

Results and conclusion

The process of Caucasian ethno-political mobilization began in the 60's of 20th century (somewhere has been running since the beginning of the Russian colonization), however its acceleration came on in the second of 80's. This period is connected with the Gorbachev's political and economical reforms aiming to multinational empire modernization. Unintended consequent of the reforms became absolute soviet power decline leading to dismantling of Soviet union.

The totalitarian system release and the political decentralization are appeared to be key catalyts of the ethnic clashes with roots lying in ethnic trauma of the last century. Ethno-mobilization arised then out of ethnic interactions given by historical reminiscence and asymeric status of particular groups within the federal system defined by the soviet authorities during 20's and 30's of the last century. In its implication, social, economical and cultural discrimination called „internal colonization“ occured. On the contrary, the „ethnic competition“ about economical and political resource control within given territory happend in cases of a titular group superior status or equal status of two titular groups. Separatism, iredentism or territorial autonomism were final goals of ethno-mobilization efforts in both theoretical cases described above. In some cases the mobilization led to armed conflicts.

The modernist theories dealing with nacionalism stress that social and economical societal modernization predates the mobilization and consequently leads to internal ethnic consolidation and nation-formation including of selfdetermination in face of the other groups. Modernization is connected with progressive urbanization and growing educational level, exactly that occured in the North and South Caucasus in the second half of the 20th century. Regional differences in modernization indicators detection should help filling a mozaic explaining different political develepment of Caucasian ethnics.

Kind of doubt were expressing at the introduction in connection with searching an „ideal“ factor or group of factors influencing the mobilization. Those doubts have been more or less confirmed, therefore some statistical analysis results are possible to consider as relevant. However, it is necessary to outline rather a concurrence influence of the factors than a significance of a single factor. Next result summary is ordered according to given hypothesis:

Ad1) Historical factors have been appeared to be the strongest determinants of ethno-political mobilization and ethnic conflicts. Ethno-national movements primarily professed

primordial principles in relation to the other ethnic groups. History manipulation for glorification or traumatism have happened integral part of ethnic relationships. The most important historical milestones as neurological point of mutual relations are the North Caucasian conquest by the Russian tsars in the 19th century, the Southcaucasian ethnic conflicts between the Armenians and their neighbours as well as the Georgians and the neighbouring minorities, political border delimitation, the Soviet political-administrative system and its changes and finally the Stalin's deportations of the Northcaucasian ethnics.

Ad2a) The ethnic polarization is important mobilization factor, however the key determinant was interethnic historical trauma. An ethnic structure change has not appeared to be statistically relevant because tensions can spring both by quick growth of one group at the expense of the second (fear of dominant status loss) and equal intensive growth of all groups accompanied by competition for the limited sources. The „korenizacia“ policy played a great role in interethnic relations, when the titular group did have a privileged position to education, control function, in cultural aspects, etc. It contributed to minority's discontent growth, because they feared societal marginalization or cultural assimilation.

Ad2b) The change rate of Russians has a significant influence on the political mobilization of autochthonic ethnics. Russian emigration from the South Caucasus and Chechnya began in the 70's, from the North Caucasus in the 90's, however a relative rate were falling in the both of regions during the whole period. There also left the politically favoured Russian culture which produced the mobilization effect of autochthons on one side and acted as an animosity buffer between those autochthons on other side.

Ad3a) The language proficiency influence did not have strong correlation on the ethnopolitical mobilization. Firstly, the titular language proficiency could be positively affected by the privileged titular ethnic status in an entity (it constituted official as well as tutorial language), or secondly, the titular language proficiency could be negatively affected by the cultural assimilative policy. The inferior cultural position could occur in two ways, to the universal Russian and to the culture of a superior entity. The first case rather conforms to the Southcaucasian republics situation, where the titular languages (Armenian, Georgian, Azeri) were relatively well spread among the minorities. The second case is typical for the North Caucasus and the autonomous Southcaucasian entities where the titular language was neither known among other groups nor a whole titular ethnic.

Ad3b) Russian knowledge and its development have not been statistically proved as important factors on the ethnopolitical mobilization. However, russification rate change during the intercensal period has appeared to have certain significance on mobilization. Although the whole russification rate was quite low in the Caucasian region, the phenomenon is very well explainable within the Russian population rate development (by the way, statistically proved). Russian as a lingua franca should have been a modernization vehicle among the soviet ethnics and the high russification (identity change) rate should have been a mark of successful cultural policy. For that matter, Russian speaking Slavic immigration was the process accelerator. The russification rate negative development accompanied by the Russian emigration have been failure of the soviet policy and a mark of increasing national identity power.

Ad4) The urbanization level proved to be an important ethno-mobilization factor. The level used to be higher in a more developed and traditionally urbanized entities, where cities became a space for ethnic competition. Urbanized titular ethnics with demands on economical sources and political power control have the most important influence. Therefore, the ethnopolitical mobilization was much stronger and ethnic clashes more frequent in the South Caucasus because the Russians (not the autochtonics) dominated in the North Caucasus. This is the main proof of modernism theories validity in the case of ethno-political mobilization in the Caucasus.

On the contrary, neither urbanization level change or dichotomy of particular ethnic urbanization level change have not proved their influence. The reason may lie in very intensive urbanization process which tracked all entities and all ethnics during the watched period in the region. The urbanization and industrialization process used to be artificially stimulated by the Soviet power with the aim of equal social development of all nations. Twenty years still seems to be short time period for a results evaluation, consequences may display later.

Ad5) Educational level influence has not proved its significance for the ethno-political mobilization. However, positive correlation between higher educational level (university and secondary school degree) and titular ethnics, respectively, lower educational level and the Russian population rate are kind of surprising and important statistical findings. This could be given by the „korenizacia“ policy which preferred the titular ethnics before the others in educational process. Therefore, the educational factor could play a hidden role in the ethnopolitical mobilization. In cases, when two relatively socially developed ethnics contested

in urban environs and one was favoured, obstructions to education could be a catalyst for ethnic clashes (e.g. Abkhazia).

The explanation of demographical and social-economical variables statistical failure towards the ethno-political mobilization consists in an extreme diversity of the Caucasian society. Therefore, a short summary of macroregional differences is suitable on the conclusion (according to the hypothesis).

AdA) The ethnic homogenization of the Caucasian entities on behalf of the titular ethnics occurred in the whole region since the 60's and it was influenced by two main trends: firstly, absolute (only in the south) as well as relative (in the south and the north) decline of Russian population rate, secondly, high natality rate and immigration rate of the titular ethnics. The South and North Caucasus were homogenized by roughly the same pace, the fastest process was registered in Chechnya in consequence of deported population repatriation during the watched period.

AdB) As was said above, the Russian population kept losing its position step by step for long period in the Caucasus. The absolute decrease was occurred mainly in the South Caucasus, however the greatest decrease of Russians in regard of all entity population affected, beside Azerbaijan, Dagestan and Chechnya. On the contrary, decrease of the Russians in Nagorno Karabakh and South Osetia was much slower.

AdC) The Southcaucasian entities were not more urbanized than the Northern ones, for example Nakhichevan, Nagorno Karabakh or South Osetia were less urbanized than most of northcaucasian entities. However, the Southcaucasian titular ethnics were more urbanized than the Northcaucasians and created main part of urban ethnic structure at the same time. On the other hand, the Russians constituted the main part of urban population in the North Caucasus. Nevertheless, the Northcaucasian entities urbanized much faster themselves and the titular ethnics were primary factor.

AdD) The russification rate and Russian proficiency were on much higher level in the North Caucasus considering the higher rate of Russian population. The republic administrative status played also certain role, because it guaranteed the official language privilege for the titular ethnics. Besides, they tried to enforce their language ethnic minorities on the autonomous entities, who defended against the assimilation policy with preference for Russian language and culture.

AdE) Generally, education level was higher in the South Caucasus than in the North, with the exception of North Osetia. Longer educational tradition in case of the Armenians, Georgians, Osetians and Abkhazians played important role in explanation of such regional differences. All in all, the oldest regional universities are situated in Tiflis, Baku and Yerevan.

Following conclusions about ethno-political mobilization in the Caucasus are possible to express in regard to research theoretical frame:

- (1) If there is a political reform attempt in a totalitarian or autocratic regime of ethno-heterogeneous and socially developed societies, the ethno-political mobilization will be a natural consequence.
- (2) Mobilization intensity expressed by national movements demands and by process of their fulfilment is primarily depend on ethnics relationships, respectively on ethnic trauma. Political tensions and ethnic clashes should be expected, if same unsettled historical interethnic dispute existed within one political territory.
- (3) The ethno-political mobilization is more probable in a urban environs which is an ideal incubator of interethnic relationships. More intensive mobilization occurs, when there is one ethnic group politically and economically superior in cities.
- (4) If there a third ethnic group with culturally and economically strong societal position exists in a ethnically heterogeneous entity, it becomes an mobilization impetus aiming cultural protection and emancipation, but at the same time acts as accommodation factor between two autochthonous groups. Therefore, third ethnic group departure can bring about a political destabilization on the contrary.
- (5) If a future interethnic development has to be enacted in an accommodation way, there must be established a democratic and decentralization system (autonomy or federation) immediately in an ethno-political mobilization beginning. If not, separatism or irredentism will prevail with a risk of escalation to ethnic conflict during the ethno-political mobilization.

At the conclusion, the Caucasian region will stay on politically extreme unstable territory. Firstly, more than decade frozen conflicts have been still influenced regional politics and they have become new ethnic trauma. No one of the involved player with own claim on disputed territory does not want to give back its position, which is sufficient motivation for ethno-political mobilization in regard of primordial character of local nationalism.

Secondly, it is very probably that societal modernization processes will continue and they will lead to stabilization and consolidation of nations which are still considerably fragmented along to clanship. It is quite possible that demographical growth will continue especially in muslim ethnics case what will lead to greater press on limited economical sources and more intensive interethnic competition. In that matter is important to attention to growing Islam influence among demographically young Caucasian population. The religion can become both a ethnic identity base and an efficient vehicle of Caucasian mobilization against outer (Russian) policy.

Thirdly, regenerate Russian national politics and geopolitics have been acting again with its agelong character of political centralism. It is interesting to follow on the centuries constant Russian attitude towards the Caucasus. The imperial policy „divide and rule“ or are still applied all around, regardless of the tsarist, Soviet or „Putin“ regime. The events in Chechnya or the permanent attempts at restriction of ethnics autonomy (the latest establishment so called Caucasian federal district whose presidential envoy is superior to local authorities) are evidences such statement. Moreover, Russia have not given up the Southcaucasus. The Russians has been recently playing very active politics against Georgia and its separatist regions and they are keeping the ace of trumps in the case of Nagorno Karabakh conflict. However, a next Russian weakening in the region will mean a new attempt at Caucasian ethnics emancipation both against the empire and against each other. It should be warning for the Russian politics and academicians and international community as well.