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# **Diplomová práce**

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**Two Hundred Eighty Characters of Jihad: Strategic  
Communication of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan  
on the X platform**

Dvě stě osmdesát znaků džihádu: Strategická komunikace Islámského  
emirátu Afghánistán na platformě X

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**Prohlášení:**

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**Keywords:**

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**Klíčová slova:**

*Afghánistán, Tálibán, Islámský emirát Afghánistán, Twitter (X), kritická diskurzivní analýza, strategická komunikace*

**Abstract:**

*The thesis examines the activity of representatives of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan on the X social site, formerly known as Twitter. Specifically, it focuses on the figure of the official spokesperson, Zabihullah Mujahid, and his strategic communication from November 2022 to August 2023. The author presents the source in three main languages, Afghan Persian, called Dari, Pashto, and English. Based on critical discourse analysis in the approach of Teun A. van Dijk, the research shows how the Emirate's representatives utilized the X platform during the observed period for a self-presentation among both domestic and international audiences.*

**Abstrakt:**

*Diplomová práce zkoumá aktivitu zástupců Islámského emirátu Afghánistán na síti X, dříve známé jako Twitter. Konkrétně se zaměřuje na postavu oficiálního mluvčího, Zabihulláha Mudžáhida a jeho strategickou komunikaci v období mezi listopadem roku 2022 a srpnem roku 2023. Autor prezentuje pramen ve třech hlavních jazycích, afghánské perštině, zvané dari, pašštině a angličtině. Analýza vycházející z kritické diskurzivní analýzy v přístupu Teuna A. van Dijka ukazuje, jakým způsobem zástupci emirátu v daném období využívali síť X k vlastní prezentaci mezi vnitrostátními i mezinárodními publiky.*

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# List of Abbreviations

CDA	Critical discourse analysis
GIA	Groupe Islamic Armé
IEA	Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
IS–KP	Islamic State – Khorasan Province
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OIC	Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
PRC	People’s Republic of China
RTA	Radio Television Afghanistan
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
US	United States (of America)

## Note on Transliteration and Referencing

I transliterate Dari, Pashto, and Arabic according to the standards set by the American Library Association – Library of Congress (ALA-LC).<sup>1</sup> Dari is transliterated according to the transliteration standard for Persian which reflects the vowel pronunciation of Afghan Dari. I diverge from the ALA-LC standards in not marking the letter “ayn” (ع), at the beginning of words. In pashto, I additionally mark the “schwa” vowel (ə) in accordance with Wardag Akbar’s *Dictionnaire Pashto-Français* and Zeeya Pashtoon’s *Pashto-English Dictionary*.<sup>2</sup>

Terms such as “jihad”, “mujahideen,” “sharia”, “Shia”, or “Shiites”, established in the English language, are romanized in a simplified manner corresponding with the most frequent form used in both the analyzed primary and secondary sources, taking into consideration that other forms may occur elsewhere. Names of the Taliban or the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan figures are preserved in the way they appear most often in the primary source. In the cases of geographical names, where more than one variant exists or is used, I chose the option that occurs most frequently in the primary and secondary sources. Names of quoted authors are preserved in the form used by themselves.

The primary source quoted in this thesis, i.e. the posts from the X platform, appears in the text mostly translated into English. For an improvement of readability, where necessary, I made adjustments in the cited primary source to grammatically assimilate it with rest of the text, as per the guidelines of the Chicago Manual of Style, 17th edition.<sup>3</sup> These insertions are marked in square brackets “[ ]”. Due to an abundance of hypertextual content typically associated with the X platform such as hashtags or links, the posts appear in abbreviated versions presenting mainly their textual content. The full versions of the posts are available in the Appendix, where they are arranged in an ascending order of their appearance on Zabihullah Mujahid’s X page, from the oldest to the latest ones. All the referenced posts are marked by a number in the footnotes, which then refers to their position in the Appendix. The number also

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<sup>1</sup> “Persian,” Library of Congress, accessed May 4, 2024, <https://www.loc.gov/catdir/cps/romanization/persian.pdf>;

“Pushto,” Library of Congress, accessed May 4, 2024, <https://www.loc.gov/catdir/cps/romanization/pushto.pdf>;

“Arabic,” Library of Congress, accessed May 4, 2024, <https://www.loc.gov/catdir/cps/romanization/arabic.pdf>.

<sup>2</sup> Wardag Akbar, *Dictionnaire Pashto-Français* (Paris: L’Asiathèque, Maison des langues du monde, 2018); Zeeya A. Pashtoon, *Pashto-English Dictionary*, first edition (Hyattsville: Dunwoody Press, 2009).

<sup>3</sup> University of Chicago Press, *The Chicago Manual of Style*, seventeenth edition (Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, 2017), part 13.12.



marks the position of the post within the oldest-latest range in the entirety of 2,112 gathered posts, regardless of their final inclusion into the thesis. In footnotes, Bibliography, and Appendix, posts and accounts are cited under a unique *username*, marked by the symbol @, which is always followed by a text in the latin script on the X platform, ensuring the accounts' identification.

# 1. Introduction

When the Taliban<sup>4</sup> entered Kabul on August 15, 2021, they also infiltrated media headlines and front pages all over the world. In only a few months after United States (hereinafter US) President Joe Biden announced the complete withdrawal of the US Armed Forces from Afghanistan, the Taliban managed to take over extensive territories swiftly. The dream of a Western-style democracy prevailing in Afghanistan finally crumbled, unveiling the illusion kept alive by the West. Owing to social media, the world was watching closely. In awe, readers wondered what made such a rapid advance possible. Within days after the fall of the Western-backed regime, several journalists provided the public with an explanation: “The Taliban turned social media into a weapon.”<sup>5</sup>

A Western reader recalling draconian practices from the era of the first Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (1996–2001) could only hardly picture a bearded Talib with a Kalashnikov in one hand and a smartphone in the other. Yet, such was the reality. When the official designated spokesman of the re-established Islamic Emirate, Zabihullah Mujahid, made his first public appearance,<sup>6</sup> his Twitter account was already followed by more than 371,000 people.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, the social media director of the reinstated Emirate, Qari Saeed Khosty, proudly shared details of the Taliban media campaigns, providing the journalists with statements about “fully equipped multimedia studios” or money paid to the “media team [...to fight] their war online”.<sup>8</sup> However, scholars and analysts specializing in the Taliban or Afghanistan had long before the fall of Kabul informed about radical changes in the means of reproduction of the

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<sup>4</sup> I adhere to the usage of the term “Taliban” for describing the movement in its pre-2021 era and “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” or its acronym “IEA” for the post-2021 period. However, I also use this term when referring to the era of 1996–2001, differentiating it as *the first* IEA.

<sup>5</sup> Aakash Hassan, “How the Taliban turned social media into a weapon,” *The New Arab*, September 8, 2021, <https://www.newarab.com/analysis/how-taliban-turned-social-media-weapon>.

See also Sarah Atiq, “The Taliban embrace social media: ‘We too want to change perceptions’,” *BBC*, September 6, 2021, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58466939>; Paul Mozur and Zia ur-Rehman, “How the Taliban Turned Social Media Into a Tool for Control,” *The New York Times*, August 20, 2021, <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/20/technology/afghanistan-taliban-social-media.html?action=click&module=Well&pgtype=Homepage&section=Technology>.

<sup>6</sup> Hassan, “How the Taliban turned social media into a weapon.”

<sup>7</sup> Atiq, “The Taliban embrace social media.” For the account see @Zabehulah\_M33, X, accessed May 4, 2024.

<sup>8</sup> Atiq, “The Taliban embrace social media.”

Taliban's views, stating, for example, that "the Taliban [had] won the information war against the US Coalition and the Afghan government".<sup>9</sup>

August 15, 2024, marks the third anniversary of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan's (IEA) reinstatement. While Afghanistan has disappeared from the headlines of the Western media, and often from their pages altogether, the IEA's media machinery has been operating at full tilt. My research attempts to shed light on the strategic communication efforts of the IEA, providing answers to the following questions: Primarily, how did the IEA utilize the X platform during the observed period from November 2022 to August 2023? Secondly, to what extent, in terms of both quantity and nature of the content, did the production aimed at domestic and international audiences differ, as well as what image were the IEA's representatives trying to create through their activities on the platform? Finally, how was the strategic communication changing during the observed period, and what prompted such alterations?

## 1.1. Scope of the thesis

In the presented thesis, I aim to analyze the IEA's activity on the X platform as a primary source of strategic communication of the state. For this multi-lingual communication, the IEA has been using various platforms, including pamphlets, magazines and newspapers, publications, websites, and social media.<sup>10</sup> Out of all these, Twitter, nowadays simply called X,<sup>11</sup> stands out significantly. "No other platform gives the Taliban the visibility and reach that Twitter currently provides," stated an analysis conducted by BBC researchers in 2020.<sup>12</sup>

At the time of writing, the official spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid's account on X has almost a million followers, making it the most followed account in the IEA's X network. Apart from that, the account deserves attention for several reasons. First, it serves as a platform for Mujahid's own statements on various political subjects. Second, it is used as one of the channels

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<sup>9</sup> Thomas H. Johnson, Matthew DuPee, and Wali Shaaker, *Taliban Narratives: The Use and Power of Stories in the Afghanistan Conflict* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), xxxiv. See also David Drissel, "Reframing the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan: new communication and mobilization strategies for the Twitter generation," *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* 7, no. 2 (2015): 123, <https://doi.org/10.1080/19434472.2014.986496>.

<sup>10</sup> See for example Johnson, DuPee, Shaaker, *Taliban Narratives*, 16.

<sup>11</sup> During the process of writing this thesis, Twitter changed to X. In this work, I use the name Twitter when quoting others using this name and when I describe this social site in the time before the scope of this thesis. For the reasons of simplification and clarity, I call the site during the whole analyzed period simply X.

<sup>12</sup> Abdirahim Saeed and Ahmed Nour, "Analysis: How Taliban used Twitter in first year of power," *BBC Monitoring*, August 12, 2022, <https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c203o5kk>.

through which the stances, views, decisions, or orders of Hibatullah Akhunzada, the supreme leader of the IEA, are shared. Finally, it serves as a hub through which all the important posts of the IEA's network flow, owing to Mujahid's full-fledged usage of X's system of reposts and quotes.<sup>13</sup> Therefore, because it is the official channel used specifically for the strategic communication of the IEA, and it ultimately shows the vastness of the Emirate's network, I limited the scope of this thesis to the activity of Zabihullah Mujahid's account only.

The temporal scope of this thesis is limited to the period between November 13, 2022, and August 15, 2023. This nine-month span was chosen for multiple reasons. The post-2021 X activity of the Emirate has already been the subject of several predominantly quantitative analyses, as shown below. These mainly analyzed the activity during the first year of the Emirate's existence, the latest one utilizing the data until April 2022.<sup>14</sup> For the first time, the presented analysis takes into account data enclosing the first two years of the Emirate's rule.

November 13, 2022, was chosen as the starting point as the day Zabihullah Mujahid shared a post on his account about a meeting of Akhunzada with judges, during which, the supreme leader was supposed to command the judges to follow sharia and in cases of "thieves, kidnappers, and corruptors" pass the judgment accordingly.<sup>15</sup> Even though these posts were shared in Dari and Pashto languages, they attracted attention of global media. After months of anxious anticipations on what reality would shape in Afghanistan and debates to what extent the second Emirate would resemble the first one, the fears of a return of the draconian rules were confirmed. Western and possibly Afghanistan's English-speaking audiences who read foreign media were taken aghast by headlines such as "Taliban leader orders judges to enforce sharia law with public executions and amputations" or "Afghan supreme leader orders full implementation of sharia law".<sup>16</sup> As such, November 13, 2022, can be seen as a turning point in the strategic communication of the Islamic Emirate and its inner dynamics.

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<sup>13</sup> Reposts and quotes present a similar function of X. Both serve to forward someone else's post; however, the latter offers the possibility to add new text or media to the forwarded post. See "How to Repost," X Help Center, accessed May 4, 2024, <https://help.twitter.com/en/using-x/how-to-repost>.

<sup>14</sup> Bradley M. Knopp, Jon Niewijk, Zohan Hasan Tariq, and Elmo C. Wright, Jr., "Comparing Taliban Social Media Usage by Language: Who's Speaking and What's Being Said," RAND Research Report, April 25, 2023: 3, [https://www.rand.org/pubs/research\\_reports/RRA1830-1.html](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1830-1.html).

<sup>15</sup> Posts nos. 6 and 7.

<sup>16</sup> The Telegraph's Foreign Staff, "Taliban leader orders judges to enforce sharia law with public executions and amputations," *The Telegraph*, November 14, 2022, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2022/11/14/taliban-leader-orders-judges-enforce-sharia-law-public-executions/>;

Agence France-Presse in Kabul, "Afghan supreme leader orders full implementation of sharia law," *The Guardian*, November 14, 2022, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/14/afghanistan-supreme-leader-orders-full-implementation-of-sharia-law-taliban>.

August 15, 2023, presents the second anniversary of the fall of Kabul, the fall of the previous Western-backed Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, and the re-emergence of the IEA, a suitable date for internal and external evaluation of the past two years. I turn to Nicole Ball's arguments on post-conflict state reconstruction, which she divides into two phases – transition and consolidation.<sup>17</sup> Ball argues that the “transition phase lasts between eighteen and twenty-four months”<sup>18</sup> during which the key reforms should be implemented.<sup>19</sup> In addition, before the second anniversary on July 27, 2023, Sirajuddin Haqqani, minister of interior affairs of the IEA and arguably the second most powerful person in the state, often called “khalifa”,<sup>20</sup> made an appearance at a press conference, a highlight of which was shared by Zabihullah Mujahid: “We have finished the Freedom Jihad, now it is the time of the Development Jihad.”<sup>21</sup> Because of the time alignment of Haqqani's declaration and Ball's theory, I argue that Haqqani's words can be understood in the context of Nicole Ball's definition of post-conflict state reconstruction as a declaration of finalizing the transition phase and entering the consolidation one. The announcement of the implementation of harsh sharia laws by Akhunzada can be seen as the first of the final steps in introducing key reforms before entering said consolidation period.

## 1.2. Theoretical background

The distinction between the terms “Taliban” and “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” deserves clarification. Some scholars point out that “the Taliban” (*sic*, with the quotation marks) is an “umbrella term” that describes a bigger body of different groups,<sup>22</sup> which is internally fragmented to a significant amount.<sup>23</sup> Therefore, the usage of the name “Taliban” is

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<sup>17</sup> Nicole Ball, “The Challenge of Rebuilding War-Torn Societies,” in *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hamson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2001), 722.

<sup>18</sup> Ball, 731.

<sup>19</sup> Ball, 722.

<sup>20</sup> Knopp, Niewijk, Tariq, and Wright, “Comparing Taliban Social Media Usage by Language,” 12–13. See also @bnaenglish, “Khalifa Sirajuddin Haqqani, the Acting Minister of Interior Affairs,” X, January 11, 2024, <https://twitter.com/bnaenglish/status/1745351578448441592>.

<sup>21</sup> Post no. 1947. The terms Freedom Jihad (in Pashto *də āzādəy jahād*, in Dari *jahād-i āzādī*) and Development Jihad (in Pashto *də ābādəy jahād*, in Dari *jahād-i ābādī*) are further discussed in the Context chapter.

<sup>22</sup> Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, eds., *The Taliban Reader: War, Islam and Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), Kindle, 19.

<sup>23</sup> Vito Morisco, “From Rebel Governance to Institutionalization: Prospects for the Taliban and Afghanistan,” Österreichisches Institut für Internationale Politik Working Paper No. 116, July 2023: 4, <https://www.oiiip.ac.at/en/publications/from-rebel-governance-to-institutionalization-prospects-for-the-taliban-and-afghanistan/>.

questionable. On the other hand, “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” serves as a term of self-denotation.<sup>24</sup> Historically, this term was used by the movement, as it saw itself as an alternative government to those holding the power *de iure*. Therefore, it should be repeated that in the following analytical chapters, I adhere to the usage of the term “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” and its acronym “IEA” as my work concerns only the period after the movement officially took power in Afghanistan and *became* the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, and simultaneously the aim of the thesis is to follow the official channels of the *state*’s strategic communication.

As one of this thesis's topical pillars, the concept of strategic communication also deserves a deeper inquiry. The simplest way to understand and describe strategic communication is as a “purposeful use of communication by an organization to fulfill its mission”.<sup>25</sup> It is used in various disciplines, the most relevant of which, for the purposes of this thesis, is political communication overlapping with public relations. Authors of such communication include government affairs staff, public relations staff, or politicians in general. They address community leaders, government officials, the general intra-state public, or international audiences.<sup>26</sup> However, the key part of strategic communication is its “purposeful nature”.<sup>27</sup> The peculiarity of the IEA’s case lies in its possible double understanding. On the one hand, it can be viewed as an insurgent or terrorist organization; on the other, it can be seen as a governmental entity. This distinction implies the usage of different strategies of communication.<sup>28</sup> I argue that after 2021, the focus should incline to the latter, yet considering the IEA's specific history, nature, and position.

I approach the IEA’s strategic communication in the framework of critical discourse analysis (CDA). I draw on the work of Teun A. van Dijk. His approach is sometimes called “socio-cognitive” discourse analysis, as it sets a “triangle” relationship between discourse, cognition, and society. Relationships are analyzed between a “communicative event”

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<sup>24</sup> James Caron, “Taliban, Real and Imagined,” in *Under the Drones: Modern Lives in the Afghanistan-Pakistan Borderlands*, eds. Shahzad Bashir and Robert D. Crews (Cambridge, Massachusetts; London: Harvard University Press, 2012), 61.

<sup>25</sup> Kirk Hallahan, Derina Holtzhausen, Betteke van Ruler, Dejan Verčič, and Krishnamurthy Sriramesh, “Defining Strategic Communication,” *International Journal of Strategic Communication* 1, no. 1 (2007): 3, <https://doi.org/10.1080/15531180701285244>.

<sup>26</sup> Hallahan, Holtzhausen, van Ruler, Verčič, and Sriramesh, 6.

<sup>27</sup> Hallahan, Holtzhausen, van Ruler, Verčič, and Sriramesh, 7.

<sup>28</sup> See for example Carsten Bockstette, “Taliban and Jihadist Terrorist Use of Strategic Communication,” *Connections* 8, no. 3 (Summer 2009): 1-24. See also: Spiro Kiouis and Jesper Strömbäck, “The Strategic Context of Political Communication,” in *The Routledge Handbook of Strategic Communication*, eds. Derina Holtzhausen and Ansgar Zerfass (New York, London: Routledge, 2015), 383–395.

(discourse) happening in local, face-to-face interactions or global interactions between groups, movements, institutions, political systems, etc. (society). These actions are affected by beliefs, goals, emotions, evaluations, and representations (cognition).<sup>29</sup> The CDA aims to focus on social problems and political issues, as well as to explain the discourse structures in the context of their social structures and social interactions.<sup>30</sup> Further on, according to Fairclough and Wodak, the CDA helps uncover ways in which power is exercised and negotiated in the discourse. This is closely related to ideologies – “particular ways of representing and constructing society which reproduce unequal relations of power [...], domination and exploitation.”<sup>31</sup> Fairclough and Wodak argue that discourse depends on its context and can only be understood with it.<sup>32</sup> Moreover, they state that discourse constitutes society and culture and simultaneously is constituted by these.<sup>33</sup>

As mentioned, the analyzed nine-month period can be understood as the final phase of the transitional period of the post-conflict state reconstruction.<sup>34</sup> I understand this term in the way Nicole Ball uses it in her article “The Challenge of Rebuilding War-Torn Societies”. I prefer its application over terms like nation- or state-building, which are, all the more in the Afghan context, generally rather understood as efforts emanating from outside.<sup>35</sup> Whereas such was the case for Afghanistan before 2021, the subsequent situation has been quite the contrary. Now, the efforts lie mainly in the hands of the IEA itself and the international community’s<sup>36</sup> contribution is highly limited. This thesis does not aim to study the state reconstruction itself but rather how it was, in the observed period, perceived by the IEA and communicated with its

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<sup>29</sup> Teun A. van Dijk, “Multidisciplinary CDA: a plea for diversity,” in *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, eds. Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (London, Thousand Oak, New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 2001), 97–98.

<sup>30</sup> Teun A. van Dijk, “Critical Discourse Analysis,” in *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, second edition, eds. Deborah Tannen, Heidi E. Hamilton, and Debora Schiffrin (Chichester: Wiley, 2015), 467.

<sup>31</sup> Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak, “Critical Discourse Analysis,” in *Discourse as Social Interaction*, ed. Teun A. van Dijk (London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 1997), 273–275.

<sup>32</sup> Fairclough, Wodak, 276.

<sup>33</sup> Fairclough, Wodak, 273.

<sup>34</sup> Ball, “The Challenge of Rebuilding War-Torn Societies,” 722.

<sup>35</sup> See for example Francis Fukuyama, “Nation-Building and the Failure of Institutional Memory,” in *Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq*, ed. Francis Fukuyama (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 3–7; Andrea Kathryn Talentino, “The two faces of nation-building: developing function and identity,” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 17, no. 3 (2004): 560, <https://doi.org/10.1080/0955757042000297008>.

<sup>36</sup> Given its presence in both Ball’s treatise and the primary source, I utilize the term “international community” despite its debatable and ambiguous nature. For the needs of this thesis, I understand the term as a society of states and transnational organizations without suggesting any institutional coherence. See David C. Ellis, “On the Possibility of ‘International Community’,” *International Studies Review* 11, no. 1 (March 2009): 23, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25482041>.

citizens and the international community. Therefore, I use the post-conflict state reconstruction theory only as a framework in which the analyzed period is approached.

Ball defines problems that the intra- and extraterritorial actors must deal with to stop conflicts. Steps that must then be undertaken to form a new, peaceful state. She divides the latter stage into the transition and consolidation periods. The main objectives of the transition phase is to establish a sufficiently legitimate and effective government that is able to implement key reforms and provide security.<sup>37</sup> Simultaneously, to obtain aid for these crucial tasks, developing long-term partnerships with the international community is necessary.<sup>38</sup> And finally, economic and social revitalization must be launched and promoted.<sup>39</sup> From the point of view of Ball's framework, these key areas offer a glimpse of how the IEA was reporting on its way from the transition to the consolidation phase. Or, in the words of Sirajuddin Haqqani, later repeated by Minister of Defense Muhammad Yaqoob,<sup>40</sup> son of the late Mullah Omar, how the Freedom Jihad was accomplished and replaced by the Development Jihad.

### 1.3. Methodology

The analyzed posts concern security and internal affairs, diplomacy and external affairs, and economy and infrastructural development. These three main fields correspond to the analytical chapters of this thesis:

- 1) Security and internal affairs: The overarching issue includes a wide variety of posts pertaining mainly to security but also topics like legal matters, designations of political representatives, providing services to the people, practical information for the citizens, military training and operations, etc.
- 2) Diplomacy and foreign affairs: Posts gathered here mainly relate to interactions with other states, official delegations, visits, or include statements concerning important events and jubilees.

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<sup>37</sup> Ball, "The Challenge of Rebuilding War-Torn Societies," 722.

<sup>38</sup> Ball, 726.

<sup>39</sup> Ball, 727.

<sup>40</sup> Ahmad Shāh Irfānī, Suhrāb Sarwarī, "Də difā' wizārat sarparast: os də abādəy aw jorawəlo wakht day, khpəl hēwād be la syālāno sara syāl kawu," *Pajhwok Afghan News*, August 15, 2023, <https://pajhwok.com/ps/2023/08/15/acting-minister-of-defense-now-is-the-time-to-build-and-build-our-country/>.



- 3) Economy and infrastructural development: Posts in this category primarily inform about facilities and infrastructure built, reconstructed, or bought, as well as general economic topics of the state.

Even though posts pertaining to these categories are prevalent in the data set, such a selection of topics is not exhaustive. To statistically accommodate all the posts that could topically not be associated with any of these three main categories, I propose a fourth virtual category for posts that mainly cross-promote other forms of strategic communication, newspapers, magazines, news agencies, social media accounts, or TV stations. Generally, posts in this category are not analyzed.<sup>41</sup>

It is necessary to add that the three main categories often overlap. For example, when a post describes a delegation of the IEA meeting its foreign counterparts and their discussion of security inside Afghanistan, a problem arises as whether to categorize such posts under internal or external affairs. In these cases, during the categorization, I paid attention to the overall tone of the message delivered through the post using the guidelines of van Dijk's discursive strategies, which tended to be more typical in one of the disputed categories. As such, nonetheless, the subsequent manual coding and division of the 2,112 posts into the categories was based solely on qualitative means. The point of the categorization, however, was not to provide an exhaustive quantitative overview of the IEA's strategic communication on X.<sup>42</sup>

To analyze the strategic communication of the IEA and to find answers to the research questions, I use the critical discourse analysis approach. Specifically, I turn to Teun van Dijk's definition of the so-called political discourse analysis or, more specifically, critical-political discourse analysis.<sup>43</sup> The latter term correlates more with the approach's definition, as it captures its focus on political discourse as well as the critical aspect. Van Dijk suggests that the most obvious way to define political discourse is by its author, i.e., politicians.<sup>44</sup> The Taliban

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<sup>41</sup> During a preliminary analysis, an excerpt was selected to be pre-analyzed by a ChatGPT AI language model that was tasked to identify the main topics of the posts. The excerpt comprised of 40 posts, the maximum possible number to fit in one prompt, in Pashto, Dari, and English. The AI was tasked to identify the main topics and provided the following results: government officials and meetings, regional relations and diplomacy, economic and infrastructure development, security and militant groups, daily newspaper and media outlets, and miscellaneous. (ChatGPT, response to the prompt „Find significant topics and keywords in the [following] tweets,” July 31, 2023, OpenAI, <https://chat.openai.com>.) The results were subsequently compared with previously done analyses (Knopp, Niewijk, Tariq, and Wright, “Comparing Taliban Social Media Usage by Language”; Saeed and Nour, “Analysis”) and with the acquired data set. As a result, I found out that these categories can be compiled into the three main fields and the fourth supplementary category into which the posts were then assorted.

<sup>42</sup> Similar approach was used for example by Drissel, “Reframing the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan,” 100.

<sup>43</sup> Teun A. van Dijk, “What is Political Discourse Analysis?” *Belgian Journal of Linguistics* 11, no. 1 (1997): 11.

<sup>44</sup> Van Dijk, 12.

have been denoting themselves as the IEA.<sup>45</sup> Such a claim did not make them politicians in the past. Instead, they have been described by academics or policymakers as an insurgent body or terrorists.<sup>46</sup> However, I argue that since the re-establishing of the IEA, its representatives should be understood as politicians, as now they fully represent a sovereign state, regardless of the current status of its international recognition. As illustrated by van Dijk's definition: "Politicians [...] are a group of people who are being paid for their (political) activities, and who are being elected or appointed (or self-designated) as the central players in the polity."<sup>47</sup>

The political discourse also presupposes the presence of recipients of the politicians' words and deeds. Van Dijk uses several names for the possible recipients: "the public, the people, citizens, the 'masses'."<sup>48</sup> These recipients can be in various relations towards the state: "voters, [...] demonstrators and dissidents", etc.<sup>49</sup> To provide one exhausting definition of the political discourse, van Dijk suggests "all participants in the political process".<sup>50</sup> In the context of the IEA's strategic communication, the recipients can be identified as all the inhabitants of Afghanistan, supporters of the Emirate or its opponents, as well as citizens of surrounding countries, their politicians, whether engaged in relations with the Emirate or not. Simultaneously, they can be political, religious or like-minded figures of the "Muslim world", or in the broadest specter, representatives, policymakers, humanitarian workers, academics, and researchers of the whole world. Positioning the political discourse between the two, the author and the recipient, van Dijk defines it as "a special case of political action, and as functional or strategic part of the political process".<sup>51</sup> The political discourse's forms stretch from parliamentary debates to propaganda, speeches, interviews, etc.<sup>52</sup> Furthermore, it may manifest itself via various platforms, utilizing spoken, audiovisual, or written forms.<sup>53</sup> Given the predominantly textual content of Mujahid's X account and the nature of the X platform in general, I mainly focus my analysis on written material.

Critical-political discourse analysis is thus designed to identify discursive structures and strategies in the defined political discourse. These structures or strategies are realized via topical

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<sup>45</sup> Caron, "Taliban, Real and Imagined," 61.

<sup>46</sup> See for example: Bockstette, "Taliban and Jihadist Terrorist Use of Strategic Communication"; Drissel, "Reframing the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan".

<sup>47</sup> Van Dijk, "What is Political Discourse Analysis?" 13.

<sup>48</sup> Van Dijk, 13.

<sup>49</sup> Van Dijk, 13.

<sup>50</sup> Van Dijk, 13.

<sup>51</sup> Van Dijk, 18.

<sup>52</sup> Van Dijk, 18.

<sup>53</sup> Van Dijk, 20.

selection, schematic structures, semantics, lexicon, syntax, rhetoric, and others.<sup>54</sup> A usual element of the strategies is a polarization of evaluations, displayed through a positive evaluation of the *ingroup* (i.e. “us”, the authors) and a negative evaluation of the *outgroup* (i.e., “them”, the recipients).<sup>55</sup> Moreover, these evaluations are often emphasized when referring to the positive values of the *ingroup* or the negative values of the *outgroup*. Reversely, the positives and negatives are de-emphasized when relating to the respective groups. Van Dijk described the schema as an “ideological square”.<sup>56</sup> Understanding these dynamics of *ingroup* and *outgroup* evaluations is fundamental for analyzing the heavily polarized society of contemporary Afghanistan.

#### 1.4. Literature review

Much has been written on the contemporary history of Afghanistan, and the first two decades of the 21st-century developments provided impetus for academic interest in Afghanistan. Prevailing was the point of view of nation- or state-building, especially concerning the efforts of the international community in Afghanistan. While the importance of empirical knowledge contained in this massive body of literature cannot be overstated, it does not deal with the principal questions addressed in this thesis.<sup>57</sup> Simultaneously, the topic of the Taliban insurgency<sup>58</sup> was studied in great detail. With the gradual withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan and increasingly successful Taliban activities, the methods of their operations were being brought to light. A change was evident in the ways the Taliban were spreading their message and attracting new people for their cause – they embraced the world of the internet and social media.

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<sup>54</sup> Van Dijk, 25–37.

<sup>55</sup> Van Dijk, 28.

<sup>56</sup> Teun A. Van Dijk, “Discourse and Ideology,” in *Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction*, Second Edition, ed. Teun A. van Dijk (London: SAGE Publications, 2011), 396.

<sup>57</sup> A few of the works should not be omitted. An extensive study on the role of state authority and government in Afghanistan was done by Barfield (Thomas Barfield, *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History* (Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010)), nation- and state-building efforts were studied for example by Fukuyama (Fukuyama, “Nation-building”) or Daudzai (Haqmal Daudzai, *The State-Building Dilemma in Afghanistan: The State Governmental Design at the National Level and the Role of Democratic Provincial Councils in Decentralization at Sub-National Level* (Opladen, Berlin, Toronto: Budrich Academic Press, 2021)).

<sup>58</sup> The term Taliban insurgency pertains to the twenty-year-long era from the end of the first Islamic Emirate in 2001 to its restoration in 2021, during which the Taliban fought against the Afghanistan’s government and foreign forces.

David Drissel in his article “Reframing the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan: new communication and mobilization strategies for the Twitter generation”<sup>59</sup> published already in 2014 argues that the Taliban managed to adapt themselves for the 21st century. He describes the genesis from the Taliban’s first website to first Twitter accounts and states that the movement simultaneously managed to bear the legacy of the mujahideen as well as to create a new collective identity. Similar are the findings of Thomas Johnson, Matthew DuPee, and Wali Shaaker in *Taliban Narratives: The Use and Power of Stories in the Afghanistan Conflict*. This book presents an extensive amount of primary sources of the Taliban’s origin in an analysis aiming to define narratives that the Taliban used in “information operations”.<sup>60</sup> The studied platforms include magazines, circulars, newsletters, the internet in general, social media, radio stations, graffiti, or poetry from almost two decades. The ample analysis shows how effective the Taliban were in disseminating their messages among incoherent audiences and creating a master narrative that resonated with them.

Neil Krishan Aggarwal undertakes a similar approach in *The Taliban’s Virtual Emirate: The Culture and Psychology of an Online Militant Community*. He also analyzes a plethora of content in different forms – articles, songs, videos, statements, interviews, scriptural exegeses, etc.<sup>61</sup> Nevertheless, he utilizes his expertise in the field of psychiatry, focusing on communication.<sup>62</sup> Using the means of critical discourse analysis, his analysis is primarily preoccupied with differences in communication in various languages. Aggarwal demonstrates how English and Arabic languages were used to communicate with audiences around the world, Urdu with Muslim audiences in South Asia, and Dari for the internal audience of Afghanistan.<sup>63</sup>

Since the fall of Kabul on August 15, 2021, and the resurrection of the IEA, its strategic communication has been primarily studied by journalists, think-tank analysts, and policymakers. A report “Powered by Twitter? The Taliban’s Takeover of Afghanistan”<sup>64</sup> analyzed the Taliban’s Twitter activities in the months before and right after the takeover. Its quantitative analysis proved the undeniable strength of the network. BBC Monitoring analysts conducted a similar quantitative analysis of the IEA’s use of Twitter during the first year of

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<sup>59</sup> Drissel, “Reframing the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan.”

<sup>60</sup> Johnson, DuPee, and Shaaker, *Taliban Narratives*, 2.

<sup>61</sup> Neil Krishan Aggarwal, *The Taliban’s Virtual Emirate: The Culture and Psychology of an Online Militant Community* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), xiv–xv.

<sup>62</sup> Aggarwal, xv.

<sup>63</sup> Aggarwal, 27.

<sup>64</sup> Laura Courchesne, Bahar Rasikh, Brian McQuinn, and Cody Buntain. “Powered by Twitter? The Taliban’s Takeover of Afghanistan,” Empirical Studies of Conflict Project Working Paper No. 30, June 2022. <http://esoc.princeton.edu/wp30>.

power. Then, Twitter was used and therefore analyzed as a platform of the official yet self-designated and globally unrecognized state. The change was visible in the language used by the state's representatives.<sup>65</sup> The analysis's conclusions confirm that Twitter continued to be the leading platform of the reinstated IEA's strategic communication.

A research report, "Comparing Taliban Social Media Usage by Language: Who's Speaking and What's Being Said", processed data from August 2021 to April 2022. Its analysis is mainly quantitative and written primarily to inform US and generally Western policymakers on pre-defined desirable topics. As such, it studies some aspects of the IEA's strategic communication disproportionately and favors them over others.<sup>66</sup> Lastly, Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, in 2018, compiled and published an exceptional collection, *The Taliban Reader: War, Islam and Politics*, which presents primary sources of the Taliban. Starting already in 1979 and stretching up to 2017, it is a valuable resource for understanding the strategic communication of the contemporary IEA. Unlike other above-mentioned publications, it is more of a chrestomathy than an analysis.

### 1.5. Zabihullah Mujahid's account as a source on the IEA's strategic communication

Unlike other IEA's network accounts, the one of the official spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid, remains unverified by the X platform at the time of writing, which allows him to share texts of a maximum of 280 characters.<sup>67</sup> Nevertheless, Mujahid aptly utilizes X's functions called reposts and quotes, which are used to share contents of other accounts.<sup>68</sup> Revealing the vastness of the IEA's X network, the whole data set comprises of 2,112 posts created by 111 unique accounts. Among these, Mujahid's is the most active one, having authored 882 posts. The thesis gathers, examines, analyzes, and presents data in five languages, focusing, however,

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<sup>65</sup> Saeed and Nour, "Analysis," 2.

<sup>66</sup> Knopp, Niewijk, Tariq, and Wright, "Comparing Taliban Social Media Usage by Language," iii, 54.

<sup>67</sup> In 2023, X launched a premium subscription, enabling its users to write texts of up to 4,000 characters (see @premium, "need more than 280 characters to express yourself?" X, February 8, 2023, <https://twitter.com/premium/status/1623411400545632256>). Some of the IEA's representatives started to pay for this feature (see Abdirahim Saeed, "Taliban start buying blue ticks on Twitter," *BBC*, January 16, 2023, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-64294613>).

<sup>68</sup> Distinguishing between reposts and quotes is problematic not only for a human user but for software as well. Different scraping tools tested in the preparation of the dataset separated and listed reposts and quotes differently. In some cases, the tool used for scraping of this data set identified the quoted posts as two separate posts along with their accompanying content, thus dramatically shifting the perceived context. It is important to note that the accessibility of the content varies in time, as whole accounts are blocked or deleted.

on the most used ones – Pashto, Dari,<sup>69</sup> and English. These languages are used to target different audiences as well as to communicate different topics.

Analyzing the Taliban’s or the IEA’s primary sources poses significant obstacles.<sup>70</sup> The most obvious is their usage of multiple languages, mainly Pashto and Dari, secondarily Arabic and even Urdu. Another challenge is presented by the limited access to the primary sources produced by the Taliban or the IEA. Those online are often out of reach due to the ever-changing internet environment. To demonstrate, when I started the preliminary research for this thesis, I worked with the well-established Twitter. For the second half of my work, I was using the X platform. Rules for data scraping changed many times. Moreover, *tweets*, subsequently simply *posts*, were becoming unavailable, just like the links leading to other media types. Even whole accounts disappeared, some only to re-appear in a different form.

Even with the scope of the thesis limited to a nine-month period and one account only, acquiring the data from X posed a serious challenge. The platform was undergoing severe structural changes during the preparation of the research. This also led to the end of X’s free API (Application Programming Interface), which fundamentally limited the usage of third-party tools designed to scrape or analyze X data.<sup>71</sup> As the structural changes continued, the possibilities of accessing large portions of data and acquiring them were restricted. To illustrate the fast changes and limitations – a specific tool that was finally used to scrape the data, accessed via a platform called Apify,<sup>72</sup> no longer exists. Despite all the limitations, I believe this thesis, for the first time, presents an extensive qualitative analysis of arguably the most crucial communication channel the IEA currently possesses. The analyzed data set might also offer an interesting insight into the broader mechanics of the IEA’s efforts in strategic communication.

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<sup>69</sup> When pertaining to languages of Afghanistan, I use term “Dari”, as it is the name for Persian spoken in Afghanistan, and “Pashto” notwithstanding other possible variants of romanization.

<sup>70</sup> Van Linschoten and Kuehn, eds., *The Taliban Reader*, 13.

<sup>71</sup> Jenae Barnes, “Twitter Ends Its Free API: Here’s Who Will Be Affected,” *Forbes*, last modified February 6, 2023, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/jenaebarnes/2023/02/03/twitter-ends-its-free-api-heres-who-will-be-affected/>.

<sup>72</sup> Apify, accessed May 4, 2024, <https://apify.com/>.

## 1.6. Outline of the thesis

To provide the necessary context for the presented primary source, the next chapter aims to outline what the IEA represents today, with an emphasis on the ideological changes and the role of social media in the transition from an insurgency into a governmental entity. I also aim to outline the general concurrence of such transition with the rise of Zabihullah Mujahid and his X account into prominence. The analytical part of the thesis is divided into three chapters. First, I present an analysis of the part of the IEA's strategic communication that concerns internal affairs. We see how one larger narrative, merging elements such as security, justice, and unity, is formed to present the IEA as a body able to rule Afghanistan and serve its people.

I then turn the attention outside of Afghanistan, focusing on the IEA's external affairs and diplomatic efforts. There, I illustrate how the current rulers of Afghanistan position themselves in the international community, fostering partnerships with key Asian geopolitical players and Afghanistan's neighboring states. Utilizing the political discourse analysis, I aim to demonstrate how the understanding of an *ingroup* transcends Afghanistan when the IEA presents itself as a member of the global Muslim community. In the third analytical chapter, I focus on the affairs of economy and development, so closely connected to the general notion of the Development Jihad. This chapter explains the IEA's emphasis on the topics concerning economic progress and reconstruction of the war-torn country. I argue that IAE's communication in this area is of a deeply strategic nature as it promotes a major narrative aimed at transporting Afghanistan into a wholly new era.

## 2. From the Freedom Jihad to the Development Jihad: A Genesis of the IEA's Strategic Communication

In an introduction to *The Taliban Reader*, van Linschoten and Kuehn make several crucial points concerning the studies of the Taliban and the IEA. They warn that Taliban have been continuously evolving since their inception and so should our understanding of the movement.<sup>73</sup> It should be noted that the events of 2021 and after represent yet another significant change in the movement's existence. Van Linschoten and Kuehn, thus, warn against relying too much on historical parallels and comparisons. In line with their words "the past offers a roadmap"<sup>74</sup>, this chapter outlines the key events of Afghanistan's contemporary history that influenced the current IEA, focusing mainly on its usage of modern technologies. Rather than retelling the narrative of the Taliban's rise to power in Afghanistan as a series of victories and defeats against both domestic and foreign adversaries, I propose a narrative connecting the movement's internal dynamics with its ideology, and, ultimately, its presentation in Taliban's strategic communication.

Despite the significant development the Taliban and the IEA have undergone, the movement's identity still reflects its origins. Through the lens of critical discourse analysis, such continuity can be documented by the *ingroup*'s, i.e. the Taliban and the IEA's, insistence to present itself as "mujahideen", those conducting jihad.<sup>75</sup> In the context of Afghanistan's contemporary history, this term has its roots in the second half of the 1970s. Then, the restless situation led to the establishment of the first mujahideen fronts, after fatwas pleading armed jihad against the central Communist government were issued. During the subsequent Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989), the mujahideen resistance came to be known worldwide. Inside Afghanistan, the experience of jihad in this era was highly influential in forming a collective identity of what would later become the Taliban and the IEA.<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, eds., *The Taliban Reader: War, Islam and Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), Kindle, 12.

<sup>74</sup> Van Linschoten and Kuehn, 12.

<sup>75</sup> See for example: James Caron, "Taliban, Real and Imagined," in *Under the Drones: Modern Lives in the Afghanistan-Pakistan Borderlands*, ed. Shahzad Bashir and Robert D. Crews (Cambridge, Massachusetts; London: Harvard University Press, 2012), 61; David Drissel, "Reframing the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan: new communication and mobilization strategies for the Twitter generation," *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* 7, no. 2 (2015), 123, <https://doi.org/10.1080/19434472.2014.986496>.

<sup>76</sup> Van Linschoten and Kuehn, *The Taliban Reader*, 22–24.



The term mujahideen is both linguistically and ideologically connected to the term jihad, an understanding of which presents a challenge by itself and as such is utilized in propagating specific ideas, frequently connected to particular power dynamics.<sup>77</sup> Within the context of the current IEA's strategic communication, we find terms like Freedom and Development Jihad, however, neither has experienced broad utilization.<sup>78</sup> In its essence, the term Freedom Jihad incorporates the more than forty-year-long struggle for freedom, and from a broad perspective, it can be tracked up to the Anglo-Afghan Wars of the 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries when the Afghans fought the British forces. To understand what the IEA represents today, one needs to go at least as far as the Soviet-Afghan War in which the mujahideen fought against the foreign occupation. Groups of religious students, i.e. "taliban" (*sic*), from southern and eastern Afghanistan were not strictly aligned with specific mujahideen factions, and they considered their jihad as a defensive one, because they "did not see themselves as the driving force of future political developments".<sup>79</sup>

The jihad in Afghanistan was fought with two overlapping intentions – jihad aimed *against* something and jihad striving *for* something.<sup>80</sup> In 1989, the jihad *against* the occupation of the Soviet Empire ended. The post-1989 years saw the students turn back to madrassas in their native rural regions.<sup>81</sup> In 1994, a change came when the society was on the verge of a collapse.<sup>82</sup> A common struggle for bringing peace, security, and the rule of law under Islam

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<sup>77</sup> In its original meaning, this Arabic word refers to a "struggle" or "striving". Historically, as Islam spread and merged with traditions in various regions and communities, jihad came to be understood in different ways. Therefore, there is a plethora of interpretations throughout the "Islamic world" (Aqab M. Malik, "Jihad: conflict-resolution or its antithesis?" *Strategic Studies* 32, no 2/3 (Summer & Autumn 2012): 206, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/48529368>).

The contemporary form has its roots in the era of modern Islamic thinkers like Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī or Muḥammad Abduh who viewed jihad in terms of social activism and struggle for reform, as a way of mobilization against colonialism. Later on, the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire was key to the 20th-century understanding of jihad, for since the caliphate was abolished, it was no longer possible to officially proclaim jihad. Finally, a few years after that, with the foundation of the Muslim Brotherhood by Ḥasan al-Bannā, the term gained new forms. During "popularization, societal dissemination, and trivialization of the Islamic reform discourse by the Muslim Brotherhood movement [...] jihad became a metaphor for social engagement fused with the organizational logic of modern mass movement." As such, the term came to be used "relatively arbitrarily" (Dietrich Jung, "Understanding the multiple voices of Islamic modernities: The case of Jihad," *Temenos* 52, no. 1 (2016): 74–77).

<sup>78</sup> Interestingly both terms were used in the Afghan context already in 1996, when a humanitarian organization Citizens Organization for Advocacy and Resilience (COAR) released a collection of videos showing its accomplishments in the fields of agriculture, education, and health after the end of Soviet invasion. See "Az jahād-i āzādī tā jahād-i ābādī," Afghanistan Center at Kabul University, accessed May 4, 2024, <https://catalog.acku.edu.af/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=46105>.

<sup>79</sup> Van Linschoten and Kuehn, *The Taliban Reader*, 24.

<sup>80</sup> Van Linschoten and Kuehn, 24.

<sup>81</sup> Van Linschoten and Kuehn, 24.

<sup>82</sup> Anand Gopal and Alex Strick van Linschoten, "Ideology in the Afghan Taliban," Afghanistan Analysts Network, June 2017: 32, <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/201705-AGopal-ASvLinschoten-TB-Ideology.pdf>.

emanated from southern Afghanistan's villages, which were dissatisfied with a general disregard for these virtues.<sup>83</sup> Students united with former mujahideen fighters in what would come to be known as *the Taliban*.<sup>84</sup> Their efforts gathered momentum and quickly spread throughout the country, leading to the establishment of the Islamic Emirate in 1996.

With the Taliban as a ruling power, the jihad continued as their priority with two goals: to bring the whole country under control of the movement, and to make it function like a proper state.<sup>85</sup> While the Taliban had plentiful experience conquering territory, they "proved incapable of ruling their country".<sup>86</sup> Not long after 2001 and the end of the first IEA, the Taliban began to mobilize again to launch a new jihad, this time *against* the American forces. As much as it superficially resembled the jihad against the Soviets, some differences became apparent. The Soviet invasion was a result of radical communist policies of the late 1970s that aimed to revolutionize society and its internal dynamics from the highest echelons to the lowest levels.<sup>87</sup> In the case of anti-Soviet resistance, the defense of the mujahideen "against this external threat was intimately tied to internal well-being".<sup>88</sup> However, in the post-2001 era, the threat was viewed as purely exogenous. The jihad was now led *against* this threat and fought in the name of national sovereignty.<sup>89</sup>

The presented overview of Afghan history suggests that the fight for freedom considerably exceeds the existence of the Taliban and the IEA. During the last decades, the *taliban* went from being a part of the mujahideen resistance, through an out-of-spotlight era, only to become *the Taliban*, the key driving force in Afghan politics. Their crippling defeat of 2001, however, gave way to a process of change evolving in the new Taliban. David Drissel sees the revitalization of this term as one of the key successful steps in the Taliban's post-2001 transformation. He argues that the movement managed to reconstruct its identity which linked "the legendary *mujahideen* of the Cold War past with the allegedly 'heroic' Taliban of the present [and thus creating] a powerful collective-identity recruiting tool for mobilizing disaffected youths in Afghanistan".<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> Gopal and van Linschoten, 23. See also: Van Linschoten and Kuehn, *The Taliban Reader*, 24–25.

<sup>84</sup> Van Linschoten and Kuehn, *The Taliban Reader*, 24, 59.

<sup>85</sup> Van Linschoten and Kuehn, 60.

<sup>86</sup> Gopal and van Linschoten, "Ideology in the Afghan Taliban," 32.

<sup>87</sup> Gopal and van Linschoten, 32.

<sup>88</sup> Gopal and van Linschoten, 32.

<sup>89</sup> Gopal and van Linschoten, 33.

<sup>90</sup> Drissel, "Reframing the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan," 123.

However, the transformation process started even before 2001. In its beginnings, during the Soviet-Afghan war, the students' movement could be defined as adhering to a form of "traditionalist" Islam found in southern Pashtun villages,<sup>91</sup> where the religious practice was influenced by a mixture of elements including Sufism, Deobandism, and local folk and tribal tradition.<sup>92</sup> The ideological changes began occurring with the experiences of ruling in the era of the first Islamic Emirate (1996–2001).<sup>93</sup> Establishing a new order brought the entity of a *state* into the spotlight, while to some extent disregarding the tribal and ritual-oriented tradition<sup>94</sup> Ideologically, this shift drew the movement closer to the political Islamic movements of Arab countries.<sup>95</sup>

Furthermore, these ideological changes were closely tied to what Gopal and van Linschoten, authors of a study of the Taliban's ideology, call "Taliban epistemology", a specific theory of religious knowledge. The authors remark that for the Taliban before 2001, the orthopraxy constituted the inner beliefs.<sup>96</sup> Thus, by focusing on the cultivation of expression of one's beliefs, the Taliban tried to restore virtues in order to save society from its breakdown.<sup>97</sup> These steps are infamously represented by harshly enforced dress code, prohibition of music, or banning women from public spaces. In other words, these steps aimed to re-imagine the whole Afghanistan's society into an "authentic" and "traditional" lifestyle of an idealistic Pashtun village, which was believed to imitate life in the time of the Prophet.<sup>98</sup> On the other hand, this enforcement of externalized authenticity was occasionally interrupted by an unexpected step illustrating certain tension between the tradition and modernity. One of such occasions was the launch of the first Taliban website already in 1998.<sup>99</sup>

The post-2001 Taliban moderated their requirements for desirable forms of religious expression. Therefore, some previously banned activities were normalized, such as

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<sup>91</sup> Gopal and van Linschoten, "Ideology in the Afghan Taliban," 1.

<sup>92</sup> Gopal and van Linschoten, 9.

<sup>93</sup> Gopal and van Linschoten, 27.

<sup>94</sup> Gopal and van Linschoten, 27.

<sup>95</sup> Gopal and van Linschoten, 1, 27.

It should be mentioned that Gopal and van Linschoten offer a deeper insight in the movement's ideology and its development, redundant for the purposes of this thesis. Simultaneously, they make a conclusive case against the frequent association of the Taliban ideology with Wahhabism, arguing that the strong presence of Sufi tradition in the environment from which the Taliban came contradicts the Wahhabi views (Gopal and van Linschoten, 4, 16).

<sup>96</sup> Gopal and van Linschoten, 35.

<sup>97</sup> Gopal and van Linschoten, 22.

<sup>98</sup> Gopal and van Linschoten, 23.

<sup>99</sup> Neil Krishan Aggarwal, *The Taliban's Virtual Emirate: The Culture and Psychology of an Online Militant Community* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 1.

photography or videos capturing people.<sup>100</sup> As Gopal and van Linschoten note, that does not make the movement less authoritarian or repressive, rather it changes “the way [its] conservatism is expressed”.<sup>101</sup> This ideological change allowed for the quick re-emergence of the movement after the defeat of the first Emirate in 2001, as well as for an adoption of new means of strategic communication. Neil K. Aggarwal dates the embracement of new technologies to 2004, when “Hamid Karzai’s alliance with corrupt militias, civilian mistreatment from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces, and Pakistan’s ongoing support for militancy led to the emergence of a ‘neo-Taliban’”.<sup>102</sup> Similarly, Thomas Johnson places the beginnings of the “enhanced and modified [...] propaganda campaign” to 2005.<sup>103</sup>

Both Johnson and Aggarwal’s researches of a broad range of means of the Taliban’s strategic communication, including print in the form of various magazines, newspapers, or pamphlets, radio, and TV stations, as well as online platforms, internet websites and partially social media, reach similar conclusions – the Taliban were effective in their post-2001 reform. In their way of communicating via multifarious platforms, a “consolidated and streamlined [...] strategic communication” that focused on “Islamic, cultural, and nationalistic themes to solidify the movement’s master narrative” was conveyed.<sup>104</sup> Aggarwal suggests that the Taliban skillfully worked with “cultural and tribal nuances”, and quickly utilized the media with an “increasing level of sophistication and use of technology to convey their narrative”.<sup>105</sup>

A crucial turning point in these efforts aiming to maximize the effectiveness of the strategic communication happened in 2010 when the Taliban decided to embark on a new platform – Twitter. Their first account with a username @alemaraweb linked the movement’s official website with the social site.<sup>106</sup> The timing of this step proves the capability of Taliban’s public relations staff to timely recognize the potential of a new trend and quickly adjust to it. Only a year before, the very nature of Twitter changed as the platform marginalized its user orientation to become “a medium for event-following”.<sup>107</sup> This can be illustrated by an episode from neighboring Iran, where Mir-Hossein Mousavi lost in the presidential elections in 2009

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<sup>100</sup> Gopal and van Linschoten, “Ideology in the Afghan Taliban,” 36.

<sup>101</sup> Gopal and van Linschoten, 40.

<sup>102</sup> Aggarwal, *The Taliban’s Virtual Emirate*, 14.

<sup>103</sup> Thomas H. Johnson, Matthew DuPee, and Wali Shaaker, *Taliban Narratives: The Use and Power of Stories in the Afghanistan Conflict* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 15.

<sup>104</sup> Johnson, DuPee, Shaaker, 16.

<sup>105</sup> Johnson, DuPee, Shaaker, 283.

<sup>106</sup> Drissel, “Reframing the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan,” 114.

<sup>107</sup> Richard Rogers, “Debanalising Twitter: The Transformation of an Object of Study,” in *Twitter and Society*, eds. Katrin Weller, Axel Bruns, Jean Burgess, Merja Mahrt, and Cornelius Puschmann, (New York: Peter Lang, 2014), xvi.

and used Twitter to call out to people to go out into the streets. This moment, which came to be known as the “Twitter revolution”<sup>108</sup>, posed a pivotal turn in the social site’s global usage and possibly even influenced the Taliban.

Besides Twitter, a revolution was happening in other spheres of the Taliban’s strategic communication as well. Most notably, the necessity of conveying a message in various languages was being taken into consideration. “The multilingual nature of the Taliban websites contrasts with policies favoring Pashtun language and culture during its brief time in power from 1996 to 2001,” notes Aggarwal.<sup>109</sup> Already in 2015, Drissel remarked that with several websites sharing content in different languages aimed at specific audiences and usage of social sites, “the Taliban leadership [had] essentially reconfigured their movement for the twenty-first century by implementing new communication and mobilization approaches”.<sup>110</sup>

The Taliban’s modern methods soon caught journalists’ and scholars’ attention. As soon as 2011, the media started to notice the Taliban’s presence on Twitter and thus amplify the movement’s outreach.<sup>111</sup> The @alemarahweb was quickly accompanied by other accounts. Some individuals behind these have remained highly influential until today. Such was the case of the @ABalkhi account, which engaged in fierce discussions with the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. The mysterious identity of its author was long disputed,<sup>112</sup> only to be revealed as Abdul Qahar Balkhi. Today, he serves as an official spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the IEA, administering one of the key accounts of the IEA’s network (@Qahar Balkhi).<sup>113</sup>

Balkhi became a focus of a 2012 Aljazeera article, which offers an important hint of how the Taliban perceived itself. “Balkhi sees it as his duty to ‘recover from the spiritual and material losses caused by three decades of war and invasion [in Afghanistan]’ – 140 characters at a time.”<sup>114</sup> The number of characters relates to the maximum limit set by the X platform at that time and also underlines that the bulk of Balkhi’s activity took place in the virtual domain

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<sup>108</sup> Rogers, xix. See also: Reuters, “Mousavi supporters rally support on Twitter.” *Reuters*, June 16, 2009, <https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLGG72532/>.

<sup>109</sup> Aggarwal, *The Taliban’s Virtual Emirate*, 11.

<sup>110</sup> Drissel, “Reframing the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan,” 122. This is supported by others, for example: Aggarwal, *The Taliban’s Virtual Emirate*, 29.

<sup>111</sup> See Haroon Siddique, “Taliban and Nato-led forces engage in war of words on Twitter,” *The Guardian*, September 14, 2011. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/sep/14/taliban-nato-isaf-twitter>.

<sup>112</sup> Ali M. Latifi, “Afghanistan’s online war of words,” *Aljazeera*, October 17, 2012. <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2012/10/17/afghanistans-online-war-of-words>.

<sup>113</sup> @QaharBalkhi, X, accessed May 4, 2024, <https://twitter.com/qaharbalkhi>.

<sup>114</sup> Latifi, “Afghanistan’s online war of words.”

– something previously unthinkable. Moreover, despite his appreciation for modern means of communication, Balkhi still positioned himself in a thirty-year-long tradition of fighting for peace, freedom, and national sovereignty. These values became an ideological core of the post-2001 jihad and were reflected in the strategic communication. As an article posted on one of the Taliban’s websites in 2013 suggests: “The main purpose of jihad is to end fighting [...] to bring peace.”<sup>115</sup>

This long-term mission remained a key narrative of the strategic communication in the insurgency period and after until 2023. Remarkably, the goals of this Freedom Jihad were neither fully achieved on August 15, 2021, nor weeks later as the last foreign soldiers left Afghanistan, but only almost two years after that. To understand this discrepancy, let us turn to Gopal and van Linschoten who noted already in 2017 that if the foreign soldiers were to leave Afghanistan for good, one of the movement’s ideological cornerstones, i.e. regaining sovereignty, could dissolve. The authors of the Islamic Emirate’s political discourse seem to have been aware of the significance the themes of national sovereignty and fighting for freedom and peace gained throughout the twenty years of insurgency. Therefore, it took two years to confirm the Taliban’s ability to maintain the national sovereignty while gradually altering the political discourse.

The new era officially began when Minister of Interior Affairs, Sirajuddin Haqqani, announced the end of the Freedom Jihad and designated the time to come as the Development Jihad.<sup>116</sup> On the second anniversary of the IEA in August 2023, the Minister of Defense, Mullah Yaqoob, repeated the narrative and confirmed its importance in the communicational strategy.<sup>117</sup> The utilization of the term Development Jihad can be seen as a sign of a new

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<sup>115</sup> “The difference between jihad and fighting,” in *The Taliban Reader*, eds. van Linschoten and Kuehn, 437.

<sup>116</sup> I adhere to the translation “Development Jihad”. Such translation was also used by Afghan Ariana News that published the report from Haqqani’s speech in Pashto, Dari, and English. See Ariana News, “Today’s Jihad is for implementation of Sharia and development, says Haqqani,” *ATN News*, August 7, 2023,

<https://www.ariananews.af/todays-jihad-is-for-implementation-of-sharia-and-development-says-haqqani/>.

Interestingly, the Pashto version even replaces *ābādī* with *pərməkhtag* (development) (Ariana News, “Zmunzh nənanay jahād də sharī‘at pəlay kawəlo aw pərməkhtag ləpāra day – Sirāj al-Dīn Ḥaqqānī,” *ATN News*, August 7, 2023, <https://www.ariananews.af/ps/زمونر-نننی-جهاد-د-شریعت-یلي-کولو-او-یرمخ>).

Zeeya Pashtoon’s dictionary explains this and related words as pertaining to population, prosperity, building or construction, cultivation (Zeeya A. Pashtoon, *Pashto-English Dictionary*, 1).

Such translations are supported by Wardag Akbar who even lists construction as the first translation of *ābādī* (Wardag Akbar, *Dictionnaire general Pashto-français*, 19).

<sup>117</sup> The Minister of Defense was quoted to say: “os də abādəy aw joṛawəlo wakht day [Now is the time of development and construction]” (Ahmad Shāh Irfānī, and Suhrāb Sarwarī, “Də difā’ wizārat sarparast: os də abādəy aw joṛawəlo wakht day, khəpəl hēwād be la syālāno sara syāl kawu,” *Pajhwok Afghan News*, August 15, 2023, <https://pajhwok.com/ps/2023/08/15/acting-minister-of-defense-now-is-the-time-to-build-and-build-our-country/>).

direction of the IEA. The emphasis on the development has remained a noticeable element of the IEA's strategic communication in the analyzed period.

For a historical comparison, we can take a look at the early years of the Islamic Republic of Iran where similar efforts were institutionalized in the so-called *Jahād-e sāzandegī*<sup>118</sup> (Construction Jihad). This organization, established in 1979, represented efforts to reconstruct and develop rural parts of the country. Apart from the aspect of the physical construction process, Construction Jihad aimed to spread the ideas of the revolution to regions distant from urban centers by persuading people about the benefits of the new republic's projects.<sup>119</sup> The ideological promotion was supported by infrastructural development including not only roads, bridges, and electricity network, ne but also schools, libraries, clinics, as well as distribution of supplies.<sup>120</sup> Four years later, the organization transformed into the *Vezārat-e jahād-e sāzandegī*<sup>121</sup> (Ministry of Construction Jihad) which participated in exporting the revolution, mainly to sub-Saharan Africa, and the Shi'ite territories of Lebanon, where it even helped to establish a similar body, *Jihād al-Binā'* (Construction Jihad).<sup>122</sup>

Until today, the IEA has not shown similar extraterritorial ambitions. However, a parallel can still be identified between the IEA's unifying the efforts under the label of the Development Jihad, and the institutionalization of the same practices under the Iranian organization Construction Jihad, and later Ministry of Construction Jihad. Based on their comparison, I infer that similarly to the post-revolutionary Iran, the IEA pragmatically utilizes development as an instrument of power consolidation.<sup>123</sup> As Ball suggests, "a major challenge confronting [...] the societies emerging from violent conflict [...] is to identify ways to incorporate the longer-term objective of strengthening economic and political governance into short-term rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts."<sup>124</sup> In a similar fashion, I argue that the IEA's attempts to solidify its

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The utilized terminology of development and construction implies a similar rhetorical line as Haqqani's reference to the "Development Jihad".

<sup>118</sup> Diverging from the ALA-LC standard, the romanization of this term better reflects Iranian Persian pronunciation.

<sup>119</sup> Eric Lob, "Iran and Hizbullah's Development Organization in Lebanon," *Die Welt des Islams* 59, no. 3/4 (2019): 412, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26787499>.

<sup>120</sup> Lob, 411–412.

<sup>121</sup> See footnote no. 118.

<sup>122</sup> Lob, "Iran and Hizbullah's Development Organization in Lebanon," 414.

<sup>123</sup> See Lob, 411.

<sup>124</sup> Nicole Ball, "The Challenge of Rebuilding War-Torn Societies," in *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hamson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2001, 725.

economic and political standing task are mirrored in its strategic communication, taking on a form of the Development Jihad rhetoric.

## 2.1. Zabihullah Mujahid's account as a litmus test of the IEA's network

During the years of the Taliban's insurgency, Twitter established itself as the prevailing platform for the movement's strategic communication and has continued to dominate since. The preference for Twitter/X partly stems from the fact the IEA's figures have been banned from competing platforms like Facebook and YouTube.<sup>125</sup> Analyses undertaken in the final months of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and after the re-establishment of the IEA show how vast has the X network become over the years. "Powered by Twitter? The Taliban's Takeover of Afghanistan" report identified at least 126,000 Twitter accounts of the so-called "media ecosystem" and a consistent strategy in their administration.<sup>126</sup> The findings of the BBC Monitoring agree with these tendencies based on a research focused on 216 prominent accounts of the government officials, state media, supporters, and pro-Taliban "influencers" who produced over 350,000 posts in one year.<sup>127</sup> However, the notion of such importance of the social site in the Taliban's or the IEA's successes has not been universally accepted.<sup>128</sup>

To illustrate the dynamics of the IEA's embrace of social media, I offer a brief quantitative analysis of Zabihullah Mujahid's X account activity in the analyzed nine months. The X account emerged soon after the aforementioned @alemaraweb and eventually became one of the IEA's

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<sup>125</sup> Abdirahim Saeed and Ahmed Nour, "Analysis: How Taliban used Twitter in first year of power," *BBC Monitoring*, August 12, 2022, <https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c203o5kk>.

<sup>126</sup> Laura Courchesne, Bahar Rasikh, Brian McQuinn, and Cody Buntain. "Powered by Twitter? The Taliban's Takeover of Afghanistan," *Empirical Studies of Conflict Project Working Paper No. 30*, June 2022: 6–7, <http://esoc.princeton.edu/wp30>.

<sup>127</sup> Saeed and Nour, "Analysis."

<sup>128</sup> Vincent Bernatis, while confirming some success in the Taliban's utilization of the new platform in 2014, was sober in his evaluation, commenting: "[the Taliban's] tactical reporting on Twitter does not fully complement key strategic themes" (Vincent Bernatis, "The Taliban and Twitter: Tactical Reporting and Strategic Messaging," *Perspectives on Terrorism* 8, no. 6 (December 2014): 32-33, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26297291>).

Authors of "Comparing Taliban Social Media Usage by Language: Who's Speaking and What's Being Said" even state that "there is no overall strategy behind social media use [by the IEA]" (Bradley M. Knopp, Jon Niewijk, Zohan Hasan Tariq, and Elmo C. Wright, Jr., "Comparing Taliban Social Media Usage by Language: Who's Speaking and What's Being Said," *RAND Research Report*, April 25, 2023: 54, [https://www.rand.org/pubs/research\\_reports/RRA1830-1.html.RAND](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1830-1.html.RAND)).

These statements are further contested in the analytical chapters.



most prominent accounts.<sup>129</sup> At the beginning of the analyzed period, the account had over 738,000 followers<sup>130</sup> and grew to more than 889,000 by its period’s end.<sup>131</sup> The audience still continues to grow and at the time of writing this thesis, the number counts almost a million followers, securing its position as the biggest account of the IEA network. Figure 1 shows the distribution of 2,111 posts during the observed months according to the date they were posted.<sup>132</sup>




Figure 1 Numbers of posts produced throughout the analyzed months

<sup>129</sup> However, as other, apparently it was several times blocked or censored. Originally, it was known under the nick @zabihullahmujahid. Currently, it is @Zabehulah\_M33. See Latifi, “Afghanistan’s online war of words”; Drissel, “Reframing the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan,” 114.

<sup>130</sup> @Zabehullah\_M33, X, November 13, 2022, archived at the Wayback Machine, [https://web.archive.org/web/20221113045912/https://twitter.com/Zabehulah\\_M33](https://web.archive.org/web/20221113045912/https://twitter.com/Zabehulah_M33).

<sup>131</sup> @Zabehullah\_M33, X, August 17, 2023, archived at the Wayback Machine, [https://web.archive.org/web/20230817062613/https://twitter.com/Zabehulah\\_M33](https://web.archive.org/web/20230817062613/https://twitter.com/Zabehulah_M33).

<sup>132</sup> One post is missing from Figure 1 and 3, as it was originally written outside of the scope of the thesis but reposted during it. However, given the imprecision of the scraping tool, not every repost, including this one, possesses its own timestamp. It only shows the time stamp of the original posting and therefore it had to be omitted from Figure 1. The months delimiting the analyzed period, i.e. November and August, only show incomplete monthly numbers.

The whole data set of 2,112 posts comprises of texts written by 111 unique accounts. Mujahid’s account naturally appears as the most active one, having authored 882 original posts. For a better transparency, Mujahid’s account was omitted from Figure 2 which shows the following 15 most productive accounts which authored at least 1% of all 2,112 posts. In other words, these were the most productive accounts of the “hub” that the Zabihullah Mujahid’s page represents.




Figure 2 Accounts according to the number of produced posts

As Figure 3 shows, the accounts whose posts were shared by Zabihullah Mujahid can be divided into two categories. The first one comprises of official institutions of the IEA, their representatives, and spokespeople. The second one is formed by media platforms connected to the state.

Username	Description of the account
@Zabehulah_M33	Zabihullah Mujahid, official spokesman of the IEA
@FDPM_AFG	Office of Abdul Ghani Baradar, deputy prime minister for economic affairs
@HafizZiaAhmad1	Hafiz Zia Ahmad, deputy spokesman and assistant director of public relations under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
@GMICafghanistan	Government Media and Information Center
@rtapashto	A Pashto mutation of Radio Television of Afghanistan broadcasting service
@QaharBalkhi	Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
@ARG_1880	Official account of Arg, the government's main office
@DG_Dailies	Department of State Newspapers of the Ministry for Information and Culture
@anis_daily	Newspaper <i>Anis National Daily</i>
@dailyhewad	Newspaper <i>Hewad Daily</i>
@MoICAfghanistan	Ministry of Industry and Commerce
@MoDAfghanistan2	Ministry of National Defense
@dailyshariat	Newspaper <i>Daily Shariat</i>
@MoFA_Afg	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
@MoMPAfghanistan	Ministry of Mine and Petroleum
@bnapashto	A Pashto version of the Bakhtar News Agency

Figure 3 The most active accounts and their description

Figures 4 and 5 show how each of the categories, security and internal affairs, diplomacy and external affairs, and economy and internal affairs, and economy and infrastructural development, was represented during the analyzed period. The IEA has been proving its abilities in targeting its strategic communication at specific audiences. Figure 6 shows in what languages was each of the main topics communicated. We can see that Pashto significantly dominated over the other languages in all categories, always accounting for more than 50% of the posts. Dari and English were expectingly following with 19–26%, and 4–17%, respectively. We can see that the results did not differ drastically, however, there are some noticeable trends. First, while the communication strategy in the economy and infrastructural development category aimed to inform primarily the domestic Afghan audience, it also tried to reach the global audience to inform it about the IEA’s economic activities and achievements in English. The security and internal affairs category shows very similar numbers; however, there the strategy aimed less at the general global audiences, and rather targeted the readers of the “Islamic world”. Finally, the posts in the diplomacy and external affairs category aimed significantly more at international audiences, doubling the rate of English, Arabic, and Urdu content.




Figure 4 Numbers of posts in categories over months




Figure 5 Percentage composition of categories<sup>133</sup>




Figure 6 Languages used in categories<sup>134</sup>

<sup>133</sup> Figures 4 and 5 show a total of 2109 posts. Three blank posts were omitted as they were misidentified by the scraping tool as quote posts. See note no. 68 in the Introduction.

<sup>134</sup> Percentages do not add up to one hundred, as small fractions were omitted, as well as posts that contained more than one language.

It ought to be noted that the posts were frequently released simultaneously in more than one language mutation. This was most often the case with Pashto and Dari combination. Twenty-one percent of all the posts were identified as sharing identical content in these languages. Mostly, two separate texts were posted, however, in some cases, it happened within one post only. A three-language combination of Pashto, Dari, and English was identified in 6% of the posts. A combination of four languages, including the previous three and adding Arabic, was recognized also in another 6 % of the data set. Furthermore, eight other two-language combinations and three of the three-language ones were found among the posts. Posts in all five language mutations appeared in similarly negligible numbers.

Even though the fourth category dedicated to cross-promoting posts is absent in these comparisons and the following qualitative analysis, it represents an important part of the IEA's strategic communication. It comprised almost 8% of all posts, appearing during all nine months. Significantly, posts pertaining to this category were posted more often in the first four months, hitting their peak in December 2022 when they accounted for almost 16% of the month's posts. This four-month period corresponds to the last four months of the Afghan year. Since the new year in March, this cross-promotion was significantly less frequent, which suggests a change in the communicational strategy.

In conclusion, the preliminary analysis points out to several important aspects of the strategic communication of the IEA. First, X continued to predominantly serve as a platform for official state institutions and representatives, as well as being a cross-referencing tool for other means of strategic communication of the state. Second, the IEA was aptly using various languages to reach different audiences. However, it is crucial to stress that during the analysis only minor and negligible differences between the language versions were observed. Finally, as shown by the domination of the economy and infrastructural development category in Figures 3 and 4, the Development Jihad rhetoric was playing a central role even before its official proclamation. It also confirmed a continuing trend captured by previous quantitative analyses which stressed its importance and even pointed out that the economy had even been called "top priority" by the IEA's officials.<sup>135</sup>

We see that the challenges the Taliban faced during its history differed and affected the fast-paced evolution of the movement. Some imprints of the bygone eras have remained

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<sup>135</sup> See Saeed and Nour, "Analysis"; Knopp, Niewijk, Tariq, and Wright, "Comparing Taliban Social Media Usage by Language," 20.

noticeable in the IEA's identity and, therefore, its strategic communication until these days. On the other hand, the IEA has undergone significant ideological changes which can be illustrated by its acceptance of modern technologies. In summary, the striving – jihad – for national sovereignty, peace, security, and Islamic rule drove the Taliban movement in the insurgent period until the re-emergence of the IEA in August 2021 and continued to dominate its political discourse even thereafter. August 2021 marked a turning point in politics and in the movement's strategic communication. The leitmotif of fighting for freedom could serve as its dominant narrative for only a limited time. During the same time, the IEA had to prove that they were more capable of running the state than twenty years ago. What we witnessed from November 2022 to August 2023 was a culmination of the transitional period of post-conflict state reconstruction which was mirrored in the strategic communication as the shift from the Freedom Jihad to the Development Jihad.

### 3. Security and Internal Affairs

“The Islamic Emirate considers serving the nation as its responsibility.”<sup>136</sup>

Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar  
Deputy leader of the IEA

The statement of IEA’s second-in-command presents a key phrase for understanding the political discourse of the IEA. Presenting the work of the elites as a duty and service to the public stands as a strong element in the IEA’s strategic communication. The emphasis on this theme is primarily expressed by strong *topicalization* and *repetition*. As van Dijk suggests, when analyzing the topical level of discourse structure, one should pay attention to the participants of these *semantic macropropositions* or used predicates. Generally, politicians stand on one side of the interaction and the public the other. The predicates then show what the actors, in the case of political discourse the politicians, “have done or will do, what they will decide or which opinions they have about political issues.”<sup>137</sup>

Indeed, such is often the case of posts pertaining to security and internal affairs. The IEA often portrays the public as people in need, who are successfully aided by the state. Usually, the posts inform about the state helping those struck by natural catastrophes, or providing basic needs like ensuring enough coal, medical supplies, food, etc. The IEA’s communication relates to very specific occasions in which the IEA’s problem-solving ability is the main message. To personalize this service and bring it closer to the people, the posts often present specific politicians in photos while helping. For example, one altruistic message informs about the deputy minister of defense who sent “his own car to save civilians who were stuck in a remote area”.<sup>138</sup> Here, the good deed of the politician is further supported by being *explicitly* stated and described with *positive opinion words*. This message was released both in Dari and Pashto and accompanied by a video capturing the scene enhanced with moving music.

A long-term campaign to help drug addicts presents another example of the IEA’s approach to communication. The campaign continued throughout the whole nine-month

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<sup>136</sup> Post no. 1616.

<sup>137</sup> Teun A. van Dijk, “What is Political Discourse Analysis?” *Belgian Journal of Linguistics* 11, no. 1 (1997): 26.

<sup>138</sup> Post no. 1164.



analyzed period. At first, the IEA informed about efforts to disperse a large community of drug addicts in Kabul. For example, Bilal Karimi, then a deputy spokesperson, at the time of writing the ambassador of the IEA to the People's Republic of China (PRC),<sup>139</sup> wrote that “for the first time Pul[-i sōkhta had been] cleaned from the addicts”.<sup>140</sup> He then labeled the action as successful and expressed hope for future similar successes. This *self-congratulation* presents a typical case through which the positive deeds of the *ingroup*, in this case the IEA politicians, are emphasized.<sup>141</sup> Later, further posts were dedicated to the treatment of drug addicts. On February 2, Mujahid quoted a post originally published by the Ministry of Interior Affairs with a video report from an opening of a new treatment facility with 5000 beds.<sup>142</sup>

One final example can be presented on posts from February 6, 2023, which informed that during the preceding five months, 649 children with heart diseases had been treated in various hospitals and their treatment had been financed by the Afghan Red Crescent Society. “Additional 22 children suffering from heart diseases were admitted to the Amīrzāda hospital thanks to the Afghan Red Crescent Society.”<sup>143</sup> The presented posts show a common element – a distinct *repetition* occurring even within one post, and *explicitness* applied to emphasize the numbers as a quantification of the IEA's help.

The aforementioned Afghan Red Crescent Society deserves further attention, as it is currently co-led by Mullah Nooruddin Turabi, one of the prominent members from the era of the first IEA where he served as the Minister of Justice.<sup>144</sup> With this position he wielded considerable power which he used to gain independence from the system and to commit many of the harsh practices associated with the Taliban's rule under the first IEA between the years 1996 and 2001.<sup>145</sup> Turabi seems not to have completely abandoned his previous legal positions.

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<sup>139</sup> See for example: Fidel Rahmati, “Kabul appoints Bilal Karimi as Ambassador to China: Report,” *The Khaama Press*, November 26, 2023. <https://www.khaama.com/kabul-appoints-bilal-karimi-as-ambassador-to-china-report/>.

<sup>140</sup> Post no. 681. In this post, Karimi informed about a cleaning of the space under the bridge Pul-e sōkhta located in a neighborhood of the same name in Kabul.

<sup>141</sup> Teun A. van Dijk, “Ideological Discourse Analysis,” accessed May 4, 2024, <https://discourses.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Teun-A.-van-Dijk-1995-Ideological-discourse-analysis.pdf>.

<sup>142</sup> Post no. 845.

<sup>143</sup> Posts nos. 878 and 879.

<sup>144</sup> “Mullah Nooruddin Turabi, Acting Vice President of The ARCS Met With The Officials of Zakat Charity Foundation!” ARCS, March 13, 2022, <https://www.arcs.af/en/mullah-nooruddin-turabi-acting-vice-president-arcs-met-officials-zakat-charity-foundation>; Anand Gopal and Alex Strick van Linschoten, “Ideology in the Afghan Taliban,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, June 2017: 18. <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/201705-AGopal-ASvLinschoten-TB-Ideology.pdf>.

<sup>145</sup> Gopal and van Linschoten, “Ideology in the Afghan Taliban,” 29.

Shortly after the re-emergence of the IEA, in September 2021, he hinted in an interview that some of the punishments from the pre-2001 Emirate would be revived.<sup>146</sup>

On November 13, 2022, Zabihullah Mujahid informed about a meeting of the IEA's judges with *amīr al-mu'minīn*<sup>147</sup>, as the IEA's supreme leader Akhunzada is addressed. Akhunzada was supposed to remind the judges to closely study cases of "thieves, kidnappers, and corruptors"<sup>148</sup>. In cases where these crimes meet the criteria for punishment according to sharia,<sup>149</sup> the judges should pass the judgment accordingly. Akhunzada even stressed his own role by stating: "Because this rule of sharia and my order are obligatory."<sup>150</sup> The position of Akhunzada deserves further explanation. As Michael Semple, author of the article "Rhetoric, Ideology, and Organizational Structure of the Taliban Movement" and an expert on Afghanistan and the Taliban, suggests: "Taliban rhetoric asserts that decrees and orders issued by the movement and its officials have the authority of Islam. Mullah Omar is still described as the [amīr al-mu'minīn], and officials of the Islamic emirate serve under his authority".<sup>151</sup> We can see that the strategic communication in the analyzed period continued in the same direction. However, since the re-establishment of the IEA, Akhunzada's decrees and orders have not had only the Islamic but the official statesmanlike authority as well. The officials of the IEA continue to serve under his authority, as evident from Akhunzada's words above – to issue the debated type of judgments is now an "obligatory order" of the *amīr*. This confirms the sovereign position of Akhunzada in the system of the IEA's governance.<sup>152</sup>

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<sup>146</sup> Kathy Gannon, "Taliban official: Strict punishment, executions will return," *AP News*, September 23, 2021. <https://apnews.com/article/religion-afghanistan-kabul-taliban-22f5107f1dbd19c8605b5b5435a9de54>.

<sup>147</sup> *Amīr al-mu'minīn* translates as commander of the faithful. Historically, it is an Islamic title of the sovereign, usually associated with temporal power (see "Amīr al-Mu'minīn" in Gordon Newby, *A Concise Encyclopedia of Islam* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2002), 28).

<sup>148</sup> Pashto: *ghlā, insān tākhtunkī aw fitna-garān*; Dari: *duzdān, ikhtitāfčīyān va fitna-garān*.

<sup>149</sup> Specifically, he talks about *hudūd* and *qiṣās*. The first term refers to punishments for crimes like "robbery, theft, drinking intoxicants, false accusations of unchastity, and adultery or fornication". Said punishments range from whippings to death (see "ḥadd," in Newby, *A Concise Encyclopedia of Islam*, 69). The latter term is understood as a lawful retaliation, "within the bounds of justice for individuals who are wronged" (see "qiṣās," Newby, 177).

<sup>150</sup> Posts nos. 6 and 7.

<sup>151</sup> Michael Semple, "Rhetoric, Ideology, and Organizational Structure of the Taliban Movement," United States Institute of Peace Peaceworks, 2014: 8. <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW102-Rhetoric-Ideology-and-Organizational-Structure-of-the-Taliban-Movement.pdf>.

<sup>152</sup> See John Butt, "A Taleban Theory of State: A review of the Chief Justice's book of jurisprudence," Afghanistan Analysts Network Report, August 2023: 29, <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/political-landscape/a-taleban-theory-of-state-a-review-of-the-chief-justices-book-of-jurisprudence/>.

The supreme leader's message was shared in both Pashto and Dari versions, yet it managed to attract international attention,<sup>153</sup> which concentrated on a comparison of this statement to the practices of the first IEA. This came as no surprise as certain aspects of the Taliban ideology, as well as its communication, have undergone important changes, while other remained the same. The emphasis on restoring sharia has stood in the foreground of the Taliban's proclaimed goals since the beginning of the movement. During the insurgency, when many viewed the Kabul-based government as incompetent, corrupt, and its justice system as untrustworthy, the Taliban's strategic communication was offering an alternative in the form of sharia.<sup>154</sup> In addition, the call for greater adherence to sharia has been an integral part of the more general striving – jihad – for the establishing a true Islamic system.<sup>155</sup>

The notion of establishing such system was even stressed in “The Islamic Emirate and its Governance System”<sup>156</sup>, so far the only theoretical work attempting to define the Emirate written by a member of the governmental echelons. It clearly states that the jihad “must continue until a full Islamic system has been established”.<sup>157</sup> Therefore, it can be argued that by informing the citizens about Amir's order to pass judgments qualifying for *hudūd* and *qiṣāṣ*, the IEA shows how it is approaching its ultimate goal. In their study of Taliban ideology Gopal and van Linschoten provide an important insight for understanding the role of *sharia* in Afghanistan. They return to the beginnings of modern Afghanistan, to the era of Abd al-Rahmān Khān<sup>158</sup>. He used sharia as a “uniform, formal legal code of the land” to deal with the plethora of local traditions, which to a varying degree stemmed from Sufism, Deobandism, indigenous folklore and dissimilarly adhered either to tribal or religious law. I argue that in the eyes of the current IEA, the stress on strict adherence to sharia serves a similar purpose – to be an

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<sup>153</sup> The Telegraph's Foreign Staff, “Taliban leader orders judges to enforce sharia law with public executions and amputations,” *The Telegraph*, November 14, 2022, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2022/11/14/taliban-leader-orders-judges-enforce-sharia-law-public-executions/>;

Agence France-Presse in Kabul, “Afghan supreme leader orders full implementation of sharia law,” *The Guardian*, November 14, 2022, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/14/afghanistan-supreme-leader-orders-full-implementation-of-sharia-law-taliban>.

<sup>154</sup> Thomas H. Johnson, Matthew DuPee, and Wali Shaaker, *Taliban Narratives: The Use and Power of Stories in the Afghanistan Conflict* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 26.

<sup>155</sup> Khalil Aziz, “A number of important factors for jihad,” in *The Taliban Reader*, eds. Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), Kindle, 453.

<sup>156</sup> “The Islamic Emirate and its System of Governance” is an extensive Arabic text, a comprehensive theory of the IEA's political system. It was published in 2022 by Abdul Hakim “Haqqani”, a prominent scholar among the Taliban since the beginnings of the movement, currently serving as a Chief of Justice of the IEA. See Butt, “A Taleban Theory of State,” 2–11.

<sup>157</sup> Butt, “A Taleban Theory of State,” 13.

<sup>158</sup> Abd al-Rahmān Khān, often called the Iron Amīr, reigned 1880–1901 and is regarded as a key figure in the modern Afghan history having consolidated and centralized power, giving way for modernization efforts of his successors. See for example: Thomas Barfield, *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History* (Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010), 110–111.

instrument used to achieve consolidation of the state and pave the way for “modernization”, the Development Jihad.

### 3.1. Fighting the “corruptors”

Having considered the role of adherence to sharia in the process of transition from the Freedom Jihad to the Development Jihad, the matter of its enforcement and elimination of those who resist such efforts deserves further attention. Naturally, the IEA leaders are not the first ones in Afghan history to pursue their goals in the name of jihad. Historic rulers of Afghanistan such as Dōst Muḥammad Khān used jihad to legitimize their military actions.<sup>159</sup> Abd al-Raḥmān Khān even “frequently pressed the [*ulamā*] to sanction his military ambitions as ‘jihad’ and cast his enemies as infidels”.<sup>160</sup> According to Hanafī jurisprudence,<sup>161</sup> there must be a justification for an armed jihad. Such a justification can be for example an elimination of *fitna*.<sup>162</sup> *Fitna* can be translated in various ways, including “trial, temptation, discord, civil war, strife”,<sup>163</sup> as well as corruption or rebellion.<sup>164</sup> The word is used by Akhunzada in his above-mentioned speech, where he orders to apply relevant laws to the cases of “*fitna-garān*”, i.e. the “corruptors”, those inciting rebellion or sowing discord. The term is used more often in the strategic communication of the IEA when referring to the topic of fighting those who rebel against the state. Thus, it can be argued that by using the term *fitna-garān*, the IEA rhetorically supports the legitimacy of its claim for jihad.

Moreover, the term *fitna* is historically used for two civil wars that occurred in the Islamic society of the 7<sup>th</sup> century. The first one of these led to the formation of the so-called Kharijites. This term is, interestingly, also often present together with *fitna-garān* in the analyzed posts. A post titled “Intelligence and Military Chief of Khawarij corruptors killed”, by Mujahid on February 27, 2023, in three language mutations, Pashto, Persian, and English presents an ample opportunity to analyze the utilization of both terms by the IEA.<sup>165</sup> Similar

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<sup>159</sup> Gopal and van Linschoten, “Ideology in the Afghan Taliban,” 9.

<sup>160</sup> Gopal and van Linschoten, 9; The arbitrary and multifarious utilization of jihad in different eras and communities was addressed in the context chapter.

<sup>161</sup> Hanafī jurisprudence stands as the only school Sunni Muslim legal thought on which the IEA’s law is based. See Matthew J. Nelson, “Taliban law: Theory and practice,” *Melbourne Asia Review*, no. 8 (November 15, 2021): 3, <https://doi.org/10.37839/MAR2652-550X8.20>.

<sup>162</sup> Butt, “A Taleban Theory of State,” 14.

<sup>163</sup> See “fitnah” in Newby, *A Concise Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 63.

<sup>164</sup> Butt, “A Taleban Theory of State,” 14; Zeeya A. Pashtoon, *Pashto-English Dictionary*, first edition (Hyattsville: Dunwoody Press, 2009), 534.

<sup>165</sup> Posts nos. 1022, 1024, and 1025.

brief messages informing about casualties among both the enemy and the IEA, accompanied by the numbers of confiscated arsenal were shared on Mujahid's page periodically in the analyzed period. By their structure, they strongly resemble the so-called "Statistics of Jihad" which used to be published in Taliban magazines in the insurgency period.<sup>166</sup>

Zabihullah Mujahid deemed this content noteworthy not only for the whole domestic audience, addressed in both main Afghanistan's languages, but for international attention as well. Each of the three language versions was complemented by a broader description of the event published in a light-blue table typically used by Mujahid for his statements. Only small differences are noticeable between the three language versions. However, another special post was published for the Pashto-speaking audience, sharing a short action video.<sup>167</sup> We can watch a group of armed men in a dim light, apparently preparing for a military operation and subsequently driving their pickup trucks to a location where the supposed "corruptors" are then successfully defeated in a shootout. The footage is accompanied by sung words in Arabic. Similarly to "Statistics of Jihad", these videos have been present in the IEA's strategic communication since the insurgency.<sup>168</sup>

In the English versions of the analyzed posts, the word "corruptors" is used as a translation of the discussed term *fitna-garān* which appears both in Pashto and Persian posts. Historically, the term was used for example in relation to US presidents or other representatives.<sup>169</sup> In the analyzed data set, it is applied to members of militant groups opposing the IEA, predominantly the Islamic State–Khorasan Province (IS–KP)<sup>170</sup> whose intelligence and military chief was announced dead in the quoted post. IS–KP is a terrorist organization comprised of various groups that relates to ISIS and operates in the area of Greater Khorasan.<sup>171</sup> As it poses a threat to international security, the IEA is regularly pressured to deal with this problem. After all, according to the "Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognized by the United States as a state and is known as the Taliban and the United States of America", signed on February 29, 2020, the very first point the Taliban vouched for were "guarantees and enforcement mechanisms that [would]

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<sup>166</sup> See Neil Krishan Aggarwal, *The Taliban's Virtual Emirate: The Culture and Psychology of an Online Militant Community* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 93–4.

<sup>167</sup> Post no. 1023.

<sup>168</sup> Aggarwal reports its usage already in 2014, see Aggarwal, *The Taliban's Virtual Emirate*, 109.

<sup>169</sup> Aggarwal, 109.

<sup>170</sup> Sometimes also addressed as ISIS-K.

<sup>171</sup> Kees Eggink, "ICCT Snapshot: Islamic State – Khorasan Province," *ICCT*, January 12, 2024, <https://www.icct.nl/publication/icct-snapshot-islamic-state-khorasan-province>.

prevent the use of the soil of Afghanistan by any group or individual against the security of the United States and its allies.”<sup>172</sup> It is essential for the IEA to show that it is fulfilling its part of the deal. Therefore, the posts concerning fighting the “Khawarij corruptors” are aimed at international, English-speaking audiences as well.

Furthermore, the choice of words and an emphasis on the topic by its regular *repetition* show a pattern in the strategic communication of the IEA. Let us now concentrate on the lexicon typically used in the discussed posts. Generally, it can be observed that the lexicon comprises of *negative opinion words* which present the *outgroup* as subversive to the good deeds of the IEA. Apart from the “corruptors”, the posts speak about “rebels”.<sup>173</sup> The majority of the analyzed posts describes catching and sometimes killing enemies of the IEA in their “hideouts”<sup>174</sup> where they were planning attacks or even “major destructive actions”.<sup>175</sup>

Notions of what the IEA politicians, i.e. the *ingroup*, want to express about themselves can be identified behind the basic informational value of the posts about security operations undertaken by the IEA. This presentation adheres to the basic principle of CDA, the *polarization*, where the counterpart is presented as overly negative to stress the positives of the *ingroup*. In these cases, the texts usually announce that an “operation” was carried out by “special forces”. Then, the emphasis is put on the “discovery” of the “hideout”, “destruction” of the cell, and subsequent recovery of the “rebels” weapons.<sup>176</sup> Therefore, I argue that the primary aim of the strategic communication on this topic is to position the IEA as a state authority that holds a monopoly on violence.<sup>177</sup> It presents itself as a capable, active, and effective actor in the application of its power. It tries to showcase its seriousness about providing security to the citizens. As such, the strategic communication of the IEA holds a similar course as during the insurgency period when “the Taliban project[ed] their fighters as belonging to a

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<sup>172</sup> “Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognized by the United States as a state and is known as the Taliban and the United States of America,” February 29, 2020, available at Wikisource, accessed May 4, 2024, [https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Agreement\\_for\\_Bringing\\_Peace\\_to\\_Afghanistan](https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Agreement_for_Bringing_Peace_to_Afghanistan).

<sup>173</sup> Posts nos. 142, 143, 149, and 150.

<sup>174</sup> See for example posts nos. 1145 and 1146.

<sup>175</sup> Post no. 4.

<sup>176</sup> Post no. 4.

<sup>177</sup> This claim is supported by Morisco who states: “In an attempt to transform from a non-state to state actor, Taliban leaders seem to organize their governance based on the Weberian model where state is defined as a human community that claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.” See Vito Morisco, “From Rebel Governance to Institutionalization: Prospects for the Taliban and Afghanistan,” Österreichisches Institut für Internationale Politik Working Paper No. 116, July 2023: 12, <https://www.oiiip.ac.at/en/publications/from-rebel-governance-to-institutionalization-prospects-for-the-taliban-and-afghanistan/>.

strong and organized military force. They proclaim[ed], and often exaggerate[d], military successes”.<sup>178</sup>

The used lexicon offers other interesting insights into the IEA’s strategy. As seen above, the “corruptors” are often further described as “Khawarij” – Kharijites.<sup>179</sup> Again, this pertains to various armed enemy groups, even though mainly the IS–KP. The application of this word deserves a more thorough examination. We can compare the utilization of the Kharijite term with an example of Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA)<sup>180</sup> as suggested by Mohammad M. Hafez. He argues that the GIA proclaimed that “the groups that purportedly violate[d] the Book or the Sunna [...would] be fought based on what category they [fell] under [...including] those who secede[d] from the community (*Kharijites*)”.<sup>181</sup> Similarly, Jaysh al-Islām labeled “ISIS fighters as Kharijites to justify their execution”.<sup>182</sup> Hafez connects these examples to the thoughts on the divisions in Islam by Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who identifies two types of such division. The first presents disagreements over creed, and the other over jurisprudence. And whereas the latter is “acceptable and beneficial”, the former is quite the opposite.<sup>183</sup> Therefore, those who “kill fellow Muslims based on legitimate disagreements over debatable issues [...] are engaging in religious extremism [...] associated with the detested Kharijites”.<sup>184</sup>

These historical Kharijites seceded from the Muslim community in the 7<sup>th</sup> century during the first Muslim civil war, *fitna*. When Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib decided to fight them, it was on the basis of their deeds, deemed as fanatic and unjust, not for being infidels, as Hafez remarks.<sup>185</sup> This is an important notion of the contemporary application of the term. “[By] refusing to call extremists infidels [... one] avoids the trap of [*takfir*]<sup>186</sup> that Salafists, especially the most radical among them, deem to be a legitimate practice.”<sup>187</sup>

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<sup>178</sup> Semple, “Rhetoric, Ideology, and Organizational Structure,” 8.

<sup>179</sup> See post no. 1023 and for comparison also nos. 1025, 1145 and 1146.

<sup>180</sup> Groupe Islamique Armé, the Armed Islamic Group, was an Algerian Islamist body active from 1992 until 2004, fighting the Algerian government and advocating for an Islamic state under the rule of sharia (“Groupé Islamique Armé,” Mapping Militants Project, Stanford University, last modified July 1, 2018, <https://mappingmilitants.org/profiles/groupe-islamique-arme>).

<sup>181</sup> Mohammed M. Hafez, „Not My Brother’s Keeper: Factional Infighting in Armed Islamist Movements,” *Journal of Religion and Violence* 7, no. 2 (2019): 198, <https://doi.org/10.5840/jrv2019112265>.

<sup>182</sup> Hafez, “Not My Brother’s Keeper,” 204. Jaysh al-Islām is union of groups from Damascus fighting the Syrian government, as well as the ISIS (“Jaysh a-Islam,” Mapping Militants Project, Stanford University, last modified March 1, 2019, <https://mappingmilitants.org/profiles/jaysh-al-islam>).

<sup>183</sup> Hafez, “Not My Brother’s Keeper,” 194–5.

<sup>184</sup> Hafez, 195.

<sup>185</sup> Hafez, 204.

<sup>186</sup> *Takfir*, “to declare someone an unbeliever”. A technique, specific interpretation of Islamic law, adopted by modern militant Islamic groups to allow for killing those in question (see “takfir” in Newby, *A Concise Encyclopedia of Islam*, 201).

<sup>187</sup> Hafez, “Not My Brother’s Keeper,” 204.

I argue that the IEA applies the term similarly to justify the killing of other Muslims, however “rebellious” or “corrupting” they might act. This legitimization is directed both at the domestic and international Muslim community. Simultaneously, it is meant to show that the practices of IS–KP and other groups operating in Afghanistan are considered extremist by the IEA. The choice of words of the IEA authorities, on the other hand, does not go far enough as to denote the rebels as infidels which would lead to the IEA being perceived similarly to the Salafists. Nonetheless, it is worth adding that Muslim communities from Arabic-speaking countries were an intended audience of only a limited number of Arabic versions of the posts. Posts concerning the topic of anti-IEA “rebels” were mostly published in Pashto. These were often supplemented by a Dari mutation which, apart from being relevant to the Dari-speaking inhabitants of Afghanistan, could be aimed at Iranian audiences. All other possible audiences were targeted by rather sporadic English posts.

A context to the question *takfir* in relation to the IEA should be provided. In his analysis of Taliban periodicals during the insurgency period, Aggarwal describes how various Taliban authors differentiated between the *ingroup* and *outgroup*.<sup>188</sup> Those who were building this polarization on religion were usually calling the *outgroup* explicitly “infidels”.<sup>189</sup> Such apprehension is demonstrated in many historical or contemporary primary sources of the Taliban.<sup>190</sup> This stands in stark contrast to the strategic communication presented by Zabihullah Mujahid’s account where this term is absent. Given the many ideological streams in the IEA and the variety of channels of their strategic communication, we can hardly assume that such words were removed from the rhetoric altogether. However, it suggests that the post-2021 official statesmanlike rhetoric of the IEA speaking through the account of Zabihullah Mujahid tends to be constrained.

Halfway through the analyzed period, the communication strategy on this topic changed its course. The “Statistics of Jihad” type of posts was abolished, and reactionary posts appeared instead. In other words, the topic was only tackled in reactions to claims about inadequate security measures on the part of the IEA, which had allowed for the emergence of terrorist groups. Such claims were occasionally brought up at international forums or mentioned by

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<sup>188</sup> Aggarwal, *The Taliban’s Virtual Emirate*, 67.

<sup>189</sup> Aggarwal, 67–8.

<sup>190</sup> See Van Linschoten and Kuehn, *The Taliban Reader*. It is also confirmed by analyses done by other authors (David Drissel, “Reframing the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan: new communication and mobilization strategies for the Twitter generation,” *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* 7, no. 2 (2015): 117, <https://doi.org/10.1080/19434472.2014.986496>; Johnson, DuPee, and Shaaker, *Taliban Narratives*, 23, 42).



Western politicians.<sup>191</sup> These foreign claims were often met with strongly rejective responses aimed at all possible audiences. For example on March 24, 2023, such a response in Pashto, Dari, English, and Arabic was released after US officials commented on the rising threat of IS–KP combatants in Afghanistan.<sup>192</sup> The topic was dismissed with a statement that “Daesh militants [had] already been reduced in ranks and suppressed.”<sup>193</sup> The alteration in the strategy shows that as far as communication with the public is concerned, the “corruptors” were dealt with, and the sufficient level of security was ensured. Still, the IEA deemed its reactions a necessary tool to counteract the false foreign “propaganda” on this topic.<sup>194</sup> Within this context, Mujahid even suggested that the matter goes beyond the propaganda itself and hinted that the US was “aiding [and] abetting the ISIS insurgents”.<sup>195</sup>

In the final week of April 2023, the topic was tackled again with a series of quadrilingual posts. The reaction came after, in the words of Mujahid himself, “some Western media published reports that a certified document of US Ministry of Defense [showed] that Afghanistan [had] become a so-called center of terrorism”.<sup>196</sup> A more substantive rejection of this claim was shared in the English language version which spread over seven subsequent posts, making it two posts longer than the other versions.<sup>197</sup> Such seeming urgency of the IEA’s strategic communication should be understood from the point of view of the legitimacy of rule and maneuvering in international politics in accordance with the afore-mentioned agreement signed in 2020. The following texts show again the typical polarization where the *positive* deeds of the IEA are strongly emphasized and possible deficiencies are denied, and simultaneously the negative approach of the *outgroup* is emphasized.

“Afghanistan has become a peaceful country at the regional level, this year’s Eid is a good example. Fortunately, no security incidents have occurred in the entire country [...]. At such a time, publishing such baseless claims and self-made documents is the work of intelligence agents who do not want Afghans to live peacefully.

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<sup>191</sup> See for example the words of General Michael Kurilla, the commander of US Central Command: “ISIS Could Target Western Interests In Near Future, Says US CENTCOM Commander,” *Afghanistan International*, March 17, 2023, <https://www.afintl.com/en/202303175874>.

<sup>192</sup> Posts nos. 1165–1169.

<sup>193</sup> Posts nos. 1165–1169.

<sup>194</sup> See for example posts no. 1716–1719.

<sup>195</sup> Posts nos. 1165–1169.

<sup>196</sup> Posts nos. 1319, 1324, 1330, and 1337.

<sup>197</sup> As was generally remarked in the section of preliminary analysis and here it is no exception, all of the versions showed only negligible differences.

The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan has full control over the country and does not allow anyone to use Afghanistan against the security of any other country, in particular, terrorist groups like ISIS have been severely affected and are in the process of being destroyed.

Despite the commitments and practical measures of the Islamic Emirate in the areas of existing peace and stability, Afghanistan is still being introduced this way, it is obvious that the spread of such biased reports shows that some people in America have not forgotten their hatred and enmity with the people of Afghanistan.”<sup>198</sup>

In line with the previous examples of understanding the *outgroup*, this excerpt demonstrates that the subject the IEA felt the need to oppose was “America”, or rather the United States. The US representatives were described with *negative opinion words* as authors of “biased reports”, feeling “hatred” toward the people of Afghanistan. The final words, however, show an utterly important notion of understanding of *ingroup* by the IEA. The “enmity” is not aimed at the IEA itself, nor its representatives, but rather at the people of Afghanistan as a whole. Thus, Mujahid positions himself as the speaker of all citizens of the country.

### 3.2. Unity

Nicole Ball’s description of post-conflict reconstruction is primarily focused on what is elsewhere called state-building and focuses rather on material aspects of the process. However, in a successful transformation, the state-building should be accompanied by a formation of a collective identity.<sup>199</sup> The main task of this “identity-building” is to forge “a common commitment to a single state”.<sup>200</sup> Given the multi-ethnic and multi-lingual realities of Afghanistan, such commitment has been a challenging task for all the rulers and ruling parties since the formation of modern Afghanistan. The IEA representatives are evidently aware of the problem and, therefore, the emphasis on collective identity poses a strong part of their communicational strategy.

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<sup>198</sup> Posts nos. 1319–1335, 1337–1341.

<sup>199</sup> Andrea Kathryn Talentino, “The two faces of nation-building: developing function and identity,” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 17, no. 3 (2004): 558–559, <https://doi.org/10.1080/0955757042000297008>.

<sup>200</sup> Talentino, 559.

First of all, it should be remarked that “brotherhood and unity among the [mujahideen]” is one of the key values stressed in the so-called “Instructions to the [mujahideen] from the commander of the faithful”, a document published by Supreme Leader Akhunzada in 2017.<sup>201</sup> This notion is also mirrored in the IEA’s strategic communication. I have already mentioned several examples of supporting the “identity-building”: the collective noun “mujahideen” used generally for all Afghans (and once again in the just quoted “Instructions”), or the positioning of Zabihullah Mujahid as the speaker of the whole country. Aggarwal even connects these two, stating: “The Taliban classifies Afghan civilians among the mujahideen, allowing the Taliban to speak for all Afghan Muslims.”<sup>202</sup>

Mujahid’s posts offer a plethora of other attempts to support unity through the IEA’s communication strategically directed at domestic audiences. One of those of interest concerns the Hazara community, which was subjected to many forms of persecution during the first IEA.<sup>203</sup> Nowadays, the IEA’s strategic communication attempts to paint a wholly different picture of its relations to this community. An interesting case can be observed in a series of posts shared on January 2, 2023, originally written by @ARG\_1880, an official government account. Four consecutive posts informed about a meeting of the IEA’s officials with representatives of the Shia community in Afghanistan. The community mainly comprises of Hazaras who differ ethnically, religiously, and even linguistically.<sup>204</sup> The efforts to include the community into the Emirate are even visible in the choice of language also confirming the apt utilization of language strategies in the communication – this meeting was informed about through the official government channel only in Dari, the language of the Hazara community.<sup>205</sup>

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<sup>201</sup> “Instructions to the mujahideen from the commander of the faithful,” in *The Taliban Reader*, eds. van Linschoten and Kuehn, 556; The “Instructions” can be understood as a new form of similar documents called “Layeha” issued by previous supreme leaders. According to the text, it was once again compiled by Mullah Abdul Hakeem, the author of “The Islamic Emirate and its System of Governance” (see “Instructions,” 554–561). Historically, the “Layeha” was understood as the “code of conduct”. See Thomas Johnson and Matthew C. DuPee, “Analysing the new Taliban Code of Conduct (*Layeha*): an assessment of changing perspectives and strategies of the Afghan Taliban,” *Central Asian Survey* 31., no. 1 (March 2012): 77–91, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2012.647844>.

<sup>202</sup> Aggarwal, *The Taliban’s Virtual Emirate*, 94.

<sup>203</sup> See for example: “Massacres of Hazaras in Afghanistan,” Human Rights Watch, February 19, 2001, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2001/02/01/massacres-hazaras-afghanistan>.

<sup>204</sup> Hazaras are one of the main ethnic groups of Afghanistan. They are of Mongolian or Turko-Mongolian descent and unlike the majority of Afghanistan’s population, they adhere to the Shia branch of Islam (see Arash Khazeni, Alessandro Monsutti, and Charles M. Kieffer, “HAZĀRA,” *Eyclopædia Iranica*, online edition, last updated March 20, 2012, <https://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/hazara-1>; Alessandro Monsutti, “HAZĀRA ii. HISTORY,” *Eyclopædia Iranica*, online edition, last updated March 20, 2012, <https://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/hazara-2>).

<sup>205</sup> To be more specific, Hazaras speak their own dialects of Persian which are very close to Dari (see Charles M. Kieffer, “HAZĀRA iv. Hazārāgi dialect,” *Eyclopædia Iranica*, online edition, last updated March 20, 2012, <https://iranicaonline.org/articles/hazara-4>).

During the meeting, a representative of the Shia community was quoted saying that the Shiites held a “positive” and “good” stance towards the IEA. The chair of the meeting was satisfied with the meeting and claimed that “service to the people and dealing with their problems [was] an honor [of the IEA’s officials]”. Then, the posts stressed the importance of “creating a strong and stable relationship between the nation and the system” and mentioned a promise of the IEA officials to launch “developmental” programs in the regions inhabited by Shiites like Bamyan. We see that the overall *positive tone* of the message tends to be underlined by the choice of words. A rather expectable sectarian Sunni-Shia division is omitted. Instead, the Shiites are considered a part of the “nation” and what remains to be solved is the relationship of the whole to the “system”.<sup>206</sup> The Development Jihad then appears as a solidifying tool in the relations. Finally, the IEA’s rhetoric of “service to the people” is present.

The subject of collective unity deserves a further examination. The case of “peaceful coexistence”<sup>207</sup> between Sunni and Shia communities of Afghanistan is stressed in the data set. However, it is not presented as a part of eliminating sectarian divisions, but rather as part of nationalist rhetoric aiming to promote national unity. For illustration, a Dari text was reposted by Mujahid on February 7, 2023: “Shia community of Afghanistan is a template of peaceful coexistence and a pioneer of national unity. We must not give space to corruptors”.<sup>208</sup> It is important to note that the post was originally published by @Drnazari18, an account belonging to Abdul Latif Nazari currently serving as the deputy minister of economy, and one of two high-ranking political figures of the IEA of a non-Pashtun ethnicity – a Hazara.<sup>209</sup> Furthermore, we see the term “corruptors” used again, in this context to denote those who oppose the national unity.

Remarkably, Aggarwal suggests that basing *ingroup* identity on national themes was more typical for Taliban authors writing in Dari during the insurgency.<sup>210</sup> The case of strategic communication on Mujahid’s account does not show such a tendency. This can be seen in the following example, where the emphasis on unity is further stressed by the utilization of the word “brothers”. On February 16, 2023, Mujahid quoted a post with a video of a speech by

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<sup>206</sup> Posts nos. 475–478.

<sup>207</sup> Post no. 884.

<sup>208</sup> Post no. 884.

<sup>209</sup> “Nazari, Abdul Latif Dr.,” Afghan Biographies, last modified May 28, 2023, [https://www.afghan-bios.info/index.php?option=com\\_afghanbios&id=5145&task=view&total=5071&start=3228&Itemid=2](https://www.afghan-bios.info/index.php?option=com_afghanbios&id=5145&task=view&total=5071&start=3228&Itemid=2); Fatima Shaista, “Taliban appoints Abdul Latif Nazari as Deputy Minister of Economy,” *Awaz The Voice*, December 26, 2021, <https://www.awazthevoice.in/world-news/taliban-appoints-abdul-latif-nazari-as-deputy-minister-of-economy-8392.html>.

<sup>210</sup> Aggarwal, *The Taliban’s Virtual Emirate*, 68.

Mullah Yaqoob, the minister of defense. Mujahid’s quote contains a bilingual commentary, in which the Pashto version is longer and offers slightly more details. The Dari version only states: “We are all each other’s brothers, we unite with the right and defend the right”. The Pashto version expands this by adding: “Afghans no longer accept division based on ethnicity and language.”<sup>211</sup>

The notion of the Freedom Jihad also serves as a unification tool. In this sense, those who lost their lives in its course were uniformly addressed as “martyrs”. This was not only a case of fighters who were killed by enemies in the “special operations” aimed at “corruptors”. Aggarwal points to the linguistic connection between martyrdom in Islam and declaration of faith (both being *shahāda* in Arabic) and suggests it implies “that those killed by enemies are martyrs by virtue of being confessional Muslims, fusing individual with group identity”.<sup>212</sup> However, the term stretched further than to those who fell in the fight. It rather became a general designation for all deceased Afghans. This can be illustrated on an occasion when “almost 80 Afghan citizens, including women and children were martyred as a result of sinking of the boat”.<sup>213</sup> Indeed, these unfortunate individuals were not armed fighters but rather refugees traveling on a boat from Turkey to Italy.

Let us conclude this chapter by highlighting how the strategic communication of the IEA connected the individual topics, striving for right, security, and unity, into one major narrative – one of a state serving its people. This comprehensive narrative can be illustrated by posts enclosing the analyzed period, informing about proceedings of the 2023 Muḥarram festivities. On July 28, Mujahid shared Akhunzada’s statement about the events in Dari and Pashto. The language selection is once again understandable given the presupposed introverted nature of the texts. In said statement, Akhunzada praised and thanked “all the defense mujahid forces” for their service in ensuring security in the first ten days of the Muḥarram month. He used the opportunity to once again disregard “false propaganda” concerning the inadequate security situation of Afghanistan and added that “based on the orders of sharia, individual, social and religious rights of all citizens of [the] dear country [were] protected”.<sup>214</sup> In this case, we see how the IEA presented itself as serving “all citizens”, “protecting” their “rights” and “security”.

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<sup>211</sup> Post no. 927.

<sup>212</sup> Aggarwal, *The Taliban’s Virtual Emirate*, 95.

<sup>213</sup> Posts nos. 1032–1034.

<sup>214</sup> Posts nos. 1950 and 1951.

“Peace is a guarantor of security and stability,” read one of the articles on a Taliban website Al-Emara.<sup>215</sup> “With prolonging the current security and stability, Afghans will have the opportunity to build their own country and under the Islamic system take rapid steps in the direction of development,” continued Akhunzada in the Muḥarram speech published a day after Haqqani announced the completion of Freedom Jihad and the inauguration of Development Jihad.<sup>216</sup> I analyzed the journey from the first to the latter. Security and stability, the existence of which would not be possible without an effective rule of law, and a formation of a collective identity, were the key components of this major narrative.

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<sup>215</sup> “The Afghan people wants peace, their enemy war,” in *The Taliban Reader*, eds. van Linschoten and Kuehn, 511.

<sup>216</sup> Posts nos. 1950 and 1951.

## 4. Diplomacy and External Affairs

Despite the far-reaching importance of addressing internal issues inside the IEA, its strategic communication aims outside of the Afghanistan's territory as well. Nicole Ball suggests that during the transition phase of the post-conflict state reconstruction, the actor in power comes across many challenges, some of which can only be overcome with help from the international community.<sup>217</sup> Its engagement and effective help are only possible when stable diplomatic relations between the post-conflict state and the international community are nurtured. A confirmation of the Taliban's dedication to supporting diplomatic relations with other states was most notable after the official establishment of the political office in Qatar in 2013.<sup>218</sup> These efforts were further supported by a growing focus on the strategic communication, a significant part of which became "digital diplomacy".<sup>219</sup> This term is mainly applied when describing conduct of diplomacy through social media. With their mainstream utilization, digital diplomacy became an indispensable element of international relations.<sup>220</sup>

The following chapter describes how the IEA approached digital diplomacy, i.e. how it utilized social media as a tool for strategic communication with the international community. The posts referring to the IEA's digital diplomacy presented in this chapter can be divided into two main groups according to two basic strategies. I identify the first group as *proactive*. These are texts that were written by the IEA's politicians, diplomats, etc. to *inform* about the IEA's diplomatic activities or stances. In general, these posts describe meetings of the IEA's diplomats abroad with their counterparts, visits of foreign delegations to Afghanistan, or subsequent inauguration of collaborative activities. I label the other group of posts *reactive* as it comprises of statements written and published as the IEA's reactions to an impulse from the outside such as critical statements by foreign politicians or diplomats.

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<sup>217</sup> Nicole Ball, "The Challenge of Rebuilding War-Torn Societies," in *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2001), 726.

<sup>218</sup> Theo Farrell, and Michael Semple, "Making Peace with the Taliban," *Survival* 57, no. 6 (2015): 93, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2015.1116157>.

<sup>219</sup> Constance Duncombe, "Twitter and transformative diplomacy: social media and Iran-US relations," *International Affairs* 93, no. 3 (2017): 561, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix048>.

<sup>220</sup> Duncombe, 561.

## 4.1. Fostering international relations: Proactive digital diplomacy

The IEA's strategic communication prior to the period observed was analyzed by researchers from the RAND Corporation. Their findings include a description of the main trends in the IEA's digital diplomacy. Studying the period from August 2021 to April 2022, they highlight the notable emphasis on relations with Russia and PRC. Regarding Afghanistan's Central Asian neighbors, the authors remark that the IEA's digital diplomacy focuses heavily on Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, while interestingly Tajikistan is omitted. In respect of the key Middle Eastern players, the IEA focuses on relations with Qatar, Iran, and Turkey, while Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are significantly less present in the communication. According to the RAND analysis, the messaging on external affairs with Pakistan shows a mixed relationship. These developments pose an important difference from the first IEA at the turn of the century when Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Pakistan were the only states to officially recognize the Emirate.<sup>221</sup> The general note of the strategic communication regarding the European states and Japan is positive, unlike in the case of the US. The main areas of interest handled diplomatically include economy and trade, energy, infrastructure, and overall efforts to reach good relations with the global society.<sup>222</sup>

In the period analyzed in this thesis, we can observe a continuation of these trends with several noticeable deviations, innovations, or discursive strategies different from the patterns suggested by RAND. One of the emerging factors in the observed period was the IEA's orientation on the improvement of diplomatic relations with the PRC. The relevant posts were usually written by Zabihullah Mujahid himself or Hafiz Zia Ahmad, deputy spokesman and assistant director of public relations under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.<sup>223</sup> Their statements were formulated in an official "diplomatic" language and informed about meetings of states' representatives. Another notable account, @beijing\_embassy, administered by the IEA's embassy in Beijing, is dedicated to the diplomatic activities of the IEA's mission to the PRC.<sup>224</sup> A typical example of the strategic communication relating to the PRC can be shown on a series of five posts published by the @beijing\_embassy account on April 28, 2023, concerning a

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<sup>221</sup> Adrian Guelke, *Terrorism and Global Disorder: Political Violence in the Contemporary World* (London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 55.

<sup>222</sup> Bradley M. Knopp, Jon Niewijk, Zohan Hasan Tariq, and Elmo C. Wright, Jr., "Comparing Taliban Social Media Usage by Language: Who's Speaking and What's Being Said," RAND Research Report, April 25, 2023: 31–40, [https://www.rand.org/pubs/research\\_reports/RRA1830-1.html](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1830-1.html).

<sup>223</sup> @HafizZiaAhmad, X, accessed May 4, 2024, <https://twitter.com/HafizZiaAhmad>.

<sup>224</sup> @beijing\_embassy, X, accessed May 4, 2024, [https://twitter.com/beijing\\_embassy](https://twitter.com/beijing_embassy).



meeting of the IEA head of mission with the PRC's Ministry of Foreign Affairs Special Representative for Afghanistan, Yue Xiaoyong<sup>225</sup>. The topics of said meeting included regional and international relations, especially between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and PRC, as well as issues of narcotics, security, stability, and trade. The main message apparent from a remarkable *repetition* in these five posts concerned good bilateral relations reflected in economic cooperation.<sup>226</sup>

It is worth remarking that among the many languages the IEA incorporates in its strategic communication, Mandarin Chinese is falling behind. This is apparent in the language mutations of the official state Bakhtar News Agency. In a cross-promoting post from May 27, 2023, Muhajir Farahi, deputy information and culture minister for publication,<sup>227</sup> referred to Pashto, Dari, English, Arabic, Urdu, Uzbek, and Russian versions.<sup>228</sup> An X site of the Bakhtar News Agency for PRC was introduced in July 2023,<sup>229</sup> however its full website version is still missing at the time of writing. Furthermore, the account @beijing\_embassy only shares posts in Pashto. One of the possible reasons for the notable absence of utilization of the Mandarin Chinese language could be a lack of its speakers among the IEA's content creators. In Aggarwal's analysis, the PRC is wholly missing in the analysis of relations of the Taliban with foreign states.<sup>230</sup> This deficiency of focus on the PRC in the previous strategic communication suggests that the diplomatic efforts with the country are relatively new, supposedly on the rise since August 2021. Presumably, it is for this reason that the IEA has not yet managed to fully make up for the lack in this area.

Interestingly, the language situation of the account has not changed even after Bilal Karimi was accepted by PRC's officials as the IEA's ambassador in December 2023.<sup>231</sup> It should

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<sup>225</sup> See "Yue Xiaoyong," Center for International Security and Strategy Tsinghua University, accessed May 4, 2024, <https://ciss.tsinghua.edu.cn/info/CFExperts/5824>; @stuartyueh, X, accessed May 4, 2024, <https://twitter.com/stuartyueh>.

<sup>226</sup> Posts nos. 1351–1355.

<sup>227</sup> @farahimuhajer1, X, accessed May 4, 2024, <https://twitter.com/farahimuhajer1>.

<sup>228</sup> Post no. 1572

<sup>229</sup> @bnachinese, X, accessed May 4, 2024, <https://twitter.com/bnachinese>.

<sup>230</sup> Neil Krishan Aggarwal, *The Taliban's Virtual Emirate: The Culture and Psychology of an Online Militant Community* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 117–142.

<sup>231</sup> See title on Bilal Karimi's X site: @BilalKarimi44, X, accessed April 11, 2024,

<https://twitter.com/BilalKarimi44>; Ayaz Gul, "Afghan Taliban Say China Becomes First Nation to Accept Their Ambassador," *VOA*, December 1, 2023, <https://www.voanews.com/a/afghan-taliban-says-china-becomes-first-nation-to-accept-its-ambassador/7380438.html>.

Based on the dominance of Pashto in Karimi's X activity, even in times previous to his departure for PRC when he served as a deputy spokesperson of the IEA, it can be assumed that he himself does not speak any foreign language. Apart from the lack of linguistic proficiency, Karimi also lacked previous diplomatic experience: "The

be noted that the PRC became the first country to officially accept an IEA's ambassador,<sup>232</sup> thus formally pursuing diplomatic relations between the two countries on the highest level. From November 2022 until August 2023, Mujahid's account mainly communicated the PRC-oriented diplomatic activities of the IEA to its domestic audiences using Pashto. It can be assumed that some parts, like references to "increase in exports and imports", "good relations, transit facilities and so on [that] were achieved by the Emirate in the last two years", or even that "Afghanistan is now a free and independent country [with] a strong system", were written and shared to foster the *positive image* among the Pashto-speaking audience.

The situation with Russia bears similarities with the IEA-PRC relations, as the communicated themes contain almost identical message as in the case of the PRC, i.e. a strong emphasis on building a good relationship, development, and security. Zabihullah Mujahid's activity lacked any posts in Russian, and a strong preference for Pashto once again implies that the strategic communication was aimed at the domestic audience. For instance, on January 12, 2023, Hafiz Zia Ahmad shared a series of five posts informing about a meeting of the IEA's Minister of Foreign Affairs Muttaqi with a Special Envoy to Afghanistan Zamir Kabulov. Muttaqi was quoted saying: "Russia has a special place in Afghanistan's foreign policy." He also expressed hope for the future expansion of the IEA's mission to Russia. On the other hand, Kabulov said: "Russia wants stability and development in Afghanistan and it does not want to criticize Afghanistan and interfere in its internal affairs like Western countries." He then also expressed hopes for future cooperation and mentioned Afghanistan's role as an important binding element in the relations and development of trade between Pakistan, Central Asia, and Russia.<sup>233</sup>

Muttaqi does not offer further explanation for his ambiguous term "special place" of Russia in Afghanistan's foreign policy. Understandably, the presentation of the IEA's burgeoning ties to Russia is a delicate task given the collective memory of the former Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan (1979–1989) and its impact on the mujahideen Taliban. In fact, the strategic communication during the analyzed period tackled the topic of the war as well. On February 15, 2023, the anniversary of the withdrawal of the Soviet forces, Mujahid shared his

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Taliban's new ambassador arrives in China as Afghanistan's rulers court foreign investment," *AP News*, December 1, 2023. <https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-taliban-china-ambassador-6e7f6fe404317dc18a99780808c97402>.

<sup>232</sup> Gul, "Afghan Taliban."

<sup>233</sup> For all these statements see posts nos. 580–585.

own statement in both Pashto and Dari,<sup>234</sup> as well as his and Muttaqi's speech in Pashto for a channel Radio Television of Afghanistan (RTA).<sup>235</sup> Based on the language selection, the posts were predominantly aimed at domestic audiences. Mujahid's statement applies some patterns explained in the previous chapter like explaining the successes of jihad in this matter, referring to Afghan citizens as a "proud nation" or reminding of their martyrdom. *Negative opinion words* are used to describe the deeds of the Soviets. For example, the text mentions the "destructive effect" of their "aggression".<sup>236</sup>

Referring to the Afghanistan's side of the conflict, the statement *explicitly* underlines that "Afghans are not aggressive". Simultaneously, it portrays the Mujahideen resistance as "powerful" and "victorious". It also connects the events of 1979–1989 to the later invasion of Afghanistan by the USA. I argue that this line of rhetoric reminding of historic bad experience with external actors is applied here to foster identity-building through reminiscences of events constructing collective memory. Such a tendency to recall former conflicts in Afghanistan and compare them to contemporary events has been consistently present in the Taliban's and the IEA's strategic communication.<sup>237</sup> The statement also stands as a typical case of a *negative comparison* made to stress the negative traits of the *outgroup*.<sup>238</sup> It also presents a clarification of the IEA's position vis-à-vis external actors: "After the invasion of the Soviet Union, the occupation under the leadership of [the United States of] America began and its failure again confirmed the Afghans in being very sensitive to foreigners."<sup>239</sup> Given the language selection in this case, it seems that the IEA tried to explain its diplomatic steps to the domestic audiences.

Let us return to the words of the Russian representative Kabulov about Afghanistan's important position in the region. I argue that their selection by Hafiz Zia Ahmad for his post was a result of a strategic consideration. The deputy spokesman wanted to show the alignment of the diplomatic direction of the IEA and Russia's vision to support the positive image with the domestic audiences. The aspiration to become a regional crossroads in the region is highlighted by two posts accompanied by videos, one in Pashto, the other in English. Both were originally shared by Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs Mullah Baradar's account

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<sup>234</sup> Posts nos. 911 and 912.

<sup>235</sup> Posts nos. 913–917.

<sup>236</sup> Posts nos. 911 and 912.

<sup>237</sup> Thomas H. Johnson, Matthew DuPee, and Wali Shaaker, *Taliban Narratives: The Use and Power of Stories in the Afghanistan Conflict* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 32–33.

<sup>238</sup> Teun A. van Dijk, "Ideological Discourse Analysis," accessed May 4, 2024: 155, <https://discourses.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Teun-A.-van-Dijk-1995-Ideological-discourse-analysis.pdf>.

<sup>239</sup> Posts nos. 911 and 912.

@FDPM\_AFG<sup>240</sup>. “Afghanistan's strategic location and efforts by the Islamic Emirate are turning it into a connecting point between Central and South Asia,” states the English version.<sup>241</sup> The video is a great example of the abilities of the IEA’s media production. It depicts a close cooperation in the planned development of economic infrastructure with Iran, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and even Tajikistan. This is an important notion showing a new aspect of the IEA’s diplomatic activities in comparison with the previous findings of the RAND analysis. The end of the video reflects a broader regional perspective and portrays Afghanistan as a crossroads of the whole Asia’s cooperation, stretching to India and the PRC on the one side and to the Middle East on the other.

The IEA’s strategic communication towards the Central Asian states adheres to the general trends described above. In terms of quantity, there is a noticeable tendency in favor of Uzbekistan, especially compared to a marginal representation of Tajikistan. Moving towards the Middle Eastern region, we see a slight increase in the activity concerning Turkey and Iran, while other regionally important actors like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, or the UAE fall behind. The IEA’s approach towards Iran could be described as reserved. On the one hand, a tendency to improve the relations is notable. At the same time, such rapprochements are undermined by various disputes, most notably the conflict over the rights to water of the Helmand River can be mentioned.<sup>242</sup> In these cases, Mujahid’s statements were mainly published as reactions to various accusations coming from the Iranian authorities. Despite their diplomatic tone, Mujahid also aimed to project the unyieldingness of the IEA.<sup>243</sup> Contrastingly, Turkey is approached with a positive proactive digital diplomacy as evidenced by the following post:

"Congratulatory Message of the Prime Minister of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan on the Results of the Presidential Elections in Turkey: I would like to extend my heartfelt congratulations to H.E. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on his victory in the second round of elections [...] and his re-election as the President of Turkey, may Allah Almighty grant more strength, stability, and religious service to Turkey

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<sup>240</sup> @FDPM\_AFG, X, accessed May 4, 2024, [https://twitter.com/FDPM\\_AFG](https://twitter.com/FDPM_AFG).

<sup>241</sup> Posts nos. 1434 and 1435.

<sup>242</sup> The history of the dispute between Afghanistan and Iran over the rights to the water from the Helmand river goes back for decades. The current clashes stem from accusations of breaking a 1973 treaty stipulating the total amount of water that must flow from Afghanistan to Iran via this important waterway. One of the spikes in the long-term tensions occurred at the end of May 2023 resulting in several casualties. See Shanthie Mariet D’Souza, “A Compulsive Embrace Beneath the Afghanistan-Iran Water Conflict,” *The Diplomat*, May 31, 2023, <https://thediplomat.com/2023/05/a-compulsive-embrace-beneath-the-afghanistan-iran-water-conflict/>.

<sup>243</sup> See for example posts nos. 1489 and 1490.

which plays a vital role in the region and the world. [...] May the brotherhood and friendship of the nations of Afghanistan and Turkey be eternal.”<sup>244</sup>

The importance the IEA awarded to the message is visible in the number of language versions, as this post was simultaneously released in Pashto, Dari, Arabic, and English. However, the Turkish version was missing. Its absence could once again be explained by the lack of Turkish-speaking content creators in public relation offices. As in the case of Mandarin Chinese, such argument can also be supported by a late launch of a Turkish mutation of Bakhtar News Agency account on X in August 2023, i.e. at the end of the analyzed period.<sup>245</sup> Apart from the overly positive tone of the message, there lies an important notion in the words “brotherhood and friendship of the nations of Afghanistan and Turkey”. The invocation of “brotherly” relations was also utilized with other, mainly Muslim, countries. This suggests that the IEA considers itself a member of a larger *ingroup* – in this case not only a “brotherhood” of the Afghan “nation”, but rather a “brotherhood” of all Muslim societies.

This more global understanding of an *ingroup* membership appears as a consistent trend in the IEA’s political discourse, as suggested by Aggarwal in his findings of the IEA’s strategic communication during the insurgency.<sup>246</sup> Let us further examine this phenomenon on other examples from the analyzed period. On April 15, the IEA released a statement via Mujahid on events in Sudan<sup>247</sup>:

“We are sorry to receive reports that there are clashes between people in the center and some parts of Sudan. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is deeply saddened by the incident that happened in our brother Muslim country and has made Sudanese suffer. [...] As a war-torn country and nation, we have seen and experienced the effects and consequences of war, it destroys nations, weakening governments and pave the ground for illegal foreign interventions. [...] We pray to the Almighty Allah to resolve the differences between the Muslim brothers in Sudan ASAP, remove the causes of the clashes and save its people from difficulties.”<sup>248</sup>

We see that Sudan is also considered a “brother Muslim country”. *Negative words* like “destroys” or “weakening” are used to point out the negatives of the *outgroup*. However, we

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<sup>244</sup> Posts nos. 1583–1588, 1591–1593.

<sup>245</sup> @bnaturkish, X, accessed April 11, 2024, <https://twitter.com/bnaturkish>.

<sup>246</sup> Aggarwal, *The Taliban’s Virtual Emirate*, 64–71, 117.

<sup>247</sup> See Reuters, “Sudan’s 100 days of war between rival military factions,” *Reuters*, July 23, 2023, <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudans-conflict-since-fighting-erupted-mid-april-2023-05-11/>.

<sup>248</sup> Posts nos. 1269–1279.

see that Mujahid links the *outgroup* endangering Sudan security to an *outgroup* of the IEA as well by referring to “illegal” foreign interveners. This also serves as a way to support the “brotherly” tie by comparing the events to Afghanistan’s own historical experience. In a similar manner, a *compassion move*,<sup>249</sup> i.e. showing sympathy with the victims, is used to stress the negative consequences of the *outgroup*’s actions. Mujahid’s stance is aimed at both internal and external audiences, being written in Pashto, Dari, English, and Arabic. The last language version shows the IEA communication team’s ability to reach out to Arabic-speaking audiences appropriately, when necessary, unlike in the case of Russia, PRC, or Turkey. Notably, only the English mutation does not feature an introduction in the form of a Quranic verse.

This self-incorporation into a broader Muslim society is further supported by a frequent criticism of Israel. The posts usually refer to the events with *negative opinion words* such as “Israeli barbaric raid[s]” on Palestinian territories, their “occupation”, “brutal attacks”, or “desecration” of the al-Aqsa mosque.<sup>250</sup> On various occasions, the messages were streaming through Mujahid’s account in English, Pashto, Dari, Arabic, and their multifarious combinations. In this context, the selection of languages seems rather haphazard. English serves in this case as a channel for non-specific global audiences, supposably even the Israeli one. Utilization of Arabic is also self-evident for the IEA to reach Muslim, Arabic-speaking audiences. In this matter, the Dari version also has the potential to reach Iranian politicians and diplomats. The posts can serve as a general diplomatic message to Iran that the IEA takes a similar critical stance towards Israel. I suggest that an implementation of this shared view in the communication is based on a strategic consideration with the aim to foster diplomatic relations with Iran. Concurrently, it is worth mentioning that this theme has been present in the IEA’s strategic communication for a longer time at least since 2007.<sup>251</sup>

In the previously discussed posts, the reference to the “brotherhood” of Muslims, the message of the IEA’s self-inclusion in the bigger *ingroup* was aimed at both foreign and domestic audiences. Nevertheless, on March 16, Abdul Qahar Balkhi, spokesperson of the IEA’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, released ten posts describing the proceedings of an official meeting with a delegation from the UAE. Balkhi chose to quote the words of one member of the UEA’s delegation who reportedly said: “We are your brothers [and...] we want good relations with you.”<sup>252</sup> Released only in Pashto, the message was evidently meant to mainly

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<sup>249</sup> See Van Dijk, “Ideological Discourse Analysis,” 154.

<sup>250</sup> See posts nos. 792, 793–794, 1196–1197, 1496 and 1500, or 1790–1791.

<sup>251</sup> See for example Aggarwal, *The Taliban’s Virtual Emirate*, 127–8.

<sup>252</sup> Post no. 1091.

reach Pashto speakers of Afghanistan, or in this specific case potentially also the Pashto-speaking community of the UAE.<sup>253</sup> Such invocation of “brotherhood” can be understood as an effort to foster a collective identity, one of an *ingroup* that sees itself as a member of a larger Muslim society. Furthermore, the fact that this reference was used by other spokespersons than solely Mujahid shows a wider strategy in the IEA’s communication team.

Similarly, Pakistan’s chargé d’affaires in Afghanistan was quoted by the official government account @ARG\_1880 to express hopes for an increase in political and economic cooperation between the two “brother and Muslim countries”.<sup>254</sup> In a quantitative comparison, the strategic communication on Pakistan-related affairs surpasses any other country in the Middle Eastern, South and Central Asian regions. Pakistan-related digital diplomacy frequently employs Dari or English, with Urdu being utilized with a lesser frequency. The overall tendency to stress hopes for positive outlooks was in specific cases diluted by statements reacting to accusations concerning the inner IEA security situation.<sup>255</sup>

## 4.2. Reactive digital diplomacy

In comparison to the IEA’s proactive efforts in the domain of digital diplomacy, the posts presented in this section are often richer in discursive techniques. Being a reaction to foreign accusations, their authors often utilize *opinion words* to inform about the understanding of both *ingroup* and *outgroup* in the IEA’s strategic communication. A typical example can be observed on the statement made by Zabihullah Mujahid on January 12, regarding a meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC):

„The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan welcomes the meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and its declaration on Afghanistan. Indeed, the international community should continue its cooperation with Afghans and not interfere in Afghanistan’s internal affairs. The concern of OIC regarding women’s education is understandable, but the Islamic Emirate is taking steps to resolve this issue. The Islamic Emirate wants all international organizations, especially the OIC, to have a

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<sup>253</sup> See D. N. MacKenzie, and Anne Boyle David, “Pashto,” in *The World’s Major Languages*, ed. Bernard Comrie, third edition (London, New York: Routledge, 2018), 470.

<sup>254</sup> Posts nos. 20 and 29.

<sup>255</sup> For example posts nos. 2060-2062, 2064, and 2065.

close understanding with the Islamic Emirate and to continue their cooperation with the Afghan people.”<sup>256</sup>

The declaration in question was released by the OIC on the previous day, January 11, 2023. Its text is rather critical to Afghanistan’s internal developments, stating: “OIC [...considers] the situation in Afghanistan following the decision taken by the de facto Afghan authorities to close down schools and universities to girls and women for an unspecified period and suspend women from working in all national and international non-governmental organizations [...] in violation of [...] the Islamic law.”<sup>257</sup> Further it adds that the OIC is “gravely concerned about the worsening humanitarian and human rights situation in Afghanistan”.<sup>258</sup> On the other hand, the OIC’s representatives “[reaffirmed] the strong commitment [...] to the sovereignty, independence and national unity of Afghanistan”.<sup>259</sup> In sum, the OIC communiqué urged the “de facto authorities”, i.e. the IEA, to adhere to fundamental human rights, especially regarding women, in which the OIC offered help.<sup>260</sup>

Considering these words, Mujahid’s statements deserve an examination. First, we see that a diplomatic tone was set – the IEA “welcomed” the meeting and declaration and encouraged the “international community” to further liaise with the “Afghans”. However, Mujahid stressed a key element of the IEA’s foreign diplomacy – an imperative not to “interfere in Afghanistan’s internal affairs”. This was already outlined in the examination of Mujahid’s statement on the anniversary of the end of the Soviet-Afghan war. It is since then that the accent on independence and sovereignty has been a key element of the Taliban and the IEA identity.<sup>261</sup> As such, it has been present in the strategic communication for a long time, as documented in a text called “The Afghan people wants peace, their enemy war” published on the movement’s official website in November 2014. There, the “shared values” of “Afghans” are explained, including the following: “Afghanistan is an independent and sovereign state”, “Afghans have not accepted foreign invasions and invaders throughout their history”, or “Afghans do not accept a

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<sup>256</sup> Posts nos. 588, 592, 596, and 600.

<sup>257</sup> OIC, “Final Communiqué of the Extraordinary Meeting of the OIC Executive Committee on ‘The Recent Developments and the Humanitarian Situation in Afghanistan’,” January 11, 2023, ReliefWeb, <https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/final-communicue-extraordinary-meeting-oic-executive-committee-recent-developments-and-humanitarian-situation-afghanistan>.

<sup>258</sup> OIC.

<sup>259</sup> OIC.

<sup>260</sup> OIC.

<sup>261</sup> See for example: Anand Gopal and Alex Strick van Linschoten, “Ideology in the Afghan Taliban.” Afghanistan Analysts Network, June 2017: 42, <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/201705-AGopal-ASvLinschoten-TB-Ideology.pdf>; Johnson, DuPee, and Shaaker, *Taliban Narratives*, 30.



life of subjugation nor stooge alien governments.”<sup>262</sup> Further, Mujahid, on the one hand, acknowledged foreign “concerns”, on the other he hinted that certain actions were being undertaken to “resolve this issue”. I argue that this sentence should be read as a continuation of the previous part – regardless of the IEA’s inner decisions, it is not a topic foreign actors should occupy themselves with. I propound that together these notions are a part of a larger narrative of securing Afghanistan’s independence and sovereignty, and its incorporation into the strategic communication should be understood as a part of the Freedom Jihad.

#### 4.2.1. Women’s rights and education

The topic of women’s education and engagement in Afghanistan is one of an understandable international interest. Nonetheless, it also poses a point of importance in the covert internal dynamics of the IEA. Since August 2021, we have seen several hints and even specific steps in efforts to reopen schools for girls and women. Hopes of theirs, as well as of Western observers were, however, repeatedly extinguished when the IEA’s actions failed to fulfill the expectations. For the first time since the re-establishment of the IEA, secondary schools were supposed to open in Spring 2022. On the verge of their opening, on March 20, an official confirmation statement from the Ministry of Education circulated, and subsequently a video was published to welcome girls back to schools.<sup>263</sup> Nevertheless, the ban was not lifted in the end, although in some regions secondary schools operated for a few days before returning to being closed for girls.<sup>264</sup> Since then, the ban on women’s secondary and university education has continued.<sup>265</sup>

The sudden turn of March 2022 events sparked debates on the true intentions of the IEA regarding women’s education. Certain commentators hinted that the actions contradicting promises might suggest a division within the IEA itself. For example, Rangina Hamidi, minister

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<sup>262</sup> For all statements see “The Afghan People Wants Peace, Their Enemy War,” in *The Taliban Reader: War, Islam and Politics*, eds. Alex Strick Van Linschoten, Felix Kuehn (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), Kindle, 511–513.

<sup>263</sup> See for example: RFE/RL’s Radio Azadi, “‘Shattered’ Dreams As Taliban Reneges On Promise To Open Schools For Girls,” *RadioFreeEurope/Radio Liberty*, March 23, 2022, <https://www.rferl.org/a/taliban-closes-girls-schools-afghanistan/31766277.html>.

<sup>264</sup> “Afghanistan: Taliban’s Backtrack on school re-opening for girls irreversibly impacts their future,” Amnesty International, March 28, 2022, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/03/afghanistan-talibans-backtrack-on-school-re-opening-for-girls-irreversibly-impacts-their-future/>.

<sup>265</sup> Reuters, “Afghan female students not allowed to sit university entrance exam,” *Reuters*, January 28, 2023, <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/afghan-female-students-not-allowed-sit-university-entrance-exam-taliban-ministry-2023-01-28/>.

of education from the era of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, pointed to ideological splits in the IEA. Moreover, “there are many within the [IEA] who support reversing the decree [banning schooling for girls],” she stated.<sup>266</sup> For instance, the leader of the IEA’s office in Qatar, Suhail Shaheen, confirmed that his daughters attend schools.<sup>267</sup> This assumption of the IEA’s division is supported by Vito Morisco, author of the analysis called “From Rebel Governance to Institutionalization: Prospects for the Taliban and Afghanistan”, who labels the topic of women’s rights as an internally “sensitive”, or even as a “battlefield” between the more pragmatic and the conservative factions.<sup>268</sup> Morisco explains the Supreme Leader Akhunzada’s decision to prolong the ban on girls’ education indefinitely as an intentional strike against the pragmatic faction. After all, the decision was shared with the public only a day before Minister of Foreign Affairs Muttaqi was supposed to appear as a keynote speaker at a diplomatic forum in Qatar.<sup>269</sup> Later that year, Akhunzada even replaced two main IEA politicians responsible for education with “two hardline figures close to [him]”.<sup>270</sup> This led to a December 2022 ban on women forbidding them to attend universities, even though they had taken entrance exams only a few months before.<sup>271</sup>

Morisco shows that the “radicalization” of Akhunzada and the Kandahari circle<sup>272</sup> was met with a strong criticism from other high-ranking IEA representatives, including Minister of Defense Yaqoob, Minister of Interior Affairs Haqqani, and Deputy Prime Minister Baradar, i.e. all of the current deputies to the supreme leader.<sup>273</sup> Akhunzada’s overruling of such a strong consensus of the IEA’s elites stands as a noteworthy development, given the long-standing focus among the Taliban on egalitarianism and consensus-building in the movement, hinting a turning

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<sup>266</sup> Ruchi Kumar, “Taliban could be convinced to open girls’ schools, says Afghanistan ex-education minister,” *The Guardian*, November 29, 2023, <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/nov/29/taliban-could-be-convinced-to-open-girls-schools-says-afghanistan-ex-education-minister>.

<sup>267</sup> Andrew Stanton, “Taliban Official Admits Daughters Go to School as Afghan Teens Are Banned,” *Newsweek*, May 10, 2022, <https://www.newsweek.com/taliban-afghanistan-girls-education-ban-official-daughter-comment-1705389>.

<sup>268</sup> Vito Morisco, “From Rebel Governance to Institutionalization: Prospects for the Taliban and Afghanistan,” *Österreichisches Institut für Internationale Politik Working Paper No. 116*, July 2023: 2, 14, <https://www.oiiip.ac.at/en/publications/from-rebel-governance-to-institutionalization-prospects-for-the-taliban-and-afghanistan/>.

<sup>269</sup> Morisco, 14.

<sup>270</sup> Morisco, 14.

<sup>271</sup> Hikmat Nooria and agencies in Kabul, “Taliban ban Afghan women from university education,” *The Guardian*, December 20, 2022, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/dec/20/taliban-ban-afghan-women-university-education>.

<sup>272</sup> In Kandahar, the historic stronghold of the Taliban and the seat of the current supreme leader Akhunzada, a parallel governing body with private funds and even army was formed to rival to the official seat of the government in Kabul (see “Taliban leader has withdrawn nearly \$690 million cash for personal use, says former Afghan spy chief,” *Kabul Now*, March 19, 2023, <https://kabulnow.com/2023/03/taliban-leader-has-withdrawn-nearly-690-million-cash-for-personal-use-says-former-afghan-spy-chief/>).

<sup>273</sup> Morisco, “From Rebel Governance,” 15–16.

point in the inner dynamics of the IEA.<sup>274</sup> Simultaneously, this heavy opposition of Kabul figures is unprecedented – the *Amīr al-Mu'minīn* was always understood as an absolute authority.<sup>275</sup> Thus, Morisco concludes that in this political climate “women’s rights and girls’ education remain sensitive topics for the [IEA] to the extent that the more pragmatic figures push for lifting the ban, the less Hibatullah [Akhunzada] will grant concessions”.<sup>276</sup>

Nevertheless, in this case, the study of the strategic communication can provide us with another crucial aspect of the issue of women’s rights. The sensitivity of the topic potentially endangering the stability of the young Emirate is reflected in the strategic communication in a specific way. In terms of CDA, the authors of the IEA’s political discourse and especially Zabihullah Mujahid deny the existence of the problem by a strong *de-topicalization* and *de-emphasis* on the communication of the topic. As documented by the events of December 2022, when women were again banned from universities, not a single post dedicated to the topic was published by Mujahid. Similarly, the subsequent ban of all activities of all women humanitarian workers by IEA’s Ministry of Economy was also absent from Mujahid’s posts.<sup>277</sup> The utter importance of the strategic communication in the power struggle became all the more evident, when Zabihullah Mujahid was ordered to work from Kandahar in April 2023.<sup>278</sup>

When Chargé d’Affaires of the US Mission to Afghanistan Karen Decker posted a statement in Pashto and Dari criticizing this latter decision,<sup>279</sup> it provoked Mujahid’s reaction in English, Pashto, and Dari: “American officials should stop interfering in our internal matters. We do not allow anyone to talk rubbish or make threats regarding the decisions of our leaders under the title of Humanitarian aid.”<sup>280</sup> This presents a rather typical case of *negative other-presentation*. It *emphasizes* the bad intentions of this US representative and it *generalizes* the issue, relating it to all “American officials”. Moreover, it *hyperbolizes* when accusing Decker of “talking rubbish” and “making threats”. The exaggeration is obvious if we inspect the original post of Decker in which she called on the IEA to clarify “how they intend[ed] to prevent

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<sup>274</sup> Andrew Watkins, “The Taliban One Year On,” *CTC Sentinel* 15, no. 8 (August 2022): 5, <https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-taliban-one-year-on/>.

<sup>275</sup> Watkins, 4.

<sup>276</sup> Morisco, “From Rebel Governance,” 16.

<sup>277</sup> Reuters, “U.N. urges Taliban to reverse ban on female foreign aid workers,” *Reuters*, December 26, 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/un-official-meets-taliban-urges-reverse-ngo-female-worker-ban-2022-12-26/>.

<sup>278</sup> Al Jazeera Staff, “Taliban top spokesman Mujahid asked to work from Kandahar,” *Aljazeera*, April 6, 2023, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/6/taliban-top-spokesman-mujahid-asked-to-work-from-kandahar>.

<sup>279</sup> @USAmbKabul, “Man beh’anvān-e namāyandeh-e bozorgtarīn ehdā konandeh-e komak hā-ye bashardūstāne barāye Afghānestān,” X, December 25, 2022, <https://twitter.com/USAmbKabul/status/1606999483833024512>.

<sup>280</sup> Posts nos. 434–437.

women and children from going hungry, [...] under the circumstance when women [were] not allowed to help other women and children”. At the end of her post, she stated that she holds Din Muhammad Hanif, the minister of economy, accountable for the decision.<sup>281</sup> The accentuation of *negative other-presentation* stands as a pattern in the strategic communication where typically accusations of foreign media or state representatives are labeled as “propaganda”.<sup>282</sup>

On the other hand, the topic of women’s engagement in society was also used as a political lever in meetings with foreign representatives and in the subsequent *positive self-presentation* in the strategic communication. For instance, we can examine a meeting of the IEA representatives with a delegation of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) at the beginning of January 2023. Following the encounter, Deputy Prime Minister Abdul Kabir stated that “the Islamic Emirate consider[ed] religious and modern education as the right of every Afghan and [was] engaged in creating a suitable environment for women’s education and work in the light of the religion and culture of Afghans”. Together with a statement that the current government was formed by representatives from all around Afghanistan incorporating all ethnic groups, Kabir said this to support the IEA’s claim for a seat at the UN, since the IEA “[had] met all the conditions for an official recognition”.<sup>283</sup> Remarkably, only the Pashto-written version was shared on Mujahid’s page.

Similarly, women’s rights were brought up during a visit of Deputy United Nations Secretary-General Amia Mohamed to Kabul. Minister of Foreign Affairs Muttaqi was quoted to say: “Women are engaged in educational & health sectors in significant numbers whereas those who used to work in government offices are paid salaries at home.” It is plausible to assume that this statement was once again aimed to support *positive self-presentation* towards domestic audiences, targeted with a Pashto version, and foreign ones, targeted in English. The appeal of a *positive presentation* of his *ingroup* can be detected in Muttaqi’s own expressed hopes that “the delegation would portray Afghanistan’s true picture to the international community”. Muttaqi also noted during this meeting that “schools [had] been opened for nearly 10 million students”.<sup>284</sup> The *explicitly* stated high number stated serves to enhance the *positive*

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<sup>281</sup> @USAmbKabul, “Man beh’avnān-e namāyandeh-e bozorgtarīn ehdā konandeh-e komak hā-ye bashardūstāne barāye Afghānestān”; For details concerning Din Muhammad Hanif see “Hanif, Qari Din Mohammad,” Afghan Biographies, last modified May 28, 2023, [https://www.afghan-bios.info/index.php?option=com\\_afghanbios&id=2640&task=view&total=5058&start=1709&Itemid=2](https://www.afghan-bios.info/index.php?option=com_afghanbios&id=2640&task=view&total=5058&start=1709&Itemid=2).

<sup>282</sup> See for example posts nos. 139–141, 148, 1319–1335, 1337–1341, and 1716–1718.

<sup>283</sup> Posts nos. 500–505.

<sup>284</sup> Posts nos. 662–668, 671–676.

*self-presentation*. Nonetheless, I consider it a political, and communicational, maneuver to *de-emphasize* the topic of specifically female education.

Continuing the discussion on the role of women's education engagement in society and its reflection in the strategic communication, it should be remarked that various IEA representatives have confirmed the general importance of education. This is best demonstrated on *The Islamic Emirate and its System of Governance*. Its final sixty pages, i.e. one-fifth of the whole book, are devoted to the topic of education. Furthermore, a large majority of the treatise's commentary on education focuses on the women's role and provides a deep insight into the IEA's ideological stance. On the other hand, while the text itself offers some hints advocating for women partaking in education, it fails to provide specifics.<sup>285</sup> Therefore, in his study of the document, Butt concludes: "[Haqqani's] thinking on girls' education raises more questions than it answers."<sup>286</sup> I lean towards a confirmation of an existence of a strategy in the IEA's communication of its stance on women's and girls' education. I argue that this strategy is apparent and demonstrable on Zabihullah Mujahid's account. It applies the typical ideological polarization of *positive self-presentation* and *negative other-presentation*. Since the topic is deemed controversial and sensitive among the IEA representatives, and often poses as a target of criticism from the outside, the *positive self-presentation* is primarily done by a general *de-emphasis* of the topic, its *de-topicalization* or even a *denial* of the issue's existence.

To problematize the question of a unified strategy in the communication, I now turn to one of its few analyses of the of post-2021 IEA – the RAND analysis which focuses on the topic of women's rights in a thorough manner and proposes a conclusion that "there is no overall strategy behind [the IEA's] social media use".<sup>287</sup> At this point, it should be pointed out that its authors paid disproportionate attention to the topic of "Treatment of women and girls" which only constituted 2% of their data set. Yet, the authors devoted a whole chapter to the topic at the expense of an astounding number of 53% of posts not categorized in any way.<sup>288</sup> However, they show that the domestic communication on the examined topic differed notably from the messages directed at Western audiences. According to the analysts, the domestic-language messages supported women's engagement in society and access to education while stressing

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<sup>285</sup> John Butt, "A Taleban Theory of State: A review of the Chief Justice's book of jurisprudence," Afghanistan Analysts Network Political Landscape Report, August 2023: 34–45. <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/political-landscape/a-taleban-theory-of-state-a-review-of-the-chief-justices-book-of-jurisprudence/>.

<sup>286</sup> Butt, 41.

<sup>287</sup> Knopp, Niewijk, Tariq, and Wright Jr., "Comparing Taliban Social Media," 54.

<sup>288</sup> Knopp, Niewijk, Tariq, and Wright Jr., 6.

the importance of adhering to Islamic principles. Simultaneously, the IEA communication stressed that the criticism from the outside is “based on falsehoods”.<sup>289</sup>

Both these aspects can be detected in the data set analyzed in this thesis and demonstrated on the following examples showing a continuing trend in the IEA’s strategic communication. For instance, a post in Pashto and Dari from July 27, 2023, contained a short remark that “[the IEA had] issued a (1000) business licenses to women only for them to participate in business as well”.<sup>290</sup> Similarly, a Pashto post from November 27, 2022, *emphasized* that “women’s rights were guaranteed within sharia, they work[ed] at jobs in various fields [...] but some media spread false propaganda about this topic”.<sup>291</sup> This excerpt supports the RAND’s claim that domestic-language messaging stresses the importance of *sharia* in the topic of women’s engagement.

To contest the existence of a unified strategy, the RAND analysts compare the IEA’s declaration with a lack of its actions and add that in comparison to the domestic-aimed communication, the “English-language messaging featured support for broadening women’s education but provided only limited discussion of promoting Islamic women’s rights and critiquing Western women’s rights movements”.<sup>292</sup> Based on this, they infer that each policy of interest was tailored to specific groups disregarding contradictions.<sup>293</sup> However, they argue that “there is no strong evidence of an effort to systematically shape policy messaging or to systematically influence a target audience through repeated, tailored messaging”.<sup>294</sup>

I suggest that in the broad plethora of the IEA’s social media activities, the appearance of voices contradicting one another is understandable. In the vastness of the network, voices not following the official strategy are to be expected. However, in the case of women’s rights and education, the contradictory communication should be understood as stemming from the schism between the supreme leader, and other notable figures of the IEA’s governmental echelons, not from the lack of the overall strategy. Quite the contrary, pertaining to the question of women’s rights, the official channel of the strategic communication, the Mujahid’s X account, adheres to an overall *de-emphasizing, de-topicalizing* strategy in an attempt to hide the topic’s internal sensitivity. Finally, the fact that similar findings can be demonstrated based on

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<sup>289</sup> Knopp, Niewijk, Tariq, and Wright, “Comparing Taliban Social Media,” 54.

<sup>290</sup> Posts nos. 1941 and 1945.

<sup>291</sup> Post no. 162.

<sup>292</sup> Knopp, Niewijk, Tariq, and Wright, “Comparing Taliban Social Media,” 54.

<sup>293</sup> Knopp, Niewijk, Tariq, and Wright, 54.

<sup>294</sup> Knopp, Niewijk, Tariq, and Wright, 54.

the RAND's data set and on posts gathered a year later shows a linearity in the communication indicating the existence of such strategy.

In conclusion, this chapter presented the IEA's strategic communication in the sphere of external affairs. One of the most significant aspects of the strategy in this area was the rich utilization of various languages to reach the desired audiences most effectively or to span a maximum number of possible readerships. Generally, the communication promoted the IEA's determination to establish good relations with strategic global actors, neighboring countries, or "brotherly" Muslim countries, regardless of various disputes. The good relations rhetoric was mainly supported with *positive opinion words*. We saw a new understanding of *ingroup* in the strategic communication. One that does not limit itself to the Afghan "nation", but rather situates Afghanistan among all Muslim societies. The membership in this *ingroup* was bolstered by invocations of common negative experiences. The critical stance towards Israel was utilized to serve the same purpose. Additionally, I showed how the IEA utilized X to share its core values such as emphasis on independence, with both the external and internal audiences. I also examined the specific strategy in the communication on the topic of women's rights and highlighted how Mujahid's activity aimed to hide the ideological divisions in the IEA. Presumably, such utilization of strategic communication was an integral part of the finalization process of the Freedom Jihad, allowing for a successful transition to the next phase.

## 5. Economy and Infrastructural Development

Mujahid's activity on the X platform in issues relating to inner political developments as well as external affairs both reflected and helped the successful completion process of the Freedom Jihad. The following chapter presents and analyzes the IEA's strategic communication concerning economy and infrastructural development. In quantitative terms, the posts referring to these topics formed the most significant part of the analyzed communication. Indeed, such abundance reflected strategic interests of the IEA's leadership. The authors of the RAND analysis even suggested that the IEA's representatives' interest in economics had been projected into an "economic-centered foreign policy".<sup>295</sup> According to BBC Monitoring, "the group has been eager to show off the rebuilding of facilities and roads [which is...] illustrated by a very active account attributed to the Kabul [M]unicipality, which frequently showcases road resurfacing works. In fact, the hashtag 'Kabul Municipality' topped the list for the most used hashtag by Taliban Twitter accounts."<sup>296</sup> In sum, the country's reconstruction has been one of the key narratives of the IEA's activity on the X platform.<sup>297</sup>

The IEA's utilization of strategic communication in the shift from the Freedom Jihad to the Development Jihad deserves a closer examination. In my understanding, the emphasis of the messaging on the economic, (re)construction, and development topics was used to foreshadow the planned shift. The IEA's preoccupation with economic and infrastructural development has been a key narrative since the 2021 takeover and will presumably dominate the strategic communication in the foreseeable future. The topic's dominance over other areas in the strategic communication in the time from November 2022 until August 2023 further supports my conviction that this analyzed period can be understood as the finalization of a transition phase of the IEA's post-conflict state reconstruction and its shift towards a consolidation one – a shift that aligns with the concepts of the Freedom Jihad and the Development Jihad proclaimed by the IEA's representatives. The ideological roots of the connection between these two can be traced to the insurgency era when online strategic communication included notions such as:

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<sup>295</sup> Bradley M. Knopp, Jon Niewijk, Zohan Hasan Tariq, and Elmo C. Wright, Jr., "Comparing Taliban Social Media Usage by Language: Who's Speaking and What's Being Said," RAND Research Report, April 25, 2023: 19–20, [https://www.rand.org/pubs/research\\_reports/RRA1830-1.html](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1830-1.html).

<sup>296</sup> Abdirahim Saeed, and Ahmed Nour, "Analysis: How Taliban used Twitter in first year of power," *BBC Monitoring*, August 12, 2022, <https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c203o5kk>. For the Kabul Municipality's account see @KblMunicipality, X, accessed May 4, 2024, <https://twitter.com/KblMunicipality>.

<sup>297</sup> Saeed, Nour, "Analysis."



“[Peace] removes hurdles in the way of development for a society and paves the way for a prosperous life.”<sup>298</sup>

In Nicole Ball’s outline of the post-conflict state reconstruction, one can see that “inaugurating economic revitalization” is one of the crucial necessities to a successful transition, with renovation of infrastructure such as major roads, bridges, or power station being essential to achieve economic revival.<sup>299</sup> The IEA’s policymakers seem to be aware of these requisites. Regardless of the actual impact of their actions, their efforts in this area were heavily communicated via Mujahid’s X page. Similar to the previously examined topics, the communication of economic revival also applied general and more specific discursive strategies realized through various discursive structures. For the sake of further analysis, I offer two transliterated and translated posts:

“Də Kartah-i Naw sarak də manz guldān də byāraghawəne chāre bəshpəre shawe!

[The reconstruction works on the flower lane in the middle of the Karta No road have been completed!]

hamshahrī, hamkārī, shārvālī [fellow citizenship, cooperation, municipality]

#Kābul\_šhārvālay [#Kabul\_municipality]

#shārvālī-yi\_Kābul [#Kabul\_municipality]

#Kabul\_municipality”<sup>300</sup>

“Pə pul-i sōkhta sīma ki də kābul sīnd də pākawəlo chāre rawāne di!

[Cleaning of the Kabul River in the Pul-e Sukhta area is underway!]

#ra‘āyat\_az\_qavānīn-i\_shahrī\_ḥatmī\_ast [#Following the city rules is obligatory]

hamshahrī, hamkārī, shārvālī [fellow citizenship, cooperation, municipality]

#Kābul\_šhārvālay [#Kabul\_municipality]

#shārvālī-yi\_Kābul [#Kabul\_municipality]

#Kabul\_municipality”<sup>301</sup>

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<sup>298</sup> “The Afghan People Wants Peace, Their Enemy War,” in *The Taliban Reader: War, Islam and Politics*, eds. Alex Strick Van Linschoten, Felix Kuehn (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), Kindle, 511.

<sup>299</sup> Nicole Ball, “The Challenge of Rebuilding War-Torn Societies.” In *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2001), 722–723.

<sup>300</sup> Post no. 70

<sup>301</sup> Post no. 748.

Both posts were originally published by the Kabul Municipality account. As noticed by BBC Monitoring, it is one of the most active accounts of the broader IEA's X network.<sup>302</sup> The municipality's posts follow a simple, straightforward style with the main message on top, followed by an optional hashtag and a constant "signature" of the municipality – a motto and the municipality's unique hashtag in Pashto, Dari, and English. The posts frequently include quality videos, photos, or infographics with main takeaways. As documented on the first selected post, attention is paid to (re)constructions, their commencement, progress, and ceremonial conclusion. The videos and photos show construction sites with heavy machinery, workers in workwear, or the IEA representatives examining the sites or even cutting ceremonial ribbons.

Apart from the visuals, the urgency of the messages is often stressed by a frequent utilization of exclamation marks. The urgency then correlates with ample employment of hashtags that are influential in spreading the message and engaging various audiences.<sup>303</sup> We see here that the message aims at domestic audiences by utilizing Pashto and Dari hashtags. Besides that, Pashto and Dari are used interchangeably. We can even notice in the second post that while it was written in Pashto, the following hashtag `#ra'āyat_az_qavānīn-i_shahrī_ḥatmī_ast` (Following the city rules is obligatory) is in Dari. In the analyzed period, Pashto was utilized more frequently, although Dari was not marginalized. In several cases, one language was used for the main text and the other for the hashtag.

The effort to balance the use of both languages in service of strategic communication can further be noticed in the Kabul Municipality's motto: *hamshahrī, hamkārī, shārvālī* (fellow citizenship, cooperation, municipality). The motto appears in a remarkably unified Pashto-Dari combination. While *hamshahrī* is a word typically used in Dari, *shārvālī* is a Pashto one. From the point of view of orthography, the text appears to be Dari as it uniformly applies the vowel "ی" [ī] at the ends of the words where "ی" [ay] or "ي" [ī] would be used in Pashto. Interestingly, we can see that this way, on one line, the word "city" is spelled differently in both cases (*shahr, shār*). Moreover, in the Pashto version, the first letter is changed – "بن" [sh] specific to Pashto was replaced with "ش" [sh], a letter present in both languages. Notably, the orthographical alteration only happened in the motto, not in the Pashto hashtag as well.

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<sup>302</sup> Saeed and Nour, "Analysis," 9.

<sup>303</sup> For further information on hashtags on X see for example: Jan-Hinrik Schmidt, "Twitter and the Rise of Personal Publics," in *Twitter and society*, eds. Katrin Weller, Axel Bruns, Jean Burgess, Merja Mahrt, and Cornelius Puschmann (New York: Peter Lang, 2014), 6.

Generally, the strategy behind Kabul Municipality's communication emphasizes two aspects – the city's improvement and its presentation as a joint effort and goal of all citizens. This can be detected in the utilization of the word *hamshahrī*, which is used not only in the motto but, in an adjusted form *hamshahrīyān* (fellow citizens), to address the readers as well.<sup>304</sup> I argue that together with the term *hamkārī* (cooperation), the wording is used to awaken a feeling of camaraderie among the Kabul citizens. The improvement aspect does not focus solely on (re)construction works. It promotes an idea of making the city more beautiful, as documented on the presented excerpts describing cleaning or building a flower lane. This phenomenon in the strategy extends beyond the account of Kabul Municipality, which stands as an exemplary institution both in the factual works and in the strategic communication. As such, other accounts, including Mujahid's, repeatedly praised the municipality for its actions. Mujahid even highlighted the nation-wide importance of its efforts:

“In addition to keeping the city clean and building roads, Kabul Municipality makes efforts to revive the economic foundations of the country.”<sup>305</sup>

This post was published on Mujahid's X page in both Pashto and Dari and was accompanied by a video of the Kabul Municipality. Notably, the text and the video do not seem to correlate much, as the latter focuses on the construction of one building in Kabul. It appears that Mujahid used the opportunity to remind the audience of other important accomplishments of the municipality, which is a part of the whole IEA's new system of governance. Frequently, the efforts were appreciated more explicitly: “The activities and progress of Kabul Municipality are praiseworthy,” wrote Mujahid bilingually to another of the municipality's videos displaying various achievements. Said video was introduced once again with a shot of a man sweeping a road, which can be understood as an effort to remind the audience of the cleaning provided by the municipality.<sup>306</sup> Similar appreciations were also directed at another institution, namely the Gardez Municipality.<sup>307</sup> The topic of cleanliness and beauty was brought up repeatedly by other accounts as well, hinting a broader unified strategy in the communication. For example, in March 2023, RTA Pashto noted that “significant changes” had been made concerning the “beauty and order” of the Lashkargah city since the establishment of the IEA.<sup>308</sup> Here, the apt

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<sup>304</sup> See post no. 105.

<sup>305</sup> Post no. 608.

<sup>306</sup> Post no. 957. See also for example post no. 623.

<sup>307</sup> See posts no. 85 and 118. The account of Gardez Municipality under its username @Gardez\_M is restricted at the time of writing.

<sup>308</sup> Post no. 1097.

utilization of languages in the strategic communication can once again be demonstrated. While the posts aimed at Kabul citizens were mostly bilingual, the Lashkargah post was written in Pashto and released by a media channel specialized in production in this language, which correlates with the presupposed dominantly Pashto-speaking audiences of Lashkargah located in southern Afghanistan.

Even the construction of the Qosh Tapa Canal, a strategic water management project,<sup>309</sup> was used in the promotion of beautifying activities. Given its significance, the IEA regularly informed about the progress in its construction through Mujahid's account in the analyzed period. In May 2023, Mujahid posted a YouTube link to an almost nine-minutes-long video report about the project and commented that "with the work's progress on the national water agricultural canal Qosh Tapa, its beauty [had] also increased".<sup>310</sup> Concerning language utilization, the Qosh Tapa Canal construction case presents a different case of the strategic communication of infrastructural development. When various accounts informed about the progress of the canal's building, they mainly presented its construction in Pashto, even though the canal passes through regions not generally dominated by Pashtuns. The construction of this canal can be considered a matter of "national" interest as it has been one of the most significant developmental projects of the IEA, and its finalization stands as a crucial factor in Afghanistan's water management with the potential to significantly affect its northern neighbors.<sup>311</sup>

The link between "beauty" and development is a remarkable recurring topic. In June 2023, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar attended an inauguration of several projects in Kabul. During the event, he praised the municipality's efforts in improving the city's "beauty and order" in comparison to the past. He also connected the achievements to the overall improvement in security. Concerning its importance, he stated: "Security is most important for the development of a country."<sup>312</sup> It should be noted that the account associated with him, @FDPM\_AFG, originally shared this text in both Pashto and Dari, accompanied by several other related posts containing videos, etc. However, Mujahid shared the full version only in

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<sup>309</sup> Qosh Tapa canal represents a major IEA project worth hundreds of millions of USD aiming to allocate massive amounts of water from the Amu Darya / Oxus river to Afghan territories. Freshta Jalalzai, "The Qosh Tapa Canal: A Source of Hope in Afghanistan," *The Diplomat*, December 1, 2023, <https://thediplomat.com/2023/12/the-qosh-tapa-canal-a-source-of-hope-in-afghanistan/>.

<sup>310</sup> Post no. 1491.

<sup>311</sup> Qosh Tapa canal might cause a significant reduction of the river's flow, affecting the downstream Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. See Bakyt Ibraimov, and Fawad Ali, "A lot of work for diplomats' in Central Asia as the Taliban build huge canal," *Dialogue Earth*, May 18, 2023, <https://dialogue.earth/en/water/a-lot-of-work-for-diplomats-as-taliban-build-qosh-tapa-canal/>; Freshta Jalalzai, "The Qosh Tapa Canal."

<sup>312</sup> Posts nos. 1676–1680.

Dari, while in Pashto, he only shared excerpts and the accompanying posts. Similar seemingly haphazard actions in the administration of his account were not rare and, as such, might suggest that the communication was not always fully strategically planned.

In the text, Baradar provides us with a cohesive explanation. Moreover, as shown on the quoted sentence above, he also names the objectives of the Freedom Jihad, the establishment of security, as the prerequisite for the Development Jihad. He also *implicitly* suggests that the current government, his *ingroup*, acts in this area more efficiently than the previous, Western-backed one, the *outgroup*. “Beauty and order” can be viewed as the crucial differentiating element, i.e., these virtues are something the IEA considered missing in the previous state of affairs, and on these, it documents its successes.

Furthermore, a parallel can be traced to the emergence of the Taliban. Gopal and van Linschoten demonstrate how societal collapse in the early 1990s was perceived by the early taliban (yet to emerge as *the Taliban*). The authors quote memories of one of the original members who described an encounter at a checkpoint and local commanders' cruel, arbitrary, and immoral actions. For the talib, the lack of their virtue was linked to their unkempt appearances, notably the long unwashed hair or tobacco stains.<sup>313</sup> Then, the population of Afghanistan felt the societal collapse accompanied by the failure of morality and prompted reactions: “During the societal breakdown of the civil war, some Islamist forces sought to restore virtue by linking outer cultivation to inner moral cultivation.”<sup>314</sup> As one of the results, the infamous Office for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice was established, and new rules affecting daily lives were issued. In the end, this gave rise to *the Taliban*, who “faced the task of *reconstructing* tradition, of returning virtue to a land of anomie”.<sup>315</sup> The emphasis on the restoration of “beauty and order” seems to be an analogical case to this restoration of virtue in the 1990s after a long period of its absence due to an illegitimate influence from the outside.

In similar terms, the process of restoration faces similar challenges now. “The questions of which tradition qualified as authentic became acute in urban areas like Kabul or in culturally distinct areas like [...] Loya Paktia,” state Gopal and van Linschoten.<sup>316</sup> It is thus noteworthy

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<sup>313</sup> Anand Gopal and Alex Strick van Linschoten, “Ideology in the Afghan Taliban,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, June 2017: 21, <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/201705-AGopal-ASvLinschoten-TB-Ideology.pdf>.

<sup>314</sup> Gopal and van Linschoten, 22.

<sup>315</sup> Gopal and van Linschoten, 23.

<sup>316</sup> Gopal and van Linschoten, 22.

that concerning the economic development, these very areas, Kabul Municipality, Gardez Municipality, the center of Paktia Province, and separately, the Paktia Province<sup>317</sup> were those that the IEA officials repeatedly appreciated for their efforts. Whereas during the first IEA, “the [program] of restoring virtue became inexorably linked with extending state power [and] Ministry of the Propagation of Virtue and Protection of Vice [...] transformed into [one of] the most important ministries in the country,”<sup>318</sup> nowadays the situation is different, and the economy appears to be instrumental.

Institutionally, the supervision of economic affairs is integral to the decision-making process as Mullah Baradar serves as a deputy leader and the first deputy prime minister for economic affairs. Moreover, his position in the IEA’s leadership appears stable as he is one of the Taliban’s founding members who was very close to Mullah Omar and proved crucial in negotiating the 2020 Doha deal in his capacity as the head of the political office in Qatar.<sup>319</sup> Unlike in the case of the Iranian Construction Jihad, the IEA’s Development Jihad remains a thought, a plan, rather than an institution. Its aims, as well as the efforts of Baradar, remain the same as in Iran in the 1980s – to extend the state’s power. To reach this goal, the strategic communication is employed to inform the public about the IEA’s achievements. As such, the strategy utilizes proverbial sugar rather than a whip. The whip, both figurative and literal, lies in the competencies of judges to apply punishment. The study of strategic communication, however, suggests that unlike in the 1990s and early 2000s, in some spheres of state’s application of power, the whip is being replaced with sugar. I argue that the prevalence of economy- and development-related posts embodies this claim and that the emphasis on successful and extensive country reconstruction is employed to foster the public’s positive opinion.

The emphasis on the overall positivity of the shared messages is achieved by using a “sugar-coated” language. The frequent references to the “beauty” of cities or constructions might indeed represent a residuum of the 1990s Taliban epistemology linking outer cultivation to morality. More imminently, it stands as a deliberate and *repeated* utilization of *positive opinion words* aiming to *paint* a positive picture of the IEA. We have seen that other discourse structures are used in the presented posts as well, such as graphical ones, which include the

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<sup>317</sup> @PaktiaPMC, X, accessed May 4, 2024, <https://twitter.com/PaktiaPMC>.

<sup>318</sup> Gopal and van Linschoten, “Ideology in the Afghan Taliban,” 29.

<sup>319</sup> “Profile: Mullah Baradar, new deputy leader in Afghan gov’t,” *Aljazeera*, September 7, 2021, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/7/profile-mullah-baradar-afghanistans-new-leader>; “Profile: Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar,” *BBC*, September 21, 2013, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-20582286>.

utilization of exclamation marks or hashtags. The posts often apply a propaganda-like tone, promoting a notion that the IEA's goals can be achieved collectively. Generally, this type of posts represents a typical case of ideological discourse, which van Dijk calls "goal-descriptions", i.e., focusing on activities with positive goals. By nature, these descriptions are ideological and show how the *ingroup* wants to be perceived.<sup>320</sup> The positive image-building is further bolstered through semantic structures of the political discourse with the *explicitness* and *details of description* of the successes. This is one of the dominant elements of the IEA's strategy – sharing, describing, repeating, and emphasizing numbers. These include detailed figures of exports, imports, production, quantities of workers in facilities, capacities of said facilities, numbers of individuals employed in various projects, or funds spent on them. This discursive strategy can be demonstrated on a post originally published by Mullah Baradar's X account in English. We see that a plethora of numbers is further supported on a lexical level with the term "significant strides". Moreover, both these discursive actions are used as an *implicit* criticism of the previous government.

"The country's economy has made significant strides, resulting in exports reaching \$1 billion and \$424 million in the first 9 months of the year 1401, while during the previous administration, these statistics were \$434million and \$478million in the first 9 months of 1399 and 1400."<sup>321</sup>

Similarly, the case can be presented on a post of the National Statistics and Information Agency. Its spokesperson informed that 9 million and 160 thousand electronic ID cards were issued to the citizens, out of which 5 million and 80 thousand were males and 4 million and 77 thousand were females.<sup>322</sup> A third example is Mujahid's post on opening a Snow Pharma factory. On the day of its inauguration, Mujahid wrote that the factory has 71 shareholders and can produce 5,600,000 pills, 2,000,000 capsules, and 60,000 syrup bottles in 8 hours. It is committed to spending 50 million dollars for its future enhancement in five phases. Finally, it is registered in 84 countries.<sup>323</sup> Of course, it is a rather typical case of *de-emphasis* that the post completely omits that the project had been started years before the IEA came to power.<sup>324</sup> The

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<sup>320</sup> Teun A. van Dijk, "Ideological Discourse Analysis," Accessed May 4, 2024: 148, <https://discourses.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Teun-A.-van-Dijk-1995-Ideological-discourse-analysis.pdf>.

<sup>321</sup> Post no. 564. The text is kept in the original form including orthographical deficiencies.

<sup>322</sup> Post no. 747.

<sup>323</sup> Posts nos. 1621–1626. The numbers are left in the original form of the posts.

<sup>324</sup> Fidel Rahmati, "Pharmaceutical Factory Starts production in Afghanistan's Kandahar," *The Khaama Press News Agency*, June 6, 2023, <https://www.khaama.com/pharmaceutical-factory-starts-production-in-afghanistans-kandahar/>.

strong emphasis on numbers occasionally provided the readers with somewhat perplexing information, which X users then discussed in the comment section. For instance, when Mujahid informed that “the quality and standard of the Snow Pharma medicine reache[d] from 98 % to 102 %.”<sup>325</sup> Or when he called the Afghanistan’s inflation rate drop to negative one “positive”, stating, that “the prices of goods in Afghanistan [were] lower than in most of the developing and developed countries of the world [which showed] that Afghanistan [was] ahead of many developed countries in controlling inflation.”<sup>326</sup>

Confounding revelations aside, the repeated statements of *explicit* figures can be read in one more way – as a tendency towards transparency. *Implicitly*, it stands as a case of the *ideological square*: while the previous government is described as corrupt, the IEA repeatedly expresses its willingness to be as open with the public as possible. The case for transparency can be further demonstrated on non-economic posts informing about elections. In practice, the actual division of power in the IEA remains unclear, where the lack of a proper constitution remains a noteworthy factor.<sup>327</sup> However, in the analyzed period, lists of names of individuals appointed by Supreme Leader Akhuzada to specific positions were periodically shared in Pashto, often accompanied by Dari versions.<sup>328</sup> That should be understood as a step towards making the government seemingly more transparent in order to maintain the public support for the system. The phenomenon was also captured by the RAND analysis, which described it as one of the main messages the IEA tries to communicate with the public. Simultaneously, the authors of the RAND analysis pointed out that according to the messaging, the IEA had realized the possibilities of Afghanistan’s natural resources and then centralized its economic plans around them.<sup>329</sup>

This trend continued in the analyzed period, most notably in a series of trilingual posts from August 7, 2023, where the Dari version stretched through ten posts, Pashto through eleven, and English through fourteen. Initially, the posts were published on Baradar’s X page, and

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<sup>325</sup> Posts nos. 1623 and 1626.

<sup>326</sup> Posts nos. 1780 and 1781.

<sup>327</sup> John Butt, “A Taleban Theory of State: A review of the Chief Justice’s book of jurisprudence,” Afghanistan Analysts Network Political Landscape Report, August 2023: 22–29, <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/political-landscape/a-taleban-theory-of-state-a-review-of-the-chief-justices-book-of-jurisprudence/>.

<sup>328</sup> See for example posts nos. 626 and 627.

<sup>329</sup> Specifically, concerning the information about ongoing tenders and results of the bidding processes, the RAND analysts claim: “Despite the claim of transparency, little is known about the winners of the mining contracts.[...] There are suspicions and allegations that senior [IEA] members have vested interests in the mining projects,” (Knopp, Niewijk, Tariq, and Wright, “Comparing Taliban Social Media Usage by Language,” 24–25).



Mujahid shared only the first parts.<sup>330</sup> Most posts contained lists of companies which had won the bidding process for the extraction of natural resources in various regions. These were preceded by a claim that the winners had been chosen “following an extensive and transparent evaluation”.<sup>331</sup> However, despite these detailed information lists supporting the case of transparency, the RAND suspicions of awarding lucrative contracts to business in the hands of IEA-related individuals might prove correct. Moreover, a report in *Foreign Policy* magazine from February 2024 uncovered the extent of this nontransparent business, stating that a prominent IEA member Bashir Noorzai, who had been previously known as “Pablo Escobar of Afghanistan” for his extensive participation in the heroin trade, transferred his activities to mining in “joint-venture deals with Chinese firms in Afghanistan”. According to the report, these were “little more than rentier operations raking in cash but doing nothing to develop the impoverished country”.<sup>332</sup>

Regardless of the opaque nature of certain commercial endeavors, the pursuit of transparency at the end of the analyzed period was institutionalized in what the IEA called an “Accountability program”. First inaugurated in August 2022, this program consisting of various events lasting an entire month aims to report the state’s accomplishments to the public on an annual basis around the Emirate’s anniversary.<sup>333</sup> In 2023, the program was launched on July 23, corresponding to the beginning of the month Asad in the Afghan calendar. Given the time frame of this thesis, I could not have analyzed the entire coverage of the program which ended on August 22, 2023.<sup>334</sup> Nonetheless, in line with the general methods of strategic communication in the area of economy and development Mujahid shared a post from the government media and information center, @GMICafghanistan,<sup>335</sup> which maximized its social sites reaches by employing YouTube link to a video of the opening ceremony and hashtags in Pashto, Dari, and English.<sup>336</sup> Further, Mujahid shared a post originally posted on the account of the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum, @MoMPAfghanistan, summarizing its presentation

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<sup>330</sup> To be precise, Mujahid used the quote function where he replicates the same texts.

<sup>331</sup> @FDPM\_AFG, “3/14: Following an extensive and transparent evaluation, the following enterprises have been declared as the winners,” X, August 7, 2023, [https://twitter.com/FDPM\\_AFG/status/1688520994418294784](https://twitter.com/FDPM_AFG/status/1688520994418294784).

<sup>332</sup> Lynne O’Donnell, “How an Afghan Drug Kingpin Became Beijing’s Man in Kabul,” *Foreign Policy*, February 10, 2024, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/02/10/noorzai-afghanistan-taliban-china-mining-drug-kingpin/>.

<sup>333</sup> Ariana News, “IEA launches ministerial accountability,” *ATN News*, August 1, 2022, <https://www.ariananews.af/iea-launches-ministerial-accountability-program/>.

<sup>334</sup> See “#IEA\_Accountability\_Program”, X, accessed May 4, 2024, [https://twitter.com/hashtag/IEA\\_Accountability\\_Program?src=hashtag\\_click&f=live](https://twitter.com/hashtag/IEA_Accountability_Program?src=hashtag_click&f=live).

<sup>335</sup> @GMICafghanistan, X, accessed May 4, 2024, <https://twitter.com/GMICafghanistan>.

<sup>336</sup> Post no. 1921.

during the program.<sup>337</sup> Another pair of posts shared by Mujahid deserves mentioning. The first one was initially written by the Pashto Bakhtar News Agency, and the second one by the Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled<sup>338</sup>:

“In the government's accountability program to the nation, Nimatullah Barakzai, cultural affairs advisor and representative of #Kābul\_ṣhārvālay [#Kabul\_municipality], said: This agency collected 488 thousand tons of garbage last year and dumped it in Gazak area.”<sup>339</sup>

“In the government's accountability program to the nation, Sheikh Sahib Abdul Hakim Haqqani said: The Ministry has so far registered (638,954) persons with disabilities, widows, and orphans. Out of these (87,087) are widows, (371,420) orphans, (149,672) disabled males, (30,777) disabled females.”<sup>340</sup>

Unlike the previous example, these were only shared in Pashto on Mujahid's page, making another case for a considerable level of arbitrariness in his selection of languages. Apart from that, a clear overall communication strategy is apparent. The readers were presented with a similarly structured text: an identical opening line introducing the program and the speakers, followed by quantified achievements. The posts transmit the same message – the IEA presents how well it serves its people.

In terms of quantity, July 2023 marks one of the peaks in the production of posts throughout the analyzed period. The July peak was mainly constituted by the economy section. However, the posts explicitly connected to the Accountability program were few and far between. Instead, I argue that the whole July strategy aimed at bolstering the quantity of economy-related posts to promote the achievements of the IEA further. I also suggest that this strategic communication was a part of the plan to finalize the Freedom Jihad transition period and to commence the new era of the IEA under the theme of the Development Jihad.

To conclude, this chapter analyzed the most extensive category of posts in the IEA's X strategic communication of the analyzed period. Arguably, this category was also the most important one from the point of view of the IEA's overall strategy, as it continuously dominated

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<sup>337</sup> Post no. 1923. For the account see @MoMPAfghanistan, X, accessed May 4, 2024, <https://twitter.com/MoMPAfghanistan>.

<sup>338</sup> For the accounts see @bnapashto, X, accessed May 4, 2024, <https://twitter.com/bnapashto>; @AwCharw, X, accessed May 4, 2024, <https://twitter.com/AwCharw>.

<sup>339</sup> Post no. 2046. The direct speech is not marked with quotation marks to correspond with the original.

<sup>340</sup> Post no. 2090. The numbers are left in the parenthesis and the direct speech is not marked with quotation marks to correspond with the original text.

in total numbers of posts over the other analyzed categories and foreshadowed the new phase of the IEA's existence. The economy-related topics were communicated to the public with a strong repetition and an emphasis on the achievements, which were also stressed by *positive opinion words* and graphical instruments such as exclamation marks or hashtags. Compared with other categories, the hashtags were utilized more significantly to further support the content's performance, reach, and engagement on the X platform. This suggests a strong interest of the IEA in a successful communication of the topic, as well as an ability to communicate *strategically*. However, I demonstrated that even though the communication was strategically oriented, on a smaller scale, it tended to show signs of haphazard choices on the part of the content creators, mainly concerning the selection of both utilized languages and intended audiences.

## 6. Conclusions

On August 15, 2023, the reconstituted Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan entered the third year of its existence. The first two years presented its leaders and executives with many obstacles. These included natural catastrophes, earthquakes and drought, economic hardships causing hunger among citizens, internal discords among the Emirate's factions, as well as the presence of hostile terrorist groups such as IS–KP. Yet, the IEA managed to pull through and, for the time being, secure its place among post-conflict states. In the words of the IEA's leaders, the Freedom Jihad was accomplished; now it is time for the Development Jihad to reconstruct the country.

Strategic communication and the X social site played an undeniable role in the process. This thesis is an analysis of the final nine months enclosing the IEA's transition into an era of a consolidated state. During this time, the number of followers of the main analyzed account of Zabihullah Mujahid, the official spokesman of the IEA, grew by more than 150,000 and kept increasing ever since, drawing the account to one million followers by April 2024. From November 13, 2022, to August 15, 2023, Mujahid's X page shared 2,112 posts with its readers. The spokesman's own messages accounted for almost 42% of these; the rest, forwarded by Mujahid, was created by a vast network of 110 related accounts administered by the IEA's leading figures, politicians, institutions, their respective spokespersons, state-owned or state-associated media, or even individuals supportive of the IEA of their own volition.

These accounts were used to share various views or information on the developments in Afghanistan. Mujahid's role in the process was to utilize this multifaceted communication in a manner that would serve the strategic needs of the IEA. Therefore, some accounts' content was shared more often on the spokesman's page, and certain topics were favored over others. The main communicated themes pertained to internal affairs with a focus on security, external and diplomatic affairs, and finally, economy and development. In quantitative terms, the last topic dominated constantly throughout the nine months. I argue that its prevalence could be understood as a strategic effort to share a vision for the future Emirate with the public, and to give the people an idea of a new struggle when the sworn enemy of many years was finally gone. Through Mujahid's efforts in the strategic communication, the Afghanistan's public had become acquainted with their leaders' proclaimed dedication to reconstructing the country once the idea was officially labeled the Development Jihad, and in its name, the Emirate entered a new era.

Utilizing Teun A. van Dijk's political discourse analysis, I have reached a conclusion that while the IEA's goals in the area of strategic communication were more than ambitious, the Emirate proved effective in its utilization of the X platform. It was able to reach desired audiences with specific messages and implement carefully designed communication strategy. Yet, even though its authors could not have avoided occasional recourse to haphazardness or arbitrariness, the official spokesman Mujahid managed to keep the IEA's approach to communication on social media unified and all-encompassing. It was a strategy projecting the best possible image of the current political system in all directions.

The strategic aspect of the communication was further apparent in the languages it utilized. Mujahid and other X content creators of the IEA proved able and effective in addressing and targeting various audiences in multiple languages. English was the main language of communication for global audiences, whereas regional audiences were also considered with the content in Arabic, Dari, and Urdu. The multilingual reality of Afghanistan was reflected only partially – the domestic audiences were mostly the recipients of a content in Pashto and Dari, and the choice of languages differed depending on the region of interest. Areas inhabited by Pashtuns were more likely to be addressed in Pashto; whereas areas with a majority of other ethnic groups were more often targeted in Dari. However, one phenomenon of the strategic utilization of languages is evident from the analysis. Despite preaching unity of the Afghan people, the IEA strongly preferred its Pashto-speaking citizens, neglecting the speakers of the lingua-franca, Dari.

Overall, the heterogeneous target audiences overlapped, resulting in various language combinations. Messages that were considered vital were produced simultaneously in up to all five languages. Notably in the cases where multiple audiences were addressed, and two or more languages were utilized, the content itself differed only in negligible details. However, the communication was generally directed strategically at specific pre-determined target groups of readers who would receive the message in their language. Mujahid used this tactic to consistently build a *positive* picture of the IEA based on what resonated with specific audiences.

The IEA's strategic communication employed a narrative fostering unity when approaching domestic audiences. Regardless of their ethnicity or religion, the peoples of Afghanistan were uniformly addressed as members of one "nation", "brothers", or "mujahideen", a term which offers a notion that all Afghans have fought and still fight on the same side. The enemies of the united Afghans may have been foreign intruders or simply anyone endangering the security of the people. Generally labeling them "corruptors", the IEA's spared no effort to present its

effective and successful fight against them. Their *repeatedly negative* descriptions only allowed for the IEA's representatives to emerge as the peoples' able protectors.

In the meantime, the domestic audiences were presented with a particularly positive side of the IEA's rule. The official channel informed the citizens of any construction from the capital of Kabul to the peripheries, from building sidewalks to executing ambitious million-dollar projects. Not only was the IEA described as helping the rejuvenation of the country with an infrastructural development that would firmly place it on the map of Central Asia, but also praised for doing so responsibly and transparently. This element was all the more enunciated, as it presented the IEA in a different light from the previous Western-backed government. This *ideological square* was visualized in the strategic communication, where the efforts of the current state were painted as "beautifying", *implicitly* suggesting to the readers that the past was not beautiful. And so, the screens of electronic devices inside and outside of Afghanistan were flooded with a clear message: the IEA provides for its citizens and secures them, it aims to be an equal partner in international affairs, and finally, it is here to stay and once and for all uplift Afghanistan from the crisis it fell into during the last decades.

Even though the IEA's strategic communication represented a carefully planned and implemented effort, the Emirate was capable of its dynamic adjustments. The repeated criticism by foreign political figures proved harmful to the IEA's primary goal of the foreign policy, aimed at establishing good relations with other countries. This prompted a change in the communication strategy. All relevant languages were utilized to send a message to as many recipients as possible, arguing that the foreign criticism concerning the violation of human rights and insufficient security, allowing for the proliferation of terrorist groups in Afghanistan, is nothing but "propaganda". While strongly *negative-worded* and *explicit* statements tried to paint the IEA's rulers as confident in their steps, signs of internal discords appeared. However, the strategic communication remained a tool of the state's interest, as Mujahid, by a *detopicalization* of any sensitive issue, did not allow for the official channel to show any strife.

In spite of IEA's successes in strategic communication, the future might not be that bright for the Emirate. Although it has managed to negotiate major international agreements and attract foreign investments, its growing internal division has become more apparent, and security threats have grown more imminent.<sup>341</sup> Only in the first quarter of 2024, international attention

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<sup>341</sup> On foreign investments: Diksha Madhok, Ehsan Popalzai, and Masoud Popalzai, "A Chinese company has signed an oil extraction deal with Afghanistan's Taliban," *CNN Business*, January 6, 2023,

turned to Afghanistan in relation to two major terrorist attacks associated with the IS–KP operating from Afghanistan. The first one in Iran on January 3, the second much further, near Russia’s capital Moscow, on March 25, resulted in hundreds of casualties and left even more wounded.<sup>342</sup> Even though neither was as fatal as the attacks from September 11, 2001, a parallel with the developments under the first IEA comes to mind. With the deepening discord among the state’s leadership, a crisis appears on the horizon. The current regime’s survival will depend on its ability to resolve these issues and employ the expertise of individuals such as Zabihullah Mujahid in promoting its success to both domestic and international audiences. Meanwhile, the strategic communication production continues to operate at full tilt, 280 characters at a time. As the Afghanistan’s current leaders are well aware, in the years to come, it might prove as crucial as during the 2021 takeover.

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<sup>342</sup> Eyad Kourdi and Jennifer Deaton, “ISIS claims responsibility for deadliest attack in Iran since 1979 revolution,” *CNN World*, January 5, 2024, <https://edition.cnn.com/2024/01/04/middleeast/iran-islamic-state-attack-kerman-intl/index.html>; Christian Edwards, Darya Tarasova, Amy Cassidy, and Zarah Ullah, “Russian investigators receive more than 100 missing person reports after Moscow concert hall attack,” March 27, 2024, <https://edition.cnn.com/2024/03/27/europe/missing-people-russia-moscow-concert-hall-attack-intl/index.html>.

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## Appendix

**Post no. 4 – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, November 13, 2022,**

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1591824999870259200:](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1591824999870259200)

”دغه کسان د یوې مهمې شبکې غړي وو، چې په کابل ښار کې یې په کوچنیو انفجاراتو کې لاس درلود او غوښتل یې ځینې لویې تخریبي کړنې ترسره کړي، چې الله الحمد مخکې له مخکې کشف او له منځه یوړل شول. له یاد پېنځای څخه یو شمېر وسلې، لاسي بمونه، ریمودونه، او چاودېدونکي توکي تر لاسه شوي دي.“

**Post no. 6 – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, November 13, 2022,**

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1591824999870259200:](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1591824999870259200)

”عالیقدر امیر المؤمنین د قاضیانو په یوه غونډه کې:

– د غلو، انسان تینتونکو او فتنه گرو دوسې په بڼه ډول وڅېړئ.  
– هغه دوسې چې د حد او قصاص ټول شریعي شرایط یې پوره کړي وي مکلف یاست چې حد او قصاص ورباندې جاري کړئ، ځکه دا د شریعت حکم او زما امر دی او فرض ده ترڅو ورباندې عمل وکړئ.“

**Post no. 7 – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, November 13, 2022,**

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1591826650333065216:](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1591826650333065216)

”عالیقدر امیر المؤمنین در یک نشست با قاضیان:  
– دوسیه های دزدان، اختطافچیان و فتنه گران را به گونه دقیق بررسی نماید.  
– آن دوسیه ها که در آن تمام شرایط شرعی حد و قصاص تکمیل شده باشد، شما مکلف هستید که در آن حدود و قصاص را عملی نمایید، زیرا این حکم شریعت و امر من می باشد که واجب است.“

**Post no. 20 – @ARG\_1880, X, November 15, 2022,**

[https://twitter.com/ARG\\_1880/status/1592546872165818381:](https://twitter.com/ARG_1880/status/1592546872165818381)

”عبید الرحمن نظامانی گفت که با امارت اسلامی کاملاً آماده همکاری هستیم و رهبری حکومت پاکستان می خواهد تسهیلات در امور سیاسی و اقتصادی میان دو کشور برادر و مسلمان هرچه بیشتر افزایش یابد.“

**Post no. 29 – @ARG\_1880, X, November 15, 2022,**

[https://twitter.com/ARG\\_1880/status/1592542775807193092:](https://twitter.com/ARG_1880/status/1592542775807193092)

”د پاکستان سفارت شارژدافیر وویل، مور له اسلامي امارت سره بشپړې همکارۍ ته چمتو یوو او د پاکستان حکومت رهبري هم غواړي چې د دواړو مسلمانو او ورونو هیوادونو ترمنځ په سیاسي او اقتصادي امورو کې لازياتي اسانتياوې رامنځته شي.“

**Post no. 70 – @KblMunicipality, X, November 19, 2022,**

[https://twitter.com/KblMunicipality/status/1593906384361472000:](https://twitter.com/KblMunicipality/status/1593906384361472000)

”د کارته نو سرک د منځ گلدان د بیار غونې چارې بشپړې شوې!“

همشهری، همکارۍ، شاروالی  
#کابل\_ښاروالی  
#شاروالی\_کابل  
”#Kabul\_municipality

**Post no. 85** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, November 21, 2022,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1594692297685626881](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1594692297685626881):

“د پکتیا په ولايت کې د گردیز ښاروالی خدمتونه او لاسته راوړني د قدر وړ دي.”

**Post no. 105** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, November 23, 2022,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1595390134421274626](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1595390134421274626):

“همشپږيان کابل می توانند بخاطر رفع مشکلات زمستاني خود، از محلات ذیل شهر، سنگ زغال را خریداری نمایند. قابل تذکر است که در این محلات نرخ سنگ زغال بسیار ارزان و قابل دست رس می باشد. این استثنا از طرف امارت اسلامی افغانستان بخاطر رفع مشکل سردی شهريان زیر نظر گرفته شده است.”

**Post no. 118** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, November 23, 2022,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1595513611165786113](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1595513611165786113):

“د هېواد آبادی شپه او ورځ نه غواړي، بلکې فولادي عزم او پخه اراده غواړي. د گردیز ښاروالی کارونه په توره شپه هم روان دي، چون یخ را روان ده باید د ژمي له رارسیدو وړاندې د سړ کال عمراني پروژې تکمیل شي. له مرستیال والي هم مننه چې خپل ښاروال او کارپگر یې په لیدو ونازول.”

**Post no. 139** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, November 26, 2022,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1596420028743749632](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1596420028743749632):

“د ډي ټېلېگراف ورځپاڼي هغه ادعا له حقيقت څخه لرې ده چې وايي د ا.ا ځينو غړو په قطر کې د لويغالي د جوړیدو له امله ډيري پيسې گټلي دي. دا ډول پروپاگاندا کول د غربي رسنيو هغه استخباراتي ماموريت او هڅه ده چې غواړي په يوډول د اسلامي امارت په ضد اذهان خراب کړي. هلته هيڅ دا ډول معامله نده شوي.”

**Post no. 140** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, November 26, 2022,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1596420031620972545](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1596420031620972545):

“ادعای روزنامه دی ټیلیگراف که گویا بعضی اعضای امارت اسلامی از پروژه اعمار میدان بازی در قطر پول هنگفت دریافت نموده اند حقیقت ندارد. این گونه پروپاگانداها جزء از ماموریت استخباراتی رسانه های غربی است که میخواهند علیه امارت اسلامی اذهان را تخریب کنند. در قطر هیچ اینگونه معامله نشده است.”

**Post no. 141** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, November 26, 2022,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1596428717491994624](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1596428717491994624):

“The claim of ‘The Telegraph’ that some members of the IEA have earned a lot of money due to the construction of a stadium in Qatar is far from the truth. Such propaganda is the intelligence mission of the western media which wants to spoil the minds against the Islamic Emirate.”

**Post no. 142** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, November 26, 2022,

[https://twitter.com/Zabehulah\\_M33/status/1596440084110532608](https://twitter.com/Zabehulah_M33/status/1596440084110532608):

”په دايکندي کې د باغيانو يوه ډله وځپل شوه. ورمه ورځ د دايکندي ولايت مرکز اړوند سيوک شيبير سيمه کې په يوه کور کې د مسلح کسانو د شتون را پورونه تر لاسه شول. د اسلامي امارت امنيتي ارگانونو دوه ځلي د سيمي سپين ږيري ور وليدل چې مسلح کسان بايد خپلي وسلې پرځمکه کيږدي او بغاوت هڅه ونکړي.“

**Post no. 143** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, November 26, 2022,

[https://twitter.com/Zabehulah\\_M33/status/1596440089433104390](https://twitter.com/Zabehulah_M33/status/1596440089433104390):

”خو له مکررو هڅو سره سره بغاوتکونکو د وسلې له غورځولو انکار وکړ. وروسته امنيتي ځواکونه اړ شول چې دغه ځای ته ننوزي چې له غبرگون سره مخ شول ۱ تن شهيد او ۲ ټپيان شول. بيا امنيتي ځواکونو هم متقابل بريد وکړ چې له امله يې ۹ تنه مسلح کسان ووژل شول او د ۴ تنه په متقابلو ډزو کې ټپيان شول.“

**Post no. 148** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, November 26, 2022,

[https://twitter.com/Zabehulah\\_M33/status/1596450711885283334](https://twitter.com/Zabehulah_M33/status/1596450711885283334):

”ادعاء غير صحيح لصحيفة (ذي تيليغراف) بأن بعض أعضاء الإمارة الإسلامية تلقوا مبالغ طائلة من بناء ملعب في قطر. هذا النوع من الإشاعات جزء من المهمة الاستخباراتية لوسائل الإعلام الغربية التي تريد تشويش الأذهان على الإمارة الإسلامية. لم تكن هناك مثل هذه الصفة.“

**Post no. 149** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, November 26, 2022,

[https://twitter.com/Zabehulah\\_M33/status/1596463064387575808](https://twitter.com/Zabehulah_M33/status/1596463064387575808):

”گروهي از باغيان در دايکندي کوبيده شد. روز پنجشنبه گذشته در منطقه سيوک شيبير مربوطات مرکز ولايت دايکندي، راپوری از موجوديت يک گروه مسلح دريکی از منازل به دست آمد. نيروهای امنيتی دو مرتبه موی سفيدان منطقه را به انها فرستادند تا از بغاوت دست بکشند و اسلحه خود را بر زمین بگذارند.“

**Post no. 150** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, November 26, 2022,

[https://twitter.com/Zabehulah\\_M33/status/1596463069177208832](https://twitter.com/Zabehulah_M33/status/1596463069177208832):

”با تلاش های مکرر، بغاوتگران اسلحه خود را بر زمین نگذاشتند که در نتیجه نيروهای امنيتی وارد منزل شدند. حين ورود بغاوتگران فیر کردند که از اثر آن يک تن از نيروهای امنيتی شهيد و ۲ تن زخمی شدند. بعدا نيروهای امنيتی نیز دست به اسلحه زدند که در اثر آن ۹ تن از بغاوتگران مسلح از پا درآمدند“

**Post no. 162** – @ARG\_1880, X, November 27, 2022,

[https://twitter.com/ARG\\_1880/status/1596865833464172546](https://twitter.com/ARG_1880/status/1596865833464172546):

”مولوي صاحب عبدالکبير وويل: « د اسلامي شريعت په چوکاټ کې د ښځو حقونه تامين دي، هغوی په مختلفو برخو کې په دندو بوختي دي او حکومت عملاً ټولگډونه دی؛ خو ځينې رسنی په دې اړه ناسم تبليغات کوي.» هغه له پخوانيو چارواکو سره د اړيکو کمپسيون هڅو ته په اشاري وويل، تر اوسه ۴۱۴ کسان بېرته ...“

**Post no. 434** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, December 25, 2022,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1607025916357775363](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1607025916357775363):

”امریکایی چارواکی باید ز مور په کورنیو چارو کی مداخله ونه کړي.

کومی مؤسسی چي په افغانستان کی فعالیت لري ز مور د هېواد د قوانینو او فرمانونو په رعایت مکلفي دي.

مور چاته اجازه نه ورکوو چي د بشري مرستو تر عنوان لاندي د ا.ا.ا د پریکړو او مشرانو په اړه بي مسؤلیته خبري یا تهدید وکړي.“

**Post no. 435** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, December 25, 2022,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1607028053686816769](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1607028053686816769):

”مسولین امریکایی باید در امور داخلی کشور ما مداخله نکنند.

مؤسستی که در افغانستان فعالیت دارند به رعایت قوانین و فرامین کشور ما مکلف اند.

ما به کسی اجازه نمیدهیم که تحت عنوان کمک های بشری در مورد فیصله ها و یا مسؤلین امارت اسلامی افغانستان سخنان بی مسولیت گفته و یا تهدید نمایند.“

**Post no. 436** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, December 25, 2022,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1607034813835272198](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1607034813835272198):

“American officials should stop interfering in our internal matters.

All those institutions wanting to operate in Afghanistan are obliged to comply with the rules and regulations of our country.

1/2”

**Post no. 437** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, December 25, 2022,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1607034827303432192](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1607034827303432192):

“We do not allow anyone to talk rubbish or make threats regarding the decisions of our leaders under the title of Humanitarian aid.

2/2”

**Post no. 475** – @ARG\_1880, X, January 2, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/ARG\\_1880/status/1609915801246797827](https://twitter.com/ARG_1880/status/1609915801246797827):

”معاون اداری ریاست الوزراء امروز با جمعی از علماء و بزرگان اهل تشیع دیدار نمود. در این دیدار، نخست محترم محمد حسن شریفی بلخابی به نمایندگی از دیگران در باره وضعیت اجتماعی و دیدگاه و انتظارات اهل تشیع از نظام اسلامی به مقام معاونیت اداری ریاست الوزراء معلومات ارائه کرد.“

**Post no. 476 – @ARG\_1880, X, January 2, 2023,**

[https://twitter.com/ARG\\_1880/status/1609915805130424323:](https://twitter.com/ARG_1880/status/1609915805130424323)

”بلخابی گفت که اهل تشیع کشور دیدگاه مثبت و خوبی نسبت به امارت اسلامی دارد و از نظام مقدس اسلامی به صورت همه جانبه حمایت می کند.

وی از مسئولین امارت اسلامی درخواست کرد تا در زمینه راه اندازی برنامه های انکشافی ولایت دایکندی، بامیان و سایر مناطق توجه خاص نمایند.“

**Post no. 477 – @ARG\_1880, X, January 2, 2023,**

[https://twitter.com/ARG\\_1880/status/1609915810058747906:](https://twitter.com/ARG_1880/status/1609915810058747906)

”محترم مولوی عبدالسلام حنفی ضمن ابراز خرسندی از این دیدار بیان داشت که مسئولین امارت اسلامی خدمت به مردم و رسیدگی به مشکلات آنان را افتخار خود می دانند.

معاون اداری ریاست الوزراء نقش علماء و محاسن سفیدان را در راستای ایجاد رابطه قوی و مستحکم میان ملت ...“

**Post no. 478 – @ARG\_1880, X, January 2, 2023,**

[https://twitter.com/ARG\\_1880/status/1609915815339458560:](https://twitter.com/ARG_1880/status/1609915815339458560)

”...و نظام مهم عنوان نمود و از آنان خواست تا هرچه بیشتر در این زمینه تلاش نمایند.

وی در اخیر سخنانش گفت که امارت اسلامی متعهد به انکشاف متوازن است و برنامه های انکشافی را در سرتاسر افغانستان راه اندازی خواهد نمود.“

**Post no. 500 – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, April 1, 2023,**

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1610632782144999424:](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1610632782144999424)

”د ریاست الوزراء سیاسی مرستیال محترم مولوی عبدالکبیر نن د افغانستان لپاره د ملگرو ملتونو د سرمنشي د ځانگړي استازي له مرستیال بناغلي مارک پوتزل سره ولیدل.

بناغلي مارک پوتزل وویل چې په افغانستان کې به د یوناما ماموریت او افغانانو ته د ملگرو ملتونو بشري مرستې دوام لري.  
“۱/۶“

**Post no. 501 – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, April 1, 2023,**

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1610632785923915778:](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1610632785923915778)

”هغه وویل یوناما د افغان حکومت او نړیوالې ټولني تر منځ د پل حیثیت لري او هڅه کوي چې د دواړو تر منځ واټن پای ته ورسوي.

هغه وویل ملگري ملتونه د افغانانو دین او کلتور ته درناوی لري.  
د ریاست الوزراء سیاسی مرستیال محترم مولوی عبدالکبیر د ملگرو ملتونو له بشري مرستو مننه وکړه  
“۲/۶“

**Post no. 502 – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, April 1, 2023,**

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1610632789677703176:](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1610632789677703176)

”د ریاست سیاسی مرستیال وویل چې د ا.ا. د رسمیت پېژندنې ټول شرایط پوره کړي او ملگري ملتونه باید په دې سازمان کې د افغانستان څوکۍ دوی ته وسپاري.

نوموړي وویل اسلامي امارت د ملگرو ملتونو نقش ته د قدر په سترگه گوري هغه زیاته کړه چې اسلامي امارت له نړۍ سره نیک تعامل غواړي  
“۳/۶“

**Post no. 503** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, April 1, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1610632793456889856:](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1610632793456889856)

”او يوناما دي ورسره په دي اړه همکاري وکړي. هغه زياته کړه په اوسني حکومت کې د هر قوم او هر ولايت خلک شته او لاهم هڅه کېږي چې د هر قوم او سيمي متخصص او هيواد ته ژمن خلک په حکومت کې ځای شي.“  
“۴/۶

**Post no. 504** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, April 1, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1610632797542141953:](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1610632797542141953)

”نوموړي وويل چې اسلامي امارت ديني او عصري زده کړه د هر افغان حق بولي او دافغانانو د مذهب او فرهنگ په رڼا کې دښځو د زده کړو او کار لپاره دمناسب چاپېريال په رامنځته کولو بوخت دی او پدې اړه دنړيوالو بي غرضه مرستې هم غواړي.“  
“۵/۶

**Post no. 505** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, April 1, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1610632801539194881:](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1610632801539194881)

”هغه روښانه کړه چې دافغانستان اسلامي امارت هېچاته اجازه نه ورکوي چې د افغانستان خاوره دنورو پرضد وکاروي او پدې اړه موجودې بي بنسټه ادعاوې ردوي. نوموړي زياته کړه چې دافغانستان اسلامي امارت نه د چا په کورنيو چارو کې لاس وهي اونه بل چاته د دې کار اجازه ورکوي.“  
“۶/۶

**Post no. 564** – @FDPM\_AFG, X, January 10, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/FDPM\\_AFG/status/1612743476634095617:](https://twitter.com/FDPM_AFG/status/1612743476634095617)

“The country's economy has made significant strides, resulting in exports reaching \$1 billion and \$424 million in the first 9 months of the year 1401, while during the previous administration, these statistics were \$434 million and \$478 million in the first 9 months of 1399 and 1400.”

**Post no. 580** – @HafizZiaAhmad, X, January 12, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/HafizZiaAhmad1/status/1613493743633551362:](https://twitter.com/HafizZiaAhmad1/status/1613493743633551362)

”نن د افغانستان لپاره د روسيې د ولسمشر ځانگړي استازي ضمير کابلوف د ا. ا. ا. د بهرنيو چارو وزير مولوي امير خان متقي سره وکتل. په سر کې د بهرنيو چارو وزير د افغانستان او روسيې پر دوو اړخيزو اړيکو، سيمه ييزو مسايلو، اقتصادي همکاريو او په افغانستان کې د وروستيو پرمختگونو په باب...“

**Post no. 581** – @HafizZiaAhmad, X, January 12, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/HafizZiaAhmad1/status/1613493748771454979:](https://twitter.com/HafizZiaAhmad1/status/1613493748771454979)

”هر اړخيزې خبرې وکړې. متقي صاحب وويل، چې روسيه د افغانستان په بهرني سياست کې ځانگړی ځای لري او له روسي لوري يې مننه وکړه چې په مسکو کې افغان سفارت ته ټولې اسانتياوې برابرې کړي دي. همداراز د بهرنيو چارو وزير ياده کړه، چې افغان حکومت لېواله دی چې په مسکو کې خپل ديپلوماتيک حضور پراخ...“

**Post no. 582** – @HafizZiaAhmad, X, January 12, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/HafizZiaAhmad1/status/1613493753695637505:](https://twitter.com/HafizZiaAhmad1/status/1613493753695637505)

”او کچه يې هم لوره کړي. د بهرنیو چارو وزیر د افغانستان او روسیې ترمنځ پر سوداگریزو راکړو ورکړو هم خبرې وکړې او له روسیې لوري يې وغوښتل چې دواړه هېوادونه پر هغو لارو چارو کار وکړي چې دوی اړخیزې سوداگری ته وده ورکوي. د بهرنیو چارو وزیر له روسیې څخه د نفتو، گازو او غنمو پر واردولو هم“

**Post no. 583** – @HafizZiaAhmad, X, January 12, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/HafizZiaAhmad1/status/1613493759198601216:](https://twitter.com/HafizZiaAhmad1/status/1613493759198601216)

”بحث وکړ او له روسیې پلاوي څخه يې وغوښتل چې د گمرکې تعرفې په برخه کې افغانستان سره ځانگړی چلن وشي. د روسیې ځانگړي استازي په خپلو خبرو کې د بهرنیو چارو وزارت ته څېرمه د پرونی پېښې له امله غمرازي څرگنده کړه او زیاته يې کړه چې دښمنان هڅه کوي چې افغانستان ناامنه وي. ښاغلي کابلوف وویل،“

**Post no. 584** – @HafizZiaAhmad, X, January 12, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/HafizZiaAhmad1/status/1613493764416503808:](https://twitter.com/HafizZiaAhmad1/status/1613493764416503808)

”روسیه په افغانستان کې ثبات او پرمختگ غواړي او نه غواړي د غربي هېوادونو په څېر پر افغانستان نیوکې وکړي او په کورنیو چارو کې يې لاسوهنه وکړي. کابلوف زیاته کړه، چې روسیه نه غواړي افغانستان له نړیوالې ټولنې څخه منزوي شي. ده وویل، دواړه هېوادونه باید په دې اړه گډې هڅې وکړي.“

**Post no. 585** – @HafizZiaAhmad, X, January 12, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/HafizZiaAhmad1/status/1613493770707959809:](https://twitter.com/HafizZiaAhmad1/status/1613493770707959809)

”د روسیې د ولسمشر ځانگړي استازي وویل، هېواد به يې په گڼو برخو کې افغانستان سره خپلو همکاريو ته ادامه ورکړي. ده زیاته کړه، افغانستان د پاکستان، منځنی اسیا او روسیې ترمنځ د سوداگری په وده کې گټور رول لوبولای شي.“

**Post no. 588** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, January 12, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1613529452050259968:](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1613529452050259968)

”د اسلامي همکاريو د سازمان د غونډې په اړه د اسلامي امارت د ویاند څرگندونې  
”justpaste.it/bvmv“

A text from a picture embodied in the post and in the link above:

”د افغانستان اسلامي امارت د اسلامي همکاريو د سازمان له غونډې او د افغانستان په اړه اعلاميې څخه هرکلی کوي. واقعا هم نړیوال باید له افغانانو سره خپلو همکاريو ته دوام ورکړي او د افغانستان په کورنیو چارو کې مداخله ونکړي. د بنځو د تعلیم په رابطه د دغه سازمان اندیښنې د درک وړ ده، خو اسلامي امارت په یاده برخه کې موقتي گام اخیستی چې د زمینی په مساعدیدو سره به دغه اندیښنه رفع شي. اسلامي امارت له ټولو نړیوالو سازمانونو خصوصاً د اسلامي همکاريو له سازمان څخه غواړي چې له اسلامي امارت سره له نیردې تفاهم ولري او له افغان ولس سره خپلو همکاريو ته دوام ورکړي. ذبیح الله مجاهد د اسلامي امارت ویاند  
۲۰/۶/۱۴۴۴ هـ ق“



**Post no. 592** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, January 12, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1613531926320627714](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1613531926320627714):

”اظهارات سخنگوی امارت اسلامی در مورد نشست سازمان همکاری های اسلامی  
“justpaste.it/adnk5

A text from a picture embodied in the post and in the link above:

”امارت اسلامی افغانستان از نشست و اعلامیه سازمان همکاری های اسلامی در ارتباط به افغانستان قدردانی می نماید. واقعا هم کشورها، باید به کمک های خود با مردم افغانستان ادامه دهند و هیچ کشور در امور داخلی افغانستان مداخله نه کند. تشویش سازمان مذکور در رابطه به تعلیم خانمها قابل درک است، ولی امارت اسلامی در این خصوص گام مؤقتی برداشته که با مساعد شدن زمینه این مشکل رفع خواهد شد.  
امارت اسلامی از تمام سازمان ها به خصوص سازمان همکاری های اسلامی میخواد که تفاهم نزدیک با امارت اسلامی داشته باشند و به کمک های خود به مردم افغانستان ادامه دهند.

ذبیح الله مجاهد سخنگوی امارت اسلامی  
۲۰/۶/۱۴۴۴ هـ ق  
۲۲/۱۰/۱۴۰۱ هـ ش – ۲۰۲۳/۱۲/۱ م

**Post no. 596** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, January 12, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1613543687010803712](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1613543687010803712):

”تصريحات المتحدث الرسمي باسم الإمارة الإسلامية حول إجتماع منظمة التعاون الإسلامي  
“justpaste.it/c4cq

A text from a picture embodied in the post and in the link above:

”يحق للمجتمع الدولي أن يواصل تعاونه مع الأفغان وألا يتدخل في الشؤون الداخلية لأفغانستان. إن اهتمام هذه المنظمة بتعليم المرأة مفهوم لكن الإمارة الإسلامية اتخذت خطوة مؤقتة في هذا الصدد وتحل هذه المشكلة بتوفير بيئة المناسبة،  
تريد الإمارة الإسلامية من جميع المنظمات الدولية وخاصة من منظمة التعاون الإسلامي أن يكون لها تفاهم وثيق مع الإمارة الإسلامية وأن يتواصل تعاونها مع الشعب الأفغاني.

ذبيح الله مجاهد المتحدث الرسمي باسم الإمارة الإسلامية  
1444/6/20 هـ ق  
1401/10/22 هـ ش – ۲۰۲۳/۱۲/۱ م

**Post no. 600** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, January 12, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1613549834895560705](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1613549834895560705):

”Statements of the Islamic Emirate's Spokesperson Regarding the Meeting of the  
Organization of Islamic Cooperation  
justpaste.it/6nvxj”

A text from a picture embodied in the post and in the link above:

The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan welcomes the meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and its declaration on Afghanistan.

Indeed, the international community should continue its cooperation with Afghans and not interfere in Afghanistan's internal affairs.

The concern of this organization regarding women's education is understandable, but the Islamic Emirate is taking steps to resolve this issue.

The Islamic Emirate wants all international organizations, especially the OIC, to have a close understanding with the Islamic Emirate and to continue their cooperation with the Afghan people.

Zabihullah Mujahid, Spokesperson of the Islamic Emirate

هـ ق 1444/6/20

”هـ ش ۱۴۰۲۳/۱۲/۱ م 1401/10/22

**Post no. 608** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, January 13, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1613801095016349697](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1613801095016349697):

”د کابل ښاروالی د ښار د پاک ساتنې او سرکونو د رغونې ترڅنګ هڅه کوي چې اقتصادي بنيادونه هم ورغوي.

ښاروالی کابل در پهلوی حفظ نظافت در شهر و ساختن سرک ها، تلاش دارد که بنیاد های اقتصادی کشور را نیز احیا نماید.“

**Post no. 623** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, January 14, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1614267527332519936](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1614267527332519936):

”راځئ د ریښتوني خدمت په روحيه خلکو او هېواد ته کار وکړو.

دکابل ښاروالی خدمتونه د ستایلو دي.

بیايد با روحيه واقعی خدمت، به مردم وکشور خود کار نمایم.

خدمات ښاروالی کابل ستودنی است“

**Post no. 626** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, January 14, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1614297035317936130](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1614297035317936130):

”ټاکنې:

د کار او ټولنيزو چارو وزارت مخکنی سرپرست ملا عبدالولي څارنوال؛ د پېښو پر وړاندې د مبارزې وزارت د پېښو د چارو د انسجام د معین په توګه او شیخ مولوي محمد فقیر د امر بالمعروف، نهی عن المنکر او شکایتونو اورېدلو وزارت د پالیسی او مسلکي معین په توګه وټاکل شول.“

**Post no. 627** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, January 14, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1614298409338281986](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1614298409338281986):

”تعینات:

به اساس حکم عالیقدر امیر المؤمنین حفظه الله سرپرست قبلی وزارت کار و امور اجتماعی ملا عبدالولی سارنوال، به حیث معین انسجام حوادث وزارت ضد حوادث و شیخ مولوی محمد فقیر به حیث معین مسلکی و پالیسی وزارت امر بالمعروف، نهی عن المنکر و سمع شکایات تعیین گردید.“

**Post no. 662** – @QaharBalkhi, X, January 18, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/QaharBalkhi/status/1615661868911153152:](https://twitter.com/QaharBalkhi/status/1615661868911153152)

”د ملګرو ملتونو د عمومي منشي مرستیالی امینه محمد د یو لور پورې پلاوي په مشرۍ د ا.ا.ا. د بهرنیو چارو له وزیر مولوي امیر خان متقي سره وکتل.

په پیل کې د بهرنیو چارو وزیر د م.م. پلاوي ته هرکلی ووايه او هیله یې وښوده چې د افغانستان رښتینی انځور نړیوالې ټولني ته منعکس کړي.“

**Post no. 663** – @QaharBalkhi, X, January 18, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/QaharBalkhi/status/1615661872832811010:](https://twitter.com/QaharBalkhi/status/1615661872832811010)

”ورپسې آغلي محمد افغانستان ته د خپل سفر موخه د وضعیت له نژدې لیدل او د ښځینه وو د زده کړو او کار په اړه افغان حکومت ته د نړیوالې ټولني د پیغام رسول یاد کړل. آغلي محمد زیاته کړه، ملګري ملتونه او نړیواله ټولنه په دې تمرکز لري چې له افغانستان سره خپلې مرستې او تعامل ته دوام ورکړي.“

**Post no. 664** – @QaharBalkhi, X, January 18, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/QaharBalkhi/status/1615661876452499456:](https://twitter.com/QaharBalkhi/status/1615661876452499456)

”مولوي امیر خان متقي وویل، په پیل کې مور له یو لړ ستونزو سره مخ و، له نېکه مرغه زیاته برخه ستونزې حل شوي دي؛ د مخدره موادو کښت صفر ته راټیټ شوی، دامن امنیت راغلی، د څه کم ۱۰ میلیونه زده کونکو پر مخ د زده کړو دروازي خلاصې دي.“

**Post no. 665** – @QaharBalkhi, X, January 18, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/QaharBalkhi/status/1615661880042983425:](https://twitter.com/QaharBalkhi/status/1615661880042983425)

”متقي صاحب زیاته کړه، په زیاته اندازه ښځې په تعلیمي او صحي سکتور کې په کار بوختې دي او کومو ښځو چې دفترانو کې کار کاوه هغوی ټولو ته معاشات رسول کيږي، د ښځینه زندانیانو کچه فوق العاده کمه شوي ده، د سوداګرۍ په برخه کې سهولتونه ایجاد شوي دي.“

**Post no. 666** – @QaharBalkhi, X, January 18, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/QaharBalkhi/status/1615661883754971136:](https://twitter.com/QaharBalkhi/status/1615661883754971136)

”همداراز، په ۸۳ شفاخانو کې په زرګونو معتادان تر درملني لاندې دي. بناء د دې ټولو پرمختګونو په اړه د نړیوالې ټولني لازمه همکاري اړینه ده.

د بهرنیو چارو وزیر وویل، د حکومت په رسمیت نه پېژندنه، پر مشرانو د سفري بندیزونو نه لیري کول او همدارنګه پر بانکي سیستم بندیزونه“

**Post no. 667** – @QaharBalkhi, X, January 18, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/QaharBalkhi/status/1615661887664029697:](https://twitter.com/QaharBalkhi/status/1615661887664029697)

”هغه عوامل دي چې هیوادوال یې له ګڼو ستونزو سره مخ کړي دي؛ نړیواله ټولنه باید د دغو ستونزو په اړه مثبت ګامونه واخلي.

په پای کې آغلي محمد د بهرنیو چارو وزیر له څرګندونو مننه وکړه او د شته ستونزو د حل او د لا زیاتو پرمختګونو او همکاريو په اړه یې هیله وښوده.“

**Post no. 668** – @QaharBalkhi, X, January 18, 2023,

<https://twitter.com/QaharBalkhi/status/1615661891896111107>:

”ښاغلي محمد ژمنه وکره چې په افغانستان کې د خپلو سترگو لیدلی وضعیت به له نړیوالو سره شریک کړي او افغانستان سره به د مرستو په برخه کې هم کولې گامونه واخلي.“

**Post no. 670** – @QaharBalkhi, X, January 18, 2023,

<https://twitter.com/QaharBalkhi/status/1615704278433435648>:

“Deputy UNSG Amina Mohammed heading a delegation called on IEA Foreign Minister Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi.

Welcoming the UN delegation, FM Muttaqi expressed hope that the delegation would portray Afghanistan’s true picture to the international community.”

**Post no. 671** – @QaharBalkhi, X, January 18, 2023,

<https://twitter.com/QaharBalkhi/status/1615704282032148481>:

“Ms Amina Mohammed said her visit to Kabul aimed at witnessing the situation up close & delivering the international community’s message to the Afghan government.”

**Post no. 672** – @QaharBalkhi, X, January 18, 2023,

<https://twitter.com/QaharBalkhi/status/1615704287434407939>:

“FM Muttaqi said we faced numerous issues in the beginning, however, most have fortunately been addressed; narcotics cultivation has dropped to zero, security has been ensured, & schools have been opened for nearly 10 million students.”

**Post no. 673** – @QaharBalkhi, X, January 18, 2023,

<https://twitter.com/QaharBalkhi/status/1615704292262039552>:

“FM Muttaqi added that women are engaged in educational & health sectors in significant numbers whereas those who used to work in government offices are paid salaries at home; the number of female inmates has reduced considerably”

**Post no. 674** – @QaharBalkhi, X, January 18, 2023,

<https://twitter.com/QaharBalkhi/status/1615704297194553346>:

“& broad facilities have been provided in the business sector. Also, thousands of addicts are being treated in 83 therapy centers. Therefore, all these efforts require necessary cooperation by the international community.”

**Post no. 675** – @QaharBalkhi, X, January 18, 2023,

<https://twitter.com/QaharBalkhi/status/1615704302399651843>:

“FM Muttaqi also said that non-recognition of the Afghan government, travel bans on Afghan authorities & restrictions on the banking system have led to numerous problems for

the Afghan people that require positive steps by the international community to address them.”

**Post no. 676** – @QaharBalkhi, X, January 18, 2023,

<https://twitter.com/QaharBalkhi/status/1615704307613208576>:

“To end, Ms. Mohammed thanked FM Muttaqi for comments, expressing hope for further progress & cooperation to address the existing challenges. She pledged to convey the realities as witnessed to the international community, taking firm steps for continued assistance to Afghanistan.”

**Post no. 681** – @BilalKarimi44, X, January 18, 2023,

<https://twitter.com/BilalKarimi44/status/1615747258061934592>:

”پل سوخته محل تجمع صدها معتادین در کابل:  
این پل برای نخستین بار از وجود معتادین پاکسازی گردید.  
مسولین ا.ا.ا پس ازان که پروسه جمع اوری گداها راموقفیت امیز پیشبردند، اکنون توانستند که پل سوخته محل مملوء از زباله های گنده را نیز از وجود معتادین تصفیه نمایند.  
بامید موفقیت های بیشتر“

**Post no. 747** – @Mohammad\_halimR, X, January 25, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/Mohammad\\_halimR/status/1618133449415741440](https://twitter.com/Mohammad_halimR/status/1618133449415741440):

”په هېواد کې د ۹ میلیونه الکترونیکی تذکرو وپشل کېدل  
د احصایې او معلوماتو ملي ادارې د الکترونیکی تذکرو د وپش لړۍ له پیل تر اوسه ۹ میلیونه او ۱۶۰ زرو کسانو ته الکترونیکی تذکري وپشلي چې  
۵ میلیونه او ۸۰ زره یې نارینه او ۴ میلیونه او ۷۷ زره یې ښځینه دي.“

**Post no. 748** – @KblMunicipality, X, January 24, 2023,

<https://twitter.com/KblMunicipality/status/1617871692902334468>:

”په پل سوخته سیمه کې د کابل سیند د پاکولو چارې روانې دي!

#رعایت\_از\_قوانین\_شهری\_حتمی\_است

همشهری، همکاری، شاروالی

#کابل\_ښاروالی

#شاروالی\_کابل

”#Kabul\_municipality

**Post no. 792** – @MoFA\_Afg, X, January 27, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/MoFA\\_Afg/status/1618866221658832897](https://twitter.com/MoFA_Afg/status/1618866221658832897):

“Remarks by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning barbaric raid by Israeli regime forces on Jenin city.”

**Post no. 793** – @MoFA\_Afg, X, January 27, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/MoFA\\_Afg/status/1618866246556213248:](https://twitter.com/MoFA_Afg/status/1618866246556213248)

“اعلامیه وزارت امور خارجه در مورد حمله وحشیانه نیروهای اسرائیلی در شهر جنین“

**Post no. 794** – @MoFA\_Afg, X, January 27, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/MoFA\\_Afg/status/1618888836242878466:](https://twitter.com/MoFA_Afg/status/1618888836242878466)

“بیان وزارت الخارجية بخصوص الاعتداء الوحشي لجنود الاحتلال الإسرائيلي على مدينة جنين“

**Post no. 845** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, February 2, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1621096365312081920:](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1621096365312081920)

“د کورنیو چارو وزیر " خلیفه سراج الدین حقانی " په نشه یې توکو د ورودو کسانو د درملنی ۵۰۰۰ بستریز حمایتی او روزنیز مرکز پرانیست غونډه کې: تدریجاً به ټولې ستونزې حل شي؛ له نړیوالو غواړو چې خپله توجو او مخ افغانانو ته راوگرځوئ- نړیوال دي په افراطي تعامل له افغانانو غچ نه اخلی.“

**Post no. 878** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, February 6, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1622518114859597824:](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1622518114859597824)

“نن د افغاني سرې میاشتي لخوا حاجي امیرزاده روغتون ته ۲۲ نور د سوري زړه په ناروغی اخته ماشومان ور وپېژندل. په تېرو شاوخوا ۵ میاشتو کې افغاني سرې میاشتي بېلابېلو روغتونونو ته د سوري زړه په ناروغی ۶۴۹ ماشومان ورپېژندلي، درملني لگښت یې افغاني سره میاشت تادیه کوي.“ چې د

**Post no. 879** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, February 6, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1622518120228311047:](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1622518120228311047)

“امروز از طرف جمعیت هلال احمر افغانی به شفاخانه امیرزاده ۲۲ تن طفل دیگر که مریضی سوراخ قلب داشتند معرفی شدند. در مدت ۵ ماه ۶۴۹ تن طفل از طرف هلال احمر افغانی بخاطر معالجه به شفاخانه های مختلف معرفی شدند که مصارف آن را جمعیت هلال احمر افغانی می پردازد.“

**Post no. 884** – @Drnazari18, X, February 7, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Drnazari18/status/1622862151948828674:](https://twitter.com/Drnazari18/status/1622862151948828674)

“جامعه تشیع افغانستان الگوی همزیستی مسالمت آمیز و پیش قراول وحدت ملی است. به فتنه گران نباید مجال و میدان دهیم.“

**Post no. 911** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, February 15, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1625748420068777984:](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1625748420068777984)

“له افغانستان څخه د شوروي ځواکونو د وتلو څلورديرشمي کليزي په مناسبت د اسلامي امارت اعلاميه  
“justpaste.it/bjadp

A text from a picture embodied in the post and in the link above:

“له نن څخه ۳۴ کاله وړاندې (۱۳۶۷/۱۱/۲۶ هـ ش) د وخت شوروي اتحاد يرغلگر ځواکونه دي ته اړکړل شول چې افغانستان پريردي او خپل اشغال پای ته ورسوي.

د افغانستان اسلامي امارت د دې سترې ورځې په مناسبې ژورې د وياړلي ملت د جهاد، سربښونو او قربانيو په نتيجه کې يو اشغالگر ابرقدرت ماتې وخوره، ټول ولس ته مبارکي وايي او زموږ د تاريخ يوه وياړمنه ورځ يې بولي. دا هرڅه د الله تعالی د دين برکت وو چې افغانانو د الله جل جلاله په دين باندې منگولې لگولې وې، د الله جل جلاله څخه غوښتنه کوو چې ټول تر پای پورې په خپل دين باندې ټينگ ولري.

افغانستان تل په سيمه کې يو مهم هيواد پاتې شوی او په دې هيواد کې بدو پېښو په ټوله سيمه باندې بد اثر غورځولې دي، همدا ډول د وخت د شوروي اتحاد پر غل هم چې د ۱۳۵۸ کال د جدي مياشتې په ۶ پيل شو پخپله ۹ کلنه دوره کې افغانانو ته شهادتونه، بدامنې، فقر او ناورينو راوړل او هم يې سيمي ته مهاجرتونه او بيلابيل زيانونه درلودل؛ خو د افغانانو د بي ساری قربانيو او مجاهدو په مټ دغه ستر تجاوز مات شو.

افغانان متجاوز خلک نه دي، خو د نورو تجاوز هم نشي زغملی، تر شوروي پر غل وروسته د امريکايي مشري اشغال پيل او بيا ماتې هم ثابته کړه چې افغانان د بيگانه يرغلونو په وړاندې خورا حساس دي او خپل ايماني او ديني مکلفيت يې بولي چې له خپلو ديني ازبښونو او د هيوادله آزادي او خپلواکي څخه دفاع وکړي. افغانان لکه څرنګه چې د جنگ په ميدان کې گټونکي او بريالي دي، همدا ډول په تفاهم او تعامل کې هم مخلص او متعهد دي، نو ښه داده چې نور هيڅ لوری هم د افغانانو د ځورولو هڅې ونه کړي.

که هيوادونه زموږ سره ر غنده او نیک تعامل ته راشي موږ هم د خپلو ديني او ملي گټو په نظر کې نيولوسره مثبت تعامل ته آماده يو.

همدا اوس چې په افغانستان کې يو مشروع، واحد او مستقل حاکميت د اسلامي امارت تر قيادت لاندې راغلی دا د ټولو پخبر ده چې له فرصت څخه په گټه اخيستنې د تفاهم لاره ونيسي د مثبت پرمختګ لپاره هلې ځلې وکړي. والسلام

د افغانستان اسلامي امارت

۱۴۴۴/۷/۲۵ هـ ق

۱۴۰۱/۱۱/۲۶ هـ ش - ۲۰۲۳/۲/۲۵ م

Post no. 912 – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, February 15, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1625751801420193792](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1625751801420193792):

”اعلامية امارت اسلامی به مناسبت سی و چهارمین سالروز خروج نیروهای شوروی از افغانستان

justpaste.it/b901w

A text from a picture embodied in the post and in the link above:

”۳۴ سال قبل از امروز (۱۳۶۷/۱۱/۲۶ هـ ش) نیروهای اتحاد شوروی سابق مجبور شدند که از افغانستان خارج شده و به اشغال خود نقطه پایان بگذارند.

امارت اسلامی افغانستان به مناسبت این روز بزرگ را که در نتیجه جهاد، فداکاری و قربانی های ملت پر افتخار ما یک ابرقدرت اشغالگر به شکست مواجه گردید، به تمام ملت تیریک می گوید و آن را در تاریخ یک روز افتخار آفرین می داند. این همه به برکت دین الله متعال بوده، که افغانها بر دین الله جل جلاله چنگ زده بودند، از الله متعال استدعا می نماییم که همه را تا آخر بر دین خود قایم نگهداری نماید.

افغانستان همیشه در منطقه منحيث یک کشور مهم باقی مانده و حوادث ناگوار در این کشور تأثیر مخربی بر تمام منطقه گذاشته است. همچنان تجاوز اتحاد شوروی سابق که در ۶ جدی ۱۳۵۸ آغاز شد، در دوره ۹ ساله اش برای افغان ها شهادت ها، نا امنی، فقر و بحران را به همراه داشت و برای منطقه مهاجرت ها و زیان های دیگر را بیار آورد، مگر در اثر قربانی های بی دریغ افغان ها و بازوی پرتوان مجاهدین این تجاوز بزرگ محکوم به شکست گردید.

افغان ها مردم متجاوز نیستند، اما تجاوز دیگران را نیز تحمل نمی توانند. پس از تجاوز شوروی، اشغال به رهبری امریکا آغاز و شکست آن باز هم ثابت ساخت که افغان ها در مقابل بیگانگان بسیار حساس هستند و دفاع از ارزش های دینی، آزادی و استقلال کشور را مکلفیت ايماني و ديني خود می دانند.

افغان ها همانگونه که در میدان جنگ پیروز هستند، در تفاهم و تعامل نیز مخلص و متعهد می باشند و بهتر این است که هیچ طرفی تلاش برای آزار و اذیت افغان ها نکند.

اگر کشورها با ما تعامل روشن و نیک داشته باشند، ما نیز با در نظر داشت منافع دینی و ملی خویش، آماده تعامل مثبت می باشیم. هم اکنون که در افغانستان یک حاکمیت مشروع، واحد و مستقل تحت قيادت امارت اسلامی برقرار گردیده، به خیر همه است که با استفاده از این فرصت راه تفاهم را اختیار نموده و بخاطر پیشرفت های مثبت تلاش نمایند.

والسلام

امارت اسلامی افغانستان

۱۴۴۴/۷/۲۵ هـ ق

۱۴۰۱/۱۱/۲۶ هـ ش - ۲۰۲۳/۲/۲۵ م

**Post no. 913** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, February 15, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1625799255498674178:](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1625799255498674178)

”د نن ورځې غونډې ته د هېواد د دفاع وزیر محترم مولوي محمد یعقوب مجاهد ارزښتناکه وینا“

**Post no. 914** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, February 15, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1625816385975894016:](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1625816385975894016)

”د شوروي اتحاد د لښکرو د ماتې د ورځې د لمانځلو په مناسبت جوړې شوې غونډې ته د بهرنیو چارو وزیر محترم مولوي امیرخان متقي د وینا یوه برخه [piped.video/SEVjxUs2m4Y](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SEVjxUs2m4Y)“

**Post no. 915** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, February 15, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1625823817468706816:](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1625823817468706816)

”د وینا یوه برخه“

**Post no. 916** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, February 15, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1625824275176226818:](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1625824275176226818)

”د وینا یوه بله برخه“

**Post no. 917** – @rtapashto, X, February 15, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/rtapashto/status/1625832679114506240:](https://twitter.com/rtapashto/status/1625832679114506240)

”د سلواغې ۲۶ مې د شوروي لښکرو د ماتې او وتلو په تړاو د مولوي ذبیح الله مجاهد پیغام!  
#ملي تلویزیون  
#دلو ۲۶“

@Zabehullah\_M33

**Post no. 927** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, February 16, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1626136077504335873:](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1626136077504335873)

”ویدیو د تیرکال یوه موضوع ده، خو نن له ځانه سره خورا ښکاره او معقول پیغامونه لري، افغانان نور د قوم او ژبې په نوم تقسیم نه قبلوي، ټول سره وروڼه یو او په حقه به سره راټولېږو او له حق څخه به دفاع کوو.“

\_\_\_\_\_ ماهمه برادر همدیگر هستیم، باحق یکجا می شویم و از حق دفاع می نماییم.“

**Post no. 957** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, February 22, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1628331149268336640:](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1628331149268336640)

”د کابل ښاروالی کارونه او پرمختګونه د ستایلو دي.“

فعالیت ها و پیشرفت های ښاروالی کابل ستوندي است“



**Post no. 1022** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, February 27, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1630265938644811785](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1630265938644811785):

”د داعشي فتنه گرو عمومي نظامي او عملياتي مسؤل ووژل شو  
“<https://justpaste.it/3tib4>

**Post no. 1023** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, February 27, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1630269858838462464](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1630269858838462464):

”د خوار جو فتنه گرو د عمومي نظامي او عملياتي مسؤل وژل کيدل.“

**Post no. 1024** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, February 27, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1630270719043969025](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1630270719043969025):

”مسؤل عمومي نظامي و عملياتي داعشي هاي فتنه گر كشته شد  
“<https://justpaste.it/daraw>

**Post no. 1025** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, February 27, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1630273780273561602](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1630273780273561602):

”Intelligence and Military Chief of Khawarij corruptors killed.  
<https://justpaste.it/d5d2u>”

**Post no. 1032** – @MoFA\_Afg, X, February 28, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/MoFA\\_Afg/status/1630590199204913154](https://twitter.com/MoFA_Afg/status/1630590199204913154):

”پيام تسليت وزارت امور خارجه ۱.۱.۱ در مورد شهادت اتباع افغانستان در اثر غرق شدن قايق در آب های جنوبی ایتالیا  
با تأسف اطلاع حاصل نمودیم که نزدیک به ۸۰ تن اتباع افغانستان که شامل زنان و کودکان اند و از راه آب در قایقی چوبی از  
ترکیه به سوی ایتالیا در حرکت بودند،“

**Post no. 1033** – @MoFA\_Afg, X, February 28, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/MoFA\\_Afg/status/1630590210516942848](https://twitter.com/MoFA_Afg/status/1630590210516942848):

”دیگر خودداری کنند.“

همچنان، وزارت امور خارجه از نهادهای خیریه، به ویژه صلیب سرخ، می‌خواهد که برای جستجو و انتقال اجساد افغان‌های غرق  
شده در آب‌های جنوبی ایتالیا، از روی مکلفیت انسانی، مسوولیت خویش را ایفا کنند.“

**Post no. 1034 – @MoFA\_Afg, X, February 28, 2023,**  
[https://twitter.com/MoFA\\_Afg/status/1630590202094780416:](https://twitter.com/MoFA_Afg/status/1630590202094780416)

”در نتیجه غرق شدن قایق به شهادت رسیده اند.

انالله وانا اليه راجعون

امارت اسلامی برای شهدا مغفرت و برای خانواده‌ها و نزدیکان آنان صبر جمیل استدعا می‌کند. در عین حال، یک بار دیگر به تمامی افغان‌ها توصیه می‌کند که از سفر از راه‌های قاچاقی، غیرقانونی و نادرست به کشور های“

**Post no. 1091 – @QaharBalkhi, X, March 16, 2023,**  
[https://twitter.com/QaharBalkhi/status/1636395138439323648:](https://twitter.com/QaharBalkhi/status/1636395138439323648)

”نوموړي زیاته کړه مور ستاسي ورونو یو ستاسي د کومک او ستاسي د خیر لپاره راغلي یو او له تاسو سره ښي اړیکي غواړو.

وریسي د امر بالمعروف وزارت وزیر شیخ محمد خالد حنفي د تېر جهاد په دوران کې د متحده اماراتو په نقش خبري وکړي او د هغوی مرستي یې وستایلي.“

**Post no. 1097 – @rtapashto, X, March 16, 2023,**  
[https://twitter.com/rtapashto/status/1636395715533340673:](https://twitter.com/rtapashto/status/1636395715533340673)

”د اسلامي امارت په راتگ سره د لښکرگاه ښاروالی له لوري د دې ښار د ښکلا او نظم په برخه کې د پام وړ بدلونونه رامنځته شوي دي.

نور حال یې راپور کې وگورئ“

**Post no. 1145 – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, March 22, 2023,**  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1638400319687208961:](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1638400319687208961)

”داعشي خوارجو له دغه پېنځای څخه په کابل ښار کې د بریدونو لپاره کار اخیست. او پلان یې درلود چې په رمضان میاشت کې په مقدسه اماکنو او ولسي وگرو بریدونه وکړي چې الله الحمد مخکې له مخکې کشف او لمنځه یوړل شول. په عملیاتو کې ولسي وگرو او مجاهدینو ته زیان نه دی رسیدلی.“  
“۲/۲“

**Post no. 1146 – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, March 22, 2023,**  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1638403755040288768:](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1638403755040288768)

”عملیات تازه علیه خوارج در شهر کابل:  
شب گذشته در چهاراهی بتخاک حوزه دوازده شهر کابل، علیه یک مخفی گاه خوارج داعشی عملیات انجام شد. در نتیجه سه تن از اعضای مهم خوارج به هلاکت رسیدند، اسلحه، بمب های دستی، مواد منفجره، تعداد زیاد ریمودها و وسائل زیاد ساخت ماین به دست آمد.“  
“۱/۲“

**Post no. 1164 – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, March 23, 2023,**  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1638922304951402499:](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1638922304951402499)

”احساس:

د هېواد د دفاع وزارت مرستیال ملا محمد فاضل مظلوم خپل موټر د هغو ملکي خلکو د موټر کشکولوته واستاوه چې په یوه لری سیمه کې په خټو کې نښتی وو.

معین وزارت دفاع ملامحمدفاضل مظلوم، موتر خود را بخاطر نجات آن موتر مردم ملکی فرستاد که در یک منطقه دور دست بند مانده.“

**Post no. 1165** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, March 24, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1639211906320703489](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1639211906320703489):

”په افغانستان کې د داعشي ډلې د تعداد په اړه د امریکایي چارواکو څرگندونې حقیقت نلري. داعشي فتنګر له پخوا څخه په مراتبو کم شوي او خپل شوي دي. د امریکایي چارواکو لخوا له دې موضوع سره دلچسپي او د هغوی بزرګنمائي پخپله له داعشي فتنه ګرو سره مرسته او هغوی ته کمپاین دی چې باید ودرول شي.“

**Post no. 1166** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, March 24, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1639213443164307459](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1639213443164307459):

”اظهارات مسؤلین امریکایي در مورد تعداد ګروه فتنګر داعش در افغانستان با واقعیت تطابق ندارد. ګروه خوارج بنام داعش به مراتب از قبل کم و کوییده شده است. دلچسپي مسؤلین امریکایي با این موضوع و نیز بزرګ نمایی آنها، خود همکاری با ګروه داعش و نیز کمپاین به نفع آنها است که باید متوقف شود.“

**Post no. 1167** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, March 24, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1639261639349358592](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1639261639349358592):

”تصریحات المسؤلین الأميركيين حول عدد عناصر داعش في أفغانستان غير صحيحة ، حيث تم قمع خوارج داعش وتقليل عددهم. اهتمام المسؤلین الأميركيين بهذا الأمر وتضخيمه يعتبر مساعدة وحملة دعائية لداعش والتي تجب إيقافها.“

**Post no. 1168** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, March 24, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1639261855137800193](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1639261855137800193):

“1/2:

The statements of US officials about the number of ISIS in Afghanistan are not true. Daesh militants have already been reduced in ranks and suppressed.”

**Post no. 1169** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, March 24, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1639261858803662851](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1639261858803662851):

“2/2:

The interest of the US officials in this matter and their grandiosity is aiding and abetting the ISIS insurgents, which should be stopped.”

**Post no. 1196** – @HafizZiaAhmad, X, April 6, 2023,  
<https://twitter.com/HafizZiaAhmad1/status/1643876710511792130>:

”وزارت امور خارجه ا.ا.ا. حمله ظالمانه نیروهای اسرائیلی به نمازگزاران بی دفاع در مسجد الاقصی را به شدت محکوم می کند.“

**Post no. 1197** – @HafizZiaAhmad, X, April 6, 2023,

<https://twitter.com/HafizZiaAhmad1/status/1643879495277985793>:

”د ۱۱۱ د بهرنیو چارو وزارت په الاقصی جومات کې په بې دفاع لمونځ کونکو د اسرائیلي ځواکونو ظالمانه برید په کلکو ټکو غندي.“

**Post no. 1269** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, April 15, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1647356691615236098](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1647356691615236098):

”په سوډان کې د خپلمنځي نښتو په اړه د افغانستان اسلامي امارت اعلامیه

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

قال الله تبارک و تعالی: وَأَطِيعُوا اللَّهَ وَرَسُولَهُ وَلَا تَنَازَعُوا فَعَفَا اللَّهُ عَنْكُمْ وَاللَّهُ غَفُورٌ رَحِيمٌ وَأَصْبِرُوا إِنَّ اللَّهَ مَعَ الصَّابِرِينَ. [الأنفال: ٤٦]

“١/٦

**Post no. 1270** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, April 15, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1647356695654326273](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1647356695654326273):

”ژباړه: او د الله جل جلاله او د ده د پیغمبر صلی الله علیه وسلم اطاعت کوئ، او (په خپلو منځونو کې) یو تر بله جگړې مه کوئ (چې په دې صورت کې) به کمزوري (او بې زړه شئ) او قوت به مو لار شي او (بالاخره) صبر کوئ (ځکه چې) الله جل جلاله یقیناً د صبر کونکو ملگری دی.

“٢/٦

**Post no. 1271** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, April 15, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1647356700679127044](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1647356700679127044):

”په خواشني سره مو راپورونه تر لاسه کړل چې د سوډان هیواد په مرکز او ځینو برخو کې خپلمنځي جگړه نښتې. د افغانستان اسلامي امارت په دغې پېښې سخت خواشني شو، چې زموږ په یوه ورور مسلمان هیواد کې د مسلمانانو ترمنځ خپلمنځي جگړه نښلې او سوډانی ولس ځوروي.“

“٣/٦

**Post no. 1272** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, April 15, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1647356705695473666](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1647356705695473666):

”داچې اوس لا د دغې پېښې ابتدا ده، اسلامي امارت خپل ورور سوډاني حکومت او ملت ته توصیه کوي چې هرڅه ژر جگړه ودروي او د منازعاتو د حل لپاره له سلا مشورو، سیاسي دیالوګ او حوصلې څخه کار واخلي. موږ د یوه جنګ خپلي هیواد او ملت په توګه دا وایو چې موږ د جګړو اضرار لیدلي او لمس کړي،“

“٤/٦

**Post no. 1273** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, April 15, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1647356710162423808](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1647356710162423808):

”په جګړو سره ملتونه تباہ کيږي، حکومتونه کمزوري کيږي او بهرنیو ناروا مداخلو ته لاره هواريږي. د هغو ستونزو په پرتله چې له امله یې هلته جگړه نښتې، د جګړې اضرار په څو چنده ډیريږي او د هغه هیواد خلکو او حاکمیت ته ګواښونه رامنځته کوي.“

“٥/٦

**Post no. 1274** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, April 15, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1647356714335842305](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1647356714335842305):

”له الله تعالى څخه غواړو چې هرڅه ژر په سوډان کې د مسلمانو ورونو ترمنځ اختلافات حل کړي، د جگړو لاملونه له مينځه یوسي او د هغه هیواد خلک له مشکلاتو څخه وژغوري. وما علينا الا البلاغ

د افغانستان اسلامي امارت

“۱۴۴۴/۹/۲۶ هـ ق”

۱۴۰۲/۱/۲۷ هـ ش – ۲۰۲۳/۴/۱۵ م

“۶/۶

**Post no. 1275** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, April 15, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1647357780712382466](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1647357780712382466):

“Statement of the Islamic Emirate on the Clashes in Sudan

We are sorry to receive reports that there are clashes between people in the centre and some parts of Sudan.

The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is deeply saddened by the incident that happened in our brother

1/5”

**Post no. 1276** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, April 15, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1647357784923439104](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1647357784923439104):

“Muslim country and has made Sudanese suffer.

As this incident is still in its infancy, the Islamic Emirate advises the government of Sudan and its nation to stop the clashes as quick as possible, and resolve the issue through consultation and political dialogue.

2/5”

**Post no. 1277** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, April 15, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1647357789130326017](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1647357789130326017):

“As a war-torn country and nation, we have seen and experienced the effects and consequences of war, it destroys nations, weakening governments and pave the ground for illegal foreign interventions.

3/5”

**Post no. 1278** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, April 15, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1647357793656008706](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1647357793656008706):

“Compared to the problems that caused the clashes there, the damages will be much more, in addition, it poses a threat to the people and sovereignty of that country.

4/5”

**Post no. 1279** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, April 15, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1647357797967843329:](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1647357797967843329)

“We pray to the Almighty Allah to resolve the differences between the Muslim brothers in Sudan ASAP, remove the causes of the clashes and save its people from difficulties.

Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan

۱۴۴۴/۹/۲۶ هـ ق

۱۴۰۲/۱/۲۷ ش – ۱۵/۴/۲۰۲۳ م

5/5”

**Post no. 1319** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, April 23, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1650145993097134082:](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1650145993097134082)

”د امریکا د دفاع وزارت په حواله رسنیز شوی جعلی سند، د همپښني پروپاگاندا برخه ده

خینو غربي رسنیو راپورونه خپاره کړل چې گواکې د امریکا د دفاع وزارت یو ډاگیزه شوی سند ښيي چې افغانستان په اصطلاح د ترهگری په مرکز بدل شوی، مور دا ادعا په کلکه ردوو.

“۱/۵

**Post no. 1320** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, April 23, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1650145995328479233:](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1650145995328479233)

”افغانستان د سیمې په کچه په یو امن هیواد بدل شوی، د سر کال کوچنی اختر یې تر ټولو ښه بېلگه ده چې له نېکه مرغه په ټول هیواد کې هیڅ امنیتي پېښه تر سره نه شوه، همدا راز په سیاسي او دیپلوماتیکه برخه کې هم له نړیوالو سره د مسلسلو پرمختگونو او تعامل شاهدان یو،

“۲/۵

**Post no. 1321** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, April 23, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1650145997366910977:](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1650145997366910977)

په داسې زمانې مقطع کې بې مسئولیتې ادعاوې او خودساخته اسناد خپرول د هغو استخباراتي مغرضو کړیو کار بولو چې په افغانانو یې ښه حالت نه لورېږي. د افغانستان اسلامي امارت په هیواد باندې بشپړ کنترول لری او هیڅ چاته اجازه نه ورکوي چې افغانستان د کوم بل هیواد د امنیت په ضد استعمال شي،

“۳/۵

**Post no. 1322** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, April 23, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1650145999539535874:](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1650145999539535874)

”خصوصاً د داعش غوندې فتنه گره ډله سختې خپل شوې او د محو کېدو په حال کې ده. دا چې د اسلامي امارت له تعهداتو او عملي اقداماتو سره سره بیا هم افغانستان نړۍ ته خطر معرفي کېږي او د دې پرځای چې دلته د موجود امن، ثبات او اسلامي امارت د مثبتو پیغامونو هرکلی وشي،

“۴/۵

**Post no. 1323 – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, April 23, 2023,**

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1650146001632612352:](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1650146001632612352)

”دا ډول مغرضانه راپورونه د دې ښکارندوی دی چې په امریکا کې ځینې کړی لا هم دافغانستان له خلکو سره له کینې او دښمنۍ څخه نه دي لاس په سر شوي.  
ټول باید پوه شي چې اوس عامه ذهنیت په دا ډول ناکامه هڅو نه تېر ایستل کیږي.  
داسلامي امارت ویاند ذبیح الله مجاهد  
۱۴۴۴/۱۰/۳ هـ ق  
- ۲۳/۴/۲۰۲۳ م  
“۵/۵

**Post no. 1324 – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, April 23, 2023,**

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1650153297192394756:](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1650153297192394756)

”سند جعلی رسانه ای شده به حواله وزارت دفاع امریکا، بخش از پروپاگند دوامدار می باشد  
بعض رسانه های غربی گزارشات را پخش کردند که گویا یک سند محرم وزارت دفاع امریکا نشان میدهد که افغانستان به مرکز به اصطلاح تروریسم تبدیل شده، که ما این ادعاها را جدا رد می نمایم.  
“۱/۵

**Post no. 1325 – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, April 23, 2023,**

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1650153299360841737:](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1650153299360841737)

”افغانستان به سطح منطقه به یک کشور با امن تبدیل شده، عید سعید فطر امسال نمونه بهتر آن است که در تمام کشور هیچ کدام رویداد امنیتی نداشتیم، همچنان در عرصه های دیپلوماتیک و سیاسی نیز شاهد پیشرفت ها و تعامل مسلسل با کشورهای مختلف هستیم، در همچو یک مقطع زمانی، پخش ادعاهای بی مسئولیت  
“۲/۵

**Post no. 1326 – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, April 23, 2023,**

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1650153301545975814:](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1650153301545975814)

”و خودساخته، کار حلقه استخباراتی میباشد که روادار حالت خوب برای افغانها نیستند.  
امارت اسلامی افغانستان بر تمام کشور کنترل کامل دارد و به هیچکس اجازه نمیدهد که خاک افغانستان علیه امنیت کدام کشور دیگر استفاده شود، به خصوص گروهک فتنه گر داعشی سخت کوبیده شده و درحالت نابودی باشد.  
“۳/۵

**Post no. 1327 – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, April 23, 2023,**

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1650153303722930176:](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1650153303722930176)

”اینکه ا. ا. با تعهدات و اقدامات عملی، هنوز هم خطری به جهان معرفی می شود و عوض آنکه از امنیت موجود، ثبات و پیام های مثبت امارت اسلامی قدردانی صورت گیرد، پخش همچنان گزارشات مغرضانه، نماینگر آن است که بعض حلقهات امریکایی هنوز هم از حقد و دشمنی با افغانستان دست بردار نشده اند.  
“۴/۵

**Post no. 1328** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, April 23, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1650153305870409729](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1650153305870409729):

”همه باید بدانند که اکنون ذهنیت عامه با همچو تلاش های ناکام فریب نمی خورد.  
ذبیح الله مجاهد سخنگوی امارت اسلامی افغانستان  
۱۴۴۴/۱۰/۳ هـ ق  
۱۴۰۲/۲/۳ ش – ۲۳/۴/۲۰۲۳ م

“۵/۵

**Post no. 1329** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, April 23, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1650165399911104512](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1650165399911104512):

“The Fake Document Released by the US Department of Defense is Part of a Continuing Propaganda Campaign  
1/7”

**Post no. 1330** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, April 23, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1650165404369559552](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1650165404369559552):

“Some Western media published reports that a certified document of the US Ministry of Defense shows that Afghanistan has become a so-called center of terrorism, we strongly reject this claim.  
2/7”

**Post no. 1331** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, April 23, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1650165408165421057](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1650165408165421057):

“Afghanistan has become a peaceful country at the regional level, this year's Eid is a good example. Fortunately, no security incidents have occurred in the entire country, also, we have witnessed continuous developments and interactions with the international community  
3/7”

**Post no. 1332** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, April 23, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1650165411827032064](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1650165411827032064):

“in the political and diplomatic field, at such a time, publishing such baseless claims and self-made documents is the work of intelligence agents who do not want Afghans to live peacefully.

The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan has full control over the country  
4/7”

**Post no. 1333** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, April 23, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1650165415505477634](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1650165415505477634):

“and does not allow anyone to use Afghanistan against the security of any other country, in particular, terrorist groups like ISIS have been severely affected and are in the process of



being destroyed.

Despite the commitments and practical measures of the Islamic Emirate  
5/7”

**Post no. 1334** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, April 23, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1650165419607506944](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1650165419607506944):

“in the areas of existing peace and stability, Afghanistan is still being introduced this way, it is obvious that the spread of such biased reports shows that some people in America have not forgotten their hatred and enmity with the people of Afghanistan.  
6/7”

**Post no. 1335** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, April 23, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1650165423382429697](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1650165423382429697):

“Everyone should know that now the public mind is moving beyond such failed attempts.7/7

Zabihullah Mujahid  
IEA's Spokesperson

١٤٤٤/١٠/٣ هـ ق  
٢٣/٤/٢٠٢٣ م – ١٤٠٢/٢/٣ هـ ش

7/7”

**Post no. 1337** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, April 23, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1650189992843460610](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1650189992843460610):

1/5”  
الوثيقة المزيفة التي أصدرتها وزارة الدفاع الأمريكية هي جزء من الأكاذيب المستمرة.

نرفض بشدة التقارير التي نشرتها بعض وسائل الإعلام الغربية والتي تفيد بأن وثيقة سرية لوزارة الدفاع الأمريكية تظهر أن أفغانستان أضحت مركزاً للإرهاب.“

**Post no. 1338** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, April 23, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1650189996719067137](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1650189996719067137):

2/5”  
أصبحت أفغانستان دولة آمنة على المستوى الإقليمي ، وعيد الفطر هذا العام هو خير مثال على ذلك حيث لم تقع أي حوادث أمنية في البلد بأكمله ، كما نشهد أيضاً تقدماً وتعاملاً مع دول مختلفة على الساحتين السياسية والدبلوماسية.“

**Post no. 1339** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, April 23, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1650190000904892420](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1650190000904892420):

3/5”  
نشر الادعاءات غير المسؤولة والمصطنعة في مثل هذا الوقت من عمل دوائر استخباراتية لاتريد أن يعيش الأفغان بسلام تتمتع إمارة أفغانستان الإسلامية بسيطرة كاملة على البلاد ولا تسمح لأحد باستخدام أراضي أفغانستان ضد أمن دولة أخرى وخاصة مجموعة الفتنة داعش التي هُزمت بشدة وفي طور القضاء“

**Post no. 1340** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, April 23, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1650190005220900868](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1650190005220900868):

4/5”

على الرغم من التزامات الإمارة الإسلامية وإجراءاتها العملية تُعرّف أفغانستان للعالم أنها مصدر خطر بدلاً من الترحيب بالأمن والاستقرار والرسائل الإيجابية للأمانة، من الواضح أن مثل هذه التقارير المتحيزة تُظهر أن بعض الدوائر في أمريكا لم تتغلب على حقدهم وعداوتهم لشعب أفغانستان.“

**Post no. 1341** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, April 23, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1650190009108971521](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1650190009108971521):

5/5”

يجب أن يعلم الجميع أن أذهان العامة لاتتخدع بهذه المحاولات الفاشلة.

المتحدث الرسمي لإمارة أفغانستان الإسلامية/ ذبيح الله مجاهد

هـ ق ١٤٤٤/١٠/٣

هـ ش ١٤٠٢/٢/٣

م 23/4/2023

**Post no. 1351** – @beijing\_embassy, X, April 28, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/beijing\\_embassy/status/1651864634746609666](https://twitter.com/beijing_embassy/status/1651864634746609666):

”په چین کې د ا.ا. امارت د لوی سفارت سرپرست سید محی الدین سادات د پنجشنبې په ورځ د اپریل په ۲۷ نېټه د افغانستان لپاره د چین د خلکو د جمهوریت د بهرنیو چارو وزارت له خاص استازي ډاکټر یوشیایونګ سره وکتل. په لیږنه کې د افغانستان په هکله په سیمه ایزو او نړیوالو دایریدونکو غونډو او...”

**Post no. 1352** – @beijing\_embassy, X, April 28, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/beijing\\_embassy/status/1651864638555041793](https://twitter.com/beijing_embassy/status/1651864638555041793):

”د افغانستان، چین او پاکستان ترمنځ په درې اړخیزو ناستو او نورو اړوندو مسائلو باندې مفصلي خبرې وشوې.

همداراز د سفارت سرپرست د مخدره موادو په کښت او قاچاق بندیز، د معتادینو درملنه، د هیواد په گوټ گوټ کې امنیت، په صادراتو او وارداتو کې زیاتوالی، د پولې واحد ثبات، له ګاونډیانو سره...”

**Post no. 1353** – @beijing\_embassy, X, April 28, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/beijing\\_embassy/status/1651864642774532098](https://twitter.com/beijing_embassy/status/1651864642774532098):

”بني اړیکې، ترانزیتی اسانتیاوې او داسې نور د امارت د تیرو څه کم دوو کلونو لاسته راوړنې وبللې او یادونه یې وکړه چې د دواړو لوریو ترمنځ په مختلفو برخو کې د همکارۍ لپاره ښه فرصتونه برابر شوي.

ځانګړي استازي یوشیا هم یادونه وکړه چې افغانستان اوس یو ازاد او مستقل هیواد دی...”

**Post no. 1354** – @beijing\_embassy, X, April 28, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/beijing\\_embassy/status/1651864647170138112](https://twitter.com/beijing_embassy/status/1651864647170138112):

”او پیاوړی نظام لري او د سیمې هیوادونو سره په ځانګړي توګه له چین سره په مختلفو برخو کې د همکارۍ زمینه برابره شوې. نوموړي زیاته کړه چې باید له لاسته راغلي فرصتونو څخه استفاده وکړو او پریږدو چې دغه فرصتونه ضایع شي.”

**Post no. 1355** – @beijing\_embassy, X, April 28, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/beijing\\_embassy/status/1651864651523846144](https://twitter.com/beijing_embassy/status/1651864651523846144):

”دواړو لوريو له يوه بل او د سيمې له هيوادونو سره په حسنه روابطو، ښه گاونډيتوب او اقتصادي راکړه ورکړې باندې ټينگار وکړ.“

**Post no. 1434** – @FDPM\_AFG, X, May 10, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/FDPM\\_AFG/status/1656209454902149122](https://twitter.com/FDPM_AFG/status/1656209454902149122):

”د ۱،۱،۱ په هڅو او د ځانگړي ستراتيژيک موقعيت په درلودو سره افغانستان د مرکزي او سويلي اسيا د وصل په نقطه بدلېدونکې دى.“

**Post no. 1435** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, May 10, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1656351618340618267](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1656351618340618267):

”Afghanistan's strategic location and efforts by the Islamic Emirate are turning it into a connecting point between Central and South Asia.”

**Post no. 1489** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, May 18, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1659247112390049792](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1659247112390049792):

”د ايران د ولسمشر د وروستيو څرگندونو په اړه د اسلامي امارت اعلاميه  
”justpaste.it/bi61p

A text from a picture embodied in the post and in the link above:

”تيره ورځ د ايران ولسمشر د هلمند د اوبو په اړه يو لړ څرگندونې درلودې چې په اړه يې موږ په لاندې ډول وضاحت کوو. د افغانستان او ايران تر مينځ د اوبو تړون چې نيمه پيرى وړاندې په ۱۳۵۱ لمريز کال کې لاسليک شوى، تر اوسه پخپل ځاى دى، د افغانستان اسلامي امارت ژمن دى چې په شوو تعهداتو باندې عمل وکړي. داچې په دا وروستيو کلونو کې په افغانستان او سيمه کې سخته وچکالي تيره شوه، د اوبو سطحه ټيټه شوې، د هلمند د رود په گډون زموږ گڼ ولايتونه اوسيمې له وچکالي څخه کرپيږي او کافي اوبه شتون نه لري. په داسې يو حالت کې د ايراني اړخ لخوا په مکرر ډول د اوبو غوښتنه او بيا په رسنيو کې يو لړ نامناسبې څرگندونې په زبان بولو. ايراني چارواکي د هلمند د اوبو په اړه بايد لومړى خپل معلومات له قانوني لارو تکميل کړي، وروسته بيا په مناسبو الفاظو خپله غوښتنه مطرح کړي، داچې واقعيت سم نه وي مطالعه شوي، او داسې څرگندونې مخې ته راځي چې د دوه ورونو او مسلمانو هيوادونو د خلکو او هيوادونو تر مينځ سياسي فضا خرابولى شي، دا د هيڅ جهت په گټه نه ده او بايد تکرار نشي. اسلامي امارت يوځل بيا ژمنه کوي چې د هلمند د اوبو د تړون په نظر کې نيولو سره ټوله سعیه کوي چې ايراني ولس ته د هغوى سره ژمنه شوي اوبه ورته پرېښودل شي، خو په دې شرط چې زموږ د اوبو زيرمې هغې کچې ته ورسېږي چې که يې ايران ته ورخوشي کړو نو د هلمند په وچ رود کې به په سوونو کليومتره لار ووهي او ايران ته به ورسېږي حال داچې فعلا د کمال خان بند کې هيڅ اوبه شتون نه لري او د کجکي بند لير اوبه که ورخوشي شي تر هغه ځايه نه رسېږي، نو په کار ده چې ايراني لورى دا حقايق درک کړي.

د افغانستان اسلامي امارت رياست الوزراء  
۱۴۴۴/۱۰/۲۸ هـ ق  
۱۴۰۲/۲/۲۸ هـ ش – ۱۸/۵/۲۰۲۳ م

**Post no. 1490** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, May 18, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1659249688200237056](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1659249688200237056):

“اعلامیه امارت اسلامی در پیوند به اظهارات اخیر رئیس جمهور ایران  
“justpaste.it/au14u

A text from a picture embodied in the post and in the link above:

”روز گذشته رئیس جمهور ایران در مورد آب هلمند یک سلسله اظهارات داشت که وضاحت ما در مورد آن قرار ذیل است. موافقتنامه آب که میان افغانستان و ایران نیم قرن قبل در سال ۱۳۵۱ هجری شمسی به امضا رسیده، تا هنوز پابرجاست و امارت اسلامی متعهد است که به تعهدات انجام شده عمل نماید. از اینکه در سال های اخیر در افغانستان و منطقه خشکسالی رخ داده و سطح آب پایین آمده است، به شمول دریای هلمند تعداد زیادی از ولایات و مناطق کشور از خشکسالی رنج می برند و آب کافی وجود ندارد. در چنین وضعیت، خواست مکرر ایران برای آب و اظهارات نامناسب در رسانه ها را زیان آور میدانیم. مقامات ایرانی ابتدا باید معلومات خود را در مورد آب هلمند تکمیل نمایند و بعد از آن با الفاظ مناسب خواست شان را مطرح کنند، اگر واقعیت درست مطالعه نشود و چنین اظهارات مطرح گردد، می تواند فضای سیاسی میان مردم و کشورهای دو ملت مسلمان را آسیب بزند که به نفع هیچ طرفی نیست و باید تکرار نگردد. امارت اسلامی یکبار دیگر تعهد می سپارد که با در نظر داشت موافقتنامه آب هلمند تمام تلاش خویش را به خرج می دهد که آب تعهد شده به مردم ایران برسد، اما به این شرط که ذخایر آب ما به اندازه ای برسد که اگر آنرا به ایران جاری بسازیم و در دریای خشک هلمند صدها کیلومتر مسیر را طی کند، به آن کشور برسد، این در حالی است که اکنون در بند کمال خان هیچ آب وجود ندارد و اگر آب بند کجکی در آن جاری گردد تا آنجا نمی رسد، بنابراین نیاز است تا جانب ایرانی این حقایق را درک نماید.  
ریاست الوزراء امارت اسلامی افغانستان  
۱۴۴۴/۱۰/۲۸ هـ ق  
۱۴۰۲/۲/۲۸ هـ ش – ۱۸/۵/۲۰۲۳ م“

**Post no. 1491** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, May 19, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1659363267947503617](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1659363267947503617):

”با پیشرفت کار در کانال ملی آب زراعتی قوشتیبه، زیبایی های آن نیز زیاد شده است  
“piped.video/rIHbnsUStuU

**Post no. 1496** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, May 19, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1659614548507394049](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1659614548507394049):

”اعلامیه امارت اسلامی افغانستان در پیوند به بی حرمتی مسجد اقصی از سوی اشغالگران اسرائیلی  
“justpaste.it/ar1e9

**Post no. 1500** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, May 19, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1659805422360883201](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1659805422360883201):

”Statement of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Regarding the Desecration of Al-Aqsa Mosque by the Israeli Occupation  
justpaste.it/9qj2q”

**Post no. 1572** – @farahimuhajer1, X, April 28, 2023,

<https://twitter.com/farahimuhajer1/status/1662315607818137600>:

”باختر اطلاعاتی اژانس درسره وڅاری

پښتو پاڼه: nitter.net/bnapashto

دري پاڼه: [nitter.net/bnadari1](https://nitter.net/bnadari1)  
انگليسي پاڼه: [nitter.net/bnaenglish](https://nitter.net/bnaenglish)

عربي پاڼه: [nitter.net/bnaarabic](https://nitter.net/bnaarabic)

اردو پاڼه: [nitter.net/bnaurdu](https://nitter.net/bnaurdu)  
ازبکي پاڼه: [nitter.net/bnauzbek](https://nitter.net/bnauzbek)  
روسي پاڼه: [nitter.net/bnarussian](https://nitter.net/bnarussian)

**Post no. 1583** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, May 28, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1662874950284484608](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1662874950284484608):

”د ترکیې د ولسمشرۍ په اړه د اسلامي امارت ریس الوزراء الحاج ملا محمد حسن اخند د مبارکي پیغام:  
بناغلي جلالتمآب رجب طیب اردوغان ته د ترکیې د انتخاباتو په دوهم پړاو کې د بریا، او د ترکیې د منتخب ولسمشر په توګه بیا  
انتخابیدو مبارکي وایم، له الله جل جلاله څخه هیله لرم چې ترکیې هیواد ته“

**Post no. 1584** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, May 28, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1662874967149797377](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1662874967149797377):

”چې په سیمه او نړۍ کې ځانګړی اهمیت لري لا قوت، ثبات او د دین خدمت ور په برخه کړي.  
د افغانستان او ترکیې د ولسونو وروړګلوي او دوستي دې همیشه او دوامداره وي.

ذبیح الله مجاهد د اسلامي امارت ویاند“

**Post no. 1585** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, May 28, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1662878956356534272](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1662878956356534272):

”پیام تبریکي ریاست الوزراء امارت اسلامی به مناسبت ریاست جمهوری کشور ترکیه

بمناسبت پیروزی آقای رجب طیب اردغان و تعیین وی به حیث رئیس جمهوری ترکیه تبریک عرض می نمایم.  
از بارگاه الهی امیدوارم که با این پیروزی به ترکیه که کشور مهم در منطقه است قوت، ثبات خدمت بیشتر دین نصیب گرداند.“

**Post no. 1586** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, May 28, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1662878974786277377](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1662878974786277377):

”دوستی و برادری ملت های ترکیه و افغانستان پاینده و دوامدار باد.

الحاج ملا محمد حسن اخند رئیس الوزراء امارت اسلامی افغانستان“

**Post no. 1587** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, May 28, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1662885232658325505](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1662885232658325505):

”رسالة تهنئة رئيس وزراء إمارة أفغانستان الإسلامية الحاج الملا محمد حسن أخوند:  
أهنيّ فوز الرئيس رجب طيب أردوغان في الجولة الثانية بالانتخابات الرئاسية التركية للسيد أردوغان وشعب تركيا الشقيق، وأسأل الله  
العليّ القدير أن يجعل من تركيا التي“

**Post no. 1588** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, May 28, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1662885249120980996](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1662885249120980996):

”لها أهمية خاصة في المنطقة والعالم دولة قوية ومزدهرة ويجعلها في خدمة الدين والمسلمين، راجياً أن تدوم الصداقة والمودة بين الشعبين الأفغاني والتركي.“

**Post no. 1591** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, May 28, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1662892439332331522](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1662892439332331522):

“Congratulatory Message of the Prime Minister of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan on the Results of the Presidential Elections in Turkey:

I would like to extend my heartfelt congratulations to H.E. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on his victory in the second round of elections1/3”

**Post no. 1592** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, May 28, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1662892444193521664](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1662892444193521664):

“and his re-election as the President of Turkey, may Allah Almighty grant more strength, stability and religious service to Turkey which plays a vital role in the region and the world.2/3”

**Post no. 1593** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, May 28, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1662892458412261376](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1662892458412261376):

“May the brotherhood and friendship of the nations of Afghanistan and Turkey be eternal.3/3

Alhaj Mullah Mohammad Hassan Akhund  
Prime Minister of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan”

**Post no. 1616** – @FDPM\_AFG, X, June 4, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/FDPM\\_AFG/status/1665319050291863553](https://twitter.com/FDPM_AFG/status/1665319050291863553):

“3/6: emphasized that the Islamic Emirate considers serving the nation as its responsibility. It strives to offer high-quality telecommunication services to citizens, along with other essential services. Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar Akhund added that the Islamic Emirate”

**Post no. 1621** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, June 5, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1665763043446513667](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1665763043446513667):

”نن ماښام په کندهار کې د هېواد په سطحه یوه ملي فابریکې (سنوفارما) چې د دوا جوړونې خورا مهمه معیاري او لویه فابریکه ده افتتاح کړي. دا فابریکه به د درملو په برخه کې تر ډیره د هېوادوالو اړتیا پوره کړي.

د سنوفارما فابریکې سهم داران ۷۱ تنه تجاران او شرکتونه دي.  
“۱/۳

**Post no. 1622** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, June 5, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehulah\\_M33/status/1665764391441014786](https://twitter.com/Zabehulah_M33/status/1665764391441014786):

”دا فابریکه به په یو شفت یعنی ۸ ساعتونو کې ۵۶۰۰۰۰۰ گولی، ۲۰۰۰۰۰۰ کپسول او ۶۰۰۰۰ بوتله شربت جوړوي.

– سنوفارما متعهد ده چې ۵۰ میلیونه دالره نور هم په ۵ پاسونو کې مصرف کړي، ترڅو دا فابریکه نوره هم غني شي.  
– د سنوفارما دوا به په ټول هیواد کې یو قیمت لری چې په دوا لیکل شوی ده.  
“۲/۳”

**Post no. 1623** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, June 5, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehulah\\_M33/status/1665764397174906881](https://twitter.com/Zabehulah_M33/status/1665764397174906881):

”د سنوفارما فابریکې د دوا کیفیت او معیار له ۹۸ فیصده نیولې تر ۱۰۲ فیصده پورې ده.

– سنوفارما د نړۍ په ۸۴ هېوادونو کې راجستر شوي ده.  
“۳/۳”

**Post no. 1624** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, June 5, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehulah\\_M33/status/1665769640864419841](https://twitter.com/Zabehulah_M33/status/1665769640864419841):

”شام امروز، فابریکه ملی (سنوفارما) که مهمترین فابریکه معیاری و بزرگ تولید دوا می باشد در ولایت قندهار افتتاح می گردد.  
این فابریکه پاسخگوی نیاز اکثر هموطنان در زمینه دوا خواهد بود.

سهمداران کارخانه سنوفارما ۷۱ تاجر و شرکت هستند.  
“۱/۳”

**Post no. 1625** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, June 5, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehulah\\_M33/status/1665769648485457921](https://twitter.com/Zabehulah_M33/status/1665769648485457921):

”این کارخانه ۵۶۰۰۰۰۰ قرص تابلیت، ۲۰۰۰۰۰۰ کپسول و ۶۰۰۰۰ بوتل شربت را در یک شیفټ یعنی ظرف ۸ ساعت تولید خواهد کرد.

سنوفارما متعهد است که در ۵ پاس دیگر نیز، ۵۰ میلیون دالر مصرف نماید تا این فابریکه بیشتر غنی شود.  
- دوا سنوفارما در تمام کشور یک قیمت خواهد داشت که روی دوا نوشته شده.  
“۲/۳”

**Post no. 1626** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, June 5, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehulah\\_M33/status/1665769672090812416](https://twitter.com/Zabehulah_M33/status/1665769672090812416):

”کیفیت و معیار ادویه فابریکه سنوفارما از ۹۸ فیصد تا ۱۰۲ فیصد خواهد بود.

- فابریکه سنوفارما در ۸۴ کشور جهان ثبت شده است.  
“۳/۳”

**Post no. 1677** – @FDPM\_AFG, X, June 15, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/FDPM\\_AFG/status/1669261015438229504](https://twitter.com/FDPM_AFG/status/1669261015438229504):

1/4:”

محترم ملا عبدالغنی برادر آخند معاون اقتصادی ریاست الوزراء پنج پروژہ بزرگ را در شهر کابل افتتاح نمود. در این مراسم که مولوی عبدالرشید شاروال کابل نیز حضور داشت، محترم ملا صاحب گفت؛ برای پیشرفت یک کشور امنیت از همه مهمتر است،“

**Post no. 1678** – @FDPM\_AFG, X, June 15, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/FDPM\\_AFG/status/1669261020823699456](https://twitter.com/FDPM_AFG/status/1669261020823699456):

2/4:”

شاروالی کابل به برکت امنیت به وجود .که اکنون الحمدلله در سراسر افغانستان وضعیت نسبت به گذشته بسیار عادی گردیده است آمده جهت زیبایی و منظم شدن شهر کابل بسیار سعی و تلاش می کند، که به مقایسه گذشته، نمای شهر منظم گردیده و ما از تمامی تلاش های شان تحسین و از آن حمایت می کنیم“

**Post no. 1679** – @FDPM\_AFG, X, June 15, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/FDPM\\_AFG/status/1669261023529046018](https://twitter.com/FDPM_AFG/status/1669261023529046018):

3/4:”

معاون اقتصادی ریاست الوزراء حین سخنان خود گفت، که با تکمیل این پروژہ ها برای شهروندان کابل تسهیلات زیادی مساعد و ازدحام کاهش خواهد یافت. از جمله این پنج پروژہ امروز کار عملی سرک ارتباطی شمال- غرب کابل آغاز گردیده است، که در ظرف یک و نیم سال تکمیل و به بهره برداری سپرده می شود.“

**Post no. 1680** – @FDPM\_AFG, X, June 15, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/FDPM\\_AFG/status/1669261171713806336](https://twitter.com/FDPM_AFG/status/1669261171713806336):

4/4:”

سرک وصل کننده شمال- غرب کابل ۷,۵ کیلومتر طول و ۳۰ متر عرض دارد که به مصرف ۵۳۰ میلیون افغانی احداث و مصارف آن از طریق عواید داخلی شاروالی کابل پرداخت می گردد. قابل یادآوریست که با اعمار این سرک ولایت های شمال کشور مستقیماً با شاهراه بزرگ ترانزیتی کابل- هرات وصل می شود.“

**Post no. 1716** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, June 20, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1670998535842697216](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1670998535842697216):

”د ملگرو ملتو اوخینو نورو غربی نهادونو او حکومتونو له آدرسه د اسلامي امارت په ضد پراخ پروپاگند روان دی، د افغانستان د وضعیت په اړه د ریچارد بینیت راپور د همداسې پروپاگند برخه ده چې له حقائقو سره سر نه خوري. په افغانستان کې اسلامي قوانین پلي دي، په هغو اعتراض له اسلام سره ستونزه ده.“

**Post no. 1717** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, June 20, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1670999469603823616](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1670999469603823616):

”از آدرس ملل متحد و بعض نهاد ها و حکومت های غربی علیه امارت اسلامی افغانستان پروپاگند وسیع به راه افتاده است. راپور ریچارد بینیت در مورد وضعیت افغانستان جزء همان پروپاگند می باشد که با حقائق تطابق ندارد. در افغانستان قوانین اسلامی نافذ است، اعتراض ها علیه آن مشکل با اسلام است.“



**Post no. 1718** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, June 20, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1671009803127201795](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1671009803127201795):

“The United Nations and some Western Institutions and Governments are spreading propaganda against the Islamic Emirate, Richard Bennett's report on the situation in Afghanistan is a part of such propaganda which does not reflect the realities.  
1/2”

**Post no. 1719** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, June 20, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1671009806591619073](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1671009806591619073):

“Islamic laws are under implementation in Afghanistan, objecting to them is a problem with Islam.  
2/2”

**Post no. 1780** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, July 1, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1675248077664583681](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1675248077664583681):

”اقتصادي مبارزه او مثبتی پایلی:

څیړنی بنیې چې افغانستان کې د انفلاسیون کچه منفي یو ته راتیږه شوی. په افغانستان کې د توکو بېی د نړۍ تر ډیرو مخ پر ودې او مترقي هیوادونو هم ټیټې دي.

لاندې موندنو کې ښکاري چې افغانستان له ډیرو پرمختللو هیوادونو څخه د انفلاسیون په کنترول کې وړاندې دی.

**Post no. 1781** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, July 1, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1675248077664583681](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1675248077664583681):

”مبارزه اقتصادی و نتایج مثبت آن:

تحقیقات نشان میدهد که حد انفلاسیون در افغانستان به منفی یک کاهش یافته. نرخ مواد در افغانستان از بسیاری کشورهای مترقی و کشور های روبه انکشاف هم پایین است. از یافته های ذیل واضح می گردد که افغانستان از بسیاری کشورها در کنترول انفلاسیون مقدم است.”

**Post no. 1790** – @HafizZiaAhmad, X, July 5, 2023,

<https://twitter.com/HafizZiaAhmad1/status/1676473308831793153>:

“IEA-MoFA condemns in strongest possible terms the brutal attacks by the Zionist invaders in Jenin city, and calls for it's immediate end.”

**Post no. 1791** – @HafizZiaAhmad, X, July 5, 2023,

<https://twitter.com/HafizZiaAhmad1/status/1676473308831793153>:

”تدین وزارت الخارجية لإمارة أفغانستان الإسلامية اعتداءات الاحتلال الصهيوني الجائرة على مدينة جنين بأشدّ العبارات وتطالب بإيقافها فوراً.“

**Post no. 1921** – @GMICafghanistan, X, July 23, 2023,  
<https://twitter.com/GMICafghanistan/status/1683044215868014592>:

#حساب\_ورکونه  
#حسابدهی  
#IEA\_Accountability\_Program

لنیک ویدیوی مراسم افتتاحیه برنامه حسابدهی دولت به ملت- مورخ اول اسد ۱۴۰۲  
“[piped.video/LTY0aQ4pJiU](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LTY0aQ4pJiU)”

**Post no. 1923** – @MoMPAfghanistan, X, July 24, 2023,  
<https://twitter.com/MoMPAfghanistan/status/1683459061293916161>:

“کارکرد های یک ساله وزارت معادن و پترولیم در برنامه حسابدهی دولت به ملت ارایه گردید  
شیخ‌الحدیث شهاب‌الدین دل‌اور سرپرست وزارت معادن و پترولیم دوشنبه مورخ ۱۴۰۲/۵/۲ در برنامه حسابدهی دولت به ملت که  
در مرکز اطلاعات و رسانه های حکومت راه اندازی گردیده بود...۱/۳  
“...momp.gov.af/dr/%DA%A9%D8%A7%

**Post no. 1941** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, July 27, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1684468740392632320](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1684468740392632320):

“له دی جملی څخه مو (۱۰۰۰) تجارتي جوازونه تنها بنځینه وو ته توزیع کړي چې هغوی به هم په تجارت کي ونډه لري.  
– کورني شرکتونو د (۱۵۰) میلیونه ډالرو په ارزښت نوی پانگونه کړی ده.  
– دتجارت وزارت د صنعت او انرژۍ په برخه کي (۲۵۰) میلیونه ډالرو په ارزښت نوري پانگونه ته چمتوالی نیسي.  
“۲/۳”

**Post no. 1945** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, July 27, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1684491603912675333](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1684491603912675333):

“ما (۱۰۰۰) جواز تجارتي را فقط برای زنان توزیع کردیم که آنها هم در تجارت مشارکت خواهند داشت.  
\_ شرکت های داخلی سرمایه‌گذاری‌های جدیدی به ارزش (۱۵۰) میلیون دالر، انجام داده‌اند.  
\_ وزارت تجارت، برای سرمایه‌گذاری در بخش صنعت و انرژی به ارزش (۲۵۰) میلیون دالر خود را آماده می‌کند.  
“۲/۳”

**Post no. 1947** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, July 7, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1684572444458471426](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1684572444458471426):

“د کورنیو چارو محترم وزیر خلیفه صاحب سراج الدین حقانی:  
د آزادی جهاد مو وکړ اوس د آبادی د جهاد وخت دی.

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وزیر داخله کشور محترم خلیفه صاحب سراج الدین حقانی:  
جهاد آزادی را تکمیل کردیم، اکنون زمان جهاد آبادی می باشد.“

Post no. 1950 – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, July 28, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1684998433709690881](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1684998433709690881):

”د محرم په مراسمو کې د ځانګړی امنیتي پلان د بڼه تطبیق په اړه د اسلامي امارت د ریاست الوزراء د مقام پیغام  
“justpaste.it/bg0p

A text from a picture embodied in the post and in the link above:

”بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم  
د خپلو ټولو مجاهدو امنیتي او دفاعي ځواکونو ستاینه او ترې مننه کوم چې د محرم د میاشتې د اولو لسو ورځو ځانګړی امنیتي پلان یې د لوی الله جل جلاله په نصرت په بڼه توګه ترتیب او تطبیق کړ او په مرکز او ولایتونو کې یې ټولو هیوادوالو ته ډاډمن امنیت تامین کړ.  
الله تعالی دې د دوی ستړیاوي او خدمتونه قبول کړي.  
له خپل ولس څخه هم مننه کوم چې له زغم او صبر څخه یې کار واخیست او په تیرو لسو ورځو کې یې زموږ له امنیتي او دفاعي ځواکونو سره بشپړه همکاري وکړه.  
لله الحمد د اسلامي امارت په راتګ سره په ټول هیواد کې ډاډمن امنیت تامین شوی، چې د محرم د مراسمو په ارامه توګه ترسره کیدل یې جوت دلیل دی.  
په دې سره هغه ټول تبلیغات غلط ثابت شول چې ځینې کړی د خپلو شومو اهدافو لپاره اوس هم افغانستان نا امنه بولي او زموږ د امنیتي ځواکونو په وړتیا کې شک لري.  
همدا ډول د اسلامي شریعت د لارښوونو له مخې د ګران هیواد د ټولو وګړو فردي، اجتماعي او مذهبي حقوق خوندي دي.  
د موجوده امنیت او ثبات په دوام سره به افغانان فرصت پیدا کړي چې خپل هیواد ورغوي او د اسلامي نظام تر سیوري لاندې د پرمختګ پر لور ګرځي.  
نړۍ، سیمه او ګاونډي هیوادونه هم باید په افغانستان کې له شته امنیت څخه ملاتړ او د دوی له سرحدونو څخه افغانستان ته د شریرو عناصرو د راتیریدو څخه مخنیوی وکړي.  
اسلامي امارت د خپل زوریدلي ولس سوکالي او له نړۍ والو سره مثبت تعامل غواړي.

د اسلامي امارت رئیس الوزراء محترم الحاج ملا محمد حسن اخند

۱۴۴۵/۱/۱۰هـ.ق-

۲۰۲۳/۷/۲۸م، ۱۴۰۲/۵/۶هـ.ش -

Post no. 1951 – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, July 29, 2023,

[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1685118716508569600](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1685118716508569600):

”پیام مقام ریاست الوزراء امارت اسلامی افغانستان در پیوند به تطبیق بهتر پلان امنیتي در مراسم محرم  
“justpaste.it/2dgua

A text from a picture embodied in the post and in the link above:

”بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم  
از تمام نیروهای مجاهد امنیتي و دفاعي خويش تمجید و تشکر میکنم که پلان امنیتي ده روز اول ماه محرم را به نصرت الله بزرگ جل جلاله به گونه بهتر ترتیب و تطبیق کردند و در مرکز و ولایات در تمام کشور برای همه هموطنان امنیت مطمئن را تامین نمودند.  
الله تعالی خستگی ها و خدمات آنان را قبول نماید. از مردم خويش تشکر میکنم که از صبر و حوصله کار گرفتند و در ده روز گذشته با نیروهای امنیتي و دفاعي ما همکاری کامل کردند.  
لله الحمد با آمدن امارت اسلامی در تمام کشور امنیت مطمئن تامین شده که انجام مراسم عاشورا در فضای آرام دلیل برجسته آن می باشد.  
با این تمام تبلیغات نادرست ثابت شد که بعضی از حلقات هنوز هم بخاطر اهداف شوم شان افغانستان را ناامن می پندارند و در توانایی نیروهای امنیتي ما شک دارند.  
به همین ترتیب بر اساس دستورات شریعت اسلامی، حقوق فردي، اجتماعي و دینی همه شهروندان کشور عزیز محفوظ است.  
با تداوم امنیت و ثبات موجود، افغان ها فرصت خواهند داشت تا کشور خود را بسازند و در سایه نظام اسلامی گام های سریع در جهت توسعه بردارند.  
جهان، منطقه و کشورهای همسایه باید از امنیت موجود افغانستان حمایت و از سرحدات شان به افغانستان از عبور عناصر شرور جلوگیری نمایند. امارت اسلامی خواستار رفاه و آسایش مردم رنج دیده خويش و تعامل مثبت با جهان می باشد.

محترم ملا محمد حسن اخند رئيس الوزراء امارت اسلامي  
۱۱/۱/۱۴۴۵ھق-  
۱۴۰۲/۵/۷ھش - ۲۰۲۳/۷/۲۹م“

**Post no. 2046** – @bnapashto, X, August 6, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/bnapashto/status/1688133623377969152:](https://twitter.com/bnapashto/status/1688133623377969152)

”ملت ته د دولت حساب ورکولو پروگرام کې، د #کابل\_بناوالی د فرهنگي چارو مشاور او نماینده نعمت الله بارکزي وویل: دغه اداري په تیر کال کې ۴۸۸ زره ټنه کثافات راټول او د گزک سیمي ته یې انتقال کړي دي.  
نور حال  
#باختر“

**Post no. 2060** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, August 8, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1688970807438184448:](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1688970807438184448)

”د پاکستانی چارواکو د مکررو تورو په اړه د اسلامي امارت د ویاند څرگندونې  
“justpaste.it/74foo

**Post no. 2061** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, August 8, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1688983591928336384:](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1688983591928336384)

”اظهارات سخنگوی امارت اسلامي درباره اتهامات مکرر مقامات پاکستانی  
“justpaste.it/bs2x5

**Post no. 2062** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, August 8, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1689125735288520704:](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1689125735288520704)

”پاکستانی حکام کی جانب سے مسلسل الزامات کے بعد امارت اسلامي کے ترجمان کا موقف  
“justpaste.it/c6l5p

**Post no. 2064** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, August 9, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1689156676887195648:](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1689156676887195648)

“IEA Spokesperson Statement on Repeated Allegations by Pakistani Officials  
justpaste.it/3pn2y”

**Post no. 2065** – @Zabehullah\_M33, X, August 9, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/Zabehullah\\_M33/status/1689158330525097984:](https://twitter.com/Zabehullah_M33/status/1689158330525097984)

”تصريح المتحدث الرسمي للإمارة الإسلامية بشأن المزاعم المتكررة للمسؤولين الباكستانيين  
“justpaste.it/912am

**Post no. 2090** – @AwCharw, X, August 13, 2023,  
[https://twitter.com/AwCharw/status/1690669919887609856:](https://twitter.com/AwCharw/status/1690669919887609856)

”ملت ته د دولت د حساب ورکولو په پروگرام کې شیخ صاحب عبدالحکیم حقاني وویل: یاد وزارت تر دي دمه (۶۳۸۹۵۴) ټنه معلولين، کوندي او يتيمان ثبت کړي چې په پورتنی ارقامو کې (۸۷۰۸۷) ټنه کوندي، (۳۷۱۴۲۰) ټنه يتيمان، (۱۴۹۶۷۲) ټنه نارينه معلولين، (۳۰۷۷۷) ټنه بنځينه معلولين شاملې دي.“