

CHARLES UNIVERSITY

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

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**Prospects of Understanding between EU and US towards Iran and
its Practical Impacts**

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MASTER THESIS

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Statutory Declaration

I declare that the presented master thesis has been carried out in self dependent work and only with the stated tools and literature.

Prague, January 14, 2010

Hana Biriczová

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Abstract

Master thesis “Prospects of Understanding between EU and US towards Iran and its Practical Impacts” first aims to analyse transatlantic cooperation on reducing a common security threat that in this example represents the Iranian nuclear programme. The goal of the thesis is to identify with a help from neorealist and neoliberal theory preferences about coordinating the strategies on the platform of a non-proliferation regime. The second part of my thesis focuses on the topic of public diplomacy and compares the extent and effects of public diplomacy of the EU and the US based on a small-scaled original research. The conclusion of thesis will point out the strong and weak aspects of the strategies conducted on Iran by the transatlantic actors and determine how useful a transatlantic cooperation in the field of public diplomacy might be in the attempt to reduce the security threat Iran poses.

Anotace

Magisterská práce “Výhledy porozumnění mezi EU a USA vůči Íránu a jeho praktické dopady” si klade za cíl analyzovat transatlantickou spolupráci ohledně snížení bezpečnostní hrozby, kterou v tomto případě představuje íránský nukleární program. Cílem diplomové práce je identifikovat s pomocí neorealisticke a neoliberalní teorie preference obou aktéru v zájmu o vzájemnou koordinaci svých strategií, a to vše na platformě režimu nešíření jaderných zbraní. Druhá část mé práce se zaměřuje na veřejnou diplomacii a srovnává šíři a účinek veřejné diplomacie USA a EU s pomocí malého původního výzkumu. Závěrečná část ukáže silné a slabé stránky strategií vytvořených vůči Íránu a rozhodne, jak vhodná je transatlantická spolupráce na poli veřejné diplomacie ve snaze snížit bezpečnostní riziko, které Írán představuje.

Key Words

United States of America, European Union, Iran, nuclear programme, International Atomic Energy Agency, cooperation, public diplomacy

Klíčová slova

Spojené státy americké, Evropská unie, Írán, nukleární program, Mezinárodní agentura pro atomovou energii, spolupráce, veřejná diplomacie

Acronyms

Asociace pro mezinárodní otázky	AMO
British Broadcasting Corporation	BBC
European Atomic Energy Community	EURATOM
European Security Strategy	ESS
European Union	EU
France, Germany and United Kingdom	EU-3
Generalised System of Preferences	GSP
High Enriched Uranium	HEU
International Atomic Energy Agency	IAEA
Iran and Libya Sanctions Act	ILSA
Iran Sanctions Act	ISA
National Security Strategy	NSS
Non-Aligned Movement	NAM
Non-Proliferation Treaty	NPT
Permanent United Nations Security Council Members	P5
Permanent UNSC Members + Germany	P5+1, EU-3+3
Radio Free Europe/Radio Free Liberty	RFE/RFL
United Kingdom	UK
United Nations	UN
United Nations Security Council	UNSC
United States of America	US
Voice of America	VOA
Weapons of mass destruction	WMD
World Trade Organization	WTO

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1. Introduction

Strategies on Iran had been remarkably different in the past among the foreign policies of the United States and the European Union, although otherwise they have worked together as partners in many other areas. Iran, however, is a special case: a country with rich history of attracting political turmoil, and on the other hand, viewed as a possible stabilizer in the Middle East for many decades. Surrounded by states of Arabic origin, its Persian roots, history and culture – so unique in the region – are the state's greatest assets, despite of the last thirty years of intensive efforts to make Islam the primary source of national identity. For Europe, which has been endorsing a liberal drift in the international relations basically since the end of the World War II, it is much more difficult to condemn Iran than for the United States. Ideologically, in last four decades the US have been swaying from the liberal views of President Jimmy Carter and his Democrats to the most recent Republican neo-conservative eight-year-long period that ended in 2009. The latter phase partly interferes with the time frame of this study.

Iran has a special geopolitical position and because of everything listed above, it is an important player at least in the area of the Middle East. Its turn to Islam thirty years ago has shaken the international relations in general and today its nuclear aspirations attract attention and raises mistrust and fears. What are the world's strategies to face this course of development, assessed as threat by many?

The period from 2006 to 2008 will be examined thoroughly in this thesis with focus on European-American cooperation strategies on Iranian nuclear programme, which the transatlantic actors both perceive as a security threat. Solving this threat is a real challenge and the international non-proliferation regime gives the US and the EU a proper base for cooperation. However, the potential of this cooperation is appraised differently in the debate between neorealists and neoliberalists as it will be proven later. Beside the traditional measures of foreign policy in sense of state-to-state relations, the use of soft power and more precisely public diplomacy is also proving itself as a helpful tool to minimize Iranian nuclear threat. Even though cooperation in this area seems much harder to proceed, both transatlantic actors could only gain from it.

Although the central topic focuses on transatlantic cooperation, this thesis touches several delicate matters that the actors of international relations are intensively concerned with for the last decade. These issues are difficult to compromise on – they include the function of international organisations, the meaning of international regimes, the organization of the relations on the Near/Middle East, energetic security, sometimes controversial role of public diplomacy in Western foreign policies and so on. For such a monitored topic a narrow scrutiny has been chosen together with a short research period. The author hopes this study will help answering on the below stated research questions that are targeted on the subtle topics and should help understanding of present international relations of the European Union, United States of American and Iran inside the regime of non-proliferation.

2. Theoretical Frame and Methodology

2.1 Research Aim and Purpose of the Study

The prospects of understanding between the European Union and the United States and their foreign policies towards Iran – including public diplomacy – and consequent practical impacts is an interesting and up-to-date topic that deserves scholastic attention within the discipline of international relations. The purpose of this study is to verify following hypothesis: *Targeting Iranian public as a part of a joint EU and US foreign strategy will help to reduce the security threat Iran poses now.*

Iran as a security threat is downright linked to nuclear security due to Iranian long-lasting activities in the areas that are in direct contradiction to the fundamentals of the international non-proliferation regime, which has been subsequently chosen as the ‘arena’ in this study.

The United States, the European Union and Iran figure as main actors in the thesis. The forenamed choice of subjects allows applying neorealist and neoliberal theories, since the neo-neo debate has been focusing intensely on the extent of influence international institutions like regimes actually have on interstate cooperation in an anarchical international system.

Cooperation between the European Union and the United States towards Iran has intensified since 2006, however, there are still fields needing improvement. The time phase between the years 2006 to 2008 has been chosen as a research period, because the American administration (i.a. the second administration of President George W. Bush) had been approaching a common position with European Union towards Iran and actually seeking cooperation within the international non-proliferation regime to reduce Iranian security threat, which is a big change compared to the years 2002-2005 and thus the first Bush’s administration. First research questions to answer would therefore be following:

- *How do the US and EU acquit themselves with cooperation with one and another in the case of Iranian nuclear ambitions?*

- *What meaning has the non-proliferation regime for the transatlantic partners and their foreign policies towards Iran?*
- *Has the Iranian nuclear threat been minimised in the research period of 2006 to 2008.*

The remaining gap in cooperation, in the given research period in the author's opinion, lays in one of standard practices of foreign policy: public diplomacy. Public diplomacy is a part of soft power, whereas EU names soft power as the cornerstone of its foreign policy for a considerable period of time, the USA has been gravitating to such state of affairs, particularly in the case of Iran, only since Condoleezza Rice had become the Secretary of State in 2006. That is why the thesis will focus in its second part closely on the issue of the use of public diplomacy by both actors in order to prove the hypothesis that this tool of approaching Iran was not used sufficiently, which could have made a real difference.

Both, the US and the EU, are relatively experienced in public diplomacy, yet, according to the principal assumptions of this study, this tool of foreign policy can have major influence on reducing Iranian nuclear security threat. The key is in promoting the values of the non-proliferation regime in Iran through public diplomacy, whereas both actors have their own attitude towards this statement. This study will describe their strategies and weight on the prospects of cooperation. The answers to the next two research questions are therefore essential for completing this thesis.

- *How do the US and EU use the promotion of non-proliferation regime's values in public diplomacy?*
- *Will an intensified and coordinated transatlantic public diplomacy with focus on proliferation help to solve the security threat Iran poses?*

2.2 Methodology

This study was completed as a qualitative research in consistency with the central goal of such a research – to reconstruct collective knowledge, shared experiences and tacit rules of social actors.² For the empirical foundation of this thesis primary and secondary source analysis was used in the first place. Semi-structured expert interviews were conducted in areas where information was not publicly available.

Originally, interviews as a methodological strategy were planned to a much greater extent, but the political climate in Iran did not allow completing this aim, which was to interview a research segment of students in Tehran. However, during a six-week-long study visit in Iran realised in September/October 2009 a basic participant observation had been carried out. Outcomes from an observation of the media situation and censorship will be used in the introduction of the public diplomacy chapter, as they will serve as an endorsement to already known facts. On the other hand, in spite the fact associations with the locals had been conducted on a daily basis, gathered information are not scientifically relevant due to a small period of time spent in the research area, since this should content a time frame numbered in months to conclude applicable data.³ The limited knowledge of Farsi language is also a reason, why most of the related observations will only help to formulate a conclusion of this thesis. Nevertheless, the study-visit has been incredibly beneficial to the thesis in sense of getting an insight into the societal and political matters of Iran and understanding the conditions the European and American policies are received in.

The next important detail regarding the methodology is the application of two theoretical approaches on the case of transatlantic cooperation towards Iran inside the non-proliferation regime in a chosen time frame. This part should facilitate the understanding of challenges in the interstate cooperation within one as controversial regime as the non-proliferation system is. The evaluation of the approaches' ability to explain the behaviour of the main actors will complete the first part of this thesis and give an interesting theoretical basis for the second part devoted to public diplomacy. Regarding the public diplomacy of the United States a

²FLICK, Uwe; VON KARDOFF, Ernst; STEINKE Ines. *Qualitative Forschung. Ein Handbuch*. 2.ed. 2003. Reinbek: Rowohlt. p.12.

³ KIRSCH, Gesa; SULLIVAN Patricia. *Methods and Methodology in Composition Research*. 1.ed. 1992. Southern Illionis University Press. p. 158. ISBN 0-8093-1726-5.

small-scaled quantitative and qualitative research with an original methodology was conducted.

2.3 Literature Review and Availability of Sources

2.3.1 Literature Review

The sources of this paper can be divided to primary and secondary and sorted according to leading issues of the thesis. Official documents like security strategies, resolutions, legal acts or reports originating from the European Union, the United States or international organisation (International Atomic Energy Agency and United Nations) are the most frequent primary sources. However, the outcomes of the simple participant observation conducted in Iran can also be counted into this category. Also, academic publications to the topics *cooperation, international institutions, neorealism* and *neoliberalism* have been used for the theoretical part of the thesis. Findings from articles and books written by theorists Joseph M. Grieco, Robert O. Keohane, Stephen D. Krasner, John Mearsheimer, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. or Kenneth Waltz are an essential part of this study. The reports by German proliferation expert and regime theorist Harald Müller for the Hessische Stiftung Friedens-und Konfliktforschung are also worth mentioning. His publications “Vetrag im Zerfall?” (2005) about the 2005 Non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference or “Was wäre, wenn?” (2009) about the possibilities in strengthening the regime, which are written from an insider’s perspective, have been genuinely beneficial to the insight of the proliferation issues and the positions of the actors involved.

Nevertheless, secondary literature following these contents such as the publication by Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger “Theories of International Regimes” (Czech translation, 1997) has guided this research by giving a coherent overview of the neo-neo debate in relation to international regimes. Czech scholars Šárka Waisová and Jan Karlas have provided an precise summary of international institutions’ theories.

The theory of soft power and public diplomacy in foreign policy is also important for this thesis. However, the sources are rather limited. The most summarizing and reliable is the

work of Joseph S. Nye Jr. He brought the idea of soft power as opposed to hard military power into the foreign policy discourse in a *Foreign Policy*'s article in 1990 and, in 2004 expanded the theory and updated it in his book called "Soft Power". Both of these publications also serve as primary sources for this thesis. The bibliography in Nye's book has been, however, an inspiration to not to forget newspapers and magazine articles as sources of information. He often cites worldwide-spread newspapers such as New York Times, Los Angeles Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, International Herald Tribune or Financial Times and many of them will figure in this thesis too.

Nye is the most cited author in the area of public diplomacy, together with John Melissen. His publication "Wielding Soft Power" (2005) is a primary source to the theory of public diplomacy. Other primary sources will be the paper "Iran's Media Battleground" (2006) from the Foreign Policy Centre in London, reports of the Advisory Committee on Public Diplomacy of the US State Department, publications of the EU Commission and other EU institutions regarding this topic, such as the paper "A Glance at EU Public Diplomacy" from 2007 etc.

Czech sources to this topic are rather limited. Jana Peterková from the University of Economics in Prague is the only person in the Czech academic world that continuously writes about this topic. For example, she published a paper called "Perspektivy veřejné diplomacie České republiky" ("Perspectives of Czech Public Diplomacy") together with Eliška Tomalová at the Institute of the International Relations in Prague in 2008, or an article "Veřejná diplomacie – jen módní pojem nebo skutečná změna?" ("Public Diplomacy: a Buzzword or Real Change?") in the journal *International Relations* from 2006. Concluding upon her citations Peterková clearly considers Jan Melissen as one of the most important authors in this discipline and her own inspiration. Also, Institute of Political Studies (the resident institute of the author of this study) published a collective volume called *Instruments of European Integration* (2006). Šárka Waisová and Ladislav Cabada wrote a paper called "Public Diplomacy as an Instrument of (European) Foreign Policy". They are concerned mainly with the use of corporate designs and information campaigns as political instruments. This study will not focus on this topic in particular; more importantly, the paper of Waisová and Cabada offers short and accurate introduction into public diplomacy in English.

A study written by Alexander Skiba called “Transatlantic Relations and Rogue States, The Case of Adjusting U.S. Policy towards Iran” (2007) gives a sufficient overview of the cooperation of the EU and the US on Iran during the period 2003 to 2005 and supplies with a distinctive amount of useful citations.

2.3.2 Availability of Sources

The most accessible data were the resolutions and reports from the international organizations from their internet databases on www.iaea.org and www.un.org. The United States also provide the public with sufficient information through the websites of ministry departments such as www.state.gov (the State Department). The European Union, on the contrary, does not provide basically any information about strategies on public diplomacy. The eligible documents found in the European Council’s database <http://www.consilium.europa.eu> were not accessible for an outsider. However, after approaching several experts at the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the missing data have been filled, together with helpful insights. Experts at the Radio Farda, which resides in Prague at the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, have been contacted as well with a different level of outcome.

3. The Cooperation of the Transatlantic Actors towards Iran in 2006-2008

3.1 Background about the relations between EU, US and Iran

The United States has taken measures towards Iran first in 1996 with the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), which was amended in 2006 as the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) and extended until 2011. The bill has been introduced “(i)n response to Iran’s stepped up nuclear programme and its support to terrorist organizations such as Hizbollah, Hamas, and Palestine Islamic Jihad.”⁴ President Bill Clinton banned US trade with Iran and US investments into this country. This decision was meant primarily as a hit on Iranian petroleum industry, Iran's first-hand source of finance, which needed a modernization⁵ and thus it should have *coerced* Iran to do what the US wants. However, US allies, mainly the European Union refused the central point of this act. Instead, the EU made the exact opposite: trade exchanges and investments with and into Iran. However, the main incentive of the European Union in the 90's had not been the nuclear activity of the country, but the human rights dialogue and the Iran's connections to terrorism.

In 1992 after the European Council's meeting the institution issued a following statement: “Dialogue should be maintained with the Iranian government. This should be a critical dialogue which reflects concern about Iranian behaviour and calls for improvement in a number of areas, particularly human rights, the death sentence pronounced by a fatwa of Ayatollah Khomeini against the author Salman Rushdie, which is contrary to international law, and terrorism.”⁶ The ‘Critical Dialogue’ later transformed into the ‘Comprehensive Dialogue’, starting in 1998 after the election of reformist President Mohammad Khatami. The work of the European Commission had been relatively successful on this task and the cooperation from Iranian side had also pleased the EU. Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner also declared this fact in her speech reacting to President Ahmadinejad’s rather

⁴ KATZMAN, Kenneth. The Iran Sanctions Act. CRS Report to Congress. *FAS*. [pdf]. 2007. p.1. [cit. 2009-11-10]. Available from: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS20871.pdf>.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ RUBIN, Michael. Continuing The 'Critical Dialogue' With Iran . *Radio Free Liberty*. [online]. 2008. [cit. 2009-11-10]. Available from WWW http://www.rferl.org/content/Continuing_the_Critical_Dialogue_With_Iran/1845971.html.

aggressive comments on Israel in 2005.⁷ The optimal scenario should have been closing a Trade and Cooperation Agreement, which was directly linked to the success in the Comprehensive Dialogue and Human Rights Dialogue that was established in 2002⁸. But, the revelation of Iran's clandestine nuclear activities in August 2002 through an Iranian dissident group who took pictures of gas centrifuge plant near Natanz and a heavy-water production facility at Arak⁹ disrupted the talks, and consequently, Tehran itself suspended the Comprehensive Dialogue in December 2003.¹⁰ Prior the decision of Iran to end the talks the International Atomic Energy Agency in February 2003 first visited Iran for an inspection headed by Director General Mohamed ElBaradei. The first reactions of the transatlantic partners to these facts contrasted heavily. The United States first accused Iran of “across-the-board pursuit of weapons of mass destruction”¹¹ and in summer 2003 President Bush stated that the United States would not tolerate a construction of nuclear weapon by Iran¹² and preferred to report Iran to the Security Council, a competence only the IAEA had. Also, United States' radical position against Iran was expressed by publicly connecting this country to terrorism, a topic that was still on the top of White House's agenda two years after the 9/11 attacks. “There's no question but that there have been and there are today senior al-Qaida leaders in Iran and they are busy,”¹³ declared Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who represented the hawks in Bush's first administration together with Vice President Dick Cheney. President Bush famously included Iran into the ‘axis of evil’ in his speech on 29 January 2002¹⁴ and the American government continued to underline this feature.

⁷ FERRERO-WALDNER, Benita. *Speech by EU Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner on recent declarations by President of Iran*. [online]. EU-UN. 2005 [cit. 2009-11-10]. Available from WWW http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/fr/article_5318_fr.htm.

⁸ *European Union @ United Nations*. Presidency Declaration on EU-Iran Human Rights Dialogue. [online]. 2005. [cit. 2009-11-10]. Available from WWW http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/fr/article_5505_fr.htm.

⁹ SKIBA, Alexander. *Transatlantic Relations and Rogue States – The Case of Adjusting U.S. Policy Towards Iran*. [pdf]. 2007. *WISSENSCHAFT & SICHERHEIT online*. p.10.[cit. 2009-11-10]. Available from WWW <http://www.sicherheitspolitik.de>. ISSN: 1613-5245.

¹⁰ *European Commission: External Cooperation Programme*. Iran. [online]. 2007. [cit. 2009-11-10]. Available from WWW http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/gulf-region/country-cooperation/iran/iran_en.htm.

¹¹ *NYT: Reuters*. Chronology of Iran's Nuclear Programme. [online]. New York Times. 8.8. 2005. [cit. 2009-11-10]. Available from WWW <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/08/international/08timeline-iran.html>.

¹² SANGER, David E. Bush Says U.S. Will Not Tolerate Building of Nuclear Arms by Iran. *New York Times*, [online]. 19. 6. 2003. [cit. 2009-11-10]. Available from WWW <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/19/world/bush-says-us-will-not-tolerate-building-of-nuclear-arms-by-iran.html?pagewanted=all>.

¹³ *VOA: News*. Bush Administration Reviews Iran Policy. [online]. Voice of America. 30. 5. 2003. [cit. 2009-11-17]. Available from WWW <http://www.VoAnews.com/english/archive/2003-05/a-2003-05-30-15-Bush.cfm?moddate=2003-05-30>.

¹⁴ *CNN: Inside Politics*. Bush State of the Union Address. [online]. CNN. 29.1. 2002. [cit. 2009-11-17]. Available from WWW <http://edition.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/01/29/bush.speech.txt/>.

The European Union, on the contrary, tried to resume negotiations with Iran to avoid the referral to the Security Council and initiated the conclusion of Tehran Declaration under which the EU made Iran to sign the Additional Agreement of the Non-proliferation Treaty.¹⁵ Although, the Europeans have seen this step as a big success, Washington criticized the agreement for being too soft, because the EU-3 (Germany, France, United Kingdom) hasn't incorporated a menace of sanctions into it.¹⁶ The Paris Agreement in 2004 followed according to which Iran and the EU-3 “reaffirm the commitments in the Tehran Agreed Statement of 21 October 2003 and have decided to move forward, building on that agreement.”¹⁷ And further, it offered an endorsement at the World Trade Organization for an Iranian membership.¹⁸

Both of the agreements haven't been successful, moreover some critics of the EU-3 effort have seen the Tehran Declaration and Paris Agreement as a gateway tool that allowed Tehran to concentrate on completing the uranium conversion programme without the fear from being referred to the Security Council. According to Iranian officials, the detailed list of what ‘suspension’ represents as declared in the Paris Agreement did not include the production of uranium hexafluoride, which is reached precisely through uranium conversion.¹⁹ This explanation was not received well and the IAEA strongly disapproved such an interpretation.²⁰ In summer 2005 Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, Hassan Rohani, claimed: “While we were talking with the Europeans in Tehran, we were installing equipment in parts of the facility in Isfahan. In fact, by creating a calm environment, we were able to complete the work in Isfahan. Today, we can covert yellowcake into UF4 and UF6, and this is a very important matter.”²¹ However, Iran agreed to the suspension of uranium conversion at last, which was obviously required by the EU in relation of resuming the mutual partnership.

¹⁵ IAEA: *News Centre*. Statement by the Iranian Government and visiting EU Foreign Ministers. [online]. International Atomic Energy Agency. 2003. [cit. 2009-11-17]. Available from WWW http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaealIran/statement_iran21102003.shtml.

¹⁶ SKIBA, Alexander. 2007. p.10.

¹⁷ IAEA: *INFCIR 637*. Communication Dated 26 November 2004 Received from the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United Kingdom Concerning the Agreement Signed in Paris on 15 November 2004 [pdf]. International Atomic Energy Agency. [pdf]. International Atomic Energy Agency. 2004. [cit. 2009-11-17]. Available from WWW <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcir/2004/infirc637.pdf>.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ KERR, Paul. IAEA Cites Iran Progress, Raises Questions. *Arms Control Association*. [online]. 2004. [cit. 2009-11-17]. Available from WWW http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_12/IAEA_Iran.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ *China Daily: Agencies*. Iran Confirms Uranium-to-gas Conversion. [online]. China Daily. 10.5.2005. [cit. 2009-11-25]. Available from WWW http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-05/10/content_440631.htm

Consequently, in August 2005 yet another proposition followed. The EU-3 approached the Iranian government with an offer of cooperation in trade and technology, as well as an access to nuclear fuel. In exchange the European countries demanded withdrawing from the uranium enrichment process.²² Intensive talks between the EU and the US had anticipated this offer and President Bush even tried to define a common transatlantic strategy towards Iran in March 2005. In the beginning of that month Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice held talks with European delegates in London. The stance of the US is clearly summed up in Bush's statement where he has claimed he has been “most appreciative that our friends in Europe agree with the United States, and Iran should not have a nuclear weapon, period - no ands, ifs or buts.”²³

The proposal repeated the offer of the WTO membership and included one for commercial aircraft and aircraft spare parts in exchange of the suspension of Iranian nuclear programme.²⁴ The fact that the Americans were considering to uphold this proposal, was a huge step towards a common transatlantic strategy towards Iran. The American law – precisely the already mentioned Iran Sanctions Act – forbids commercial exchanges with Iran, and Washington also hasn't officially acknowledged the “legitimacy of Iranian government”²⁵. Therefore only the EU with the US consent might have offered the trade proposal formally. The most debated topic in the talks was the specific terms of the transatlantic partners towards Iranian conducts and misconducts in its nuclear programme. The required outcome for the US was to “turn the current suspension of their nuclear activities into a full cessation”²⁶ The European Union had never been so radical and it had always used solely the term ‘suspension’. Suspension of uranium enrichment activities was the condition of the Tehran Declaration signed by Iran and EU-3 in October 2003 and the Paris Agreement that specified the terms of the Tehran Declaration from November 2004. Even the above mentioned final proposal from 2005 asked for ‘suspension’.

Unfortunately, Iran didn't comply with the offer made by the EU-3 and – what is more – it removed the IAEA seals on equipment plants in Isfahan and continued some activities related

²² WEISMAN, Steven R. On Iran, Bush Weighs a Joint Strategy With the Europeans. *New York Times*. [online]. 4.3.2005. [cit. 2009-11-25]. Available from WWW <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/04/politics/04iran.html?scp=38&sq=Iran&st=nyt>.

²³ WEISMAN, Steven R. 2005.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

to the conversion of mined uranium tetrafluoride gas, which can be fed into centrifuges for enrichment.²⁷

Despite of this diplomatic failure, the United States remained on the “same page”²⁸ with the European Union as George Bush stated already in February 2005. Condoleezza Rice, who took over the United States Secretary of State’s office after Colin Powell in the second Bush’s administration starting 2005, had favoured a multilateral diplomacy and a wider use of soft power over coercion and hard power. In May 2006 she assured Iran that the US remained faithful to diplomatic solutions and she also mentions that effective negotiations with the European Union will produce “benefits...for the Iranian people”²⁹. The transatlantic relationship to addressing the public and public diplomacy in general will be examined closely later, for now it is crucial to emphasise how the United States have turned away from the hard power instruments and leaned towards a multilateral cooperative approach using diplomacy as the main tool of action. The European Union has therefore gained a very strong partner in its effort to peacefully resolve this new nuclear proliferation case. This study will not only concentrate on the development of this case in relation to public diplomacy, it will also inquire into the theory of international regimes and examine the changing strategies of the transatlantic actors towards Iran in connection with the leading theories in international relations: neorealism and neoliberalism.

²⁷ *The American Journal of International Law: Use of Force and Arms Control*. Ongoing U.S. Efforts to Curb Iran's Nuclear Programme. *The American Journal of International Law*. [pdf]. April 2006. Vol. 100, No.2. p.481. [cit. 2009-11-25]. Available from WWW <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3651175?origin=JSTOR-pdf>. p.481.

²⁸ BRANIGIN, William. Bush, Schroeder Oppose Iran's Nuclear Ambitions. *Washington Post*. [online]. 23.2.2005. [cit. 2009-11-25]. Available from WWW <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A46143-2005Feb23.html>.

²⁹ RICE, Condoleezza. *Press Conference on Iran*. [online]. The Acronym Institute. 31.5.2006. [cit. 2009-11-25]. Available from WWW <http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0605/doc04.htm>.

3.2 Overview of Nuclear Security Issues in the Present World with Emphasis on Iran

The leading concept of international security used to be clear and simple during the Cold War: it was important to maintain nuclear safety and prevent a massive world destruction impending from the bipolar system and arms race. The other goal of both super-power rivals during the Cold War was to get a grip on as much political power as possible and to keep this power. Nevertheless, the primary domain of security during the Cold War was military-political and this stance has been described as the traditional security concept.³⁰

However, the perspective on security – as well as the world order – has changed tremendously in the 90's. “The military game and the overall structure of the balance of power dominate when the survival of states is clearly at stake, but in much of modern world politics, physical survival is not the most pressing issue,”³¹ Joseph Nye wrote in 1990.

The security agenda has broadened since the beginning of the post-Cold War era and, consequently, in 1994 the United Nations Development Programme devoted a big part of its Human Development Report to the ‘human security’. The agency emphasised the need to divert from interpreting the concept of security in terms of nation-states’ interests and focus rather on the interests of ordinary people.³² Economic, food and health, environmental, political or personal securities among others have become bases for today’s security discourse. Also the meaning of the ‘regional’ increased rapidly as Barry Buzan examined in his book *Regions and Powers: the Structure of International Security*. Although Buzan acknowledged that the willingness of the superpowers to intervene internationally – which fell back in the 90's – had risen up again after 9/11, he didn't attribute a long-lasting future to this ‘second-hand’ change. On the other hand, the eight-year-long Bush and neo-conservative era pushed the US back towards their international interventionist status; Washington started two wars with a help from the EU in the Middle East shortly after the beginning of the 21st century and both of these military actions have still not been finished in 2009. Not only have been the

³⁰ BUZAN, Barry; WAEVER, Ole; DE WILDE, Jaap. *Security: a new framework*. 1. ed. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1998. p.vii. ISBN 1-55587-603-X.

³¹ NYE, Joseph S. Jr. *Soft Power. Foreign Policy*. Fall 1990. p.159.

³² UNDP: *Human Development Report*. New Dimensions of Human Security. [pdf]. United Nations Development Programme. 1994. p.22. [cit. 2009-11-26]. Available from http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr_1994_en_chap2.pdf.

transatlantic actors feeling threatened by terrorist organizations particularly from this area after 9/11, bombings in Madrid or London, but, the military and nuclear aspect of security, this threat of the world destruction, is still present as well, and nowadays – with governments North Korea or Iran have, and with their deeds and rhetoric – maybe stronger than ever.

Traditional forms of international politics are changing as well. Joseph Nye Jr. sees power as passing from the ‘capital-rich’ to ‘information-rich’.³³ While the access to information is the new power, the capacity to response to new information is the new power resource. This analogy can also be applied for the nuclear proliferation, since the ability to construct a nuclear weapon is contingent on the know-how of the process of uranium enrichment. This fact hangs closely together with the changes in nuclear military system.³⁴

In 1990, Nye described the system as strictly bipolar, whereas the trade as multipolar.³⁵ Nearly twenty years later this diversification is insufficient in terms of security. Despite the fact that opinions vary – some like Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno in *Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War* argue the present system is unipolar³⁶, some consider it multipolar³⁷, and others think of it even as a 'new world disorder'³⁸ such as Ted Galen Carpenter – the number of states armed with nuclear weapons is getting higher in reality: North Korea admitted possession of a nuclear weapon in 2003 to China and United States. North Korean officials also threatened to spread the weapon if the US won't hold one-to-one talks with them.³⁹ It is believed that Iran – being the current number one suspect of developing nuclear arms – stays in contact with North Korea regarding this issue⁴⁰, other sources speculate Iran obtained the know-how from Pakistan⁴¹.

³³ NYE, Joseph S. Jr. *Soft Power. Foreign Policy*. Fall 1990. p.164.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ KAPSTEIN, Ethan B.; MASTANDUNO, Michael. *Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War*. 1.ed. 1999. New York Columbia University Press. ISBN 0231113099.

³⁷ KEGLEY, Charles W. Must We Fear a Post-Cold War Multipolar System?. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Sept. 1992. Vol. 36, No. 3. pp.573-585.

³⁸ CARPENTER, Ted Galen. The New World Disorder. *Foreign Policy*. Autumn 1991. No. 84. pp.24-39

³⁹ AFTERGOOD, Steven; KRISTENSEN, Hans M. Nuclear Weapon Programme. [online]. 16.11.2006. *Federation of American Scientists*. [cit. 2009-11-26]. Available from WWW <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/index.html>.

⁴⁰ GARTENSTEIN-ROSS, Daveed. North Korea/Iran Cooperation Shows Implications of Nuclear Test. *Counterterrorism Blog*. [online]. 9.10.2006. [cit. 2009-11-26]. Available from WWW http://counterterrorismblog.org/2006/10/north_koreairan_cooperation_sh.php.

⁴¹ SMITH, Jeffrey. Pakistani Scientist Cites Help to Iran. *Washington Post*. [online]. 9.9.2009. [cit. 2009-11-26]. Available from WWW <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/08/AR2009090803731.html>.

According to the speech President Barack Obama gave in April 2009 in Prague, the US doubts Iran already owns a nuclear weapon⁴²; still, the activities of this country are closely watched by the US, EU and by the IAEA among the international organizations.

Both transatlantic partners have had severe troubles dealing with a state like Iran. The US lost its influence on this country exactly thirty years ago, right after the Islamic revolution in 1979, and close economical ties some EU members have with Iran have been preventing a radical attitude from the European Union.

Other problematic issue is the dispute between India and Pakistan. It does not seem this conflict will be settled any time soon and the last bombing episode in Mumbai, which many believe Pakistan is responsible of,⁴³ is not a sign of improvement. Scarily enough, both of these states possess the nuclear weapons. That takes the number of nuclear weapons' owners to nine. To previously mentioned North Korea and the initial signatories of the Non-proliferation Treaty, namely France, China, Russia (formerly the Soviet Union), Great Britain and United States, Israel, also, must be included.

Last but not least to point out is the risk of non-state actors, i.e. terrorist organizations, possessing an atomic weapon. This issue should be depicted together with the problematically close relationship of Pakistan and Al Qaeda, which is slowly becoming a permanent resident on Pakistani land and thus stacks the odds against the transparency of present international security system even further. And, as mentioned earlier, Pakistan has some ties to Iranian nuclear programme. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the 'father' of Pakistan's nuclear programme, who is often described as the most enthusiastic nuclear proliferator in the world, stated in a television interview in September 2009 that if Iran succeeds in "acquiring nuclear technology, we will be a strong bloc in the region to counter international pressure. Iran's nuclear capability will neutralize Israel's power."⁴⁴ He also admitted Iran purchased some equipment

⁴² OBAMA, Barack. Prague Speech on Nuclear Weapons. *Huffington Post*. [online]. 5.4.2009. [cit. 2009-11-26]. Available from WWW http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/04/05/obama-prague-speech-on-nu_n_183219.html.

⁴³ CORERA, Gordon. Mumbai Blasts: Who Are the Suspects? *British Broadcasting Company*. [online]. 12.7.2006. [cit. 2009-11-26]. Available from WWW http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/5172586.stm.

⁴⁴ SMITH, Jeffrey. Pakistani Scientist Cites Help to Iran. *Washington Post*. [online]. 9.9.2009. [cit. 2009-11-26]. Available from WWW <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/08/AR2009090803731.html>.

from a Pakistani contact in Dubai.⁴⁵ The terrorist attack from October 2009 in Iranian Baluchistan, which is basically on the border with Pakistan, shouldn't have been forgotten especially because Iran has not been typically a terrorist target. It is obvious that new threats keep emerging and the old ones are not going away. As US President Barack Obama said during his speech on nuclear weapons in Prague: "Today, the Cold War has disappeared but thousands of those weapons have not. In a strange turn of history, the threat of global nuclear war has gone down, but the risk of a nuclear attack has gone up. More nations have acquired these weapons. Testing has continued. Black market trade in nuclear secrets and nuclear materials abound. The technology to build a bomb has spread. Terrorists are determined to buy, build or steal one. Our efforts to contain these dangers are centred on a global non-proliferation regime, but as more people and nations break the rules, we could reach the point where the centre cannot hold."⁴⁶

3.3 International Regimes

This part of the study will focus on the Iranian dangerously growing nuclear programme and the reactions and contra-actions of the transatlantic partners in the period from 2006 to 2008, which was extraordinarily eventful, to put it mildly. First and foremost, it is necessary to introduce the concept of international regimes in relation to the international non-proliferation efforts that certainly create this kind of a regime too. International regimes as the central theoretical phenomenon will also make it easier to underline the co-operational aspect of this thesis, since the international regimes are part of the so-called international co-operational institutions together with international organizations.⁴⁷ Also, the different theoretical attitudes of the euro-Atlantic actors towards the use of such institutions in the international politics, moreover, the International Atomic Energy Agency, can be depicted distinctly on the regimes.

⁴⁵ SMITH, Jeffrey. Pakistani Scientist Cites Help to Iran. *Washington Post*. [online]. 9.9.2009. [cit. 2009-11-26]. Available from WWW <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/08/AR2009090803731.html>.

⁴⁶ OBAMA, Barack. Prague Speech on Nuclear Weapons. *Huffington Post*. [online]. 5.4.2009. [cit. 2009-11-26]. Available from WWW http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/04/05/obama-prague-speech-on-nu_n_183219.html.

⁴⁷ WAISOVÁ, Šárka. *Mezinárodní organizace a režimy*. 1.ed. 2008. Plzeň: Vydavatelství a nakladatelství Aleš Čeněk, s.r.o. p.17. ISBN 978-80-7380-109-0.

The international regimes' discourse was at its peak in the 1980's. In 1983 Susan Strange famously criticised the loose and inconsistent interpretation of the term among the international relations' scholars⁴⁸. A year earlier a conference about the topic was held and Stephen D. Krasner had later elaborated the results into a definition of the international regimes.⁴⁹ He explains them as "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in given area of international relations. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice."⁵⁰

Harald Müller, an Executive Director of the Peace Research Institute of Frankfurt and a long-time researcher on the non-proliferation system, even tested the definition on the case of the non-proliferation regime, in which he has seen four principles. The first one says that proliferation of nuclear weapons brings the world closer to a nuclear war; the second principle recognizes the compatibility of the multilateral nuclear weapons' non-proliferation with continuation and even expanding of the use of atomic energy for peaceful proposes. The third principle claims that there exists a relation between horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, which means that from a long-time perspective the proliferation can be stopped only with reduction of the superpowers' nuclear arsenals. And, finally, the forth is the principle of safeguards.⁵¹

On the basis of Krasner's definition Müller identifies nine norms as well. For example, he recognizes the commitment of the non-nuclear states to abandon the production and obtaining of the nuclear weapons, the commitment of all states not to help the non-nuclear states the latter activities and the commitment of the nuclear states to begin negotiations that should lead to conclude arrangements about the nuclear disarmament.⁵² These norms later develop

⁴⁸ STRANGE, Susan. Cave! Hic Dragons: a Critique of Regime Analysis. *International Organization*. [pdf]. Spring 1982. Vol. 36, No. 2, International Regimes. p.484. [cit. 2009-12-19]. Available from WWW <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706530>.

⁴⁹ HASENCLEVER, Andreas; MAYER, Peter; RITTBERGER, Volker. *Teorie mezinárodních režimů*. 1. ed. 2005. Brno: Centrum strategických studií. p.13. ISBN 80-903333-4-6.

⁵⁰ KRASNER, Stephen D. *Structural Causes and Regime consequences* IN KRASNER, Stephen D. *International Regimes*. 8.ed. 1995. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. p.2. ISBN 0-8014-9250-5.

⁵¹ MÜLLER, Harald. *Regimenanalyse und Sicherheitspolitik: das Beispiel Nonproliferation* IN HASENCLEVER, Andreas; MAYER, Peter; RITTBERGER, Volker. 2005. p.14.

⁵² MÜLLER, Harald. *Regimenanalyse und Sicherheitspolitik: das Beispiel Nonproliferation*. IN HASENCLEVER, Andreas; MAYER, Peter; RITTBERGER, Volker. 2005. p.14.

into a system of laws and regulations with concrete proposals or prohibitions, which help to show who does and who doesn't comply with the purpose of the regime.

Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger with a help of Harald Müller also imply two significant facts about the non-proliferation regime: first, according to a common opinion the Non-proliferation Treaty is the core of the regime, whereas a more accurate formulation would be that this treaty works as a normative pillar of the regime *together* with other important documents (The IAEA's statute, Safeguards Agreement, etc.)⁵³, and secondly – and this works in general – an international regime does not overlap with an international organization. In this case the non-proliferation regime has appointed the International Atomic Energy Organization for safeguards verifying⁵⁴. It might be tempting to say an organization 'works' for a regime. But, the potential discussion about what is supreme to what clashes with the view of Robert Keohane, who stated that regimes are a set of principles, norms, regulations and procedures accepted by the states, which did not have a power to act, compared to organizations that were able to response to situations.⁵⁵

Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye have elaborated a theory of international regimes already in 1977. They see regimes as “sets of governing arrangements that include networks of rules, norms and procedures that see it as that regularize behaviour and control its effects.”⁵⁶

Haggard and Simmons see international regimes as multilateral agreements of a cooperative art that should regulate the behaviour of states within a specific thematic area. The regimes condition the acceptable behaviour of the states together with explicit delimitation of restrictions.⁵⁷

Šárka Waisová summed up the different definitions. She argues that the international regimes are a permanent arrangement between actors of international relations that regulate behaviour and expectations in a particular political environment, which also makes the actors more

⁵³ MÜLLER, Harald. *The Internalization of Principles, Norms and Rules by Governments: The Case of Security Regimes* IN HASENCLEVER, Andreas; MAYER, Peter; RITTBERGER, Volker. 2005. p.15.

⁵⁴ HASENCLEVER, Andreas; MAYER, Peter; RITTBERGER, Volker. p.15.

⁵⁵ KEOHANE, Robert. *Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics* IN HASENCLEVER, Andreas; MAYER, Peter; RITTBERGER, Volker. 2005. p.15.

⁵⁶ KEOHANE, Robert IN KRASNER, Stephen D. 1995 p.141.

⁵⁷ HAGGARD, Stephan; SIMMONS, Beth A. *Theories of International Regimes* IN WAIŠOVÁ, Šárka. 2008. p.27.

predictable. Waisová divides the regimes into four levels: principals, norms, rules and decisions' powers, whereas they are bound with explicit agreements.⁵⁸

The Non-proliferation Treaty or the Safeguards Agreements work as an example for this kind of agreements within the non-proliferation regime.

3.4 The Debate on International Regimes between Neorealists and Neoliberals

Probably the smoothest way to analyse the stance towards cooperation of both transatlantic actors is from a structural perspective such as neorealism⁵⁹ or neoliberalism, because it centralizes the international system.

The crucial standpoint of power-based neorealism is the anarchic environment, where states, which are considered as the main actors in the system and rely primarily on self-help.⁶⁰ Their main concern is either power-competition with other states and accumulation of power, (offensive realism) or state is survival (Waltzian defensive realism).

“The behaviour of individual states, regardless of their domestic political characteristics, is constrained by their own capabilities and the distribution of power in the system as a whole. The external environment will inevitably pressure states to move toward congruity between commitments and capabilities,”⁶¹ Stephen Krasner writes.

The neoliberals agree with neorealists on the states as central actors of the international system, as well as they have adopted the anarchic structure and argue that there is no directly appointed authority for states to obey in the international system. However, neoliberals are not power-oriented, but interests-oriented instead. Robert Keohane even accepted the neorealist idea (or so at least so he thought as Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger imply)⁶² of states as egoistic actors and calls them rational as well. “Rationality means that [actors] have

⁵⁸ WAISOVÁ, Šárka. 2008. p.27.

⁵⁹ This thesis uses solely the term ‘neorealism’, although many theorist (Waltz, Grieco, Mearsheimer, Jervis etc.) call the same stream of thought ‘structural realism’ or simply ‘realism’.

⁶⁰ WALTZ, Kenneth . 1979. p.105.

⁶¹ KRASNER, Stephen D. *Power, Polarity, and the Challenge of Disintegration* IN HAFTENDOM, Helga et al. *America and Europe in an Era of Change*. 1993. Boulder: Westview Press. p.42. ISBN 0-8133-1670-7.

⁶² HASENCLEVER, Andreas; MAYER, Peter; RITTBERGER, Volker. 2005. p.31.

consistent, ordered preferences, and that they calculate costs and benefits of alternative courses of action in order to maximize their utility in view of those preferences. Egoism means that their utility functions are independent of one another: they do not gain or lose utility simply of gains and losses of others,”⁶³ Keohane wrote. He considers egoism an important fact for the systemic theory, because it helps showing the reactions of the actors on changing conditions in the system.⁶⁴

Neoliberalism does not agree with the argument of relying on self-help and promotes interstate cooperation in international institutions “if states have significant common interests”⁶⁵. Robert Keohane chose international regimes as such institutions in his comprehensive work and theory he himself named as neoliberal institutionalism (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger call it also contractualist or functional). He basically argued that regimes are established by states as instruments to accomplish certain selfish goals.⁶⁶ He acknowledged states’ insecurity of the partners’ reliability as the main issue working against cooperation, but argued that regimes can overcome this problem by the fact that states would set their reputation at stake if they won’t comply with the rules of the regime and, consequently, those ‘rebellious’ states would lose their potential future profits from cooperation.⁶⁷

The neorealists, on the other side, perceive the insecurity risks in a much more existential nature and therefore impose that states are on the watch with each other even if they have a good relationship at the moment. Based on the realist theory of Joseph Grieco a State A is not only asking if its partner State B would be ready to use or threaten to use its relative power capabilities against State A, but, State A also realizes and considers important that these power abilities are products of a “distribution-wise uneven mutual cooperation”⁶⁸. However, Joseph Grieco explained the fact that states turn to intensified cooperation with another actor in his ‘voice-opportunity hypotheses’. State A uses the opportunity to voice its concerns and

⁶³ KEOHANE, Robert. *After Hegemony*. IN HASENCLEVER, Andreas; MAYER, Peter; RITTBERGER, Volker. 2005. p.32.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ KEOHANE, Robert; MARTIN, Lisa L. The Promise of Institutional Theory. *International Security*, 1995. Vol. 20, No 1, p.39.

⁶⁶ KEOHANE, Robert. *After Hegemony*. IN HASENCLEVER, Andreas; MAYER, Peter; RITTBERGER, Volker. 2005. p.38.

⁶⁷ KEOHANE, Robert. *After Hegemony*. IN HASENCLEVER, Andreas; MAYER, Peter; RITTBERGER, Volker. p.37.

⁶⁸ KEOHANE, Robert. *After Hegemony*. IN HASENCLEVER, Andreas; MAYER, Peter; RITTBERGER, Volker. 2005. p.107.

interests on the platform of an international institution so that it prevents growth of power of State B.⁶⁹ Sometimes it is not risky not to cooperate.

Grieco also criticized the neoliberal emphasis on the importance of anarchic system and rational egoism in its analysis of realists' theory, because according to him the neoliberals didn't understand the meaning of those aspects. Grieco argues that rational egoism is not what states should follow in an anarchic system⁷⁰ and this anarchy does not result from the fact that there is no authority (agent) who enforces promises and keeping them, but from the absence of common administrative instruments which the agents could use to guarantee the states a survival as independent system units.⁷¹ The rational egoism is not implied in neorealist theory, as Grieco claims, precisely because of this anarchic system where only states themselves are responsible for their survival and, therefore, they have to preserve and eventually expand their capability of self-help, which works as their relative power capability.⁷² Based on Kenneth Waltz's explanation it is possible to say that State A is afraid that its final profit would be smaller or equal to its partner's – State B – who can use these results to its own advantage and destroy State A or deceive State A in some other way.⁷³ Returning to Keohane's statement this means that State A is considering the profits of State B and these do influence the profits of States A. This neorealist statement is called the 'relative gains'. The neoliberals are convinced states are satisfied with whatever profits they get and thus are oriented on the 'absolute gains'.⁷⁴

According to Grieco international institutions influence international cooperation only in a minor way and didn't consider them as an independent power that makes cooperation easier. However, he admitted that institutions have a certain importance for cooperation. The problem with Keohane's neoliberal institutionalism is not the fact that he accentuated the significance of institutions, but the fact he underestimated the extent of functions the institutions must execute to really help the states with cooperation.⁷⁵ John Mearsheimer went further and criticized the institutionalist outlook that institutions and thus cooperation push

⁶⁹ HASENCLEVER, Andreas; MAYER, Peter; RITTBERGER, Volker. 2005. p.112.

⁷⁰ GRIECO, Joseph. *Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism*. IN HASENCLEVER, Andreas; MAYER, Peter; RITTBERGER, Volker. 2005. p.105.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² HASENCLEVER, Andreas; MAYER, Peter; RITTBERGER, Volker. 2005. p.106.

⁷³ WALTZ, Kenneth. 1979. p.105.

⁷⁴ HASENCLEVER, Andreas; MAYER, Peter; RITTBERGER, Volker. 2005. p.119.

⁷⁵ GRIECO, Joseph. *Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism*. IN HASENCLEVER, Andreas; MAYER, Peter; RITTBERGER, Volker. 2005. p.111.

states away from war. He granted the institutions “minimal influence on state behaviour and thus hold little promise for promoting stability in the post-Cold War world.”⁷⁶

The neoliberals and neorealists have several common starting points (anarchical system, states as main actors), but differ in the main objective: the neorealists aim to keep and extend power, whereas the neoliberals focus on interests. The character of these interests may vary, however, neoliberalism stem from economical propositions, so they were primarily meant in the sense of economic gaining. The egoism of states following only their own interests, which neoliberals see as a mutual characteristic with neorealists, understand both camps in a surprisingly in different way. Neorealists do not agree with neoliberals that states do not care about other states’ profits. In terms of cooperation, neorealism is mainly concerned with relative gains and cheating, which are also the chief barriers for cooperation. “(C)operation takes place in a world that is competitive at its core-one where states have powerful incentives to take advantage of other states.”⁷⁷

3.5 Official Arrangements of the European Union in Relation to Iran

The European Union is of course much closer to the regime’s concept, where a bloc of international actors – including national states – share a common sense of principals, norms, rules and decision powers’ and honour these with an agreement and, of course, an adherence to such an agreement. First, the multilateralism is given inside the European integration discourse and the same approach brings the EU into the outside relations. Second, the engagement of other than national states’ actors into a political decision-making is nothing new to the European Union. The main debates inside the EU are led around the topic of institutionalization and the level of authority each of its three main bodies – the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council of the EU – has and should have: Third, the theoretical approaches addressing European integration, no matter if supranationalist or intergovernmentalist, they all tackle around the same issue: cooperation. These three characteristics make it clear that the European Union would rely on an international regime when solving a problem inside the regime. When talking about nuclear

⁷⁶ MEARSHEIMER, John J. The False Promise of International Institutions. *International Security*. 1994-1995. Vol. 19, No. 3. p.7.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

energy, the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) established in 1957 had been a forerunner in applying safeguards⁷⁸, even though it only worked between the member states of the European Communities. In case of Iranian nuclear programme the European Union supports the International Atomic Energy Agency in the area of control and verifying and pins its faith upon the decision of the United Nations Security Council for an appropriate reaction to violations of the regime's agreements as the below revised key documents show.

The main EU documents are the European Security Strategy (ESS) and EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, both adopted by the Council of the in December 2003. The ESS states five key threats of EU's foreign and security policy: terrorism; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); regional conflicts; state failure and organized crime.⁷⁹ Most of the threats, maybe with the exception of organized crime, stem also from the area of the Middle East.

Furthermore, the ESS indicates three strategic objectives: addressing the threats stated above; building security in its neighbourhood and, finally, developing an international order based on effective multilateralism.⁸⁰ Again, these objectives are linked to the Middle East. The first one has a direct connection to the main threats EU poses according to the ESS, the second one tackles the task of building good relations with the Mediterranean, whereas solving the Arab-Israeli conflict is a "strategic priority"⁸¹. The ESS mentions vaguely "other problems of the Middle East" that cannot be resolved without the previous goal. However, the strategy does not content a direct reference to Iran.

In contrary, the review of the ESS from December 2008 (precisely the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy - Providing Security in a Changing World, later only Report) mentions Iranian nuclear programme on the fifteenth line. Also, the document underlined the importance of transatlantic relations and UN objectives in the

⁷⁸ SCHENKEL, Roland. *The EU Nuclear Security Programme*. [pdf]. European Commission. 16.4.2009. p.4. [cit. 2009-11-30]. Available from WWW http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Meetings/PDFplus/2009/cn166/CN166_Presentations/Opening%20Session/Schenkel.pdf.

⁷⁹ *Europa: Summaries of EU Legislation*. European Security Strategy. [online]. 4.9.2006. Europa. [cit. 2009-11-30]. Available from WWW <http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r00004.htm>.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid.

political decision the EU makes.⁸² The first key issue for the renewed European Security Strategy is proliferation of weapons of mass destruction among states and non-state actors.⁸³ “The EU has been very active in multilateral forum, on the basis of the WMD Strategy, adopted in 2003, and at the forefront of international efforts to address Iran's nuclear programme. The Strategy emphasises prevention, by working through the UN and multilateral agreements, by acting as a key donor and by working with third countries and regional organisations to enhance their capabilities to prevent proliferation,”⁸⁴ the Report says. In consequence the EU should work on successful results at the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in 2010.⁸⁵ This resolution probably follows up the farce at the last NPT Review Conference in 2005. The outcomes of this forum will be discussed later.

Anyway, while Iran and North Korea are identified as the biggest threats in the EU report, it continues with referring only to Iran. “Development of a nuclear military capability would be a threat to EU security that cannot be accepted,”⁸⁶ the document later says in a reference to this state. It points out the dual-track approach that is EU’s main strategy on Iran and which means to run a dialogue and to execute pressure together with the United States, China and Russia. Also, the EU will need to grow “additional measures in support of the UN process”⁸⁷ if Iranian nuclear programme advances. The EU has also expressed endorsement to resolutions of the Security Council of the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency and pointed out the offer to rebuild “confidence and engagement”⁸⁸ brought by the High Representative Javier Solana in May 2008 to the Iranian government in exchange to stop the enrichment of uranium.

Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy shows a few differences in comparison to the ESS. First, it is far more specific and second, it basically names Iran as the number one security threat to the EU. Three days before the Report the Council issued a Statement on Strengthening International Security (Statement) that claimed that the Iranian nuclear issue is a priority of the European agenda.

⁸² *Council of the EU: euDOCs*. Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in the Changing World. [pdf]. Council of the European Union. 11.12.2008. p.2. [cit. 2009-11-30]. Available from WWW www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/./reports/104630.pdf.

⁸³ Ibid. p.3.

⁸⁴ Ibid. p.3.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid. p.7.

⁸⁷ Ibid. p.2.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

“If it is to be effective, our action against proliferation must also be based on resolute operational cooperation to obstruct illicit transfers, control exports even more effectively, counter illegal networks, take punitive action against proliferation financing and reduce the risk of a link-up between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. The new lines for EU action to combat proliferation will be implemented without delay. They will boost the effectiveness of the EU's 2003 strategy, “⁸⁹ stands in the Statement.

The EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Strategy) summarizes the global problems with WMD and EU actions to challenge those. Of all things the document calls “small number of states and non-state actors”⁹⁰ responsible for recent proliferation and highlights the importance to preserve an integrity of the NPT and it concludes that the Treaty “has helped to slow and in some cases reverse the spread of military nuclear capability, but it has not been able to prevent it completely.”⁹¹ However, the next sentence is even more interesting. “The possession of nuclear weapons by States outside the NPT and non-compliance with the Treaty’s provisions by states party to the Treaty, risk undermining non-proliferation and disarmament efforts.”⁹² This comment hinted at Israel, India and Pakistan, three states that possess nuclear weapons, but are not among the signatories of the NPT. The most controversial from the list today is definitely Israel. The Arab states officially strive for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Near East since the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference (Conference) and the accession of Israel to the NPT and this topic heated the discussions at the two Conferences (in 2000 and 2005) as well. Egypt especially held a strong and very active position towards this issue and, for example in 2005, proposed in a presented working paper that in order to bring Israel to sign the NPT the Conference should require “that States take specific actions in that regard, including undertaking not to transfer

⁸⁹ *Council of the EU*. Statement on Strengthening International Security. [pdf]. French Presidency to the Council of the European Union. 8.12.2008. p.8. [cit. 2009-11-30]. Available from WWW http://www.eu2008.fr/webdav/site/PFUE/shared/import/1211_Conseil_europeen/Statement%20on%20strengthening%20international%20security_EN.pdf.

⁹⁰ *Council of the EU: Documents*. EU Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. [pdf]. Council of the European Union. 9.12. 2003. p.3. [cit. 2009-11-30]. Available from WWW <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/st15708.en03.pdf>.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid.

nuclear-related material, technology and information to Israel, and deny Israeli scientists access to nuclear-related facilities and laboratories.”⁹³

In 2006 the EU ordered to establish a WMD Monitoring Centre an implemental instrument for the Strategy and to create a cooperative method to help the Council’s Secretariat, the High Representative, the Commission and the member states to assure a better interconnection in the fight against WMD.⁹⁴ The Monitoring Centre should supervise the observance of the Strategy and collect intelligence material together with a so-called Situation Centre.⁹⁵

The Strategy is practically implemented with publishing the Six-monthly Progress Reports and with adopting of Joint Actions, Common Positions, Council Decisions and Action Plans. In 2008 the Council of EU adopted the already fourth Joint Action for assistance to the nuclear security projects of the IAEA.⁹⁶ Consequently, the EU has become the major donor to the Nuclear Security Fund of the organization with a total contribution of 23 million dollars.⁹⁷

3.5.1 EU-Iranian Trade Relations

For a comprehensive understanding of the relations between the EU and Iran, the trade relations cannot be neglected. In 2008 EU exported to Iran goods for €14.1 billion in total (machinery and transport equipment (54.6%), manufactured goods (16.9%) and chemicals (12.1%) and imported goods from Iran for €11.3 billion in total (90% energy and energy related products).⁹⁸ The European Union has been negotiating with Iran for a Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) since 2002, but this dialogue has been on hold since August 2005, when Iran resumed its nuclear activities. Trade with Iran is subject to the EU general import regime, since Iran is not a member of the WTO and there is no bilateral agreement between the EU and Iran. Iran benefits from the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) and

⁹³ UNIS: Vienna. Review Conference on Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Hears Introduction of Working Papers. [online]. United Nations Information Service. 18.5.2005. [cit. 2009-12-01]. Available from WWW <http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2005/dc2965.html>.

⁹⁴ TŮMA, Miroslav. *Mírové využívání jaderné energie, nešíření zbraní hromadného ničení a jaderné odzbrojení*. 1.ed. 2009. Praha: Ústav mezinárodních vztahů. p.36. ISBN 978-80-86506-77-7.

⁹⁵ TŮMA, Miroslav. 2009. p.37.

⁹⁶ TŮMA, Miroslav. 2009. p.36.

⁹⁷ SCHENKEL, Roland. 2009. p.14.

⁹⁸ European Commission: Trade. Iran. [online]. European Commission. 1.6.2009. [cit. 2009-11-30]. Available from WWW http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/iran/index_en.htm.

therefore from reduced import duties for its exports to the Community. However, preferential exports accounted for only 4% of total Iranian exports to the EU in 2008, as most of Iran's exports are oil products for which there is no import duty.⁹⁹

3.6 Official Arrangements of the United States against Iran

The United States' strategy on Iran used to be very different from the European way of multilateral diplomatic negotiation and continual attempts of engagement. The hawks and doves of the American administration battled over influence on the final decision especially during the mandate of George W. Bush. The hawks like former Vice President Dick Cheney and Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld together with John Bolton at the State Department kept winning during Bush's first term, which was characteristically neorealist. The key idea was to endorse a new revolution in Iran and overthrow the ruling elite with a help of American secret covert military actions¹⁰⁰ and to press tough sanctions in the Security Council towards Iran¹⁰¹. Rumsfeld even threatened with a direct military action in 2003 and as an answer Iran offered negotiations of even the nuclear issues and Iranian support of terrorism, which had been the two biggest thorns in the flesh in American point of view. After considerations, whereas Secretary of State Colin Power wanted to test the offer since he had held a more internationalist position, advocated for cooperation with strategic partners like Europe, China and Russia in dealing with Iran and preferred engagement, the Americans turned the proposition down. The hardliners won.¹⁰²

Condoleezza Rice as National Security Advisor was trapped in the middle of the dispute and worked more or less as a mediator between the two camps.¹⁰³ She, however, inclined more to the diplomatic resolution which was visible during her mandate as Secretary of State in the second Bush's administration.¹⁰⁴ The influence on President Bush shifted from the Department of Defence to the Department of State since Rice had a very close relationship with him. This change showed in the transition from the hard powered coercive attitude to a

⁹⁹ *European Commission: Trade. Iran.* [online]. European Commission. 1.6.2009. [cit. 2009-11-30]. Available from WWW http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/iran/index_en.htm.

¹⁰⁰ SKIBA, Alexander. 2007. p.34.

¹⁰¹ Ibid. p.35.

¹⁰² Ibid. p.37.

¹⁰³ Ibid. p.35.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

much softer policy. Condoleezza Rice is a big supporter of soft power and public diplomacy; therefore she had focused on Iranian public, often pointing out the struggle of the Iranian people with lack of freedom. “We must continue to make clear that while we differ fundamentally with the current government of Iran, and we seek friendship with the Iranian people,”¹⁰⁵ Rice explained in her Testimony before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State and Foreign Operations in 2007.

The National Security Strategy (NSS) from 2006 is the second security strategy of the Bush administrations. Although he calls the document a “wartime national security strategy”¹⁰⁶, it is written in a different tone than the previous document from 2002, where the former President announced about the US determination for pre-emptive acts to combat terrorism and other security threats.¹⁰⁷ The 2006 NSS states several “essential tasks”¹⁰⁸, defeating of global terrorism, prevent the threats with WMD, “building infrastructure of democracy” and building cooperation with other global powers¹⁰⁹ among others. Iran is mentioned sixteen times in the document. The American government calls Iranian regime a “tyranny” together with several¹¹⁰ other regimes and sets as the main goal to end these tyrannies. “All tyrannies threaten the world’s interest in freedom’s expansion, and some tyrannies, in their pursuit of WMD or sponsorship of terrorism, threaten our immediate security interests as well,”¹¹¹ the NSS says, indirectly pointing a finger at Iran with the reference to the WMD and terrorism.

Other comments about Iran in the NSS are also connected to these two phenomena and, altogether, the NSS calls Iran a ‘greater challenge’. Changing current policies, opening up the political system and granting freedom to Iranians had been the ultimate goal for US policy according to the Strategy.¹¹² As a for the strategy the US plans to “block the threats posed by

¹⁰⁵ RICE, Condoleezza. *Testimony of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State and Foreign Operations*. [online]. U.S. Government Printing Office. 10.5. 2007. p.9. [cit. 2009-12-05]. Available from WWW <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110shrg521/html/CHRG-110shrg521.htm>.

¹⁰⁶ *White House: President George W. Bush. National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. [pdf]. White House. March 2006. p.1. [cit. 2009-12-02]. Available from WWW <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf>.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid. p.15.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid. p.1.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid. p.3.

¹¹² Ibid. p.20.

the regime while expanding our engagement and outreach to the people the regime is oppressing.¹¹³

“We may face no greater challenge from a single country than from Iran. For almost 20 years, the Iranian regime hid many of its key nuclear efforts from the international community. Yet the regime continues to claim that it does not seek to develop nuclear weapons. The Iranian regime’s true intentions are clearly revealed by the regime’s refusal to negotiate in good faith; its refusal to come into compliance with its international obligations by providing the IAEA access to nuclear sites and resolving troubling questions; and the aggressive statements of its President calling for Israel to “be wiped off the face of the earth.” “The United States has joined with our EU partners and Russia to pressure Iran to meet its international obligations and provide objective guarantees that its nuclear programme is only for peaceful purposes. This diplomatic effort must succeed if confrontation is to be avoided.”¹¹⁴

The quote summarizes the American criticism towards Iran and includes references to its non-compliance with the International Atomic Energy Agency and multilateral cooperation between US, Europe and Russia, whereas the call for restoring the partnership with other global actors is the biggest distinction from the 2002 NSS.

Besides the national security strategies the previously mentioned Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) – originally from 1996 and amended in 2006 as the Iran Sanctions Act – is a very important and concretely targeted document in American policy towards Iran. The European Union was outraged about the sanctions, primarily because the ILSA required the President to impose sanctions on any foreign company that invested more than 20 million dollars a year in Iranian energy sector.¹¹⁵

“(T)he EU did not believe in the economic and political isolation of Iran and opposed US extra-territorial legislation like the Iran Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), which penalises EU

¹¹³ Ibid. p.20.

¹¹⁴ Ibid. p.20.

¹¹⁵ KATZMAN, Kenneth. CRS Report to Congress: The Iran Sanctions Act. *Federation of American Scientists*. [pdf]. 2007. p.2. [cit. 2009-12-05]. Available from WWW <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS20871.pdf>.

companies engaged in legitimate commercial activity in Iran,”¹¹⁶ as UK Foreign Secretary Robin Cook expressed in his letter that was read in front of the House of Representatives on 17th March 1998. He suggests the best way to hinder Iranian attempts to obtain WDMs is “through effective export controls and joint political action with suppliers of technology, areas in which the EU is already extremely active.”¹¹⁷ Cook expressed concern about ILSA act standing in the way of effective transatlantic cooperation and Iran being the one actually benefiting from this face of affairs. Finally, he calls upon the House of Representatives to “try to find a way through these difficulties, so that we will find it easier to achieve our common goal, preventing Iran acquiring weapons of mass destruction.”¹¹⁸ The European Union threatened to take the issue to the World Trade Organization and advised European companies not to comply with ILSA.¹¹⁹

An official agreement on a common approach of the European Union and the United States towards Iran does not exist. The following chapters will, however, portray the interactions of the transatlantic actors foremost on the platform of the International Atomic Energy Agency and its practical impacts resulting into sanctioning of the Islamic Republic, whereas the path to the sanctions will be accentuated in particular.

3.7 Eisenhower's Legacy and the International Atomic Energy Agency

American president Dwight Eisenhower gave an unforgettable speech called Atom for Peace in 1953. Addressing not only the UN's General Assembly sitting in the audience but also the general public on 8th December, he spoke out about the level of destruction nuclear weapons might cause and warned against particular countries, he suspected from being able to develop one. Of course, he had Soviet Union in mind at that time, and was convinced US lost the monopole on nuclear weapons (NW) and verbalized his fear about the spread of NW into the world. However, he acknowledged the positive potential of nuclear energy and wished

¹¹⁶ COOK, Robin. Working towards a Common U.S.-European Union Position on Proliferation Issues. *Global Security*. [online]. 20.2.1998. [cit. 2009-12-05]. Available from WWW

http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/congress/1998_cr/h980317h.htm.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ *Suburban Emergency Management Project: Biot Report*. What is the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA)? [online]. Suburban Emergency Management Project. 26.12.2004. [cit. 2009-12-05]. Available from WWW http://www.semp.us/publications/biot_reader.php?BiotID=158.

countries from West and the East use it rather to “aspire to humanity”¹²⁰ than to arming. In the last part of his speech he suggested a solution for this matter by starting an agency that would be in charge of controlling the nuclear arming. Eisenhower believed an international status among the United Nations should be granted to this agency.

This speech consequently led to the establishment of International Atomic Energy Agency (Agency, IAEA) and initiated the international regulation of nuclear activities. It had been also a big inspiration for the Statue of the organisation, which all of the 81 United Nations’ members approved unanimously in October 1956. The Statue set three main pillars for the IAEA: nuclear control, defence and safety. The Agency itself came into existence in 1959; however, tight political environment caused by the Cold War stood Agency’s proper activity, as anchored in the Statue, in a way. Situation escalated in 1962 with the Cuban crisis, after which the United States and Soviet Union finally realised how necessary a control over nuclear arming really was. Of course, a theoretical debate followed this finding and in 1964 Karl Deutsch and David Singer warned against unstable regimes possessing nuclear weapons, even though otherwise they advocated for multipolar international system.¹²¹

The IAEA has agreed to fulfil the wish of the super powers under three circumstances: “when it had itself arranged for the transfer of fuel and equipment; when some technical assistance agreement between two states had specified IAEA as the inspection agent in place of the donor state; and when any state had unilaterally asked the agency to apply such safeguards over specified facilities.”¹²² However, the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a core written arrangement first standardised the safeguards required for all countries.¹²³

¹²⁰ EISENHOWER, Dwight D. *Atom for Peace*. [online]. International Atomic Energy Agency. 8.12.1953. [cit. 2009-12-05]. Available from WWW http://www.iaea.org/About/history_speech.html.

¹²¹ DEUTSCH, Karl; SINGER, J. David. Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability. *World Politics*. [pdf]. April 1964. Vol. 16, No. 3. p.404. [cit. 2009-12-07]. Available from WWW <http://www.jstor.org/pss/2009578>.

¹²² QUESTER, George H. The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency. *International Organization*. [online]. Spring 1970. Vol. 24, No. 2. p.163. [cit. 2009-12-07]. Available from WWW <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2705939>.

¹²³ QUESTER, George H. 1970. p.164.

3.7.1 The Non-proliferation Treaty

NPT was signed in 1968 and it came into force on 5th May 1970. USA, Great Britain and the Soviet Union initiated the treaty with their large fear of a nuclear war as the main reason. The text divides the parties to the treaty into three categories: the nuclear-weapon State Parties; the non-nuclear-weapon State Parties; and other Parties, meaning the members of IAEA's Board of Governors as stated in Article VIII (2). Altogether, the document encloses an preamble and eleven articles, whereas numbers I, II, III, IV, V and VI will be particularly examined, since they relate to the issue of Iran and its potential nuclear arming and include main directives of the NPT: *non-proliferation*, *disarmament*, and *peaceful use of nuclear energy*, sometimes called the 'three pillar system'¹²⁴.

Article I of the NPT bans nuclear-weapon State Parties to transfer nuclear weapons or their components directly or indirectly to “any recipient whatsoever”¹²⁵; and to “assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices”¹²⁶.

Article II, on the other hand, appeals to the non-nuclear-weapon States that they won't receive, manufacture or accept any assistance on constructing nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives devices. The following Article III develops this condition with a demand on the non-nuclear-weapon States to accept and follow the IAEA's safeguards and thus prevent a violation of Article II, since the nuclear energy should serve only to “peaceful uses”¹²⁷. Consequently, the Article IV makes it clear that not all nuclear activities are prohibited for the Parties of the Treaty. In fact, they have the very right to “develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty”¹²⁸. The exchange of “equipment, materials and technological information” for this matter is also supported according to the Article IV.

¹²⁴ *IAEA Bulletin*. Road to Disarmament. [online]. International Atomic Energy Agency. 4.5.2009. [cit. 2009-12-10]. Available from WWW <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull511/51103570609.html>.

¹²⁵ *IAEA: INFCIRC/140*. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. [pdf]. International Atomic Energy Agency. March 1970. p.2. [cit. 2009-12-10]. Available from WWW <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf>.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

¹²⁸ *Ibid.* p.3.

Article V points out the obligation nuclear-weapon States to share any valuable information for peaceful use of nuclear energy with the non- nuclear-weapon States. Finally, the Article VI articulates the plan for the future regarding nuclear arming: “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”¹²⁹

Two terms are crucial in this article: ‘cessation’ and ‘general and complete disarmament’. Both of them have been heavily discussed ever since the NPT and the signatories took measures to act on the Article with several treaties. Because of the Cold War, the USA and Soviet Union have been the most active in this process, starting with SALT I in 1971 regarding the limitation of nuclear weapons and followed by ABM treaty in 1972. In 1991 the Cooperative Threat Reduction Programme was launched and SALT II was finally ratified in 1992, thirteen years after it actually had been written. The topic aroused again recently when President Obama held a speech in Prague in May 2009 about his goal to pursue nuclear disarmament and establish a special agency for this matter. However, the disarmament clause in Article VI has not been sufficiently explained in the NPT according to some members. Mexico, for example, has proposed for a more precise specification of these measures in the Treaty.¹³⁰

3.7.2 The Documents of the IAEA's Safeguards System

The Agency works on three objectives: safety, security and safeguards. The latter is the most criticised and controversial part. IAEA's safeguards stand for a guarantee system controlling the nuclear-related activities in states that own facilities with nuclear material and those that possess nuclear power reactors. The mission is to cautiously observe these states to detect any attempt of using a peaceful nuclear programme to develop a nuclear weapon.¹³¹

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ ELLSBERG, Daniel. *Nuclear Disarmament*. [pdf]. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Conference 2000. 3.5. 2000. [cit. 2009-12-10]. Available from WWW <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/NGOpres00/5.pdf>.

¹³¹ IAEA: *Factsheets*. IAEA Safeguards: Stemming the Spread of Nuclear Weapons. [online]. International Atomic Energy Agency. 2002. [cit. 2009-12-12]. Available from WWW http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/S1_Safeguards.pdf.

The IAEA signs a so-called Safeguard Agreement with any country that conforms to complying with the Agency's verification system. A respectable number of 145 states has already signed this agreement and let Agency's inspection teams to examine their nuclear material, facilities and activities.¹³² Two documents are essential in the safeguards problematic; whereas the comprehensive safeguards system is based on document INFCIRC/153 (Corr.) and later this system has been strengthened by the Additional Protocol in 1997, which has been officially published under the document INFCIRC/540 (corr.) and stem from criticism of the original Safeguards Agreement from 1972. The Additional Protocol orders the States to inform the Agency about their “nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development activities”¹³³, mining”¹³⁴.

3.7.3 The Board of Governors

Since the decisions of the Board of Governors will take a distinctive part in the next chapter, the constitution of this body shall be described appropriately. The Board of Governors consists of representative from 35 Member States that meet five times a year.¹³⁵ The representation of the states changes every year in the case of those appointed by the outgoing Board, or every two years when appointed by the General Conference.¹³⁶ The outgoing Board is responsible for choosing ten members who are the most advanced in the technology of atomic energy including the production of source material and come from North America, Latin America, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Africa, Middle East and South Asia, South East Asia and the Pacific, Far East. The General Conference picks five representatives from Latin America, four representatives from Western Europe, three representatives from Eastern Europe, four representatives from Africa, two representatives from the Middle East and South Asia, one representative from South East Asia and the Pacific, and one representative from Far East. Further, one member should come from this category: Middle East and South Asia,

¹³² *IAEA: Factsheets*. IAEA Safeguards: Stemming the Spread of Nuclear Weapons. [online]. International Atomic Energy Agency. 2002. [cit. 2009-12-12]. Available from WWW http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/S1_Safeguards.pdf.

¹³³ *IAEA: INFCIR/540c*. Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between state(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards. [pdf]. International Atomic Energy Agency. September 1997. p.2. [cit. 2009-12-12]. Available from WWW <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1997/infcirc540c.pdf>.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ *About IAEA*. IAEA Board of Governors. [online]. 23.2.1989. International Atomic Energy Agency. [cit. 2009-12-12]. Available from WWW <http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/Board/bgrules1.html>.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

South East Asia and the Pacific, Far East and another one from Africa, Middle East and South Asia, South East Asia and the Pacific.¹³⁷

Quorum as well as the limit for adopting a resolution is requested at the majority of two-thirds of the Governors.¹³⁸ All states from the P5+1 have been on the Board in periods 2006/2007¹³⁹, 2007/2008¹⁴⁰ and 2008/2009¹⁴¹.

3.7.4 Improving the System

Since a great part of this thesis will be devoted to the non-proliferation regime, a short examination of the strengths and weaknesses and suggestions for improvement of the regime is in place. Harald Müller believes the core lies in the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency and consequently has drafted several concepts of improvement scenarios for the function of the organisation. He evaluates the foundation of the IAEA very positively and highlights the activities of the Agency such as conducting up-to-date reports about the countries, inspections and satellite snapshots and collecting intelligence information from states.¹⁴² Overall it produces qualitative and quantitative information with hard data and solid conclusions.¹⁴³ The Agency as a unique insight into the world of nuclear energy, nuclear weapons and infrastructure and another information can be acquired by cooperating with other verification systems like the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty regime or the Chemical Weapons Disarmament regime.¹⁴⁴ However, Müller stated three scenarios that would improve the work of the Agency and the functioning of the regime. First, the IAEA should be the only authoritative body in guarding the rules of the non-proliferation regimes. In case the

¹³⁷ IAEA. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. [online]. 23.10.1956. International Atomic Energy Agency. [cit. 2009-12-15]. Available from WWW http://www.iaea.org/About/statute_text.html#A1.6.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ IAEA: *Staff Report*. New Members Elected to the IAEA Board of Governors. [online]. International Atomic Energy Agency. 22.9.2006. [cit. 2009-12-15]. Available from WWW <http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2006/board2006-2007.html>.

¹⁴⁰ IAEA: *Staff Report*. Board of Governors Elects New Officers. [online]. International Atomic Energy Agency. 24.9.2007. [2009-12-15]. Available from WWW <http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2007/BGChairman.html>.

¹⁴¹ IAEA: *Staff Report*. Board of Governors Elects New Officers. [online]. International Atomic Energy Agency. 6.10.2008. [2009-12-15]. Available from WWW <http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2008/bog061008.html>.

¹⁴² MÜLLER, Harald. Was wäre, wenn? Wie kann sich die internationale Gemeinschaft gegen Regelbrecher durchsetzen? *Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung*. 4/2009. p.10.

¹⁴³ MÜLLER, Harald. 4/2009. p.11.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

organisation identifies a state working on a nuclear weapon and estimates the time necessary for completing the weapon within 18 months, the UNSC, after receiving a referral from the IAEA, should have the right to impose the Article 51 of the UN Charter. Thereby, the IAEA will keep its independency and the decision for a military action will still lie on the Security Council. Second, the right to veto in a case of a nuclear security risk should be suspended. And third, Müller calls for legalisation of military sanctions through the General Assembly under the ‘Uniting for Peace’ resolution.¹⁴⁵ These suggestions really could strengthen the non-proliferation regime as a powerful institution whose conclusions would have been taken seriously among the international security. Now, Iran is cooperating with the Agency only partly as the next chapter will show and the core of his lax attitude might lie in the insufficient mandate the organisation holds.

3.8 The Transatlantic Cooperation towards Iran and the Role of the International Atomic Energy Agency

This chapter will analyse the coordination of American and European tactics towards Tehran’s nuclear aspirations on the basis of the verification outcomes of the International Atomic Energy Agency as the fundamental organization in the global non-proliferation regime.

Iran has signed the Safeguards agreement allowing observations on its territory conducted by the IAEA in 1974. According to Article 19 of this agreement the Agency can act on behalf the Article XII of its statute after the Board of Governors finds out the inability of the organisation to confirm the non-existence of modifications of nuclear materials to nuclear weapons.¹⁴⁶ The Article XII (C) gives the Board an authorization to report this incident to all members of the IAEA, as well as to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations.¹⁴⁷ The Agency is, however, obliged to offer the Iranian government an opportunity to explain the situation. The Iranian government is, on the contrary, obliged to report to the Agency’s

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ IAEA: *INFCIR/214*. The Text of the Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferatio of Nuclear Weapons (sic). [pdf]. International Atomic Energy Agency. 13.12.1974. p.6. [cit. 2009-12-12]. Available from WWW <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc214.pdf>.

¹⁴⁷ IAEA. Statue of the International Atomic Energy Agency. [pdf]. American Journal of International Law. 2005. s. 270. [cit. 2009-12-12]. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2195745>.

inspectors any new activities in country's nuclear programme.¹⁴⁸ The Islamic Republic was resisting signing the Additional Protocol for a long time and finally did so in December 2003, seventeen years after the agreement came into force.¹⁴⁹ However, in 2006 Iran withdrew from the Additional Protocol¹⁵⁰ and this topic has become a regular in IAEA resolutions or statements of the Director General as the Agency has been pushing Iran to reapply the Additional Protocol.

Although Iran participates on the non-proliferation regime for 35 years, this country has been one of the biggest 'sinners' of this institution. Since 2002, after uncovering revelations of the Iranian opposition group about nuclear sites at Natanz and Arak, the Agency has registered activities in the Iranian nuclear programme that should have been reported to the IAEA's inspectors by the Iranian government, yet Iran failed to do so.¹⁵¹ Around that time the Agency did not hold enough evidence to convince the Board of Governors that Iran is constructing a nuclear weapon and is thus breaking the Non-proliferation Treaty, but the United States were very vocal in their wish to take appropriate measures and act on paragraph C of the Article XII, persuade the Board of Governors to report these facts to UNSC and hence begin the sanctioning of Iran and their effort intensified after the doomed attempt of the European Union in August 2005 to re-gain balance within the international community with an offer of economical cooperation to Iran in exchange for enrichment suspension.¹⁵²

The IAEA finally issued a resolution GOV/2005/77 on 24th September 2005. The resolution has been described as a 'milestone'¹⁵³ in the dilemma the IAEA was facing with Iran, because it expressed Iranian non-compliance with the safeguards for the first time. The debate on the resolution was portrayed noticeably by the voting in the Board of Governors. Usually the resolutions are adopted by a consensus but here a vote proceeded, whereas 22 members out of

¹⁴⁸ IAEA: INFCIR/214. p.6.

¹⁴⁹ European Union @ United Nations. Commission welcomes Iran's signature of Additional Protocol to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. [online]. 18.12. 2003. [cit. 2009-12-12]. Available from WWW http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/fr/article_3120_fr.htm.

¹⁵⁰ Report by the Director General. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. [pdf]. International Atomic Energy Agency. 27.2.2006. p.6. [cit. 2009-12-12]. Available from WWW <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-15.pdf>

¹⁵¹ European Parliament: Motion for a Resolution. European Parliament resolution on Iran. [online]. European Parliament. 5.10.2005. [cit. 2009-12-12]. Available from WWW <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=B6-2005-0537&language=CS>.

¹⁵² LANGEBACH, Anna; OLBERG, Lars; DUPREEZ, Jean. The New IAEA Resolution: A Milestone in the Iran-IAEA Saga. [pdf]. November 2005. . [cit. 2009-12-13]. Available from WWW http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_69a.html.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

35¹⁵⁴ voted in favour of the resolution, 12¹⁵⁵ abstained and one¹⁵⁶ voted against it.¹⁵⁷ The draft resolution originally included a referral to the Security Council, which was supported eminently by the United States but it was removed because of Russian and Chinese concerns about the need of this step and their confidence the situation could have been solved by the IAEA alone.¹⁵⁸ Interesting are the preferences of the countries on the Board of Governors. Venezuela was left alone by other members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in voting against the resolution. The NAM promotes universal nuclear disarmament among other agenda¹⁵⁹ and displayed sympathies to Iran at the recent 2005 Non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference,¹⁶⁰ where the United States, on the other hand, shattered its position as a reasonable actor in the international community by undermining the force of the results from the 2000 NPT Review Conference and altogether with a very unilateral attitude, which was backed practically solely by France.¹⁶¹ Nevertheless, other members of the NAM besides Venezuela that were on the Board had voted in favour or abstained from the IAEA resolution.

Although the US sustained a defeat, because it did not manage to push the referral, it stayed positive. “[T]his is a significant step forward in the international effort to isolate Iran. It's also a significant setback for Iran's nuclear strategy. We have a patient, long-term strategy. It is to isolate Iran on this question. It's to ratchet up the international pressure on Iran. It is to assemble a growing international coalition against it, as we've done with North Korea,”¹⁶² the Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns commented on the IAEA resolution.

The use of the phrase ‘the international effort to isolate Iran’ is worth a short analysis. The strategy Burns was talking about stood very much opposite of the European efforts when recalling the Paris Declaration where the EU promised an endorsement at the WTO for

¹⁵⁴ Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Ecuador, Germany, Ghana, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, Slovakia, South Korea, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States.

¹⁵⁵ Algeria, Brazil, China, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Vietnam, and Yemen.

¹⁵⁶ Venezuela.

¹⁵⁷ LANGEBACH, Anna; OLBERG, Lars; DUPREEZ, Jean. 2005.

¹⁵⁸ LANGEBACH, Anna; OLBERG, Lars; DUPREEZ, Jean. 2005.

¹⁵⁹ NAM. History and Evolution. [online]. Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement. July 2009. [cit. 2009-12-13]. Available from WWW <http://www.namegypt.org/en/AboutName/HistoryAndEvolution/Pages/default.aspx>.

¹⁶⁰ MÜLLER, Harald. Vertrag im Zerfall. *Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung*. April 2005. p.28.

¹⁶¹ MÜLLER, Harald. 2005. p.1.

¹⁶² BURNS, Nicholas Burns. *Remarks to the Press on the IAEA Board of Governors Resolution Regarding Iran*. [online]. The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy. 27.9.2005. [cit. 2009-12-13]. Available from WWW <http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0509/doc23.htm>.

Iranian membership after certain cooperation from the Iranian side. The European Union has been trying to pull Iran in the international community, which was an approach the US very openly disregarded.

The EU-3 continued to lead diplomatic talks with Iran but continued to fail which culminated on January 2006, when Iran made it clear to the IAEA it had removed seals in at least three nuclear facilities.¹⁶³ Shortly after this unpleasant news, representatives of the P5+1 (or EU-3 + 3), namely the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, China and Russia, met to discuss this matter and thus established a 'P-5 Contact Group'¹⁶⁴. They agreed that Iran should continue diplomatic talks with Britain, France and Germany and suspend its nuclear programme, however, China and Russia objected to the proposition of reporting this incident to the Security Council.¹⁶⁵

Shortly afterwards a special meeting of the Board of Governors was held with the European Union as the initiator. The United States supported this step, since they finally got the European Union fully on board in the quest to report Iran to the Security Council and begin the sanctioning.¹⁶⁶

The Agency then issued several documents on this topic during one month including resolution GOV/2006/14 adopted on 4th February and the Report by the Director General GOV/2006/15 from 27th February. The resolution tried yet again to pass the vote on reporting Iran to the Security Council. In the first section the Board was asking Iran, besides suspension of the nuclear programme and ratifying and implementing the Additional Protocol of the Safeguards Agreement, to reconsider the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water and to implement transparency measures as stated by the Director General in

¹⁶³ IAEA: *Press Release No. 2006/01*. Iran to Resume Suspended Nuclear Research and Development. [online]. International Atomic Energy Agency. 3.1.2006. [cit. 2009-12-12]. Available from WWW <http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/PressReleases/2006/prn200601.html>.

¹⁶⁴ KATZMAN, Kenneth. CRS Report to the Congress: Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses. *Federation of American Scientists*. [pdf]. 7.12.2009 p.20. [cit. 2009-12-12]. Available from WWW <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL32048.pdf>.

¹⁶⁵ WEISMAN, Steven R. Test of Wills Between Iran and the West. *New York Times* [online]. 12.1.2006. [cit. 2009-12-12]. Available from WWW http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/12/international/middleeast/12diplo.html?_r=1/

GOV/2005/67.¹⁶⁷ The Board of Governors than requests the Director General to report to the UNSC “that these steps are required of Iran by the Board and to report to the Security Council all IAEA reports and resolutions, as adopted, relating to this issue.”¹⁶⁸

In the following paragraph the Board expresses “serious concern”¹⁶⁹ about the IAEA being not fully confident about all important details of Iranian nuclear programme, such as “the fact that Iran has in its possession a document on the production of uranium metal hemispheres, since, as reported by the Secretariat, this process is related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon components”¹⁷⁰. Iran has provided the IAEA with a copy of this document, which the Agency accepted as “positive step”¹⁷¹ but the Board “requests Iran to maintain this document under Agency seal and to provide a full copy to the Agency”¹⁷².

In the paragraph number 4 the Board “deeply regrets”¹⁷³ that Iran removed the Agency's seal from the nuclear facility in Natanz beginning with conversion activities since 8th August 2005 and following with enrichment since 10th January 2006.

According to the next two parts of the document the Board of Governors urges Iran “to adopt a constructive approach in relation to negotiations”¹⁷⁴ and “to help the Agency clarify possible activities which could have a military nuclear dimension”¹⁷⁵.

The United States issued a statement delivered by the Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte in the Board of Governors meeting on 10th February, where he pointed out on behalf of the American government the efforts of the EU-3 to diplomatically solve the situation with Iran, as well as numerous calls from the IAEA, which had issued eight resolutions since 2003, and stressed the failure of Iran to react to any of them in a satisfactory way. Perhaps to persuade the undecided states, or simply just not to shatter the fragile consent on the character of the resolution, still and all, the US had been trying to act on the Article XII (C) since 2003, the

¹⁶⁷ *Board of Governors*. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. [pdf]. International Atomic Energy Agency. 4.2.2006. p.2. [cit. 2009-12-12]. Available from WWW <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-14.pdf>.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid. p.3.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

speech included a following statement that didn't correspond with the previous pro-sanctions rhetoric: “We are not now seeking sanctions or other punitive measures on Iran. We do not seek to harm the Iranian people or deprive Iran of its right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. We also do not seek to remove this issue from the IAEA Board's active consideration. Instead, we seek to support the ongoing efforts of the IAEA with the weight of the Security Council's authority. We seek a carefully calibrated approach in which the Council applies escalating measures on Iran's regime.”¹⁷⁶

The vote on the resolution was clear-cut, twenty seven states voted in favour of the document, three against it, namely Cuba, Syria and Venezuela, and five countries – Algeria, Belarus, Indonesia, Libya, and South Africa – abstained.¹⁷⁷

The following IAEA Board Report from 27th February describes in detail the Agency's observations about the Iranian nuclear programme and the decision of the Iranian government to halt implementing the provisions of the Additional Agreement the country has signed in December 2003¹⁷⁸. On 6th February, two days after the publication of the new IAEA resolution through which the Agency reported Iran to the Security Council, Iran informed the Agency that the organization should act from now on merely on the Safeguards Agreement and that “all voluntarily suspended non-legally binding measures including the provisions of the Additional Protocol and even beyond that will be suspended.”¹⁷⁹

Even though Iran withdrew only from the Additional Protocol of the NPT and not from the Treaty itself, it was a distinctive step showing how the country had been pulling itself away from the international non-proliferation regime, and also a sign of a disapproval of being reported to the Security Council. Iran actually warned the IAEA in advance that if a resolution with such content passed, Tehran would stop following the Additional Protocol and resume uranium-enrichment.¹⁸⁰ In the letter Iran asked the Agency to remove surveillance cameras of Tehran's nuclear facilities that had been installed after the Paris Agreement by mid-February.

¹⁷⁶ *IAEA Special Board of Governors Meeting*. US Statement. [online]. The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Policy. 2.2.2006. [cit. 2009-12-12]. Available from WWW <http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0602/doc02.htm>.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ *IAEA Staff Report*. Iran Signs Additional Protocol. [online]. International Atomic Energy Agency. 18.12.2003. cit. 2009-12-12]. Available from WWW <http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2003/iranap20031218.html>.

¹⁷⁹ *Report by the Director General*. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. [pdf]. International Atomic Energy Agency. 27.2.2006. p.6. [cit. 2009-12-12]. Available from WWW <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-15.pdf>

¹⁸⁰ *CNN: World*. Iran Tells IAEA to Remove Cameras. [online]. CNN. 7.2.2006. [cit. 2009-12-12]. Available from WWW <http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/02/06/iran.inspections/index.html>.

The snap inspections that allowed this Agreement Iran also rejected. The inspectors and all verification procedures must have been announced beforehand according to the letter. The Council didn't want to take any action until the IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei would present his report in March.¹⁸¹

In this report ElBaradei expressed his concerns about the slow progress on the conclusion and entry into force of additional protocols by 118 states and 34 states that signed the NPT but had not applied their safeguards agreements properly.¹⁸² Later in his report he addressed Iran and its implementation of the safeguards and concluded that “the Agency has not seen indications of diversion of nuclear material to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Regrettably, however, after three years of intensive verification, there remain uncertainties with regard to both the scope and the nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.”¹⁸³ The nature and future of Iranian nuclear programme seemed unclear to the Director General and he advised Iran to “do its utmost to provide maximum transparency and build confidence”¹⁸⁴

In a respond the UNSC issued a Presidential Statement in which the body called for a rectification of Iranian non-compliance with the steps required by the Board of Governors in the resolution GOV/2006/14 and asked the Director General to report the results in thirty days to the Security Council.¹⁸⁵

The requested report was published under number GOV/2006/27 on 28th April and described the progresses of Iranian attitude since March 2006. The Director General called for a new implementation of the Additional Protocol by Iran, since the IAEA was not able to find out were contamination of most high enriched uranium (HEU) in some locations in Iran came from and needed more precise examinations and thus better conditions for the work of their inspectors.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² ELBARADEI, Mohamed. *Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors*. [online]. International Atomic Energy Agency. 6.2.2005. [cit. 2009-12-14]. Available from WWW <http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2006/ebsp2006n003.html#iran>.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ *Security Council: SC/8679*. Presidential Statement. [online]. United Nations Security Council. 29.3.2006. [cit. 2009-12-14]. Available from WWW <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8679.doc.htm>.

¹⁸⁶ *Board of Governors*. Implementation of Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. [pdf]. International Atomic Energy Agency. 28.4.2006. p.3. [cit. 2009-12-15]. Available from WWW <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-27.pdf>.

Regarding the P1 centrifuges and the potential offer of this technology to Iran in mid-1990, the Director General concluded that testimonies about this story made by concerned Iranians are not in conformity. Previously that is, Iran assured the Agency that there was no activity from its side to acquire this technology in the period from 1987 to mid-1993. Director General ElBaradei stressed the fact the IAEA had been still waiting for documentation on that matter.¹⁸⁷ The organisation also obtained information about the development of P2 centrifuges and has been waiting for an explanation from the Iranian side.¹⁸⁸

Further, Iran had been denying the Agency a copy of a document about its uranium re-conversion¹⁸⁹ and the information gathered by the organization based on explanations from Iranian side about experiments involving the separation of small (milligram) quantities of plutonium was – according to the Director General – not unimpeachable.¹⁹⁰ The IAEA didn't obtain any information about the uranium mining activities, nor about the research of polonium.¹⁹¹ Some other inadequacies were mentioned in the report; however, the Director General stated that the Agency had not found any other undeclared nuclear material in Iran. Despite of this matter and the fact, the investigations went on for three years already, the Agency was not able to make clear conclusions about the nature of Iranian nuclear programme, mainly because of Iranian centrifuge programme.

Than again, Mr. ElBaradei stressed the importance of the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, so that the Agency could “understand fully the twenty years of undeclared nuclear activities by Iran”¹⁹².

At the publish day of this report, the IAEA obtained a letter from The Permanent Mission of Iran dated April 27th with reassurance of Iranian will to resolve remaining issues and would send the Agency a timetable for this matter within next three weeks. The report by the

¹⁸⁷ *Board of Governors*. 28.4.2006. p.3-4.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.* p.4.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.* p.5.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁹² *Ibid.* p.7.

Director General GOV/2006/38 published on June 8th 2006 claimed that no such document had been sent to the Agency until the day.¹⁹³

After these disappointing reports, nothing actually stood in a way of the sanctions towards Iran, whereas the first round was imposed by the UNSC on December 26th 2006. The members of the UNSC have unanimously voted for the 1737 Resolution in accordance to the Article 41 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Prior this decision the 1696 Resolution from July 31 gave the Islamic republic of Iran a month to stop the enrichment of uranium and other dangerous behaviour.¹⁹⁴ Iran has not complied with this appeal and therefore the UNSC formulated and accepted the 1737 Resolution, which says Iran has to end all following nuclear activities in sixty days: all actions connected to uranium enrichment including the research and developing of heavy water projects like the development of heavy water reactor.¹⁹⁵ Other UN states were not supposed to provide Iran with technologies that can be used to uranium enrichment or developing a nuclear weapon.¹⁹⁶

The situation developed several months later on March 24th with the 1747 Resolution, which was proposed by the EU-3. Iran had not been cooperating with UNSC after the 1737 Resolution and, consequently, the next one contented tougher sanctions. The 1747 Resolution banned Iran from gun export, froze its assets, and restricted the freedom of movement of certain persons that have worked on the nuclear programme. This resolution was also approved unanimously.¹⁹⁷

Third round of sanction began on March 3rd 2008. This 1803 resolution strengthen the already mentioned 'punishments' and added a clause about the control of activities of Iranian banks on the territory of other UN state members and blocking an import and export of nuclear material and inspection of aircraft transportation from an into Iranian territory.¹⁹⁸ The UNSC

¹⁹³ *Board of Governors*. Implementation of Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. [pdf]. International Atomic Energy Agency. 8.6.2006. p.1. [cit. 2009-12-15]. Available from WWW <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-38.pdf>.

¹⁹⁴ *Security Council: SC/8792*. Resolution 1696. [online]. United Nations Security Council. 31.7.2006. [cit. 2009-12-15]. Available from WWW <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8792.doc.htm>.

¹⁹⁵ *Security Council: SC/8928*. Resolution 1737. [online]. United Nations Security Council. 23.12.2006. [cit. 2009-12-15]. Available from WWW <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8928.doc.htm>.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid*.

¹⁹⁷ *Security Council: SC/8980*. Resolution 1747. [online]. United Nations Security Council. 24.12.2007. [cit. 2009-12-15]. Available from WWW <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc8980.doc.htm>.

¹⁹⁸ *Security Council: SC/9268*. Resolution 1803. [online] United Nations Security Council. 3.3.2008. [cit. 2009-12-15]. Available from WWW <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9268.doc.htm>.

explained the 1803 resolution with the unwillingness of Iran to comply with its previous resolutions and to establish a “full and sustained suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities and heavy water-related projects”¹⁹⁹. Fourteen states have voted in favour of the resolution, whereas Indonesia has abstained from voting.

Prior the 1803 UN resolution regarding the third round of sanctions against Iran IAEA published a nine-page-long report GOV/2007/58 on November 15th 2007. The report has confirmed that despite the two previous rounds of sanctions, Iran has renewed its nuclear programme and was enriching uranium.

One day after the release of the UNSC resolution the European countries revealed a proposition for a separate IAEA resolution, however, it was denied after a serial of diplomatic discussions. China, Russia and the so-called Non-aligned Movement held the strongest inquiries. The opponents stated that Iran would have been even less willing to cooperate with the IAEA after this resolution.²⁰⁰ In September 2008 the DG issued a statement with the progresses in the Iranian questions and unfortunately concluded that Iran yet again failed to answer questions made by the Agency concerning its nuclear programme.²⁰¹ Consequently, the UNSC issued another resolution (1835)²⁰² unanimously adopted on 27th September and affirming the force of the previous resolutions.

However, the sanctions implicated through UNSCR 1737 of 23 of December 2006, UNSCR 1747 of 24 of March 2007 and UNSCR 1803 of March 2008 influenced EU-Iranian trade relations by restricting them. The European Council Regulations 423/2007, 618/2007 and 1110/2008 set out a list of products prohibited from export to Iran.²⁰³

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ AFP. IAEA Board Drops Iran Sanctions Resolution. [online]. Google. 4.3.2008. [2009-12-15]. Available from WWW <http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5hbJ1wSX63xg6gwD5JpdzMR4pCbog>.

²⁰¹ Board of Governors. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran. [pdf]. International Atomic Energy Agency. 15.9.2008. p.5. [2009-12-15]. Available from WWW <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2008/gov2008-38.pdf>.

²⁰² Security Council: SC/9459. Resolution 1835. [online]. United Nations Security Council. 27.9.2008. [2009-12-15]. Available from WWW <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9459.doc.htm>.

²⁰³ European Commission: Trade. Iran. [online]. European Commission. 1.6.2009. [cit. 2009-12-15]. Available from WWW http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/iran/index_en.htm.

3.8.1 The Cooperation of EU and US from the Neorealist Perspective

United States criticized Iranian nuclear programme since the early 90's and, finally, used coercive measures in form of economical sanctions by passing the ILSA act in 1996. However, as already mentioned above, other actors like European Union didn't respond to these solitaire American actions well and protested even with a threat to report the provocative parts of the act to the World Trade Organization. From both of the Bush Administrations the first one was definitely in line with neorealist view on international relations. It preferred to use hard power and coercion, not to mention it started two wars in the Middle East, first in Afghanistan, than in Iraq, and was ready to begin another military action – this time against Iran.²⁰⁴ The latter never happened, although the Bush Administration has maintained a substantial naval presence in the Persian Gulf,²⁰⁵ but the United States continued the sanctioning of Iran and named it one of biggest global security threats²⁰⁶, i.e. American security threats, and therefore the efforts to keep Iran from acquire a nuclear weapon turned into a matter of simple survival in the anarchical international system and, of course, a power game.

The US understood that UN sanctions have even bigger coercive power and needed to bring the European permanent members of the UNSC on their side, because China as the major trade partner of Iran²⁰⁷ and Russia that actually is working on Iran's power plant in Bushehr²⁰⁸ were still hostile against this idea.²⁰⁹ Besides, the UNSC is a convenient place for Americans to negotiate within the international community over a security issue like Iran, since they have 'only' fourteen states that can either oppose them or agree with them, whereas France and Great Britain are traditional allies. Therefore, it was US priority that the IAEA Board of Governors would have reported Iran to the UNSC as soon as possible. However, in the case of Iran the US didn't profit from the otherwise big advantage of the permanent UNSC members

²⁰⁴ KATZMAN, Kenneth. CRS Report to the Congress: Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses. *Federation of American Scientists*. [pdf]. 7.12.2009. p.37. [cit. 2009-12-12]. Available from WWW <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL32048.pdf>.

²⁰⁵ KATZMAN, Kenneth. Summary of the CRS Report to the Congress: Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses. *Federation of American Scientists*. [pdf]. 7.12.2009. [cit. 2009-12-12]. Available from WWW <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL32048.pdf>.

²⁰⁶ *White House: President George W. Bush*. 2006. p.20.

²⁰⁷ KATZMAN, Kenneth. 2009. p.11.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.* p.22.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.* p.24.

– the right to veto, since China and Russia have used it several times²¹⁰ already to prevent the sanctions. This situation corresponds with the neorealist theory of relative gains. Although the veto is a great capability for a state in the global politics, in this case the US would probably rather give it up generally so that no one from the UNSC members would be able to invoke it.

In the IAEA's Board of Governors is a different story. As already mentioned all states from the P5+1 have been on the Board in periods 2006/2007, 2007/2008 and 2008/2009. But, there are 35 states on the Board that otherwise change every year (the ones appointed by the outgoing Board) or every two years (the ones appointed by the General Conference) and the range of states that belong to some other international groups/bodies, like the European Union, the Non-Aligned Movement etc., is much wider, their preferences vary and, in many cases, they might be completely different from the United States' priorities. A good example of the tough US position on the Board is the above mentioned proposition of a resolution with the aim of reporting Iran to the UNSC in 2005, where only 22 members out of 35 voted in favour of the resolution and it didn't pass despite of great efforts from the US camp. Overall, The United States did not maintain a good relationship with the IAEA during Bush's era. Their first conflict was Iraq in 2003 when Director General Mohamed ElBaradei was not able to confirm American claims that Iraq renewed its nuclear programme, later in 2005 the Americans tried to block his re-election and accused him of being too soft towards Iran. ElBaradei countered with saying the US and its allies were complicating the IAEA investigations in Iran and Syria by not provide enough intelligence.²¹¹ In a 2007 CNN's interview with ElBaradei the director claimed that the aggressive attitude of the United States has made the situation with Iran much more difficult and stated that he was not able to confirm Iran is developing a nuclear weapon.²¹² After this statement French President Nicholas Sarkozy joined the US position. At a joint meeting in February 2008 he said he was convinced that Iran is developing a NW.²¹³

²¹⁰ GPF: *Tables and Charts on the Security Council*. Changing Patterns in the Use of the Veto in the Security Council. [online]. Global Policy Forum. 2008. [cit. 2009-12-12]. Available from WWW <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/tables-and-charts-on-the-security-council-0-82/use-of-the-veto.html>.

²¹¹ KAKATKAR, Manasi. ElBaradei to Leave IAEA in 2009. *Arms Control Association*. [online]. October 2008. [cit. 2009-2-14]. Available from WWW http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_10/ElBaradei.

²¹² CNN Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer. Interview With Mohamed ElBaradei. *CNN*. [online]. 28.10. 2007. [cit. 2009-2-14]. Available from WWW <http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0710/28/le.01.html>.

²¹³ Ibid.

The European Union was not as concerned about Iranian nuclear programme at first, because it was relying on the judgment of IAEA experts that kept on stating that they had not been able to confirm Iran is developing a nuclear weapon. Putting a crucial global security issue completely into hands of an international organisation, which is not even a primary actor in the international system, is very problematic to neorealists. The United States therefore pushed the European Union to action both in the IAEA's Board of Governors, and through bilateral talks.²¹⁴ But, following Iranian actions on January 2006 the members of EU-3 learned their lesson, mobilised themselves and began to respond to American calls first to report Iran by the IAEA Board of Governors to the UNSC and then to impose sanctions on Iran. Finally, the first UNSC resolution containing sanctions had the number 1696 and was proposed by the whole P5+1.

The European objectives against the sanctions were simple: it was not profitable, since the European Union has strong economical ties with Iran through its oil in particular, France and Germany from the EU-3; otherwise also Italy or Netherlands.²¹⁵ The European strategy was therefore purely centered on the interests of the EU and certainly not power-oriented as would a neorealist approach demand. However, before the UNSC resolution 1803 that imposed the third round of sanctions on Iran, France, despite its economical cooperation with Iran, toughened its position as mentioned above and supported the US against the IAEA. However, an odd situation turned up when only after the UNSC resolution the IAEA issued a report confirming Iran had renewed uranium enrichment stating that the Agency obtained some new information. This is strange since the Agency is generally the most informed platform in this area. Was the first claim of insufficient information a strategy of the International Atomic Energy Agency that for some reasons did not wish to sanction Iran again, or did the IAEA issue the report after the resolution only to stay relevant as an actor in the non-proliferation regime?

Finally, both of the transatlantic partners have behaved in a neorealist way with the co-operational aspect inside an international regime, which says this cooperation never occurs because of the simple existence of a regime, but because the states want, need and start to

²¹⁴ *BBC News*. EU-Iran Nuclear Talks Break Down. [online]. British Broadcasting Corporation. 23.3.2005. [cit. 2009-2-14]. Available from WWW http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4374485.stm.

²¹⁵ KATZMAN, Kenneth. 2009. p.11.

cooperate from their own initiative.²¹⁶ Between years 2006 and 2008 the United States made a lot of effort to engage with the EU in the case of the Iranian nuclear programme, because the Americans needed the EU support to enforce the sanctions. First, George W. Bush was officially referring to Iran as to a ‘global threat’ and thus implied a multilateral approach. Second, they continuously tried to persuade the Board Governors to report Iran to the UNSC; third, they softened their attitude towards diplomatic efforts and finally even endorsed EU-3 bargaining with Iran. Here the role of the Director General and IAEA inspectors needs to be mentioned since they often stayed in opposition to US efforts.

Even though the strategy of the second administration was very different from the previous hard-powered and mainly self-help tactics in Bush’s first administration (plans for military actions, covert actions) and the previous Clinton’s administration (economic sanctions), the relative gains in form of defeating Iran were larger than the importance to hold a position. But, on the other hand, it also raises a question if this turn in policy didn’t weaken the American power status in the eyes of Iranians?

3.8.2 The Cooperation of EU and US from the Neoliberal Perspective

The friendly step made in 2006 by the Americans towards European engagement in diplomatic and even economic activities with Iran was a big improvement in comparison to American aggressive rhetoric and plans made during the first Bush’s administration. States should cooperate when they have eminent common interests to do so and Iranian nuclear threat does concern both transatlantic actors in a major way as their security and foreign strategies imply. Therefore, it is completely natural and right for the US and the EU to support each other’s endeavours and trust each other. Trust is an important issue for a co-operational partnership, luckily there are international regimes to help with the evaluation of the trustworthiness of other states. The EU-3 and the United States stood behind the establishment of the Non-proliferation Treaty together; they launched the International Atomic Energy Agency and thus stood at the beginning of the non-proliferation regime. The European Union and the United States have always behaved according to the rules and

²¹⁶ POWELL, Robert. Review: Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate. *International Organization*. [pdf]. Spring 1994. Vol. 48, No. 2. p.319. [cit. 2010-01-04]. Available from WWW <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706934>.

agreements of the non-proliferation regime and, moreover, have been very active in promoting these rules and developing them. Therefore, the transatlantic actors should be trustworthy partners for each other as well to all other states that signed the Treaty and comply with it. Iran shall be judged on the same principal since it is a signatory, but unfortunately with a different result because it has continuously broken the rules of the non-proliferation by not providing the IAEA with sufficient information about its nuclear programme as stated in several IAEA resolutions, withdrew from the Additional Agreement and removed IAEA seals without previous consultation with the organisation. Consequently, the reputation of Iran has come to the downhill and has its reliability. As a result Iranian profits should be negatively influenced according to neoliberal theory.

This has already happened with the United States, which do business with Iran only on a much circumscribed level. However, American ILSA actions might have been too much of a precaution in 1996, since there was no clear evidence within the international non-proliferation regime of Iran being noncompliant. Moreover, this measure harmed the transatlantic partnership, because it took away the possibility of maximising profits hence the absolute gains with punishing the EU for economical cooperation with Iran. Therefore, no one won in this game, not even the United States, because they lost a major economical tie with Iran and jeopardised their trustworthiness for the EU. From this perspective, the ISLA has not been a good step.

However, Iran has a strong importance in energy policy for the European Union because of energy resources.²¹⁷ For example, the Nabucco pipe line project, which should decrease the energy dependence of Europe on Russia, lies on weather or not it would stream Iranian gas, which is a strong argument for easing Iranian natural gas off sanctioning.²¹⁸ On the other hand, it is an unreliable partner in the non-proliferation regime, which means it is a threat to the EU security. This is a great example of a clash between economical/energy and security priorities, in a sense of which is more important. The neoliberals believe states behave as rational actors for selfish goals, which means they do not think about how their behaviour will influence others, so their decision to remain in an economical partnership with Iran and

²¹⁸ *EurActiv News*. Iran Provokes West with Long-range Missile Launch. [online] EurActiv. 28.9.2009. [cit. 2009-12-15]. Available from WWW <http://www.euractiv.com/en/foreign-affairs/iran-provokes-west-long-range-missile-launch/article-185822>.

keeping in mind European energy supply vulnerability²¹⁹ was made precisely according to the neoliberal principals. However, this means the economical factor has won over the security factor. This brings out the question if the reliability as the crucial neoliberal argument in testing other states and being precautionary of their hidden agenda is transformable from low-politics (economical relations) to high-politics (security)? In case the answer is positive, the EU is not behaving according to neoliberal propositions at the moment. If the answer is negative, it shatters the usefulness of neoliberal theory for high-politics issues. The non-proliferation is complex problem precisely due to larger economical interdependence between states. Nye and Keohane believed this condition will preserve conflicts globally.²²⁰ It sure works this way in many cases, for example for the states of the European Union, or between United States and China; but perhaps it ironically preserves solving possible conflicts in some other ones. The truth is, Iranian profits have not suffered a bit since the beginning of the new millennium, on the contrary, the European Union proposed several proposals of other economical support under the condition of cooperation with the IAEA. But, even though Iran has not done so and, moreover, even worsened its attitude towards the non-proliferation regime, the European Union continued doing business with Iran. The export from the EU made more than 14 billion euro in 2008.²²¹ This basically means that Iran is able to pursue its negative policy together with economical benefits. The only thing Iran cannot reach is the extra support from the EU, which was – as mentioned above – offered in May 2008 for the last time. If Iran will be able to have it both, that would be the ideal case in terms of absolute gains. But, even without it, Iran still does pretty well and for sure profits from the current state more than the EU and the United States. The EU also gains from the events, but is not successful in resulting the proliferation dilemma and the security threat Iran poses. The US, on the other hand, does not profit in any way, economically, or in security.

3.9 Who Does it Better? A Conclusion

From the neorealist perspective the United States are on the best way to overthrow Iran using the international regime to this purpose. However, wider cooperation with the EU is a shift from neorealist principle of self-help and the softening of American position might show the

²¹⁹ Ibid.

²²⁰ KEOHANE, Robert O.; NYE, Joseph S. 1989. p.27-28.

²²¹ *European Commission: Trade*. 1.6.2009.

US as a 'weaker' actor to Iran. The European Union has made several missteps on the other hand. One not being mentioned yet has been a complete rejection of the self-help rule in a form of breaking economical ties with Iran.

The neoliberal perspective on one hand does say how to preserve security; on the other hand, this implication obviously doesn't practically work in the case of Iran. Either will the EU (and Iran) loose economically, or the EU *might* win with the US the security dilemma. EU winning in both cases is not an option. Nevertheless, the EU behaves accordingly to the neoliberal theory since it cooperated with the US carefully within the non-proliferation regime and punished Iran for non-compliance only within the regime as well, meaning the reporting to the UNSC and following sanctions. This is much more convenient for the European Union in terms of reaching absolute gains. However, altogether from the neoliberal view Iran must be the ultimate winner maximizing its gains under giving circumstances in the research period 2006 to 2008.

In any case, this study confirms the flaws of neorealist and neoliberal theories. Because they are structural theories, they do not take in account many important factors like access of other oil resources for the European Union, but, the same for the United States. What if there are hidden motives in the US policy giving the fact energetic security is one of the most challenging issues internationally and Iran holds the world's third largest oil reserves?²²²

Neoliberalism has been also widely criticized for its incapability to explain other regimes than the strictly economical ones like GATT for example. This thesis showed that dead ends might occur in the states' choices if they want to behave according to neoliberalism in an international regime that originated to preserve global security. Neorealism, on the contrary, had to compromise in its scepticism about multilateral cooperation and withdraw from the belief of self-help dramatically.

²²² *EIA: Country Analysis Briefs*. Total Energy Consumption in Iran. [online]. U.S. Energy Information Administration. February 2009. [cit. 2009-12-20]. Available from WWW <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Iran/Background.html>.

4. Public Diplomacy in Promoting the Non-proliferation Regime

4.1 Soft Power

The term ‘soft power’ was first introduced by Joseph S. Nye Jr, when he accentuated the recent increasing meaning of “technology, education and economic growth”²²³ over “geography, population and raw materials”²²⁴. As one of the founders of the theory of interdependence (together with Robert Keohane), Nye saw the growing relations between state, business corporations, international organizations and other non-governmental actors as the new cornerstone of the post-Cold War politics. Simultaneously, he recognized modern national security issues in terms of seeking economic and ecological security rather than military.²²⁵ These new priorities shape nowadays politics and push ahead the interdependence of state and non-governmental actors, which – as Nye believed – are “often more relevant in achieving country’s goals than are other states”²²⁶. Since many of these actors are multi-, or even trans-national, states are forced to cooperate with one another rather than trying to balance each other’s powers.²²⁷ Countries don’t perceive each other as enemies or rivals anymore, moreover, they behave like ‘friends’, because they find themselves in a relationship where they have so much in common they cannot afford to harm each other.

4.1.1 Public Diplomacy and its Roots

Public diplomacy is a common practice used by national states (through their ministries of foreign affairs), NGO’s and other international actors, such as NATO, the European Commission or the UN, to communicate with the ‘outside world’, pass on their agenda and promote their values and believes. Paul Sharp gives similar description of public diplomacy. He sees it as “the process by which direct relations with people in a country are pursued to

²²³ NYE, Joseph S. *Soft Power: the Means to Success in Global Politics*. 1.ed. 2004. New York: Public Affairs. p.154. ISBN 1-58648-225-4.

²²⁴ Ibid.

²²⁵ Ibid., p.155.

²²⁶ Ibid., p.157.

²²⁷ Ibid. p.158.

advance the interest and extend the values of those being represented.”²²⁸ Public diplomacy (PD) is an important tool of soft power and has an impressive history dated from the time diplomatic efforts have first occurred in ancient history. However, as Jan Melissen points out, the importance of public diplomacy has grown with media and them being used for official communication.²²⁹ After Gutenberg’s invention of movable type printing in around 1439, the spread of information to the public increased rapidly and the communication between ruling establishments and the ordinary people had began on a regular basis.

However, it was first Cardinal Richelieu who realized the importance of keeping in touch with the ‘outside world’. Richelieu, as Henry Kissinger in his book *Diplomacy* implies, used to be a very pragmatic statesman, who had no fear of – for his time – unusual acts in attempt to make France a Great Power.²³⁰ He had established the first ministry of foreign affairs just two years after coming into office in 1624. Other European countries followed his step then, and, at the end of the 19th century diplomacy had become a standard practice among national states throughout the entire world.²³¹

Nevertheless, ministries did not let embassies and their employees to engage in much contact with the locals, nor did they try to reach other nationalities directly through the media until about the beginning of World War II. Walter R. Roberts even suggests that Great Britain started to broadcast in foreign languages first after the Nazis and Soviets “became too meddlesome”²³² with their own efforts in this area. Both dictatorships used broadcasting for propaganda, although they weren’t the first who understood how useful the radio could be for foreign policy purposes. In 1927 Netherlands became the first country that transmitted broadcasting outside the country, specifically to the Far East. The Soviet Union obviously saw broadcasting as a functional instrument in its international politics and had launched a large radio center in Moscow with broadcasting in fifty languages and dialects three years later.

²²⁸ MELISSEN, Jan. *Wielding Soft Power: The New Public Diplomacy*. [pdf]. Netherlands Institute of International Relations. May 2005. p.8. [cit. 2010-01-01]. Available from WWW http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2005/20050500_cdsp_paper_diplomacy_2_melissen.pdf.

²²⁹ MELISSEN, Jan. 2005. p.1.

²³⁰ KISSINGER, Henry. *Umění diplomacie*. 3.ed. 1994. Praha: Prostor. p.55. ISBN 80-7260-025-7.

²³¹ ROBERTS, Walter R. *The Evolution of Diplomacy*. *Mediterranean Quarterly*. [online]. Summer 2006. p.1. [cit. 2010-01-01]. Available from WWW <http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/70.htm>.

²³² Ibid.

Germany followed with propaganda to Austria and shortwave broadcasting to Latin America in 1933.²³³

The non-English British Broadcasting Corporation service was established in 1938, six years after BBC began to broadcast to English-speaking people outside Britain. King George V was the first monarch who reached out to public with a Christmas message via broadcasting. He then spoke to “men and women so cut off by the snows and the deserts that only voices out of the air can reach them”.²³⁴ The primary languages covered by the Empire Service were Arabic and Spanish, with the former being Britain’s reaction to the already mentioned German propaganda in Latin America. Nevertheless, number of languages increased by the beginning of the World War II to seven, and in 1940 the Empire Service was renamed to more fitting External Service.

However, the development in United States was visibly slower compared to European countries or Japan. Initially, New York Congressman Emmanuel Celler introduced some bills in late 30’s aimed to respond appropriately to German propaganda, but actual governmental efforts occurred not earlier than in 1941. At first, the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA) began to broadcast to Latin America and, later, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt created the U.S. Foreign Information Service (FIS).²³⁵ His speechwriter and former playwright Robert Sherwood started to produce news broadcasting for European audience with a small number of journalists in a rented headquarters in New York and transmitted them by privately-owned American shortwave stations.²³⁶ After the attack on Pearl Harbour and the declaration of war made by Germany to United States, Sherwood asked a theatrical producer and director John Houseman to take over FIA’s New York office and in December 1941 made the institution its first direct broadcast to Asia. For direct broadcasting to Europe, which was launched on February 24, 1942, FIA used BBC medium- and long-wave transmitters and for the first time opened the German programme with the legendary line “Here speaks a voice

²³³ *VOA: About VOA*. VOA History. [online]. Voice of America. [cit. 2010-01-01]. Available from WWW <http://author.voanews.com/english/about/VOAHistory.cfm>.

²³⁴ *BBC: World Service*. When did the World Service Start? [online]. British Broadcasting Corporation. [cit. 2010-01-01]. Available from WWW http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/institutional/2009/03/090313_history.shtml.

²³⁵ *VOA: About VOA*. VOA History. [online]. Voice of America. [cit. 2010-01-01]. Available from WWW <http://author.voanews.com/english/about/VOAHistory.cfm>

²³⁶ *VOA: About VOA*. The Beginning: An American Voice Greets the World II. [online]. Voice of America. [cit. 2010-01-01]. Available from WWW <http://author.voanews.com/english/about/beginning-of-an-american-voice.cfm>.

from America.”²³⁷ Four months later Voice of America found its place under the Office of War Information, a large number of new transmitters had been constructed and at the end of 1944 VOA broadcasted in over forty languages.

This short introduction into the very beginning of the use of media for public diplomacy shows few interesting points. First, the primary reason broadcasting became a popular tool in foreign policy was its easy misuse for propaganda. Second, Western countries began broadcasting only after they had seen how powerful and effective German and Soviet programmes happened to be, especially in Latin America where the popularity of the Nazi regime was increasing rapidly. Third, United States hesitated for a long time with launching an international broadcasting service in comparison to European states. The FIA began its activity almost ten years after the BBC Empire Service commenced. The latter account shows small political will of the United States Congress to get involved into the World War II. The policy of isolationism was, however, finally completely dismissed after Pearl Harbour.

What also can be drawn from the last couple of paragraphs is the differentiation within public diplomacy. Although the beginnings of PD are linked to broadcasting and news reporting, the cultural ‘embassy-to-people’ and ‘people-to-people’ aspects play an essential part in public diplomacy and have a perpetual role in foreign policy. However, American public diplomacy especially is biased on what is more important: information or cultural affairs? The beginning of the Cold War sabotaged any attempts to lead an independent cultural diplomacy. All fragments of foreign policy were subordinated to the challenge of winning this war. There was no place for a proper dialog; on the other side, propagandists and “informationists”²³⁸ got a hold on lots of space with their own version of it: let’s “sit down together and talk – about me.”²³⁹ However, good American influence on ‘its’ part of the world after the World War II was undeniable. The United States succeeded tremendously at the rebuilt of the American quarter in Germany and all of Japan. Marshall Plan helped the economical recovery of Western Europe. The Fulbright Programme, for example, started only a year after the war and established itself as one of the most prestigious exchange programme in the world and a

²³⁷ *VOA: About VOA*. VOA History. [online]. Voice of America. [cit. 2010-01-01]. Available from WWW <http://author.voanews.com/english/about/VOAHistory.cfm>

²³⁸ ARNDT, Richard T. *The First Resort of Kings*. 1.ed. 2005. Dulles, Va.: Potomac Books. p.214. ISBN 157488587.

²³⁹ ARND, Richard T. 2005. p.215.

convincing case in point for those who were in favour of cultural diplomacy in the purest sense.

The lone term ‘public diplomacy’ is in a way connected with USIA. Edward R. Murrow, former broadcaster and famous rebel against the McCarthyism in the 50’s, was a director of USIA in 1961 to 1964 and TAFTS University opened a Centre in his name at its Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy a year after he came out of office. American diplomat Edmond Guillionne held a speech at the opening and used there the expression ‘public diplomacy’ for the first time. Still, this term had to wait few decades to become a stable vocabulary in diplomatic dictionary. After the World War II these agendas, arranged by a government with a goal to make an influence on foreigners, were officially called ‘information and cultural programmes’²⁴⁰. Twenty years later, even though the term ‘public diplomacy’ had already existed, cultural diplomacy became a much popular name for these actions. The turning point came in the late 60’s, because ‘cultural diplomacy’ felt to be too narrow. It didn’t include international broadcasting and the work of the press attaché or any other policy information job, as Walter R. Roberts reveals.²⁴¹ He also mentions the hearings in the Congress in 1975 on the subject ‘Public Diplomacy and the Future’. “However, not until the tragic events of 9/11 was the term public diplomacy accepted by the American press and, indeed, within the US government,” Roberts, who is a veteran in diplomatic services, explained.²⁴²

When discussing the implementation of public diplomacy into governmental language and practice in recent American history, the name of former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice needs to be mentioned. She saw public diplomacy as an applicable and reliable strategy on the Middle East and was a strong supporter of the use of American soft power in this region. The U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy has been created by Congress and appointed by the President serves this matter as an agenda setter.

Public diplomacy of the European Union celebrated its 50th anniversary in 2007²⁴³ and, basically, has been copying the development of the European Communities and the European

²⁴⁰ ROBERTS, Walter R. The Evolution of Diplomacy. *Mediterranean Quarterly*. [online]. Summer 2006. p.1. [cit. 2010-01-01]. Available from WWW <http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/70.htm>.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² Ibid.

²⁴³ *European Commission: External Relations. A Glance at EU Public Diplomacy at Work*. [pdf]. European Commission. 2007. [cit. 2009-12-30]. Available from WWW http://bookshop.europa.eu/eubookshop/download.action?fileName=Nf7807271ENC_002.pdf&eubphfUid=568469&catalogNbr=Nf-78-07-271-EN-C.

Union with the European Commission working as the executor of the approved policies through its External Relations unit. The United States faced the challenge of finding the balance between promoting the right image and providing the right information to the outside world (which can be easily called propaganda) and establishing true friendships and stable relationships with people in other countries based on honesty and openness. The European Union, on the other hand, has been confronting the lack of identity not only inside the body but consequently also to the ‘outside’. It is a state “without a European nation, since there is still no European mass media, parties, interest groups (except in business), or public,” as Stanley Hoffman wrote in 1993.²⁴⁴ As Cris Shore pointed out, the crisis of European identity moves between an elitist view on Europe as the bearer of Western intellectuality and heritage on one hand and a constant ‘danger’ of being absorbed by the aggressive Americanization of culture and society on the other hand.²⁴⁵ The other important factor is the variety of cultures inside the European Union. Which one to pick?

4.2 Nowadays’ Iran: Politics, Society, Media

4.2.1 Politics

An important milestone that still shapes today’s Iran was the year 1979, when the so-called Islamic revolution went through and Iran became a state where religion and politics go hand in hand. The constitutional principle *velayat-e faqih*²⁴⁶ Rumollah Khomeini instituted thus says that the spiritual power is above the secular one. Iran is officially a constitutional Islamic republic, but above the president, who is formally the head of state, stands the so-called *rahbar*, Supreme Leader, who must have a qualification as a Shia Islam scholar.²⁴⁷ The Supreme leader has always the last word in important state matters; he is the official head of Iranian army, the Revolution Guards and security forces and, moreover, his official agenda is setting governmental policies. He names the chief justice as well.²⁴⁸ Rahbar is elected for life by the so-called Assembly of Experts, which is a body of 86 high placed clerics with a

²⁴⁴ HOFFMAN, Stanley. Goodbye to a United Europe. *New York Review of Books*. 1993. Vol. 41, No. 10. p.31.

²⁴⁵ SHORE, Cris. *Building Europe: the cultural politics of European integration*. 1.ed. 2000. London: Routledge. ISBN: 978-0-415-18014-6.

²⁴⁶ GOMBÁR, Eduard. *Dramatický pŕlměšíc*. 1.ed. 2001. Praha: Karolinum. p.122. ISBN 80-246-0370-5.

²⁴⁷ Ibid. p.127.

²⁴⁸ Ibid. p.132.

mandate of eight years, who have i.e. the right to elect a rahbar,²⁴⁹ but also to vote him off, if they feel he is incompetent.²⁵⁰ The relationship between the rahbar and president is also interesting. The Supreme Leader has the right to remove the president under the condition that two thirds of the Parliament votes for such decision. The Parliament is a single-chamber legislative body with 270 members, whose mandate is four years.²⁵¹ Supervision over the parliament elections effectuates the Council of Guardians. The Council itself is elected half-way by the rahbar and half-way by the chief justice who is however named by rahbar. The Council has twelve members and oversees observing of the Islamic law *sharia* in the new legislation passing in the parliament. If the Council disapproves it they can put a veto on such legislation acts.²⁵² In case of a dispute between the Parliament and the Council, the Expediency Discernment Council of the System will step in as the final arbiter.²⁵³

The rahbar status belongs to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei since the death of Khomeini in 1989. Former major of Tehran Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been elected twice into the function of the president, first in August 2005 and in June 2009 for the second term.

The President, on the other hand, is in chair for the government, the so-called Council of Ministers, a body of 8 vice presidents and 21 ministers with executive powers obliged with state administration. Prime Minister post was abandoned in 1989 after changes in the constitution.

4.2.2 Society

The population of Iran is estimated at 66,4 millions in 2009²⁵⁴, which makes it the 19th largest in the world.²⁵⁵ The stratification of Iranian society according to the age-criteria is following:

²⁴⁹ Ibid. p.128.

²⁵⁰ UTVIK, Bjørn. Demystifying Power Relations: Iranian Reformists Challenging Theocracy. *Gulf Studies*. [pdf]. 2007. No. 8. p.5. [cit. 2010-01-03]. Available from WWW <http://www.hf.uio.no/ikos/forskning/forskningsprosjekter/utvik/gulf/8.pdf>.

²⁵¹ GOMBÁR, Eduard. 2001. p.131.

²⁵² Ibid. p.131-132.

²⁵³ SALEHI, Ali. Tips to Unravel the Complexities of Iran's Theocracy. *The Fox News*. [online]. 23.5.2009. [cit. 2010-01-03]. Available from WWW <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,528124,00.html>.

²⁵⁴ CIA: *World Fact Book*. Iran. [online]. Central Intelligence Agency. 2009. [cit. 2010-01-02]. ISSN 1553-8133. Available from WWW <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html>.

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

about 21,7% is between 0-14 years old²⁵⁶, 72.9% is between 15-64 years old²⁵⁷ and the rest of 5.4% is 65 years and older.²⁵⁸ The median age is 27.²⁵⁹ About 2/3 of Iranians live in urbanised centres and almost 80 percent is literate. The structure of education is unusually complicated because it is divided into five cycles; namely pre-school, primary, middle (or guidance), secondary and post-secondary.²⁶⁰ Elementary education is mandatory under the Iranian constitution and due to increasing number of applicants, admission to post-secondary institutions is through a nation-wide entrance examination and thus studying at universities is an elite option.²⁶¹ The comparison to the system of Czech Republic suggests itself here. Education (in primary, secondary, and post-secondary levels) is free of charge though private schools and universities authorized by law are allowed to charge tuition fees.²⁶² Regarding higher education, Iran has 80 state and 25 private universities²⁶³. In 2008 about 3,4 million students enrolled into Iranian universities²⁶⁴ and the number is expected to increase.²⁶⁵ The trend is that the majority of students are women, in 2008, it was 53%.²⁶⁶ However, women-ratio at Iranian universities overall increased after the Islamic revolution in 1979. The most likely explanation will be that before the revolution some traditional conservative families didn't send girls into schools having male teachers and non-Islamic school as reasons and after Islam became the main course of every day life of Iranian society and most of the educational institutions separate girls from boys,²⁶⁷ this situation changed.²⁶⁸ The most

²⁵⁶ Ibid.

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

²⁵⁹ Ibid.

²⁶⁰ *The Embassy of Islamic Republic of Iran: Oslo*. Education System in Iran. [online]. The Embassy of Islamic Republic of Iran. 2002. [cit. 2010-01-02]. Available from WWW <http://www.iran-embassy-oslo.no/embassy/educat.htm>.

²⁶¹ Ibid.

²⁶² Ibid.

²⁶³ *TMU: About TMU-I*. Education in Iran. [online]. Tarbiat Modares University. [cit. 2010-01-02]. Available from WWW <http://www.modares.ac.ir/enpage/systems/index/edu/tmu-i/abt/stu>.

²⁶⁴ *UNESCO: UIS*. Iran: Table Viewer. [online]. UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 2010. [cit. 2010-01-02]. Available from WWW

http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/document.aspx?ReportId=136&IF_Language=eng&BR_Topic=0

²⁶⁵ *Payvand's Iran News*. Minister: Five Percent of Iran's population are university students. [online]. Payvand. 20.8.2008. [cit. 2010-01-02]. Available from WWW <http://www.payvand.com/news/08/aug/1204.html>.

²⁶⁶ *UNESCO: UIS*. 2010.

²⁶⁷ *Mongabay: Profiles*. Iran: Society. [online]. Mongabay. 2006. [cit. 2010-01-02]. Available from WWW http://www.mongabay.com/reference/new_profiles/195.html.

²⁶⁸ ESFANDIARI, Golnaz. Number Of Female University Students Rising Dramatically in Iran. *Payvand*. [online]. 21.11.2003. [cit. 2010-01-02]. Available from WWW <http://www.payvand.com/news/03/nov/1133.html>.

popular fields of study for women in 2008 were social sciences, business and law, followed by engineering, manufacturing and constructing.²⁶⁹

Above stated data allow to make following deductions as a summary. Iran is one of the largest countries in the world in population, most of which is younger the age of 30. Majority of the society lives in urbanised areas and receives primary, as well as secondary education. Education is available to women and men equally.

4.2.3 Media and Censorship

Media in Iran follow naturally the evolution of the Western media. Moreover, Iranian history contributed to the modern development of media as well. The revolution of 1979 has been called a media revolution, in which the ‘small media’ in form of cassette tapes and leaflets conquered the ‘big media’, which propagated the shah.²⁷⁰ The situation today is different. Samizdat has been replaced by modern technologies and satellite. Besides classics like newspapers, TV and radio broadcasting, internet as a new medium is widely used, despite Iran being the second biggest censor of the internet in the world right after China.²⁷¹ Even though this is pretty standard anywhere in the world, the media are influenced significantly by politics in Iran, but with the irony that Iran practically lacks a proper political party system.²⁷² The easiest way of classifying the Iranian media system is a division into ‘reformist’ and ‘conservative’. The reformist media are connected to the name of former president Mohammad Khatami who was first elected in 1998. His proclamations about ‘civil society’ and greater press freedom perceived the conservatives as an impulse to retaliate and so the attacks against the media had not vanished.²⁷³ The press in Iran has been called the ‘fourth estate’ in the meaning of being an extended arm of the government. In the aftermath of the

²⁶⁹ UNESCO: UIS. Iran: Table Viewer. [online]. UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 2010. [cit. 2010-01-02]. Available from WWW

http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/document.aspx?ReportId=136&IF_Language=eng&BR_Topic=0

²⁷⁰ SREBEMY, Annabelle; MOHAMMADI, Ali. *Small Media, Big Revolution: Communication, Culture, and the Iranian Revolution*. 1.ed. 1994. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press p.119. ISBN-13: 978-0816622160.

²⁷¹ HF: *Global Post*. Iran Internet Censorship Second To China. [online]. The Huffington Post. 7.7.2009. [cit. 2010-01-02]. Available from WWW http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/07/07/iran-internet-censorship_n_226953.html.

²⁷² SEMATI, Mehdi. *Media, Culture and Society in Iran: Living with Globalization and the Islamic State*. 1.ed. 2007. London: Routledge. p.17. ISBN: 978-0-415-77216-7.

²⁷³ SEMATI, Mehdi. 2007. p.17.

reformists' victory the discussion between them and the conservatives about the role of the media has began.²⁷⁴

4.2.3.1 Press and Press Regulations

In order to get some press on his side with understanding that he cannot count on the national broadcasting organisation Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) that was being controlled by the conservatives, Khatami gave out licences for new periodicals that began to attract readers not only with the reformist rhetoric and topics, but also with more subtle graphic designs and modern titles.²⁷⁵ Opposite of traditional dailies such as Resalat (Prophetic Mission) or Jumhuri-e Eslami (Islamic Republic) suddenly stood periodicals like Jameh (Society), Neshat (Joy), Mellat (Nation) or Haghugh Zanan (Women's Rights) among others.²⁷⁶ After one year from Khatami's election the number²⁷⁷ of media granted with a licence had come to 1055.²⁷⁸

But journalists kept being followed, arrested and even vanished when Iran, still an autocratic country of course, had a moderate president. "The current press law, passed by parliament in the spring of 2000, is exceptionally repressive and must be completely overhauled by the next president so that press offences are decriminalised and freedom of language, religion and political opinion is guaranteed without discrimination,"²⁷⁹ wrote the organisation Reporters without Borders (RWB) in a report on Iran just before the presidential election in 2005. According to the data the organisation published, four journalists have been killed, one has disappeared, more than 150 newspapers (not counting student newspapers) have been closed by the authorities, more than 200 journalists have been summoned, detained and questioned, and 52 of them have been sentenced to prison terms ranging from three months to 14 years during the eight-year-long presidency of Khatami.²⁸⁰ The organisation also criticised article 24 of Iranian constitution, which says that "publications and newspapers are free to express

²⁷⁴ Ibid. p.22.

²⁷⁵ Ibid.

²⁷⁶ Ibid. p.23.

²⁷⁷ Ibid.

²⁷⁸ The number prior Khatami's administration is unfortunately not available although all potential sources have been tested.

²⁷⁹ *Payvand's Iran News*. 17.6.2005.

²⁸⁰ Ibid.

any opinion except if it upsets the bases of Islam and public decency"²⁸¹. RWB saw it as a violation of article 19 of the UN's International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which Iran has ratified.²⁸² The main crusade started on 17th April 2000, when the parliament – dominated by the conservatives at that time – adopted the above mentioned law, which said “persons sentenced by revolutionary courts for threatening state security and those who spread propaganda hostile to the Islamic regime are under no circumstances allowed to work for a newspaper.”²⁸³ And moreover to the fact that convicted journalist can never work again the law banned all “direct and indirect foreign aid to newspapers.”²⁸⁴ Besides taking into account the impact on standard journalism and focusing on terms of public diplomacy this could easily mean banning embassies from promoting their cultural or other activities in Iran through official media, a practice that is relatively common in non-democratic regimes. The next reformist parliament tried to vote off the article but Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei didn't allow this action.²⁸⁵ Moreover, for insulting religion can one be punished by death, or by prison.²⁸⁶ “Iran's judiciary frequently denies accused journalists due process by referring their cases to the Islamic Revolutionary Court, an emergency venue intended for those suspected of seeking to overthrow the regime. The Preventive Restraint Act is regularly used without legal proceedings to temporarily ban publications,” says the Freedom of the Press 2008 report published by the Freedom House.²⁸⁷

The last statistics records show that there are 112 daily newspapers issued in Iran, whereas the number of non-daily periodicals rises at 906.²⁸⁸ This corresponds with the data from the end of the 90' and 2005. The results of the participant observation showed that in Tehran were usually about 40 dailies on the display. Of course, many periodicals from the 112 newspapers may be regional but even those should be available in a capital city.

²⁸¹ Ibid.

²⁸² Ibid.

²⁸³ Ibid.

²⁸⁴ Ibid.

²⁸⁵ Ibid.

²⁸⁶ *Freedom of the Press 2008*. Iran. [pdf]. Freedom House. 2008. [cit. 2010-01-02]. Available from WWW http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fop08/FOP_Iran.pdf.

²⁸⁷ Ibid.

²⁸⁸ *Nation Master: Media Stats*. Iran. [online]. Nation Master. 2002. [cit. 2010-01-02]. Available from http://www.nationmaster.com/red/country/ir-iran/med-media&b_cite=1&all=1.

4.2.3.2 TV and Radio Broadcasting

IRIB broadcasts eight national television channels, four international news channels, three satellite news channels and twenty nine provincial channels.²⁸⁹ According to the IRIB website the television in Iran expanded only after the revolution, since before there were only TV channels 1 and 2. These turned into eight new national channels: Channel 1 (the national channel), Channel 2 (focusing on culture and science), Channel 3 (youth channel), Channel 4 (for intellectuals and the educated people) and Channel 5 (exclusively limited to Tehran).²⁹⁰ Radio broadcasting is much more diverse though. “Today IRIB broadcasts various programmes via the powerful transmitters installed in Tehran under the following names: Iran Radio station, Tehran radio station, Farhang radio station (meaning culture), Javan radio station (The Youth), Sports radio station, Quran radio, Mareef radio (Islamic teachings and culture), Health radio station, Payam radio station, Dialogue radio station, the familiar voice radio station, Business radio station, (as the last Radio station installed and run in late October of the current year)”²⁹¹ (Punctuation being corrected by the author). The IRIB conducts also world service radios in more than 30 languages.

Besides official national television and radio stations, there is a common habit among the Iranian society to use satellite dishes to catch more over 500 TV stations, i.e. Persian, Arabic, Turkish, Polish, Italian or German as well. Now, there are 37 Persian TV stations.²⁹² The Persian programme offer varies from standard news networks (BBC Persian, VOA a.o.), to entertainment stations (Farsi 1) with music and series, mostly South American, Korean or American telenovelas, sometimes showing more ‘exclusive’ segments like current popular American comedian series. Iranian music occupies several channels. Needless to say female hosts do not wear any kind of head covering on these programmes. Satellite dishes are banned in Iran since 1995²⁹³ and although the new conservative Parliament in 2004 tried to change

²⁸⁹ *IRIB: About Us*. IRIB at a Glance. Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting . [online]. 2010. [cit. 2010-01-03]. Available from WWW <http://www.irim.ir/English/AboutUs/index.php>.

²⁹⁰ Ibid.

²⁹¹ Ibid.

²⁹² SEMATI, Mehdi. 2007. p.94.

²⁹³ STRUCK, Doug. Grumbling in Iran Grows over Ban on Satellite Dishes. *The Baltimore Sun*. [online]. 8.5.1995. [cit. 2010-01-03]. Available from WWW http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1995-05-08/news/1995128074_1_satellite-antennas-tehran-baywatch.

the restriction, the ban stayed.²⁹⁴ Nevertheless, the number of satellite dishes in Iran was estimated at 1 million in 2005.²⁹⁵

4.2.3.3 Internet

Internet is also developing very quickly in Iran. Iran has the highest growth in internet usage in the Middle East. Internet penetration is up to 35 percent, which is much higher than the average 26 percent of population using internet in the rest of the Middle East,²⁹⁶ even though in 2000 the Supreme Council for Cultural Revolution (SCRC) ordered that all privately-owned Internet Service Providers should close down or transfer their equipment and installations to the public sector. Despite missing appropriate legislation the decree was implemented.²⁹⁷ The number of internet users grows month by month as the reports of Telecommunication Company of Iran (TCI) show. TCI stated 18 millions users in March 2008²⁹⁸ and in September²⁹⁹ 21 millions users. The plan for 2009 has been to reach 30 millions.³⁰⁰ Today's Iranian blogosphere is incredibly diverse. Harvard's Berkman Center for Internet and Society lines Iran to countries with the richest blogosphere with clusters for secular and reformist politics.³⁰¹ It originated in the lack of news and information available especially to younger public who turned to new technologies to be able to find, exchange and offer information. In 2005 the number of blogs in Farsi rose to 40 thousand³⁰² and in 2008 it was 60 thousand³⁰³, altogether there have been about 200 thousand websites launched in

²⁹⁴ SENNITT, Andy. Iran's New Parliament Rethinks Satellite TV Ban. *Radio Netherlands Worldwide*. [online]. 21.7.2004. [cit. 2010-01-03]. Available from WW <http://blogs.rnw.nl/medianetwork/irans-new-parliament-rethinks-satellite-tv-ban>.

²⁹⁵ *Payvand's Iran News*. 17.6.2005.

²⁹⁶ *ITU: Report Frame*. Internet. International Telecommunication Union. [online]. 2008. [cit. 2010-01-03]. Available from WWW http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/icteye/Reporting/ShowReportFrame.aspx?ReportName=/WTI/InformationTechnologyPublic&RP_intYear=2008&RP_intLanguageID=1.

²⁹⁷ *Payvand's Iran News*. 17.6.2005.

²⁹⁸ *TCI*. Performance Report. [pdf]. Telecommunication Company of Iran. March 2008. [cit. 2010-01-02]. Available from WWW http://irantelecom.ir/pdfs/amar/march_2008.pdf.

²⁹⁹ *TCI*. Performance Report. [pdf]. Telecommunication Company of Iran. September 2008. [cit. 2010-01-02]. Available from WWW http://irantelecom.ir/pdfs/amar/SEP_2008.pdf.

³⁰⁰ *Ibid*.

³⁰¹ KELLY, John; ETLING, Bruce. Mapping Iran's Online Public: Politics and Culture in the Persian Blogosphere. *The Berkman Center for Internet&Society at Harvard University*. [pdf]. April 2008. [cit. 2010-01-02]. Available from WWW http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.harvard.edu/files/Mapping_Irans_Online_Public-PERSIAN.pdf.

³⁰² *Payvand's Iran News*. 17.6.2005.

³⁰³ KELLY, John; ETLING, Bruce. 2008.

Iran.³⁰⁴ However, internet in Iran is crippled with large blocking and filtering by the government. In 2003 at UN digital summit president Khatami said in a statement that he expects to “ensure the indiscriminate access of individuals, institutions and countries to information, international policies and monitoring instruments should be envisaged so that no government will have the right to impose unilateral decisions, depriving other nations from their rights including correct access to information.”³⁰⁵ He also insisted that Iranian government is blocking only about 240 sites that are in contradiction with Islamic law, i.e pornographic and “immoral“ and that “all political sites are free“³⁰⁶. But according to reports about 10 thousand of websites were actually restricted for access at that time and the discussion about Iranian internet freedom heated when the website covering the summit had been flooded by complains by Iranian internet users.³⁰⁷

As already mentioned journalists in Iran are facing automatic prior censorship, state surveillance of journalists, mistreatment, illegal arrests and imprisonment, or they are forced to flee the country. Reporters Without Borders has been completing every year a Press Freedom Index and Iran was placed on place 162 (out of 175) in 2006³⁰⁸ and sank on 166 in 2007³⁰⁹ and 2008³¹⁰. The situation regarding media freedom has worsened since ultra-conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected as President in August 2005, although journalists and press have been persecuted even before, given that the Parliament was dominated by hard-liners since February 2004.³¹¹ But, according to RWB’s report at least sixty journalists and bloggers were summoned, questioned and convicted in 2008, whereas several are still imprisoned with lack of needed medical support and three foreign reporters were expelled. Overall it has been very difficult to work and travel to Iran. Moreover, local

³⁰⁴ *Ettela’at Int.* Iran Ranks 32nd in World in Terms of Number of Websites. Ettela’at International. 26.5.2009. No . 3521. ISSN 1353 8829.

³⁰⁵ KHATAMI, Mohammed. Statement before the World Summit of the Informational Society. [pdf]. Geneva: World Summit on the Information Society. 10.12.2003. [cit. 2010-01-02]. Available from WWW <http://www.itu.int/wsis/geneva/coverage/statements/iran/ir.pdf>.

³⁰⁶ SCULLION, Aaron. Iran's President Defends Web Control. *British Broadcastin Corporation*. [online]. 12.12.2003. [cit. 2010-01-02]. Available from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/3312841.stm>.

³⁰⁷ Ibid.

³⁰⁸ *Press Freedom Index*. North Korea, Turkmenistan, Eritrea the Worst Violators of Press Freedom. [online]. Reporters Sans Frontiers. 2006. [cit. 2010-01-02]. Available from <http://www.rsf.org/en-classement70-2006.html>.

³⁰⁹ *Press Freedom Index*. Eritrea Ranked Last for FirstTime while G8 Members, Except Russia, Recover Lost Ground. [online]. Reporters Sans Frontiers. 2007. [cit. 2010-01-02]. Available from <http://www.rsf.org/en-classement69-2007.html>.

³¹⁰ *Press Freedom Index*. Only Peace Protects Freedoms in Post-9/11 World. [online]. Reporters Sans Frontiers. 2008. [cit. 2010-01-02]. Available from <http://www.rsf.org/en-classement794-2008.html>.

³¹¹ *RWB: Annual Report*. Iran - 2005 Annual Report. [online]. Reporters Sans Frontiers. 2005. [cit. 2010-01-02]. Available from WWW http://www.rsf.org/en-rapport153-id_rubrique509-Iran.html.

correspondents have been facing surveillance by intelligence services.³¹² An interesting fact is that 45 percent of all media workers jailed worldwide are online journalists (bloggers, Web-based reporters, or online editors) and thus make the largest professional group on the list of the Committee to Protect Journalists.³¹³ The same situation is in Iran, the majority of persecuted journalists are working freelancing online.³¹⁴

A short research was conducted by the author of this thesis during a visit of Iran in September/October 2009 in order to verify data collected by the Open Data Initiative, which has actually proved about 8 thousand websites in Iran.³¹⁵ For example following websites had not been continuously available: VOA.com, CNN.com, Daily Mail.co.uk, BBC.co.uk, Aktuálně.cz. The Guardian.co.uk, on the other hand, was available with an exception of about two weeks after the Quds day on 18th September 2009. The main foreign domain used by Iranians for e-mails accounts is Yahoo.com. Altogether filtering is wide and fast in Iran and there have been two visually different types of the announcement that the website has been blocked. One type had a reference to TCI and was obviously permanent and the second was used when the censorship was just temporary. However, Iranian hackers provide internet users with directions how to break governmental precautions in some permanently banned websites. Consequently, community servers like Facebook, Flickr, YouTube, eBlogger, Blogspot, Tumblr are widely popular among Iranian youth. And especially social server Twitter.com played an important role during the last presidential election in June 2009, which started another political turmoil and brought hundred of thousands of Iranians into the streets to protest against the government. The string of events has been called the ‘Green Revolution’, since green ribbons became popular as symbols among the protesters, or the ‘Twitter Revolution’, because the server worked as a universal forum for people around the world to protest against the controversial outcomes of the voting, after which Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been re-elected. Obama’s administration even asked the server to move the planned maintenance to assure continual system functioning,³¹⁶ as Twitter – besides showing

³¹² Ibid.

³¹³ CPJ: *Special Reports*. CPJ's 2008 Prison Census: Online and in Jail. [online]. Committee to Protect Journalists. 4.12.2008. cit. 2010-01-02]. Available from WWW <http://cpj.org/reports/2008/12/cpjs-2008-prison-census-online-and-in-jail.php>.

³¹⁴ Ibid.

³¹⁵ ONI: *Country Profiles*. Iran. [online]. OpenNet Initiative. 16.6.2009. [cit. 2010-01-02]. Available from WWW <http://opennet.net/research/profiles/iran>.

³¹⁶ MACASKILL, Ewen. US Confirms it Asked Twitter to Stay Open to Help Iran Protesters. *The Guardian*. [online]. 17.6.2009. [2010-01-03]. Available from WWW <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jun/17/obama-iran-twitter>.

the Iranians the rest of the world is not passive about their thing – was also used by the people inside Iran to spread warnings about police arrests and generally to inform about what is happening where, because authorities blocked text-messaging service.

This action of the American government illustrates that the West acknowledges and is concerned with the fact Iranian government represses freedom of speech and communication freedom. The European Union even included this issue into Parliament's resolutions on Iran.³¹⁷ Unfortunately, a few stains on the attitude of the United States and European Union appeared. Governmental internet control demands appropriate filtering systems. SCRC set up in 2002 the Committee in Charge of Determining Unauthorized Sites (CCDUS) with a mission to determine criteria for identifying unauthorized Web sites.³¹⁸ A report by OpenNet Initiative informed that Iran was using a filtering product SmartFilter designed by American company Secure Computing to block internationally-hosted sites in English as well as sites in Farsi.³¹⁹ However, Secure Computing has denied selling any products to Iran and in a statement send to the OpenNet Initiative spoke about 'illegal and unauthorized attempts' to use the software in Iran.³²⁰ On the other hand, big companies based in European Union like Siemens and Nokia have been really selling web filter equipment into Iran and have been criticized for it for example by the Dutch Lower House. It expressed desire for global unhindered access to the internet guaranteed by the EU with an inspiration in the US, where similar measures are being considered. Such EU directive could provide European internet technologies' companies with guidance on how to handle regimes that restrict free access to the web, or even intimidate and check citizens who want to use the internet.³²¹

Even during the time the author stayed in Iran, the mobile service was restricted making it impossible to text outside Iran. The lack of freedom to communicate, to use internet as much as a person from central Europe is used to since high-speed connections are very rare, to read

³¹⁷ EP: B6-0607/2006. Motion for a Resolution. [online]. European Parliament. 14.11.2006. [2010-01-03]. Available from WWW <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=B6-2006-0607&language=EN>.

³¹⁸ ICTRC. A Report on the Status of the Internet in Iran. [pdf]. Iran CSOs Training & Research Center. 8.11.2005. [2010-01-03]. Available from WWW http://www.genderit.org/upload/ad6d215b74e2a8613f0cf5416c9f3865/A_Report_on_Internet_Access_in_Iran_2.pdf.

³¹⁹ ONI: Country Profiles. 16.6.2009.

³²⁰ ONI: Country Profiles. 16.6.2009.

³²¹ KIEVIT, Rob. Don't Sell Web Filters to Iran, Parties Say. *Radio Netherlands Worldwide*. [online]. 3.7.2009. [cit. 2010-01-02]. Available from WWW <http://www.rnw.nl/english/article/dont-sell-web-filters-iran-parties-say>.

news and use websites according to own judgment, was the hardest thing for the author during the stay.

4.3 US Public Diplomacy in Iran: the Voice of America and Radio Farda

Example

Condoleezza Rice as Secretary of State promoted diplomatic solutions in dealing with Iran and supported widely soft diplomacy and particularly public diplomacy. The main change in American foreign policy towards Iran compared to Bush's first administration thus became the abandonment of the 'regime change strategy' and focusing on Iranian people as those who should potentially reach it. "We are going to work to support the aspirations of the Iranian people for freedom in their country,"³²² Rice said in her testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 15th February 2006.

Rice proposed a sevenfold increase in soft diplomacy budget compared to previous time period until it reached a ¼ of an annual BBC budget. Most of the sum (about 50 million USD) should have been directed at creating an independent round-the-clock Farsi-language television in tandem with current foreign nonstop radio broadcasts, the rest went on lifting bans on US financing of Iran-based nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), trade unions, human rights groups, and opposition candidates. However, Rice planned most of the money for organizations based outside of Iran but with direct ties to eligible groups and people inside the country to protect their identity. An third, Rice promised to boost cultural and education fellowships and exchanges, since the number of Iranian students coming to the US decreased dramatically since the Islamic revolution, up to a ten times of the former amount which used to be around two hundreds thousand students in the 70's. In comparison, for 2008 a total amount of 109 million USD has been requested for funding projects including VOA's Persian services (20 million USD), Radio Farda (5,5 million USD). An extensive amount of 75 million USD has been asked for Economic Support Funds for civil society and human rights projects in Iran.³²³ The numbers show that after the media public diplomacy tools had been established, the funding has been lowered in favour of non-governmental initiatives.

³²² BEEHNER, Lionel. U.S. *Soft Diplomacy in Iran*. [online]. Council on Foreign Relations. 17.2.2006. [cit. 2010-01-02]. Available from WWW http://www.cfr.org/publication/9904/us_soft_diplomacy_in_iran.html.

³²³ RICE, Condoleezza. 2007. p.9.

This study is merely takes into account the TV and radio broadcasting and specifically Radio Farda and VOA to make an example of how media public diplomacy can work in promoting the international non-proliferation regime. Persian is one of the few regional languages of the world with broadcasts from the external services of all states holding a permanent seat at the UN Security Council. In 1991, Radio France Internationale (RFI) in Persian joined the existing services of BBC London, than China Radio International (formerly Radio Beijing), Voice of Russia (formerly Radio Moscow), and Voice of America.³²⁴

In the US the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) – a nine-member, presidentially-appointed body – makes strategies for all U.S. government funded non-military international broadcasting and supervises their implementation.³²⁵ Radio Farda came first on air on 12th December 2002 as a new US external service broadcasted in Persian and as a successor to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s (RFE/RF) Persian Service Radio Azadi that existed since 1998. The difference between Azadi and Farda was that the latter is co-produced by RFE/RL and Voice of America staff and it has an around a clock programme. Especially for younger audience Radio Farda should have been appealing because besides of current news, it contents also entertainment features and popular Western and Persian music. In 2002 Farda was expected to cost about \$8 million.³²⁶ The emphasis on young audience was realised with an on-air dominance of mainstream pop music and followed with critique, some even quite strong. “It's difficult to believe that the Bush administration has agreed to support this shift from a proven programme of serious policy discussion to a teeny-bopper music-based format. It likely will insult the cultural sensitivities of Iranians, as well as their intelligence. Meanwhile, the brave professor sits in jail cell awaiting execution, students plot protests, and the regime struggles to hold the line against the will of the people. And the U.S. will be spinning Britney Spears discs?”³²⁷ veteran Republican Senator Jesse Helms said for Wall Street Journal. In fact VOA did abandon the 24 hours-a-day programmes combined from popular music and news in Europe, although it worked like that for 12 years.

³²⁴ BIENER, Hansjoerg. The Arrival of Radio Farda: International Broadcasting to Iran at a Crossroads. *Middle East Review of International Affairs* . [pdf]. March 2003. Vol. 7, No. 1. p.13-14. [cit. 2010-01-03]. Available from WWW <http://meria.idc.ac.il/JOURNAL/2003/issue1/biener.pdf>.

³²⁵ Ibid. p.17.

³²⁶ Ibid.

³²⁷ Ibid. p.18.

The Voice of America broadcasting to Iran is called the Persian News Network (PNN) and contains Persian-language television, Internet and radio projects. The main goal of PNN is to “serve as a lifeline with the outside world.”³²⁸ Original TV programmes go for 7 hours a day, repeating into full 24 hours and radio programmes air for 5 hours a day via shortwave, AM and the internet. Viewers of VOA television can choose between several different formats: documentaries (Today in Washington), discussions (Today’s Women, Roundtable with You, News Talk), news and commentaries (News and Views, 48 Hours) and feature programmes (Late Edition).³²⁹

Regarding VOA’s relation to promoting non-proliferation an e-mail to the PR Team was sent. The question was following: “I am wondering if the agenda of PNN includes promoting values of non-proliferation regime and the work of IAEA in Iran? I visited Iran in September/October 2009 and watched VOA on tv (sic) and I have noted that VOA is reporting about the newest progresses in nuclear negotiating with Iran, however, I would like to know if there exist a particular strategy or goal to inform the Iranian public about this issue?”³³⁰

The answer was received on 17th December 2009 and read: “Thank you for writing to Voice of America. As to PNN, the mission of PNN is to broadcast accurate, balanced, and comprehensive news and information to Iran in accordance with the VOA Charter and Journalistic Code. We do not promote any specific policies.”³³¹ Obviously, the answer was very short, without any specifying details and thus improper as a research outcome. In any case, it at least portrays the core values of the Voice of America.

However, the focus from Voice of America was shifted to Radio Farda since it resides in Prague and its journalists and experts are available for media interviews or to provide background information on a wide variety of subjects and issues as stated on the website.³³² Afterwards, concrete experts in Radio Farda have been contacted through e-mails with the same question as the Voice of America staff. Mr. Hossein Aryan³³³ specializes as a

³²⁸ *VOA: Persian Fact Sheet*. VOA Broadcasting to Iran. Voice of America. 20.10.2008.

³²⁹ *Ibid.*

³³⁰ E-mail Conversation, Hana Biriczová to PR Team of Voice of America, 11.12.2009.

³³¹ E-mail Conversation, PR Team of Voice of America to Hana Biriczová, 17.12.2009.

³³² *RFE/RF. Experts*. [online]. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 2010. [cit. 2010-01-04]. Available from WWW <http://www.rferl.org/expert.aspx>.

³³³ E-mail conversation, Hana Biriczová to Hossein Aryan, 11.12.2009.

broadcaster on topics regarding nuclear proliferation and Mr. Mosaddegh Katouzian³³⁴ is an Operations and Programming Director of Radio Farda. Unfortunately, neither of them reacted to the e-mails.

After these failed attempts to interview both specialists as well as gaining information from the PR Team of VOA, a second option to analyse the US public diplomacy relationship to international non-proliferation regime was pursued. Only Radio Farda has been chosen for this part due to the potential proximity of the approached experts in case they would contact the author eventually.

Nevertheless, looking deeper into the website of Radio Farda it is impossible for someone who does not understand Farsi, since the content is only in Persian. Luckily, the website of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty offers some useful resources in form of abstracts from the Radio Farda's weekly broadcasting in the section Heard This Week so a simple qualitative/quantitative data research could have been completed. To narrow the research materials one set of searches on the search engine Google.com were conducted with the key words 'site:www.rferl.org Heard This Week Radio Farda IAEA'. The key word IAEA has been chosen because the organisation conducts the most practical work from all other possible actors for the non-proliferation regime in Iran. Of course, the author tried to search on the RFL/RL search engine, but after comparing the results with Google, the latter showed the concrete weekly rubric in contrast to the RFL/RL engine, which found only random single articles. Obviously, there are more helpful articles available on the RFL/RL but the selected criteria suit the purposes of a Master's thesis in form of assuring appropriate length of the study.

Regarding the research period, one option was to take the previous research time frame (2006-2008) but a problem would occur with the data from the European Union, since its strategy on public diplomacy has started in 2008 and the most developments turned up in 2009. It is desired to maintain consistency, but the data regarding Radio Farda content in 2006-2008 are interesting, so this time frame has been kept in the quantitative part as well as in the qualitative part, which concentrates on interpreting the chosen reports.

³³⁴ E-mail conversation, Hana Biriczová to Mosaddegh Katouzian, 16.12.2009.

4.3.1 Radio Farda and the Non-proliferation Regime

4.3.1.1 Quantitative Research

Under the selected set of key words ('site:www.rferl.org Heard This Week Radio Farda IAEA') one result worked for the Heard This Week rubric in 2006, and thus Heard This Week – 04/13/2006. In 2007 the number of segments has been visibly higher; Google showed seven links referring directly to Heard This Week, concretely: Heard This Week – 01/11/2007, Heard This Week – 03/22/2007, Heard This Week – 04/19/2007, Heard This Week – 05/31/2007, Heard This Week – 06/28/2007, Heard This Week – 08/23/2007, Heard This Week – 11/22/2007. In 2008 the number decreased again to two links: Heard This Week 02/28/2008 and Heard This Week – 04/10/2008.

4.3.1.2 Qualitative Research

4.3.1.2.1 Year 2006

Heard This Weak – 04/13/2006 contains three short abstracts, whereas two of them are connected to the work of the IAEA. From these two references the one from 13th April is interesting for this research: "Radio Farda extensively covered on April 13 ElBaradei's talks with Iranian officials in Tehran. The IAEA chief said at the end of his one-day visit that Iran should take confidence-building measures to reassure the international community of her non-military intentions. Radio Farda covered all aspects of the fast-developing story -- including a report on students at an Iranian university, who plan to celebrate the 'breakthrough' in Iran's nuclear drive by eating a huge yellow cake on 16th April 16."³³⁵

It says that Radio Farda covers the trip of IAEA's Director General 'extensively' and stressed this fact even further saying that the radio 'covered all aspects of the fast-developing story'. The main incentive is to present the radio to the readers and listeners as a trustworthy and

³³⁵ *Radio Farda Reports: Communications*.
Heard This Week - 04/13/2006 [online]. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 13.4.2206. [cit. 2010-01-04]. Available from WWW <http://www.rferl.org/content/pressrelease/1106013.html>.

resourceful witness, since the introduction to this week's segment stated that the radio's staff interviewed a "host of experts and important figures in the field"³³⁶

4.3.1.2.2 Year 2007

Heard This Week – 01/11/2007 referred to the organisation once (but three times to the non-proliferation regime altogether): "Radio Farda informed listeners on January 9 about Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani's statement that, in response to the sanctions imposed under UN Security Council Resolution 1737, Iran will no longer cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) within the context of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty's Supplementary Protocol. In this regard, Henry Sokolski, the executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center told Radio Farda that Iran's reaction to the sanctions resolution poses another question -- will Iran join North Korea by leaving the IAEA? According to Sokolski, Iran is trying to make its nuclear programme as ambiguous as possible, in order to 'make the international community worried about such activities'."³³⁷

This piece is basically a statement of fact, although the presence of Mr. Sokolski's quote makes it storming. The choice of an expert statement over a quote from a politician/diplomat gives the report a certain level of 'scientific' validity, which could have been appreciated also by the listeners.

Heard This Week – 03/22/2007 tackled the question of the UNSC Resolution 1747 from 24 March 2007. Four out five short reports dealt with the issue and only one paid attention to the most popular Holiday in Iran Nowruz. The IAEA has been acknowledged as following on 14 March: "Radio Farda reported on March 14 that more than 300 political activists in Iran had issued a statement asking the country's highest authorities to accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Mohamed ElBaradei's proposal for a mutual suspension by the UN Security Council of its resolution against Iran and of its uranium enrichment programme by Iran. According to the statement, this is a wise proposal that can prevent sanctions and a possible war and will lead to a win-win policy. Criticizing the government's tension-creating policies, the signatories of this statement emphasised that an

³³⁶ Ibid.

³³⁷ *Radio Farda Reports: Communications*. Heard This Week - 01/11/2007. [online]. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 11.1.2007. [cit 2010-01-04]. Available from WWW <http://www.rferl.org/content/pressrelease/1106052.html>.

open, transparent dialogue between Tehran and Washington is one of the best solutions for preventing bloodshed and mayhem in the region.”³³⁸

This piece of news has a great value for the promotion of the non-proliferation since it refers to actions of Iranian activists that actually promote the non-proliferation regime and cooperation with the UNSC themselves and that, consequently, can have a much stronger impact on Iranian audience. Also, it speaks very much in favour of the offered proposal. The reference to ‘war’ is, however, a very nonstandard and intense reference, but Radio Farda obviously just cited the statement made by those Iranian political activists.

Heard This Week – 04/19/2007 brought one simple reference to the IAEA from 15 April.

“Radio Farda reported International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Mohamed ElBaradei’s statement that, while no proof exists to demonstrate that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons, it is worrying that, even after three years of investigation, the IAEA cannot confirm the peaceful intent of Iran’s nuclear programme. ElBaradei also noted that a military strike on Iran would have grave consequences.”³³⁹ Ahmadinejad’s quote followed: “Radio Farda also reported, on April 16, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s repeated assertion that Iran will continue its nuclear programme: ‘The Iranian nation will stand up for its legal right and will not retreat even one iota to preserve its nuclear right’.”³⁴⁰ The note strikes as very sad at first, as a form of sigh from ElBaradei compared to strong language of Ahmadinejad. The contrast of these two ‘approaches’ to the topic of Iranian proliferation, one calling out the ‘grave consequences’ and the other one being radical and not mentioning the consequences at all, might work in favour of the IAEA’s Director General’s message.

Heard This Week – 05/31/2007 contained this remark on the IAEA: “Following the May 24 release of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) report on Iran’s increase of uranium enrichment activities despite the demands contained in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1747, Radio Farda interviewed U.S. Ambassador to the IAEA Gregory Schulte. Amb. Schulte said that the UN Security Council had proposed mutual suspensions: ‘If Iran

³³⁸ *Radio Farda Reports: Communications*. Heard This Week - 03/22/2007. [online]. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 22.3.2007. [cit. 2010-01-04]. Available from WWW <http://www.rferl.org/content/pressrelease/1106061.html>.

³³⁹ *Radio Farda Reports: Communications*. Heard This Week - 04/19/2007. [online]. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 19.4.2007. [cit. 2010-01-04]. Available from WWW <http://www.rferl.org/content/pressrelease/1106065.html>.

³⁴⁰ Ibid.

suspends the activities of concern, then the Security Council will suspend existing sanctions and suspend its consideration of future sanctions. But the report says Iran is not suspending and so therefore the Security Council will move forward with the third set of sanctions.’ The U.S. judgment, Amb. Schulte told Radio Farda, is that the soonest Iran could acquire nuclear weapons is in the next decade, ‘So that gives us time for diplomacy, but it doesn't give us time for complacency.’ While expressing hope that Iran will eventually cooperate with the IAEA, Amb. Schulte said nuclear weapons will not bring safety to Iran, but will rather spark a nuclear arms race in the Middle East.”³⁴¹

This is once again a very attractive statement for a research on public diplomacy since Mr. Gregory Schulte has made it clear that there existed conditions under which Iran would not have to face a third round of UNSC sanctions, but he has added that the IAEA report did not confirm the fulfilling of those from the Iranian side and thus the sanctioning process would happen. The listeners were therefore informed about the fact that the Iranian government did have a chance to prevent the sanctions but it refused it. The last sentence seems like a ‘formula’ that should remind the listeners or readers that nuclear weapons is not something they should be proud for.

Heard This Week – 06/28/2007 begins with a short title “Tehran's most recent interactions with the IAEA.”³⁴² “Iran has invited the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to send a team to Tehran to resolve that agency's questions about Iran's nuclear programme. In this regard, Radio Farda's June 26 ‘Evening Magazine’ broadcast an interview with the head of Chatham House's Middle East programme, Claire Spencer. Spencer told Radio Farda there are two ways of evaluating the move -- Iran is trying to buy time as the UN Security Council considers extending sanctions and adopting a new resolution against Iran's nuclear efforts, or ‘It could be a new way of saying that we will actually open up the facilities.’ The question, according to Dr. Spencer, is how long this process will take. She also noted this should not be the final IAEA inspection of Iran's nuclear programme and such inspections must continue in the future.”³⁴³ This segment is partly informative and partly deductive and offers the audience once again an expert’s point of view. The explanation of Dr. Spencer also partly hinders an

³⁴¹ *Radio Farda Reports: Communications*. Heard This Week - 05/31/2007. [online]. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 31.5.2007. [cit. 2010-01-04]. Available from WWW <http://www.rferl.org/content/pressrelease/1106071.html>.

³⁴² *Radio Farda Reports: Communications*. Heard This Week - 06/28/2007. [online]. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 28.6.2007. [cit. 2010-01-04]. Available from WWW <http://www.rferl.org/content/pressrelease/1106075.html>.

³⁴³ Ibid.

understanding of the behaviour of the Iranian government as a form of a newly found positive attitude; it rather points out calculation as a reason and thus warns the listeners about believing the Iranian government.

Heard This Week – 08/23/2007 contains a distinctive note not only the IAEA, but the strategy of the United States. “U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs R. Nicholas Burns, in an exclusive interview with Radio Farda on August 20, stressed that ‘a peaceful diplomatic solution’ of Iran's nuclear issue remains possible. Burns contended, however, that the UN Security Council should go forward with a new resolution mandating new sanctions against the country, even if Iran is attending meetings with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): ‘It is not logical at all to reward a country that has held out for so long. To reward a country for answering a few questions, we're going to turn off the sanctions? That’s not possible.’ According to Burns, the U.S. strategy is a diplomatic one which involves offering negotiations, as well as using economic pressure and financial leverage against the Iranian government. As for its bilateral talks with Iran, Burns contended that the U.S. wants an open and active dialogue on the question of security in Iraq, not other issues. ‘We are going to judge the Iranians based on whether or not they do the right thing, which will be to fight against the terrorist groups that are in Iraq, including the Shi'a terrorist groups that are attacking both the Iraqi Army as well as American soldiers and others’.”³⁴⁴

This is a clear declaration of public diplomacy made by an American politician in order to clear out US intentions and probably also to assure the Iranian audience that the Americans do not plan a war with Iran, whereas the possibility of an armed conflict was previously mentioned on the waves of Radio Farda.

Heard This Week – 11/22/2007 analyses the latest IAEA report and “provided listeners comprehensive coverage of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) latest report on Iran's nuclear programme: Radio Farda aired highlights of the IAEA report and reaction to it by the White House as well as a report on a 10-page list of questions concerning Iran's nuclear programme presented by the U.S., Britain and France IAEA Director General Mohamed

³⁴⁴ *Radio Farda Reports: Communications*. Heard This Week - 08/23/2007. [online]. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 23.8.2007. [cit. 2010-01-04]. Available from WWW <http://www.rferl.org/content/pressrelease/1106083.html>.

ElBaradei.³⁴⁵ This statement is not the most exclusive from this rubric, since it references to interviews with the US officials like the US Ambassador to the IAEA Gregory L. Schulte, which may have been much more interesting for an analysis but these are unfortunately not available in English. However, the quote again highlights the focus of Radio Farda on the proliferation question and the emphasis on American point of view.

4.3.1.2.3 Year 2008

Heard This Week – 02/28/2008 has one piece of article on the IAEA from 26th February: “Pointing to Iran's lack of cooperation with the IAEA, transparency and confidence-building measures, U.S. Ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Gregory Schulte told Radio Farda that Iranian leaders are misleading people in Iran by saying that they have been cooperative and Iran's nuclear case is closed: ‘Here in Vienna, unfortunately, Iran's nuclear file is going to stay very much open.’”³⁴⁶ The segment was broadcasted just few days before the UNSC issued the Resolution 1803 on 3 March. The rhetoric of the piece is targeted at Iranian listeners to call attention to the fact Iranian government had been struggling to reveal truth about the nuclear programme on both sides – the Iranian public and the international community.

Heard This Week – 04/10/2008 also mentions the IAEA once from 9 April: “U.S. Ambassador to the IAEA Gregory Schulte tells Radio Farda ‘the installation of additional centrifuges by Iran would be a clear-cut violation of four Security Council resolutions.’ Schulte's statement follows Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's announcement that his country has begun installing another 6,000 centrifuges as part of Iran's controversial uranium-enrichment programme.”³⁴⁷ This statement was again posted shortly after the date the UNSC issued yet another resolution on Iran (number 1835) on 25th September.

³⁴⁵ *Radio Farda Reports: Communications*. Heard This Week - 11/22/2007. [online]. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 22.11.2007. [cit. 2010-01-04]. Available from WWW <http://www.rferl.org/content/pressrelease/1106096.html>.

³⁴⁶ *Radio Farda Reports: Communications*. Heard This Week - 02/28/2008. [online]. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 28.2.2008. [cit. 2010-01-04]. Available from WWW <http://www.rferl.org/content/pressrelease/1106109.html>.

³⁴⁷ *Radio Farda Reports: Communications*. Heard This Week - 04/10/2008. [online]. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 4.10.2008. [cit. 2010-01-04]. Available from WWW <http://www.rferl.org/content/pressrelease/1121364.html>.

4.3.2 Summary of the Outcomes

The vital role of the US Ambassador to the IAEA Gregory Schulte as well as the clear emphasis on the promotion of the United States' positions over any other actor arise as the most significant features of the Radio Farda broadcasting based on the weekly digest of the most important stories published in English on the RFE/RL website. The reporting, or at least the published fragments, inclined to the side of the non-proliferation regime's values. The editorial staff of Radio Farda diversified the sources of opinions, varying from the political or diplomatic representatives to independent experts. However, only ten references to the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency were made in the period 2006-2008. This number seems quite low; on the other hand, some episodes of the rubric included several other reports on Iranian nuclear programme and Radio Farda constantly reminded the readers and listeners that it covers this issue thoroughly.

4.4 The EU Public Diplomacy on Iran – Targeting the Media

The current strategies and concrete measures in public diplomacy of the EU towards the Islamic Republic are quite hard to describe only with a help of publicly accessible sources such as the official documents of the EU since none of the two that are to find in the Public Register of the Council are actually public. A draft joint paper formed by the Council Secretariat and the Commission services called Recommendations on How to Increase the Visibility and Public Diplomacy on the EU's External Human Rights Work from 7th July 2009 and a draft Council Decision on Public Diplomacy by the Middle East/Gulf Working Party addressed to the Political and Security Committee from 5th June 2009 are to find, although both of them are not publicly accessible.

From this reason two experts from the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, former and current representatives of the Czech Republic in the Middle East/Gulf Working Group, have been approached and asked for an interview about European public diplomacy towards Iran.³⁴⁸ According to provided information the public diplomacy towards Iran had been first discussed during German Presidency to the Council of the European Union, which Germany held from

³⁴⁸ The sources have not granted the author of this study an authorization for the disclosure of their names.

January to June 2007. The following Portuguese Presidency did not concentrate on this topic and it was brought to the light only after the Slovenians took upon the post in the beginning of 2008. On the basis of a request made by the working group MoG/COMEM the Head of Missions in Tehran draught up a questionnaire to public diplomacy that had been discussed in Brussels afterwards. Finally, in July 2008 a Joint Action Plan for Public Diplomacy of the EU towards Iran (JAP) has been published. The plan set down four main objectives; first, to sensitize the Iranian population; second, to better explain the EU politics to Iranian decision-makers and to the Iranian general public, especially concerning the double approach in the nuclear issue; third, to avoid misunderstandings and negative perceptions of the EU above all and fourth, to take positive effect on the EU ambition, a general method, to cooperate with Iran, which is in Iranian interest as well.

The Joint Action Plan according to my sources seeks to improve the transmitting of messages to the general Iranian public that demonstrate the benefits people of Iran could gain if the decision makers would change their present nuclear policy and to resume the negotiations on the basis of the new E3+3 offer of extended cooperation also inside the civil nuclear domain, human rights and regional questions. For this matter it is necessary to elaborate a proactive, coherent and long-termed public diplomacy towards Iran.

JAP suits to intensify the efforts to 1) to promote a positive environment of reinforcement of a wide scale of local non-governmental actors and 2) to bring assistance to non-governmental actors.³⁴⁹

According to the plan, however, several concrete solutions have been initiated, for example an expert seminar held in Iran or establishment of a TV station in Farsi. In cooperation with the Czech non-governmental organization Asociace pro mezinárodní otázky (AMO) and the Paris based EU Institute for Security Studies meetings with Iranians about the European Union in the European Union may be organized in the future, but the whole project is subject to the approval by the EU Council. The latter is a sensitive topic since it is still waiting for realisation and the organizers do not wish for a similar course as was with the case of a seminar in Iran that had been planned for the end of the French Presidency. Unfortunately, no

³⁴⁹ Interview with a former Czech Representative to the Middle East/Gulf Working Party conducted on 2nd December 2009.

one from the European side got visa and the whole program had to be postponed because the internal political situation in Iran is rape for such an event. This has not happened yet. The plan of a TV in Farsi sponsored by the European Union is important for this thesis. However, information on progress on its initiation is rather unavailable. The current Czech representative in the Moyen Orient/Golfe Groupe in Brussels admitted that this arrangement, which is conducted by the European Commission, is in fact the only one moving along in the field of EU's public diplomacy towards Iran. Although it is still in a preparation phase, the Commission should announce the winner of the selection procedure for the network operator. Other activities are halt at the moment due to a bad political situation in Iran, the source claimed.

This topic was brought up even in the interview with my other source. He said the EU is afraid of two complications: first, it is not desirable to make Iranians think EU wants a regime change in Iran. Second, the decision-makers inside the EU believe common Iranians are very proud of their nuclear program and therefore they might not respond well to any kind of criticism.³⁵⁰ After an objection that VOA reports about the activities of IAEA and it does not seem it worsens somehow the positions of Iranian public towards the United States, my other source admitted a special survey among Iranians may be needed.³⁵¹

Nevertheless, before any kind of EU media public diplomacy tool could have been launched, the UK started on 14th January 2009 its own television broadcasting in Persian language, a branch of BBC World Service – BBC Farsi.³⁵² The annual budget for the station was estimated at £15 million. Director of BBC World Service Nigel Chapman stated that “We will be the first international broadcaster to deliver a Farsi tri-media news service under a single brand - the BBC.”³⁵³ He was referring to the already existing radio BBC Farsi that operates in Iran since 1940³⁵⁴, the internet web <http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/index.shtml> and the television BBC Farsi. Chapman also claimed the station was “increasingly dominating the way that

³⁵⁰ Interview conducted on 3.12.2009, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

³⁵¹ Interview conducted on 3.12.2009, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

³⁵² *Newsatch: Censored*. Iran Bans BBC's Farsi Language TV Station, Journalists Asked not to Work for Foreign Media. [online]. Newswatch. 29.1.2009. [cit. 2010-01-04]. Available from WWW <http://archives.newswatch.in/newsblog/3879>.

³⁵³ *BBC News*. BBC to Launch TV Channel for Iran. [online]. British Broadcasting Corporation. 10.10.2006. [cit. 2010-01-04]. Available from WWW <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/6037832.stm>.

³⁵⁴ *Ibid*.

millions of Iranian people receive their news³⁵⁵ and promised the Farsi channel would be “editorially independent of the UK government.”³⁵⁶

In about two weeks after its launching, the satellite TV station was banned by Iranian Culture and Islamic Orientation minister Mohammad Hossein Safar-Harandi. He later said: “The BBC English channel will be confronted if it abuses its legal rights by producing reports for BBC Persian and we are continually on watch for that.”³⁵⁷

Although the station is officially banned, for people who own an appropriate satellite dish and receive satellite programmes, BBC Farsi is easily accessible. The same works for the radio broadcast (although the Iranian government uses jammers for both TV and radio)³⁵⁸. The main problem lies in the internet website, because Iranian censorship of the internet is quite thorough.

4.5 American versus European Public Diplomacy and their Potential to Cooperate

The European media public diplomacy towards Iran is currently being developed and thus it is considerably behind the United States, which has been concentrating on Iran since 2002. The fact that the European Union consists of 27 states with variety of preferences and different levels of concern about the Iranian issue and the use of public diplomacy in Iran, as the timeline of the public diplomacy project on the background of the rotating presidencies showed, is without a doubt a big challenge for the European policy towards Iran. Consequently, the unilateral project of Great Britain may have been an attempt to keep up with the United States, whereas the BBC, like the Voice of America, has a great experience with external broadcasting and launching a Farsi station was therefore a logical and notably prestigious step as the director Chapman has pointed out.

³⁵⁵ Ibid.

³⁵⁵ Ibid.

³⁵⁵ Ibid.

³⁵⁶ Ibid.

³⁵⁷ *Newsatch: Censored*. Iran Bans BBC's Farsi Language TV Station, Journalists Asked not to Work for Foreign Media. [online]. Newswatch. 29.1.2009. [cit. 2010-01-04]. Available from WWW <http://archives.newswatch.in/newsblog/3879>.

³⁵⁸ BRIEL, Robert. BBC Farsi adds two new satellites. *BroadBand TV News*. [online]. 22.6.2009. [cit. 2010-01-04]. Available from WWW <http://www.broadbandtvnews.com/2009/06/22/bbc-farsi-adds-two-new-satellites>.

To be the fair European Union has an extensive students' exchange programme Erasmus Mundus, which includes Iranian participants as well. In 2007/2008 24 Iranians (12 women and 14 men) have been selected for studying in Europe.³⁵⁹ However, in 2006 Condoleezza Rice stated there are 2000 Iranian students studying in the US and considered that a downfall.³⁶⁰ Of course, only numbers from the Erasmus Mundus have been taken into account, although the member states of the European Union probably operate exchange programmes with Iran on their own. However, the difference between the above states numbers is still very high. Concluding on them, two explanations arose: first, young Iranians prefer the United States to Europe as a study destination, but after comparing the data of other nationalities participating in Erasmus Mundus programme this seems unlikely, or second, despite being economically disconnected, the United States is much more opened in the people-to-people relations to Iran.

Even though the United States is far more active in public diplomacy than the European Union, whereas on the other hand it is deficient in diplomatic state-to-state relations, the outcomes of the transatlantic strategy on Iran have not been ideal in the non-proliferation regime. In 2006-2008 Iran was still conducting a suspicious nuclear programme and gave the impression it did not mind the intensifying international pressure or the economical sanctions and this approach would probably continue wouldn't it be for the infamous presidential election in June 2009. It was the Iranian public as a force that has first in a long time visibly shaken with the government of the Islamic Republic. Not few intellectuals but hundred of thousands of common people have joint the protests in the streets of Iranian cities and demanded a new vote and new representatives. These displeased citizens were grateful for every piece of information brought to them by foreign media through the satellite or the internet when the state tried to defend its existence with oppressing the media and communication channels during the protests. This incident has demonstrated the true power of the people and thus confirmed the appropriateness of the use of public diplomacy in Iran. The potential of transatlantic cooperation in public diplomacy towards Iran lies not only in exchanging information about the concrete use of the tools of public diplomacy and the

³⁵⁹ EC: *External Cooperation*. External Cooperation Window - Call for Proposals 2007 - Selection results. [online]. European Commission. 2007. [cit. 2010-01-04]. Available from WWW http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/extcoop/results/2007/results_2007_en.htm.

³⁶⁰ BEEHNER, Lionel. U.S. *Soft Diplomacy in Iran*. [online]. Council on Foreign Relations. 17.2.2006. [cit. 2010-01-02]. Available from WWW http://www.cfr.org/publication/9904/us_soft_diplomacy_in_iran.html.

responses of the public (where the US can provide the EU many useful data and information) but also in a coordination of their policies, so that every actor would focus on some issues and areas of public diplomacy that feel secure and achievable for him but together they would cover as many aspects as possible: the availability of diverse information, cultural public diplomacy, people-to-people diplomacy etc. This approach could help creating the European Union a more recognizable and attractive profile among the Iranian public and ease the United States in their current sole efforts. It could also open a debate among the transatlantic actors about their goals and aspirations in the region on a different level and thus help to intensify their cooperation in general.

5. Conclusion

The main purpose of this study has been finding the best solution for reducing the security threat that currently represents the Iranian nuclear programme to the European Union and the United States. The idea was to map the strategy of the transatlantic actors first and then incorporate public diplomacy in the resolution of this problem and so verify the hypothesis: *Targeting Iranian public as a part of a joint EU and US foreign strategy will help to reduce the security threat Iran poses now.*

The first part of the thesis seeks to answer on three research questions with a help of the structural theories of international relations, the neorealist and neoliberals. This aim will be realised with a help of the conclusions from the neorealist and neoliberal explanations of the transatlantic actors' behaviour in cooperating with each other inside the non-proliferation regime in the case of Iranian nuclear programme. The first research question to answer is *“How do the US and EU acquit themselves with cooperation with one and another in the case of Iranian nuclear ambitions?”*

Strategies of both of the transatlantic actors between 2006 and 2008 included cooperation as the key tool in the quest to reduce Iranian security threat, even though they might have different reasons. The US tried to use cooperation with the European Union to apply stronger coercive measures in form of the UNSC sanctions against Iran. At last, this deduction traces the neorealist approach, because the factor of the coercive power really did play a pivotal role in the US strategy as the analysis of the American actions in the non-proliferation regime in the chapter 3.6 shows. Although the first George W. Bush's administration did apply unilateral tactic in the US foreign policy and thus without a doubt fulfilled the neorealist principles, the second administration, whose policies this study analysed, was much more compliant to cooperate with the European Union on Iran, probably since the self-help tactics has not brought satisfactory results. This fact was manifested by changed rhetoric resulting in a generally more open impression and by diverting from the Iranian government as the object of the statements to Iranian public. This step allowed including more positivity into the proclamations. These changes turned up in 2006 and proved a success with finally reporting

Iran to the UNSC that issued the 1696 Resolution, followed by the 1737 Resolution, which finally imposed sanctions on Iran. The main goal of the American strategy was therefore accomplished by the US turning to cooperation as a measure.

The European Union, on the other hand, copies the neoliberal drift and the EU has always supported cooperation and multilateralism in the case of Iran. What the rational neoliberal outlook showed is the possible uncertainty with the true motives of the EU. Perhaps the diversified and complicated arena of the non-proliferation regime suits the EU better because than it doesn't have to bargain with economical and energy gains as much as it probably would have to if choosing the unilateral approach. It is also much more difficult to criticise one another if you are leading diplomatic and multilateral negotiations together site by site. The case of the ILSA and the sanctioning of European companies by the US government would probably not have happened in case of the EU and the US tightly cooperating to minimise Iranian threat and that is profitable for the EU as well.

Now let's move on to the second research question "*What meaning has the non-proliferation regime for the transatlantic partners and their foreign policies towards Iran?*" The non-proliferation regime works certainly as a global security arrangement and hence it has a crucial importance for the transatlantic actors as well. The EU-3 and the US (together with Russia and China) have established the regime and the P5 as the main judge of the compliance with the non-proliferation, so the EU and US have strong ties to the core of this agreement. All of the security measures and arrangements of the EU and US are targeted at nuclear security as portrayed in chapters 3.5 and 3.6 in detail.

The Figures 1 and 2 enclosed in the Appendix illustrate the progress in issuing resolutions by the International Atomic Energy Organization and the Security Council from 2003 to 2008. The outcomes of the graphs portray the way the members of the IAEA operate with the mandate of the Agency to report a country to the Security Council, whereas the United States and the European Union had been the most active in the process during the given period. The IAEA put out eight resolutions between 2003 and 2005, and only two in 2006, while in the following two years there was no activity. The Security Council was a complete opposite, it began to act first in 2006 and issued 5 resolutions until 2008. As soon as the sanctioning process in the SC began, the IAEA backed down. The seriousness of the situation when the IAEA let the SC to assume responsibility, together with the concerns of some of the other

states like China, Russia and the NAM countries that Iran would perceive further resolutions as a provocation and will pull away from the Agency might be an explanation for this matter.

Further, one motive of the US to fight against Iranian nuclear programme that has not been highlighted yet could be the aggressive position of Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad against Israel, which is a traditional American ally and George W. Bush, in particular, had a very strong relationship with this small country. He even promised a military defence to Israel against Iran.³⁶¹ Weakening Iran economically through sanction and thus decrease its chances on acquiring nuclear weapons was however a much convenient option for the American government. The fact that Israel holds nuclear weapons is a long-time thorn in the flesh for some countries, including Iran. The most vocal have also been Arabic countries as direct neighbours that in standard do not maintain a good relationship with Israel. Opponents of Israeli NW possession (most of them are members of the Non-Aligned Movement) call for a disarmament on the Near East since 1995 when a resolution at the NPT Review Conference has been adopted on this matter.³⁶²

The non-proliferation regime might also have an economical meaning for the European Union as stated in the answer on the first research question.

The answer on the last research question of the first part of the study “*Has the Iranian nuclear threat been minimised in the research period of 2006 to 2008?*” is unfortunately ‘no’. Of course, the enforcement of the UNSC resolutions 1737, 1747 and 1803 and applying of the economical sanctions have been a success in the way of how the international community has been active, but it hasn’t really stopped Iran from working on its nuclear programme because the following year 2009 Iran was more straightforward than ever in stating its non-compliance with the non-proliferation regime by secretly operating on an uranium enrichment plant near Qum and received a rebuke from the IAEA, which was endorsed by China and Russia.³⁶³ Shortly afterwards, Iran announced to the Agency it would keep plans for 10 new enrichment plants secret until six months before they were ready to concentrate uranium into nuclear

³⁶¹ KESSLER, Glenn. Bush Says U.S. Would Defend Israel Militarily. Washington Post. [online]. 2.2.2009. [2010-01-04]. Available from WWW <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/01/AR2006020102134.html>.

³⁶² MÜLLER, Harald. Vertrag im Zerfall. *Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung* . 4/2005. p. 8.

³⁶³ COOPER, Helene; BROAD, William J. Russia and China Endorse Agency’s Rebuke of Iran. *New York Times*. [online]. 27.10.2009. [cit. 2010-01-04]. Available from WWW <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/28/world/28nuke.html>.

fuel.³⁶⁴ However, the fact China and Russia, two permanent UNSC members that have opposed the sanctions the most, are finally supporting the EU/US actions, is a positive sign, together with the fact that Iranian social and political situation is extraordinarily intense since the presidential election in June 2009. Iranian people have been protesting against the government and news reporting about this topic has shadowed the nuclear programme.

The second part of the thesis states two more research questions. '*How do the US and EU use the promotion of non-proliferation regime's values in public diplomacy?*' is the first one and the outcomes of a small research among specialists in foreign policy (in case of the EU) and data analysis (in case of the US) help at least to give the idea. The American media public diplomacy towards Iran is much more refined and developed than the European, which is basically still in the beginnings. Although the broadcasting projects of Voice of America and Radio Farda have been designed as tools of public diplomacy, the PR department of VOA denied any strategy on promoting the non-proliferation regime. The data analysis on the website of Radio Farda showed that the use of language in the reports on Iranian nuclear programme and non-proliferation regime is from time to time used to appeal to the Iranian public and tends to promote the work of the IAEA and the US positions through numerous declarations by the US representative at the IAEA. The work of the European Union has not been acknowledged practically at all.

The European Union incorporated the promotion of the non-proliferation regime in its Joint Action Plan for Public Diplomacy of the EU towards Iran, but since that not much has been done to implement it. The uneasy political situation in Iran is definitely one objective; however the opinion that the Iranians will not respond well if EU will tackle this topic has also appeared during the interview. The question is who the sources from the European Union environment mean when they say 'Iranians', the common public or the government? There are no proofs about negative reactions of Iranian public are to American actions in public diplomacy and from this point of view the European reasoning does not appear plausible. This and the fact that the balance of trade payment of the European Union indicate that the main motive for European cautiousness might be lack of political will among the states to provoke Iranian government as a trade partner and possibly also the fear of walking on a thin ice when leading dialogs about human rights. In any case, the plan for a news television station is the

³⁶⁴ BROAD, William J. Iran Sets Limit to What It Tells Atomic Agency *New York Times*. [online]. 4.12.2009. [cit. 2010-01-04]. Available from WWW <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/05/world/middleeast/05nuke.html>.

next to realization and the year 2010 will show the intentions the European Commission has with this project.

The second research question is related to the hypothesis of this study and it says: *‘Will an intensified and coordinated transatlantic public diplomacy with focus on proliferation help to solve the security threat Iran poses?’*

On the basis of the conducted research and considering present state of affairs in Iran the answer is positive. American television and radio stations do have an influence on Iranians that are watching and listening to their segments. If nothing else, they provide information that is otherwise not accessible in the country. It is a pity that ordinary Iranians cannot reach similar information about the work of the European Union which is far more active than the United States in economical and technical endorsements’ proposals to Iran and diplomatic talks. This conclusion backs Fardi Alikhah in Semati’s *Media, Culture and Society in Iran: Living with the Globalization and the Islamic State*, who names the following among the challenges that will bring along satellite television networks to Iran: political impacts in form of disruption of political socialization, desacralization of clergies, political leaders, and politics, increase in the sense of political deprivation, organization of the opposition, erosion of political legitimacy, increase in political awareness, and rise of ethnic identity.³⁶⁵ Alikhah also stresses the socio-cultural impacts of satellite television like increasing gap between tradition and modernity, contribution to Iranian identity, presence of globalization, lifestyle changes and consumerism and secularist perspectives.³⁶⁶ Giving these effects of the public diplomacy on Iranian public, a coordinated transatlantic strategy might be the ultimate weapon in combating the negative aspirations of the Iranian government. The use of the new media, the Public diplomacy 2.0 as the Americans call it, showed its great potential during the events in June 2009. Nevertheless, the results of the first part of this thesis have demonstrated that the transatlantic actors are able to cooperate with each other on a high diplomatic level. Adding cooperation on a lower platform might be the key to success. Therefore, with a little boldness, the hypothesis of this thesis *‘Targeting Iranian public as a part of a joint EU and US foreign strategy will help to reduce the security threat Iran poses now.’* can be verified.

³⁶⁵ SEMATI, Mehdi. *Media, Culture and Society in Iran: Living with Globalization and the Islamic State*. 1.ed. 2007. London: Routledge. p. 106. ISBN: 978-0-415-77216-7.

³⁶⁶ SEMATI, Mehdi. *Media, Culture and Society in Iran: Living with Globalization and the Islamic State*. 1.ed. 2007. London: Routledge. p.106. ISBN: 978-0-415-77216-7.

In the dawn of the year 2009 major street protests were happening in many cities of Iran, even in the otherwise top conservative town of Qum. They are even more intensive than the riots in June after the questionable re-election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The fallout of the Islamic regime is definitely an option, maybe not even from a far future, everything stands upon the determination of the rahbar and his mullahs to preserve the Islamic republic as it is. During the authors visit in Iran quite a few Iranians – mostly man – have called for a regime change stating the comeback of a constitutional monarchy as a desirable form of government. They have also often said that the problem of their country lies not in hijab (the rule for women to cover their heads and body in the public) since the Iranians often asked about the opinion of the author on this law. However, if Iranians want freedom, they should first grant it to more than one half of their population. This decision now lies in the hands of Iranian men who have to support this change and fight not only for a different government but for universal human rights. They should help Iranian women to gain confidence again and strip off the chadors, rusaris, shals and mantos. “Women are not free in Iran,” as one of the young protesters in Iran told the author. After calming down the situation around Iranian nuclear threat, the next big mission for transatlantic foreign policies and their public diplomacies will be to support the freedom of women and helping establish Iran as a strong and modern democratic country on the Middle East.

Wordcount: 34162 Words (157333 characters without gaps / 186837 with gaps)


RESUMÉ

Hlavním cílem mé magisterská práce “Výhledy porozumění mezi EU a USA vůči Íránu a jeho praktické dopady” bylo zjistit, jakou má naději na realizaci koordinovaná veřejná diplomacie transatlantických aktérů vůči Íránu, jakožto strategie na snížení bezpečnostní hrozby, kterou v současné době pro USA i EU představuje iránský nukleární program. V první části mé práce jsem prizmatem neoliberální a neorealistickej teorie analyzovala postup USA a EU vůči Íránu v letech 2006 až 2008 uvnitř mezinárodního režimu nešíření jaderných zbraní. Výsledkem tohoto zkoumání bylo, že spolu transatlantičtí aktéři v případě iránské otázky jsou schopni poměrně efektivně kooperovat, což se projevilo především úspěšným vyjednáváním v Radě guvernérů Mezinárodní agentury atomové energie, která nakonec rozhodla, aby se iránským nukleárním programem zabývala Rada bezpečnosti OSN. Rada bezpečnosti potom na Írán opakovaně uvalila ekonomické sankce, což lze považovat za velký úspěch koordinované transatlantické strategie. Bezpečnostní hrozba tím ale snížena nebyla, protože Írán pokračoval v aktivitách, které jsou v rozporu s dohodami o bezpečnostních zárukách MAAE. V druhé části diplomové práce jsem nejprve shrnula současnou iránskou politickou, společenskou a především mediální situaci. Následně jsem na základě malého původního výzkumu analyzovala výstupy rádia Farda, jakožto příkladu veřejné diplomacie Spojených států, a s pomocí rozhovorů s dvěma odborníky Ministerstva zahraničních věcí České republiky jsem se pokusila zmapovat veřejnou diplomacii Evropské unie vůči Íránu. Výsledek ukázal, že USA má mnohem propracovanější strategii veřejné diplomacie než EU, která na konkrétních projektech teprve pracuje. Spojené státy jsou rovněž aktivnější v prosazování hodnot mezinárodního režimu nešíření jaderných zbraní skrze veřejnou diplomacii, protože Evropská Unie si v této oblasti drží spíše rezervovaný postoj. Vzájemná spolupráce na poli veřejné diplomacie vůči Íránu by jistě byla možná, jak ukázaly výsledky první části mé diplomové práce, a zároveň by mohla být tím faktorem, který konečně posune snahy o snížení bezpečnostního rizika iránského nukleárního programu k pozitivnímu výsledku. Tomuto závěru nahrávají i události po prezidentských volbách v Íránské islamské republice v červnu 2009, kde se ukázala opravdová síla a odhodlanost iránské veřejnosti změnit vývoj ve své zemi.

APPENDIX 1


Number of resolutions on the Iranian nuclear programme issued by the IAEA in the years 2003 – 2008

Figure 1



Number of resolutions on the Iranian nuclear programme issued by the UNSC in the years 2003 – 2008

Figure 2



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Project of a Master's Thesis

Topic:

Prospects of understanding between EU and US foreign policy on Iran and its practical impacts

Research framework:

I have chosen the prospects of understanding between EU and US foreign policy on Iran and its practical impacts as a topic for my master's thesis. I was driven by my long lasting interest in Iran to write about this issue. I have completed several assignments about Iran's public policy, population policy or the Iran-Iraq war, all during my Master's studies at the Faculty of Social Sciences.

The purpose of this study is to verify following hypothesis: *Targeting Iranian public as a part of a joint EU and US foreign strategy will help to reduce the security threat Iran poses now.*

As the hypothesis shows I would like to prove a causal relationship between targeting Iranian public as a part of joint EU and US foreign strategy (arbitrary variable) and the elimination of security threat (dependent variable). My methodological approach will be a qualitative research based on observable implications that will help to verify my theory.

I have based my hypothesis on following studies about the new approaches on Iran: Iran: Time for a New Approach published within the American Council of Foreign Relations (New York, 2008), or the article U.S. Foreign Policy and the Future Democracy in Iran written by Abbas Milani and published in Washington Quarterly (Washington, 2005).

In the first part of my thesis I want to draw the observable implications from a case study about the EU and the US foreign policies on Iran in 2006-2008 and the depth of their cooperation in this particular period. I have chosen this two-year-long time frame because beginning 2006 the US administration abandoned George Bush's National Security Strategy that practically brought the USA closer to the EU policy stance towards Iran. This case study should illustrate that although the approximation of the EU and the US foreign policies had a positive effect in unifying towards Iran, it hasn't brought the desirable outcome in terms of changing the course of Iranian intentions - the security threat Iran poses hasn't been at least minimized so far.

I believe that the cooperation of the transatlantic partners was based on the 'good cop-bad cop' principle, whereas US was playing the 'very bad cop', especially since George Bush's first election until the year 2006. The EU, on the other hand, has acted too soft most of the time. Perhaps that is the reason Europe was never as powerful and relevant actor for Iran and why it couldn't play its mediator's role properly. With Barack Obama as the new president of the US the school of internationalism in foreign policy is precisely what can bring the transatlantic partners nearer to each other. I assume a more coordinated strategy of the EU and the US that could conform to both sides may, bring better results towards the Iranian challenge.

The second part of my thesis will result from the outcomes of the case study, which I will apply with the help of an inductive method. I want to point at a certain 'gap' in foreign policies of the EU and the US towards Iran and then help to fill this space with an analysis of Iranian intrastate political and societal situation. I believe the foreign policy of the

transatlantic actors should be as multileveled as possible, which hasn't been the case so far. I assume the above mentioned 'gap' being the insufficient orientation on the Iranian society by the transatlantic partners and their underestimation of this aspect's influence on reducing security threats. Assuming the potential growth of coordination of policies of the EU and the USA towards Iran can happen with the new US administration, I want to prove that it can succeed only with focus on the Iranian public.

I intend to spend a month in Iran while writing my thesis to gain relevant information about the region and add authenticity and creditability to my research.

Outline:

1. INTRODUCTION:

- 1.1 Basic background about the relations between EU, US and Iran in recent years
- 1.2 Presentation of my intentions and hypothesis
- 1.3 Methodology
- 1.4 Sources

2. BODY

- 2.1 Case study about the EU and the US foreign policies on Iran in 2006-2008 and their cooperation
 - 2.1.1 Specification of the term "security threat" for the EU and the US in relation to Iran
 - 2.1.2 The EU and the US tactic on forcing Iran to suspend uranium enrichment
 - 2.1.2.1 The EU and the US cooperation on the uranium enrichment issue
 - 2.1.3 Cooperation of EU and US with international organizations (UN, IAEA)

2.1.4 Conclusion of the case study

2.2 Iranian public as one of the targets of the EU and the US foreign policies

2.2.1 Stratification of the Iranian society

2.2.2 Public influence on practical decisions of the Iranian government

2.2.3 Iranian official and unofficial media

2.2.3.1 The optimal communication channels for targeting the Iranian public by the EU and the US

2.2.4 Prospects of the EU and the US to target the Iranian public

2.2.5 Examples of advantages of the multileveled coordinated strategy

3. CONCLUSION

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I assume the bibliography will be extended during the actual writing of my master's thesis.