Summary

The present thesis aims to reconstruct and interpret how the topic of objectifying thinking is understood in Karl Jaspers and Ladislav Hejdánek, to identify the limits they attribute to objectifying thinking, to examine the alternatives they propose to it, and to assess the extent to which their respective conceptions are convincing. The thesis first traces the motives that lead Jaspers to conceive objectivity as a constrained yet unavoidable medium of all thinking whatsoever. As Jaspers's own alternative to an objectifying approach to thought, his conception of transcending thinking, reason, and the ciphers of transcendence are considered. In each of these cases, the approaches in question cannot overcome the objectifying character of thought; yet they reach its limit and, in their "foundering" upon them, achieve the utmost accomplishment that is possible in relation to non-objectifiable reality. In the case of Hejdánek, the thesis examines his conception of conceptuality, from which his critique of objectifying thinking arises. According to Hejdánek, objectifying thinking involves a mistaken suggestion of an ontologically object-like character of reality precisely where reality is not an object that could adequately be set before us. In analysing Hejdánek's reflections on possible non-objectifying thinking, the exposition arrives at his notion of a methodologically integrated handling of objective and non-objective intentions. In this integration, Hejdánek discerns a promising mode of relating to non-objectifiable reality – one that avoids its reduction.

The thesis concludes that both thinkers diverge in their understanding of the nature of objectifying thinking. For Jaspers, all thinking is objectifying in the sense that it is invariably directed toward something beyond itself; for him, objective intentionality thus coincides with intentionality as such. Hejdánek, by contrast, assumes that our thinking involves both objective and non-objective intentions, and he argues that, by maintaining intentionality, one can nevertheless avoid rendering the intended reality into an object. Jaspers thereby arrives at the view that objectifying thought constitutes an inescapable necessity, whereas Hejdánek regards it as a historical phenomenon that may, in time, undergo transformations.

Keywords

Karl Jaspers, Ladislav Hejdánek, object, non-objectivity, concept, conceptual thinking, rationality, intentionality