

## ABSTRACT

1. The introductory chapter provides an overview of the research question - namely the relationship between religion and modern democracy - and the literature used in the discussion of the topic. It is first shown that for the discussion of the connection between religion and modern democracy, no meaningful reference can be made to the concept of "political religions", which was developed in particular by Eric Voegelin for the connection between religion and modern totalitarian systems.

On this basis, the concluding part of the introduction states the two central aims of the thesis: in a first step, other concepts (than that of political religion) are to be examined that might be considered for a discussion of the relationship between modern democracy and religion, in particular the concept of civil religion. Since this is not the case, the work turns to a second objective: the question of whether the historical beginnings of modern democracy in Paris in 1789 can instead provide a better answer to the question.

2. The second chapter will therefore examine the question of whether one of various conceptual proposals is suitable for clarifying this connection in a general way. Theological (Rothe, Gogarten, Rhonheimer), legal (Hörnle) and sociological (Durkheim) approaches are presented, but in particular the concept of civil religion and modern nationalism, which has been qualified as the "religion of modernity" for around one hundred years. As a result, none of these proposals is suitable for providing general, i.e. globally generalisable, insights into the relationship between democracy and religion.

3. Instead, it is proposed to turn to the concrete phenomena that accompanied the historical beginning of modern democracy in the spring and summer of 1789. These phenomena were already interpreted by Sieyès in 1789 in a way that has remained powerful to this day - namely as the appearance of a nation declaring itself sovereign. The question of whether this interpretation is convincing from a historiographical point of view is the subject of the third chapter. It must be answered in the negative: the force that emerged as an inspiring and violent force in 1789 could not have been the sovereign nation.

4. As a more convincing explanation of the events of the time, the concept of revelation is introduced in the fourth and final chapter and presented in detail. A closer look at the parliamentary events of 1789 shows that they can easily be interpreted as an event of revelation. The peculiar nature of this revelation and attributes of the power that is revealed (the "people's sovereign"), are presented, and objections are discussed that could be raised against the application of the concept of revelation to the parliamentary events in Paris in 1789. Finally, it is shown that Jean-Jacques Rousseau's contribution, which was in any case essential for the revolutionary events, can be read not only as an intellectual stimulus, but also as a concrete prophecy pointing to the appearance of the people's sovereign.