind the governments embracing of the project. Officially the radar had two motivations, the first was the prevent a long range missile from the Middle Eastern region generally thought to be Iran from successfully targeting the American mainland with the second being to strengthen bi-lateral relations with the United States. Later especially following the Georgian crises the Russian factor came into the equation. How big a motivation the perceived threat of Russia was for the ODS led government will be looked at in this analysis.

• Protection from Iran

Despite the threat from Iran being one of the state intentions of the project it definitely was not a major factor in the thinking of the Czech elites. The threat of an Iranian attack certainly wasn’t felt among the Czech public and was a secondary motivation for Czech elites at best. Similarly in interviews with academics the threat of attack from Iran was played down as an incentive ‘If Iran was a motivation there would have been a request for that and not just accepting the American request’. 173 However the Czech government for the large part up until the conflict in South Ossetia was excellent in the discourse and in saying to the media that this was one of the primary reasons.

• Keep alliance Credible

As already outlined in chapter 2 being part of an alliance means that efforts must be made to keep the alliance function able and strong for the Czech Republic. Thus when America the dominant actor inside the NATO alliance asks for a favor, there is no reason to say no. This feeling of giving something back and giving material meaning to the alliance definitely seems

172 Koran, Micheal, Hynek Nik, Handle Vladimir and Stititcky Vit, , The US-Russian Security ,Reset implications for Central Eastern Europe and Germany‘, European Security

173 Interview Jiri Schneider:
to have been a major motivation for Czech elites' an alliance means something concrete so that was the motivation to become involved and integrated with allies, not just being an ally on paper but also to do something on our territory, that was the motivation and it was part of a deep conviction that an alliance is not just political commitment it has concrete expressions, that (the Missile defense) was seen as the concrete expression…. this small symbolic contribution of having an ally on our territory and showing that we are not a second class ally. This can be seen as part of Czech efforts to keep an alliance alive and credible and can be traced back to the formative experiences of 1938 where weak alliances were unable to prevent Nazi Germany.

- **Strengthen Bilateral Ties**

The strengthening of bi-lateral ties definitely seems to have a major motivation for the embracement of the MD project in Czech Republic by the ODS led government. The motivation was that it was the ‘first real offer’ to do something with Americans after Czech entry to NATO on Czech territory. It was seen as an opportunity to co-operate with America in an area that the Americans consider important. The preference for having the missile defence negotiations at a bi-lateral level with the America’s was reflective of the ODS’s ideological orientation. The feeling was that if the negotiations became multilateralized then it would lose some of its exclusivity.

Some within the ODS felt that the missile defense would result in a special relationship being formed between the United States and the Czech Republic, ‘All talk was about having a special relationship at the Ministry, the US officials would call them every time something happened and they all were delighted with the increased communication’. The idea of a special relationship was certainly one of the main goals of European Affairs Minister Alexandr Vondra. However one must keep in mind that Czech Republic had limited influence in the project and that it was an American project from the start till the very end.

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174 Interview: Jiri Schneider
175 Interview: Ditrych, Ondrej:
176 Interviews with Vondra’s advisor’s confirm that efforts to build a ‘special relationship’ with US were high on the ODS led agenda
177 Although Karel Schwarzenberg of the Green party was Foreign Affairs minister, Vondra was active in this field also
• **Reinforce US commitments to Europe**

The primary motive behind the missile defense was to keep American commitments to the Czech Republic alive and credible and is reflective of the declining confidence in NATO in the Czech Republic. The worst case scenario thinking of Czech elites from a military sense was that even if NATO ceases to be, the US will provide security to places where they have soldiers.

• **Russian Link**

A clear indication of the Russian link in Czech motivations behind the radar can be seen between the linking of the Russian invasion of Georgia to the American BMD project by leading Czech politicians. ‘The Best campaign for the radar was the campaign in South Ossetia’\(^{178}\). With this statement the Czech Prime Minister Topolanek contradicted the official reasons of the site being a deterrent towards Iran and strengthening bi-lateral ties with the US and instead we can see that the PM clearly had the threat of Russia in mind. In terms of Russia, the missile defense was seen as a counter against Russia in two ways, the first was that it would embed Czech Republic in the Atlantic alliance and prevent Russia from attempting to divide Europe between ‘East’ and ‘West’ while the second and more questionable motivation was that by having US installations in Czech Republic it would provide territorial defense from a Russia invasion.

• **Anchored in Western Civilization**

The Missile Defense project would have further embedded Czech Republic in the Euro-Atlantic area. In a symbolic sense it would have showed that Czech Republic had ceased to be an area of Russian influence or in Russia’s ‘near abroad’. By hosting the Missile Defense facility the Czech Republic (and Poland) would deprive Russia from dividing NATO into two categories of countries, East and West.

• **Territorial Defense from Russia**

The disputed idea that the radar would provide territorial defense from a Russian invasion certainly existed among some members of the Czech elite. The missile defense presents a

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‘security dilemma’ in that it antagonizes Russia while strengthening US commitment to the region. The idea was that ‘if the Russian’s come to US will be there for us’. The rationale among some members of the Czech elites was that the benefits of increased US support outweighed the costs of angering Russia. The logic behind this line of thinking was much divided among interviewees.  

**Motivations Conclusion**

Even without its realization the BMD project as revealing of Czech strategic cultures. The motivations for the Czech Republic in participating in the BMD project listed show that the BMD project grounded in the Czech Republic primary security objective: a continued American presence in Europe with the additional benefits of increasing bi-lateral ties to the United States. Officially the Czech justification and discursive presentation of the project was based on the assessment of the threat posed by Iran and the ‘transatlantic narrative’. However the Russian factor certainly emerged in the argumentation after the Georgian crises thus the project clearly has subjective value and thus validates the Constructivist hypothesis on security supported in this thesis. This subjective value of the project can be seen in former President Havel’s comments that the Czech Republic should partake to the project ‘even if we don’t know whether it will work or not’. 

- **Position of the Main Political Parties towards Missile Defence**

During the Missile Defence project the main parties further conformed to their ideological pools. The ODS overwhelmingly supported the installation of the Missile Defence base. The majority of the party was behind Chairman and Prime Minister Topolánek and EU affairs Minister Vondra both great supporters of the project. Within the ODS efforts were made to keep the project as bi-lateral as possible with the thinking being that the more the project was multi-lateralized the more it would lose its exclusiveness and reduce the possibility of forming a special relationship with the United States.

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179 It is questionable whether the Missile Defence System would have provided extra defence against Russia or instead would have had the opposite effect. During my interviews a difference of opinion among interviewees was apparent with some referring to the idea that the missile defence provided some sort of defence mechanism against Russia as ‘crazy logic’ while others answering that it was a ‘clever way to say if you need help from the American’s they will be there for us’

180 Comments by Vaclav Havel former President of Czech Republic cited in Cadier, David: opt cit: 20
The CSSD were for the most part against the project this despite the fact that the first deliberations on the possible location of the radar in the Czech Republic started when the CSSD government under Paroubek were in power. Paroubek himself claims that these were merely technical consultation with no decision making on the project being made.\textsuperscript{181} Six years after and the most vocal opponents of the radar were CSSD radar leader Jiri Paroubek and his shadow Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lubomir Zaoralek. This switch in position can be explained by the switch in position from government to opposition but also the radar issue was one of the few foreign policy issues that touched upon public opinion against is a good topic on which to challenge the government with an upcoming election in mind.\textsuperscript{182} In arguments against the radar the CSSD outlined the following positions: the treaty was a bilateral deal between the US and the Czech Republic and would eventually weaken NATO and the CFSP,\textsuperscript{183} it only serves to defend American territory not Czech or European, there is no imminent threat of a missile defense attack and that it will damage Czech Republic’s relationship towards Russia.\textsuperscript{184}

- Public Opinion and Missile Defence

Public opposition to the radar remained high, despite intensive PR efforts of both the Czech and US governments. On average 70\% of the Czech population were opposed to the construction of the radar, with 20\% in favor and the rest all undecided. The position of the parties tends to go along with the position of their electorates. A survey undertaken by CVVM polling agency in July 2008 suggests that 68 per cent of ODS supporters were for while 88 per cent of Communist voters are against.\textsuperscript{185} Within the CSSD 80 per cent of supporters were against.\textsuperscript{186} Overall 74\% of the public were against the missile defense site, thus once again Atlanticism can be viewed as a project of the elite running counter to public opinion.

\textsuperscript{181} Kral D, Weiss, T and Rihacova V: 78

\textsuperscript{182} Although the Czech Public are for the most part disengaged from foreign policy decision issue the radar issue is one of the few issues that has generated significant public interest

\textsuperscript{183} This is reflective of the CSSD’s overall greater preference for security arrangements to be multilateralised

\textsuperscript{184} Kral D, Weiss, T and Rihacova V: 70

\textsuperscript{185} CVVM (2008 b) Obrane o americké radarove zakladne v CR cited in Kral et al: 77

\textsuperscript{186} CVVM (2008 b) Obrane o americké radarove zakladne v CR cited in Kral et al: 77
3.2. The CFSP ‘A promoter of Czech Interests?’

Having in part one looked at case studies that revealed Czech Republic’s strong sense of Atlanticism and need to align with America in security policy in this chapter I seek to gain an insight into Czech views of the ESDP and also Czech preferences within the organization. The degree to which Czech Republic will become ‘Europeanized’ will be to the degree that it comes to see the CFSP as the protector of its interests. Before the enlargement Czech Republic and other Central European states reacted defensively to the creation of the ESDP, wary of the potential overlap that it could cause in the security realm. However Czech and other CEE states perception evolved from their participation in the process as well as following the improvement in EU-US relations thus reducing the fear that CFSP/ESDP would emerge as a counterweight to Washington. According to Edwards they have actually become ‘highly active in terms of EU’s CFSP’. For Christopher Hill the most important factor on whether countries will not become greater supporters of the ESDP project is ‘whether or not national decision makers are reconceptualising their interests and identity in European terms’.

The case study of the Czech EU presidency provides an excellent opportunity to see if and how far the Czechs have come to see the CFSP as representative of its interests over the past 6 years. In order to gain an insight into Czech preferences vis-à-vis the CFSP a case study of the Czech EU presidency will be utilized. The Czech EU presidency is a suitable case study in that for a 6 month period the country holding the EU presidency gets to set the agenda, with the priorities in chooses to focus on while holding the presidency revealing of how its view the EU and EFSP as a protector of its interests. As will be shown in this chapter during the EU Presidency in terms of CFSP, the Czech Republic had 3 main priorities in terms of transatlantic unity, common energy policy and policies towards the European neighborhood.

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187 Cadier David, ‘ CFSP and central European strategic cultures: the Visegrad countries and the Georgian Crises, Project paper EU Consent Wider Europe, Deeper Europe

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190 In a comprehensive study on the Visegrad countries and the enlarged transatlantic community written back in 2002 Serena Guisti outlines the characteristics of NATO and the EU from a Czech perspective. For Giusti
3.4. Czech Priorities under CFSP: Case Study of Czech EU Presidency

Czech Republic assumed the EU Presidency on January 2009 under the slogan ‘Europe without barriers’. As president of the rotating 6 Month presidential programme the Czech Republic was given the opportunity to set the EU’s policy agenda for a 6 month period. In its work programme the Czech presidency set 3 priorities the so called 3 Es, Economy, Energy and EU in the World (EU neighborhood policy). While economy targeted external EU policy, the former two had important internal dimensions that reflected Czech foreign policy interests and can be linked to Russia. In terms of ideological pool the Czech Presidency priorities reflected an internationalist orientation with an Atlanticist tinge that was characteristic of the ODS0 Green – KDU coalition government in Prague. 191

- Transatlantic Relations

The issue of transatlantic unity was a clear preference for the Czech ODS led minority government during the EU Presidency. As shown previously for the ODS NATO is the designated framework to interact with the US or they even favor bilateral relations but during the EU Presidency it recognized the opportunity to deal with the US through the framework of the EU. As part of the Czech EU Presidency the government put improving transatlantic relations high on the agenda. Given the recent election of an internationalist president Barack Obama as President of America, a more effective co-operation between the EU and US on Defence was viewed optimistically. Speaking to Czech Radio prior to the Czech EU presidency Deputy European Affairs Minister Marek Mora said ‘the first one (priority) is trans-Atlantic co-operation- we would like to strengthen the EU’s relations with the United States in particular’. 192

NATO compared to the EU offers the following advantages 1 presence of the United States 2 active and inclusive organization 3 lack of any formal equivalent of the acquis communitarian 4 the CEE states can take part on re-engineering the continent 5 it is based on ‘moral values’ rather than pure economic interests 6 the CEE’s bridge position is retained to a greater extent 7 If the EU succeeds in shaping a truly European defense force, NATO will constitute the only protection for the discriminated European states not yet members of the EU 8 it has a more global role. In contrast she only highlights 3 advantages from EU membership 1 epitomizes the return to normalcy 2 promotes democratization 3 membership in the EU attracts foreign investors.

191 Drulak: 2008: 23
The Czech Republic welcomed one of the Obama administrations first decision in closing the Guantanamo Bay facility. Prague also held an EU-US summit in Prague on April 5th however the event was largely symbolic rather than substantive in nature. Indeed throughout the EU Presidency little of substance was achieved in EU-US relations. ‘Despite much talk prior to the Czech Presidency about improving transatlantic relations, the achievement turned out to be rhetorical and little of substance was achieved’.  

- *Energy Security*

Overall the Czech Republic has been very active in the energy field and unlike other CEE states made pro-active efforts to diversify away from its reliance on Russia gas early. In Energy issues the Czech Republic supports a harmonized EU policy of the issue and believes its interests in the Energy sector are best achieved through the EU framework. For the Czech Republic the priority is to diversify supply and reduce reliance on Russia as a supplier. This can be seen in Czech Republic’s overwhelming support for the proposed Nabucco pipeline project. The project is a 3,300 kilometers long pipeline that will take oil from the Caspian via Turkey into Europe this bypassing Russia.

Prior to the Czech EU Presidency Deputy Prime Minister Alexandr Vondra said he supported a strong EU energy policy and a common European energy market ‘A genuine external energy policy market not thinkable without a strong single energy market. The two complement each other and cannot be separated’. The Ukraine – Russia gas crises of January 2009 raised the profile of energy security in the EU and thus a greater political will was given to one of the top priorities of the Czech EU Presidency. For some Czech officials the Ukraine – Russian gas dispute of 2009 was intentionally escalated by Russia to undermine the credibility of Ukraine as a transit country and also to undermine the whole Eastern Partnership concept. In reaction to gas crises the Czech Presidency pushed for a review of the

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193 Interview Vit Benes
194 Czech Republic is also connected to the Western gas grid and can import from Germany in the event of a shut off in supplies. The Czech Republic currently receives 77% of its gas from Russia compared to some Eastern countries such as Lithuania who are almost 100% reliant on Russia gas
strategic energy infrastructure and of the networks of major producing and transit countries, advocated review of the rules for creating oil contingency stocks and raised the issue of energy solidarity. 197 198

• Eastern Neighborhood Policy

The idea of enforcing the European dimension first came about during the Czech EU Presidency of the Visegrad group in 2007-2008. The approach leading to the gradual integration of the Eastern neighbors into the European economy, through deep and comprehensive free trade agreements, is closely linked to the Czech idea of a liberal economically open Europe. The long term goal of the Partnership is the establishment of a free trade regime with all countries involved and follows on the visa free travel agreement already reached with certain countries. 199 It is also part of the Czech support for the idea of Europe without barriers as opposed to ‘fortress Europe’ and aim’s to democratize and promote human rights in these countries thus moving them closer to Europe and further from Russia.

Under the Czech Presidency security in Europe’s Eastern neighborhood was also given great priority. The Czech government placed immediate emphasis on an area where it has close historical roots with the immediate focus placed on pushing for Croatian accession to the EU. It also emphasized continued support for the Stability and Accession process in the Western Balkans. While promising to continue support for the Southern dimension of the European neighborhood policy, the Czech government gave special attention to the Eastern Dimension of the ENP, promising to push forward the Eastern Partnership initiative that had been proposed by Sweden and Poland in 2008. The plan was inaugurated in Prague in May 7th


198 The Spring European Council (March 19-20) Conclusions approved the initiatives mentioned in the Strategic Energy Review, explicitly underlining the energy infrastructure development and calling on to Commission to table draft measures for achieving the priority goals of the review and to propose a new EU tool for energy security and infrastructure at the beginning of 2010. Also the Council underlined the need for new EU crises mechanisms and for securing supply guarantees from transit and supply countries. The Council also emphasizes the the diversification of energy supplies and corridors and stressed the growing importance of energy issues in EU’s external relations. The Commission also called upon a measure for developing the Southern corridor including a mechanism for accessing Caspian gas by the end of 2009.

199 Bartovic, Kral and Rihackova:opt cit: 52
2009. The approach while recognizing the key strategic importance of Ukraine and the Caucasus for Europe is inevitably linked to Russia.

Czech preference for using the EU and US in its relations with Russia and its Eastern neighborhood can be seen in Article 45 of its Security Strategy ‘An important part of the process for the Czech Republic is the deepening of NATO’S and EU’s relations with partner countries, encouraging a co-operative approach to security issues. The Czech Republic attaches great importance to the development of relations with the Russian federation, Ukraine, the countries of Southern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia, and Middle East and North Africa’. This article reflects how the Czech Republic is aware of the limitations of its size and is prepared to use multi-lateral institutions to promote its interests.

- United Approach to Russia

Although not a priority the Czech government also pledged to develop a United EU approach towards Russia. The Czech Republic in this regard strove to form a balanced position between the ‘Russo hawks/ Cold war warriors’ like Lithuania and Poland and ‘Russo doves / Trojan horses/ Friendly Pragmatists such as Germany, France and Italy. While the Czech government tends to be much more pragmatic in co-operation with Russia than Poland it stills remains very cautious over Russian intentions in the EU neighborhood and increasingly so since the Russian invasion of South Ossetia and ‘Reset strategy’ between Russia and the United States. For the Czech elites given the wide divergence of perspectives on Russian issues it was considered too difficult to articulate a common European position on Russia and thus attention should be given to analyzing and understanding Russian motives underpinning its policies towards the EU. The thinking behind this is that only once such an analysis is shared at an EU level, can a long term strategy towards Russia be developed. The Czech

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200 Czech security strategy 2003

201 A test of the Eastern Partnership came in April 2009 as a result of political developments in Moldova. In the election of April 2009 the Communists were victors but the results were contested by the opposition, a strong test of EU commitments to the region. However the event occurred after the fall of the Czech government thus the Czech Republic’s position to mediate was severely weakened. Czech Republic was not very active on the issue and was limited to issuing a statement calling for an end to hostilities and respect for the rule of law.

202 Buan, Micheal and Dan Marek, Czech Foreign Policy and EU membership: Europeanisation and Domestic Sources, prepared for the 11th biannual Conference of the European Studies association, April 23-25th 2009

203 Bartovic, Kral and Rihackova:opt cit: 53
Presidency was very supportive of developing strategic dialogue on Russia, not just at a political level, but also among experts, research institutions and think tanks across Europe. However over the EU Presidency no concrete measures or platform structures on how to deal with Russia were proposed.

3.5. Conclusion

It is important to see that all three priorities within the CFSP and especially the last two factors are linked to Russia. Czech Perceptions of Russia have influenced a standpoint on these two CFSP policies. The first preference of a strong transatlantic alliance with the motivation being to maintain an American military presence in the region is a way for the Czech Republic to seek to balance from Russia influence in the CEE region by having an American presence, alive, active and credible. Similarly energy diversification is seen as a means to reduce Russia’s potential to use its resources for political means while Eastern Partnership is an effort to expand Democracy and human rights in Russia’s sphere of influence and over the medium-long term pushing these pendular countries further towards the EU.

Similarly Czech Atlanticist actions in Iraq and the Missile defense system are also linked to their threat perception of Russia and are means through which the Czech Republic aims to keep American commitments to the region alive and credible. At the beginning of the chapter I raised the hypothesis that ‘Given the geo-political and historical context, Czech Republic still sees Russia as a major security threat to their sovereignty and independence and has developed its security strategies within the European defense, NATO and bi-lateral ties with the United States to check direct Russian influence in its affairs’. From an overview of these case studies the evidence seems to support this hypothesis. Russia is a vital factor in explaining Czech Alliances within the alliance. In a hypothetical and unlikely situation that Russia was to disappear or given up their weapons and declare neutrality in the mourning it is safe to assume that Czech Security policy preferences towards the US and within the ESDP would change entirely.
Chapter 4: Conclusion

‘Regardless of what government is in power, the Czech Republic should not loathe the European Union that is politically more integrated. Although it is unrealistic to speak of the United States pulling out of Europe completely, the continent’s defense will grow increasingly dependent on European resources. If this is a reason why Prague worries about a security vacuum in Central Europe, the Czechs should pray for a stronger and more integrated Europe’. 204

4.1. Introduction

Having in previous chapters looked at the roots and motivations behind Atlanticism in the Czech Republic in this chapter I will enquire into its durability. My aim here is to answer research objectives four and five as laid out in section 1.5 which were 1 ‘To critically assess of strength of Czech Republic’s Atlanticism and gauge its durability and 2 ‘To critically access if Czech support for the ESDP project is increasing and what the future position of the Czech Republic towards the ESDP is likely to be. ‘Again this chapter will be split into two sections. The first section will look at how Czech foreign and security has developed over the last 18 months following firstly the Obama administrations overall ‘reset’ strategy with Russia and later cancellation of the missile defense project.

Here my hypothesis is that ‘Atlanticism in the Czech Republic will decline in upcoming years with the Czech Republic becoming a greater supporter of the European defense project however the extent of the decline will be dependent on four key variables, which political party/Coalition of parties is in power, the type of EU that emerges, the degree to which Czech interests are supported by the European defense project and American policy towards the region’.

I will show that one element of Atlanticism in the sense of trying to formulate a special bilateral relationship with the United States has already begun to decline with recognition that Czech Republic can only foster a normal relationship with the United States. In order to show this I will look at Czech preferences for a strong territorial defense commitment in negotiations over a new NATO strategic concept with special attention given to interviews with leading academics and policymakers involved in the process. Also attention will be

204 Lunak, P, Zapad, Spojene a staty a Zapadni Evropa ve studene valce, Prague 1997 cited in Stastny: opt cit
given to the position and actions of Poland over this period. Poland is both the strongest
power in the region but also the strongest most ardent Atlanticist the CEE region.\textsuperscript{205} In its
role as regional leader the actions of Poland will have important implications for the Czech
Republic. If Poland the region’s most ardent Atlanticist can be seen to be putting greater
emphasis on the ESDP then we can reasonably expect that Czech Republic a much more
hesitant Atlantics than Poland will sooner or later follow in the same direction.

The second part of the chapter and the conclusion of my thesis will look at the long term
orientation of Czech Foreign and Security policy. Here I will argue that Atlanticism in the
Czech Republic will decline and we are likely to see the Czech Republic adopt a more
‘Europeanist’ position. History one of the main factors behind the Atlanticism in the past 20
years will not play as determinant a role in Czech Republic’s future as it has in the past.
Memories fade and new elites emerge with different perspectives. Also societal factors impact
with elites less likely to ignore public opinion as Czech democracy matures and with
Parliament likely to play an increasingly important role vies-a- Vis the Ministry of Defence
and Foreign Affairs in foreign policy making in the Czech Republic.

However the speed and extent of the Europeanization process will be dependent on four main
variables which party is in power, finding an EU consensus to deal with Russia, what type of
EU emerges and US policy towards the region. The first is which party and what type of
coalition is in power will also be important with the more left leaning the governing parties
greater the possible shift towards a Europeanist position. The greatest challenge for the CFSP
will be to find a consensus on how to deal with Russia. For the moment this is lacking, in
particular the position of Germany and its ability to form a consensus with Czech Republic
and the CEE states will be vital. Also important will be what type of EU emerges. A strong
CFSP project will only be supported in the short and medium term by the Czech Republic as
long as it doesn’t develop as a counter to the US. For the moment this French model seems
dead in the water but what shape EU-US relations take in the future difficult to predict. This
brings me on to my last point US policy towards Central Europe, Europe and the wider world.
A multi-literalist approach with respective for international institutions will be more likely to
keep public opinion positive towards the US and the Czech Republic tied to the United
States. If the US continues to priorities relations with Russia at the expense of the region or

\textsuperscript{205}Popescu
trust in NATO as a security provider declines then we can expect Czech elites to place great emphasis of the ESDP to support its goals towards Russia. Also if American continues to withdraw its presence from the European continent and lose interest in Europe as a whole then European’s will be left with no option but to start taking its own security policy seriously.

4.2. Obama’s reset strategy – A shift to a more Europeanist position among Atlanticists

This section will focus on the nominalization of Czech Republic and US over the past 12-18 months. It will be done so within the geo-political context of Russia’s re-assertive attitude towards the region as well as the perceived US withdrawal from the region. However as this dissertation focus on the orientation of Czech security, the policies of Russia towards Central Europe while important will only be looked upon briefly and within the context of how they have affected Atlanticism and Europeanism. This section will look at the strategic re-alignment of the region and the transformation of the perceived special relationship with the US that some within the Czech elite once believed it had to what has today been described by Hynek, Koran and Stritecky as ‘normal life’. But first I will show that Central European leaders were worried about Obama’s policies towards the region even prior to his reversal, a sentiment best embodied by the letter published in Gazette. Great attention will be given to the letter as it highlights very accurately the fears of Central European states and where they lay (Russia)

In this section I will discuss the missile defense reversal of the Obama administration. Before I go on to discuss Czech reactions to the missile defense reversal I will first look at how priorities shifted under the Obama administration shifted away from Central Europe and how Central Europe became something of a bargaining chip for the Obama administration as part of his broader geo-political goal of better relations with Russia. This shift was recognized immediately among leaders in Central Europe and a sense of alarmism had been raised even prior to the Obama administrations reversal on missile defense.

- No more special relationship normalization of relations under President Obama

According to Hynek and Stritecky the reversal of the missile defense and the overall new strategy towards Central Europe ‘has been linked with the accession of President Barack
Obama as president of the United States’. As the authors point out in their study of the fall of the missile defense site upon acceding the Presidency the Obama administration made important shifts away from the previous strategy of the Bush Administration. The most notable of these being the reframing of the third Site of BMD from a military issue into a political bargaining chip for talks with Russia and subsequently cancelling the project as an issue. The politicization of the missile defense in best represented in a previous study by Hynek who looked at changes in policy under the New Obama administration compared to Bush administration. Here Hynek identifies that ‘For Obama the missile defense project has never represented a narrow geo-strategic issue as it was for Bush, but a political issue’. Indeed since the Obama administration took office there was a growing sentiment within the Czech Republic and other CEE countries that that they were being somehow left out in the cold by the Obama administration as America’s broader geo-political goals of better relations with Russia and Russia support over issues in Afghanistan and Iran was considered a far greater priority than missile defense in the Central European region. The greatest manifestation of this shift can be seen in the presidential letter that Obama sent to Russian President Medvedev soon after coming into office. The latter which was latter leaked to the New York Times indicated that the proposed missile defense system would not be necessary if Moscow could help stop Iran from developing long range missile and nuclear warheads. In his letter Obama according to Hynek and Stritecky ‘completely reframed the Third Site from a security matter into a political bargaining chip for negotiations about the nuclear arms control and coordinated advance in regard to Iran’.

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The reaction and feeling of concern about the Obama administration’s stance among Czech and Central European leaders can be traced back to the electoral campaign for the US Presidency but is best represented in their letter published in Gazeta Wyborska on July 17th 2009 where they argue that the US must not forget about the region, that the US has to carry out a firm and principled policy towards Russia and that missile defense is a test of Washington’s credibility towards the region. Among the signatories were Vaclav Havel, former President of Czech Republic, and Karel Schwarzenberg at the time Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic plus other leading policymakers and former policies of CEE countries. In the letter it states

‘As the new Obama Administration sets its foreign-policy priorities… our region is one part of the world that Americans have largely stopped worrying about. Indeed, at times we have the impression that U.S. policy was so successful [here] that many American officials have now concluded that our region is fixed once and for all and that they could "check the box" and move on to other more pressing strategic issues. Relations have been so close that many on both sides assume that the region's transatlantic orientation, as well as its stability and prosperity, would last forever. That view is premature’ 211

The Letter also makes direct reference to the Russia’s active approach in its near abroad region

‘At the same time, storm clouds are starting to gather on the foreign policy horizon. Like you, we await the results of the EU Commission's investigation on the origins of the Russo-Georgian war. But the political impact of that war on the region has already been felt. Many countries were deeply disturbed to see the Atlantic alliance stand by as Russia violated the core principles of the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris, and the territorial integrity of a

country that was a member of NATO's Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council -all in the name of defending a sphere of influence on its borders’.

Tellingly it refers to Russia as a ‘revisionist power’ in its actions towards the region ‘with its own aspiration in what it sees as its near abroad region at a global level, Russia has become, on most issues, a status-quo power. But at a regional level and vies-a-vies our nations, it increasingly acts as a revisionist one. It challenges our claims to our own historical experiences. It asserts a privileged position in determining our security choices. It uses overt and covert means of economic warfare, ranging from energy blockades and politically motivated investments to bribery and media manipulation in order to advance its interests and to challenge the transatlantic orientation of Central and Eastern Europe.’

Also discussed are energy security and the fear that NATO as an organization is ‘perceived as becoming less and less relevant…. NATO today seems weaker than when we joined’

Probably the most telling aspect of the letter is that it questions whether NATO which it describes as ‘the only credible hard power security guarantee we have ‘would be willing and able to come to our defense in some future crises’ This can be interpreted as concern over Russia which it refers to a second time as ‘a revisionist power pursuing a 19th-century agenda with 21st-century tactics and methods’ and is reflective of the post-Georgian war anxiety in the region.

For regional leaders the concern highlighted in the letter is that current lack of interest in Central European region could lead to a ‘neutralization of the region’ and makes references to the negative history that the region has had when it succumbed to ‘realism’ and suffered at the hands of broader geopolitics. The letter also makes reference to the MD project which it describes ‘as a symbol of America's credibility and commitment to the region’

Later after the letter was published Czech Foreign Minister at the time Karel Schwarzenberg said the main motivation behind sending the letter to the Obama administration was to keep American engaged in Europe and to keep Central Europe on America’s list of priorities ‘Lately I don't know whether Barack Obama doesn't understand Moscow's ambitions in our

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part of the world or simply underestimates them. Perhaps, with China, Iran, and the whole of Middle East on his mind, Mr. Obama has crossed us off his priorities list. If this is the case, then our role is to make him aware of that mistake. And this is not about saving the missile defense at all cost. Still, our consent to it was a confirmation of our friendship with the US. That's why we should have a say in the debate about it. 213 214

While the letter was promoted in the media it failed to have any major impact on the Obama administration’s thinking as On September 17th 2009 Obama cancelled the Missile Defense project. His justification was that he wanted to switch to an alternative reconfigured system designed to shoot down Iranian missiles. Obama called Czech President Fisher at 00:21 am to announce the end of the missile defense project. The timing of the cancellation could be considered symbolic in a negative sense in that it came on the 70th anniversary of the Nazi invasion of Poland.

Immediate Reactions to shelving of the Project

• *Switch to a more internationalist position among Atlanticists*

The initial immediate impact of the Obama administrations reversal was that there was a slight re-orientation with a shift in the balance of view between the Washington- Brussels orientation axis towards Brussels. Previous held sentiment that the Czech Republic somehow might enjoy a special relationship with the US quickly evaporated. As highlighted in Chapter two prior to this Czech elites especially those surrounded by Vonda felt that the Czech missile defense project would contribute to forming some kind of a special relationship between the Czech Republic and the US. 215 Instead after the reversal Czech elites who had lost so much political capital on the project had to recognize that Czech Republic has just a normal relationship with the United States and must adapt accordingly. This shift can be seen in the

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213 Interview with Karel Schwarzenburg, Gazata Wyborcza, July 17th 2009, [http://wyborcza.pl/1,76842,6826295,Central_European_Leaders_Call_Obama_Not_to_Check_Region.html](http://wyborcza.pl/1,76842,6826295,Central_European_Leaders_Call_Obama_Not_to_Check_Region.html)

214 Another telling aspect of the letter is the manner in which leaders in Central Europe decided to communicate their message to Washington. (Via newspaper). This method is reflective on the overall decline in personal relations between Czech leaders and the White House which peaked during the Havel’s time.

215 This viewpoint was confirmed in interview’s with Mr. Vondra’s advisors
reaction of Alexandr Vondra who stated that in light of recent events is the proper moment to start taking European security seriously and deepen the ties among European allies. 216 Similarly for Jiri Schneider the initial reaction of Obama’s reversal was that it brought ‘Czech Security policy closer towards a pragmatic expectations Vis-a- Vis Washington and brings it closer to Brussels’. 217 The more pragmatic expectations on the part of ODS politicians involved a realization that Czech Republic never had nor never will have a special relationship with the US. 218 This shift should be viewed not as abandonment of the previously held Atlanticist position towards an Europeanist one but as the Atlantisists shifting towards a more internationalist position as outlined in the ideological pool illustration in appendix G. Rather than focus on building on a bi-lateral relationship with the US the emphasize now for the Czech elites is to work within the NATO and EU framework in their relations with America. ‘ There has been a growing recognition that instead of building a special relationship ( Poland) or a strategic relationship ( Czech Republic) with the US stronger support for the EU as a global credible actor is needed in order for the EU to be a credible actor and politically responsible partner to the US’. 219

Czech Preferences under the new strategic concept – Obsession with Article V

As previously shown the normalization of relations with America should not be reviewed as a resignation of the transatlantic agenda but as an adoption of a more internationalist approach. In response to this ‘ reset strategy’ and Russia’s escalating attempts at revision, Czechs have begun to reexamine the rationale behind their close bilateral ties with the US. In particular Czech Republic has reacted by focusing its efforts on the New NATO strategic concept. 220

216 Vondra : Lidove Noviny vited in Koran et al
217
218 The author is highly skeptical that a small state in International Relations can ever enjoy a ‘special relationship’ with a major power in International Relations and extremely skeptical in the Czech-US circumstance
219 Hynek and Stritecky: opt cit: 11
220 The overall decreased confidence in NATO’s commitment towards the territorial defense of the region can be seen in Polish efforts to obtain ‘Article 5 plus’ clause guarantees during the missile defence negotiations.
These efforts are significant because they reflect the extent to which Russia is fuelling demand for elevated territorial defense inside Central Europe.

At a Conference held in Prague in preparation of NATO’s new strategic concept Czech officials openly questioned NATO’s security commitment to the Central Europe and appealed to the military alliance to strengthen its guarantees. 221 Alexandr Vondra doubted whether the "all for one" Article 5 of the NATO charter, which obliges the alliance to come to the defense of any member who is attacked, would be adhered to should the Czech Republic or a neighboring member state be attacked. "We need a new affirmation, mainly for the new NATO member states, that the commitment on joint defense is taken seriously…this also concerns the defense planning and the deployment of respective capacities to enable a reaction in the case of a crisis" 222. In particular, Vondra was concerned about Russian policy toward the region, saying his concerns are "naturally connected with uncertainties around Russia's further development." Speaking to Jiří Schneider of the Prague Security Studies Institute after the Conference he similarly concluded that the Conference highlighted Czech Republic’s concern about American commitments to territorial defense of the region. ‘The problem is that we [the Czech Republic] have only been in NATO for 10 years, and, as of yet, there has not been a materializing of guarantees. People question whether NATO would be willing and able to come to our defense in some future crises," 223

Indeed throughout the Conference Czech participants expressed the view that it would be hard to reset the Alliances relations with Russia without new reassurances on Article 5. 224 One participant clearly defined the differences in views on Russia between CEE members of NATO and the rest of the Alliance by stating that ‘Central European members worry about artificially induced conflicts, cyberattacks and disruption of energy flows. The rest of NATO is primarily concerned with sending the right signal to Russia’. Also at the Conference was

221 The Conference was headed by Czech Born Madeline Albright and was designed to get Czech input into the New NATO strategic concept

222 Author, NATO security guarantees questioned at Prague meeting, January 20th 2010

223 Author: opt cit

224 Prague Security Studies Institute, ‘NATO strategic concept: Response to our Concerns?’ International Conference
the debate with most Czech participants emphasizing that territorial defense should remain the core task of NATO. ‘NATO should distinguish between Article 4 and 5, which is about getting things done’. 225

- **Position of Poland greater supporter of ESDP**

Perhaps the most tangible shift towards the ESDP can be seen in the position of Poland. An excellent example of the newfound Polish emphasis on ESDP can be seen by a speech delivered by Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Radoslaw Sikorski ‘ We support the building of a more federal Union, which is able to play in global fields of competition as one of the strongest players… I am sure that a Union, which is able to take its fair share of responsibility for global affairs, is compatible with interests of the United States’226. Also it is very interesting to note that Poland with begins its EU presidency in July 2011 has made the CFSP as one of its priorities of the EU presidency programme. Poland joined force with France a country previously very receptive to the Medvedev plan in an effort to work on the European security dimension. An interesting development in this process as highlighted by Koran et al is that Poland has been attempting to revive the G6 (Group of Six) platform, an unofficial group of six of the EU’s most populated country’s Germany, France, UK, Italy, Spain and Poland and include the platform in European security tasks. The original focus of the platform was on third pillar issues (Police and Judicial Co-operation in Justice)227.

Although tangible shifts have not been so apparent the shift in emphasis by the Czech Republic but also Poland towards a greater support of the ESDP within the last 18 months should not be underestimated. As Koran at al state ‘ it is obvious that the rock solid pro-US orientation of the CEE countries that was long taken for granted has faded, with Poland and to a lesser extent the Czech Republic …. Shifting towards the European security architecture and policy. 228 The above highlighted developments represent a serious departure from the previous efforts of Czech elites to attain security through the building of a special relationship with the United States. As Hynek and Stritecky eloquently put it ‘ The change of the discourse

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225 PSSI: opt cit:

226 Sikorski: 2009 speech cited in Hynek and Stritecky: opt cit: 11

227 Koran et al, ‘ Implication etc_ : 7

228 Koran et al:
and an emerging political consensus on strengthening Europe in the area of EU’s Common Foreign Security and Defence policy may become one of the most important changes in Poland and the Czech Republic in the past decade.229

4.3. Long term orientation

Theoretical Basis for Assessing Possible Shifts in Czech Security

Before I begin my analysis I will first discuss the theoretical basis of how a European state like the Czech Republic might shift to a more ‘Europeanist’ position according the academic literature written on the possible convergence of European strategic cultures. In his study on this topic Chistoph Meyer asked the question if strategic cultures within the EU are converging towards the European norm and if so can this convergence by can explained by realist, constructivist or regional theories of change. Here he identified three main sources that could cause a state to shift towards a more Europeanist position in the realm of foreign policy, 1 changes in the external environment, 2 Europeanization and 3 conflicts or major events. According to Meyer the degree to which these forces will effect national security cultures varies differently and depends on a state’s, 1 Geography, 2 Institutional sticking of domestic ideas values and norms and 3 the degree to which societies are subject to social contention.230

Converging towards a European Norm a state’s Individual characteristics

In this section I will discuss exactly how a states individual characteristics matter in the degree of convergence. In studies of Europeanization it has been argued by scholars that member states adaption to the same kinds of incentives and constraints can vary considerably depending on different factors, most notably the mediating impact of formal and informal institutions. As Meyer shows ‘The same is true for the study of the cognitive impact of changed distribution of power capabilities in the international system. Europeanization processes and experiences of violent conflicts on constitutive and regulatory norms prevailing

229 Hynek and Stritecky: opt cit: 11

national strategic cultures’. For Meyer the adoption process is mediated by three factors: geographical position of a given country, the depth and institutionalization of such norms and the presence of strong ideological cleavages within a country. 231

- **Geography**

While geography proved to be a major factor in a preference for Atlanticism in the Czech Republic, its relevance as a factor could decline and even push the Czech Republic towards the CFSP. The Czech Republic obviously will not change location but as Meyer states ‘the preference for the US rather than the EU as a security provider may change gradually as a result of negative experiences with the US, as well as positive experience of the EU in dealing forcefully with the occasional Russian demands and blackmail attempts… ten years of Post-cold war experience are relatively little, however, when compared with long experience with a powerful, and over the last 40 years quite malevolent and repressive neighbor in the East’. 232

- **Stickiness of national security norms and ideas**

Ideas and norms may be deeply internalized or they may be rather shallow. In Czech Republic the painful experience of being bargained away by great powers on several occasions and the painful experience of being in a non democratic alliance left a cognitive imprint on Czech Republic’s strategic thinking. These particular concerns refer to the cognitive ability of the Czech Republic elites to cede sovereignty, fully trust European countries with their defense and reduce attachment to territorial defense. Having already showed that the Czech Republic is moving strongly away from its sovereignist approach233, I see also show that trust towards Europe in the security realm is increasing as time goes by but that the Czech Republic will remain attached to territorial defense for the foreseeable future.

- **How deep strategic culture is Contested along Party Lines**

As Meyer outlines ‘national security cultures may be deeply contested along party lines, rendering the impact of convergence forces uneven and hard to predict’. 234 As shown

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231 Meyer: opt cit: 17

232 Meyer : opt cit: 16

233 Reflective of its new attitude and position towards Germany as a partner within the EU than a competitor

234 Meyer: opt cit: 17
throughout this thesis Czech Republic has two main parties with quite opposing views on crucial aspects of security. These opposing views are also shared among the population even if the public remains largely disengaged. The result of this means that a change in government could dramatically change government policy towards the ESDP and the US even if it is not going to alter collectively shared notions within the population.

- *Incidents, wars, Conflicts*

Also Meyer acknowledges that incidents could be the catalyst for a re-orientation. Earlier in the previous chapter when I looked at the impact of the Iraq war on Slovakia I showed that in a society with deep domestic divisions (Akin to Czech Republic) it takes very little to shift away from a previous strongly held position.

**4.3.1. Societal factors – Position of the government on the left-right wing axis**

In theorizing national strategic cultures Meyer concludes that ‘national security cultures may be contested along ideological or party lines, rendering the impact of convergence forces uneven and hard to predict’. 235 This means that a change of government could dramatically change the orientation of Czech security, even if it is not going to dramatically alter collectively shared notions of when the use of force is legitimate. In the previous section I highlighted that a divide very much exists between the main political parties as regards which orientation Czech Republic should take. Thus the more left leaning future governments are in the Czech Republic the more likely Czech Republic will be to shift towards a more Europeanist position. Also looked at here will be public opinion with my argument being that as Czech Democracy matures further we will likely foreign policy decisions more in line with Public opinion in the country.

- *Orientation of Party/Coalition in Power*

At the time of writing the outcome of the May 29th 2010 elections are yet unknown, the outcome of this election however will certainly impact on the orientation of Czech Security. In chapter 2 I discussed the institutional stickiness in Czech security policy. Here one could see that the influence of the Ministry of Foreign and Ministries of Defence tended very strong in foreign policy making over the past 20 years. However recent trends point to Parliament

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235 Meyer: opt cit: 2004 17
playing an increasingly greater role in foreign policy decision making, a trend which is likely to continue in the future. Thus the outcome of which party wins upcoming elections is likely to have a greater impact on foreign policy making than previous elections.

The type of government in power and its ideological orientation will influence the countries orientation in various situations in the future far more than historical memories. What is determinant will be the positions of the rightist or leftist governments who will use interpretations of history less and less. A social Democrats government should they win upcoming elections will be more likely to adopt a Europeanist position and shift the Czech Republic towards Brussels. The impact of this shift will certainly be dependent on the party’s coalition partners, with the communist party an option that would speed up this process.

- **Impact on Ministries**

A social democrat victory will also impact on the Ministries of the Czech Republic with widespread purges predicted with those in the Ministries receptive to a more Atlanticist position expected to be replaced by more ‘Social democrat thinking’ people. ‘Some things are resistant but some things are not when the Social democrats came to power in 1998 there were Purges and there were even bigger purges when Vondra become deputy minister’. In anticipation of a possible Social Democrat victory in the upcoming elections purges are according to Ditrych very likely ‘It will certainly happen again if Social democrats win but the extent to which these purges will occur are hard to say’. Even before the anticipated Purges begin we have already begun to see an overrepresented clique of Atlanticist in government and the Ministrie in the Czech Republic begin to lose power over the past 5 years.

- **Public Opinion**

Over the past 20 years as we have seen public opinion as a factor on Czech foreign policy making has not been at the level expected by a more mature Western Democracy. However

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236 Khol: 2004: opt cit

237 Interview Ondrej Ditrych

238 Interview Ondrej Ditrych

239 This has been confirmed by interview with both those inside the Ministries and Research Institutes
public opinion as a variable in foreign policy decision making will likely increase as Czech democracy matures and the Czech public becomes increasingly interested in foreign policy decision making. Already we have seen that the Social Democrats are far more prone to link their foreign policy stances in accordance with public opinion.

As evidenced by the election campaign of 2010 interest in foreign policy issues remains very low in the Czech Republic with foreign policy issues having minimum impact in an election campaign dominated by domestic politics. However major issues that touch upon the public mind would certainly have the potential to create a debate within Czech society that could potentially shift Czech foreign policy away from its Atlanticist position. As shown in the case study of Iraq, Czech Republic missed an opportunity to reassess the orientation of its security policy as the left wing Social Democrats become the standard bearers of the war. If the more right wing parties were in power during the unpopular Iraq war then it would have been likely that a debate and divide in Czech society among the Europeanist anti Iraq War Social Democrats and the Atlanticist ODS would have come to the fore with a public debate emerging on the issue of the orientation of Czech foreign and security. The possibility on another event emerging that puts the Czech Republic in a bind between its Atlanticist elite and largely Europeanist public would have the potential to change this and for the first time a genuine debate on the orientation of Czech Foreign and Security policy among the public could begin.

4.3.2. Russia the key variable—Energy, Eastern Partnership and Architecture

As I showed in Chapter 3 Czech actions in aligning so close America (Iraq, missile defense) or within the EU framework (energy, Eastern partnership) are either directly or indirectly linked to their fear of Russian influence in the Czech Republic. In order for the Czech Republic to become a stronger supporter on the CFSP in the future one extremely important variable will be the necessity for the EU to form a common consensus on how to deal with Russia. As this thesis has shown despite some convergence in many important aspects between ‘New’ and ‘Old’ member states Central European governments do tend to view the world differently than their Western counterparts in certain aspects. Increasingly in the post-Georgia war setting these governments have developed a sharp sensitivity to Russian geopolitical presence.
One major divide between East and West can be seen in the question of how best to deal with Russia. As Ilves points out ‘Uncomfortable as it may be to hear, and as it is to say, the behavior of the old EU member states towards Russia has often been viewed among the Central and Eastern Europeans as naïve at best, mendacious at worst…indeed new member states elites fear that when it comes to Russia, individual member states interests will triumph over the interests of the Union if a good bilateral deal can be had’\textsuperscript{240}. In Czech Republic and the CEE region Russia represents a discernible gap between the position of CEE and Western Europe. Old member states view Czech Republic and other CEE states as dangerously Russo phobic. This perceived Russo phobia is treated as a threat to foreign policy and as a threat to bilateral opportunities in dealing with Russia. In contrast CEE countries see old member states perceived nearsightedness on Russia and the preponderance of bilateral national interests as a real threat to the European CFSP. Bridging this gap will be one of the principal needs and one in which the current and future success of a common European Foreign and Security Policy will deepen on and also one in which the position of Germany will be very important.

The preferences for the US rather than the EU as a security provider may change gradually as a result of positive experience of the EU in dealing forcefully with Russia demands. As Chistoph Meyer states in his research on the Convergence of European strategic cultures ‘ten years of Post Cold War experience are relatively little, when compared with the long experience with a powerful, and over the last 40 years, quite malevolent and repressive neighbor in the East’.\textsuperscript{241} One academic who agrees with this assessment on the importance of the EU finding a consensus of how to deal with Russia is Nik Hynek. ‘I think that the position adapted towards Russia position will be important, they need to find a consensus on how to deal with Russia, if don’t find a consensus you are not going to speak about a strong European security project.’\textsuperscript{242} More recently one of the trends we have seen is the lowering distance between the old and new Europe in how to deal with Russia but still the German position towards Russia remains very different to that of the Visegrad four.

\textsuperscript{240} Ilves, Toomas Henrik, ‘The Pleiades join the stars: TransAtlanticism and Eastern Enlargement’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 18:2, 191- 202

\textsuperscript{241} Meyer, Christoph, ‘Theororising Strategic Culture: Between Convergence and Persistence of National Diversity’, Centre for European Policy Studies, June 2004

\textsuperscript{242} Hynek, Nik: Personal Interview
• **Energy Security**

In particular between these two blocs Germany and CEE states there is a need to carve out a consensus on how to deal with Russia in the energy realm. To date we can see that Germany has been very careful to deal with Russia as part of a multi-lateral approach as far as security is concerned but in its energy relations Germany has adopted a bi-lateral approach with Russia overlooking the complains of other EU states. Evidence of this can be seen in the German’s courting of Russia to build the Nord Stream pipeline directly from Russia to Germany, which much to the dismay of some of CEE countries bypassed them.²⁴³ Germany interests in attempting not to offend Russia have been deeply rooted. In fact the Khol government of the 1990s stood opposed to Baltic countries membership of the EU lest Russia be offended.²⁴⁴

The issue is not solely to do with interests but also divergent perceptions. One major divide between Germany and the CEE has to do with perceptions with the Czech Republic and CEE countries seeing energy as a security issue something not shared with their German counterparts. The core of the problem has been the failure of the CEE countries to see energy security from a German perspective as being part of their overall security project. ‘Central Europe needs to understand this dichotomy in security and foreign policy. Once they understand this they can talk to Germany in better fashion and then forge consensus on how to deal with Russia.’²⁴⁵

• **Eastern Partnership**

Europe also needs to take a united approach towards its Eastern neighborhood. As shown in Chapter two among the greatest concern to the Czech republic will be the ‘weakness’ of the ‘new neighborhood’ states such as Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and Georgia. Cross border crime, illegal immigration and human trafficking have been long term concerns for the Czech Republic and as the income between the Czech Republic and these new member states increases, these worries will increase. Of greatest concern will be the nature of these regimes and the degree to which Russia can be seen to be meddling in the internal domestic politics of

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²⁴⁴ Illves: opt cit: 198

²⁴⁵ Interview: Hynek
these states. In this regard the recent election of President Yanukovych as President in Ukraine will be viewed with concern in the Czech Republic. The President’s recent deal to extend the lease on the Black sea Russian fleet in Ukraine in return for cheaper gas will have been interpreted as Ukraine somewhat turning its back on possible EU accession and moving further towards Russia. However Ukrainian politics is pendulum by nature and with its tendencies to swing between Europe and Russia a reattempt by Ukraine to move away from Russia and towards Europe in the future should be viewed as a distinct possibility. With a ‘Wider Europe’ the cornerstone of Czech Republic’s priorities within the CFSP greater support from Western Members states will prove good for a more united European approach. Russia’s meddling and aggressiveness in the new neighborhood and acceptance by some Western European member states that Russia has a legitimate sphere of influence are totally unacceptable for Czech elites. A success of the EU in the Eastern Neighborhood can be seen during the Georgian crises when the EU showed a united front in dealing with Russia and negotiated a ceasefire settlement. Actions such as this are good for gaining Czech support for the ESDP but question remains whether Europe will remain show such a united in dealing with Russia if another crises arrives.

Under a united approach the EU should encourage the countries in Europe’s Eastern neighborhood to adapt European norms and regulations. It must also be kept in mind that it all rankings of power (Hard or soft) the EU outranks Russia. The EU’s combined economy is 15 times the size of Russia’s, its population three and a half times bigger, and the EU buys 56% of Russian exports while Russia buys 6 % of EU imports. From a market sense Russia needs the EU and has no practical alternative in the short or medium term to supplying gas to the EU.

- **Security architecture**

In dealing with Russia there is a growing recognition that a new security architecture will be needed, yet which architecture will be adopted remains a major question. Indeed this recognition of needing a new security architecture can be traced to Obama’s reset strategy with Russia. As Hynek and Stritecky point out ‘there has been a growing understanding in Poland and the Czech Republic that a stronger Europe with its own reinvigorated security
architecture is needed for dealing effectively with Russia.\textsuperscript{246} The first step that needs to be taken is to reject the Medvedev plan, a plan which seeks to divide Europe.

A continued different approach between Old and New member states over how to deal with Russia cannot continue for long. Without willingness on the part of New Member states to take into account and defend the interests of CEE member states on matters that are of gravest concern to them, the CFSP’s popularity will decline among the Czech public and elites. If the national interests of old member states dominate EU-Russian relations, the new member states will once again look to the US. Old member states should contain themselves and adopt a policy of ‘principled bi-literalism’ as advocated by Leonard and Popescu in their report on EU-Russian relations. This goal would be to ensure that bilateral contacts Russia and individual member states would reinforce rather than undermine common EU objectives.

4.3.3. Europeanization

The concept of strategic culture brings with it an additional advantage in that it allows one to consider changes in security preferences. Several scholars in their study of the ESDP and CFSP have found that Europeanization of foreign policy have been a major factor in shifting countries to become greater supporters of the ESDP project. This is especially strong in Neutral countries such as Finland which have seen major shifts in their security preferences away from neutrality and more in line with European norm. During the 1990s and prior to EU accession Czech elites were socialized through the NATO framework but more and more we are likely to see this socialization process take place within EU institutions.\textsuperscript{247} Baun and Marek in their study of Europeanization of Czech foreign policy concluded that over the past 6 years Czech foreign policy has only been Europeanized to a limited extent and that EU influence on Czech foreign policy decision making is very small relative to domestic factors.\textsuperscript{248} For them limited socialization is largely determined by the Czech Republic’s (pre 1989) historical experience and perceptions of Czech geographical vulnerability. However the authors do acknowledge that socialization as a variable is likely to become more influential

\textsuperscript{246} Hynek and Stritecky: opt cit: 11

\textsuperscript{247} Czech elites deal with the EU and EU institutions on a daily basis

\textsuperscript{248} Baun and Marek: opt cit:
overtime as Czech Republic accumulates experience in European Defence structures and see’s the EU as a framework in which it can achieve its goals.

From my own experience as an Irish citizen I would remark that the ‘socializing’ effect of EU membership can sometimes be exaggerated and in the experience of Ireland the country is now ‘more neutral’ than when it became an EU member in 1973. Learning processes and spillover effects do not have the same strength in the intergovernmental cooperation of the EU’s second pillar as in the supranational pillar. Thus socialization taken on its own without the support of other variable is unlikely to be a major cause of the Czech Republic to shift to a more Europeanist position.

4.3.4. What type of EU emerges – Powerful and in tandem with US

Also important will be what type of CFSP emerges. As has been highlighted throughout this research the Czech Republic will only support the CFSP in the short and medium term so long as its aims do not conflict with those of NATO. In this sense they do not want to see any decoupling between the two organizations. Following the Iraq war one of the main aims of the Czech Republic and other CEE states was to repair the relationship between the United States and Europe. Such attempts have been successful with the France model which sought to promote a European defense project as a counter to the United States no longer seen as a viable option among policymakers and politicians throughout Europe. Now the consensus very much seems to be in Europe for the ESDP to develop in tandem with the United States. Czech Republic for the foreseeable future will back a Europe with a Euro-Atlantic orientation and disapprove of a stronger EU as a counterbalance to the terms. The development of the French model of Europe as a counter to the US is seen by the Czechs as a threat to US engagements in the region, but also inefficient and costly.

The EU also needs to start investing more in the ESDP project and increase its military capabilities considerably if it wants to be seen as a viable alternative to the US by CEE states in the long term. In light of recent developments with regards the EU currency the principle of

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249 How much of this has to do with CEE states rather than factors such as the accession of President Sarkozy as President is very much up for debate.

250 Interview Ministry of Defence
solidarity\textsuperscript{251} one of the pillars upon which the EU has been based has been called into question. Such developments lower trust among member states and does not bode well for an ESDP which will need considerable investment over the coming years if it hopes to move away from civilian missions and become a military might in the mould of powers such as the US and China.

However a consensus also needs to be reached on what is the optimal way to divide competencies between the EU, US and NATO. The growing trend seem to be that the best option would be for a European security project that is run by the EU member states without the United States but to maintain the NATO relationship with the United States. This setup of community and alliance by two different entities also brings advantages in that it will appease Russian concerns of too much US influence in Europe. The benefit of this setup is that Europe would maintain its link to NATO and its article V guarantees and could seek to divide coupling between the CFSP and NATO. \textsuperscript{252}

\textbf{4.3.5. US policies towards Europe and the World}

The last major variable that will impact on the orientation of Czech Security will be the actions of the United States both towards Europe and the World. Recent trends suggest that the Obama administration’s interest is low not just in Central Europe but in Europe as a whole. \textsuperscript{253} A declining interest in Europe will likely see Europe take more responsibility for themselves in the security realm something that the American’s have been pushing for a number of years and something they will likely support\textsuperscript{254}. America is also likely to be pleased if Central European governments while maintaining their Atlanticist orientation also

\textsuperscript{251} By this the author is referring to the recent financial crises in Greece and lack of solidarity among Eurozone members

\textsuperscript{252} Recent development with the EU do not bold well for a stronger defence emerging soon. The global financial crises and the current difficulties of the EU have put a strong European defence on the backburner for the moment. A recent speech by Alexandr Vondra in Washington confirms this theory with Vondra arguing that for the moment Europe’s greatest concern in to keep internal unity and prevent the emergence of a North – South divide. \textsuperscript{252}Also the view of the Czech Republic and other CEE countries tends to be close to the standpoint of Britain. The recent accession of a Euro-Skeptic Prime Minister in David Cameron does not bode well for European integration but Cameron’s impact should not be overestimated.

\textsuperscript{253} This can be evidenced among other things the Presidents decision not to attend this years EU- US summit in Madrid

\textsuperscript{254} Initially the US were hesitant to the idea of a common European foreign policy but have since become great supporters of the project
become greater supporters of the CFSP project. Indeed recent efforts by the Czech Republic in becoming greater supporters of the CFSP have been well received in the United States. In October 2009 Vice-President Joe Biden came on a trip to Czech Republic to reassure concerned Czechs about America’s commitment to the region. One of the key aims of the trip was to confirm the normalization of relations between the two countries but also to encourage these countries to ‘become partners rather than protégées of the United States’. However the role of partners still requires that the US takes Czech and CEE interests into account when making decisions. The Czech Republic will not be a satisfied partner if the US continues to prioritize relations with Russia over Central Europe and cuts deals directly with Russia without Czech involvement and at the Czech’s expense.

This declining interest in Europe also needs to be weighed up in a global context against the overall decline of the US as a superpower. The situation with which the Czech Republic was presented in 1989 when it had to choose whether to align with the world’s only superpower or not is very different to today where we can witness the tracings of a much more multi-polar world emerging. This relative decline of US power will likely result in both the trend of a declining US interest in Europe continuing as time, power and money must be invested only into regions and countries that are considered a priority of the US administration.

Finally the model of international relations which the US pursues will affect how closely the Czech Republic is likely to align itself in the future. With Public opinion likely to increase as a factor in foreign policy decision making, close alignment will only be supported if America adopts a more multi-lateralist model of international relations than those pursued under President George W Bush. Memories and gratitude towards the US for the creation of the Czech state in 1918 and liberation in WW2 while so vital in the Atlanticist orientation in the 1990s will becoming less and less important as the years. Increasingly more recent memories of the US as a neo-conservative hegemon under Bush or as a defector under Obama will replace the previously wide held positive image of America in the Czech Republic. It will be up to American to reinvent itself and appeal to the Czech public who more naturally align

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255 Hynek and Stritecky: opt cit: 11

256 America’s overall ‘reset strategy’ towards Russia and Medvedev’s new security architecture can be interpreted as Russia seeking to take advantage of both declining American power and also declining American interest in Central Europe.
themselves with the European model of international relations which places emphasis on multilateral institutions, democracy, human rights and international law. For now and in the short and medium term the Czech Republic not support a non divisive setting between NATO and the EU but in the long term the US must return to effective multilateralism.

**Recommendations**

**Europe**

Optimal Scenario: Czech Republic and CEE countries emerge as full supporters in the ESDP project and in issues of intra-Alliance or intra-European debate can be counted on to support a pro-European viewpoint.

- Achieve Consensus on who to deal with Russia
- Support CEE preferences in Eastern neighborhood
- Common energy policy
- Increase military capabilities
- Develop in tandem with US

**The US**

Optimal Scenario: CEE’s countries influence increases the EU’s security capabilities and reinforces the transatlantic connection

- Reinforce ties with Czech Republic and CEE states through security commitments
- Change from ‘energy centric’ approach to a more allied centric approach
- Encourage Czech Republic and CEE states to promote transatlantic unity
- Work with Europe on energy security
- Renew involvement in Europe’s neighborhood and reject Russia sphere of influence

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257 This is also linked to power with IR theory as a general showing that the weaker the state the more likely to states elite and public will put emphasis on multi-lateral institutions and human rights

4.4. **Research Objectives: Summary of Findings and Conclusions**

In section 1.3 I outlined my research objectives and in section I outline my findings to these questions.

**Research Objectives One**

To identify how a small state in the International system such as the Czech Republic attempts to maximize their security in the current international system

*Summary of Findings:* Small states seek to maximize their security by balancing against perceived threats. This threat can be best explained by a Constructivist lens which takes into account perceptions and ideas about what constitutes a threat better than Walt’s balance of threat theory.

**Research Objective Two**

To account for Czech preferences for alliances over neutrality

*Summary of Findings:* Czech preference for alliance over neutrality can be linked a formative experience in Czech history (The Munich Conference) when a largely defensive strategy failed to prevent Nazi occupation. As a result of the process of learning as shown by Reiter’s theory Czech Republic switched to a policy of more active engagement in alliances in an effort to ensure alliances stay credible.

**Research Objective Three**

- To explore whether the Czech Republic has a strategic culture and if so to identify what are the main determinants influencing Czech Security culture.

*Summary of Findings:* Czech Republic has elements of strategic culture. Among the elite there is a general consensus of what constitutes a threat (Russia) and the best way to deal with this threat. (Atlanticism). This security culture is not shared among the general population but among the Czech elite. Even among the elite there is a growing divide emerging on how best to deal with the threat with some favoring an Atlanticist approach and others advocating a more Europe approach.\(^{259}\)

**Research Objective Four**

\(^{259}\) For more information see Illustration X ‘Map of Czech strategic culture’
• To critically account for the origins and motivations behind Prague’s strong sense of Atlanticism in security policy.

Summary of Findings: Atlanticism is rooted in Czech Republic’s geopolitical history. This includes being a small power in central Europe which has had negative encounters with Nazi Germany and the Communist regime over the past century. It is also attributed to the support shown by the US during the formative period 1993-1999 when America pushed for Czech integration into Europe Atlantic institutions and is also a strategic calculations among Czech elites that active engagement with America is the best way to balance against Russia.

Research Objective Five

• To critically assess of strength of Czech Republic’s Atlanticism and gauge its durability.

Summary of Findings: In the short and medium term Czech Republic will continue to see NATO as the main security provider to the CEE region. Atlanticism in the sense of trying to formulate strong direct bi-lateral relations with the US has already begun to decline and there is a growing recognition that Czech Republic should now deal with the US through the EU or NATO framework. There is a growing support in creating a strong European defence project in response to America’s disengagement from Europe and Russia’s escalating attempts at revisionism. Long term durability of Atlanticism will be depend on which political party/coalition is in power, what type of EU emerges, which party (EU or US) proves more adept in dealing with Russia and Europe’s neighborhood and on US policy towards the region.

Research Objective Six

• To critically access if Czech support for the CFSP project is increasing and what the future position of the Czech Republic towards the CFSP is likely to be.

Summary of Findings: Czech support for the project is increasing and will continue to increase in the future. In light of recent events there is a growing recognition of Europe as a second pillar and a need to create a strong Europe in the military realm which works in tandem with the United States. Support for the CFSP will be depend on which political party/coalition is in power, what type of EU emerges, which party (EU or US) proves more
adept in dealing with Russia and Europe’s neighborhood and on US policy towards the region.

4.5. *Final Word*

The pro-Atlanticist orientation of the Czech Republic stems from the countries historical experience and lack of faith in the effectiveness of European security policy. However Czech attitudes towards the US and EU are extremely complex with a divide among the public but also between and within parties. Czech affinity towards the US and Czech gratitude for the role that the US has played in the history of the Czech state is a major factor in the Atlanticist action of the Czech Republic in the realm of foreign and security policy over the past 20 years. Czech positive attitudes towards the US should not be interpreted as permanent and has already begun to decline partially as the result of US actions and partially as a result of a growing appreciation towards the role that Europe can play in promoting Czech foreign and security policy interests. Czech Republic’s Atlanticist orientation can be expected to decline in upcoming decades with a greater emphasis being placed on the CFSP. How far the Czech Republic will come to view the CFSP as the best protector of its interests will be dependent on how much Old member states are willing to adapt a New member state friendly approach to Russia and how close the CFSP aligns itself with America. Without a united coherent approach from the EU on how to deal with these issues Czech Republic a shift back towards Atlanticism cannot be ruled out.
Appendix A

List of Interviewee’s

- Advisor to Alexandr Vondra: (Anonymous), May 8th 2010
- Benes, Vit: Research Fellow, Institute of International Relations, May 20th 2010
- Cadier, David: PHD candidate Science Po Paris, May 1st 2010
- Ditrych, Ondrej: Charles University Prague, May 7th 2010
- Havranek, Jan: Independent Foreign policy analyst, Graduate of Security Studies Fletcher School of Diplomacy
- Hynek Nik: Research Fellow, Charles University Prague, April 21st 2010
- Kral, David: Research Fellow, Europeum, May 18th 2010
- Schneider, Jiri: Program Director of Prague Security Studies Institute, 8th April 2010
- Stritecky Vit: Research Fellow, Institute of International Relations, May 7th 2010
- Ministry of Defence: (Anonymous), April 22nd 2010
- Neuman, Marat: PHD Candidate Groningen University, May 10th 2010
- Weiss, Tomas: Research Fellow Europeum, May 18th 2010
Appendix B

Map of Czech Republic’s Strategic Culture

Small State (10 Million. citizens)

History
Formative experiences
(1918, 1938, 1968, 1989, etc.)

Geographical Location:
Perceptions of Russia

Domestic factors
(Political Parties, Ministries)

Czech Republic’s strategic culture

“Socially transmitted norms, attitudes and traditions, habits of mind, preferred models of co-operation, perceptions of the international environment that are more or less specific to a particular geographically based security community that has a unique historical experience”

Purpose for the use of Force
Basis for Security Policy
Alliance vs. Neutrality
Large vs. small state
Pro-Active engagement
Areas of Focus

Area of co-operation
(non durable pillar)

Why not durable?

Causes of Change

Parties in power
Public Opinion
Europeanization
External environment

ČSSD
ODS

Future orientation: ?
• **Definition**

Security culture for this analysis is defined as ‘a set of Socially transmitted norms, attitudes and traditions, habits of mind, preferred modes of co-operation, perceptions of the international environment that are more or less specific to a particular geographically based security community that has a unique historical experience’.

The Czech Republic has had an inverse strategic culture (not shared among the wider population) that is shared among the countries security community (leading party politicians or security experts with the Ministry of Defense and Foreign Affairs) that has dominated the security discourse since 1989.\(^{260}\) Within this community they have a general consensus on the threats (Russia) and on the resulting modes of co-operation. (Atlanticism).

• **Determinants**

Rooted in geopolitical history, its position in Central Europe as a small state with history of occupation and invasion by foreign powers (Hapsburgs, Nazi Germany and Russia) and linked to perception of Russia

*Small State*

Small state with 10 million citizen’s located in Central Europe surrounded by larger states

*Formative experiences*


*Perceptions of Russia*

Czech Republic has a strong uninformed strategic culture which is linked to threat perception of Russia and is rooted in socio historic context (40 years of Communist rule and 1968 invasion)

\(^{260}\) The Czech Republic does not have a united full blown security culture in that the security community is relativem new ( 20 years). In this sense Czech Republic lacks certain basis for analysing security culture. My aim here is to outline certain element sof Czech Security culture rather than attempt to formulate a fully blown security culture.

\(^{261}\) For information on the lessons learned during these formative experiences please see Appendix C
Czech Republic’s Atlanticist orientation (either through or direct bi-lateral ties with the US) and the resulting position this beings (Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and Missile Defense) is all linked to their overarching motivation of keeping American presence in Europe alive and credible which in as effort to check direct Russian influence in its affairs’.

Within the ESDP and CFSP Czech preferences of strong transatlantic alliance, energy security and Eastern partnership is an effort to check Russia influence in its affairs.262

- **Domestic Factors**

**Political Parties**

Divide among the main political parties ODS more Atlanticist while CSSD more Pro European263

**Ministries**

The Ministry of Foreign affairs and Ministry of Defence have been very influential in decision making since 1989 and both tend to be Atlanticist institutions. The MoD is more Atlanticist that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who are more likely to take into accounts the interests of European member states.

**What Constitutes Czech Security Culture**

- **Area of Co-operation** - Preference for a strong US in NATO or strong bi-lateral ties with the US. This is the preference of the Atlanticist community who have largely dominated the discourse in the Czech Republic since 1989 and are strong within the ODS party and Ministry of Defense. This preference is not shared among the CSSD.

- **Purpose for the Use of force** - Attachment to territorial Defense. Czech Republic is attached to Article V of NATO and sees this as the organizations primary role (Uneasiness about NATO moving away from territorial defense towards other goals)

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262 Whichever (EU, NATO/US) is perceived as being the best promoter of Czech interests vis-à-vis Russia in the future will likely see Czech Republic orientate in their direction.

263 For more Information see appendix F
• **Basis for CZ policy** – Niche specialization for missions abroad but can this can be linked back to attachment to territorial defense.

• **Alliance versus neutrality** – Strong Preference for alliance while neutrality as an option has no basis (This is linked to 1938 when largely defensive strategy failed)

• **Large versus small state** – Small state of 10 million but surrounded by large Russian state to the East and bigger states within Europe, its preference to align with US can be seen within a geo-political context (As a way to balance against Russia but also against domination of Europe by the larger states)

• **Pro-active engagement** – Preference for dealing with threats early and outside the Czech mainland (Again result of suffering from a defensive stance in 1938)

• **Promote human rights and democracy** – strong advocate of pushing human rights and democracy (Can be linked to history under communism, it is best displayed in Czech policy towards Cuba and Belarus with Havel as the symbolic leader of this approach.

**Preferences with Alliances**

Within ESDP it is an advocate of civilian rather than military capabilities and has preference for 1 strong transatlantic co-operation, 2 European energy security  3 Eastern partnership

Within NATO - Preference for strong US leadership - supports missions abroad but attachment to territorial defense (Article V).

Within Multi-lateral institutions – preference for multi-lateral institutions that can work towards the prevention of security threats but unwilling to rely multi-lateral institutions such as the UN to provide for its security (linked to bad historical experience with League of Nations during the Inter War period)

**Durability of Czech Security Culture**

**Elements that are durable**

• Support for Human rights

• Democratic transformation (Cuba and Belarus)

• Alliances above neutrality
Elements that have strong potential to change

Area of co-operation – EU vs. US/NATO – The strong preference for a US led NATO or bi-lateral ties with the US has been held together by the ruling coalition and Atlanticist leaning Ministry of Defense and Foreign Affairs but has the potential to change.

Causes of this change

- Coalition in power - The more left leaning the party the more likely that Czech Republic will move closer to a Europeanist position (Czech Atlanticism increases as one goes from left to right along the political spectrum)

- Strong Public Opinion - The general public is largely uninformed and not wholly interested in foreign affairs. Public opinion as a factor over the past 20 years has not been at the level of West European democracies. However a major event under certain circumstances could create a public debate on the orientation of Czech Security. In general the public are more in line with the Europeanist model of international relations with the CSSD’s position is more reflective of public opinion

- Degree of Europeanization – Thus far very limited Europeanization within Czech foreign policy with interests still largely determined by pre 1989 historical experience and geographical vulnerability however further Europeanization is possible as Czech Republic accumulates experience in EU foreign policy institutions.

- Changes in the external environment - America’s declining power and interest in Central Europe and Europe in general could cause a further shift towards an Europeanist position. For America Europe and its Eastern neighborhood no longer represents a priority. (This decline is reflected in a more active approach of Russia in its near abroad)

Top Down Changes Bottom up

External environment Political party in power

Socialization

- Conclusion

Future Orientation of Czech Security culture
National strategic culture of the Czech Republic is rooted along party lines rendering the move towards European security culture hard to predict, key determinants will be which coalition is in power, the strength of the CFSP, its ability to deal with Russia and promote Czech interests within the alliance and US policy towards Central Europe.

Appendix C

The Impact of formative events on Czech Security Policy

1. Event: 1918 Creation of the Czechoslovakian state

Lesson

America a guarantor of small nations

Sovereignty is possible with the help of great powers

Impact today:

American seen by many as a benign hegemony without territorial ambitions in the region (In the negotiations on Missile Defense America not viewed as imperialist power)

2. Event: 1938 Munich Conference

Event: Abandoned by its allies

Lesson

• Pursue a policy of alliance over neutrality

• Keep alliances credible

• Keep American commitments to the region alive and credible

• Deal with threats at an early stage at a distance from Czech territories

• Distrust of European powers to provide security to Czech Republic

• Do not rely on only one ally

• Work within Multilateral Institutions but do not trust them to provide security
• Strengthen bi-lateral ties with powerful allies

**Impact Today**

• No culture of neutrality

• Strong involvement inside NATO (e.g. Kosovo, Afghanistan) in an effort to keep the alliance credible

• Strong efforts to keep America engaged in Europe (Missile Defense project, Transatlantic relations priority under Czech EU Presidency)

• Deal with threats at early stage from Czech territory

• Strong preference for NATO instead of ESDP within Atlanticist Community

• Efforts to create a strong bi-lateral or even a ‘Special relationship’ with the US

3. **1948**

Event: Communist Coup

**Lesson**

• Dissatisfaction towards elites

**Impact Today**

• A gulf between the public and politicians

• Disinterest among the general population towards foreign policy

4. **1968**

Event: Soviet invasion of Czech Republic

**Lesson**

• Be part of a democratic alliance

• Territorial Defense is priority

• Fear of Russia
Secure Immediate borders

*Impact today*

- Strong attachment to article V of NATO
- Policies towards NATO, US and ESDP are reflective of perception of the Russian threat
- Czech’s strong supporters of human rights across the world – policy towards Cuba

5. 1989

Event fall of Communism

*Lesson*

- Promote human rights and democracy
- Pursue policies of pressure not engagement in defeating oppressive regimes

*Impact today*

- Czech policy towards Belarus – very critical - more reflective of US policy that European policy during Communist

6. 1993-1999

Event: Integration into Euro-Atlantic structures

*Lesson*

- American a champion of Czech cause
- American can help Czech Republic transcend dilemma of living in Central Europe

*Impact today*

Strong Atlanticist orientation of security policy 1989-2009

7. 2009?

Event Obama reset strategy and reversal of Missile Defense

*Lesson*
Central Europe not a priority for America

*Impact today*

- Greater support for ESDP as a second pillar of defense
- No more efforts to formulate a ‘special relationship’ with US

**Appendix D**

**Table 4: Parties in the Czech Parliament**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Parties Represented in the Parliament (Chamber of Deputies) – Election Results and Mandates</th>
<th>Governing Coalition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
OF 49.5% (124)  
KSČ 13.2% (33)  
HSD – SMS 10% (23)  
KDU – 8.4% (20) | OF                         |
| 1992-1996 | ODS 29.7%  
KSCM 14.1. %  
CSSD – 6.5%  
LSU 6.5%  
KDU – CSL 6.3%  
SPR- RSC 6%  
ODA 5.9%  
HSD-SMS- 5.9% | ODS-KDS-KDU-CSL-ODA       |
| 1996-1998 | ODS 29.6%  
CSSD – 26.4%  
KSCM – 10.3%  
KDU-CSL – 8.08%  
SPR-RSC – 8%  
ODA 6.36% | ODS-KDS-KDU-ČSL-ODA       |
| 1998-2002 | CSSD 32.3%  
ODS 27.7% | CSSD minority government |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KSCM</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDU-CSL</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSSD</td>
<td>30.2%</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODS</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>KSCM</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>KDU-CSL</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSSD</td>
<td>35.38%</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODS</td>
<td>32.32%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KSCM</td>
<td>7.23%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SZ</td>
<td>6.29%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ČSSD** Česka strana socialně demokraticka (Czech Social Democratic Party)

**HSD – SMS** Hnuti za samospravnou demokracii – Společnost pro Moravu a Slezsko (Movement for Self-Government Democracy – Union for Moravia and Silesia)

**KDU** Křesťanská a demokratická unie (Christian and Democratic Union)

**KDU – ČSL** Křesťansko-demokratická unie – Československa strana lidova (Christian Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People’s Party)

**KDS** Křesťanská demokratická strana (Christian Democratic Party)

**KSČ** Komunistická strana Československa (Communist Party of Czechoslovakia)

**KSČM** Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy (Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia)

**LSU** Liberalně – sociální unie (Liberal Social Union)

**ODA** Občanská demokratická aliance (Civic Democratic Alliance)

**ODS** Občanská demokratická strana (Civic Democratic Party)

**OF** Občanské Forum (Civic Forum)

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264 KDU and US in coalition
Annex: E

Annex G Recommendations

Europe

Optimal Scenario: Czech Republic and CEE countries emerge as full supporters in the ESDP project and in issues of intra-Alliance or intra-European debate can be counted on to support a pro-European viewpoint.

- Achieve Consensus on who to deal with Russia
- Support CEE preferences in Eastern neighborhood
- Common energy policy and united approach in dealing with Russia
- Increase military capabilities
- Develop in tandem with US

The US

Optimal Scenario: CEE’s countries influence increases the EU’s security capabilities and reinforces the transatlantic connection

- Reinforce ties with Czech Republic and CEE states through security commitments
- Encourage Czech Republic and CEE states to promote transatlantic unity
- Work with Europe on energy security
- Renew involvement in Europe’s neighborhood and reject Russia sphere of influence
Annex F: Different approaches to foreign policy issues among two main parties

- **Position towards US**
  - ODS – Czech Republic should make every effort to formulate strong relationship with US either through NATO or direct bi-lateral relationship
  - CSSD – Relations with US should be through the EU or NATO framework

- **Russia**
  - CSSD – much more pragmatic – tends to emphasize economic benefits over ideological
  - ODS – much more Russia skeptic

- **ESDP**
  - ODS – ESDP must not develop as a substitute to NATO
  - CSSD – Supports to development of a strong ESDP

- **NATO**
  - ODS – NATO primary vehicle for European defense
  - CSSD – Supports NATO but tends to be more enthusiastic about ESDP

- **Deeper European Integration**
  - ODS – has skeptical elements in the party – those surrounding Klaus see it as a threat to Czech sovereignty
  - CSSD – Pro-Strong European integration
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• Benes, Vit : Research Fellow, Institute of International Relations, May 20th 2010

• Cadier, David : PHD candidate Science Po Paris, May 1st 2010

• Ditrych, Ondrej: Research Fellow Institute of International Relations

• Havranek, Jan: Independent Foreign policy analyst, Graduate of Security Studies Fletcher School of Diplomacy

• Hynek Nik : Research Fellow, Institute of International Relations, April 21st 2010

• Kral, David : Research Fellow, Europeum, May 18th 2010

• Schneider, Jiri: Programe Director of Prague Security Studies Institute, 8th April 2010

• Stritecky Vit : Research Fellow, Institute of International Relations, May 7th 2010

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• Neuman, Marat : PHD Candidate Groningen University, May 10th 2010

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