

My thesis focuses on the topic of gender selection (deliberate determination of the child's gender which is now possible thanks to recent developments in reproductive medicine) from the perspective of biomedical ethics. The main question is whether the practise of gender selection complies with the 4 basic principles of bioethics against which all medical action should be assessed (principle of autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence and justice). In the thesis, I distinguish between two main types of gender selection: gender selection for medical and non-medical reasons. The main focus is put on the second type, which is more ethically disputable, as it is not as directly related to the child's health and well-being as the first type. Gender selection for non-medical reasons is practiced in the context of multiple interactions of social, political, economic and other factors that all inform parental choices. One of the very influential factors is the medical discourse. For the purpose of complex contextualisation of gender selection for non-medical reasons, the concept of procreative liberty (introduced by J.A. Robertson) and feminist critiques of reproductive choices are presented. My main argument is that gender selection for non-medical reasons should not be legal and available as it has a high potential of reproducing gender stereotypes.

Keywords: gender, gender selection, bioethics, feminism, diversity, procreative liberty, autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence, justice