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The Hidden Debt Scandal in Mozambique:

Analysing the Impact of Elite Corruption on Human Security

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List of Abbreviations

ARA - Regional Water Administration

ARA-Centro - Regional Water Administration Central Mozambique

CL - Civil liberties

CPI - Corruption Perceptions Index

EIU - Economic Intelligence Unit

EPI - Environmental Performance Index

EVI - Environmental Vulnerability Index

FFP - Fund for Peace

Frelimo - Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Mozambique Liberation Front)

FSI - Food Security Index & Fragile State Index

GDP - Gross domestic product

GFS - Global Freedom Score

GHG - Greenhouse Gas

GHI – Global Hunger Index

HD - Hidden Debts

HDI - Human Development Index

HDR - Human Development Report

HDS - Hidden Debt Scandal

HSI - Human Security Index

IFF - Illicit Financial Flow

IMF - International Monetary Fund

INE - The National Statistics Institute in Mozambique

MAM - Mozambique Asset Management

NSI - National Statistics Institute

OECD - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

PFI - Press Freedom Index

PR - Political rights

PTS - Political Terror Scale

Renamo - Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambique National Resistance)

RSF - Reporters without Borders

SIDA - Swedish International Cooperation Development Agency

UN DESA - United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs

UN Water - United Nations Water

UNDP - United Nations Development Programme

UNHSU - United Nations Human Security Unit

USD - United States Dollar

WASH - Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

WGI - World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators

WHO - World Health Organisation

YCELP - Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy

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Abstract

This thesis aims to investigate the detrimental effects of elite corruption on the level of human security experienced by a state's citizens, employing the 2016 Hidden Debt Scandal in Mozambique as a case study. The Hidden Debt Scandal involved the misappropriation and concealment of \$2 billion in unapproved loans secured against the state's assets, obtained by an elite group of politicians and businessmen. By analysing various indices and data sources from the period spanning 2012 to 2022, the research evaluates the impact of the debt scandal on different aspects of human security as described in the 1994 Human Development Report by the United Nations Development Programme. These aspects include the economic, political, food, health, environmental, personal, and community pillars of human security, allowing for a comprehensive assessment of potential threats and consequences.

The findings indicate a worsening trend in a many of the indices following the Hidden Debt Scandal, however, some data does not align with that expected outcome. Additionally, the study acknowledges the influence of other economic, political, social, and environmental factors that may have contributed to human insecurity in Mozambique during the specified timeframe. Consequently, it is argued that while the Hidden Debt Scandal is not solely responsible for the overall state of human insecurity during this period, it emerges as a significant contributing factor, encouraging further research on the broad effects of elite, grand corruption on human security.

Section 1 - Introduction

This dissertation seeks to address the impact of elite corruption on human security using the 2016 Hidden Debt Scandal in Mozambique as a case study. This is accomplished by evaluating the change in a series of indices and data from before, during and after the scandal that indicates the level of human security experienced by the Mozambican population. Section 1 will present the facts of the case study by outlining the details and conditions of the scandal and highlighting the scale and level of injustice committed. It will also provide a summary of Mozambique's history of governance and security which contextualises the events that unfolded in the past decade as well as recent figures regarding corruption and human development. Section 2 introduces and critically evaluates the existing literature regarding the Hidden Debt Scandal, as well as the many conceptualisations of human security, and defines hidden debts and corruption. In Section 3, the methodological approach is introduced and justified while highlighting the limitations of the research. The analysis is conducted in Section 4 and is divided into six parts corresponding to the human security pillars outlined in the 1994 United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) Human Development Report (HDR): economic, political, food, health, environment, personal and community security. Personal and community security are discussed together in the final section of the analysis because the data used overlaps. Conclusions about each of these components of human security are drawn throughout the analysis based on the three measures selected to measure that human security pillar. The fifth and final section compiles these individual conclusions to present final remarks about how the Mozambican population's human security as a whole can be argued to have been impacted by the Hidden Debt Scandal.

Cases Study: The Hidden Debt Scandal in Mozambique

The following section provides a summary of the event known as the ‘Hidden Debt Scandal’ which provides the basis for understanding its impact on human security. It also presents how the hidden debts were unconstitutional and corrupt, evidencing that elite corruption did indeed occur in this time period in Mozambique.

The Hidden Debt Scandal in Mozambique refers to an event where an estimated \$2 billion (USD) in hidden loans intended for public good were misappropriated by an elite group. The responsible parties within this elite group include senior Mozambican politicians and public servants, Credit Suisse and VTB Capital bankers in Europe, as well as businessmen and contractors from the shipbuilding company Privinvest based in Abu Dhabi and Lebanon (Navarra & Rodrigues, 2018; Cortez et. al., 2021). This case has been referred to in Mozambican and international media, academic literature, and policy papers as the ‘Hidden Debt Scandal’, the ‘Hidden Debt Crisis’, the ‘Tuna Bonds Affair’, and the ‘Secret Loans Affair’ amongst other variations. For continuity, the case will hereinafter be referred to as the Hidden Debt Scandal or abbreviated to HDS. The case involves a high number of actors and processes, spanning over years and jurisdictions, and a significant amount of the money involved has yet to be traced and recovered.

The timeline of the case begins officially in September 2013 when the initial loans were contracted from CreditSuisse and VTB Capital by three Mozambican state-owned companies (Williams & Isaksen, 2016, p.7). Communication between individuals from Privinvest, managers at Credit Suisse, and some government-linked Mozambican individuals began already “sometime after 2010” regarding a significantly sized business deal, but the initial dealings associated with the HDS arguably started in 2013 when there were definitive deals made (Cortez et al., 2021, p.16). The three companies created with the

intent to secure the loans were EMATUM, ProIndicus, and Mozambique Asset Management (MAM) and they were all “co-owned by other state companies” and departments including the State Information and Security Service and the Ministry of Defence (Navarra & Rodrigues, 2018, p.3). EMATUM was intended to be a tuna-fishing fleet as well as providing maritime security, ProIndicus was created to provide maritime security for offshore oil and gas enterprises, and MAM’s responsibilities would lie in maritime equipment maintenance and repair (Navarra & Rodrigues, 2018, p.3). However, the appointed CEO of all three companies would later admit that “the tuna concept had been a pretext for defence expenditure” (Branson, 2017, p.1). The first illegal and corrupt action, and where the initial impact on other uninvolved parties began, was the state’s secret decision to guarantee the loans which were then authorised by the Ministry of Finance without a vote in the Assembly of the Republic (Navarra & Rodrigues, 2018, p.3). This action affected Mozambique’s public debt, meaning that it would eventually become a burden to be carried by the whole state and its people as opposed to one carried by solely those responsible. The public was alerted to the existence of a \$850 million loan regarding the EMATUM company in 2013, and when the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was informed of it they required it to be included in the state budget (Cortez et al., 2021, p.16; Navarra & Rodrigues, 2018, p.3). However, they were not yet aware of the two other loans that had been granted.

In April 2016, the Wall Street Journal revealed that the Mozambican government was hiding at least a further \$1 billion in debt (Wirz & Wirnau, 2016). In the same month following this revelation, the IMF, the World Bank, and other individual donor countries suspended their programs in Mozambique (Haysom, 2019, p.7). In November 2016, a parliamentary commission would report that “the debts were contracted without proper parliamentary authorisation” (Navarra & Rodrigues, 2018, p.3). Because of the debt’s size the

guarantee made by the state was void because the debts surpassed the legal limits set for the contraction of loans made without a vote in the assembly. Hence, the procuring of the loans was deemed a constitutional violation and to be breaking budget laws (Navarra & Rodrigues, 2018, p.3). It would later be revealed that there were also price discrepancies in assets and services, “substantial overpricing” by contractors, and of the three companies, none ever had “coherent business plans nor were they fully operational” (Navarra & Rodrigues, 2018, p.4). As stated, the total of the three loans amounted to roughly \$2 billion. This corresponds to around “12% of GDP of one of the poorest countries in the world” which highlights the incredible scope and severity of this case (Cortez et al., 2021, p.6). A case such as the Hidden Debt Scandal would rock any country, but Mozambique in particular was already in a vulnerable state due to other factors such as tensions between the two leading political parties Frelimo and Renamo, insurgency violence in the northern region of Cabo Delgado, high poverty rates and high exposure to natural disasters. Therefore, when analysing the HDS’s impact on human security, these factors are also considered.

At the time of writing in 2023 the legal repercussions for the parties involved have varied, with charges ranging from bribery, money laundering, and blackmail to wire and securities fraud. The former president of Mozambique’s son and ten other individuals were found guilty in a Mozambican court for charges related to the hidden loans in December 2022, while eight others were acquitted (Mucari, 2022). Mozambique’s former finance minister was arrested in 2017 in South Africa in connection to the HDS and lost an appeal there in May 2023 meaning that he faces extradition to the United States (Magome, 2023). In a different case, Credit Suisse has agreed to pay “\$475 million to American and British authorities to settle allegations of bribery and kickbacks related to the bank’s involvement in the loans” (Magome, 2023, no pagination). A subsidiary of the Russian bank VTB “also agreed to pay \$6 million to settle

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission charges it misled investors” (Mucari, 2022, no pagination). Despite a thorough forensic analysis investigation in 2017 by the auditing company Kroll, financed by the Swedish government and the IMF, at least \$500 million remains unaccounted for to this day (Haysom, 2019; Williams, 2018).

Historical Background

The following section provides a historical summary of the events and circumstances that have led the Mozambican state to the situation that it is in today, \$2 billion in debt to external partners at the expense of its people. It also serves to provide a basis to understand not only why and how these loans were contracted, but also how this context affects the level of impact the HDS has had on Mozambican society.

The Independent Republic of Mozambique is situated on the south-eastern coast of Africa and is home to around 32 million people. As a former Portuguese colony, Mozambique's history of governance and security has been turbulent. Mozambique's independence was officially established in 1975 following a decade-long liberation war which tore through the northern provinces in particular (Bueno, 2021, p.1019). During the liberation war, the ‘Frente de Libertação de Moçambique’ (Frelimo) was the major actor in securing Mozambique's independence, and it later became the ruling party, which it still is to this day almost 50 years later (Bueno, 2021, p.1019). However, it would take another two decades before economic and democratic development could faithfully be attempted. In 1977, the country was thrust into yet another violent conflict, this time between the dominant Soviet-supported group Frelimo and the oppositional US-supported ‘Resistência Nacional Moçambicana’ (Renamo) (Weinstein & Francisco, 2005, p.163). With estimations of upwards of one million war-related deaths and millions more

displaced during the 15 years the war lasted, it left deep scars and residual tensions felt to this day (Weinstein & Francisco, 2005, p.165).

However, following the 1992 General Peace Agreement that put an end to 16 years of civil war, the country performed remarkably well economically by experiencing sustained economic growth, leading it to outperform most others in the region (Borowczak, Kaufmann & Weimer, 2020; Mambo et al., 2018). Multi-party elections were held and constitutionalised in 1994, however, Frelimo had at this point become entrenched with the state, leaving the political system to resemble one of a party-state (Sumich & Honwana, 2007). Despite numerous dubious elections, international development partners were impressed with the success of Mozambique's peacebuilding projects, poverty reduction, democratisation, post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction efforts, along with the aforementioned economic growth. The country was therefore often hailed as a success story, making it known for some time as the 'donor darling' of the international community (Borowczak, Kaufmann & Weimer, 2020; Bunk, 2018). Although there were certainly a number of governance issues present in the country, international development partners were seemingly hopeful about the country's future, and somewhat accepted these issues in the midst of all the successes (Hanlon, 2004). Donor aid became a large part of Mozambique's national budget, so for decades now, its economy and growth have relied heavily on external parties. However, the successes projected to external partners have not necessarily trickled down to the larger population. In 2001, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Integrated Regional Information Network stated that "ordinary Mozambicans have yet to see any real changes in their daily lives, despite official World Bank figures" (Hanlon, 2004, p.3). High-figure dealings and investments in Mozambique with a low pay-out for ordinary citizens have become somewhat of a trend in Mozambique, as have corruption cases and scandals. Corruption is largely contextual, it is crucial to understand some of the

historical background which led to the political and economic system that exists in Mozambique today. These events are what created the environment and conditions in which the HDS was able to occur, and it could affect the severity of the impact of the hidden debts.

Current Figures

High-level corruption is a malady that has plagued Mozambique for decades. In 2022 alone, corruption cost the state at least \$9.6 million according to the annual report on the justice system presented to the Mozambican parliament by the Attorney-General (CoM, 2023). The figures presented to the parliament, called the Assembly of the Republic, are conservative and only account for the cases already known to prosecutors, meaning that the real figure of the cost of corruption in Mozambique is assumed to be considerably larger. An estimate of the cost of corruption in Mozambique between 2002 and 2014 by the Chr. Michelsen Institute presents a figure of \$4.9 billion (Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2016, p.7). Mozambique's General Attorney's Office voiced that in 2016, illicit financial flows (IFFs) cost the state an estimated \$26.4 million (Kukutschka, 2018, p.6). Mozambique is not alone in dealing with the costly effects of corruption and illicit financial flows (IFF). Kukutschka (2018, p.2) states that on the African continent, some calculations suggest that IFFs "surpass the levels of development aid received" depriving the state and the people of much-needed resources.

In Transparency International's most recent Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) ranking (2022), Mozambique placed 142nd out of 180 countries with a score of 26/100. The score each country receives is judged by the "perceived level of public sector corruption" by "experts and businesspeople" where 0 is determined to be "highly corrupt" and a score of 100 means the country is "very clean" (Transparency International, 2021, no pagination). When looking at the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), Mozambique had a

rank of 22.6 in the ‘Control of Corruption’ indicator of 2021, where 0 is the lowest rank in comparison to all countries in the world and 100 is the highest (The World Bank, 2021b). Beyond the grim estimations and rankings regarding corruption levels, Mozambique also performs poorly in the UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI), scoring a value of 0.446 in 2021 (UNDP, 2021). In comparison, the 2021 world average was 0.732, meaning that Mozambique scored lower in all indices that make up the HDI: life expectancy at birth, expected years of schooling, mean years of schooling, and Gross National Income per capita (UNDP, 2021). Within the Sub-Saharan Africa group consisting of 46 countries, only six countries have a lower score than Mozambique (UNDP, 2021). These figures and rankings clearly illustrate the challenges that the Mozambican state is facing in providing its citizens with the different elements that would improve their level of human security. The Hidden Debt Scandal which this thesis seeks to examine, is argued to have placed more stress on an already fragile state and further endangered the human security of the Mozambican people.

Section 2 - Literature review

Having introduced the Mozambican context as well as the case study in further detail, the literature deemed to be relevant to assess the impact on human security due to the Hidden Debt Scandal revolves around the debt scandal itself, human security, and corruption studies. The literature review will first cover the literature on human security relevant to the question. Rather than detailing the myriad of debates and criticisms within the human security framework, the literature that will be used to guide the analysis section will be covered as well as a general outline of how human security literature has reached the point that it has come to today. Then, the existing literature on the HDS and the existing gaps in the literature will be addressed, which provides the rationale for the thesis itself. The literature discussing the intersection of corruption and human

security studies will also be highlighted. Lastly, definitions and short discussions of corruption and hidden debts will also be provided in this section.

Human Security Literature

The human security framework was conceptualised at a time when the concept of ‘security’ was broadening both in academia and in praxis. Following the end of the Cold War, states and institutions were increasingly looking to neo-liberalism and democratic governance as the solutions to international stability. As inter-state warfare and nuclear standoffs declined, other major challenges and conflicts arose, so a new understanding of security was imminent and perhaps even necessary. Human security proponents shifted the focus from state security to the security of people, essentially merging development and security. The United Nations laid the foundations for a widespread but conceptually broad understanding of human security with The Report on Human Development of 1994. This report defined human security as universal, interdependent, preventative, and people-centered (UNDP, 1994). The report also established seven categories of human security, namely: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political security. In the General Assembly resolution 66/290, human security is described as an “approach to assist Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people” (UNTFHS, no date b, no pagination). This definition encapsulates two fundamental freedoms outlined in the 1945 UN Charter, namely: “freedom from want” and “freedom from fear” (UN Charter, 1945). The establishment of the Commission on Human Security in 2001 further confirmed human security’s place in the theoretical and practical understanding and application of security (UNTFHS, no date b). Criticisms of the theory were plentiful, much of it directed at the ambiguity of the concept and the feasibility of its real-world application, so the malleability of human security can be understood as both a feature and a flaw. To its proponents, the ambiguity has allowed the concept to

continuously evolve over time and cover a wide range of applications, definitions, and measurements.

There is not one singular definition that encapsulates all that human security is argued to be, rather “each proponent of the concept has his or her own definition” (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 2007, p.9). Some authors raise the point that providing a precise definition of human security is difficult because “human security is more easily identified through its absence than its presence, and most people instinctively understand what security means” (Fukuda-Parr & Messineo, 2012, p.6). What is commonly agreed upon however, is that the human understanding of security sets itself apart from other theories of international relations and development because it centres on the human experience rather than power and statehood. Fukuda-Parr and Messineo (2012, p.14) describe four conceptual innovations offered by MacFarlane and Khong (2006), the first one being that the “state is no longer privileged over the individual”. Along with centring the individual over the state, human security also “provides a vocabulary for understanding the human consequences of violent conflict” (Fukuda-Parr & Messineo, 2012, p.14). Thirdly, it is highlighted that already at the time of writing in 2012, several states and organisations had made human security an integral part of their foreign policy and this trend has seemingly continued. Lastly, whilst the securitisation of issues that would previously not have been considered security issues per se has been met with criticism, it has also “resulted in more policy attention and resources for these issues” (Fukuda-Parr & Messineo, 2012, p.14).

Authors such as Axworthy (2001, p.19) similarly argue that in human security a much broader range of threats should be considered than in traditional discussions of security, because it centres the protection of people from more than just traditional warfare, which “must be a principal concern”. Human security as defined by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of

Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) is fixed to a certain set of principles. These principles define human security as people-centric, multi-sectoral, comprehensive, context-specific, and prevention-oriented in a similar but not identical fashion to the 1994 Human Development Report (UN OCHA, no date, p.7). Others such as Beebe and Kaldor (2010) distinguish their idea of security from traditional security by moving away from concepts such as militarisation, statehood, warfare, and hegemony, and rather include other dimensions such as healthcare, food and water, shelter, and the aforementioned ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’.

Criticisms and debates

Providing a comprehensive and detailed review of the existing human security literature and the debates it has sparked is beyond the scope of this research. Therefore, while some of the broader criticisms and analytical angles will be discussed, the main priority is to review the literature as it pertains to the following analysis of elite corruption and its usefulness in analysing the impact of said corruption on a state and its people.

Broad versus narrow human security?

To its proponents, the broad and malleable nature of human security theory is an asset because it means that it can be applied in a range of cases and different levels of severity. The broad conceptualisation of human security has been pushed by a range of organisations and authors including the UNDP, “the European Council and the Barcelona Group, the Commission on Human Security” and different academics (Fukuda-Parr & Messineo, 2012, p.5). The broadest of approaches would likely include “all threats and vulnerabilities to human freedom and dignity including threats of hunger, disease, natural disasters, economic downturns, political repression” (Fukuda-Parr & Messineo, 2012, pp.5-6). In this broad vision of human security, it is not necessarily regarded as a tool to enact policies, rather it can be understood as a concept or

paradigm that introduces overarching ethical norms in the security sphere (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007). Tadjbakhsh (2013, p.54) argues that “human security should not be reduced to lists or to a narrow definition” rather, the flexibility of the concept allows for “a deeper understanding of the root of insecurities and capacities to address them”. She further explains that proponents of broad human security “believe that research should be concerned with ways in which definitions insisted on by security studies circumvent political, moral and ethical concerns in order to concentrate on relations of power” (Tadjbakhsh, 2013, p.46). From that position, the lack of definitional consensus is not a flaw but rather “a refusal to succumb to the dominant political agenda” (Tadjbakhsh, 2013, p.46).

To its critics, the broad conceptualisation of human security is flawed and some authors direct criticisms toward the ambiguity of the concept and the difficulties in translating theory to practice. Authors such as MacFarlane and Khong (2006) and Mack (2002) believe that in the process of stretching the concept of human security to include all threats against human security, the usefulness of human security as a policy tool diminishes. According to Howard-Hassman (2012, p.91) the narrower understanding of human security “focuses on crisis situations that require international remedies”. Therefore, if human security cannot be utilised as a policy tool it loses value and Howard-Hassman (2012, p.101) argues that broad human security thus “does not improve on the national laws, principles, and policies meant to protect, promote, and fulfill human rights”. Muguruza (2007, p.15) however, argues that “human security has already proved its utility as a tool for policy analysis” therefore the focus now should lie in adopting human security “as a policy framework where the security, human rights and development agendas are integrated”.

For some with narrower definitions of human security, the focus lies in the prevention of violence. Mary Kaldor’s (2011, p.5) definition of human security

“emphasises what the UNDP calls personal security” and the security of humans experiencing “violent upheavals”. Owen (2004, p.385) is also among the authors who believe that a broad, vague, definition of human security is insufficient in achieving “the very purpose of human security” which he describes as being about re-evaluating both theory, policy, and resources to focus on “the issues actually affecting people, rather than to those the military establishment deems important”. However, he also believes that those advocating for a narrow conceptualisation of human security, that want to focus primarily on violence as a human security threat, are disregarding the level of harm present from nonviolent threats (Owen, 2004). Therefore, Owen (2004, p.382) proposes a “hybrid definition” that diverges from both broad and narrow conceptualisations. In this definition, instead of security threats being listed in advance, “threats would be included on the basis of their actual severity” which means that a range of different threats could be considered but “only those that surpass a threshold of severity would be labeled threats to human security” (Owen, 2004, p.382).

Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007, p. 9) summarise this ‘broad versus narrow’ debate by stating that the definition of human security ranges “from a narrow term for prevention of violence to a broad comprehensive view that proposes development, human rights and traditional security together”. Despite the criticisms of its broadness, the UNDP (1994) conceptualisation of human security is the basis on which the analysis will be built in this thesis. The criticisms of broadness are valid and serve a purpose in developing the human security framework. However, when evaluating the impact of the HDS the malleability of the UNDP definition is considered a feature rather than a flaw. The direct and indirect costs of the HDS are diverse and broad, so it is argued that a narrow conceptualisation of human security would place limitations on the analysis conducted. Using UNDP’s seven pillars of human security also functions as an analytical guideline ensuring that all aspects of human security

are considered, even in cases where the impact on a specific human security component would not be immediately obvious. The analysis will therefore be conducted by looking at a range of measures that add to the understanding of how each of the seven human security pillars may have been affected by the HDS.

Human Security and Corruption

Seemingly, most literature that bridges human security and corruption in those precise terms is quite disaggregated, and many focus on particular country case studies. There is plenty of literature that has been published connecting corruption and human rights, corruption and good governance, corruption and human development, etc. These concepts may be strongly connected to human security, but they are not indistinguishable. For instance, to some academics and practitioners, human security can be understood as addressing more urgent threats whereas development addresses the broader wellbeing of society. Taylor Owen (2004, p.381) describes that even in its early stages, the difference was made clear in that “human security was said to be a necessary but not sufficient precondition for human development.” In terms of corruption and human development, Johnston (2005, p.10) for example argues that “particular syndromes of corruption are linked, via participation and institutions, to deeper problems of development.”

Based on empirical findings, Bo Rothstein (2011, p.14) outlines the ways in which corruption harms human well-being by arguing that “the state’s administrative capacity, control of corruption, and quality of government is central for development and human well-being.” He describes that high levels of administrative capacity and quality of government in states “generate social trust, which makes it easier to create large sets of public goods in a society” which then leads to those societies being “more successful than their opposites in fostering human well-being” (Rothstein, 2011, p.16). In his research he also

finds that “high levels of corruption and low levels of quality of government are important causal factors behind low social trust” (Rothstein, 2011, p.15). Although Rothstein does not explicitly mention human security, this research which finds causal links between high social trust, good governance and human well-being are relevant because human well-being is a central theme in human security.

In terms of development aid and corruption, Tucker (2013, p.2) suggests that “the way in which official development assistance has routinely been administered has had a corrupting influence on the societies in which it has been administered” and furthermore, when it is not confronted it “has inevitably led to grand corruption”. He links corruption and human security in stating that “corruption not only impairs the physical security and well-being of countless citizens, but substantially increases the probability that fragile states will degenerate into failed states” which would ultimately impact human security (Tucker, 2013, p.11). He is a proponent of evaluating corruption through a human security framework because “the myriad complex issues surrounding human security – including corruption – require different modes of redress than those traditionally used in national security or international security frameworks” (Tucker, 2013, p.12). Traditional security frameworks, he believes, are not as well-equipped to confront and prevent corruption as the human security framework.

There are particular case studies that have been presented linking corruption and human security such as in Uddin’s (2014, p.18) research which finds that corruption is one of the root causes fuelling “human trafficking and threatens human security of the trafficked persons in South Asian countries”. Sen and Mallick (2006, p.2) argue in their research on India’s presidency in the mid-1970’s that the “securitization of development, in order to extricate the national developmental enterprise from the deadweight of corruption” ultimately led to

the de-politicization of development efforts “which in turn negatively impacted human security”. Furthermore, in his research paper “The Impact of Corruption on the Human Security of Societies in Transition” Ahmed Mohamed Hassan (2020) examines the case of Iraq in its transitional period post-2003. In it, he tests three main assumptions:

First: There is a strong correlation between corruption and human security. Second: Correlation between corruption and human security is reverse, i.e., the more the corruption, the less human security achieved. Third: There is a significant impact of corruption on human security. Impacts of its dimensions vary. Political corruption is the most widespread and influential. (Hassan, 2020, p.3)

The research paper presents statistical social survey data gathered through a questionnaire asking “the opinion of a sample of the employees in the public and private sectors” (Hassan, 2020, p.3). The findings of the research paper confirm the three hypotheses, except they did not prove “that political corruption is the most critical dimension in the spread of corruption, even if it was at a high degree” (Hassan, 2020, p.17). While much of the context is different between Mozambique and Iraq, the establishment of a reverse correlation between corruption and human security in this case is useful to show that this research topic is relevant. Given these connections established that are outlined above between corruption and human security, it is argued that the study of corruption, and the Hidden Debt Scandal in particular, is suited to be examined through a human security lens. This is because it can affect people’s security by causing financial insecurity, as well as creating barriers to education, healthcare, housing, freedom of movement, access to food, and other necessities. It can also have a hampering effect politically and socially through its impact on the trust and transparency of governments.

The Hidden Debt Scandal Literature

Research regarding the HDS cannot be regarded as abundant, however, there are key pieces that address the topic from different analytical angles. There are studies, research projects, reports, investigations, and articles that have been written about the effects of the hidden loans on the Mozambican economy, political security, and to some extent the effects on human security. However, these are not explicitly framed as human security issues. Rather, they focus on certain aspects of society and the state that certainly falls under the human security umbrella, but they are discussed in more broad general terms or as they pertain to that specific issue. Reviewing the literature surrounding the HDS does not seem to reveal a topic in which there are major debates or vastly contradicting views. Rather, as opposed to the human security debates where there are clear opposing views, the HDS literature and data seem to be in general agreement with the harmful effects of the event, although it is approached from different angles. Therefore, the following review is not structured in a way that presents contradictions, rather it presents and evaluates some of the most in-depth and influential literature that provides the basis for the following analysis. Literature on the economic impact of the HDS is the most well-established, and within this literature, other components of human security are also mentioned but rarely expanded upon greatly. Therefore, the following section covers reports and academic articles that discuss economic and political security and to some extent food and health security following the HDS. The remaining pillars of environmental, personal and community security are unfortunately understudied in terms of the HDS, which leaves a knowledge gap to be filled.

Literature regarding the HDS that can be associated with the 1994 Human Development Report's seven human security categories is by far the most plentiful in the economic section. Several studies and reports have been completed that use different measures to estimate the economic cost of the

hidden debts and their revelation. In their 2021 report “Costs and Consequences of the Hidden Debt Scandal of Mozambique”, Edson Cortez and his co-authors from the Centro de Integridade Pública and the Christian Michelsen Institute address the direct and indirect costs of the HDS. This report is arguably the most comprehensive and detailed existing document regarding the consequences of the HDS. The objective of the report is to provide an “inventory of all the costs – economic, political, institutional and social” in quantitative terms where possible (Cortez et al., 2021, p.119). Where quantitative measurements were not possible, the report aimed to highlight “the mechanisms through which the HD caused damage” (Cortez et al., 2021, 119). While the report does not explicitly mention ‘human security’, it covers topics within the human security framework. The document clearly establishes links between the HDS and different human security components. It provides a strong basis to answer how the HDS impacted human security in Mozambique through an analysis of the years prior to and after the HDS came to light, by looking at the changes in a range of indices. However, as stated, it does not explicitly link these consequences to human security, and certain human security components such as environmental security are not mentioned.

Another paper that pertains to the economic impact of the Hidden Debt Scandal is one that was published a short time after the revelation of the debts. In 2016, Castel-Branco and Massarongo examined the impact of the hidden debts on Mozambique’s debt stock, the structure of the debt, and the subsequent economic consequences of the debt. For the methodological aspect, they mention the lack of availability of information pertaining to the Mozambican public debt, its vagueness, and that it is “inconsistent between different official documents” (Castel-Branco & Massarongo, 2016, p.1). This places some limitations on the validity of their study, which they themselves admit. However, using a range of sources such as the Annual Debt Report, official speeches, and data from the Administrative Tribunal (“the body that checks the

legality of public expenditure - on the General State Account”) the study compares features such as the volume of public debt and the public debt share of GDP different time periods (Castel-Branco & Massarongo, 2016, p.1). As part of an independent non-profit organisation, Castel-Branco and Massarongo are able to objectively compare data and draw conclusions, however, they are limited to the information available to them from the state. Despite the limitations of the data, they hypothesise that the debt would weigh heavy on the state’s ability to provide social security, as well as have a negative effect on the education and healthcare sectors. They also highlight the dangers of procuring debts so high that they correspond to a large percentage of the country’s entire gross domestic product (GDP), which amplifies existing problems, and “generate further indebtedness” (Castel-Branco & Massarongo, 2016, p.2). As with the other reports mentioned, this short report does not make explicit mention of human security, but it adds to the understanding of the impact of the hidden debt scandal in the economic sector and the ways in which that impact can bleed into other parts of society.

Navarra and Rodrigues (2018) from Nordiska Afrikainstitutet (The Nordic Africa Institute) assess the consequences of the HDS, in particular the withdrawal of donor support which has historically made up a large part of the government's budget. Using data from a range of established sources such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Swedish International Cooperation Development Agency (SIDA), they compare the volume of donor aid flowing into Mozambique before and after the HDS. The policy note also presents the changes in government revenue and expenditure within different sectors. The authors highlight how the HDS disproportionately punished the Mozambican public through the increase in poverty and decrease in the provision of social security due to the decrease in expenditure in certain sectors.

Other authors such as Williams and Isaksen (2016) focus on external actors, debt, and anti-corruption. Their report provides a timeline of the case study and discusses illicit financial flows and the negative impact they have on development due to the reduction in government capital (Williams and Isaksen, 2016). Furthermore, organisations such as the World Bank (2016 & 2018) discuss the hidden debts in terms of their culpability in bringing on economic instability in their 'Country Economic Update' reports. The IMF (2019, p.5) address the HDS in their "Diagnostic Report on Transparency, Governance and Corruption" stating that "the impact of government mismanagement and corruption has been intensified in the current climate of limited resources" largely brought on by the HDS. The vast majority researchers of the economic impact of the HDS seemingly reach similar conclusions in that the HDS had a significant negative impact on economic security in Mozambique. However, the literature sometimes diverges in the quantitative data used. Some figures used to draw conclusions differ between sources, therefore, the issue of data discrepancy will be discussed further in the methodological section. Despite the sometimes-differing figures, the literature as a whole supports the argument that the economic impact of the HDS was significant.

In terms of the impact of the HDS on political security, a limited amount of literature that directly links and discusses the two. The literature that does exist is congruent and focuses mainly on how the concealment of the loans led to decreased transparency and credibility of the government. Nuvunga and Orre's (2019, p.116) article "The 'Secret Loans Affair' and Political Corruption in Mozambique" establishes the contributing factors leading up to the existence of the hidden debt scandal, naming it a "large-scale, premeditated and cynical scheme". It explains the rationale for contracting the loans and while it does not discuss the impact on human security at length or explicitly, it covers the effects the scandal had on the Mozambican government's relationship with its population and external development partners. They highlight the damaging

effects on political institutions, trust and transparency and go as far as to say that the scandal “could threaten the survival of the political regime itself” (Nuvunga & Orre, 2019, p.117). The research conducted by Cortez et al. (2021) also discusses the political impact by highlighting the effects on the credibility of the government, responsibility and impunity, the growing authoritarianism, transparency issues, and the repression of civil liberties and freedom.

Within the theme of food security, there are few studies that focus specifically on the impact of the Hidden Debt Scandal on the Mozambican population. Several reports do mention that the economic crisis that followed has an effect on food security, but the discussions on its impact are not detailed (Cortez et al., 2012; Navarra & Rodrigues, 2018; Shipley & Jenkins, 2019). However, Mambo et al. (2018), provide a report on the effect of increased prices during the 2016 economic crisis in Mozambique, which is argued to have been significantly brought on by the hidden debts and the revelation of those debts. The role of the HDS in sparking the economic crisis is mentioned specifically in the study along with weak international demand and the fall in prices of export goods (Mambo et al., 2018, p.1). They estimate the impact on real household consumption and poverty by detailing the microeconomic impact of price variations on everyday Mozambican households in all provinces in part by showing the changing price of a standardised food basket. There are several assumptions made in calculating these costs which are outlined in the methodology, and there are also some limitations present. The study uses two data sources provided by the National Statistics Institute (INE) in Mozambique which has in recent years started surveying households three times a year, which is an increase from the previous yearly survey (Mambo et al., 2018, p.7). The discrepancy in available data from older surveys and newer surveys may influence the final result, so the robustness of the study is dependent on the robustness of the INE’s surveys and the limitations and biases that it itself has. The methodology and research focus are relevant to the research question because it discusses an impacted sector of

human security using quantitative measures. However, while it is useful and relevant to human security, the terms and concepts used within human security theory are not explicitly mentioned. This is not a fault in itself because it was not the intention of the researchers to pursue an analysis within the human security framework. For the purpose of answering the given research question of this thesis, the study is useful and provides an understanding of the costs of an economic crisis to the general population. Aside from this study, there is a gap in the literature on the topic of the impact of the HDS on food security in Mozambique and an even larger gap that treats the issue through a human security lens.

Although several reports from established institutions have mapped the impact of the HDS on some human security pillars, there is a gap to be filled in this topic. The research conducted by Cortez et al. (2021) is reoccurring in most sections because they do cover a wide range of effects of the HDS including economic, political, institutional, and social. However, while their research alone could arguably be used to answer the research question in some capacity, it does not explicitly link the concept of human security to that research, nor does it cover aspects such as environmental or community security. Mentions of 'security' are limited to short sections discussing food insecurity and descriptions of relevant actors from the Mozambican security services involved in procuring the debts. Therefore, their report does not negate the need to add to the understanding of how the HDS impacted human security in Mozambique. Furthermore, on the topic of health, environmental, personal and community security, no literature has been found that explicitly links these human security components and the HDS in those terms. However, the existing literature on the Hidden Debt Scandal is largely in agreement that it has had a negative effect on the economy and on the political institutions and has limited the government in its ability to provide many of its crucial services. These

limitations may have an impact the level of human security experienced in Mozambique, which will be examined in the analysis.

Defining Corruption

The research topic addresses the HDS in Mozambique, which is undoubtedly a case of corruption, specifically elite corruption. A definition of corruption as well as elite corruption in particular is therefore necessary in order to address its impact on human security. However, there is not a singular agreed-upon definition of the term ‘corruption’ as it spans across a broad range of aims, actions and consequences, and defining it in a certain way not only has consequences within academic theory but also in practice. Some literature provides a broad definition, such as Mark E. Warren (2004, p.333) who describes corruption as an action that creates “gains for those included in the decision or action and harm for at least some of those who are excluded”. He describes that these actions or exchanges can be both private or professional, and while the gains are often easier to identify and measure, the harms are more difficult to quantify because “they are often small, incremental, and randomly distributed” (Warren, 2004, p.334).

The anti-corruption organisation Transparency International (2020, no pagination) defines corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain” which can also be considered a fairly broad definition. Pozsgai-Alvarez (2020, p.436) argues that this definition provided by Transparency International continues the “standardized formula abuse-power-gain while formally including the private sector” because it includes “entrusted power” and “private sector” specifically. This is useful not only because it includes both political corruption and private corruption, but Pozsgai-Alvarez (2020, p.436) also argues that it provides a “relationship-centred nature” which includes “the larger social dimension of corruption” as opposed to earlier definitions that focused on the legal or market aspects. Transparency International’s current

definition is similar to the classic definition by Jeremy Pope which defines corruption as “the misuse of entrusted power for private benefit” (2000, cited in Polner & Ireland, 2010, p.3). While the two definitions are very similar, there are some key differences in the specific words used to describe similar concepts such as ‘abuse’ versus ‘misuse’ and ‘gain’ versus ‘benefit’. The World Bank (2020a, no pagination) similarly defines corruption as “the abuse of public office for private gain” and emphasize the importance of strong institutions to counter its harms. These definitions have been criticised for focusing entirely on the acting ‘abuser’ or “demand side of corruption at the expense of the supply side and third parties involved” (Pozsgai-Alvarez, 2020, p.436). Further criticisms of these organisational approaches to corruption also exist. For example, Bill de Maria (2008) argues that Transparency International’s definition and Corruption Perceptions Index are flawed, do not take cultural context into account, and rather serve Western business interests.

Corruption in Mozambique

Literature on corruption has touched on its role in financial systems, political systems, as well as the crossing of these two. It spans over the public and private sphere, from high-level to low-level, and from democratic ‘strong states’ to authoritarian ‘fragile’ states. Much of the literature is also focused on anti-corruption strategies and building resilient institutions. Bill de Maria asserted in 2008 (p.185) that there was at that point “agreement in the literature that the definition of “corruption” has not altered in the last 50 years” and that the African perspective on corruption had been “buried under a semantic and methodological tsunami that came in from the West”. He takes issue with the business-centric conceptualisation of corruption and the lack of attention paid to post-colonial power asymmetries (de Maria, 2008). The pervasiveness of corruption in Mozambique specifically has been established by some authors such as Tvedten and Picardo (2018, p.542) who argue that corruption in Mozambique is “structural and omnipresent” and that “small-scale corruption is

so common that it has become an integrated part of daily life for the large majority of the urban and rural poor.” Tvedten and Picardo (2018, p.542) also argue that most corruption research “has been dominated by political science and economics” focusing on structural aspects on one side, and on the other, it has focused on individual cases. They therefore distinguish between ‘illicit’ and ‘habitual’ corruption and through their research found that the public in Mozambique also does so in differentiating “‘illicit’ larger-scale corruption and ‘habitual’ everyday corruption, both in their local vernacular and in their agency as citizens” (Tvedten & Picardo, 2018, p.543). The development and spread of ‘habitual’ corruption is a worthwhile research focus and Tvedten and Picardo clearly demonstrate its causes and effects in their 2018 paper, however, the Hidden Debt Scandal case study is an example of ‘illicit’, elite, large-scale corruption. In this thesis, elite corruption can be broadly understood as corruption undertaken by an ‘elite’ group of people that have financial or political power.

Nuvunga and Orre (2019, p.119) present two main arguments for the emergence of widespread corruption in Mozambique. First, some of the literature argues that the civil war following independence devastated the country in such ways that the “collective national project” was “pulverised” leading everyone, both elites and the poor, to fend for themselves and ensure their survival (Nuvunga & Orre, 2019, p.119). The second argument, which Nuvunga and Orre (2019, p.119) take issue with, argues that the neo-liberalist ideology introduced, or some would argue imposed, in the late 1980s and 90s which introduced structural adjustment programs and privatisation, resulted in “budget cuts and misery for many and opportunity for a few” thereby justifying greed in a way that it had not been justified before. Mozambican expert Joseph Hanlon (2004) is a proponent of this argument and has for over two decades argued that the influx of donor money and requirements, along with Western neoliberalist ideals, created an environment where the Mozambican government became

dependent on donor money. Therefore, there was a shift from a responsibility towards the population to a responsibility to external donors (Hanlon, 2004). Combined with a much larger flow of aid into the country, these factors thus facilitated greed and corruption. Hanlon (2016, p.753) therefore later argued that the harsh international response to the HDS could be seen as “unfair or disingenuous” because the hidden loans were “the direct result of conditions carefully created by the same lenders and donors during four decades”. Nuvunga and Orre (2019, p.120), while not in complete disagreement that external factors play a role in the rise of corruption, voice that this argument “tends to tilt the balance of blame towards external forces, while downplaying the responsibility of the domestic elite’s own responsibility”. Regardless of why corruption has grown to become a detrimental, omnipresent reality in Mozambique, it is safe to say that the hidden loans contracted by Mozambican elites were illegal and not pursued for the good of the Mozambican people, but rather for the good of a few select pockets. The spread of corruption in Mozambique detailed here highlights the environment in which the HDS occurred, and therefore the environment in which the effects of the HDS are felt.

Defining Hidden Loans and Debts

Defining what hidden debts are, why they occur, and their potential risks is necessary to analyse their economic, political, and social impact. Hidden debts or loans are debts or loans that have been or are being concealed by a state, individual, or organisation, and the reasons for their concealment vary. In the HDS case study, the billion-dollar loans from private banks were concealed in part for Mozambique “to avoid hitting its own public debt limits” (Brown, 2022, p.2). The continued concealment of the second two loans (MAM & ProIndicus) after the revelation of the first one (EMATUM) can also be argued to have been undertaken to avoid further attention and investigation into the state of Mozambique’s public debt. In a larger generalised context, hidden debts exist because states want “to avoid punishment for their growing debt burdens” and

therefore choose to hide them from global records (Brown, 2022, p.2). Kathleen Brown (2022, p.2) describes that if a state reveals its real debt burden it can be damaging for its ability to continue borrowing because if its debts are considered “excessive” then “creditors increase costs and restrict credit access”. Therefore, despite operating with the knowledge that there are severe consequences of hiding debt, especially significantly sized ones, states continue to do so because the risk seemingly outweighs the reward of being granted further loans. In the context of “less-developed countries”, Brown (2022, p.4) states that some countries “have agency on the credit market and use hidden debt as a tool to avoid the constraints of international institutions”. When organisations such as the World Bank or the IMF are “constraining domestic fiscal policy space” it gives the borrowing countries “an incentive to hide debt, potentially undermining these organizations’ own debt sustainability goals” (Brown, 2022, p.4).

While the concealment of debts can have some beneficial effects for borrowing states, it also carries high risks and can be potentially detrimental for a state’s entire economy. Kletzer (1984, p.292) identifies two main risks with hidden debts, the first being that hiding sizable debts causes information asymmetry leading to lenders granting loans which may exceed the borrowers’ capacity. Secondly, there is an increased risk for a debt crisis to occur because the market underestimates the size of the debt, as well as debt repudiation which means that borrowers refuse or are unable to make the agreed-upon payments (Kletzer, 1984, p.302). In turn, these risks, if materialised, can cause economic instability or crisis. In the case of Mozambique for example, Mambo et al. (2018) argue that one of the main factors of the economic crisis starting in 2016 was the disclosure of the hidden debts.

Section 3 - Methodology

Given the information presented in the literature review, the following research question has been developed: *How did the Hidden Debt Scandal impact the level of human security in Mozambique?* The following section provides the hypothesis, methodology, and also highlights the limitations of the project.

Hypothesis and Time Span Justification

In this thesis, it is hypothesised that: *In the years following the HDS, a decrease in human security will be witnessed, indicated by a worsening of the selected indices.* Therefore, the focus of the analysis will be looking at the years following the scandal, in 2016 and onwards. However, the full period of analysis will span from 2012-2022. This time period was selected because it provides a range of time before the HDS occurred, during the HDS and after. This allows for a comparative analysis to be conducted that illustrates not only the human security level after the HDS but also the change over time from before it occurred. The full long-term impact of the HDS cannot yet be determined, however, within this time span the sectors that have been the most affected so far can be established which may indicate how future effects may develop. Furthermore, although the full extent of the hidden debts was revealed in 2016, the timeline for the case starts before that with the reveal of the first EMATUM loan in 2013, therefore it is important the year 2013 is incorporated. The timespan of 2012-2022 therefore includes one year before there was any public knowledge of the debts to the year where the most recent figures are available in most indices. The potential time lag effect on some of the measures is discussed in the analysis as well, because in those measures the effects would arguably not be visualised immediately after the HDS.

Application of Theory and Measuring Human Security

Human security was selected as the analytical framework in this project because it provides the personal and multi-dimensional context to a topic that is often

understood in strictly financial terms, or through a ‘power’ lens. The human security framework can accommodate analyses that take the complexities of a globalised world into account while addressing the general well-being of the humans experiencing that world. Furthermore, since the research question addresses the impact on human security levels, naturally the theoretical framework falls under human security.

The extent to which causal links between the HDS and human insecurity can be established is limited. Economic changes can be measured and monitored quantitatively, but understanding the mechanisms through which these changes then affect the day-to-day lives of civilians regarding food and health, political, environmental, personal, and community security requires a broader set of measures. However, just as there is not one agreed upon definition of human security, there is also not one agreed-upon measure of human security. On the topic of measuring human security, Orencio (2015, p.982) presents a paper describing different human security components, the human values they cover, the main threats they face, and data sources to measures those threats. Aside from his own proposed human security measure, which is based on using thresholds of severity, he also presents a summary of frameworks by other authors used to measure human security (Orencio, 2015). One of the frameworks presented is that of Hastings (2009) called the Human Security Index (HSI). The Human Security Index is a prototype framework that incorporates a range of human security components: economic, environmental, social (education, empowerment, diversity, peacefulness, food security, health, and governance) (Orencio, 2015, p.166). It covers a wide range of threats, and the methodology is based on mapping and combining different indices from institutions and agencies to measure the level of human security, which is similar to the intention of this dissertation. However, Hastings’s Human Security Index “incorporates 150 input datasets overall when one counts the source data used in the index” (Orencio, 2015, p.992). Therefore, along with its

status as a prototype with seemingly little published development in the past decade, it cannot be replicated within the parameters of this research. However, it does provide sets of indices covering all the human security pillars that are useful in measuring components of human security. The thesis credits the HSI for inspiration as to the indices and data sources used in the analysis section to measure human security in Mozambique.

Singular Case Study

Taking into account the information presented, the use of a case study research design was selected as the tool for analysis. Case studies are especially useful within social sciences where a “holistic, in-depth investigation” is often required and they are effective in explaining processes and outcomes beyond quantitative data results (Zainal, 2007, p.1). While statistical data is useful in its objectivity and provide opportunities for ‘retesting’, a combination of both quantitative and qualitative data allows for a contextual analysis that considers multiple factors and processes from different kinds of resources while maintaining validity. In order to answer the research question, multiple types of data will be collected and analysed based on Hasting's (2009) indicators of human security where possible. A range of indices will be utilised to evaluate how the level of human security in Mozambique has been impacted following the HDS. These indices also aid in explaining the nature of the impact, thus answering the ‘how’ in the research question. Reports and previous academic articles on the topic provide further evidence and explanations for the impact on human security.

Reports and Indices

Indices and rankings are useful because they provide quantitative measures of different aspects of human security which can be measured over time so the impact of the HDS can be understood more clearly. However, the robustness of their methodology varies and data from all relevant years are not always

accessible, making analyses over time more difficult. There are various academic reports available that discuss the impact of the HDS which will be used to supplement the index analyses. Table 1 below details which years the reports cover in brackets, meaning the years where there is data available for each index. In a majority of the sections, at least three indices and/or reports are used to analyse the specific human security pillar in question, which provides a broader range of measures than relying on just one index. This thesis will utilise a range of quantitative and qualitative data from several different non-governmental organisations and researchers outlined below, where a majority are included in Hastings (2009) methodology (Those that are not are marked by a *).

Table 1. Measures of Human Security Data Sources

Human Security Pillar	Economic	Political	Food	Health	Environmental	Personal and community
Measure 1	Public debt share* (2013-2019)	Global Freedom Score (GFS)* (2012-2022)	Food Security Index (FSI) (2012-2022)	Government healthcare expenditure* (2012-2020)	Environmental Vulnerability Index (N/A)	Fragile State Index* (2012-2022)
Source measure 1	Castel-Branco and Massarongo (2016)	Freedom House	The Economist Impact	World Bank, Shipley & Jenkins (2019)	South Pacific Applied Geoscience Commission & UN Environment Programme	The Fund for Peace

Measure 2	GDP per capita (2012-2021)	Press Freedom Index (PFI) (2012-2022)	Real household consumption* (2014-2017)	Life expectancy at birth (2012-2021)	Environmental Performance Index (N/A)	The Political Terror Scale* (2012-2022)
Source measure 2	The World Bank Database	Reporters Without Borders	Mambo et al. (2018)	The World Bank Database and UN Data Portal	Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy	Political Terror Scale Org
Measure 3	Inflation and purchasing power* (2012-2022)	Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) (2012-2022)	Prevalence of undernourishment (2012-2020)	Access to safe drinking water (2012-2020)	Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and pop growth. (N/A)	N/A
Source measure 3	World Bank Database & Cortez et al. (2021)	Transparency International	The World Bank Database	United Nations Water (UN Water) and SIDA	(N/A)	N/A

Limitations

There are limitations to this research design and methodology that may impact the findings of the study. In terms of data collection, for analyses over time to be made there needs to be data produced and made publicly available that measures data points annually. For some of the indices, this can be successfully completed in the chosen ten-year analysis period of 2012 to 2022.

Unfortunately, some indices have not been measured within this period of time, or they are not available, or the organisations only release general regional reports that do not include individual countries' data. Furthermore, the data collection is primarily conducted using the English language which somewhat limits the scope. Mozambique is a multilingual country, but the official language is Portuguese so Portuguese is primarily used in official government reports and in Mozambican media. While some governmental reports are translated into English, not all are, which means that the research is limited to the translated reports. There are translation services available online that can be and are utilised within this research to some extent, but their accuracy cannot be guaranteed. The thesis is also limited in the sense that while some arguably direct effects of the HDS can be justified in the economic pillar for example, other analyses touch more on 'what could have been' if the HDS had not happened. For example, 'had the Mozambican state not had to restructure its budget to repay the debts and had the international donors not drawn back their support, that money could have been used in these other sectors which could have affected the level of human security'. This is especially apparent in the analysis of environmental security, where data that draws links between the HDS and the environment was unavailable and/or not suited for analysis over time. In terms of personal and community security, two measures were deemed enough for conducting the analysis due to the wide range of the data source material in The Political Terror Scale and the multiple sub-categories covering several aspects of the security pillar in The Fragile State Index.

Another limitation of the research design is that the case study design is reduced in its ability to produce scientific generalisation (Zainal, 2007). Case study analyses are not replicable in the same way that other methods are. The Hidden Debt Scandal is a singular unique case of an event that despite the range of international actors present mostly concerns those within the Mozambican borders. Therefore, its applicability to other cases of hidden debt revelations

outside of Mozambique is not direct or necessarily useful because of the broad scope of impacting factors and socio-historical context. However, while the exact factors and consequences of the HDS may not be applicable to other cases of hidden loan procurements by political elites, the extent and nature of the human security impact and the range of data used to measure it can be useful for future studies. Considerations have been about the ethical implications or conflicts of interest in the dissertation, and none have been found. All data used has been accessed through open sources online and there are no other participants than the researcher to consider.

Section 4 - Analysis

Having established the case study, historical background, the existing literature and methodology, the following analysis is divided into six sections corresponding to the pillars of human security outlined by the UNDP (1994) (economic, political, food, health, environmental, personal & community). While all pillars of human security are important, the first two sections discuss economic and political security because not only are they the most well-covered in the existing literature, but they may also have a cascading effect on the other pillars. Then, the following sections provide analyses of the impact on food, health, and environmental security by the HDS. The impact on personal and community security are discussed jointly in the final section.

Economic Security

The economic consequences of the HDS are the most established in the academic literature, in reports and in international organisation resources. This can be explained in part by the high quantity of economic institutions and organisations that are able to make accurate impact analyses using quantitative data. The economic health of a state can be a good measure of its ability to provide security for its people because economic security and overall human security are interconnected (Fontanel & Corvaisier-Drouart, 2014). Rice and

Patrick (2008, p.12) argue that unsurprisingly, countries that are performing well economically “also tend to be better providers of social welfare”. It is argued that high quality social welfare provision by states in turn correlates to higher levels of human security in that state (Jones, 2004). The UNDP raises issues such as “unemployment, job insecurity, income inequality, inflation, underdeveloped social security and homelessness” as human security threats that can result from a poor economy (Martin, no date, no pagination). While human insecurity in different forms is present in many economically strong states as well, it does not negate the harmful threats faced by many in economically weaker states experiencing insecurity because of those economic factors. States that have strong economies are in a better position to confront human security threats whether that is food security, health security or threats within other pillars of human security. This section will establish that the HDS played a considerable part in bringing on the economic crisis in Mozambique in 2016, which is argued to subsequently have had a negative cascading impact on other sectors. The following section details the economic impact of the HDS on Mozambique first by addressing the ‘donor flight’ wherein a considerable number of development partners suspended their support following the revelation of the debts. The economic impact on human security associated with the HDS over time is also illustrated by evaluating the increase in the public debt share in Mozambique as well as the decreased figure of its GDP per capita. Along with these measures, other resources are presented to evidence how the economic crisis following the HDS had a considerable impact on human security in Mozambique through the increase in inflation, the decreased purchasing power of citizens, and the number of people pushed into poverty following the HDS.

Donor flight

The initial economic impact of the HDS began in 2013 when the first EMATUM debt was revealed (Hanlon, 2016, p.765). At this point, the IMF demanded

further information on the loan and “put an ongoing loan negotiation on pause” (Haysom, 2019, p.7). Because it seemed like an “isolated incident that could be resolved” the IMF were willing to renegotiate “more favorable re-payment terms for the Mozambican government in exchange for some limited disclosures” (Haysom, 2019, p.7). Thereafter, \$500 million of the EMATUM loan was required to be transferred to the state budget (Haysom, 2019, p.7). In 2013, this undisclosed loan was still considered to be a ‘workable’ issue and as long as the Mozambican government met the IMF’s and other donors’ requirements these international partners were willing to continue supporting the country (Branson, 2017). Three years later when the full extent of the debts was revealed, Mozambique suffered a disastrous loss of donor support from eight countries in the budget support group and the “IMF terminated its Standby Credit Facility Arrangement” (Navarra & Rodrigues, 2021, pp.4-5). Mozambique had received roughly \$4 billion in budget support for over a decade at this point, “representing four percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and 12 percent of the state’s total income” (Navarra & Rodrigues, 2021, p.5). As the ‘donor darling’ of the international community, the loss of donor aid hit the Mozambican economy hard. Furthermore, the two other loans made Mozambique’s best service burden “too high for the economy to carry” and in 2016 the country defaulted on its debt (Gebregziabher & Sala, 2022, p.1). The increased debt and loss of donor support and international backing therefore had a significant impact on the Mozambican state and economy.


Public debt share

The loss of donor aid due to the HDS thus had a large economic impact on Mozambique, however, it is not the only factor that impacted the country’s economic security. One way to visualise the economic impact of the HDS is by looking at the public debt stock, which can be understood as the total amount of debt that a government has accumulated. The term is often used as an “indicator to evaluate the debt sustainability of a country” and can show the “weakness or

strong sides of an economy” (Yilmaz, Tatoğlu and Ataer, 2015, p.336). Castel-Branco and Massarongo (2016, p.2) argue in their paper that the hidden debt scandal “amplified a problem that was already worrying” in terms of Mozambique’s public debt. As explained in the literature review, there are high risks associated with taking on too much debt such as the increased risk for a debt crisis and general economic instability. These risks materialised in Mozambique and pushed the state “into a protracted economic downturn” (Gebregziabher & Sala, 2022, no pagination).

Castel-Branco and Massarongo (2016, p.2) present data showing that between 2014 and 2015, “the foreign public debt service almost doubled” because of the inclusion of the EMATUM debt which the IMF demanded. Furthermore, they state that in 2016 the hidden loans “increased the total public debt stock to at least US\$ 11.6 billion, or 78% of GDP” which is the highest level recorded since 2005 (Castel-Branco and Massarongo, 2016, p.1). However, Cortez et al. (2021, p.37) do not corroborate Castel-Branco and Massarongo’s 78% increase, rather they present the total public debt of GDP to be 102% in 2016 which can be seen in Figure 1 below. As mentioned in the literature review, Castel-Branco and Massarongo do highlight that there are inconsistencies in official documents on Mozambique’s public debt which may explain this difference. All three hidden debts considered, which totalled around US\$2.2 billion, the loans “added around 30 per cent to the country’s foreign debt” according to Nuvunga and Orre (2019, p.116). A similar but not identical increase can be seen in Figure 1 below provided by Cortez et al. (2021, p.37) who establish that following the HDS, the public debt grew to “unsustainable levels, from 42.90% in 2013 to 79% in 2019” which would put it at around a 36% increase.

Figure 1. Mozambique Public Sector Debt (% of GDP)



Source: Reproduced from Cortez et al., 2021, p.37.

Thus, on top of the decreased support from donors, Mozambique was classified as “in default by the ratings agencies” which made it more difficult for the country to arrange other loans on international markets (Cortez et al., 2021, p.37). Mozambique’s economy was already regarded as vulnerable before the HDS because of its import dependency, and “small number of primary products for export to volatile markets” (Castel-Branco & Massarongo, 2016, p.1). While high debt is not uncommon in many states around the world, even economically strong ones, the negative effects of it are typically not as destructive as they were for Mozambique in this period. This is because those economies are able to sustain their indebtedness and “their productive capacity expands in such a way” that the debts can be accommodated and crises can be avoided (Castel-Branco and Massarongo, 2016, p.1).

Furthermore, Castel-Branco and Massarongo (2016, p.2) highlight that at the time of writing, in Mozambique’s public debt overall “more than 60% of the growth” was connected to funding large infrastructure projects and purchasing defence equipment. This is considered problematic because “these projects


serve large capital which exploits the natural resources” but there are no guarantees to the “development of a broader productive base” (Castel-Branco & Massarongo, 2016, p.2). In the HDS debt specifically, the problem was similar because a majority of the loans contracted were spent on defence and security equipment and long-term major investment projects “of doubtful return and priority” (Castel-Branco & Massarongo, 2016, p.2). Aside from the issues of resource exploitation and the lack of positive gains made for societal development, these projects also “do not generate a capacity to service the debt in the short and medium term” (Castel-Branco & Massarongo, 2016, p.2). Therefore, they add to a negative cycle of contracting loans to finance projects that can among other things serve to repay the loans, but the projects are left unfinished or even uninitiated, so the state is left with high debt and no projects completed. The effects of this are plentiful and can be both direct and indirect, for example by impacting economic stability, squandered employment and business opportunities for local populations, environmental degradation, and underdeveloped infrastructure. This in turn can impact the human security of the population as described in the introduction of the economic security section. In Mozambique specifically, Cortez et al. (2021, p.50) argue that following the economic downturn new employments opportunities “that would have been created, and businesses that would have arisen in connection with those investments, did not materialize on the scale expected”. Additionally, many businesses in both the formal and informal sector had no option but to declare bankruptcy which worsened unemployment further (Cortez et al., 2021, p.50).

GDP per capita

The economic crisis following the HDS can also be visualised by examining Mozambique’s GDP per capita. The term ‘GDP per capita’ refers to the gross domestic product per person in a country, which is calculated by dividing a country’s GDP by its population number. GDP per capita is a commonly used statistic to measure economic strength and prosperity because the components

necessary are regularly tracked worldwide, making its calculation and application straightforward and accessible.

Figure 2. Mozambique GDP per capita (in US\$)



Source: Reproduced from World Bank, 2022a.


Figure 2 depicts the change in GDP per capita in Mozambique using data accessed from the World Bank in the given 2012-2022 period. Upon viewing solely the graph above, it is clear that the period around the HDS was one of economic decline. There is a significant drop between 2014-2016, and for added context, the GDP per capita in 2016 was the lowest measured since 2010 (World Bank, 2022a). This dip points to the loss of donor support following the revelation of the debts, and the significantly decreased budget of the Mozambican state. Cortez et al. (2021, p.6) calculate the damage caused by the HDS as the “fall in the value of the GDP caused by the debt” which they place at \$10.7 billion between 2016-2019. This includes the direct cost of the debts, i.e. the payments made, as well as the losses due to the economic slowdown. With this information, they argue that the total cost per capita of the HDS was \$403 between 2016 and 2019 alone (Cortez et al., 2021, p.6). Therefore, not

only did the GDP per capita fall generally, but the HDS can be argued to have quantifiable direct costs for the ordinary citizen. It is important to consider that while the HDS was arguably a large reason for the economic slowdown, there are also other factors present to consider such as insurgency violence in the northern region of Cabo Delgado, political tensions between the ruling parties as well as natural disasters such as the severe, record-breaking 2019 cyclones Idai and Kenneth.

Inflation and Purchasing Power

Aside from examining the decreased state budget due to donor flight, the public debt stock, GDP, and GDP per capita, there are also other economic measures that evidence the negative economic conditions that followed the HDS. For example, the inflation percentage in terms of consumer prices increased drastically in 2016 as seen in Figure 3 below from the World Bank. This was the highest inflation rate measured in over a decade (World Bank, 2022b).

Figure 3. Mozambique Inflation Consumer prices (annual %)



Source: Reproduced from The World Bank, 2022b.

According to Cortez et al. (2021, p.40), several factors contributed to this inflation increase including the depreciation of the Metical (the Mozambican Currency 'MZN') which was "linked directly to the decline in the inflow of foreign exchange" which they argue was influenced by the HDS. Administered prices of a number of goods such as "fuel, electricity, water, bread and public transport" also increased because the Mozambican government suspended subsidies on these goods (Cortez et al., 2021, p.40). Lastly, aside from the HDS, the circulation of goods was restricted due to political and military tensions and the agricultural sector took a hit due to natural disasters as well (Cortez et al., 2021, p.40). In basic terms, an increase in the level of inflation a country experiences means that the purchasing power of its citizens decreases (Taylor & Taylor, 2004). This means that their inflation-adjusted income is lower than before, and they can therefore not afford the same goods as they could when inflation was lower. This was also the case in Mozambique, where due to the increased prices and cost of living, conditions for many worsened. There was a reduced ability to purchase basic goods, which affected the level of human security experienced. Mambo et al. (2018, p.12), also highlight that prices for food commodities increased more than non-food goods which disproportionately impacted "poorer and more vulnerable households". Lastly, by calculating 'consumption poverty' using "the explanatory factor of 70.6%" of the HDS to poverty, they argue that "the increase in poverty would be 70.6% less" had the HDS not happened (Cortez et al., 2021, p.110). Therefore, Cortez et al. (2021, p.6) argue that the Hidden Debt Scandal pushed at least 1,9 million people "below the line of consumption-based poverty by 2019".

The HDS was followed by an economic crisis which impacted the economic security of Mozambique as a country and its population. This is clear when evaluating the effects of the loss of donor aid as well as the dramatic increase in public debt. In their procurement of the debts, the elites responsible essentially used the Mozambican economy and its people as collateral. Furthermore, due

to the economic crisis that ensued after the HDS, GDP per capita fell significantly, inflation increased, poverty increased, and the purchasing power of Mozambicans decreased. This ultimately resulted in a decrease in the security of the Mozambican population, particularly for those already living in poverty. While there are a wide range of further measures that exemplify the effects of the HDS on Mozambique's economy such as unemployment rates, interest rates, exchange rates or import and export revenue, this section has clearly illustrated the negative impact of the economic crisis that followed the HDS. It also serves as a springboard to discuss the other pillars of human security, where most negative effects discussed are primarily the result of the economic crisis.

Political Security

The impact of the HDS on the political sector contributes to the understanding of the HDS's impact on human security overall in Mozambique as it is one of the UN's human security pillars. Three indices have been selected to examine the impact of the HDS scandal on human security in the political category: Freedom House's 'Freedom in the World Report', Reporters Without Borders' 'Press Freedom Index' and Transparency International's 'Corruption Perceptions Index'. The latter two indices mentioned are included in Hasting's (2009) Human Security Index methodology, whilst the first is a personal addition. It has been included because it rates political rights and civil liberties globally which provides an indication of the level of political security in a country, which is a component of the level of human security experienced more generally. These measures also contribute to the understanding of Mozambique's political governance which is linked to the level of security experienced by its citizens. This is evidenced in the 'Index of State Weakness in the Developing World' report where a "moderately strong relationship between political governance and the ability to ensure the security of citizens" was found (Rice & Patrick, 2008, p.12).

The Global Freedom Score (GFS)

The ‘Freedom in the World’ annual global report created by Freedom House rates both political rights and civil liberties around the world. Each state is given a total aggregate score, a ‘status’, and ratings for political rights and civil liberties (Freedom House, no date b). In this thesis, data was collected from their ‘Country Profile’ webpage and their Excel data bank and compiled in the table below. It should be noted that Freedom House’s presentation of the scores has changed in the past decade. In 2016, a total score out of 100 is presented to show the level of freedom, based on 40 points of political rights (PR) and 60 for civil liberties (CL) (Freedom House, no date b). In this measurement, a higher score indicates a higher level of freedom. Before 2016, this was represented as a number between 1 to 7 where 1 represents the highest level of freedom and 7 the lowest. In order to show the change over time with the same scoring system, the total scores after 2016 have been converted to the pre-2016 scoring system, written in brackets. The individual PR and CL scores in the ‘old’ system can be found in their data bank (Freedom House, no date b).

Table 2. Global Freedom Scores - Total, Political Rights and Civil Liberties, Status

Year	Total score:	Political rights (x/40)	Civil liberties(x/60)	Status
2022	43 (4.5)	14 (5)	29 (4)	Partly free
2021	43 (4.5)	14 (5)	29 (4)	Partly free
2020	45 (4.5)	14 (5)	31 (4)	Partly free
2019	51(4)	19 (4)	32 (4)	Partly free
2018	52 (4)	20 (4)	32 (4)	Partly free
2017	53 (4)	20 (4)	33 (4)	Partly free
2016	56 (4)	4	4	Partly free

2015	3.5	4	3	Partly free
2014	3.5	4	3	Partly free
2013	3.5	4	3	Partly free
2012	3.5	4	3	Partly free

Table 2 Data source: Freedom House, no date a.

What can be gathered from this data is a few points. Firstly, Mozambique has not shifted in its status as ‘Partly Free’ in this ten-year span. While the total score, PR points, and CL points have shifted over the years, they have not shifted enough for Mozambique to be moved to the ‘Not Free’ or ‘Free’ status. Secondly, starting in 2016 when the HDS was revealed, the total score increased from 3.5 to 4 points due to a worsening civil liberties score. Then, in 2020, it increased again to 4.5 points due to a worsened political rights score which put Mozambique on the list of the largest ten-year declines in freedom globally (Repucci & Slipowitz, 2021, p.6). The extent to which the worsened score in the same year as the HDS revelation can be attributed to the revelation is not certain. Freedom House attributes the decline to surging political violence between supporters of the ruling party Frelimo and the oppositional Renamo (Freedom House, 2017b, p.11). Furthermore, clashes were also reported between the Mozambican army and Renamo fighters, where “security forces’ abuse of civilian populations in the country’s central region forced thousands to flee” (Freedom House, 2017b, p.11). Other factors such as the insurgency violence in the northern region of Cabo Delgado are described as factors affecting the scores in 2016 and onwards (Freedom House, 2017b, p.11).

However, the debt scandal is highlighted as a contributing factor to the low ‘Government Openness and Transparency’ score in 2017, as well as in 2018 (Freedom House, 2017a & 2018). It is also mentioned in the ‘Government Safeguards Against Corruption’ measure in 2022 (Freedom House, 2022). The decline in the Global Freedom Score over the 2012-2022 period cannot be

attributed solely to the Hidden Debt Scandal as there are many contributing factors that affect the score. However, the inclusion of the HDS in the discussions of some of the categories of measurement shows that it has played somewhat of a role in the declined Global Freedom Score. Although this index alone cannot give conclusive evidence that the HDS heavily impacted human security in Mozambique, in this dissertation the GFS is used as one of the measurements to analyse the impact on political security, therefore this decline in the GFS is consistent with the theory that there was a decline in the level of human security following the HDS.


Some authors such as Nuvunga and Orre (2019, p.116) are more definitive in their conclusions about the HDS's impact in the political category, stating that the HDS actually "brought the destructive role of grand political corruption to the extreme". Because of the significant economic impact that it had, they argue that the scandal "jeopardised the Mozambican government's standing with the public" as well as with development and business partners, which highlights the issue of credibility and transparency (Nuvunga & Orre, 2019, p.117). Furthermore, they state that the HDS "demonstrated a prolonged failure" of the Mozambican government's ability to tackle corruption and establish robust judicial and political institutions (Nuvunga & Orre, 2019, p.117). This is in line with the conclusions drawn about the Global Freedom Score data because it demonstrates that the issues Mozambique is facing post-HDS are not new, however, the HDS certainly did not improve the situation.

The Press Freedom Index (PFI)

Another index that can shed light on changes in the political human security component is the Global Press Freedom Index. Produced by Reporters Without Borders (RSF) (2023a, no pagination), it is an annual qualitative analysis "combined with quantitative data on abuses and acts of violence against journalists". The data is gathered through a questionnaire sent out to media

experts, lawmakers, and sociologists that covers their judgement of countries’ “pluralism, media independence and respect for the safety and freedom of journalists” (RSF, 2023a, no pagination). This is combined with quantitative data where abuses and violence against media outlets and journalists are tallied annually. In this index, countries are scored between 0 to 100, where 0 is the worst possible score and 100 is the best possible score. This scoring system has been used since 2013, which might explain the 2012 data point, which appears to be an outlier (RSF, 2023b). No information has been found regarding the change of the scoring system on the RSF website that might otherwise explain this significant jump from 2012 to 2013.

Figure 4. Mozambique Press Freedom Index



Source: RSF Index, 2023a.

The RSF data is not consistent with the hypothesis that human security worsened especially following the HDS. Rather, since the jump from 2012 to 2013, there has been a slow trend of decreased press freedom every year until 2021 when there was a more significant dip. The RSF (2023a) also provide a map indicating the status of each country and in this measurement, Mozambique decreased from a ‘Problematic situation’ (65 ; 75 points) to a ‘Difficult

Situation' (45 ; 65 points) between 2020 and 2021. The RSF (2023b, no pagination) explain this steady decline as a result of the ruling Frelimo party's long-held grip on a significant portion of the media sphere, "growing authoritarianism and increasingly difficult access to information". The violence in Cabo Delgado is again presented as a contributing factor, as journalists trying to cover any stories in the region would find it "virtually impossible without risking arrest" (RSF, 2023b, no pagination). The Press Freedom Index tells a similar story to the Global Freedom Index of a gradual deterioration of press freedom and other liberties in Mozambique.


Cortez et al. (2021) draw more absolute conclusions regarding the HDS and the increasingly authoritative nature of the Mozambican state. Using data from the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), they emphasise that although Mozambique had been on a democratic decline since 2008, in the EIU ranking "the most abrupt fall in classification happened in the years following the hidden debts" (Cortez et al., 2021, p.55). Furthermore, they conclude that following the HDS, "authoritarian measures increased in order to restrict freedom of expression and other civil liberties, including attacks and threats against known critics of the HD [Hidden Debts]" (Cortez et al., 2021, p.104). It is therefore argued that the HDS was one of the contributing factors in the continued PFI downward trend that was already occurring. As one of the measures being used to evaluate human security in Mozambique, this emphasises the worsening political security experienced in Mozambique following the HDS.

The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)

Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index is one of the most widely used and well-established rankings of corruption perception globally. The index gives every country a score from 0 to 100 "where 0 means highly corrupt and 100 means very clean" based on several data sources from international institutions combined with survey responses from local experts

(Transparency International, 2023, no pagination). It is not an exact measure of the level of corruption in a country, rather it is “limited to experts' and businesspeople’s perceptions of corruption in the public sector” (Transparency International, 2023, no pagination). Since Mozambique’s inclusion in the ranking in 1999 it has never had a score over 35 which reaffirms the long-standing struggle that the nation has had with the issue of corruption. Figure 5 below depict the range of scores that Mozambique has received in the CPI from 2012 to 2022.

Figure 5. Mozambique Corruption Perceptions Index



Source: Transparency International, 2022.

The data above shows a downward trend between 2015 and 2018, with the lowest score registered in 2018. This coincides with the HDS and the years following the revelation of the scandal in 2016. However, the trend appeared already a year before in 2015, therefore it does not represent clear evidence that the HDS was the main source of the decreased score. One could argue that since one of the loans was revealed in 2013 before the full extent of the debt was revealed in 2016, the score could have started decreasing before 2016. However,

between 2013 and 2015, Mozambique's CPI score actually increased and then peaked within the 2012-2022 time period indicating a lower level of perceived corruption.

In their own examination of the CPI, Cortez et al. (2021, p.87) argue that "to no great surprise" this data shows "that the perception of the general level of corruption in Mozambique increased significantly after the HD [Hidden Debts]". Cortez and his co-contributors therefore strongly suggest that the HDS played a significant part in the downward trend seen in Figure 5, arguing that although there may be other compounding factors present, the HDS cannot be discounted. They also reviewed other indices regarding public financial management such as the World Governance Index which measures the 'Effectiveness of governance', the 'Quality of the regulatory environment' and the 'Control of corruption' as well as the World Bank's 'Ease of doing business' classification (Cortez et al., 2021, pp.85-85). Taking these into account, they conclude that the indices "indicate that conditions worsened after 2014-15, reaching a nadir in the following years with the revelation of the hidden debts" (Cortez et al., 2021, p.87). Therefore, by looking at the CPI data in Figure 5 in combination with the research conducted by Cortez et al. it is argued that the credibility of the government decreased following the HDS. Given the links established by Rothstein (2011) among others regarding government quality, control of corruption, social trust, and human well-being, it is argued that low government credibility has a negative impact on human security. Furthermore, Cortez et al. (2021, p.87) argue that the decreased credibility contributed to the drop in donor aid which made the government less able to meet its population's needs and provide crucial services.

Having examined the data from the three selected sources, this thesis is unable to definitively conclude that the HDS was the main factor contributing to the decline in political security in Mozambique when it occurred and the years

following. Rather, the HDS is argued to have been a contributor to the pre-existing decline in political rights and civil liberties, press freedom and corruption. In a hypothetical scenario where the HDS did not occur, perhaps this decline would have plateaued around 2014 and the years following rather than continued downward. This scenario would be challenging to prove, but some economic estimations do suggest that Mozambique would have performed significantly better had the HDS not happened (Cortez et al., 2021, p.123). Therefore, given the link between economic performance and government function in weak states discussed in the economic section, it is a possibility that these years would have been marked by a smaller decline or even an increase in government functions. While the three indices analysed in this dissertation cannot clearly evidence a direct impact, other sources such as Cortez et al. (2021) and Nuvunga and Orre (2019) argue that it did have significant consequences in terms of the government's ability to provide basic security to its citizens as well as having an increased level of authoritarianism. Therefore, it is concluded that the HDS was followed by worsening political security in Mozambique, especially in the perception of corruption in the government as well as in their credibility and transparency.

Food Security

As one of the human security pillars outlined by the 1994 Human Development Report, food security represents a fundamental part of human well-being. Food insecurity is a fairly well-defined and understood concept, although over the years other terms such as “hunger, malnutrition, food insufficiency, starvation, and famine” have been used to describe it (Hadley & Crooks, 2012, p.74). In this thesis, some of these terms such as malnutrition and starvation are rather understood as consequences of food insecurity rather than synonymous with it. The dire consequences of inaccessibility to sufficient quantities and quality of food sources are perhaps obvious. As a biological need, a lack of food has direct consequences on individual health as well as on a larger societal scale. Hamelin,

Habicht and Beaudry (1999) found in their research that not only can there be physical effects such as hunger, fatigue, and illness, and even death, but also psychological and socio-familial effects such as stress, impaired focus and productivity, feelings of shame, and decreased participation in social and civil life. On a societal level, food insecurity can therefore be a consequence of economic and political insecurity, but it can also be a reinforcing cause of these two pillars if people are not able to participate in society due to their malnutrition and the maladies it brings.


Analysing the topic of food security specifically in Mozambique reveals that the country has struggled with food insecurity for decades, meaning that it is not a new phenomenon brought on by the HDS. Aside from economic factors, threats such as “frequently occurring natural disasters, climate change, and destructive crop pests” limit Mozambique’s food production and contribute to food insecurity (Matavel et al., 2022, p.2). Furthermore, while food production has been growing it has done so “at smaller rate than the population growth rate” which is concerning for the country’s ability to achieve a higher level of food production self-sufficiency (Ferrão et al., 2018, p.9). As described in previous sections, the data necessary to measure the impact of human insecurity threats is often incomplete in Mozambique. This is the case with the Global Hunger Index (GHI) which was intended to be used in this analysis, but Mozambique is one of 15 countries where there is not sufficient data to draw definitive conclusions from (GHI, 2022). It is especially challenging to find certain data points over time, therefore the following section will provide data from the ‘Food Security Index’, as well as the percentage of undernourished people, which covers two of Hastings (2009) Human Security Index components: undernourished people and food insecurity. In addition, a study by Mambo et al. (2018) on the changing costs of a basic food basket has been included because it makes specific mention of the HDS as a contributing factor to the

changing costs, and the authors show a correlation between the HDS, the economic crisis and food security.

The Food Security Index

The Economist’s ‘Food Security Index’ is made up of four different components which produce a score describing the health of a state’s food security environment from 0 to 100 (Economist Impact, 2022). In this index, a score of 100 would indicate the best conditions and 0 would indicate the worst. The four components include ‘affordability’, ‘availability’, ‘quality and safety’, and ‘sustainability and adaptation’ which means that it covers a wide range of factors within food security (Economist Impact, 2022).


Figure 6. Mozambique Food Security Index - Food Security Environment



Source: Reproduced from Economic Impact, 2022.

The blue line in Figure 6 shows the changing score for the ‘Overall Food Security Environment’ in Mozambique between 2012-2022. What is evident from the graph is that following the HDS, between 2015 and 2017, the score decreased to its lowest point in this ten-year span. This appears to be heavily influenced by the ‘Affordability’ component in Figure 7 which shows a dramatic drop between 2016-2017, when the country was facing its economic crisis. As established in the economic section, this economic crisis is argued to have been largely accelerated by the Hidden Debt Scandal. Therefore, this drop indicates that conditions for food security worsened following the HDS, leaving more people vulnerable to the consequences of food insecurity highlighted earlier such as malnutrition and illness.

Figure 7. Mozambique Food Security Index - Affordability, Availability, Quality and Safety, Sustainability and Adaptation



Source: Reproduced from *Economic Impact*, 2022.

Real Household Consumption - The Cost of a Food Basket


In their 2018 report, using various simulation procedures, Mambo et al. examine the impact of the 2016 economic crisis in Mozambique on real household consumption and poverty. Using consumer price index and household budget survey data from INE (The National Statistics Institute in Mozambique) they show that between 2015-2016 the cost of a basic food basket “increased between 7 [\$0.15] and 15 [\$0.31] Meticaís per day per person” (Mambo et al., 2018, p.10). Their results and discussion indicate that a high number of households would not be able to afford the same goods in 2016 as they could in

2014/2015 (Mambo et al., 2018). Mambo et al. (2018, p.1) also suggest that in all regions of the country, the prices of basic food products increased “much more than the price of non-food products”. This is concerning because food products are not luxury goods, or ‘wants’, rather they are ‘needs’ that can directly impact the level of human security experienced by a population. Furthermore, they acknowledge that there are several factors that brought on the economic crisis such as the fall in prices of important export goods and weakened international demand. However, they argue that the strongest contributing factor that intensified the impact of the economic crisis was the HDS and the subsequent suspension of foreign aid from the IMF and other development partners.

Prevalence of Undernourishment

The prevalence of undernourishment can be useful as a measure of food security because it shows the direct impact of the lack of sufficient food in a population. Figure 8 below shows the prevalence of undernourishment as a percentage of the population in Mozambique. This percentage was declining prior to 2012 but then increased significantly until 2016 where it decreased slightly again. This data is not necessarily consistent with the hypothesis that the selected indices would be worse in particular after the HDS, as it would be expected then that the percentage of undernourished people would increase in the years following the revelation due to the loss of donor support, rising inflation and economic instability.

Figure 8. Mozambique Prevalence of Undernourishment (% of population)



Source: Reproduced from World Bank, 2020c.

There are several hypotheses that can be made about the reason that Figure 8 does not necessarily corroborate the arguments made based on the previous two measures. Firstly, while the percentage of undernourished people increased before the full effects of the HDS could arguably be felt, undernourishment is an extreme condition. There is a possibility that the number of officially undernourished people did not increase significantly post-HDS, but the number of people affected by food insecurity did, although it did not leave them undernourished. Secondly, there are other factors affecting food security in Mozambique than the HDS such as “conflict and recurring displacement” as well as “extreme weather events” such as cyclones, floods and droughts which can affect agriculture and livestock and therefore the number of undernourished people (World Food Programme, 2023, p.1). Thirdly, as established, there are many discrepancies in the data available in Mozambique on a number of human security measures which could alter the rigidity of any conclusions made. It should be noted though that this is also the case with data supporting the

hypothesis that the HDS would be followed by a worsening trend in the indices used to measure human security. Despite this, it is argued in this thesis that the HDS could still have been a contributory factor to the percentage of undernourished people. While the data cannot show that the HDS alone was responsible for the one of the peaks in 2016, it is consistent with the HDS being a contributing factor to the percentage of undernourished people because of the sustained level of 30% and above of the population being undernourished in the years following the HDS.

To summarise the effects of the HDS on food security, the changes seen in the indices are consistent with the theory that conditions worsened after the HDS although it cannot be proven definitively using the above measures that it was the sole or even the strongest contributing cause. The Food Security Index indicates that the economic crisis played a large role in the decreased level of food security, and this crisis is by several authors, including this thesis, largely considered to be a consequence of the HDS. The increased price of a basic food basket between 2015 and 2016 is by Mambo et al. (2018) strongly considered to be a result of the HDS as well. However, the percentage of undernourished people in Mozambique does not follow the trends or conclusions previously made within the topic of food security or economic security. Nevertheless, the other measures used do indicate that in the years following the HDS, food security in Mozambique worsened.

Health Security

Within the human security framework, there is a distinct lack of consensus regarding the definition of 'health security' (Aldis, 2008). In their 2003 report "Human Security Now", the UN Commission on Human Security referred to health security in one of their ten policy recommendations by urging to accord "higher priority to ensuring universal access to basic health care" (Aldis, 2008, p.370). Similarly, the World Health Organisation (WHO) urges that "every


national health system should ensure universal access to adequate quality care and avoid unfair and unjustified discrimination between individuals, groups and communities” (WHO, 2002, p.6). Both these definitions focus on access to health care, which is most often considered a state responsibility. In the UNDP’s HDR (1994, pp.27-28), health security is discussed in terms of preventable diseases due to poor nutrition, unsafe environments, and lack of clean water. They highlight that many health security threats disproportionately affect the poor and women, and also the importance of access to health services in countering these threats (UNDP, 1994, pp.27-28). While there are threats to health security that lie beyond access to health care such as the deployment of biochemical weapons by non-state actors or natural disasters, it is argued in this thesis that it should ultimately be the state’s responsibility to ensure that the consequences of these threats are faced in a sufficient manner. The following section addresses the health of the Mozambican population before and after the HDS by looking at a range of different measures of which the last two adhere to Hastings (2009) methodology: government health expenditure, life expectancy at birth, and access to clean water.

Government Health Expenditure (per capita)

Given the crisis that the Mozambican government was facing during the HDS and the IMF support suspension, between 2013 and 2016 the government revised their annual budgets with the aim of readjusting them to the dramatic loss of revenue (Shiple & Jenkins, 2019). Between 2013 and 2016, external support “for the State Budget fell by approximately USD 1.2 billion, from USD 1.98 billion in 2013 to 821 million in 2016” (Cortez et al., 2021, p.112). The use of tax revenue was insufficient in compensating for this revenue loss, so instead, the decision was made to cut expenditure in multiple sectors (Shiple & Jenkins, 2019). Shipley and Jenkins (2019, p.7) detail in their report that “the amount made available for debt servicing” which laid at around 75.4 billion Meticaís [\$1.57 billion], “was almost as much as that provided for education and health

spending combined” which was 79.2 billion Meticais [\$1.65 billion]. Although it could be possible to continue delivering the same healthcare services at a lower cost through different kinds of reforms, it is assumed that “cuts in public expenditure in the social sectors would produce, or result in, less well-being” (Cortez et al., 2021, p.112). This is supported by Rezapour et al. (2019, p.6), who found in their research that “public health expenditure had significant effects on health indicators in all groups” and higher expenditure “increased life expectancy level and decreased the infants and under-five mortality rate in all groups”. Thus, in this thesis it is argued and expected that health security would decrease following a decrease in government healthcare spending. Figure 9 below illustrates the health expenditure per capita in USD in Mozambique between 2012 and 2020. It demonstrates a dramatic decrease in expenditure per capita between 2014 and 2016, reaching its lowest point in 2016 around the time of the HDS. Under the assumption that less expenditure equals less health security this suggests that in this period, Mozambicans on a whole suffered a loss in health security. However, this decrease in expenditure seems to have recovered in the couple years following the HDS between 2016-2018, the reasons for which this thesis cannot determine.

Figure 9. Mozambique Government Health Expenditure (US\$ per capita)




Source: Reproduced from World Bank, 2020b.

Life expectancy at birth

Conducting an analysis of the changes in life expectancy at birth means looking at “the average number of years that a new-born could expect to live, if he or she were to pass through life exposed to the sex- and age-specific death rates prevailing at the time of his or her birth, for a specific year, in a given country, territory, or geographic area” (Landry, 2023, no pagination). It is one of the components used to create Hastings (2009) Human Security Index because it acts as a measure of population health. Life expectancy at birth is also connected to the level of government health expenditure, meaning that these two measures are interconnected. Roser, Ortiz-Ospina, and Ritchie (2013, no pagination) found in their research that “countries with higher expenditure on healthcare per person tend to have a higher life expectancy.” Furthermore, when viewing life expectancy over time they find that “as countries spend more on health, life expectancy of the population increases” (Roser, Ortiz-Ospina, & Ritchie, 2013, no pagination). Figure 10 below from the World Bank details the life expectancy at birth in Mozambique for both sexes between the years 2012 and 2021.

Figure 10. Life Expectancy at Birth in Mozambique (World Bank Figures)




Source: Reproduced from World Bank, 2021a.

Figure 10 above, accessed from the World Bank, is not necessarily consistent with a change in the estimated life expectancy at birth due to the HDS. Rather, it shows a gradual yearly increase in life expectancy from 2012 to 2020 where it then decreases. Figure 11 below based on more specific figures from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) (2022) tells a similar story, along with an increase after 2021. From comparing life expectancy figures globally using the World Banks database, it is fair to state that these figures typically do not dramatically increase or decrease from one year to another. While it is a “key metric for assessing population health” it does not appear to be one where you might visualise the immediate consequences of crises or disasters (Roser, Ortiz-Ospina, & Ritchie, 2013, no pagination). It is possible that in this measure it may take years for an effect to become apparent because it shows long-term effects of health insecurity. Therefore, the data presented does not support that the HDS had an impact on population health in

the few years following, but it could be argued that the HDS may have been or will continue to be a contributing factor in the long-term.

Figure 11. Life Expectancy at Birth in Mozambique (UN DESA Figures)




Source: UN DESA, 2022.

Proportion of population using safely managed drinking water services

Access to safe drinking water is fundamental to maintaining a healthy population. Similar to the discussion on food security, the importance of water access and quality cannot be overstated as it is integral to human health, and therefore human security. The consequences of a lack of safe, potable, and easily accessible water are well-documented and can cause serious harm to individuals and communities through for example the increased risk of diseases, respiratory infections, chemical intoxication, and decreased sanitation (Hughes & Koplan, 2005). Therefore, access to safe water sources is included in Hastings's (2009) Human Security Index as a measure to map the level of human security experienced in a country. Figure 12 below depicts a graph of the proportion of the Mozambican population using safely managed drinking water services in Mozambique from 2000 to 2020 sourced from United Nations Water

(2022). Something that presents a challenge in this analysis is that the data on access to potable drinking water in Mozambique varies between organisations. For example, in Figure 12 UN Water (2022) puts the proportion of people using safely managed water services at 61% in 2019, while USAID (2020a) claims that in the same year, the percentage of people that have access to just basic water services was 56%.

Figure 12. Proportion of Population Using Safely Managed Drinking Services in Mozambique



Source: Reproduced from UN Water, 2022.

Figure 12 clearly depicts a steady, yearly growth in the proportion of the population using safe water services. Between 2012 and 2020, this number increased by approximately 2-3% every year with no major peaks or dips. When viewed as a measure of human security, this data on potable water access is therefore not consistent with the hypothesis that human security decreased following the HDS. One explanation for this could be that despite major donors cutting their support to Mozambique monetarily after the HDS, many countries and organisations continued their water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) programmes in Mozambique during and after this period. For example, despite raising concerns about the low financial absorption of external funds for WASH programmes already in 2015, the organisation WaterAid did not suspend its programmes in Mozambique following the HDS in 2016 (WaterAid, 2015).

Similarly, USAID continued its existing programmes and even started new projects in Mozambique in 2016 (USAID, 2020b). Furthermore, despite a decrease in government spending on WASH projects, much of the infrastructure and tools already built for these ends such as wells and water pumps would still be functional and accessible despite budget cuts.

Worsening Conditions post-HDS: the Pungwe River Basin Project

On the topic of safe water management and accessibility, authors at the long-time development partner Swedish International Cooperation Development Agency (SIDA) however presents findings indicating that from 2017, water management systems have worsened in certain cases. SIDA's Pungwe River basin management project in central Mozambique was in effect between 2007 and 2017 with the aim to strengthen water resource management capabilities for WASH and environmental sustainability purposes, and support local institutions and stakeholders (Sørensen, 2020). SIDA's 2021 evaluation report of the project determines that between 2017-2020, the Regional Water Administration offices (ARA) in central Mozambique (ARA-Centro), experienced "a decrease of overall performance" (Sørensen et al., 2020, p.9). The first factor causing this decreased performance listed by the authors is Mozambique's financial situation, particularly the "continuous recovery" of the hidden debts (Sørensen et al., 2020, p.9). Other factors are also presented such as the conflict in Northern Mozambique, high staff turn-over, and later the Covid-19 pandemic (Sørensen et al., 2020, p.9). Mozambique has for decades been characterised by an over-bureaucratic and slow system of public administration (Stasavage, 1999, p.79). It is the authors at SIDA's determination that in the 2017-2020 period, this already faltering system was slowed down further in part due to budgetary cuts, which lead to intended staff development and effectivisation programmes not being implemented. Sørensen et al. (2020) describe that these budgetary cuts were introduced as a result of the decreasing size of the Mozambican state budget. Unsurprisingly, this effected the overall performance of ARA-Centro,

and in some cases the water quality even worsened because of under-regulated gold panning and mining activities (Sørensen et al., 2020, p.28). This is attributed by the authors to the fact that with a shortage of staff, budgetary issues, and poor administration capacity, ARA-Centro has found it “difficult to control larger companies” and implement sustainable strategies (Sørensen et al., 2020, p.28). The Pungwe River basin management case study is highlighted to exemplify how decreased government spending has knock-on effects in a variety of sectors and harms public administration of crucial services. Ultimately, although these issues were not born with or solely perpetuated by the HDS, it serves to show that indirect yet harmful events linked to human security were witnessed following the HDS.

When summarising if and how the HDS impacted health security, it is argued that health expenditure decreased as a result of financial restructuring to accommodate the debts. Given the correlation between health expenditure and health outcomes (Rezapour et al., 2019), it is argued that this could have worsened levels of health security and thus overall human security. Cortez et al. (2021, p.9) suggest in their report that it is likely that if the HDS had not happened “the health services would have been in better condition”. However, in terms of life expectancy at birth and safe water services figures, the data analysed does not support the theory that these measures would worsen following the HDS. This is however not argued to be solid evidence that the HDS did not affect health security at all in Mozambique in this period. Rather, while these measures are useful indicators of human security when viewed in combination with other components, they typically do not directly reflect short-term economic or political shifts. The Pungwe River basin case study demonstrates that the HDS was followed by decreased water security in central Mozambique due to the decreased expenditure in public administration. Furthermore, Mozambican public administration and government social welfare services are institutionally weak across most regions (Garrido, 2020). Therefore,

while Sørensen's (2020) SIDA report only tells the story of ARA-Centro, given Mozambique's general institutional weakness across the nation, it is possible that other regional offices could have been affected similarly across the country. Ultimately, it is concluded that health security worsened to some extent following the HDS.

Environmental Security

Environmental security is not always considered in regard to human security, especially in narrow conceptualisations of it. In broad understandings of human security, and by both Hastings (2009) and in the UNDP HDR (1994), it is considered because environmental insecurity can have serious consequences for the people living in that environment by threatening their wellbeing and livelihood. However, there is seemingly no widespread consensus on the definition of environmental security. Gierszewski (2018 p.54) discusses environmental security in the terms of 'ecological security' where the defined aim is "to protect humans from dangers of both human and natural origins (e.g., dangers related to access to clean water, air pollution, or global warming caused by greenhouse gases)". The UN Human Security Unit (UNHSU) (2016, p.7) similarly categorises "environmental degradation, resource depletion and natural disasters" as environmental security threats. Both of these definitions are in line with how environmental security is discussed in the UNDP Human Development Report (1994). Others view environmental security in connection to conflict, arguing that environmental insecurity can be both the cause and result of conflict (Kirchner, 2000; Brauch, 2008). Although the topic of the environment-conflict nexus could be an interesting discussion in regard to Mozambique, the following section focuses on the UNDP, UNHSU, and Gierszewski's approach to environmental security.

Unfortunately, it was not possible in this thesis to approach environment security in the same manner as the previous human security pillars for a couple

reasons. Firstly, in terms of Hastings (2009) methodology, he utilises measures such as the 'Environmental Vulnerability Index' (EVI) created by the South Pacific Applied Geoscience Commission and the United Nations Environment Programme, the 'Environmental Performance Index' (EPI) created by the Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy (YCELP), greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions per capita, and population growth. However, these measures and indices are not necessarily useful in evaluating how environmental security could have been impacted following the HDS. Neither the EVI nor the EPI publish data showing changes over time, with the creators of the EPI stating that "backcasting scores is unfeasible" in part because the "underlying data series we use are asynchronous" (YCELP, 2022, no pagination). Furthermore, while GHG emissions and population growth are utilised by Hastings (2009, p.22) as measures to "characterise the broad issue of human security" in different countries, these indices are argued to be ineffective in measuring the impact of singular events from one year to another. It is also argued in this thesis that it is likely that the potential effects of the HDS on GHG emissions and population growth would experience a lag effect, which would only be visible in the longer term.

Secondly, some threats to environmental security are natural ones which a political and economic scandal such as the HDS could not be the cause of. What could be evaluated is the response to these natural events and how the state mobilises its resources to increase its environmental security, which could be affected by budgetary issues caused by the HDS. This could be achieved by examining if the HDS had any impact on environmental security based on government expenditure on climate issues in a similar fashion to how health expenditure was analysed, however these figures have not been encountered in the research. Therefore, only assumptions can be made such as that if government expenditure fell in almost all sectors such as education, infrastructure, social welfare, and the judicial system as established by Cortez

et al., (2021, p.35), perhaps expenditure would also fall in programmes and departments tasked with different aspects of environmental security. However, without any clear data on this, no conclusions can successfully be drawn in this regard. Another assumption that could be made is that aside from creating health insecurity, the decreased performance of the ARA-Centro offices due to budget cuts in the aforementioned Pungwe River Basin project also had an environmental impact. The decrease in water quality due to unregulated mining activities could have affected not only health security but also environmental security by polluting the water. The discussion on environmental security in this thesis is evidently and regretfully limited, therefore further research on this topic is encouraged.

Personal and Community Security


Personal security is a component of human security that “aims to protect humans from physical violence of the state and other entities” (Gierszewski, 2018 p.54). Threats to personal security can include physical violence, crimes against life and property, accidents, abuse, and neglect (Gasper & Gómez, 2015, p.4). The United Nations Human Security Unit's (2016, p.7) definition of personal security, based on the UNDP HDR (1994), involves threats such as “physical violence in all its forms, human trafficking, (and) child labour”. In this sense, human security “encompasses not only freedom from social needs, but from threats to human psychosocial development as well” (Gierszewski, 2018 p.64). Gierszewski (2018, p.61) argues that these threats “can quickly and easily transform into much more serious social conflicts” which in turn can impact the security of the state and its people. Community security is generally understood to be concerned with “inter-ethnic, religious and other identity-based tensions” as well as crime and terrorism (UNHSU, 2016, p.7). These threats can be considered to also have an effect on psychosocial development and often deal with the occurrence of physical violence. While there is a clear distinction between personal and community security, several of the measures often used

to examine these overlap. Furthermore, as established by Gierszewski (2018), certain personal security threats can transform into community security threats if left uncorrected. Therefore, in the last section of the analysis on the impact of the HDS on human security, these pillars will be discussed in tandem. In Hasting's (2009) Human Security Index, personal and community security are not heavily discussed, therefore in this last section two separate measures have been selected to evaluate both personal and community security, namely: the Fragile State Index and the Political Terror Scale.

The Fragile State Index

The Fragile State Index (FSI) is calculated by researchers at the Fund for Peace (FFP) as a tool used to indicate “pertinent vulnerabilities which contribute to the risk of state fragility” (FFP, 2023d, no pagination). This is achieved by synthesising “quantitative data sets, content analysis, and qualitative expert analysis” which are then “subjected to critical review to obtain final scores for the Index” (FFP, 2023d, no pagination). In this index, a higher score indicates greater instability whereas a low score or a reduction in the score “indicates an improvement and greater relative stability” (FFP, 2023d, no pagination). There are 12 indicators with sub-scores that make up the total country score including for example: the security apparatus, group grievance, state legitimacy, demographic pressures, etc. The total country score is used as a measure in this thesis to broadly indicate the changes in the level of human security experienced in Mozambique between 2012-2022, whereas certain sub-scores are used to examine certain personal and community security factors in particular. The fragility of a state can affect the level of human security because “symbolic of such states is the collapse of law and order, along with basic services” whereas “where the state's fundamental features are strong, major conflict and human insecurity are less likely” (Bellamy, 2020, p.111). Therefore, the FSI is a “useful indicator of the degree to which human security is threatened” (Bellamy, 2020, p.101).

Figure 13. Mozambique Fragile State Index – Total Country Score




Source: Reproduced from Fund for Peace, 2023c.

Figure 13 above depicts the trend line for the total country score of Mozambique in the Fragile State Index between 2006 and 2023. In the given time period from 2012-2022, the data is not consistent with the hypothesis that a change would be seen particularly in 2016-2017 following the HDS. Rather, the total country score has been increasing and decreasing periodically since 2006 and reaching its most fragile state in 2022. This is a worrying development, leading Mozambique to be one of “the world’s six-most worsened country over the past decade” and highlights its “high vulnerability to event-driven risks” (Fiertz, 2020, no pagination). In an article from 2020, FFP author Natalie Fiertz attributes this worsening trend to the insurgency violence in Cabo Delgado as well as the 2019 cyclones Idai and Kenneth. However, it is worth noting that in 2017 shortly following the HDS in 2016, the country score did reach its highest point at the time since 2006. Similar to in other measures discussed in the thesis, it could be argued that the HDS was a contributing factor to worsening trends following the HDS, rather than the sole perpetrator.

Figure 14 below shows the scores for the indicators ‘Security Apparatus’ and ‘Group Grievance’ from 2012 to 2022. In the Fragile State Index, the Security Apparatus indicator considers security threats such as “bombings, attacks and

battle-related deaths, rebel movements, mutinies, coups, or terrorism” as well as “organized crime and homicides, and perceived trust of citizens in domestic security” (FFP, 2023a, no pagination). In some cases, this indicator also includes “state-sponsored or state-supported private militias that terrorize political opponents, suspected “enemies”, or civilians seen to be sympathetic to the opposition” or "armed resistance to a governing authority” through "insurgencies, proliferation of independent militias, vigilantes, or mercenary groups" (FFP, 2023a, no pagination). These security threats are considered when evaluating personal security primarily, however they could also be used to indicate community security in terms of crime and terrorism which are included in UNHSU definition based on the HDR (1994). The index does not provide detailed data on the exact factors that make up each country’s score, rather the aforementioned factors may vary across countries. Therefore, which factors have affected Mozambique’s score is undetermined, but what can be commented on is that the data is not consistent with an expected increase following the HDS around 2016-2017. Rather, the highest, i.e., worst, scores were measured in 2015 and 2021-2022.

Figure 14. FSI - Security Apparatus Indicator and Group Grievance Indicator



Source: Fund for Peace, 2023a & 2023b.


In terms of the Group Grievance indicator, the Fragile State Index considers “divisions and schisms between different groups in society” in particular those based on “social or political characteristics and their role in access to services or resources, and inclusion in the political process” (FFP, 2023b, no pagination). This indicator is therefore used to discuss community security in particular because it considers “real or perceived atrocities or “crimes” committed with apparent impunity against communal groups” (FFP, 2023b, no pagination). Similar to the Security Apparatus indicator, the specific factors affecting each country's score are not detailed. Figure 14 above does not show an increased score for group grievance following the HDS, rather between 2015 and 2018 there is a period of decline. However, despite this data not being consistent with the theory that indices would show a worsening trend following the HDS, there were indeed personal and community security threats recorded linked to the HDS during and after the scandal. Some sources such as Cortez et al. (2021, p.100) argue that in terms of political intimidation, the ruling party “Frelimo entered the 2018/2019 elections under great pressure caused by the hidden

debts, and it was necessary to resort to any means, including authoritarian ones, to avoid defeat.” They explain that “the police resorted to violence to intimidate voters and the opposition and to influence the results” on behalf of the ruling party, and the state “invested in the machinery of intimidation, repression, harassment” of the opposition (Cortez et al., 2021, p.100). Thus, in their opinion, physical violence committed by the state did follow the HDS, which in this thesis is considered a component of personal security and therefore human security.

The Political Terror Scale

The Political Terror Scale (PTS) measures the annual levels of “political violence and terror that a country experiences” presented in a five-level “terror scale” (PTS, 2023, no pagination). This index can therefore be used to discuss both personal and community security because political violence and terror can affect both individuals and communities. It should be explicitly noted that this index is not a measure of terrorism, rather a “conceptualization of state terror” i.e., violence and repression committed by the state (Wood & Gibney, 2010, p.367). The data used is compiled from three sources: Amnesty International’s annual country reports, Human Rights Watch’s (HRW) World Reports, and the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices from the U.S State Department (PTS, 2023). Using these sources PTS coders assign a score to each country from 1 to 5, with 1 being the best and 5 being the worst. As can be seen in Figure 15 below created using data from the PTS website, the data is unfortunately incomplete for some years due to a lack of availability from the different sources.

Figure 15. The Political Terror Scale - Amnesty International, HRW, U.S. State Department, and Average Score



Source: Political Terror Scale, 2021.

Table 3. The Political Terror Scale Scores - Amnesty International, HRW, U.S. State Department, and Average Score

Year	Amnesty	Human Rights Watch	U.S. State Department	Average
2021	4	4	4	4
2020	4	4	4	4
2019	2	3	3	2,67
2018		3	3	3
2017	3	2	3	2,67
2016	3	3	3	3
2015	2		3	2,5
2014	3		3	3
2013			3	3
2012	3		3	3

Source: Political Terror Scale, 2021.

Table 4. Political Terror Scale Score Interpretation

Score	Interpretation
1	"Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their views, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare." (PTS, 2023, no pagination)
2	"There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare." (PTS, 2023, no pagination)
3	"There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited de-ten-tion, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted." (PTS, 2023, no pagination)
4	"Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas." (PTS, 2023, no pagination)
5	"Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals." (PTS, 2023, no pagination)

Source: Political Terror Scale, 2023.

Mozambique ranges from a score of 2 to 4 on this scale in the given time period of analysis, and the interpretations of these scores are included above in Table 5. Based on the available data in Table 4, an average score was calculated in this thesis to provide one complete line ranging from 2012-2021. Although the rigidity of this calculation could be contested given that the data is incomplete, it is included to provide a rough estimation of Mozambique's PTS score

between 2012-2021. The data show peaks in 2016, 2018 and 2020, however it is not fully consistent with the hypothesis that these scores would show an increase following the HDS in the period 2016-2017. It is arguable whether the peak in 2016 is an indication of worsened state terror following the HDS as this may not have been apparent so soon. Although for example, the Amnesty report used to calculate the 2016 PTS score includes events from both 2016 and 2017 as it was released in February 2017, so it is possible (Amnesty International, 2017). Furthermore, in this report, they highlight several human rights abuses and occurrences of physical violence committed by the state or state-tied groups that would be considered personal security threats (Amnesty International, 2017). For example, several community organisers and journalists, some Renamo affiliated and some independent, who were critical of the hidden debts and government were abducted, assaulted, and even shot by “unidentified armed men believed to be members of a death squad composed of security officers” (Amnesty International, 2017, pp.262-263). The Human Rights Watch World Report of 2017 based on 2016 events reported similar politically motivated abuses by state-affiliated groups, but also highlighted equally brutal abuses by Renamo forces against suspected Frelimo supporters (pp.439-442). In the U.S State Department’s 2017 Country Report on Mozambique, similar events of political violence, abductions, and repression are discussed. It also includes information about the Budget Monitoring Group described as a “group of civil society organizations created to monitor the government’s handling” of the HDS (U.S. Department of State, 2017, p.8). This group experienced infiltrations and disruptions by government security agents as well as violent threats and intimidations believed to be on behalf of the Mozambican government (U.S. Department of State, 2017, p.8).

Therefore, although the PTS data is not necessarily consistent with the hypothesis, in the sources used to create the index, the HDS is considered as an event that negatively impacts the level of political terror experienced in

Mozambique. This indicates that following the HDS there were events tied to the HDS that threatened the level of personal security in Mozambique. On the topic of community security, if one includes crime as a measure, this is also the case because crimes against civilians were committed in relation to the HDS. However, in terms of inter-ethnic, religious, or other identity-based violence, the answer is not clear. The HDR (1994, p.31) discusses community security in terms of “membership in a group - a family, a community, an organization, a racial or ethnic group” but does not specify if for example political affiliation would qualify as such a group or organisation. If political groups are considered, then community security can be argued to have been affected because a number of those that experienced violence at the hand of the state were Renamo members. To summarise the conclusions drawn regarding personal and community security using the Fragile State Index and the Political Terror Scale, the data does not necessarily show a particular decrease in these measures following the HDS. However, using evidence from a range of other sources it is argued that following the HDS, personal and community security decreased to some extent, especially for Renamo members and other critics of the government.

Section 5 - Final Remarks

This thesis set out to answer the question: *How did the Hidden Debt Scandal impact the level of human security in Mozambique?*

The methodology used to help answer this question was to examine a range of indices tied to human security and establish whether they worsened following the HDS in 2016. The understanding of human security in this thesis was based on the UNDP definition of human security in the 1994 Human Development Report and supplemented with the work of other authors, allowing a broad range of components and threats to be considered. Although causal links between

these different indices and the HDS were not established, a worsening trend in many of these indices following 2016 when the full extent of the debts came to light was revealed. In other indices, this expected trend was not witnessed in the data, but other sources highlighted the negative impact of the HDS in these different spheres of human security. The aim of this thesis has also been to add to a more general understanding of the potential impact of elite corruption on human security. As established in the literature review, Warren (2004, p.334) states that the gains that can be made from corruption are often quantifiable and direct, whereas the harms are challenging to measure because they are often “incremental and randomly distributed”. This has been the case in the analysis of the Hidden Debt Scandal where a decrease in some aspects of human security certainly followed the HDS, but the extent to which they can be attributed to the HDS alone is more challenging to establish.

In terms of economic security, the impact of the HDS is the most well-documented in the existing literature and it consistent with the data analysed in this thesis. The exposure of the hidden debts in 2016 caused multiple external development partners to suspend their support to Mozambique, which then decreased the state budget. Furthermore, once the debts were no longer hidden and then included in the country’s debt share, it increased Mozambique’s debt by at least \$2 billion. Many organisational sources and authors, this thesis included, argue that the hidden debts were a considerable factor in bringing on the economic crisis in Mozambique in 2016-2017. This crisis led to the GDP per capita decreasing, inflation increasing, the number of people under the poverty line increasing, and the overall purchasing power of citizens decreasing. This caused economic insecurity for many, affecting their livelihoods and wellbeing, and thus their level of human security.

In the sphere of political security, when looking at Mozambique’s Global Freedom Score, the Press Freedom Index and the Corruption Perceptions Index

score, there are multiple factors present that arguably impact their general decline. Several authors and reports mention the insurgency violence in Northern Mozambique as well as renewed tensions between Frelimo and Renamo as factors in both the Global Freedom Score as well as the Press Freedom Index. In these two measures, it is concluded that the HDS was not the sole factor in their decline but rather it likely contributed to an already worsening political security environment trend. The decrease of Mozambique's Corruptions Perceptions Index score does correlate with the reveal of the hidden debts and the ensuing economic crisis. It is argued in this thesis, and by authors such as Cortez et al. (2021) and Nuvunga and Orre (2019) that in terms of government corruption, transparency and credibility, Mozambique suffered following the HDS.

Food security was analysed in this thesis using the Food Security Index as well as examining the difference in the cost of a basic food basket from before and after the HDS, and by looking at the prevalence of undernourishment. The Food Security Index showed that following the HDS, Mozambique's 'Food Security Environment' score reached its lowest point in 2016 and 2017 within the established analysis period. This was seemingly mostly affected by the 'Affordability' component, highlighting how economic crises can affect human security pillars other than the economic one. Real household consumption was measured by Mambo et al. in 2018 by showing the change in price of a basic food basket. Their research revealed a decrease in what an average family was able to buy in 2015 versus in 2016 after the HDS. Although it cannot be stated that this was entirely due to the HDS, it correlates to the worsening economic conditions experienced following the HDS. When examining the prevalence of undernourishment, the data showed a varyingly rapid increase since 2012, indicating that this pre-dated the HDS. However, it is argued that the reveal of the hidden debts and the economic crisis that followed may have been

contributing factors to the increase in the percentage of undernourished people in Mozambique.

In the health sector, government healthcare expenditure decreased in the years following the HDS due to the government readjusting the state budget. Given the positive correlation between health expenditure and health outcomes established by Rezapour (2019) among a multitude of other studies, it is assumed that this decrease in expenditure may have been followed by a decrease in overall health outcomes, and thus health security. Analysing the data regarding life expectancy at birth did not reveal a correlation with the HDS, however, it is argued that such a measure would not be immediately affected by an event such as the HDS because it typically shows the long-term effects of health insecurity. The data showing the proportion of the Mozambican population using safely managed drinking water sources also did not follow the expected worsening index trend following the HDS. This could be explained by that despite the Mozambican government's struggles to effectively govern, other organisations were present in the given time period that continued and even started new water, sanitation, and hygiene programmes. However, Sørensen et al. (2020) from SIDA argue that the economic fallout of the HDS left certain regional offices worse off in terms of finances and organisational efficiency, which in turn affected the water management systems in the local communities.

This thesis was unable to draw any conclusions regarding environmental security following the HDS using the available data sources outlined in Hastings (2009) Human Security Index or other resources. Only assumptions can be made regarding the decrease in government expenditure overall and how that may affect expenditure on environmental issues. It could be argued however that issues concerning the Pungwe River Basin water management case outlined in the health security section not only affected the drinking water for people, but

also had a negative environmental impact due to the pollution from unregulated mining activities. Overall, further research on the HDS and environmental security as well as elite corruption and environmental security generally would be valuable and welcomed as it appears to be an understudied topic.

Personal and community security were analysed in this thesis using the Fragile State Index's total country score as well as the sub-indicators of 'State Apparatus' and 'Group Grievance' along with the Political Terror Scale. In these indices, there were no clear suggestions in the data showing a worsening trend following the HDS. However, a range of authors and reports have highlighted the political violence and repression of critics of the government's handling of the HDS, especially those belonging to the opposition party Renamo. Therefore, it cannot be established that personal and community security overall in Mozambique worsened specifically following the HDS, however there were a considerable number of organisations and individuals who experienced violence and insecurity in connection with the HDS. The Fragile State Index and the Political Terror Scale's data both show that the worst scores seen in the 2012-2022 time span have been in the past couple of years.

Going off of the last statement, while some indices throughout this thesis show improved human security conditions in recent years, most of them do not. This is an indication of the continued worsening economic, political, and social conditions in Mozambique. Some researchers and organisations have been ringing the alarm bells about Mozambique in recent years, fearing that between the political tensions of the Frelimo-ruled government and the oppositional Renamo, the continued violent insurgencies in Cabo Delgado, the high risk of climate disasters, and the once relatively successful but now struggling economy, the Mozambican state is at the risk of failing (Matsinhe & Valoi, 2019; Jett, 2020; Fiertz, 2020, FFP, 2023c). The Hidden Debt Scandal provided further and significantly larger evidence of the already widespread corruption

that the Mozambican state has dealt with for decades. Although the Hidden Debt Scandal is singular case study, it also serves to highlight how large-scale elite corruption can impact the larger population of a country on a more general level. While the exact conditions of the Hidden Debt Scandal could not be applied to other cases, this thesis emphasises that the connection between elite corruption and human security is worth investigating in other cases as well. The analysis conducted in this thesis highlighted that in many of the indices that can be used to measure aspects of human security, conditions worsened following the HDS. It is therefore ultimately argued that while the Hidden Debt Scandal was never the sole contributor to any worsening human insecurity levels in Mozambique, it added a further heavy weight to be carried by an already fragile state.

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