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The Return of the Far Right to Romanian Mainstream Politics: A Discourse Analysis of Calin Georgescu's Presidential Campaign

Master's Thesis

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Abstract

The research below explains how Călin Georgescu, an independent outsider, managed to win the first round of Romania's 2024 presidential election and subsequently become embroiled in one of Romania's biggest legal battles since the fall of communism. This project aims to map the ideology of Georgescu's discourse online, as well as break down this discourse into dimensions that can be analyzed. This specific paper utilizes Georgescu's video posts, totalling 124 videos, within the first round of the social media platform Facebook, as well as his 42 page manifesto outlining his plans for Romania upon becoming president. By using this data, this research sheds light on far-right politics in Romania's current political climate, where international research is still limited. It also shows how Georgescu's candidacy plays a larger role in the normalization of far-right rhetoric in mainstream politics.

Keywords: Georgescu, Romanian far-right, Nationalism, Digital Discourse, Eastern Europe, Far right, Populism, Sovereignty, Extremism

Patriotism is when love of your own people comes first; nationalism, when hate for people other than your own comes first.

- Charles de Gaulle

The ignorance of one voter in a democracy impairs the security of all.

- John F. Kennedy

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1. Introduction

In November 2024, after the first round of the Romanian presidential election, once all the votes had been counted, a seemingly unknown and unexpected candidate, Călin Georgescu, was declared the winner. Georgescu, a former United Nations (UN) consultant and former head of the Office of the Environment after the fall of communism, ran on a platform of sovereignty and return to traditionalist ideas. In polls leading up to the night of the election, Georgescu was at around 9 percent, but no poll suggested he could achieve success above the 20 percent range. That night, Georgescu would go on to win the first round by garnering 23 percent of the vote (Deloy, 2024). He achieved this victory without using a traditional campaign or any party support, running as an independent candidate. He took a rather modern approach to campaigning, focusing heavily on social media content in which he discussed various topics, everything from religion to globalism. This first round had many believing that Georgescu, an independent candidate, would sweep the second round against his opponent, Elena Lasconi. These events didn't come to fruition, as the Romanian Constitutional Court subsequently annulled the election after proof of Russian interference had come to light and as a result, Georgescu would be barred from running again. The campaign itself left many questions, with many people asking how an unfamiliar political figure could achieve such success through social media.

The campaign appears to be part of a broader movement within political systems around the Global North of far right groups gaining support. This recurrence has been exemplified first by Winston Churchill, who famously warned that "those who fail to learn from history are doomed to repeat it." Since then, political scientists have observed consistent resurgences in far right movements every few decades. German political scientist Klaus von Beyme was the first to identify these waves, providing "at least a rough sketch of the ways in which the far right" organized throughout "the second half of the 20th century" (Mudde, 2019, p. 21). Cas Mudde has

since built on these foundations, arguing that far right movements come in waves and Europe is now in a "fourth wave", which he described as "pathological normalization" of these ideas. As the research will show, Georgescu is part of this far right movement himself, exhibiting common themes outlined by Mudde. This research has been built around the understanding of what makes a far-right candidate and where Georgescu falls within the far-right spectrum, considering prior research only goes so far as to classify his candidacy as far right. This research intends to analyze his discourse and conclude whether he is just another populist radical right actor or indicates secret extreme right intentions. Furthermore, I intend to answer the following questions:

- What type of far-right ideology does Georgescu exemplify?
- Which dimensions are the most dominantly recurring parts of this ideology throughout his discourse?

To answer these questions, this research utilizes a critical discourse analysis focused around Georgescu's discourse complemented by a manifesto disseminated the day of his official candidacy in the first round. This analysis employs a mixed methods approach, building a relatively small but detailed dataset of Georgescu's Facebook discourse during the first round of the Romanian presidential campaign. Furthermore, it analyzes frequencies of occurrences of the most important traits of Georgescu's discourse through qualitative coding. The timeline for this dataset is from the first video posted on March 1st, 2023, to the day after the election on November 24, 2024, totaling 124 videos transcribed from Romanian into English. These videos were subsequently coded with seven recurring dimensions of Georgescu's ideology: Call to action, conspiracy theory, anti-globalism, religion, anti-Western/pro-Russian, ultra-conservative, and historical context.

Furthermore, this research utilized Georgescu's manifesto titled National Project: Hrană, Apă, Energie, which was disseminated to his followers on September 1st, 2024, to better understand his ideology beyond social media discourse. The thesis itself leans heavily into Mudde's (2019) *The Far Right Today* to accurately classify the radical right and extreme right, as well as Ruth Wodak's (2015) *Politics of Fear* to better understand Georgescu's discourse within the broader far right context. This paper looks into Georgescu's discourse to understand how he repackaged and normalized nationalist ideology for the 21st century through digitalization. The following chapter lays out a thorough foundation of prior research on the history of Romania, the far right in Europe, social media's use in politics, and Georgescu. Chapter 3 conceptualizes the theoretical background, the far right, and main themes that appear throughout Georgescu's discourse. Chapter 4 describes the data collection process and the overall methods used for the research in-depth. In Chapters 5 and 6, the research analyzes the collected data, explains and builds upon with examples backing up each claim. Beyond presenting and explaining the findings, these chapters answer the questions presented and discuss limitations of the research. Chapter 6 also serves to present a more nuanced understanding of Georgescu's strategy for cultivating an effective and engaged audience. Chapter 7 wraps up the research, presenting suggestions for future analysis on the topic of the Romanian far right, as well as my own analytical conclusions on the far right. Ultimately, the thesis hopes to shed light on the rapid rise of the far right in a country largely overlooked in the context of European politics.

2. Literature Review

This literature review dives into past research conducted on a broad range of topics, setting the foundations for this analysis. It is divided into three sections, meant to provide a background on Romanian politics and establish prior research on the far right. The first part dives into the historical foundations of Romania and its history with fascism and the far right. This section also explores the specific ideological roots of the far right as they relate to Romania. The second section examines the far right after the fall of communism, and examines how it has been reshaped for the modern European context. Furthermore, this section explores past research on the role of social media in amplifying far-right narratives, as well as considers how these platforms have contributed to the movement's growth since 2019. The third section sets the foundations for previous research on Georgescu and his appeal, particularly among young and local voters, as well as the Romanian diaspora. This section seeks to understand Georgescu's fundamental beliefs and his election strategy. Given the limited availability of peer-reviewed research on this topic, this section integrates both academic and journalistic sources to provide a more thorough understanding. This chapter as a whole helps create the foundations for the theoretical framework, clarifying how populism, nationalism, and media influence relate to the rise and persistence of far-right populism in Romania.

2.1 Romanian Historical Overview

Romania was officially recognized in the 19th century as the Kingdom of Romania, with its name being derived from its Latin roots after the Roman conquest of Dacia in 101 AD. Romanians took pride in being recognized after their original conquerors, but for political reasons, this claim to its name was largely contested by Saxon and Hungarian scholars who denied these claims to its Roman ancestry. The Russian Empire accepted Romania's Roman

heritage only in regions where the two countries' interests didn't intersect (Georgescu, 1991, pp. 10-12). After World War I, Romania gained Transylvania and Bessarabia through postwar territorial settlements, making it the sixth largest country in Europe. This unification of the historically divided country is known as Greater Romania and is often referred to as Romania's golden age (Bottoni, 2014; Ciorteanu, 2015). This new Greater Romania faced many issues, such as integrating its new territories that had large groups of Hungarian and German minorities still living there. Despite the war's end, it had to maintain a strong military presence on its borders, as it faced "revisionist attitudes" from its neighbors, the Soviet Union, Hungary, and Bulgaria (Ciorteanu, 2015, p. 61).

During the same time, many nationalist groups started forming to fight against the similarly rising communist groups, the most famous being Corneliu Zelea Codreanu's creation of the Legion of Michael the Archangel, also known as the Iron Guard. The Iron Guard emerged in 1927 in a section of Paris called "the nuclei of the Romanians abroad" (Sandu, 2017, p. 69) and is widely regarded as Romania's first successful far-right nationalist movement. Its ideology was heavily influenced by Hitler's National Socialist German Workers' Party, a connection shaped partly by Codreanu's earlier studies in Berlin (Tudor, 2014, p. 67). Following Germany's pact with the Soviet Union (USSR), parts of Greater Romania were ceded to the USSR and Hungary, leading to outrage against King Carol II and Jewish Romanians who were seen as directly responsible for these events. These events led to King Carol II being ousted by his son, King Michael, but as Michael tried to stay neutral during World War II (WW2), the Iron Guard helped General Ion Antonescu take control as dictator in hopes of regaining this lost territory. Following his rise to power, Antonescu eliminated the Iron Guard as he saw it as a direct threat to his power. He then went on to assist Germany in fighting the Soviets. Germany rewarded Romania

with the Bessarabian and Transnistrian regions, but Antonescu specifically wanted Transylvania back (Grigorie, 2016, p. 48-50; Bogdan et al., 2016, pp. 193–194), which only occurred after 1945. What followed was decades of communist rule, transformed by the USSR into a satellite state governed by the dictator Nicolae Ceausescu (Georgescu, 1991, p. 242).

2.2 Emergence of the Far Right in Post-Communist Romania

Right after World War II, the new communist government rounded up tens of thousands of Legionnaires, torturing and killing many of them for decades to come through "re-education" programs (Tudor, 2014, p. 98). Throughout this time, many who weren't captured went into hiding while still holding onto their beliefs. The Iron Guard increasingly tied itself to Romanian Orthodoxy as one of its core pillars in secret. Meale highlights this closely tied relationship in his research, noting that "Historians… have found it far harder to separate the Legion from its Orthodox roots than they have to separate almost every other fascist movement from its religious symbolism" (Meale, 2016, p. 63). Church monasteries were frequently accused of supporting the Iron Guard as a result. Although the Communist regime was staunchly atheist, it permitted the church's continued existence, mainly because of the population's deeply ingrained religious faith and fears of political unrest. While Codreanu himself had been assassinated, his legacy lives on through his followers, and the fall of communism saw a resurgence in the Iron Guard with Horia Sima at the helm until his death in 1993 (Meale, 2016; Tudor, 2014 p. 76).

During the 1990s and early 2000s, Romania's interim government, led by Ion Iliescu, took shape. This government was plagued with corruption and anti-democratic practices. In this period, many former communist party members broke away to form their own parties in hopes of gaining support. Corneliu Vadim Tudor's Greater Romania Party (GRP) gained significant

support during this period. Tudor himself was a former communist poet and propagandist; his charismatic personality was a driving force during his political campaign. Tudor managed to use his magazine to lean on the memory of Ceausescu and Antonescu, using a mixture of nationalism and collectivism. In the 2000 campaign, he successfully got legislative seats for his party (Mungiu‐Pippidi, 2001, p. 187). Tudor's party is comparable to Italy's Social Movement (MSI) party, which similarly leaned into Mussolini's nostalgia factor and shared fascist ideology (Gallego, 1999, p. 160). Had Romania not been under Soviet occupation for decades, it would also have come out of WW2 with neo-fascist parties ready to reestablish themselves into political and social life, with GRP campaigning Ceausescu as a fighter for Romania's independence from the Soviets and Antonescu as an ancestor of Ceausescu (Mungiu‐Pippidi, 2001). Tudor's party ultimately declined due to its failure to distinguish itself from rival parties, its decision to join a broader coalition and a subsequent loss of public support. After his defeat in the second round of the 2004 presidential election, Tudor, unironically, as an anti-democratic and anti-EU candidate, ran for the European Parliament and won (Cinpoes, 2010; Mungiu‐Pippidi, 2001). The heritage of fascism can be seen in terms of references to myths, symbols, and slogans of the interwar fascist experience, often veiled as nostalgia, or in terms of a more explicit reference to at least part of the ideological corpus of fascism (Mudde, 1999, p.238).

With the Romanian Orthodox Church (ROC) continuing to play a significant role in Romanian politics, as Cinpoes (2010) highlighted that the country placed in sixth place on the Global index of Religiosity during this time; the church's influence is extremely powerful in the country as it ties into the very core of Romanian heritage. George Becali (Gigi Becali), a prominent socialite and oligarch figure, entered politics around 2004 setting up the New Generation Party (PNG), which leaned heavily on their Christian orthodox belief, with similar

values the parties competed in 2004 but intersected in 2008 with Becali joining the PRM ticket securing an MEP seat in the European Parliament (Cinpoes, 2010). Becali leans heavily into nationalist Iron Guard ideology and his Orthodox faith to resonate with voters, but during the 2010's he was convicted of fraud and corruption (Asavei, 2020). Throughout the 2010s, Romania was heavily plagued by corruption scandals, eroding large amounts of trust in voters, culminating in the largest protest since the fall of communism after the legislature attempted to pass legislation that would allow for the theft of government funds up to $50k without prosecution (Nicula et al., 2020, p.202). Becali ironically portrays himself as a fighter for the Romanian people's "spiritual and material well-being… emphasizing an urgent need to… discipline the corrupted elite" (Asavei, 2022, p.46). Asavei highlights throughout her paper the use of Saints and the savior mentality as Becali's messaging. Although the Iron Guard doesn't exist anymore, its slogans and likeliness are more prominent than ever.

2.3 Romania's Newest Wave

In September 2019, the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) led by George Simion, was founded with the aim of pursuing the reunification of Romania and Moldova and restoring Romania's pre-World War II territorial boundaries, echoing the Iron Guard's talking points (Soare and Tuffis, 2023, p. 103). As Doiciar and Cretan (2021) points out, AUR took advantage of current events, starting with the COVID-19 pandemic six months after its founding. Throughout 2020, AUR consistently criticized the current government for its handling of the pandemic, securing a rapid victory with 9.1% of the vote in the Parliament, partly due to the second wave and reduction in the number of older voters (Doiciar and Cretan, 2021). AUR employs nationalist rhetoric conflating national sovereignty with EU membership, fueling

emotional responses rather than fostering rational debate about Romania's role in the European Union (Alupoaei, 2024, p. 345). It shares stark similarities to the Iron Guard Movement of the 1930s; AUR draws approximately 40% of its support from voters under the age of 35 and consistently anchors its legitimacy in its association with the Orthodox faith (Doiciar and Cretan, 2021, p. 248). Beyond attracting new voters due to Covid-19 conspiracies, AUR also saw many of the older far-right parties fold into the party, such as the NGP and GRP. This effectively consolidated the far right in Romania under one party, the AUR party.

Soare and Tufis (2023) explore the power of the diaspora and its use to secure AUR's political influence. With over 6 million Romanians having migrated abroad, AUR voices "the need to defend them from exploitation and discrimination in Western Europe, to politically represent them in Bucharest, and to safeguard their group identity" (Soare and Tufis, 2023, p.102). AUR capitalizes on Romanians' ongoing frustration over the delayed Schengen membership, particularly after Croatia's admission ahead of Romania while being a newer member of the EU bloc. The diaspora was also deeply angered by the PSD (Social Democrats), which had mocked them, restricted their ability to vote abroad by removing voting stations, and attempted to discredit them by spreading false claims that they were traitors for leaving the country (Soare and Tufis, 2023, p.102). Prior to the 2020 election, many in the diaspora voted for the USR (Save Romania Union) and PNL (National Liberal) parties as pro-European progressives in hopes of change, but this change never came to fruition (Dragoman, 2021). Soare and Tufis (2023) further highlight that AUR perceives the people it represents as a three-layered community; noting that AUR believes it represents the embodiment of Romania. This approach reflects the Iron Guard and, for that matter, the PRM's method of positioning itself as the authentic representative of the Romanian people and the ROC, as outlined by Meale (2016). This

parallel is unsurprising given that the Iron Guard serves as a direct ideological inspiration for AUR, which consistently draws upon and emulates its (the Iron Guard) core principles. Grappa (2023) observes that much like Donald Trump, Simion has discovered that generating public drama through inflammatory language, calling for protests against perceived corruption, and various provocative actions have effectively boosted support for his party, both at home and abroad.

Although AUR faced notable weaknesses during its early years, the rise of pandemic populism offered the party a unique opportunity to set itself apart from mainstream political actors by promoting religious freedoms and individual choice regarding masking and vaccination (Craciun and Taranu, 2023, p. 656). As the party was pushed into the mainstream, it had to distance itself from its earlier antisemitic rhetoric to appeal to a broader electorate. Many of its more popular talking points were adopted, especially anti-covid, anti-liberal messaging, but its more extremist members split off to form 'S.O.S. Romania', a pro-Russian and anti-EU party led by current MEP Diana Sosoaca. This party adopts a more extreme approach and doesn't try to hide its admiration for the Iron Guard, which is regularly mentioned in meetings; the party actively tries to portray itself as a modern rendition.

2.4 The 2024 Romanian Elections: Who is Georgescu?

Botan (2025) characterizes the election best by highlighting that AUR and S.O.S. Romania capitalize on widespread political disillusionment, presenting themselves as clean, untainted alternatives to the scandal-ridden mainstream parties. He further notes a lack of in-depth research on the connection between conspiracy theories and populist or nationalist ideologies in Eastern European contexts. Burciu (2024) examines the radicalization of young people in Romania, seeking to uncover how far right groups and actors specifically target this

demographic. He highlights how these groups disseminate extremist narratives and messages, particularly through social media platforms like Instagram and TikTok (see section 2.5). Colibasanu (2024) was among the first scholars to investigate Georgescu's presidential candidacy following his initial round victory and the election's annulment by Romania's Constitutional Court. She analyzed the Georgescu campaign and Russian interference, mainly whether the claims were credible and what strategic interests might have motivated such involvement. Her claims were later backed by the declassification of multiple documents from the Romanian Security Services that, in fact, Russian interference had occurred. In her analysis, she makes it clear that Romania was fertile ground for extremism as a result of the political landscape in the country. Gherghina (2025) followed up this analysis a few months later with hard data to back these claims, showing that public opinion was extremely distorted, with as much as 40 percent of the population believing that the election had been manipulated somehow.

Marincea (2025) analyzed the Georgescu campaign in itself, summing it up as a neo-legionary movement based on ideas that were planted long ago; while he uses an illiberal approach, Georgescu propagates conspiracy theories and sows constant distrust in the government. Marincea also highlights that Georgescu himself is a product of the very system he campaigns against. During the first round of the 2024 election, Georgescu extensively outperformed the polls, gaining 22 percent by the end of the election. The map in *Figure 1* shows where many of these votes came from, with large parts being from rural communities and the European diaspora. Furthermore, Germany's Bundesamt reported a population around nine-hundred thousand Romanians, of that number, roughly 50% of the Romanian diaspora in Germany voted for Georgescu (Statistisches, 2024). Meanwhile, AUR's George Simion failed to

get any major support abroad in the first round and mainly competed with PSD and Georgescu for rural voters.

Figure 1 *Results of the 1st round 2024 Romanian presidential election*



Note. Permanent Election Authority (2024).

2.5 Social media in Romanian politics

Political campaigns and social media have become increasingly intertwined over the past two decades, enabling unexpected candidates, most notably Donald Trump, to gain remarkable traction. One key ingredient of successful political communication on these platforms is sensational, emotionally charged, and divisive content that taps into voters' fears and frustrations (Engesser et al., 2017, p.1112; Moffitt, 2016, p. 135). The literature on “hope and fear” media

identifies three primary mechanisms through which such messaging influences voting behavior: (1) constructing threats that are perceived as relevant and imminent, (2) deploying hopeful narratives as alternatives to fear-inducing messages, and (3) diffusing strong emotional responses by altering perceptions of threat or possibility (Black et al., 2021, p. 143). While the far right has been extensively studied globally, Romania presents a unique case. Until the 2024 elections, far-right groups in Romania remained fragmented and largely ineffective throughout the last two decades. However, Călin Georgescu's successful first round marks a significant turning point, presenting a compelling case study on how fear and hope can be weaponized through populist messaging, especially through digital media.

Botan et al. (2025) build on this research about emotionally charged and polarizing content used to provoke and mobilize voters. Over the past five years, Romania's far-right movements have utilized social media to transform themselves from fringe actors into nationally influential and mainstream forces. Platforms like Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube provided spaces for ultranationalist voices to circumvent traditional media outlets, while TikTok, a relatively new platform, has enabled better outreach to younger audiences (Stanescu, 2024, p. 361; Burean and Palfy, 2025, p. 85). Largely ignored by mainstream media, AUR leans into this new forum, building its base through an intense online campaign, broadcasting live videos and viral posts that activate disillusioned voters (Burciu, 2024, p. 11). For context, Romania ranks first in Europe for news consumption through social media platforms like TikTok. At the same time, it scores the lowest in digital skills, meaning that most Romanians, through no fault of their own, have a hard time distinguishing the truth from 'fake news' (Stanescu, 2024; Burciu, 2024, p. 11). Botan et al. (2025) also observed that individuals who primarily consume news through social media are significantly more likely to support nationalist far-right populist parties in Romania

(Botan et al., 2025, pp. 112-114), indicating that AUR's digital strategy tapped an abundant audience. AUR's mix of "populist, nationalist, and anti-establishment discourse," including anti-masking campaigns during the pandemic and promises to save the nation, spread effectively across social media, mobilizing a previously disengaged portion of the electorate (Burean and Palfy, 2025, p. 109). As a result, AUR's base is largely young, male, and anti-establishment, including many first-time voters at home and abroad. This surge culminated in their unexpected entry to Parliament in 2020, successfully capturing 8% of voters, a breakthrough widely attributed to its social-media-driven grassroots campaign (Burean and Palfy, 2025, p. 84), similar to Trump's successful presidential campaigns.

A defining feature of Romanian far-right communication since 2019 has been the use of emotionally charged content that taps into voters' fears and frustrations. Far-right influencers regularly deploy fear-based narratives about national decline, cultural "erosion," and foreign exploitation, coupled with hopeful visions of national rebirth and reunification of Greater Romania to resonate with audiences (Nistor, 2024, as cited in Botan et al., 2025, p.113). Their posts and videos often construct imminent threats from "corrupt elites" in Bucharest to distant EU bureaucrats or global conspiracies and promise proud, sovereign alternatives. This emotional and polarizing style aligns with a broader "spectacularization" of politics; far-right figures turn themselves into online celebrities through provocative stunts and personal live streams (Grapa and Mogos, 2023, p. 151). For example, AUR's leader, George Simion, frequently staged confrontational Facebook live videos and Telegram posts that glorified patriotic defiance. This strategy won him substantial media attention and made his movement "especially attractive" to segments like the diaspora, and ultimately resulted in a designation of persona non grata by Moldova's Government (Grapa and Mogos, 2023, p. 150). Along with emotional appeals,

conspiracy narratives have been an intricate part of the far-right's online content. During the Covid pandemic, AUR and its allies embraced anti-vaccine and anti-lockdown rhetoric citing conspiracy theories. These conspiracies were amplified on social media platforms to rally skepticism and develop fringe communities (Burean and Palfy, 2025). Such messaging effectively captured a public with low trust in institutions and low media literacy, allowing fringe ideas to circulate widely. Sosoaca embodies this approach, rising to prominence by flooding social media with tirades against pandemic restrictions and globalist plots, cultivating an image as the authentic voice of the people against experts and authorities (Burean and Palfy, 2025, p. 100). These tactics broadened the far right's appeal, especially among younger audiences seeking anti-system outlets and diaspora members who felt alienated by mainstream parties. By 2023, far-right groups like AUR and S.O.S. built robust online followings, forcing a shift in Romania's political landscape as mainstream actors struggled to counter the constant flood of emotional and conspiratorial content reshaping and manipulating public perception (Botan et al., 2025, p.115).

These developments set the stage for what would become the disastrous and scandalous 2024 presidential election, where social media became a decisive battleground. The campaign of Călin Georgescu is of particular interest, being an independent far-right candidate who captured digital media on an unprecedented scale. Georgescu's discourse "combines mysticism, Orthodox spirituality, and ecological messaging with nationalist appeals", to create a compelling narrative that distinguishes itself from typical politics (Trifan, 2025, p. 222). He framed Romania's challenges as a moral and spiritual crisis, describing the country as a fallen nation needing renewal, while making no policy recommendations. This symbolic, mythical messaging (references destiny, faith, and a return to "authentic" values) was carefully tailored for social media amplification. In short, Georgescu fashioned himself as a prophetic outsider, offering

salvation to a disenchanted populace. His campaign communicated this personality in an easily shareable, relatable way through social media (Trifan, 2025, p. 223).

Georgescu's team utilized all major platforms for their campaign, but TikTok emerged as their trump card for successful voter outreach. TikTok's algorithm and youth-based audience made it ideal for spreading Georgescu's short, emotionally touching videos. Throughout 2024, these videos would often feature passionate monologues laced with nationalist slogans and spiritual rhetoric. As a result, Georgescu racked up an extensive following, turning him from a little-known candidate into a viral sensation. By the first round of voting in November 2024, he had gained significant visibility among young voters on TikTok, while staying largely under the radar to the political machine (Stanescu, 2024, p. 362; Cistelecan et al., 2025, p. 169). Analysts noted that Georgescu's online popularity was not entirely authentic; rather it was propagated successfully through the use of unmanned scripted accounts known as bots. These bots were used to successfully game the algorithm into boosting his content to millions of Romanians in the final weeks. It was later uncovered that some of these bot farms were linked to pro-Kremlin propaganda networks (Cistelecan et al., 2025, p. 170). This covert amplification and an ecosystem of fringe "alternative news" sites that mixed conspiracy theories and political propaganda, helped saturate and normalize social feeds with Georgescu's narrative, trapping people in echo-chambers (Botan et al., 2025, p. 114). Consequently, themes like national sovereignty, attacks on globalist elites, and references to historical fascist icons spread rapidly under innocuous hashtags and patriotic soundtracks. Emotional and symbolic messaging was central. Georgescu's posts evoked national pride, anger, and hope, often using Orthodox imagery and traditional symbols to get to voters (Trifan, 2025); this strategy proved remarkably effective at mobilizing the youth and diaspora. Surveys indicate that younger Romanians with high social

media consumption were especially drawn to Georgescu's anti-establishment appeal (Botan et al., 2025).

Meanwhile, Romania's diaspora, long active on Facebook and increasingly on newer platforms, became an electoral force for Georgescu. Nearly half of the diaspora voters supported him in the first round, far above any other candidate, reflecting how his promise of a redeemed Romania resonated with citizens abroad frustrated by corruption at home and marginalization abroad (Cistelecan et al., 2025). It's clear now that the diaspora's endorsement was not just digital excitement, but actual deep-seated frustrations left unchecked for years, that translated into real votes in hope of change. Georgescu's quick rise, from polling in the low single digits to winning over 20% of votes, shocked the political world to its core and underscored the transformative power of social media in Romanian politics. His campaign operated largely under the radar of traditional media, but it thrived on the attention driven algorithm created by platforms like TikTok and Facebook. These algorithms rewarded his provocative messaging by disseminating his account to their Romanian user base (Cistelecan et al., 2025). Notably, Georgescu wasn't the first to utilize the power of social media; prior to him, former president Klaus Iohannis's victories in 2014 and 2019 had already clearly demonstrated that digital campaigning was highly effective in Romania. The algorithms were also particularly effective in mobilizing the diaspora via platforms like Facebook (Gherghina, 2023). However, Georgescu's success marked a new chapter in Romanian politics; unchecked, far-right actors can weaponize social media through emotional appeals, nationalist spiritual rhetoric, and conspiratorial disinformation to dramatically reshape the political landscape (Cristelecan, 2025). What had once been a fragmented, ineffective far right was, by 2024, a digitally savvy movement capable of mounting a serious challenge to Romania's establishment, one TikTok election at a time.

2.6 Reflecting on the Far Right

Populist Radical Right movements backed by conservative outlets aren't exclusive to Romania though; Kubik (2024) captures this broader trend best by describing the shift in Central and Eastern Europe as "illiberalism." He emphasizes that these developments are rooted in historical trends rather than being merely reactions against external liberal influences. Romania is a clear example of this dynamic; the far right identified groups that felt socially excluded and tapped into those frustrations, promoting a sense of collective identity rooted in both religion and nationalism. In terms of Georgescu's rise to popularity, it was the result of several converging factors, the most significant being a disinformation campaign spread through social media, and the general illiberal consensus sweeping through the region. This chapter explored the foundations of Romania's far right; it also left questions about what type of far-right candidate Georgescu is.

3. Theoretical framework

To analyze Georgescu's ideology manifesting in his social media campaign, it is important to establish a clear theoretical framework, as such this chapter intends to define key theories and perspectives around the rise and appeal of far-right populism (FRP). This section explores and establishes digital populism as a defining feature of the modern radical far right, dividing the section into four main areas. To begin with, this section defines the "far right" movement, as well as distinguishes between the different characteristics of radical and extreme right-wing ideologies. The subsection focuses on populism and digital populism as a characteristic used in modern radical right campaigns. The following section explores Mudde's wave theory as a fundamental basis of this research, the subsection on Mudde's fourth wave specifically focuses on the modern far right as it pertains to this research. The next section examines national identity as constructed in far-right discourse, through in-group vs. out-group dynamics. This chapter also examines how the far right employ emotional and symbolic discourse, and how they seek political legitimacy by positioning themselves against established elites. The final section contextualizes Georgescu's campaign within broader trends of modern European FRP's and breaks down the various strategies used by Georgescu to attract voters (echo chambers, conspiracy theories, nationalist sovereignty and religious appeal).

3.1 Defining radical vs extreme right

Mudde (2019) and Halperin (2021) break down the broader family of political actors within the far right, often dividing them into two groups: radical right and extreme right. Radical right movements operate within the bounds of electoral democracies while pushing for illiberal, authoritarian values and nativist ideologies. In contrast, the extreme right is characterized by

their rejection of core democratic principles, openly expressing anti-democratic and fascist/neo-Nazi tendencies (Mudde, 1996; Mudde, 2007; Mudde, 2019). Mudde (2019) builds on this by differentiating the two, noting that the radical right accepts democratic principles in theory, hoping to reform the system from within, which also legitimizes their power, while the extreme right rejects popular sovereignty and majority rule, instead taking an insurrectionist approach. Radical right parties actively participate in elections and parliaments. Meanwhile, extreme right groups tend to be excluded from or banned in democratic politics due to their anti-democratic stances, with the best example of this being Germany's Grundgesetz law banning anti-democratic parties (Mudde, 2019, p. 25).

Mudde (2007) highlights three distinct features that go into the ideology of the contemporary radical right: nativism, authoritarianism, and populism. Minkenberg (2017) and Mudde (2007, p. 19) note that nativism is a form of nationalism centered around xenophobia and highlighting the belief in authoritarianism as the answer to social problems. Following Mudde, this thesis will adopt his definition of nationalism as:

*"*An ideology that holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group ('the nation') and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-state*."* (Mudde, 2007, p. 19)

Mudde (2019) emphasizes that these beliefs are usually sold through populist discourse, coining the term populist radical right in his 2007 research. The extreme right still shares these nativist and authoritarian traits while incorporating anti-democratic beliefs, sometimes glorifying past authoritarian regimes or envisioning a totalitarian future (Mudde, 1996; Halperin, 2021, p. 743). In the 20th century, classic fascist movements such as Germany's Nazi party and Romania's Iron Guard are two notable extreme right examples that rejected democracy outright

and pursued a total transformation of their societies through violent, revolutionary means (Cinpoes, 2010; Tudor, 2014, p. 89). Meanwhile, many successful far-right parties in post-war Europe, such as France's National Rally and Italy's post-fascist movements, adapted to democratic competition while still sharing radical right ideology and promoting nationalist, illiberal agendas (Mudde, 2019; Gallego, 1999).

It is important to note that in practice, these definitions often blur the lines between radical and extreme, with some organizations exhibiting a hybrid ideology blending democratic participation with extremist rhetoric and symbols (Mudde, 2019). Slovakia's Slovak People's Party Our Slovakia or Greece's Golden Dawn, as highlighted by Mudde, are examples of this ideology starting out as marginal extremist groups, later engaging in elections, and blurring the line between radical and extreme (Mudde, 2019, pp. 60–62). Romania's AUR positions itself as populist radical right, actively participating in elections, but shows signs of extreme right sentiments, even neo-legionary sentiments; notably, its more fringe members have mostly moved to S.O.S. Romania (Soare & Tufis, 2023; Marincea, 2025). Understanding where Georgescu fits on this spectrum is complicated; Trifan (2025) states that Georgescu's campaign aligns closely with traditional populist radical right ideology, employing democratic mobilization and anti-elite appeals. At the same time, his campaign's discourse clearly shows signs that once elected, he would erode and undermine the democratic system. Employing messianic rhetoric, he frames himself as the nation's savior, subtly evoking extremist ideological motifs from Romania's past, such as the legacy of the Iron Guard's nationalism and mythologized Orthodoxy, as Marincea (2025) highlights. The thesis intends to understand where exactly Georgescu fits within the far right spectrum. However, using the term far right is more beneficial as it is an umbrella term covering both radical and extreme right.

3.1.1 Populism as a tool of FRP

Literature on populism is extensive, with much debate on how to accurately define it accurately; however, Mudde's approach to treat populism as a "thin-centered ideology" separating society into two antagonistic and homogeneous groups, between the "pure people" vs corrupt "elites", is widely accepted in the academic field (Mudde, 2004, p. 543). Populism itself is central to understanding modern radical right ideology, as populists claim that all legitimate political power lies with the collective population, arguing that politics should be an unmediated expression of people's general will (Mudde, 2004; Canovan, 1999). Populism by itself doesn't offer comprehensive policy suggestions, instead attaching to "host ideologies" like nationalism, which have more comprehensive plans (Mudde, 2004, 2007). Populists identify themselves as the unified society fighting against the enemy, usually elites and corrupt politicians, portrayed like a David and Goliath story (Wodak, 2015). Mudde (2018) furthers research on populist ideology in the moral dimension, highlighting the portrayal of the people as fundamentally good and righteous, while the ruling elites are immoral and corrupt. This moral dichotomy is usually used by populists to delegitimize the opposition, especially through claims of corruption, arguing that to compromise with the opposition is a betrayal of the people (Mudde, 2018; Wodak, 2013). This rhetoric is exemplified in us versus them language, using words such as "traitors", "enemies of the people," or "drain the swamp" to condemn established political and self-serving elites; while claiming to have a unique mandate to represent the unheard and unappreciated voices of ordinary citizens (Taggart, 2000; Moffitt, 2016 p. 43; Mudde, 2019).

Right-wing populists tend to fuse populism and nativism, often defining 'the people' in ethnic, cultural, and religious terms, while outsiders aren't just elites, but also minorities and marginalized groups who are stigmatized. It is also important to highlight that populism is not only on the right, Left-wing populists invoke a similar narrative but the elite is usually defined in

socio-economic terms and the people are the abused working class (Mudde, 2007; Wodak et al., 2013). This ideology is exemplified in Eastern Europe, especially Romania, where populist politicians tend to rail against the EU and Brussels bureaucrats in their appeals, framing themselves as patriots rescuing the nation from corrupt globalist elites who sold out the country (Dragoman, 2021; Cistelecan et al., 2025). Mudde (2007) uses the term "populist radical right" to underscore actors like Georgescu, who follows this template closely throughout his campaign, positioning himself as a former insider who has seen the evils of globalist elites and speaks for "Real Romanians" upset with their corrupted political elites (Trifan, 2025; Gherghina, 2025). By conceptualizing far right populism, this research can better analyze Georgescu's campaign rhetoric, which simultaneously targets elites and outsiders.

3.2 Recurrent wave theory

To better understand the modern far right in Europe, it is important to study Italy's deep-rooted history with fascism. During the interwar period, Italy's fascist movement gained support following the chaos of World War 1. Fascism at that time was largely a youth-driven revolt against the old order, with Benito Mussolini himself being just 39 when he became Prime Minister in 1922 (Mosse, 1966, p. 16). After the fall of Mussolini's regime, the first wave of the modern far right started adapting and reforming. Even though the new Italian Republic was founded on anti-fascist principles, by 1946, veterans of Mussolini's regime had already formed the Italian Social Movement (Movimento Sociale Italiano, MSI), with the party being explicitly loyal to Mussolini's legacy (Gallego, 1999, p. 160). This is largely categorized as the first wave of the modern far right (1945–1955) (Mudde, 2019). This wave is the least prominent but should not be understated, as it leads to a domino effect for future waves.

This first wave consisted of marginal movements often led by former fascists defending the old regimes (Mudde, 2019, p. 27). During these early waves, far-right parties had little electoral impact, as mentioned earlier, but this is where the radical and extreme right diverge. Mudde defines the far right broadly to include both the extreme right, which outright rejects democracy in the tradition of fascism and the radical right, which accepts electoral democracy but opposes liberal-democratic values like minority rights (Mudde, 2019). This distinction implies that the radical right sought to repackage far-right ideas within the bounds of democratic politics. In contrast, extreme right groups remained underground or banned in the early post-war era. The second wave (1955–1980) remained similarly marginal, emerging in response to social changes and focusing on criticisms of the postwar liberal order (mainly opposition to the expansion of welfare states) (Mudde, 2019, p. 27).

The third wave of the far right (1980s–1990s) saw a significant resurgence of radical right parties in Western Europe (Mudde, 2019, p. 27). This third wave saw the first successful populist radical right parties, such as the French National Front (FN), gain traction while still being treated as pariahs by the political mainstream. This wave was much more successful in its goal of chipping away at the political mainstream, allowing the fourth wave to appear around the 2000s and continue today (Mudde, 2019). Shifts in the 1970s, such as economic stagnation and neoliberal shifts, created openings that far-right populists exploited (Halperin, 2021, p. 742). The neo-fascist MSI survived the post-war period and, in the early 1990s, refashioned itself as the National Alliance (Alleanza Nazionale - AN), entering a governing coalition in 1994. It is one of the first far-right successors of fascism to attain power in post-war Western Europe (Gallego, 1999, p. 161). Similarly, around Western Europe, other far-right parties began making electoral headway during this third wave; parties like Jean-Marie Le Pen's National Front (FN) in France,

Jörg Haider's Freedom Party (FPÖ) in Austria, and others gained popularity by railing "against immigrants and … national elites, while presenting themselves as the voice of the 'ordinary people'" (Mudde, 2019, p. 26). By contrast, in Eastern Europe, openly far right political sentiments were repressed under communism. (Halperin, 2021, p. 734).

After the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, the trajectory of the far right has differed somewhat from the West, failing to gain much traction during the early 1990s. One reason is that emerging democratic systems were dominated by ex-communist and nationalist-populist parties that already occupied much of the same ideological space that the far right might otherwise claim. Additionally, in the early transition years many Eastern European countries saw improving economic conditions, temporarily dampening the appeal of extremist solutions. However, as the post-1989 euphoria faded, societies in Eastern Europe tended to exhibit lower levels of mutual trust and higher dissatisfaction with institutions than those in the West. For example, Polyakova (2015) found that about 43% of Western Europeans expressed general trust in others, versus only 23% in Eastern Europe, a gap that can foster receptivity to anti-establishment rhetoric. Far-right movements in the East have gradually "modernized" their image and messaging, but still consistently rely on fear of globalization, anti-elite populism, and grandiose promises to protect the nation (Mudde, 2019; Wodak et al., 2013). By the 2010s, radical right parties in many Eastern European states had begun to break into the mainstream by embracing ultra-nationalist themes and exploiting historical grievances. Hungary's Fidesz party, under Viktor Orbán's leadership, transformed from a center-right liberal party into a hardline nationalist party. As a result, he pushed Hungarian foreign policy toward Russia and continues to push strong anti-European Union (EU) rhetoric while continuing to chip away at democratic checks and balances (Minkenberg, 2017, p. 33; Mudde, 2014, p. 100). This broader success of

normalizing the far right around Europe sets the stage for examining Romania's own far-right trajectory following the fall of communism. Mudde further develops this wave theory by building out what he calls "the fourth wave" of the far right, in "which radical right parties have become mainstreamed and increasingly normalized" (Mudde, 2019, p. 15)

3.2.1 Breakdown of Mudde's Fourth Wave

Mudde (2019) explains that the far right heavily exploited three major crises in the early 2000s, giving way to the fourth wave. The 9/11 terrorist attacks, the 2008 financial crisis, and the 2015 migrant crisis, followed by a string of terrorism in Europe, created fertile ground for anti-establishment and nativist rhetoric. Far-right leaders position themselves as the only ones willing to address public anxieties around these matters without fear of political correctness (Mudde, 2019; Halperin, 2021). The fourth wave is further exacerbated by voters' gradual detachment from traditional mainstream parties, allowing for these new movements to gain popularity. Mudde also highlights that the fourth wave brought heterogeneity to the far right, with a multitude of archetypes made of well-established networks, movements, and social media personalities (Mudde, 2019, p. 61). Some of these archetypes lean more extreme than others, ranging from neo-Nazis' to illiberal democrats, but at their core, they share similar themes like nativism and populism. Ironically, these groups share transnational narratives like protection of Christian values and opposing globalism (Halperin, 2021; Wodak, 2015).

In Eastern Europe, Mudde's fourth wave is further exacerbated by additional triggers such as corruption scandals, slow improvements in the standard of living, and cultural backlash against rapid liberalization. These factors were weaponized by AUR and figures like Georgescu, blaming "transition" elites and external actors like the EU for Romania's misfortunes (Burean & Palfy, 2025; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2001, p. 193). The modern Romanian far right learned from other

movements globally, in what is often referred to as "globalization of far-right discourse" (Mudde, 2019; Sorensen, 2022). Georgescu's campaign is a prime example, drawing inspiration from the successes of Donald Trump, Marine Le Pen, and Viktor Orban, even adopting similar slogans like "draining the swamp" and "protecting our nation" and adapting them to Romanian contexts. Mudde's point is that the fourth wave is a global phenomenon (Mudde, 2019; Colibasanu, 2024; Gherghina, 2025).

3.3 Ideology of Far-Right Discourse

Nativism, authoritarianism, and populism, Mudde identifies these three dimensions as core components that are constantly intertwining in contemporary far-right discourse (Mudde, 2007). Wodak (2015) notes that far-right populists envision an *"*anti-pluralist*"* society, deciding *"*who belongs and who does not belong*"* (Wodak, 2015, p. 52). She also highlights that fear and blame are central themes observed, scapegoating others for "very complex issues," usually with loosely corroborated claims to reaffirm this narrative (Wodak, 2015, p. 52). Throughout this analysis, conspiracy theories emerge as a recurring undertone in far-right discourse, as it is used to shape emotions and fabricate narratives. In the Romanian context, the discourse merges these features of nativism, authoritarianism, and populist ideas, but adds an Orthodox Christian frame. Georgescu regularly *"*invoking Orthodox spirituality and ecological nationalism*"* in his fight against globalism (Trifan, 2025, p. 223). Below are further considerations of the emotional and symbolic appeals in far-right discourse, and how it fits within the Romanian context. This research intends to reinforce the evidence that emerging actors in Romania fit within the broader context of the far-right as identified by Mudde, Wodak, and other scholars. It also argues that Georgescu embodies the ideas of nativism, authoritarianism, and populism laid out by Mudde while adding the Judeo-Christian narrative to better appeal to his target audience.

3.3.1 Emotional and symbolist appeals

Research in political communication highlights the power of emotions like fear and hope as key motivators in political behavior; as such, far right campaigns tend to lean strongly into these strategies (Marcus, 2000; Nabi, 2003). The "*Politics of Fear*" by Wodak (2015) specifically analyzes this playbook; noting the use of existential threats and crisis, populists heighten public fear to present themselves as the solution. Fear-mongering is the only side of emotional politics; hopeful or prideful narratives are common among successful populists, using it as an antidote to the fear they stoke, usually promising a national rebirth or great future once the corrupt elites are swept away (Black et al., 2021). In the context of far-right rhetoric, these positive appeals often involve symbolism, usually referring to a golden age that has passed and consistently invoking national heroes, God, and family. The symbolic appeal is especially powerful in Romania, where the historical remembrance of Romania's unification, Greater Romania, and resistance against communism is regularly tapped into for national sentiment (Bottoni, 2014; Grigore & Pappas, 2016). Anger is another mobilizing emotion frequently used in far-right discourse to provoke outrage among the in-group against out-groups and elites. This anger is usually tied to a sense of betrayal, using the idea that corrupt elites have sold out the working class, or the out-group has abused the nation's generosity (Hameleers, 2020). Ahmed (2004) and Moffitt (2016) defined this strategy as affective politics in which emotion (affect) is a fundamental part of political identity and decision making. When analyzing Georgescu's speeches and media posts, this emotional and symbolic content consistently appears. This research intends to understand how he uses these appeals to resonate with his audience and reinforce his ideological messaging.

3.4 Strategies in Far-Right Digital Discourse

With digital media, radical right-wing actors have managed to spread their message faster, cheaper, and more efficiently than ever before, giving rise to "digital populism" (Engesser et al., 2017; Sorensen, 2022). Social media platforms like Facebook, YouTube, TikTok, and Twitter have fundamentally changed the political landscape forever through algorithmic engagement and virality (van Dijck and Poell, 2013). The algorithm rewards content that is emotionally resonant, shareable, and often polarizing, because it's most likely to keep users engaged. FRPs are well-positioned to exploit this logic, as their discourse is often emotionally charged and simplified into "us versus them" terms, making their content highly shareable online (Engesser et al., 2017; Bobba, 2019). Studies have found that "sensationalist and divisive messaging" tends to perform well on social media, helping outsiders like Georgescu reach mass audiences directly without assistance for traditional media (Tucker, 2018; Nistor, 2024). The key ingredient of recent far-right successes in both the United States and Europe has been the use of online platforms to amplify messages that tap into voters' fears and frustrations (Nistor, 2024; Kubik, 2024). Each subsection below further breaks down the most common strategies used in digital discourse among the far-right in Romania and abroad.

3.4.1 National identity and in-group/out-group dynamics

Far-right populist discourse often claims to defend the "true authentic nation", which they argue is under threat from various outsiders or internal traitors (Wodak et al., 2013; Minkenberg, 2017). This is where in-group versus out-group dynamics come into play among far right populists. Benedict Anderson (1983) coined the term "imagined community" to better explain this type of social construct that is built off of shared symbols, media, and narratives, but it should be noted that imagined community applies to both sides of the political spectrum. While

his research didn't specifically focus on far-right ideology, the imagined community is an intricate part of the far-right. In terms of right wing parties, they typically promote a narrative of nostalgic glory and future revival, often by alluding to historical figures (Tudor, 2014; Mosse, 1966). They also identify the out-group as responsible for the nation's perceived decline, advocating for the in-group to rally against this existential other (Wodak, 2015; Marincea, 2025). The in-group/out-group framing serves multiple purposes in populist campaigns, allowing them to strengthen solidarity by sticking together to survive against this existential threat; second, it gives them the ability to simplify complex issues by attributing blame to out-groups (Pelinka, 2013). For example, in the Romanian election, the out-group narratives range from anti-Brussels, to anti-Hungarian, to classic antisemitic tropes (Marincea, 2025, p. 50). The research utilizes Marincea's (2025) research around the Neo-legionary revival in Romania, by recognizing that frames will be the key to understanding how Georgescu's messaging resonated with segments of the Romanian public who felt that their nation was under siege.

3.4.2 Disinformation

Disinformation is more prominent and uncontrollable than ever before, with Baghiu (2025) arguing that social media companies' "platform capitalism" model has effectively created a digital dystopia in which the more outrageous the content the more attention a candidate receives (Baghiu, 2025, p. 3). This, in turn, shapes the electoral performance of candidates. Digital platforms offer three major advantages for populist candidates: direct communication with supporters; creating an illusion of intimacy and authenticity, the illusion of community among like-minded individuals, which is essentially an echo chamber, and real-time analytics allowing these candidates to pivot their messaging based around their most liked content (Enli, 2017; Engesser et al., 2017; Bartlett and Birdwell, 2021). This results in feedback loops pushing

out content meant to trigger strong emotional reactions, primarily through meme culture which further polarizes and expands their reach. Viral memes, slogans, and satire is one of the main hallmarks of digital populism, condensing complex ideological messages into punchy and emotional snippets that spread quickly (Geurkink, 2020). Romania's 2024 campaign indicates clear manipulation of the algorithms and "clickbait" content to significantly boost their far-right narratives (Baghiu, 2025, p. 7; Cistelecan et al., 2025, p. 170). Georgescu's team crafted viral content filled with allegations of vast corruption and existential threats to the nation, which spread like wildfire among Facebook groups and Telegram channels aligned with his movement (Trifan, 2025). Botan et al. (2025) criticizes the Georgescu campaign's refusal to fact check, blurring the lines between legitimate political communication and disinformation. Like other scholars, her research team agrees that in the Romanian context, an online ecosystem of questionable news sites and social media pages helped bolster these false narratives (Botan et al., 2025).

3.4.3 Anti-establishment rhetoric and legitimacy claims

A recurring theme across the concepts of populism, identity, emotional appeal, and far-right politics overall is the question of political legitimacy, in particular, how far-right populists construct their legitimacy while undermining their opponents. In liberal democracies, legitimacy is typically formed around the adherence to democratic norms and the rule of law. However, populists tend to promote a mandate of "the people" as their basis of legitimacy; asserting that they have the support of the nation behind them as the only rightful and capable leader, Canovan describes this type of behavior as "redemptive" (Canovan, 1999). Several other legitimacy strategies are commonly employed in far-right discourse, such as conspiracy theories in which the nation's democracy is a sham controlled by external powers such as Soros and

Brussels. These claims have both the effect of delegitimizing the current governments as puppets and elevating the populist as a courageous leader willing to expose and rail against the scheme (Marincea, 2025; Mudde, 2019). Additional strategies include constitutional and religious legitimacy; in terms of constitutional legitimacy, they tend to accuse the government of violating the country's constitution, reinterpreting it to fit their narrative, arguing that once elected, they will restore the rule of law (Halperin, 2021). Religious legitimacy is often embraced among populists because it can conveniently be invoked to fit their narrative, claiming to defend "judeo-christian values" and "define the moral boundaries of the nation" (Wodak, 2015; Mudde, 2019, p. 46).

These legitimacy claims are usually supported by anti-establishment rhetoric, insisting that existing elites have lost their legitimacy and essentially vilifying them in the process (Mudde, 2010). Furthermore, Moffit (2016) discusses the use of performative politics, where theatrics such as confrontations and provocations are used to show these leaders are advocating for the people. In the case of Romania, Grappa and Mogos (2023) discuss George Simion's orchestrated and choreographed performances of 'patriotic violence,' portraying himself as a strong oppositionist never willing to secede in the fight. The Orthodox Church is also considered a highly trusted institution, which benefits far-right parties by closely associating with religious conservatives and utilizing spiritual language to advocate for their mission (Asavei, 2022, p. 51). Furthermore, in terms of corruption, Romania still ranks as one of Europe's most corrupt countries, with countless political elites being accused and indicted of blatant corruption, which makes it an easy target for figures on the far-right like Georgescu. Many political figures, such as Becali who was indicted in 2012, have also been accused of or indicted on large corruption schemes (Asavei, 2022). In the context of Georgescu's campaign, this analysis is especially

important in understanding his legitimacy claims and rhetoric. These frames will be used as analytical units in the subsequent analysis.

3.5 Theoretical overview

This chapter highlights the theoretical foundations of the thesis, defining far right and populism through Mudde and Wodak's definitions, as leading scholars on the subject. Understanding Mudde's wave theory allows for a better understanding of Georgescu's campaign within the broader far-right context. Having built out this framework around the far-right and populism, my thesis intends to analyze the content and strategy used in Georgescu's campaign rhetoric, evaluating to what extent they reflect a wider pattern and what contributions this had on his unexpected rise in popularity throughout the election. I also intend to clarify where Georgescu positions himself within the greater far-right movement.

4. Methodology

This chapter breaks down the research design, data collection, and analytical framework for examining Georgescu's campaign discourse on Facebook as it relates to far-right populism in Romania. The objective of the section is to give a clear understanding of the thought process behind the research. The research intends to break down the sample selection and explain "why Facebook" instead of any other platform. Mudde's (2019) *Far Right Today* is the base framework; the research produced intends to place Georgescu within Mudde's broader fourth wave. This section also intends to address factors such as limitations, time frame, and other ethical considerations.

4.1 Research design

A qualitative critical discourse analysis is not the analysis of discourse, but how discourse relates to "other objects, elements, or moments" (Fairclough, 2010, p. 4). This research combines descriptive and analytical approaches to evaluate the campaign communications of Georgescu's social media. The research catalogues everything that is verbally communicated, but also interprets how it is said and its significance. The use of language, appeals, and narratives is integral parts of analyzing his discourse. The thematic analysis portion identifies, analyzes, and interprets recurring topics and motifs across his posts (Clarke and Braun, 2017, p. 297). This focus on both rhetoric and themes allows for a better understanding of Georgescu's communication in terms of both how and what messaging is being conveyed. The design is rooted in the broader literature around far-right populism and the popularization of digital political discourse.

As discussed in the theoretical section, Mudde's (2007, p. 23) characterization of far-right populist discourse as a nationalist "people-centric" worldview, and Wodak's (2015, p. 2) deconstruction of far-right populist discourse into "us, the righteous people" and "them, the evil people," provides an initial framework for populist themes such as nationalism, religion, historical ties, and conspiracy theories. It's important to acknowledge that elements are further exacerbated by digitization; the political landscape has completely shifted as a result of social media. Prior studies have found that digital platforms enable these populist candidates to structure and amplify their messaging by framing political issues, while avoiding journalists whom they disagree with (Engesser et al., 2017, p. 1110). Examining Georgescu's Facebook videos through both qualitative coding and critical discourse interpretation provides a deeper understanding of where within the larger far-right spectrum he fits, and how this campaign leveraged social media to propagate his FRP rhetoric. This design documents and translates the content and analyzes it, informed by the broader academic discussion.

4.2 Sample selection

The empirical focus is on the campaign's Facebook posts, specifically, the video content produced and posted to Georgescu's official campaign page between the period of March 1st, 2023, and November 24th, 2024. The sample period was chosen for its relevance as the main period of his discourse, capturing the entire run-up to the first round of the presidential elections. The start date coincides with the first video posted to his account, and the end date is the day after the first round of the presidential election. Collecting the digital footprint over this twenty-month period allowed for the best tracking of his discourse throughout the first round. The data analyzed consists mainly of videos; status updates, photos, and reels were excluded. Reels are similar to videos but usually under one minute. In Georgescu's case, the reels largely

featured the exact same content as his longer videos, just cut into short segments. The decision to focus on his videos was both for practical and theoretical motives. Georgescu relied heavily on video content to convey his messaging, with his page primarily featuring videos of speeches, interviews, and public appearances/community outings. Focusing on the videos ensured the greatest substance and objective understanding of his discourse without redundancy or repetition.

His text and image posts were unnecessary for incorporating in the sample, as they weren't his main form of appealing to his voter base or central to his campaign strategy. I decided to limit the sample in this way to align with other qualitative researchers like Wodak or van Dijk (1993), their approach is to select materials that are relevant and elaborate on the sociopolitical goal of their research (van Dijk, 1993, p. 252). For my research, the official campaign account is the primary verified source of all campaign communications; this ensures that all samples were authentically produced by Georgescu, instead of pulling from third-party sources like news reports. Facebook was also chosen as the primary data source, because of its continued use by both younger and older Romanians. A Statista (2024) report shows the platform bolsters over 12.35 million Romanians, making up over 65% of the population, and is by far the most popular social media app in the country. The sample collected was made up of all the aforementioned content within the set period; this approach allowed the case study to avoid selection bias. This approach aims to ensure that the analysis reflects the full range of his video-based discourse during the campaign window rather than cherry-picking the data.

4.3 Data collection

Each video post was collected in the sample period, translated, and entered into an Excel spreadsheet for coding and analysis. This spreadsheet, included in the appendix under the dataset section and illustrated in Table 1, was designed to facilitate data collection and analysis. It

recorded key variables including the date of publication, dimensions of far-right ideology, engagement metrics (likes, views, comments), video length (short, long video), video link, English translated transcript of the video, and finally remarks by the author. These metrics provide context regarding information such as the effectiveness, messaging, and reach of each post. This data is especially important for connecting the themes with interaction rates. The core of the data collection was the coding of each video's recurring themes.

After watching every video fully and transcribing them into English, multiple themes became abundantly clear and were subsequently coded as dimensions. After each video, using the themes listed below, I went through and assigned any dimension labels that were present based on the discourse that was used. These discourse themes were created to exemplify what is considered far-right and populist rhetoric. Some of the dimensions below were highlighted by other scholars like Mudde, while some were added and refined by me throughout the course of my research for the Romanian context. They encompass multiple prominent themes, such as nationalist appeals to the Romanian identity, Orthodox Christianity, and general Christian references, anti-elitist and anti-globalist rhetoric, historical and ancestral references, call to action (mobilization of supporters to fight back against the current order), and conspiracy theories.

Dimensions

- **Call to Action -** Moffitt (2016) and Wodak (2015) highlighted that populist leaders stage things in a perpetual state of constant crisis, rallying their audience and portraying themselves as the voices of the silent majority. The call to action can be as simple as getting out to vote or as provocative as mobilization against the current government, especially if the far-right populist loses.

- **Conspiracy theory -** Far right discourse often relies on conspiracy theories to control the narrative. These theories tend to offer a simplified explanation to complex social issues within the country. Mudde (2019) notes that the populist radical right frequently uses conspiracy theories to undermine and erode trust in democratic institutions.
- **Anti-globalism** - Mudde (2017) highlights anti-globalism as a feature of radical right rhetoric because it's framed as a defense against "globalist elites" who have sold out the nation. Minkenberg (2017) also notes that in Eastern Europe, this rhetoric adds a post-communist layer, associating institutions like the IMF, EU, and UN with the real external dominators.
- **Religion** - Religion is especially important to far-right discourse as it legitimizes their position as the party of the people, especially in a country that ties religion to national identity. Mudde (2019) explains how the far-right present themselves as "Judeo-Christian" defenders, to culturally tie themselves to the nation and exclude the perceived outsider.
- **Anti-western/Pro-Russian** - Post-communist countries, like Romania, tend to show signs of skepticism towards the EU, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the United States (US), because of the rapid shift in their countries' socio-economic circumstances. Far-right populists play on this skepticism to motivate support, with these anti-Western views being framed as a rejection of liberalism and secularism. These groups also tend to frame Russia as a defender of Christian moral values (Wodak, 2015).
- **Ultra-Conservative** - There is an emphasis on traditional values and resistance to liberalism, which means opposition to LGBT rights, feminism, and multiculturalism. Wodak (2015) notes that these views are framed into narratives of national decline and

cultural eradication. Mudde (2007) adds onto the research by noting that far-right movements claim to represent the "real people" against the morally corrupt elites.

- **Historical Context** - National history ties back into the preservation of culture, often framing history to create an emotional narrative of betrayal, decline, and possible revival of the nation. Wodak (2015) refers to this as "politics of memory"; the past is invoked to reinforce present-day grievances.

Ultimately, the data collection presented a thorough understanding of Georgescu's position as it shifted throughout his discourse, adapting to new conversations. It also allowed for a thorough understanding of which dimensions resonated most with viewers based on likes, views, and comments.

Figure 2

Example of the table used to organize data from Georgescu's Facebook discourse

Post date	Dimensions	Engagement Metrics	Status	Link	Notes	remarks
3/1/2023	Religion, Call to Action	290 likes (L), 3k views (V)	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/3290888031126425	First video on his FB Channel, a Call to action to fight for the country as our forefathers have, closes out with facts over fear, and talks about manifest destiny	

4.4 Limitations and ethical considerations

The scope of the data collected was limited to a single social media platform, in this case, Facebook, because it would have been redundant to collect from all its social media pages as they tend to be the same clips cut up and reuploaded over multiple platforms. Focusing on Facebook allowed for a comprehensive understanding of the themes present in his discourse. Howef, it also means that the findings may not fully capture Georgescu's broader online presence and campaign strategy on other platforms like TikTok. His main success on the campaign trail came from his official TikTok account, which has since been deleted after reports by the Romanian security service and internal government documents were released by then-President Iohannis. These documents highlighted that the account was propagated by swarms of bot accounts that would repost these videos, manipulating the algorithm in the process; these accounts were traced to bot farms in Turkey and the funding was traced back to Russia. As such, focusing on Facebook, which appeared to be a centralized source for all his content, was decided as the best way to preserve a consistent and coherent dataset.

The analysis also relies on data from user engagement metrics to understand which frames were most popular among Georgescu's voters. However, these numbers don't provide a complete picture across all platforms, where user engagement may be higher. Upon further examination of Georgescu's Facebook likes, a proportion of the accounts appeared to be bot accounts supporting these videos, potentially influencing Facebook's algorithm. The metrics collected don't account for age, sex, location, or political affiliation, which limits the research to more generalized assumptions. Furthermore, since the speeches were transcribed into English, some vocabulary may have been changed in translation to convey the intended meaning rather than the literal equivalence. An example of this is Georgescu's use of the term "Hrană" to refer

to organic food, while its literal meaning translates as “fed.” The engagement metrics, particularly comments, should be interpreted cautiously, as comments were deactivated for much of the first quarter of Georgescu’s campaign. Each video can be independently verified; within the dataset there’s a link to each video.

5. Discourse analysis of Georgescu's campaign

This chapter presents the findings and analysis of Georgescu's Facebook discourse and his manifesto *Hrană, Apă, Energie*. The focus of this research is to identify how he exemplifies far-right ideology particularly through his discourse, patterns, and themes to frame national decline, sovereignty, and moral rebirth. Applying the framework established by Mudde (2019) and Wodak (2015), this analysis shows the evident recurrence of these dimensions and how Georgescu employs a saviour complex to position himself as the savior of the Romanian people and the spearhead of a systematic overhaul. This chapter utilizes the theoretical lens of "populist radical right" as defined by Mudde (2007, 2019), within the bounds of nativism, authoritarianism, and populism. The chapter also utilizes Wodak's "*Politics of Fear*" to explain the strategic construction of a crisis and emotional framing. These frameworks allow for a better understanding of Georgescu's discourse as part of the broader far-right, seeking to normalize illiberalism under the guise of patriotism, faith, and traditionalism. The dimensions are individually broken down in the sub-sections below, using examples from transcribed videos, visuals, and manifesto excerpts to exemplify Georgescu's ideology as a part of the far-right. The analysis that follows offers a thorough account of Georgescu's rhetoric revealing a strategic convergence of populist messaging and authoritarian aspirations.

5.1 Analysis of the dimensions of Georgescu's far-right ideology

The dimensions provide a structured understanding of the rhetoric and ideology that define Georgescu's far-right discourse. These dimensions aren't isolated and are frequently overlapping to reinforce each other and form a consistent narrative of moral decay, elite betrayal, and national redemption. Each dimension was adapted for Georgescu's Romanian political

discourse and falls within existing far-right literature. The section seeks to understand Georgescu as a far-right candidate by analyzing and placing his discourse within the dimensions. Backed by direct quotes, imagery, and corresponding passages from the manifesto, this section seeks to place him within the broader far-right of Mudde's (2019) fourth wave.

Call to action

The call to action emerged as central within Georgescu's discourse, both in the form of urging Romanians to vote and as a moral and societal duty to change the country's current socio-economic trajectory. Based on the dataset, it's the first theme introduced in his Facebook discourse and the most frequently used, with 58% of all videos having some form of call to action. The first video of the dataset, posted on March 1st, 2023, begins with a dramatic appeal: "The country has crashed, fight with your hearts and your spirits" (Georgescu, 2023a, 0:01–0:09). This early framing repositions Georgescu as a freedom fighter instead of a politician, advocating for collective resistance which is rhetoric that becomes increasingly common throughout. This is exemplified in his announcement that he is officially running for president, in which he declares, "This is not a presidential campaign but a calling … in which we don't change our owners, but our society entirely" (Georgescu, 2024j, 0:20–3:30). The language aligns with Wodak's (2015) research on right-wing populists' ability to construct narratives of crisis, while presenting themselves as moral saviors. Moffitt (2016) also describes this as "permanent crisis performance," where there is a continuous emergency to justify extraordinary measures (Moffitt, 2016, p. 116). This performance is extensively clear in the manifesto, where Georgescu suggests political participation is necessary to begin the nation's destiny-writing: "*Țara trebuie adusă la nivelul unei chemări*" (The country must rise to the level of a calling) (Georgescu, 2024a, p. 6).

Another example of collective mobilization is Georgescu's use of the bee as a metaphor for national unity. It's only explicitly mentioned once in a video from July 30th, 2024; the bee is elaborated on in the manifesto multiple times: "*Nu exagerăm dacă spunem că salvarea albinelor înseamnă salvarea oamenilor*" (We are not exaggerating when we say that saving the bees means saving humanity) (Georgescu, 2024a, p. 9). In this context, the bee represents both community interdependence and environmental protection. Building off this appeal to national duty, Georgescu frequently frames the state as abandoning and selling out the nation, particularly those in the diaspora. Offering no evidence to substantiate these claims, Georgescu uses a populist far-right approach of framing the Romanian people as righteous but neglected and needing a strong leader to redeem the country. The call to action is almost never a stand-alone dimension; rather it's usually employed as a tactic once emotionally charged content has been invoked, to act on these emotions.

Conspiracy theories

According to Mudde (2019), conspiracy theories are a frequent feature of the populist radical right, used to chip away at the trust of democratic institutions and frame elites as intentionally betraying the nation. In the case of Georgescu, this dimension is consistently intertwined throughout his discourse, frequently involving the spread of misleading or blatantly false information. The first mention of conspiracy rhetoric appears on March 6, 2023, in a carefully choreographed video (Video 5) featuring Georgescu and an elderly man dressed in traditional clothing sitting across from each other with fresh produce between them (Georgescu, 2023b). The two discuss the disarray of Romania's politics, society, and economy, claiming that the EU deliberately poisons food with harmful chemicals while blocking Romanian-grown products from being sold. The older man expresses his frustrations with the country's political

system over the last three decades and its inability to produce anything of value. The video blends multiple rhetorical dimensions but clearly serves its purpose, becoming the first post to surpass 1,000 likes. These conspiratorial theories are not simply social media rhetoric, as they are reinforced in his written manifesto, where false claims from earlier videos are repackaged as policy. For example:

- "In order to improve the value of the soil, synthetic insecticides and pesticides must be replaced with ecological alternatives." (Georgescu, 2024a, p. 9)
- "Under no circumstances can we allow economic entities… to contaminate… our water resources." (Georgescu, 2024a, p. 21)
- "The indiscriminate adoption of 'green' policies… has created… a state of permanent energy crisis." (Georgescu, 2024a, p. 15)

Georgescu also strategically uses his past experiences with international institutions, such as the United Nations (UN) and the Club of Rome, to bolster his anti-globalist stance. In Video 25, he repurposes these connections to depict organizations as evil forces created to manipulate global populations (Georgescu, 2024f). He further appeals to the psychology of Romanians by drawing on the past traumas from the communist era and Western European stigmas of the Romanian people, remarking that "Bulgaria has surpassed Romania economically by a lot" (Georgescu, 2023c, 0:33–0:40). In the same video, he claims that Romania hasn't seen meaningful investment since the 1990s; this isn't incompetence, but rather intentional incompetence. In his discourse, he also propagates COVID vaccine conspiracies, asserting that unvaccinated people were discriminated against for refusal to accept the vaccine, arguing instead that the body supposedly produces all necessary antibodies, a false claim that has been disproven (Georgescu, 2023g). Conspiracies have proven to be a central and recurring theme of Georgescu's discourse. The data

suggests that conspiracy theories appear in approximately 48.4% of all videos analyzed from his Facebook page.

Anti-globalism

Anti-globalism is a centrally rooted dimension in Georgescu's campaign, building a narrative around globalism as a civilizational threat on top of an economic one. Throughout his videos and manifesto, he constructs a sovereignist, anti-technocratic, anti-Western worldview, framing Romania as a victim of foreign exploitation and elite betrayal. Explicitly self-identifying as a sovereignist, he shifts the definition to mean self-reliant: "I am talking about individual sovereignty" (Georgescu, 2024p, 0:31–0:35). This connection between nationalism and individualism is meant to convey the concept of "pure people" being oppressed collectively and individually by a corrupt global order. Mudde (2019) categorizes this ideology as the populist radical right, focusing on a nativist rejection of transnationalism. In his rhetoric, Georgescu claims, "We import 90% of our elements, 90% of our banks are outside Romania," suggesting there is a loss of economic autonomy, which is both framed as purposeful humiliation and elitist treason (Georgescu, 2024s, 0:01–0:09). This messaging implies Romania is more an exploited colony sold off to outsiders, rather than a nation struggling in a globalized world.

This theme frequently intersects with conspiracy narratives, reinforcing the idea that Romania's economic difficulties are engineered by "techno-globalist oligarchs" (Georgescu, 2024, p. 2). In this framing, Romania's political establishment isn't just incompetent but actively complicit in a global scheme to extract resources and erase national sovereignty. His rhetoric consistently blurs the lines between critique, conspiracy, and flat-out lies. The visuals from Georgescu's Facebook video in Figure 3 portrays the leader of the World Health Organization (WHO) as a terrorist; in the same video, the devil is depicted shaking hands with a suited figure,

which is supposed to imply capitalism deals with the devil (Georgescu, 2024f, 1:40; 3:12). This use of satanic manifestations is further exacerbated in a prior video, where he says, “What I can add is that this form of globalism which is a complete shame and negative and satanic at its core, principally are you with us or against us, against us means against LGBT, that there is no religion … they act in desperation to hold onto power” (Georgescu, 2024e, 0:01–0:54). Wodak (2015) describes this rhetoric as othering in far-right discourse. The anti-globalist dimension is deepened by including the religious dimension, tying globalism with anti-Christian values, which in turn presents Georgescu as the final stand against moral evil.

Figure 3

Screenshots from Georgescu’s Facebook depicting figures in suits interacting with the devil, and WHO Director-General Dr. Adhanom as a terrorist.

Note. Screenshots from Facebook post by Georgescu (2024f), labeled as Video 25 in the annex dataset

While promoting an anti-globalist narrative, he focuses on a Western-specific version, as he claims "BRICS is the future with China being the head" (Georgescu, 2024d, 1:45), and, when discussing the Russian war on Ukraine, states "No, because I promote peace, not war" (Georgescu, 2024r, 0:11–0:14).

The anti-globalist dimension is central to Georgescu's manifesto, which calls on Romania to focus on adopting an economic program of self-sufficiency, focused on local production of food, water, and energy, and withdrawing from the EU to control domestic policy without influence. These proposals resemble Trump's "Make America Great Again" strategy, which similarly focuses on isolationist ideology. Like Trump and Orban, Georgescu calls for the country to reject modernity and accept "a sovereignist model adapted to the challenges of the 21st century" (Georgescu, 2024a, p. 2). For Romanians, this type of messaging resonates strongly due to their communist past and fears of being forced to conform to Western liberal ideology. While the dimension only appears about 25% of the time in discourse, it garnered about 400,000 likes across the collected time frame.

(It should be noted that this calculation does not account for potential overlap between coded dimensions.)

Religion

The religious dimension, specifically Romanian Orthodox Christianity, is a foundational position of Georgescu's political messaging, both in his discourse as well as in his manifesto "Hrana, Apa, Energie" (Georgescu, 2024a). This religious dimension connects national identity with Orthodox Christianity, serving as a moral compass; he regularly blends faith and tradition as the foundation for Romania's belonging and national survival. Orthodoxy is used to draw the lines between true, hard-working Romanians and corrupt elites trying to wipe away this heritage and impose atheistic liberalism. Mudde (2019) notes this adoption of the Judeo-Christian narrative is frequent among radical right-wing actors to create cultural exclusion and political legitimacy. Georgescu often embeds religious references in emotionally appealing language, with one of the best examples being his announcement to candidate for president declaring: "don't

wish me luck, wish us luck, this isn't just a presidential campaign but a calling; come I call on you to come alongside me on this project with us and all of us with God" (Georgescu, 2024j, 0:14–0:31). In this language, he reframes his political ambitions as a sacred mission. This type of reframing invites supporters to see him as less like a political figure and more like a prophet from the Bible. Wodak (2015) examines how this type of rhetoric manipulates emotions through fear, pride, and hope.

Another recurring theme within the religious dimension is the rebuilding of Romania on a Christian order, with him emphasizing, "from today Romania is again run by God, but the power belongs to us to use with intellect, God's plan for Romania is freedom, liberty, and morality, and in the middle is God's love" (Georgescu, 2024x, 0:23–0:40). This rhetoric implies that by electing Georgescu, Romanians are voting for a nation reborn under Christianity. Georgescu's manifesto further pushes these ideas, writing "Romania is a country of morality, decency, respect, and deep faith in God" (Georgescu, 2024a, p. 3). This declaration sets the tone for the rest of the document, suggesting that the country's political and economic issues can only be resolved if grounded in Christianity. He makes it clear that the nation must do away with the ideas of Western liberal democracy to separate church and state; for Romania to be successful, religion must be incorporated into the national identity.

In this religious dimension, Georgescu connects the church with rural agrarian life and ancestral identity, often idealizing this rural farming lifestyle as an expression of spirituality. In a Facebook post from September 6, 2024, Georgescu says, "what greatness God has given us. It's great to see you all selling Romanian produce" to farmers at a market (Georgescu, 2025l, 0:40). This is similarly apparent in videos of him preaching at a rural Orthodox monasteries, where

Jesus portrayed next to him (Georgescu) in a mirrored stance, before the video cuts to a frame of a church set against Romanian fields, as pictured in Figure 4 (Georgescu, 2024z, 0:45; 6:29).

Figure 4

Screenshots representing Georgescu's discourse through a religious dimension



Note. Screenshots from a Facebook post by Georgescu (2024z), labeled as Video 64 in the annex dataset

His manifesto reinforces this agrarian linkage, writing: "We are not exaggerating when we say that saving the bees means saving mankind" (Georgescu, 2024a, p. 9). While the line refers to environmental issues, it's framed within the larger context connecting nature and spirituality. This religious traditionalism is further invoked in his take on family, clearly supporting the nuclear family. In video 110, a family dressed in traditional clothing is walking together. The father of this family says, "I thought there was no hope then I discovered Mr. Calin Georgescu, and his discourses, like the bird phoenix from nothing it can become powerful, the same way Romania can be reborn into a strong nation" (Georgescu, 2024t, 0:08–0:22). The phoenix can be interpreted as Jesus's rebirth, and the father implies that Georgescu is a higher being brought by God to save the nation. We see this messianic ideology continually recur throughout Georgescu's discourse, stating, "I am not candidating in my physical state, through me the Romanian people are candidating, I am just the tip of the spear... It is a political shift from the 35 years that have

occurred, and the people want change" (Georgescu, 2024v, 0:09–0:30). This essentially implies that he is the lifeblood of Romania and that he is the embodiment of the Romanian people's will.

Mudde (2019) explains this is central to nativism, whereby culture and faith are inseparable. The narrative is supposed to be exclusionary to create an 'Us vs them' narrative, in which the 'they' have controlled Romania, now we must take back control and redeem ourselves. This is exemplified in the manifesto where he writes Romania needs to return to "truth, freedom, and sovereignty"; the movement is painted as redemption instead of Nationalism (Georgescu, 2024a, p. 4). More evidence to back up this claim is his open admittance, proudly considering himself a Christian Nationalist. Georgescu says, "Nationalism is a belief, in essence, in which God gave your people a sacred mission, if the mission is successful he is saved …God's project for Romania is the quality of the people's existence, in the middle of this is his (God's) love for the people" (Georgescu, 2024b, 3:16–4:05). By presenting Orthodox Christianity as a key foundation of Romania, he managed to mobilize religion to legitimize his political vision with God's authority, something that we don't see happen as successfully in other countries.

Anti-Western/ Pro-Russian stance

The anti-Western/pro-Russian dimension is the least discussed throughout the campaign, mainly as a result of Romanians' negative view towards Russia and still relatively positive view of the EU. As a result, Georgescu often disguises this rhetoric with advocacy for peace, leaning on the unpopularity of the war among Romanians. This subdued approach is what Wodak (2021) describes as "calculated ambivalence… to de-escalate intentionally provoked scandals." Hence, Georgescu wouldn't side directly with Russia and would rather advocate for peace and neutrality (Wodak, 2021, p. 162). This is why he tries to avoid discussing the conflict entirely, especially

towards the end of the first round of the campaign, instead trying to manipulate the narrative, as we see in the speech below.

“I would like to apologize to my colleagues … Until now, the Romanian people have wanted something different from us … that’s why I provoke (implore) everyone for the next week to refuse any question about the war, Ukraine, Russia, America, Putin, Zelenski, Trump, etc, … I have a belief in all of you that if we work together to bring peace among each other then we can bring peace to the rest of the world.” (Georgescu, 2024w, 0:08–1:00).

Georgescu’s rhetoric frames NATO and the West as the provocateur of the war, blowing up the Romanian budget on armament and training for Ukraine while neglecting poor Romanians. He has found that taking a subdued approach to the war is much more beneficial for his campaign than a blatant supporter of the Kremlin, instead using skepticist language targeting Romanian soldiers like “6.5 billion dollars for airplanes, … for machines that won’t arrive for many years, but money for our soldiers isn’t there … The Romanian government approved money to train Ukrainian pilots … The Romanian government supports soldiers who haven’t sworn an oath to the Romanian people.” (Georgescu, 2024u, 0:01–0:54). While this may seem to be an advocacy for support for better treatment of Romanian soldiers, Georgescu has extensive knowledge of Romanian history. That matters because during the 1940’s and the 1989 revolution, the army had shifted support towards the revolting forces. This speech stands to suggest that, if elected president, Romania should change its allegiances once again and a complete government overhaul. On page 12 of his manifesto for example, he calls for withdrawing from NATO and shifting towards neutrality to regain sovereign integrity (Georgescu, 2024a).

It should be noted that this approach is broadly used by Eastern European far-right actors who sympathize with Russia. Instead of declaring outright loyalty, they cast the current military alliance as corrupt and war hawkish. Georgescu's foreign policy aligns with Mudde's (2019) analysis of the far-right, characterized by a rejection of the current liberal internationalism in favor of nativist self-determination. His approach pushes for sovereignty and neutrality by using religious and cultural issues to push the narrative that Romania must detach from the Western bloc to survive. Another perfect example of this is his use of religion "NATO doesn't have a lineage to the Christian world, to people's lives, it is just an association of blocks… people have started to wake up worldwide, not just in Romania" (Georgescu, 2024b, 0:02–0:28). By using this moral superiority, he avoids discussing difficult policy stances entirely. Regarding analytics, Georgescu prefers to avoid this dimension, with only about 8.5% of his videos directly addressing the Western alliance. His campaign follows the broader Eastern European far-right tendency of rejecting Western ideas by suggesting its incompatibility spiritually and ideologically.

Ultra-Conservatism

As mentioned in the methodology, right-wing movements utilize ultra-conservative tropes as a tool to oppose liberalism and push both authoritarian and nativist ideologies, such as ethnic nationalism (Mudde, 2019). Ultra-conservatism operates more as a binder in which multiple other dimensions, such as conspiracy, anti-globalism, and historical mythology, converge. This dimension advances a vision of Romania grounded in moral absolutes, idealizing values of land, family, and generational legacy. This discourse resists cultural pluralism and portrays Western liberalism as an external elitist force trying to impose its will. Georgescu articulates these ultra-conservative ideas frequently in moralizing statements about the national

decline and uses visual symbols, like traditionalist clothing and rural areas (pictured in figures 4 and 5), to add further emphasis on this degradation of the Romanian identity. A perfect example is an early video interview of Georgescu sitting with a traditionally dressed elderly man in a village near the town of Sibiu, Transylvania, an area renowned for its cultural heritage (Figure 5). In the video, they discuss Romania's continued degradation, airing out their grievances about the younger generation and EU dependency and touching on anti-Hungarian sentiments (Georgescu, 2023b). The visuals and themes framed in this interaction are the bedrock of Georgescu's campaign. They use nostalgic traditionalism against liberal modernity, which they argue has corrupted the youth and gutted national production.

Figure 5

Traditionally dressed old man and Georgescu sharing a meal and remanicing on old times

Note. Screenshot from a Facebook post by Georgescu (2023b), labeled as Video 5 in the annex dataset

Figure 6

Traditionally dressed young girl greeting Georgescu with bread and salt

Note. Screenshot from a Facebook post by Georgescu (2024l), labeled as Video 65 in the annex dataset

These themes aren't isolated incidents, more so part of a broader strategy to cast traditionalism as resistance to globalism and capitalism. Georgescu frequently frames Romania as a country with dwindling morality pushed by corrupted elites, "A people that does not respect its traditions … will be condemned" (Georgescu, 2024q, 0:01–0:20). This rhetoric uses a biblical tone to express moral decline, asserting that Romania's sovereignty must be restored through "self-reliance" and renationalization "of our country" (Georgescu, 2024i, 0:39; 0:54). He further reinforces this rhetoric in his manifesto, calling for "a change of the system … A THIRD FORCE, meant to permanently replace both the gangster capitalism at home and the oligarchic techno globalism" (Georgescu, 2024a, p. 2-3). This marks a shift from radical right to far right, seemingly shifting away from calling for reforms from within but rather transitioning to an entirely different system, which he refers to as the third force. Georgescu's ultra-conservative framing offers a blueprint for Romania to return to traditionalism through "individual sovereignty" and a distributist economy rooted in family, faith, and labor (Georgescu, 2024p,

0:34). His discourse frames rejecting technocratic and liberal pluralism as rejecting globalism culturally and economically, calling it “satanic”, linking it to LGBT acceptance and secularism in what he frames as spiritual war, stating, “This form of globalism is a complete sham … satanic at its core. You are either with us or against us. Against us means against LGBT” (Georgescu, 2024e, 0:09–0:27). Such narratives use the religious dimension to build on this ultra-conservative narrative.

Furthermore, this ultra-conservative dimension highlights a “strong leader” as someone who is intelligent, masculine, and commends authority. He highlights these ideas in his rhetoric by saying, “We need to bring the academics together with a strong leader and come up with a plan for the country” (Georgescu, 2023d, 0:35–0:45). To emphasize his strength as a leader, he posts a campaign ad in which the head of Romania’s martial arts federation declares, “When we say Calin Georgescu, we say he is one of our brothers in judo… a righteous person who learned from a great master” (Georgescu, 2024y, 0:05–0:48). This frames Georgescu as a strong yet humble man who’s trained to be disciplined and honorable; this type of imagery closely mirrors Putin’s own constructed masculinity. Georgescu further projects this masculine theme as he directs his content towards the Romanian armed forces. In a full-length address, he criticizes the state and elites for failing to care for our Romanian soldiers, underpaying them while giving billions of Euros to train Ukrainian forces (Georgescu, 2024u). This appeal reinforces a key ultra-conservative idea that real power and honor comes from defending the nation, not from globalist coalitions like NATO. Mudde (2019) calls this a normalization of authoritarian views by far-right actors to undermine the democratic system; this is part of the process of transitioning from radical to extreme.

Through his campaign, he constantly implies that Romania must cleanse itself morally and spiritually to rise again, constantly using historical figures in Romanian history to emphasize this message, such as Michael the Great and Nicu Golescu. At a memorial speech for Golescu, he states, “History is a holy thing, it is my passion because it speaks the truth, and where there is truth, there is God…” then proceeds to quote Nicolae Iorga “A fundamental law is the continuity of history. You can’t disown it.” (Georgescu, 2023e, 0:34–0:47; 1:35–1:43). This rhetoric presents a worldview where order, tradition, and sovereignty are under siege by modern liberalism, and salvation requires a return to Romania’s authentic self, defined by land, discipline, family, and a righteous leader. Georgescu morphs himself into more than just another political candidate, but rather a moral custodian of the nation’s will, sent by God.

Historical References

History is constantly referenced in Georgescu’s discourse, used to legitimize his broader calls for national rebirth. Unlike references to history that serve to commemorate the past, Georgescu uses this past as a guide for the future, envisioning Romania as the holy land for Romanians. The modern country has been corrupted, and the sacred community has been betrayed. It must be brought to its original state, similar to ‘make America great again,’ referring to a nostalgic past that has since been degraded. This message is concurrent across his social media and his manifesto, linking tradition, spirituality, and national sovereignty into a single emotionally charged narrative and often speaking about this history as a 6000 year old continuous timeline, giving the country a unique identity and purpose. Declaring in one video, “Romania means life, culture, history. Whoever forgets their history risks losing their country… The history of Romania is one of more than 6000 years” (Georgescu, 2024g, 0:01–0:26). The language itself isn’t historically accurate but evokes a sense of pride and urgency. He frames

historical memory as a moral obligation of every Romanian, who believes themselves to be a patriot, to "return to our roots" and describes Romania as "a land salted with the blood of our heroes" (Georgescu, 2024a, p. 3,10). The rhetoric treats history as sacred, blending references to saints, warriors, and poets to paint Romania as a moral nation that needs help finding its way on the right path.

Georgescu regularly employs theatrics when talking about the past, with many of his campaign videos placing him in a traditional rural setting, wearing folk clothing, or speaking to elders in villages as shown in Figures 4 and 5 (Georgescu, 2023b, 2024k). These choreographed scenes are designed to show him as someone rooted in Romanian history and traditionalism, separating himself from modern political elites. This symbolism helps paint himself as an authentic person, caring deeply about the Romanians left behind. This history is regularly used to present disappointment with the present, with Georgescu regularly reflecting on the pre-1990 communist era, saying in an interview, "Many people are disappointed, many can't find their worth… Remember before the 1990s, everything was great" with the interviewer proceeding to agree (Georgescu, 2024c, 0:13–0:40). This nostalgia is regularly invoked across Eastern European far-right discourse; this nostalgia paints the Romania of the past as stable while the current country is in chaos.

Religious language is often overlapped with this historical narrative; quoting famous Romanian poet Mihai Eminescu, Georgescu says, "From 2000 years ago, love is preached, and we discuss it between us," then adds that modern people only talk about love while living in greed and lies (Georgescu, 2023g, 7:04). These lines blur religious decay with historical beautification, presenting the issues of today as part of a broader trend of national decline. Georgescu frequently visits symbolic places to invoke Romania's historical and religious past

when covering this religious dimension. In another video, visiting Aron Pumnul's home and speaks stoically and poetically about the country, with portraits of saints and heroes on screen, while calling for national unity (Georgescu, 2024k, 0:56). In his manifesto, he adds that Romanians must reconnect with ancestral values, and the nation's problems won't be solved by modern liberalism but by "truth, freedom, and sovereignty" grounded in tradition (Georgescu, 2024a, p. 4). He also calls for Romanians to honor their sacred lineage, stating, "A people that doesn't respect its traditions, that doesn't protect its faith and doesn't honor its grandfathers and forefathers will be condemned" (Georgescu, 2024q, 0:05–0:20). Essentially, he calls on his followers to return to a more traditional Romania of the past or face destruction, pushing fear rhetoric and offering hope.

When calling for national unification, which is frequently discussed and tied to this historical dimension, he says, "Romania's greatest project was unification," and again uses Mihai Viteazul as a symbol of spiritual leadership (Georgescu, 2024m, 0:04–0:11). This type of rhetoric is meant to convince his audience that Georgescu is a modern-day Mihai Viteazul whose sole mission is to reconnect Romania with its lost identity. Across all these examples, Georgescu uses history as a political tool to support his position that Romania was once great, betrayed, and sold out by elites and now must be restored to this great power again. Mudde (2019) points out, movements in this space often rely on selective historical memory to build emotional and symbolic legitimacy. Georgescu's campaign closely aligns with this analysis, using the past to criticize the present and to propose a future based on restoration rather than reform. In short, using a trope called the grass is always greener on the other side.

5.2 Analytical review of the dimensions

While the platform TikTok was his primary source of success, his Facebook gave a more in-depth look at who Georgescu is as a political candidate. That's mainly because TikTok only allows minute long short form content, while Facebook allows for long-form declarations, monologues, and visual imagery used to appeal to an older audience. The data in figures 7 and 8 clearly shows the posts drew heavily on religious and nationalist themes and emotionally charged calls to action riddled with baseless conspiracies. Figure 8 shows which dimensions generated the most engagement by likes, with conspiracy theories and calls to action competing for second place. At the same time, ultra-conservatism resonated the most with the audience. This type of content aligns with platform algorithms, prioritizing such materials because clicks and constant user interactions fundamentally drive their business models. The dataset took into account the frequency of thematic dimensions to establish the most central themes to Georgescu's discourse strategy as well as metrics per theme (Likes, Views, and Comments).

Figure 7

Frequency of each discourse dimension



Note. 1st Round Georgescu's presidential campaign - Facebook Data (see annex)

Figure 8

Likes by percentage per discourse dimension



Note. 1st Round Georgescu's presidential campaign - Facebook Data (see annex)

Figure 7 shows the frequency of each dimension; but beyond the figures, the data shows his discourse frequently intertwines, creating a layered ideological dynamic meant to reinforce Georgescu's narrative. This style allows him to create a hybrid message which simultaneously activates fear, outrage, and hope, which based on likes can be inferred as successfully transmitted.

5.3 Overview of findings

This chapter created a detailed analysis of the ways in which Călin Georgescu used key elements of discourse in the Romanian election to influence his audience through the use of conspiracy theories, socio-economic frustrations, and xenophobic traditionalism. The campaign systematically organized recurring rhetorical patterns designed to induce emotions to force mobilization around the idealized Romanian identity. Examining the dataset of Georgescu's discourse in the first presidential round, the analysis revealed persistent use of these seven dimensions mentioned above. These dimensions each

played a significant role in framing an ideologically cohesive narrative that was tactically executed. While the themes worked in tangent with each other, they weren't distributed equally as some were clearly utilized more than others like the *Call to action* and *Ultra-conservatism*. These narratives further played out in his manifesto, which was released on the day of his official candidacy for president, reinforcing many of the same rhetorics present in his online discourse. The manifesto calls for "truth, sovereignty, and faith," constructing a symbolic narrative of crisis and redemption. The overall discourse clearly shows a portrait of Western countries as the true adversaries who have corrupted the political elite and sold out the country. By regularly invoking national heroes, victimhood resistance, a return to Christian fundamentalism, and a new socio-economic system built on equality, Georgescu essentially has met the criteria as outlined by Mudde (2019), exemplifying nativism, authoritarianism, and populism.

6. Further elaboration on georgescu's far-right ideology

The research laid out in the findings examined Călin Georgescu's discourse on the campaign, focusing on the symbolic messaging and rhetorical strategies that position him within the far-right spectrum. This research intends to understand how his messaging was so engaging and captivating with voters and what he communicated that exemplifies him as a far-right candidate. Previous literature addresses his rise as exemplified by the literature review, but rarely dives into discourse specific content. After a thorough reading of both his manifesto and facebook video discourse, the chapter explores Georgescu and his world view around religious nationalism, moral authoritarianism, and historical victimhood. In the process I examine his discourse's construction of a messianic image of himself in which he offers salvation in redemption not just promises of reform. Applying the theoretical frameworks of Mudde and Wodak, this chapter positions Georgerscu's discourse within the broader Far-right in Europe, while emphasizing its unique characteristics to Romania, such as religious symbolism and historical narratives. This chapter specifically, sets out to use the empirical findings laid out in the previous chapter to discuss Georgescu's campaign in-depth and answer the questions surrounding Georgescu:

- What are the main features of Georgescu's discourse that exemplify his position within the far-right?
- Which dimensions appear as the fundamental base of Georgescu's discourse, and how do they function?

Georgescu characterizes himself as a sovereigntist, judeo-christian, and nationalist which serves to define his morals and ideas, without needing to elaborate. He proudly displayed these labels to

show his commitment to a Romania-first agenda while rejecting supranational institutions built on the ideas of globalism and liberalism in favor of a homogeneous theocratic nation.

6.1 Georgescu - Extreme or Radical Far-Right?

Mudde (2019) laid out the foundations necessary to distinguish between the far right into extreme and radical, arguing that the radical right is willing to accept democratic rule, while the extreme right is vehemently opposed to democracy and instead advocates for an entirely new system. When analyzing Georgescu's discourse and manifesto within Mudde's framework of the far-right, as outlined by both his 2010 pathological normalcy and 2019's far right today, Georgescu's rhetoric comes into the frame as a core example of what Mudde defines as a far-right actor. In Mudde's definition of radical and extreme right, the radical actor accepts the democratic outcome and institutions, seeking change through reform. In contrast, the extreme right rejects democratic principles and instead advocates for a complete system overhaul. Usually this overhaul of the democratic order is meant to establish an authoritarian or totalitarian regime. Mudde highlights that radical right actors embrace democracy as a formality but regularly advocate for majority rule, rejecting checks on executive authority once elected. We see this from actors such as Viktor Orbán or Donald Trump.

In Georgescu's political campaign, the data unequivocally acknowledges him as far-right, but his ideology doesn't strictly adhere to either of these ideologies consistently. Rather, his campaign functions within the current democratic rules, running his presidential election legitimately. This campaign constantly called for public debate, and participation of all Romanians in the electoral process. However, analyzing all of his written and videographed discourse reveals ideological themes vehemently opposed to democratic rule. This strategic framing of his campaign ensures his legitimacy and allows him to carry out his plan to dismantle

the current political and democratic order as laid out in his manifesto. This type of far-right rhetoric and planning completely blurs the lines between extreme and radical. Georgescu further blurs these lines by using messianic language when discussing himself or his plans, further exacerbated by his conspiracy narratives and glorification of Romania's history. Georgescu rephrases his messaging around democratic acceptance, regularly claiming to represent "the people", and presenting his campaign in the Us vs them terminology, "Us – the pure, forgotten nation" and "them – corrupt globalist elites." This language closely aligns with Wodak and Mudde's definition of populism, meant to divide society into the pure group and corrupt-evil group, while calling for the will of the people to be expressed freely.

Georgescu proclaimed multiple times on the campaign trail that he was already president of Romania, with the interviewer asking for clarification and Georgescu reaffirming once again; this reflects a deeper authoritarian impulse, effectively trying to delegitimize the democratic outcome upon a potential loss. We saw this pattern again with George Simion after the second round of the presidential election. Before the votes had even started to be counted, he declared himself the winner. Georgescu and, for that matter, the broader far-right movement in Romania has regularly created these narratives, going as far as attacking institutions in place to defend the current democratic order, calling the Constitutional court "traitorous" and regularly referring to the government as a "puppet regime." This strategy is meant to amplify conspiracy theories of a 'stolen' election propagated to appease the EU. Coupled with his proclamation of winning the election, he effectively disavowed any possibility of a defeat and, in the process, reinforced public distrust in the democratic process. This, in turn, fuels post-electoral grievances among large sections of the population. The strategy was made famous by Trump after the 2020 election, and Mudde (2019) notes that it has become increasingly common among the fourth

wave of the far-right globally. Applying Mudde's framework here, this rhetoric strongly leans towards the extreme right, actively seeking to erode the democratic system and gain power through any means necessary.

Using this framework based on the ideological triangle of nativism, authoritarianism, and populism, Georgescu embodies all three. His nativism is ethnic and religious, regularly affirming that Romanians are part of a sacred lineage connected to God. He further exemplifies this nationalism by using historical figures like Mihai Viteazu to establish national unity and create a Golden age that once was, and that can be regained. Tapping into a collective trauma from Nazi occupation and Communism, when the country was divided up, to construct the idea of reunifying a modern day unification of Greater Romania. This rhetoric closely emulates the efforts of the Iron Guard and Antonescu during their attempts to reunify Greater Romania during WW2 by unifying the country with the Axis powers, as mentioned in the literature review. Georgescu's authoritarianism seeps through his moral absolutism, vilifying those who disagree with his vision by labeling them as corrupt, evil, or part of a foreign agenda. On the campaign trail, his position on the Russia-Ukraine war was neutrality, and anyone who opposed him was subsequently labeled a war hawk propagated by NATO. Under this same authoritarian wing of his discourse, his messianic language appears, implying he was sent by God, labeling his campaign "a calling" and himself "a man of God". The populist side of Georgescu's discourse is a common occurrence in far-right discourse; in his case, he focuses on the elimination of globalist capitalism and a return to traditionalism. This rhetoric is exacerbated by his calls for "pure-blooded Romanians" to be given the conditions needed to return home. With populist narratives, there are limitless conspiracies that are propagated, with the goal of appealing to disenfranchised voters who feel disposed of by the Elites.

As said before, placing Georgescu within Mudde's radical vs extreme right spectrum is complex. For one, his ideology is deeply rooted in radical right, building emotional connections, pushing against elites, and willing to participate in the democratic process. Yet, this is not to say that his discourse isn't deeply steeped in anti-democratic views, fascist nostalgia, and spiritual nationalism, in this regard aligning with the extreme right. Georgescu strategically rejects to assume power by force, having extensively studied history, he understands that he must take power by democratic means to secure legitimacy. As such, Georgescu regularly moves between both groups, which were identified in Mudde's fourth wave. While unsuccessful in the scheme of things, this candidacy succeeded in the normalization of the reintroduction of extreme right parties into mainstream politics in Romania.

6.2 Interchanging discourses to fit an ever-changing narrative

Georgescu's discourse rarely stays in just one theme, rather like links in a bigger narrative, each video presented multiple themes at the same time. In the subsection below, these links are exemplified through his most commonly used three link strategy. This type of discourse is especially useful at invoking emotionally charged thoughts and discussions.

Ultra-Conservatism + Call to Action

With over half of all videos analyzed being composed of *calls to action* and *ultra-conservative* rhetoric, it becomes no surprise that they would regularly overlap. As the data collection continued though, it became clear that these two dimensions were core pillars to Georgescu's narrative. The *call to action* was regularly used as an attachment to feed into a larger narrative, while *ultra-conservatism* itself is the fundamental ideology. The *call to action* serves to energize and activate his audience, urging them to participate in their civic duty so as to

save their country from decline caused by corrupt elites and multinational institutions. The ultra-conservative aspect is Georgescu's political and moral code, a man grounded in his orthodox faith, patriarchal values, and patriotism for his country. This strategy was extremely effective at cultivating viewership and likes. The strategy consistently added a third layer, usually *conspiracy theories* (24 posts), *religion* (22 posts), and *historical context* (21 posts), so as to deepen the engagement and emotional intensity of the discourse. This third dimension was usually the focus of the discourse within any given video, and served to reinforce the core message. For example, *conspiracy theories* usually functioned as an explanatory tool meant to give emotional fuel to his call to action, like when Georgescu tells his followers that globalist elites or shadowy powers are undermining Romania's sovereignty. In this example the anger is presented to his viewers along with a call to resist this aforementioned threat by voting for Georgescu to restore Romania.

Similarly, the *religious* dimension plays a vital role in his discourse meant to proclaim a sense of urgency, that spirituality is being washed away. With Georgescu regularly speaking in a sense of urgency when utilizing the religious dimension, he often positions himself as a prophet-like figure, using phrases like "my dears" and directly invoking God to validate his claims. These posts often painted Romania's problems as a moral and spiritual collapse brought upon by Western liberalism. This combination of ultra-conservatism and religion translates into christian nationalism calling for an awakening to redeem the nation and protect Romanian traditionalism. Trifan (2025) also highlighted this in her work, specifically Georgescu's lean heavily into the concept of Romanian exceptionalism and divine destiny. The third common layer, historical context, serves to legitimize his claims through mythic national history, as well as just bolster his intellectual image. By invoking historical conflicts, figures, and the golden age,

Georgescu frames his campaign as part of history, trying to restore Romania's glory. These narratives often create the image of a once great Romanian nation that has been chipped away by corrupt elites and foreign parties. When combined with the *ultra-conservatism* and *call to action*, history serves as a source of nostalgia and justification for much needed change.

Anti-Globalism

It's important to note that while the '*Anti-globalism*' dimension only appeared in about a quarter of all posts, it had the most engagement from users overall, suggesting that it particularly resonated with Georgescu's audience. This dimension should be noted as always part of a linkage as well, reinforced by a call to action, conspiracy theories, and religious messaging serving to amplify the evils of globalism. This discourse was always framed to induce emotions of panic and political resentment as it suggested malicious intent by international organizations such as the EU, NATO, and the UN. This rhetoric regularly suggested Romania was betrayed by elites and exploited for its strategic position, workers, and minerals. It's important to state that this dimension didn't always use fear, it would also balance hope offering nationalistic traditionalism to save the nation. Wodak's (2015) *Politics of Fear* describes this as the "politics of hope", positioning Romania as a victim of abuse, while offering salvation through isolationism. This use of emotional appeal likely explains why user engagement is especially high in this subsection of his discourse.

The discourse formula presented above was replicated throughout all of his videos, with each dimension being interchangeable to fit his narrative. Throughout the data collection it became obvious that Georgescu would regularly appear uncertain of what his next words would be, with a common tell being his long pauses and slow speeches. He also regularly referenced the same historic periods or figures in multiple videos posted around the same short time frame,

which suggests scripted inductions rather than fluid originality. Notable examples were in videos from 1/26 to 2/01/2024 when he references Mihai viteazul in multiple videos sequentially, and again throughout mid-October when he references “Greater Romania” recurrently (Georgescu, 2024b, 2024c, and 2024d). I would also like to note that Georgescu is almost always filmed in a suit, only prior to the election does he dress in a traditional shirt to clearly assert his roots visually. This image of traditionalism crafted through friends, attire, and other traditional props, is meant to craft Georgescu’s image as a trustworthy outsider who is willing to speak what everyone else already thinks. These little details generally go undetected to the average viewer, only emerging when watched sequentially implying this passionate campaign is likely tightly choreographed to the smallest details.

6.3 Framing the narrative for emotional appeal as a communication style

For better or worse, social media platforms have completely shifted the way political campaigns present their messaging to be consumed. For far-right actors like Georgescu, these platforms have created a direct channel between him and voters to communicate without filters, fact-checkers, or institutional accountability. Prior to this change in dynamic, media networks could challenge these claims, but today, the new digital environment rewards this type of emotionally charged, polarizing content. Georgescu’s discourse exemplified this shift; his strategy reflects his command over populist rhetoric but also a strong understanding of algorithm-fueled content. While in the past, politicians who pushed anti-systemic or illiberal messaging faced more vigorous pushback from legacy media, today some news outlets have adapted to maintain viewership by feeding into these echo chambers (Dragomir, 2020, p. 20-21). This is especially prevalent throughout Georgescu’s video content, where more than half of all videos from the first year of posting are news interviews with Georgescu, feeding into his

narrative. This discourse analysis shows that Georgescu, like other far-right leaders, speaks directly to his audience through social media, in his case, regularly addressing them as a parental figure would talk to their child by starting most videos with “dragii mei - my dears”. While this greeting might seem innocent, it's supposed to instill a sense of care in his viewers and authority over them. This personalization in his messaging creates a sense of trust and enhances the emotionally fueled aspects of his campaign discourse.

His use of social media to directly communicate with his audience allows for freedom to disseminate messaging without rebuttal. Beyond the volume of the content, the style and emotional structure of his discourse are fundamental as they are the most influential aspects of his online campaign. While the first half of his campaign consisted of interviews on shows, the second half was much more interpersonal, speaking directly into the camera and regularly going to smaller communities. This second half of his campaign saw a spike in likes and views but also created the illusion of community within this campaign. Georgescu regularly invoked tradition and orthodoxy to emphasize this sense of community further, with him regularly being filmed preaching at churches and advocating for a reshaping of Romania. This reshaping that he lays out in his manifesto taps into the Romanian diaspora’s sense of marginalization in the EU, as he regularly suggests the EU is sucking Romania dry of its resources while abusing the Romanian people.

6.4 Limitations and guidelines for future research

This study extensively researched Georgescu’s views within the far-right conceptualization lens and collected data on the first round of his Facebook content. The research dove in depth into Georgescu’s discourse, but it should be noted that important constraints remain. Most importantly, his now deleted TikTok account, widely cited as the center

of his campaign and the center of the controversy surrounding his online surge, couldn't be analyzed. Furthermore, the data relies on engagement metrics at face value and cannot accurately distinguish between bot accounts and human ones. This brings up the issue of accurately examining which dimensions were most accurate on viewers; some dimensions may have appeared more popular than they actually were.

Since Georgescu has since 'retired from politics' and George Simion has regained his leadership of Romania's far-right, several different research opportunities have come out of this. That being said, future research on the continuous rise and fall of far-right politicians in Romania and what sets each one apart could prove helpful for advancing research on Romania's far-right. Another avenue of research should focus on understanding what makes Georgescu much more popular than Simion, as Georgescu regularly maintained popularity much better than Simion could. Finally, for anyone intending to use the structure of the dataset and dimensions, understanding the linkages between different dimensions and how they influence the demand side of far-right discourse, focusing on the audiences could complement the current research and give a better understanding of how these groups manage to continually regain popularity.

7. Conclusion

Georgescu's presidential run illustrates a distinct, digitally mediated subset of the fourth wave as outlined by Mudde; in this case, the far-right discourse laces the Orthodox faith, historical nostalgia, and conspiracy-riddled anti-globalism into a 21st-century digital campaign optimized for algorithms. After analyzing the Facebook discourse in the first round of Georgescu's campaign and his manifesto, the study found seven recurring dimensions utilized concurrently to deliver an emotionally impactful message meant to galvanize Romanians to take action. This research reinforces the claim that Georgescu engineered a systematic narrative painting religious nationalist sovereignty as the answer to Romania's decay, a concept Wodak labels as fear and hope politics. His candidacy didn't rely on party-centered politics, instead relying on the most fringe ideas within society, normalizing and building a massive internet following off these ideas. This research also builds on the study of the far-right, specifically in the case of Georgescu an extreme far-right candidate masquerading as a radical far-right candidate, by furthering literature on digital FRP's and its consequences on the uninformed electorate and, for that matter, democracy as a whole. Unchecked, unhinged, emotionally charged rhetoric online has proven especially effective and dangerous. This dataset built a continuous collection of a far-right actor's discourse in the context of post-socialist Europe and gave a rare in-depth look into Romania's far-right. This study shows that Romania is part of a broader trend of far-right normalization, intended relying on religious nationalism to succeed in eliminating the current liberal global order.

In terms of final remarks, while Georgescu's campaign may have been cut short by the Constitutional court, George Simion largely adopted his platform and achieved a 40.96% vote in the first round rerun, which occured on May 4th, 2025 (Europa Liberă Romania, 2025). This

exemplifies what is already feared by many; the far-right is quickly gaining traction and while it may have been ultimately defeated in this presidential election, in the broader scheme Georgescu has normalized at least in parts far-right ideology. Taking a look at Trump's political career as a prime example, in his time out of office, his propaganda machine worked extensively to create a delegitimization campaign online. This strategy has been highly effective, and we already see it being adopted in Romania by AUR and S.O.S. in hopes of a similar outcome in the following election in five years. The far-right presents an especially worrisome threat in Romania, as it stands at a geographically strategic point between Europe and Russia. That said, if the EU fails to enact legislation to combat false information and Russian propaganda online out of fear of infringing on free speech, it will eventually find itself in a harsh reality of authoritarianism. Romania, for its part, risks falling back into authoritarianism, and its under-representation in the discussion around the far-right in itself pushes the narrative of a culturally and politically excluded nation.

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9. Appendix

List of Abbreviations

AN - National Alliance (Alleanza Nazionale)
AUR - Alliance for the Union of Romanians
EU - European Union
FN - National Front
FPÖ - Freedom Party of Austria
FRP - far-right populism
GRP - Greater Romania Party
IMF - International Monetary Fund
MSI - Italian Social Movement (Movimento Sociale Italiano)
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PNG - New Generation Party
PNL - National Liberal Party
PSD - Social Democrats
ROC - Romanian Orthodox Church
UN - United Nations
US - United States
USR - Save Romania Union
USSR - Soviet Union
WHO - World Health Organization
WW2 - World War II

Figures

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Dataset

Color Key
Red (horizontal and vertical) - strong examples of recurring themes
Light blue (post date column) - Video's cut from the same interview and posted across multiple entries
Light green (post date column) - Video's cut from the same interview and posted across multiple entries
Light blue and green (post date column) - used to make the separation between different videos originating from the same interview

Post date	Dimensions	Engagement Metrics	Status	Link	Notes	remarks
Video 1 3/1/2023	Religion, Call to Action	290 likes, 3k views	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/329088803112 6425	First video on his FB Channel, a Call to action to fight for the country as our forefathers have, closes out with facts over fear, and talks about manifest destiny	
Video 2 3/2/2023	Call to Action	59 likes, 445 views	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/587849453393 200	Reporter asks what do you want to do for romania, he responds I will do what needs to be done, what i want to do is not important as those who have come before me have done what they wanted	
Video 3 3/3/2023	Religion	418 L, 2.9k V	Long Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/1819295055138105	Achievements he has made with the help of the Orthodox church, and what he hopes for Romania's future to look like, admittedly it cannot be achieved by politicians with ambitions, he states	
Video 4 3/5/2023	Call to Action, Religion, Historical Context	629 L, 3.8k V	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/888631159081077	Cuts of multiple Tik Tok videos, in which he talks about the spirituality of the nation, and the legacy of the nations, The nation has destroyed itself but not the people we must fight he says in another. All of this while using intense music as the background.	

Video 5 3/6/2023	Conspiracy Theory, Call to Action, Anti-Globalism, Religion, Anti-western /pro-Russia, Ultra-conservative, Historical Context	1.3k L, 13k V	Long Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/701580321755953	Interview between Georgescu and an older man from Sibiu Transylvania, a part of Romania that has been battled over for hundreds of years, they talk about historical figures, about how young people are a failure, how the country has been sold off after all the fighting for it, anti hungarian mentions, all while sharing a meal and a shot of palinka (a romanian drink), while bashing young people they talk about the hard work of this older man in the field, many subjects discussed but sums up Georgescu, at the end they discuss Romanian reliance on the EU giving Romanians bad food and that nothing is produced in the nation anymore and the teens are leaving; calls for a return to traditions	
Video 6 3/12/2023	Anti-western /pro-Russia, Historical Context, Religion, Call to Action	3.3k L, 66k V	Long Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/1216263474075521	Reposted TV interview, pattern of using historical and biblically historical moments to discuss about his situation and where his funding/ who his backers are, he speaks extremely philosophical to establish his education level, he relies heavily on life metaphors to discuss how he sees the future of Romania developing if he were elected.	
Video 7 3/14/2023	Anti-Globalism, Anti-western /pro-Russia, Ultra-conservative, Conspiracy Theory	261 L, 2.4K V	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/735520451445499	Repost TV Interview; they talk about Romania's 31 years as a democracy, He talks about Romania's failure to develop major projects, and the abandonment of long partnerships with neighbors (implying Russia) and partners in Asia and Africa, He heavily emphasis an anti-EU and NATO view point saying Romania today is Poor and just being used for its resources	

Video 8 3/15/2023	Anti-western /pro-Russia, Conspiracy Theory, Anti-Globalism, Call to Action	482 L, 4.1k V	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/208776615162105	Repost TV interview: Speaking on the EU and Nato, he says Romania has been surpassed by even bulgaria (FALSE); after 1970s nothing has been invested in Romania's education and in production, we have copied what the west has said and done without any debate, we have failed to invest in our country	
Video 9 3/15/2023	Conspiracy Theory	846L, 10k V	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/753145612996302	Repost : an authentic leader brings big minds together, this hasn't happened in Romania, we need to bring the academics together with a strong leader and come up with a plan for the country.	
Video 10 3/16/2023	Religion, Call to Action, Ultra-conservative, Conspiracy Theory	322 L, 1.9k v	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/620021220150792	The security of Romania and the good of the Romanian people is important, his bible is the integrity of the nation of Romania and the good of the Romanian people. we won't solve the problems at the top, we have to start at the bottom, it's a thing about management to apply a fix to the current situation in Romania and deal with the incompetence of the government during covid	
Video 11 3/30/2023	Conspiracy Theory, Anti-western /pro-Russia	376 L, 3.1k V	Long Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/330628892303 4740	He worked 8 years for the UN, They go on to talk about ukraine in the interview, Georgescu said the was blackens lives, we as people sit locked at home watching our TV's hypnotized by the Terroristic news (meaning fear mongering) and cannot oppose the winds meaning politically,	
Video 12 3/30/2023	Historical Context, Ultra-conservative	192L, 906 V	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/6	Reporter: since you have such a transcendent attitude, Don't you fear your enemies, yes like Nicolae Iorga said the more	Reposted twice back to back

				74942904639495	enemies, the more honor, I prefer honor myself	
Video 13 3/30/2023	Call to Action, Religion, Ultra-conservative, Historical Context, Conspiracy Theory	96 L, 282 V	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/238662335211608	History is a holy thing, it is my passion because it speaks the truth and where there is truth there is God, and on this path everything is made through him (God) and not for him (God). he is our essence like a universe, Reporter: can history be falsened? Yes seen today Quotes Iorga again "A fundamental law is the continuity of history, you can't disown it."	
Video 14 3/30/2023	Conspiracy Theory, Anti-western/pro-Russia, Anti-Globalism, Ultra-conservative	101 L, 435 V	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/340372155654630 8	They discuss the EU and diversity, Georgescu says that Europe is a continent of countries meaning he's against a federalised system, where there is a lot of darkness, one small flame can make a big difference, (metaphors). the EU wants to inhale countries souvernties but that we cannot allow it to occur.	
Video 15 3/30/2023	Ultra-conservative, Call to Action	86 L, 307 V	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/668769984923551	They talk about the Supremacy of Germany and its eclipse of Romania and the German chancellor being replaced, we shouldn't expect saving from the outside only from the inside, and we have always been expecting it from the outside which will never be the case.	
Video 16 3/30/2023	Conspiracy Theory, Ultra-conservative	142 L, 907 V	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1594824001041242	Vaccines and Covid, have you been vaccinated? the most unhappy thing is when you split with criminal intentions, the split between unvax and vax means nothing why should we split with each other based on if you are vaxed, we need to be united, all the studies show that only the body can make the antibodies	

					needed to heal, allow the family doctors to decide not politicians	
Video 17 4/1/2023	Call to Action, Religion, Anti-Globalism, Anti-western /pro-Russia, Ultra-conservative, Historical Context, Conspiracy Theory	190 L, 936 V	Long Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/1146526862654149	Georgescu wearing traditional clothing in this video should be highlighted, they talk about traditions and the protests against the war in Ukraine, the commentator says let's be clear the Russians didn't pay these people. The people's minds have been stolen and their souls have been sold similar to 2000 years ago. Jesus was murdered for similar messaging (talking about his own), for the world's oligarchs I have a message after capitulation comes salvation, those who fight for God will never be beaten; Now the time has come to fight again for the system to change	This is the Cut off for the first videos he posted, decided to jump ahead as it didn't make sense to code interviews in which he repeats himself consistently , these videos establish his views
Video 18 6/13/2023	Historical Context, Ultra-conservative, Religion, Call to Action, Conspiracy Theory, Anti-Globalism	758L, 16K L	Long Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/2004898866543970	Georgescu in a Romanian Orthodox Church; they talk about spirituality, health, and Religion and faith in God. The world is unhappy and violent because we pretend everything is good, but the only Good thing is God and we have lost that because we steal everything only for profit. This is a Cancer. He quotes eminescu, when talking about nature and god the link between them: "from 2000 years ago love is preached and we discuss it between us" we see that today, we talk about love but it's false. *Bill Gates and Soros didn't make you,* God made you. The question is what do you know what to do and many don't know how to do anything society wants you to be	He talks slow in all of his videos, almost like he's trying to think of every last word methodically

					a slave, a consumer. Fear is an element false that proves man has disconnected from God…	
Video 19 11/24/2023	Call to Action	444L, 3.6K L	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/863688215457831	Romanian Flag is the Table!, he published his book and the caption says exit from the Matrix, He speaks very philosophically	Posts almost daily till june, then nothing until November 2023 and it is a Tlk Tok repost
Video 20 1/26/2024	Call to Action, Conspiracy Theory, Anti-Globalism, Religion, Historical Context, Ultra-conservative, Anti-western/pro-Russia	14k L, 178K L	Long Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/1063925068251674	A report by a journalist ben fulfort mentions an honorary moment of a romanian Calin Georgescu a big awakening, ben fulfort brings forward things that corporate press hides, He demasks the global world order hiding, The interviewer then asks Georgescu are you a nationalist or more of a globalist, Georgescu admits to being a Christian Nationalist proudly, Georgescu says Nationalism is a belief, in essence, in which God gave your people a sacred mission, if the mission is successful he is saved, God's project for RO is the quality of the people's existence, in the middle of this is his (God's) love for the people.	He essentially talks about his motives for being a christian nationalist
Video 21 1/26/2024	Call to Action, Conspiracy Theory, Anti-Globalism, Religion, Ultra-conservative, Anti-western/pro-Russia,	367L, 2.2k V	Long Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/3706517122965680	Constitutions have been made on the bible, many people are disappointed, many people can't find their worth, remember before the 1990's, everything was great, the interviewer agrees, Today we have reached uniformity and federalization, the interviewer says pro-lgbt is extremely bad where are we	

	Historical Context				heading as a continent. Georgescu says the world has departed from its divinity. Pray, what today seems bad tomorrow may be good.	
Video 22 1/28/2024	Conspiracy Theory, Anti-Globalism, Religion	183L, 840 V	Long Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/929135728841286	Romania is a nation that will be ruled only through Jusus Christ's laws, the interviewer agrees. There is already a large transformation where you see people turning to god because God and the universe is meant for success, humanity's problem is necessity, not meaning money. For example, people have never seen covid but have decided to get vaccinated against something they can't see, because people have been instilled with herd mentality and fear. fear is counter to God	
Video 23 2/1/2024	Anti-Globalism, Conspiracy Theory, Anti-western/pro-Russia, Ultra-conservative, Historical Context	165L, 950 V	Long Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/379651828002175	The US debt being 30 trillion will be the greatest disaster in our lives. This situation has become so bad to the point where no one believes what Washington says anymore. The interviewer talks about BRICS being the alternative to the US global order, Georgescu agrees capitalism/ banks is the head of the snake, BRICS is the future with China being the head. We have entered an era where there are multiple super powers, this is the end of an era where the world has been based on threats, corruption, and dollars as an instrument, Africa for example is far x10 the richest continent, yet we are asked to help them because they are so poor, that's why he left the UN. These countries have been exploited to the max by the western nations and	

					impoverished as a result. African leaders have been bought exactly like in our nation.	
Video 24 4/13/2024	Conspiracy Theory	115L, 2.4K V	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/802166725096690	What I can add is that this form of globalism which is a complete shame and negative and satanic at its core, principally are you with us or against us, against us means against LGBT, that there is no religion, they act in desperation to hold onto power	
Video 25 4/6/2024	Conspiracy Theory, Anti-Globalism, Religion, Ultra-conservative, Historical Context	444L, 37K V	Long Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/1126944738346930	The UN is now indistinguishable from the World Economic Forum/Davos, because it's being controlled by the same ideas and oligarchs, the UN checks to make sure everyone is politically correct and cuts out those who are not, they try to control you with money and benifits. The UN badge tries to make you look superior to the people on the streets, they the global order try to manipulate the people, Darwin said we are descendants of monkeys now we come from robots is what the new darwinists say. They try to dictate our health, picture of Bill Gates, and the chair of WHO, (Intense music starts as if they are trying to solve a mystery) they talk about malcom X and his fight against slavery, Control is about the financial and banking system. They talk about Donald Trump and how the oligarch system didn't expect that, covid was a conspiracy created by these oligarchs back in 2016 for 2020.	He uses his 8 years at the UN and on missions in Africa as credibility
Video 26 4/13/2024	Conspiracy Theory, Anti-Globalism, Religion	115L, 2.4K V	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/8	What I can add is that this form of word of globalism is a thing negative and satanic, essentially	

				02166725096690	you are against lgbt if you don't accept globalism	
Video 27 7/25/2024	Conspiracy Theory	417L, 6.9k V	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/870558932945 7021	Project, food, water, energy; essentially you provide these things free, clearly you pay for the infrastructure, it's a nishe which hasn't taken place in Romania for 10's of years	
Video 28 7/26/2024	Ultra-conservative, Call to Action	524L, 10k V, 18 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/810474740857 415	You will give back what you take, we must transmit love not fear, it's the single thing that will unite us. A poor person should not exist in this nation, we all should have some form of security	This is the first video where he lets people comment, This video reposts again the next day
Video 29 7/26/2024	Anti-western /pro-Russia, Ultra-conservative, Conspiracy Theory	534L, 9.9k V, 14 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/120824327382 2184	For us NATO, China is becoming our enemy, NATO doesn't realize what China is capable of as a country, what they build in a week takes the US years.	
Video 30 7/28/2024	Call to Action, Historical Context, Ultra-conservative, Conspiracy Theory	317L, 4.1k V, 12 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/332046000492 5208	Romania means Life, culture, history, whoever forgets their history risks to lose their country, today many forget the history of Romania, and just talk about history as a whole, The history of Romania is one of more than 6000 years	
Video 31 7/28/2024	Ultra-conservative, Call to Action	214L 3.2K V, 6 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/170672152008 3348	Romania is a nation educated, we need to understand how easy it is to be educated, and wake up from this darkness	
Video 32 7/28/2024	Religion, Conspiracy Theory, Call to Action, Ultra-conservative	335L, 4.5k V, 7 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/186974588343 9010	Fear is a relation with God that has been degraded, those who have been vaccinated because of fear, this cannot function, the first manipulation on this earth was the first lie	

Video 33 7/29/2024	Call to Action, Conspiracy Theory, Anti-Globalism, Anti-western/pro-Russia, Ultra-conservative	285L, 3.9k V, 8 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/521516833741568	Us as a nation are stuck in a matrix, a cage, for the simple fact that some have wanted power, all these nations that stole profited and the companies who profited off of Ukraine, will be the poorest in the world as they will have to pay back all that they have stolen because the law of the universe always balances back out	
Video 34 7/30/2024	Anti-Globalism, Ultra-conservative, Call to Action	7.5K L, 79K V, 828 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/464231786427624	The good of the community, working together, developing together, we are one big family working together, for us it's important to distinguish between intelligence and knowledge	One of his first major successes
Video 35 7/30/2024	Conspiracy Theory, Anti-Globalism, Anti-western/pro-Russia	27k L, 1.1M V, 827 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1017662513355476	Follow the resources of about 13 trillion dollars underneath Romania, and that's why the west wants to be our friend for our lithium and natural gas.	
Video 36 7/30/2024	Conspiracy Theory, Anti-Globalism, Anti-western/pro-Russia	175L, 3.6K V, 2 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/416456087460890	NATO doesn't have a lineage to the Christian world, to peoples lives, it's just an association of blocks, people have started to wake up world wide not just in romania. Africa for example who has pushed back their colonizers, Belarus who has a direct connection with China	
Video 37 7/30/2024	Ultra-conservative, Religion, Anti-western/pro-Russia	20K L, 524K V, 600 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/1022887692204814	Interviewer: What would you negotiate? weather its nato, EU, Russia, USA, China, weather we are members of these organizations doesn't matter to me, I just want us as a nation to have peace with everyone especially our neighbors (Russia) cause God gave us our neighbors	

Video 38 7/30/2024	Call to Action, Ultra-conservative	5.2k L, 99k V, 239 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/503719298851527	Us as a nation like bees in a hive must work together including in our community	
Video 39 7/30/2024	Anti-western/pro-Russia, Conspiracy Theory	13k L, 298k V, 319 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/952072879937215	Top of the list Raytheon Tecnol and lockheed and boeing are companies that have big profits and budgets as a result of Wars and especially the Ukraine war has been profitable for them	
Video 40 7/30/2024	Conspiracy Theory	9.4k L, 134K V, 349 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/1621068135340782	Whats important especially today is not said, its important what is not seen, if you see directly those who manipulate you what does that transmit, fear	Rambling a lot
Video 41 7/31/2024	Call to Action	2.3k L, 30k V, 63 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/1208140120192687	Romania is a commodity county, Romania also has people we cannot pass over this aspect, in which Romanian's have been passed over by the Romanian government, Romanians have no protection abroad	I think he's talking about the Romanians in Norway case
Video 42 7/31/2024	Call to Action	311L, 4.3k V, 8C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/1155357699077690	The economy leaves from social problems, we need to know who we are and where we want to end up; I wish for the romanian people to respect themselves and find their dignity	
Video 43 7/31/2024	Anti-western/pro-Russia, Anti-Globalism, Conspiracy Theory, Historical Context	233 L, 4.1k V, 5 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/749923867158104	1991, was a year that the media doesn't speak of in Romania, we could have had peace in the world, but it wasn't like that because america didn't want this, because that's where the military industrial complex comes from	
Video 44 8/1/2024	Anti-western/pro-Russia, Conspiracy Theory	213L, 3.4k V, 2 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/1	In Romania where everyone (politicians) says I have a relation with the US, we should have dignity and honor there is	

				1645397715435529	nothing there that we want, America is playing with fire and bringing the world at risk	
Video 45 8/1/2024	Conspiracy Theory	545 L, 7.7K V, 15 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/520472213787613	Where this war after war, the people there have nothing to do with starting these wars, but there are powers behind these wars stealing resources, look at syria, we must admit the truth to bring peace to this world	
Video 46 8/3/2024	Conspiracy Theory, Ultra-conservative	11K L, 178K V, 310 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/1918704351931082	one is natural food, one is processed food which is full of plastics inside and out, if a produce has 40-50 ingredients how can you call that food	
Video 47 8/3/2024	Conspiracy Theory, Ultra-conservative, Anti-western/pro-Russia	12k L, 275K V, 565 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/1440790853307993	Romania will have very expensive natural food in the near future and that, water, and energy is exactly the neishe of Romania, it will make the country number 1 in Europe that will make every other country jealous, especially a country like england where i studied years, is much poorer than romania	
Video 48 8/3/2024	Conspiracy Theory, Anti-Globalism, Anti-western/pro-Russia, Ultra-conservative	27k L, 571K V, 754 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/1160361315268551	England can't compare, the financial banking system can be found in England but in Romania there is no financial system that belongs to Romania, in England over 80% of their banks are english	
Video 49 8/4/2024	Call to Action, Anti-Globalism, Ultra-conservative	2.5k L, 27k V, 98 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/512302971258591	How the exterior looks, looks our interior, we must strengthen our people so that they don't feel fear and shame, I hope that Romania will be characterized by ownership of our own country, private property is the key to this	Reposted on 14 of august, 3.2k L message resonates heavily

Video 50 8/4/2024	Conspiracy Theory, Anti-Globalism, Anti-western/pro-Russia, Call to Action	24K L, 1.2m V, 787 c	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/1422652361784645	Today in Romania a kilo of cherries costs 8-12 lei (a pound british) in the UK its almost 20 pounds	
Video 51 8/7/2024		336 L, 5.8k V, 4 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/853430270073509	Whoever will be the next US president, won't be able to focus on international issues, they will have to focus on America's debt otherwise the country will no longer exist	
Video 52 8/7/2024	Religion, Ultra-conservative	6.8k L, 99k V, 273 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/1023606909460226	in the bible thievery or lying isn't the biggest sin, fear is the biggest sin, fear means you have a love which is degraded in relation with God, the moment you don't have a relation with God fear comes in	
Video 53 8/11/2024	Ultra-conservative, Conspiracy Theory, Anti-Globalism, Call to Action	3.6k L, 71K V, 113 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/1251524439374281	How can we be a set economy if we continue to import more and export less and less, salt for example we have enough for 500 years yet we import from Turkey, we import over 90% of products from outside Romania, we have processed food not organic romanian made food,	He associates organic with homegrown Romanian food
Video 54 8/21/2024	Religion, Historical Context	6.5k L, 88k V, 267 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/491819823477055	when Ferdinand called the man to battle he promised them land, meaning he didn;t understand just in land he understood in God, when you realize what you are doing you realize you will leave this earth	Incoherent rambling mix of historical figures in Romania and religion
Video 55 8/23/2024	Call to Action	12k L, 166k V, 515 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/404645318906584	When people wear masks how can you have a consistent relation with someone, serious and full of love humanized, everyone wears a mask and there isn't any authenticity left	

					around us, we all feel at fault so we all wear masks cause everyone else wears masks so basically there's a world with an open wound.	
Video 56 8/24/2024	Religion	5.4k L, 55k V, 374 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/330273933412120	This is a thing of spirit, you have to be in a mindset, the idea is that love is everything, people have to have a spiritual life, think of politicians judges and police officers full of love what would that mean	Love in his meaning is love from God
Video 57 8/24/2024	Anti-western/pro-Russia, Historical Context, Ultra-conservative, Conspiracy Theory	12k L, 187k V, 436 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/1053147032990421	the formula of LGBT half naked people, that is the blue print they want the world to look like, the message is you don't matter, that's what they have been transmitting to us repeatedly, not that you don't matter you're a slave thats not true, messages fake, if there was romanian history not just general (he's implying fake history) there's a huge difference.	
Video 58 8/26/2024	Conspiracy Theory, Ultra-conservative, Religion, Historical Context	699 L, 10k V, 19 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/272267816235798 37	I have created them, ambassadors, politicians, presidents, all my people (out of context); the spirit, the soul here is the power when consciousness awakens and the light appears in your soul youre unbeatable. That's how Mihai Viteazu was like. When the germans were attacking from the north and romanian's were sent to the slaughter to be killed but they knew the land.	
Video 59 8/29/2024	Conspiracy Theory, Call to Action, Anti-Globalism	31k L, 911k V, 1.2k C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/488897357183409	The subliminal message is that we the people don't matter, while showing a clip of a hand playing with a puppet, the people don't matter automatically in romania its a social experiment to see if	

					anyone cares and if anyone rebels	
Video 60 8/29/2024	Religion, Call to Action, Conspiracy Theory, Historical Context	4.4k L, 58k V, 114 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/1064825858600873	How could a romanian receive many messages from the subtle messaging to fight for romania, to learn what is romania and to support the Romanian idea, listen we both came from a woman, in front of a woman you kneel because she gives birth to a person	
Video 61 8/31/2024	Religion, Call to Action	4.9k L, 74k V, 150 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/2087125001755182	The single exceptional thing, a single miracle on this earth is love. Romanians today are a mechanism for transporting this cosmic energy towards a higher power of God. Use of classical music	
Video 62 9/1/2024	Call to Action, Conspiracy Theory, Anti-Globalism, Religion, Historical Context, Ultra-conservative	6.5k L, 331k V, 869 C	Long Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/1953963148449230	I am Calin Georgescu, I am a romanian like you, i am candidating for the presidency, don't wish me luck, wish us luck, this isn't just a presidential campaign but a calling; come i call on you to come alongside me on this project with us and all of us with GOD, peace respect for romanians in the country is our communal ideas, my project hungry, water, energy explains how we can together except these ideas together, cause only together can we succeed. In the international context of instability and loneliness, put my project there and fix the internal economy, bring stability and security to all Romanian citizens. I was born and raised orthodox, historical and military. My father was a cavalry officer for the Romanian armed forces. Because I have loved the traditional Romanian and the Romanian land unconditionally I have studied in Bucharest and received my doctorate. I liked sports so I learned judo and athleticism. My life has been abroad so i have diplomatic experience, i have worked in many international institutions so i know these world leaders personally. Coming back to romania to worship the romanian people from 2021 i am a professor at university of pitesti. I am married and have three boys family small means family big which means our nation, (Switches from hopeful classical	So a lot to unpack in a suit put together from head to toe in his office talking straight to the camera.

					music to intense classical) all these things have made me rich and have made me realize the importance of the christian family in society for the history of romania, the education and survival of Romania. It is important for our children to take their place in society as number one. Romania is awakening we arent changing our owners but our system entirely. The time has come to make history not politics, this is how i hope god will help us	
Video 63 9/6/2024	Call to Action, Historical Context, Religion, Ultra-conservative	567 L, 14k V, 31 C	Long Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/1042284223918478	Our word is the word of saints, a lot of historical figures being shown while he speaks poetically about Romania, using figures like Eminescu, even going to his house trying to show his love for the country and calling for the unity of Romania	
Video 64 9/6/2024	Call to Action, Religion, Historical Context, Ultra-conservative, Conspiracy Theory	486 L, 14k V, 20 C	Long Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/492999240362750	Traditional video at a Romanian monastery in which traditionally dressed people are singing Romanian folk songs and the video shows georgescu going into an orthodox church, hes in a church talking a lot about love, God, and family in the first half, In the second half he says God is calling on you the traditional people to fight, king decebal is calling you to fight, We can be strong because God is on our side, The youth need us to fight for them so they can have a good future	
Video 65 9/6/2024	Call to Action, Anti-Globalism, Religion, Historical Context, Ultra-conservative	763 L, 16k V, 58 C	Long Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/861572645920320	Video of Georgescu shaking hands in the region Moldova and speaking to Romanians about their hard work farming, and what greatness God has given us. It's great to see you all selling Romanian produce. We have to hold hope that change is near	
Video 66 9/9/2024	Religion, Historical	1.3k L, 30k V, 135 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorges	What convinced you to run for president? I remember the moment a good friend died.	

	Context, Call to Action			curo/videos/267186387510 84788	Before he died he said those who survived the communist prisons true believers in God survived, I am a soldier and a true believer in my culture.	
Video 67 9/12/2024	Religion, Call to Action	22k L, 614k V, 1.4K C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/489090550584391	Before the sun sets, the darkness creeps in and the cold harshest, everything happening now is all part of God's plan but it matters to be awake as a man, because the peace of resistance is liberty, and liberty of mankind's existence cause from holy knowledge	
Video 68 9/13/2024	Call to Action, Religion, Ultra-conservative, Historical Context, Conspiracy Theory	804:L, 11k V, 28 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/379495291874239	Cleptocrats we see with our own eyes that at least in Romania the moment you don't know how to do something you don't know anything; that's how you become a politician, if you knew how to do something else you wouldn't do this, thats why I say i am not running a political campaign for its a calling to make history my party is the Romanian people, its a calling with God	
Video 69 9/18/2024		821 L, 14k V, 52 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/874285087586472	At one point you were with AUR and George simion, yes I paid for this, I was cheated, how were you cheated? well what they promote and what they are doing, well AUR has nothing to do with sovereignty and Nationalism, and proud things, they didn't matter to me	And now He will be george simions PM, this video and the one before it is what makes him a hypocritical populist
Video 70 9/19/2024	Conspiracy Theory, Ultra-conservative	789 L, 10K V 37 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/1	The state helps, it doesn't trip you up, the nation is a family a big family, you go from your family which is supposed to	

				838829946647717	flourish because it is helped, the state is supposed to help you it is one of the most important inventions that mankind has made, with one important thing, it's supposed to serve you, not the other way around	
Video 71 9/20/2024		780 L, 11k V, 25 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/887100036122686	To take advantage of any rain storm or flood it needs to be planned, for example austria which collects their water and regulates everything	
Video 72 9/20/2024	Conspiracy Theory, Ultra-conservative	749 L 11k V, 19 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/496374413358255	The club of Rome started in 1967, funded by the UN and World economic fund, For me i resigned after 7 years because of this criminal lie which was climate change	
Video 73 9/20/2024	Ultra-conservative, Religion	11k L, 144k V, 462 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/543662851395945	It's a human relation that you have to have with a teen or child as a professor, so when a professor enters a classroom a child should be able to say I am ready with my heart and soul	
Video 74 9/20/2024	Conspiracy Theory, Historical Context, Ultra-conservative, Call to Action	1k L, 18K V, 34 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/1217688143018484	How do we change the constitution? before you can change it you must respect it and this is an essential point, articles of life say that the Gov has to take economic and social protection measures to assure that citizens have a decent living article 135 says romania's economy is a market economy based on the freedom of movement of goods, exploitation of natural resources etc	
Video 75 9/21/2024	Conspiracy Theory, Ultra-conservative, Call to Action	597L, 9.6k V, 597 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/529777522968438	For me its important to reintroduce romanian culture and language as the dominant language and culture our language is sacred to our identities	

Video 76 9/21/2024	Ultra-conservative, Anti-Globalism, Call to Action, Historical Context	989 L, 17k V, 60 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/1021033082836578	What type of life would you adopt as romanian president passive or player? I don't think i would be either or, Romanian's have to understand I am in their service not them in mine thats most important thing as a participating democracy, especially since it's something that's been missing for the last not 35 years but last 100 years, the other part is that you should implicate yourself in everything to do with RO Politics, you should fight to protect the dignity and sovereignty of RO, yet the level of living and quality of life of Romanians should be of the highest importance	started doing flash interviews at home
Video 77 9/21/2024	Ultra-conservative, Anti-Globalism, Call to Action	770 L, 11k V, 43 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/1286264485693390	What are the three main responsibilities of the future RO president? Three constitutional things but also something else we need a president who loves their nation and history unconditionally and have strong leadership not to bring problems but to fix problems, constitutionally it's the representation of the nation on the international stage, two to keep and protect the nation's sovereignty, and three ...	
Video 78 9/23/2024		959 L, 14K V, 37 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/1759221574614142	What experience internationally have you gathered in 17 years at ONU? It takes many years, you have to be eyes and ears at everything it matters, nothing is coincidence, it matters how you structure your team and life, first my Romanian name which helped some stringent problems when it came to national parks or toxic dumping in Hungary where it wasn't simple. You have	

					to know about the people behind the politicians who matter even more but that you may not know them personally.	
Video 79 9/25/2024		695L, 10K V, 17 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/1200942864447001	What will be the principal criteria for approval of proposals from the government? we as a nation must work together no matter the party, just for them to have three positions: morality, professionalism and responsibility.	till october 9 he reposts earlier interviews which i have already covered.
Video 80 10/9/2024	Historical Context, Ultra-conservative, Religion, Call to Action	874L, 13k V, 45 C	Long Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/508554905277154	Video of people laying wreaths in front of the memory of nicu golescu, who fought for the Romanian people and praised god, he talks more about Golescu's accomplishments, and says that today a romanian president needs to make similar achievements to honor the memory of golescu.	
Video 81 10/11/2024	Historical Context, Religion, Call to Action, Ultra-conservative	1k L, 15k V, 52 C	Long Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/1039119124540633	Romania's biggest project ever was unification, Mihai Viteazu started Romania's unification, a man of God he was going to revolt against the ottomans and liberate Konstantinopol, he is an example for all of us a Romanian people	
Video 82 10/16/2024	Call to Action, Conspiracy Theory, Historical Context, Ultra-conservative, Religion, Anti-Globalism	29K L, 356K V, 1.6 K C	Long Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/1152597273216494	He's speaking to Romania's army mainly officers, using his fathers background as a military officer to thank them for their service and calls on the military to take a stand and fight for Romania's constitution and its people, he says in zadar in the bible that the government has to feed its people especially its military, this entire video is a call to action for Romania's military telling them	

					that they haven't been paid well mistreated by the politicians and caused to fight for other governments	
Video 83 10/16/2024	Conspiracy Theory	23k L, 621k V, 552 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/2101511430264994	I want to tell you of countries close to us, especially Hungary and Austria, especially Austria, they have amazing irrigation that moves it around, and makes fresh water available even during droughts, and it protects their whole nation especially the capital. Someone with a brain created it, we also had that, we had over 3.5 million hectares of irrigated land and now maybe we have 100 thousand	
Video 84 10/17/2024	Call to Action, Anti-Globalism, Historical Context	44k L, 1.2M V, 1.4k C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/1752044402280987	When the pure blooded Romanian entrepreneur will be wealthy, the nation will be wealthy, what does that mean, you have to offer them all the facilities to develop, meaning traditional , romanian skilled laborers, the school of arts and labor like back in the day, The moment we give way for new schools of technical arts the country will flourish and the country will gain wealth. Momentarily we don't produce anything, we are able to produce from nails to airplanes if given the right education	
Video 85 10/17/2024	Call to Action, Anti-Globalism, Ultra-conservative	679L, 12k V, 27C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/518006384448708	My project and my program's first action is for the nation to be healthy and be stable on its own feet at the same time to offer small producers what's needed to develop the country. Interviewer: the conditions where you become president and implement this plan you also mean these plans will be with sovereigntist sources? I am first	

					talking about individual sovereignty	
Video 86 10/20/2024	Historical Context	7.1k L, 107k V, 291 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/1301672890845085	The idea is that you have to bring morality to the forefront, and for that our fighters have fought for the moral man. This is what king Carol said at bucharest, I don't need specialists I need character when offered help in bucharest by the state. In the rest of the video they tell him thanks for his presence and wish him the best luck in the campaign.	
Video 87 10/20/2024	Ultra-conservative	517 L, 12k V, 21 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/1610958553170774	From the point of view as Romania's next president will you negotiate with absolutely anyone for Romania's interest? Yes absolutely anyone and not only that I am sure I will win whatever negotiation I undertake because this is my specialty that I have spent 25 years cultivating. In the diplomatic bag I carry, I have all the tools I need to succeed, one condition is to love your people and your nation.	This is really the first time he sounds more like trump than anything else
Video 88 10/21/2024	Anti-western/pro-Russia, Conspiracy Theory	692 L, 14K V, 35 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/820641170282 1519	There is a big difference, in the game of this world today is about resources and who has all the resources, Europe is dry of resources because it fell in this situation, I won't comment on the war itself but europe fell in this mess like a boomerang and Europe forbid any relationship whatsoever with Russia	First time he openly names Russia by name, before he would only say our neighbor
Video 89 10/21/2024	Religion, Historical Context, Ultra-conservative, Call to Action	744L, 14k V, 29 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/537418429009997	A people that doesn't respect its traditions, a people that doesn't cultivate and doesn't protect their faith, a people that does not show love for its grandfathers and forefathers will be condemned, Romania should not and cannot do such a thing	

					because this land has been salted with the blood of its heroes through their pain those known in history and those forgotten	
Video 90 10/21/2024	Conspiracy Theory, Ultra-conservative, Call to Action	895L ,16k V, 28 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/435034802951520	What I call organic food and regular food is different, regular food is filled with chemicals and fats from labs and doesn't ensure your health. I have a single Idea to have a well fed organically fed romanian nation. A healthy nation means a free nation, an unhealthy nation there's nothing you can do with them	Clarify his food and organic food metaphor, In romanian its different
Video 91 10/21/2024	Call to Action, Ultra-conservative	1.5K L, 22k V, 69 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/861439762771703	Everything was left in shambles, nothing was finished before "29" and basically all the structures rotted and all the construction before the wiring and piping was stolen and sold off to metal works. So in short what's left is to give way to small producers who can work in reciepe, give way to the small Romanian entrepreneur who you should consider the princes of this nation whatever romanian entrepreneur is a prince, if they have 100 employees and they are paid well even with taxes included, help these entrepreneurs pay skilled workers better like abroad 2-3000 euros and instead of 100 to have 1000 workers.	
Video 92 10/22/2024	Call to Action, Religion, Ultra-conservative, Historical Context	1.6K L, 45K V, 86 C	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/522279197336974	interviewer Who are you sir? well who are we romanians, we will see in a minute. We invited mr georgescu (big room clapping) we don't give name to politicians he's stupid he's smart, take the political situation after 1989 and before and have a view	The comment ator spoke the whole time and this looked

					optimistic big and religious for the romania of tomorrow	like a book signing for georgescu
Video 93 10/22/2024	Call to Action, Conspiracy Theory, Religion, Historical Context, Ultra-conservative	37K L, 705k V, 3.8k C	Long Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/1273733977404585	My Dears, this message is probably the most important up until this point and will probably change our political history in the last 35 years, i want to understand whats at stake in our proposed calling this social movement is the most important thing that we can still do, we still have the freedom to choose to show we are free and still have the right to believe in democracy i have used the word still obsessively because its now or never and we still have a chance to change something. Romanian brothers I refuse to believe to my bones that I, an independent candidate, will be taken advantage of. I, calin georgescu, am only sustained by the romanian people and i calin georgescu have the interest to only serve the romanian people above anything else. Alas the regulations around the election are meant to serve those who are in power and in high paying functions ...we will write history together... the institutions want to reduce me to a single number	Very long video but tries to discredit the election if he loses
Video 94 10/23/2024	Call to Action, Ultra-conservative, Anti-Globalism	1.4k L, 28k V, 75	Short Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/1267419537629365	I am for an absolutely free market, what does that mean, any Romanian producer doesn't fear the free market because they can make a better and better product, each producer should have fiscal security to feel wealthy but to also serve the	

					Romanian seed. The state should do whatever it takes to take on Romanian producers to show them traditional care and with this we capture the world	
Video 95 10/24/2024	Call to Action, Ultra-conservative	1.4kL, 31k V, 111L	Long Video	https://www.facebook.com/calingeorgescuro/videos/417060218107786	loved romanians in the world, I am CG and am candidating to be Romania's future president, like many of you I have spent many many years beyond Romania's borders, and while physically I was finishing my mission I was exactly like you with my soul at home in Romania, wherever I was I praised my nation and people with pride and dignity of being romanian, like you I have seen what is happening in our beloved nation and what I saw hurt me the same as it probably hurts you and disheartens you and exactly that stimulated me to bring my contribution to put my nation in the place it belongs in its rightful place not just in mine and your hearts but in front of the whole world. I have a good cohesive plan that is easy to implement a program that has all good viable factors accounted for, for our own good, I coordinated and planned in 2008 the only national strategy of Romania's development in the last 50 years, but you know if you open a dictionary and search for the term diaspora you will find the meaning spread out migration, you romanians left putting romania in your souls you were and remain its ambassadors, in the more than 17 years that Romania has been a member of the EU, you have sent more than 70 billion euros home, the ones producing the	DIrected at the diaspora directly