CHARLES UNIVERSITY

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Institute of Political Studies

Department of Security Studies

Master's Thesis

2023 **Bc. Julie Rjazanova**

CHARLES UNIVERSITY

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Institute of Political Studies

Department of Security Studies

Formation of Pro-Russian Sentiment in Belarus and Serbia during the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

Master's thesis

Author: Bc. Julie Rjazanova

Study programme: Security Studies

Supervisor: doc. PhDr. Vít Střítecký, M.Phil., Ph.D.

Year of the defence: 2023

Declaration

1. I hereby declare that I have compiled this thesis using the listed literature and resources only.
2. I hereby declare that my thesis has not been used to gain any other academic title.
3. I fully agree with my work being used for study and scientific purposes.

In Prague on 23. July 2023 Bc. Julie Rjazanova

References

RJAZANOVA, Julie. *Formation of Pro-Russian Sentiment in Belarus and Serbia during the Russian Invasion of Ukraine.* Praha, 2023. 65 pages. Master's thesis (Mgr.). Charles University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Political Studies. Department of Security Studies. Supervisor doc. PhDr. Vít Střítecký, M.Phil., Ph.D.

Length of the thesis: 113 144 characters with spaces

Abstract

This thesis examines how Russia uses propaganda to build alliances with Serbia and Belarus in order to expand its influence and mobilize support. The study investigates the specific narratives and messages employed online focusing on how they shape public opinion and create a positive perception of Russia within the targeted countries. To get practical insights into the subject, the content analysis chosen as a research method for the thesis focuses on the content of selected media outlets in each studied country. In this context, the formation of pro-Russian sentiment is viewed as a social movement seeking social change. The thesis also incorporates the concept of hybrid warfare, which offers valuable insights into contemporary Russian strategic thinking and security challenges.

Abstrakt

Tato diplomová práce zkoumá, jak Rusko využívá propagandu k budování spojenectví se Srbskem a Běloruskem s cílem rozšířit svůj vliv a mobilizovat podporu. Studie zkoumá konkrétní narativy a zprávy používané online a zaměřuje se na to, jakým způsobem formují veřejné mínění a vytvářejí pozitivní obraz Ruska v cílových zemích. Pro získání praktického vhledu do tématu byla jako výzkumná metoda pro práci zvolena obsahová analýza, která se zaměřuje na obsah vybraných médií v každé ze zkoumaných zemí. V tomto kontextu je na formování proruských postojů nahlíženo jako na sociální hnutí usilující o společenskou změnu. Práce rovněž zahrnuje koncept hybridní války, který nabízí cenné poznatky o současném ruském strategickém myšlení a bezpečnostních výzvách.

Keywords

propaganda, alliances, narratives, messages, social movement theory

Klíčová slova

propaganda, spojenectví, narativy, zprávy, teorie sociálního hnutí

Title

Formation of Pro-Russian Sentiment in Belarus and Serbia during the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

Název práce

Formování proruského sentimentu v Bělorusku a Srbsku během ruské invaze na Ukrajinu

Acknowledgement

I would like to thank the members of the Institute of Political Studies for providing a conducive academic environment that nurtured my intellectual growth and research capabilities. Their passion for teaching and dedication to their respective fields have been a great source of inspiration.

Furthermore, I would like to express my profound gratitude to Mr. Radoslav Babiar. Your support and encouragement have been invaluable, and I am truly thankful for your presence in my academic journey.

Table of Contents

Introduction 2
Propaganda and Social Movement Theory 4
1.1. Characteristics of Propaganda 5
1.2. Propaganda Model 8
1.3. Social Movement 11
1.4. Mobilization of Collective Action 14
Hybrid Warfare in Information Sphere 18
2.1. Information Confrontation 18
Binding Elements of pro-Russian Sentiment 22
3.1. The Case Study of Serbia 22
3.2. The Case Study of Belarus 27
Research Methodology 33
4.1. Operational Definitions 33
4.2. Selection of Media Outlets 36
4.3. Data Collection 36
4.4. Risks and Limitations 37
Empirical Findings 39
5.1. The Case Study of Serbia 39
5.2. The Case Study of Belarus 41
5.3. Discussion of Empirical Findings 43
Conclusion 47
Summary 49
List of References 50
Sources of Research 55
List of Appendices 64

Introduction

Russia's search for alliances deviates significantly from traditional forms of geopolitical influence. Rather than relying solely on military force or economic coercion, Moscow has used a holistic approach to strengthening connections with potential or already existing allies. The motivation behind conducting the study of Russian propaganda used in order to build alliances with other countries comes from the fact that the issue has not been yet extensively studied. Despite numerous studies, there are still many potential areas for improvement in understanding tactics that shape public opinion, influence governmental decisions, and affect international relations.

Serbia and Belarus both share a long history of relationship with Russia that continues to influence their foreign policies. In Serbia, Moscow has tried to enhance ties as part of its efforts to expand Russian influence in the Balkans. On the other hand, the Serbian government seeks to maintain a favourable relationship with the European Union, the country's largest trading partner and a major source of foreign investment. The country balances its collaboration with both sides, which is why it is chosen as the subject of the study. On the contrary, Belarus is selected as Russia's long-standing economic and military partner as well as a crucial politically allied regime. In addition, Belarus provides a buffer zone for Russia. Hence, its geographic position plays a significant role in the construction of Russian security policy.

A comparison of Moscow's ways used to build stronger alliances in two countries can provide a comprehensive overview of the methods and efficacy of Russian propaganda campaigns. Therefore, the research focuses on specific narratives and messages of Russian state propaganda employed to build alliances with both countries. In the end, the following research questions will be answered: *"How does Russia use propaganda to build alliances with Serbia and Belarus, and what specific narratives or messages have been employed in this effort?"*

As social movement theory offers a potential framework for understanding the role of propaganda in the context of collective action and political mobilization it is critically analysed through a literature review of existing scholarly publications. The formation of pro-Russian sentiment in the studied countries is considered a social movement that seeks to bring social change.

The use of propaganda is an essential component of social movements' communication inventory where it serves multiple purposes. There are some potential ways that propaganda is expected to be used to build alliances with other countries. Firstly, Russia might use its propaganda strategy to favourably shape the narrative around particular issues or events. The effects of such misuse of information can create a positive perception of Russia in the targeted country. Secondly, Russia might use propaganda to demonize a common enemy or to create a sense of shared threat. This tactic can create a sense of solidarity between Russia and the targeted country and increase support for joint action. Finally, Russia might use propaganda to leverage media and technology to spread its message more widely and effectively. Such propaganda has the potential to confuse or divide the public, diminishing support for policies or alliances perceived to be harmful to Russia's interests.

Theoretically, the thesis is enriched by incorporating the concept of hybrid warfare. This concept offers valuable insights into the dynamics of contemporary security challenges, particularly in the context of Russian efforts to build potential new alliances or straighten existing ones with the corresponding narratives. Hybrid warfare is fully incorporated into the Russian National Security Strategy (NSS) and it is a strong component of contemporary Russian strategic thinking.

The research methods include qualitative methods such as content analysis of articles drawn from the most influential pro-governmental digital news sites in Serbia and Belarus. The data set for each studied country covers the year of the war in Ukraine. The collected data are carefully examined and searched for passages or sections that promote potential narratives.

Overall, Russian propaganda has a wide range of complex and temporarily different consequences. The research aims to investigate the impact of Russian propaganda on Serbia and Belarus during the war in Ukraine, particularly in relation to promoting its political doctrine. The study seeks to understand how Russian propaganda influences these countries and the ways in which it shapes their perspectives within the context of the conflict.

Propaganda and Social Movement Theory

The term “propaganda” has been frequently used to describe various forms of persuasive communication that seek to influence people’s attitudes, beliefs, and behaviour. Our daily lives are now highly influenced by propaganda, which is omnipresent in contemporary society. However, while propaganda has been studied from various disciplinary perspectives, its relationship with social movements and collective action has received relatively less attention.

Social movement theory offers a potential framework for understanding the role of propaganda in the context of collective action and political mobilization. This theoretical perspective emphasizes the importance of political consciousness, collective identity and collective action frames in shaping social movements' discourse, strategies, and outcomes. According to sociologist Sidney Tarrow, social movements are “collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities” (Tarrow, 2011, p. 9). His definition highlights the collective and organized nature of the phenomenon, as well as its interactions with those in positions of power.

The use of propaganda is an essential component of social movements' communication inventory where it serves multiple purposes. Firstly, propaganda helps social movements create and distribute their ideas to a broad audience. Nowadays propagandists leverage technology to spread their message more effectively. Secondly, propaganda can help to legitimize the movement's claims, demonize a common enemy or create a sense of shared threat. Thirdly, propaganda can serve as a tool for mobilizing and energizing followers, building collective identity, and sustaining movement momentum. Such a strategy can shape the narrative around particular issues or events in favour of the propagandists’ needs.

Propaganda, however, also presents several challenges for social movements. First off, it might be challenging to control the message and make sure that it aligns with the movement's goals and core values. Second, propaganda is vulnerable to antagonistic messages that raise doubt about the movement's legitimacy or misrepresent its ideas. Furthermore, propaganda might have negative overtones or be perceived as immoral or deceptive.

In this chapter, I aim to explore the interconnection of propaganda and social movements from the perspective of social movement theory by using corresponding academic literature

as a source. Specifically, I seek to specify propaganda tactics and methods that define the phenomenon, examine the creation of propagandist content and the success of its dissemination and study narratives that mobilize collective action in society. For the complexity of the topic, I incorporate a review of Herman and Chomsky's concept of "manufacturing consent" to describe the process by which the mass media creates the appearance of public debate while actually restricting the range of acceptable opinions. The first chapter will give an overview of the ways in which social movements might employ propaganda to sway public opinion and pursue their goals.

1.1. Characteristics of Propaganda

In his seminal work "Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes", Jacques Ellul offers an analysis of the ways in which propaganda reaches its highest potential in shaping and manipulating public opinion. First published in 1962, Ellul's research has had a significant influence on the study of media and communication. For academics seeking to comprehend how propaganda has influenced modern society, the book continues to be a valuable resource.

At its core, Ellul's critique of the regular approach to studying propaganda is an exploration of the phenomenon's characteristics that support its fruitful application. From the very beginning, the author emphasizes the importance of scientific analyses of modern psychology and sociology that serve as a fundament of modern propaganda. According to the author, methods, approaches, or propaganda subjects are no longer chosen by the man of talent but rather are carefully calculated to have the greatest impact. Based on the research, to produce custom propaganda that will support the social movement's message external and internal characteristics shall be taken into account.

As one of Ellul's external characteristics of propaganda, a symbiotic relationship between an individual and the masses is emphasized: "because in that way his psychic defences are weakened, his reactions are easier to provoke, and the propagandist profits from the process of diffusion of emotions through the mass, and, at the same time, from the pressures felt by an individual when in a group." (Ellul, 1965, p. 7) While addressing an individual they must be addressed in terms of what they have in common with the others and at the same time they must be individualized to feel seen and addressed personally. These days, the exclusive nature of mass media splendidly archives the required effect.

The second external characteristic describes sufficient propaganda as total. Due to the limited receiving range of one medium (e.g. newspapers or television), it is necessary to combine the instruments of propaganda in order to obtain the maximum coverage of the area. Additionally, Ellul claims that modern propagandists should also combine different types of propaganda as it responds to different sectors of action (Ellul, 1965, p. 17). In relation to the total nature of propaganda, the author mentions its continuity and long-lasting duration. Because of its isolative character, propaganda leaves no room in the mind of an individual to think outside of the box. At the same time, they must not have time to recover from the propagandist thought. In Jacques Ellul's words: "No propaganda is possible unless psychological influence rests on reality, and the recruiting of individuals into cadres or movements goes hand in hand with psychological manipulation." (Ellul, 1965, p. 20)

Furthermore, successful propaganda needs a physical organization that can be of various types (e.g. a political party or integration of an entire population into cells). Besides giving a sense of belonging, the presence of the physical organization keeps the propagandist separated from the subjects.

According to Ellul's analysis, the goal of modern propaganda is to provoke action and participation. He differentiates between active participation which is a cause of mass mobilization and passive participation when an individual does not act directly but viscerally supports the action (Ellul, 1965, p. 26).

Among the internal characteristics of propaganda is knowledge of the psychological terrain. In order to conduct a successful campaign "propagandists must know the sentiments and options, the current tendencies and the stereotypes among the public they are trying to reach." (Ellul, 1965, p. 34) The second rule they must obey is "not to make a direct attack on an established, reasoned, durable opinion or an accepted cliché, a fixated pattern." (Ellul, 1965, p. 34) Even though existing options should not be contradicted, they might be utilized. By utilizing existing opinions or ideas propaganda never creates something out of nothing but it always conforms its content to the needs of a targeted group. Nevertheless, the propagandist is free to go further with modifications of already existing information and always create something new.

The knowledge of the psychological terrain is closely connected with the knowledge of collective sociological presuppositions and fundamental social myths. As specified by

Jacques Ellul, propaganda will only be understood and accepted if it is based on the proper collective beliefs (Ellul, 1965, p. 39). The collective sociological presuppositions are judgments indoctrinated by time and shared social consciousness with a group so deep that they determine our actions (e.g. a man is naturally good). The myth expresses the deep inclinations of society (e.g. the myth of youth). Overall, a good propagandist should always follow the general direction of evolution to keep up with the trends and attraction.

“Man can be captured and mobilized only if there is consonance between his own deep social beliefs and those underlying the propaganda directed at him, and he will be aroused and moved to action only if the propaganda pushes him toward a timely action.” (Ellul, 1965, p. 43) The quality of an event occurring at a favourable time challenges the man, therefore, timeliness and use of hot-topic events are crucial for effective propaganda.

It is a frequent misconception that all products of propaganda are fabricated lies. In his work, Ellul questions whether truth is an appropriate term to use in regard to the issue. People have understood the relevance of truth and how it contributes to the construction of alternate information for decades because of propaganda studies. Ellul in his book proposes rather the use of the terms “accuracy” or “reality” when speaking of the relationship between propaganda and the accuracy of facts. Sometimes some facts are hard to prove. In other instances, the way the facts are presented to the public is a technique that propagandists might potentially misuse. The facts might also be treated in a way that leads people to simple and obvious conclusions. A so-called innuendo technique implies a suggestion or insinuation about a person, group, or idea, without making an explicit statement. Regardless of any actual evidence to back up the words, the innuendo technique relies on the power of collective consciousness to influence the audience's opinion. On the contrary, the usage of this technique forces the enemy to provide proof instead despite the fact that conclusions are already made.

From all the above characteristics, Ellul comes up with his own definition of propaganda as “a set of methods employed by an organized group that wants to bring about the active or passive participation in its actions of a mass of individuals, psychologically unified through psychological manipulations and incorporated in an organization.” (Ellul, 1965, p. 61)

Jacques Ellul's work “Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes” has been both highly praised and heavily critiqued. Some critiques target the magnitude of Ellul's definition of

propaganda. In Jowett and O'Donnell's piece “Propaganda & Persuasion,” authors point out that Ellul's definition is troublesome owing to the fact that to analyze propaganda one needs to be able to identify it (Jowett and O’Donnell, 2012, p. 4). Contrary to their statement, the French philosopher considered propaganda as a sociological phenomenon rather than something actively created or generated by people. The broadness of Ellul's conception of propaganda presents the phenomenon rooted in unconscious dissemination. Conversely, Jowett and O'Donnell's definition of propaganda focuses on the communication process - most specifically, on the purpose of the process. Both scholars examine the qualities of context, sender, intent, message, channel, audience, and response in order to identify propaganda within communication studies.

Another scholar who examines Ellul's work on propaganda is David Welch. In a study “Propaganda and Mass Persuasion: A Historical Encyclopedia, 1500 to the Present” Welch calls Ellul’s analysis of propaganda a “hypodermic needle theory”. In his opinion, Ellul’s suggestion of the “people’s need for propaganda” lacks complexity in acknowledging the influence of the mass media, and recognition that individuals seek out opinion leaders within their own social class and gender (Cull, Culbert and Welch, 2003, p. 16). Welch's criticism of Jacques Ellul's definition of propaganda also refers to the philosopher's belief that only successful propaganda is true propaganda (Cull, Culbert and Welch, 2003, p. 318).

Nonetheless, Jacques Ellul's analysis of propaganda techniques used to shape public discourse has a significant impact on the study of communication and media. In addition, his framework can be useful in studying Russia's use of propaganda to build relations with chosen states and understanding the methods that the Russian government uses to shape attitudes, beliefs and behaviours of targeted groups. Overall, adopting Ellul's approach to the study of the pro-Russian sentiment foundation can help in revealing the underlying mechanisms of persuasion and manipulation at work, as well as the larger social, cultural, and political context in which these efforts are situated.

1.2. Propaganda Model

Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman's work “Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media” examines how the media shapes public opinion and reinforces prevailing social narratives. First published in 1988, the book offers a powerful critique of corporate media's impact on democracy and freedom of speech. According to the authors,

the media is a propaganda system that promotes the elite's interests rather than being neutral or objective.

In the book, Chomsky and Herman introduce their propaganda model based on the capitalist perspective of societal class conflict of interest and the asymmetry of the world's wealth distribution. In this respect, systematic propaganda is a tool used in order to integrate individuals into the institutional structures of a larger society. The mass media serve as a communication system throughout the process to inculcate established values, supportive beliefs and required behaviour. The monopolistic control of the media accompanied by official censorship in circumstances where a state bureaucracy controls the levers of power makes it obvious that the media operates to advance the interests of an elite (Herman and Chomsky, 2002, p. 1). This main argument of Chomsky and Herman's work has been highly influential in shaping the debate around media ownership and control.

Chomsky and Herman built their propaganda model on a set of "filters" that identify the roots of a potential success behind the government's efforts to get their messages across to the public in cooperation with dominant private interests. The first powerful filter has to do with ownership, its size and the profit orientation of the mass media. The dominant media companies are driven by profit-oriented forces. Their goal is to secure continuous profit, therefore, their interests are interlocked with the interests of other major corporations, banks, and governments. Critical journalism takes second place after everything that guarantees profits.

The second filter exposes the real role of advertising. To fill the gap between the actual expenses of the mass media business and the consumer's will to pay for it, the advertisers enter the scene. The primary objective of advertisers is to make sales, and in connection to the media, this means creating a desire to purchase. Thus, advertisers are paying for the audiences and, as the authors of the book point out, they "will want, more generally, to avoid programs with serious complexities and disturbing controversies that interfere with the "buying mood"." (Herman and Chomsky, 2002, p. 17). Hence, the relationship between the media and advertisement creates another barrier to implementing an ethical and proper information flow.

"The mass media are drawn into a symbiotic relationship with powerful sources of information by economic necessity and reciprocity of interest." (Herman and Chomsky,

2002, p. 18) That being the case, news sourcing of the mass media is considered by Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman as the third filter of their propaganda model. Governments, state institutions and corporate sources have the status of being credible and recognizable. From this position of power, they are also considered to be objective without a doubt. A natural power imbalance between the authority as the information source and the media as a middleman causes tendencies towards exploitation.

Discreditation or as the authors call it "flak" of a media statement or program reinforces the command of the political authority in its news-management activities (Herman and Chomsky, 2002, p. 28). Diverting the conversation from criticism is the fourth filter identified by Chomsky and Herman when the authorities are taking the place of enforcers in order to eliminate inconvenient information spread by the media.

The final filter of Chomsky and Herman's propaganda model as well as an element of the consent manufacture is the creation of a common enemy. A phenomenon to fear usually corral public opinion. A successful propaganda campaign requires not only a sociological component to embrace the mass action but also a psychological component to reassure an individual of their emotions towards a corresponding issue. As one of the most powerful emotions, fear helps to mobilize the populace against any suggested enemy.

The five filters presented by Chomsky and Herman reduce the scope of news that gets through the gates created by the establishment and constrain what can become "the big news". In addition to the propaganda model, the authors mention a dichotomy of worthy and unworthy victims judged by the government or corporate community and the media. Only the ones considered "worthy" by the establishment might be shown to the public to intensify the sense of constant fear and alertness in society. "Conversely, propaganda campaigns will not be mobilized where victimization, even though massive, sustained, and dramatic, fails to meet the test of unity to elite interests." (Herman and Chomsky, 2002, p. 33)

Who are the (un)worthy victims? In "Manufacturing Consent" authors describe the worthy victims as people abused in enemy states while unworthy are those treated with equal or greater severity by their own government or clients (Herman and Chomsky, 2002, p. 38). However, in the case of worthy victims, the quality of coverage is usually well-designed to score political points (Herman and Chomsky, 2002, p. 42).

While the media certainly have an influence on public opinion, one of the issues that might be a subject of criticism in "Manufacturing Consent" is that the authors tend to exaggerate its real impact and disregard the role of other factors important in shaping people's beliefs and values, such as education and socialization. Additionally, the study of how different ideologies might shape media content aside from the argument that the media are biased in favour of a powerful elite would serve the theory as an extension.

By applying Chomsky and Herman's propaganda model to the topic of pro-Russian sentiment formation in the chosen countries, we can better understand how media content is shaped and disseminated. The model suggests that the media are not objective, but rather serve the interests of the powerful elite. In the case of Russian propaganda, the elite in question would be the Russian government and its leadership. We can also identify the ways in which the Russian government seeks to control and shape the messaging that is being promoted and the potential impact that this messaging may have on the targeted countries' foreign policies.

1.3. Social Movement

"The Strategy of Social Protest" by William Gamson is one of the most prominent works in the areas of social movements and social change. From its first publication in 1975, it has been highly influential in shaping an early articulation of the "resource mobilization" approach to social movements. In the book, Gamson examines how social movements operate and the different factors that contribute to their success or failure.

Gamson starts by identifying an entity capable of taking action against the established political system or as he calls it "the challenging group". To understand its nature he distinguishes three concepts of a target for such groups. First, the target of influence represents a set of individuals, groups or social institutions that a challenging group opposes with its policies in order to bring a change. In Gamson's words, such a target is called the group's antagonist. The second target is those individuals or groups whose resources and energy are used for mobilization. The group's constituency, as Gamson refers to it, attempts to implement change.

In the book, the author strictly refers to political mobilization as a creation of commitment. "Mobilization is a process of increasing the readiness to act collectively by building the

loyalty of a constituency to an organization or to a group of leaders." (Gamson, 1990, p. 15) According to Gamson, mobilization is part of an organizational process that proceeds specific attempts at influence, whereas commitment activation is viewed as part of an influence attempt.

The final target is the group's beneficiary or else the target of benefits. Those are people whom the challenging group hopes to positively affect by their brought changes. In some cases, the group's constituency and the beneficiary are the same individuals. However, Gamson highlights that overlap is not always the rule. Overall, only the antagonist and the constituency are relevant to the definition of a challenging group. The group's beneficiary becomes relevant in combination with the constituency when assessing the success of a challenging group. At the same time, a challenging group must satisfy the central criteria of seeking the mobilization of an unmobilized constituency and its antagonist shall lie outside of its constituency.

The scope of Gamson's work is one of the many strengths it has. He covers a variety of social movements in his research that have shown to be advantageous in understanding them further. In particular, our knowledge of how social movements function and how they might successfully accomplish their objectives has been shaped by Gamson's focus on the significance of resource mobilization.

Gamson incorporates the "think small" formula for the movement's success in one of the chapters observed and interpreted by Roberta Ash as follows: "The broader the goals of a social movement, the more central its focus, and the greater its threat to class structure, the less likely it will be to succeed." (Gamson, 1990, p. 41) Gamson reevaluates the formula based on his research. Based on his findings what really stands in the way of the ambitious challenger's success is not diffuse objectives but targets of change (antagonists) who are reluctant to assist in their own annihilation (Gamson, 1990, p. 49). Nonetheless, regardless of the means used by a challenging group, the antagonist's resources are typically more advanced than those of a starting group.

In addition to measuring the group's success by its objectives, he also assesses the criteria of a group's size. Gamson believes that compared to smaller groups, bigger groups are not significantly more likely to achieve the desired changes. On the other hand, he sees that there

is a more significant difference in gaining acceptance in larger groups. Nonetheless, it continues to be irrelevant in terms of a group gaining new advantages.

Based on Mancur Olson's seminal work "The Logic of Collective Action" Gamson further analyses the limits of members' solidarity to a group's common interests. William Gamson based his understanding of challenging groups on the relevance of the theory of public goods. In "The Strategy of Social Protest", he notes that a collective good is defined for a particular group and might not appear as desired for the whole community. However, even while overcoming the issue of different convictions by establishing the change with a majority there is still a question of so-called free-riders who are benefiting from the change without contributing to it. In reaction, Gamson introduces the term "internal social control" to Olson's theory where three basic ways present the solution to such a problem. The first two ways involve the use of negative and positive sanctions (constraints and inducements) and the third way is the actor's persuasion.

In addition to the solution to the free-riders dilemma, Gamson covers James Coleman's argument on the topic of why individuals are willing to surrender their freedom to corporate actors. The so-called effectiveness of normative appeals is discussed in terms of an individual's personal satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) with the achievements of a collective actor. Their investments in the activities of a collective actor might come from the psychological pleasure of involvement, self-identification as part of a certain group or their expectations of personal gains. According to Gamson, Coleman's presented examination of selective incentive does not contradict Olson's basic premise but rather it is an alternative means of overcoming the free-rider problem.

Furthermore, with the help of Albert Hirschman's argument, Gamson addresses the role of loyalty. Speaking of a challenging group, loyalty might substitute motivation through disguised personal goals involved in a person's support for a group. Gamson considers loyalty especially needed within bigger groups where one individual can hardly hope to make a real difference through his sacrifices. However, from Olson's perspective, this phenomenon remains irrational and insufficient as a means of social control. Overall, Gamson concludes with the thought that "it is not impossible to succeed with only loyalty and solidarity as one's mobilization weapon, but the reduced success rate of such groups supports the usefulness of the theory of collective goods in understanding the careers of these challengers." (Gamson, 1990, p. 71)

Other criteria for evaluating the success of a challenging group are analysed in terms of violence and other constraints. Gamson hesitates to evaluate them as successful tactics of social influence or social control, however, he admits that their absolute failure as such can be ruled out. On the other hand, he also makes the point that under certain conditions, such as when one employs untruly tactics in circumstances where public sentiment neutralizes the action's normal deviance, their employment might be rewarded with success.

Maintaining a structure of specific commitment on the part of members secures the readiness of a challenging group for their involvement in a political conflict. In his work, Gamson examines the bureaucratic organization of a challenging group, its centralization of power and tendencies to factionalism in order to measure their contribution to success in such conflict. “A centralized, bureaucratic group that escapes factional splits is highly likely to be successful; so, in fact, is a decentralized, bureaucratic group that escapes factionalism, but it is less likely to escape than its centralized counterpart.” (Gamson, 1990, p. 108) Overall, to win the battle with a usually well-organized and committed antagonist a challenging group shall proceed with certain commitments to its structure.

Notwithstanding the influence of Gamson's framework, it does not account for the role of power dynamics in social movements, nor does it address the ways in which they interact with the state or state institutions. However, by enriching his framework of the cultural and ideological dimensions of social protest, it can be applied to a range of collective action efforts, including state-sponsored propaganda campaigns aimed at building relations with chosen states even though Gamson's framework was originally developed to analyze social movements.

Analyzing the formation of pro-Russian sentiment as a type of social movement through the lens of Gamson's framework can be useful for understanding the underlying strategies and tactics used to build relations with chosen countries. It is necessary to emphasize that the framework must be modified to account for the differences between state-tailored propaganda efforts and traditional social movements.

1.4. Mobilization of Collective Action

“Talking Politics” is another seminal work by William Gamson offering a nuanced understanding of how people talk about and engage with politics. Published in 1992, the

book draws on Gamson's in-depth research into political discourse and offers a theoretical framework that has influenced further research in the area. His approach is notable for its emphasis on the relevance of narratives in shaping political views and behaviours, as well as its focus on how power dynamics are reflected and reproduced in political discourse.

In the book, Gamson focuses on the topic of political consciousness that supports mobilization for collective action. His argument is that social movements shape their narratives into implicit organizing ideas or frames. Hence, movements use different collective action frames as a form of explanation for the desirability of some form of action. For a definition of collective action frames, Gamson quotes Snow and Benford (1992): "action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that legitimate social movement activities and campaigns." (Gamson, 1992, p. 7) Moreover, the author studies three components of these collective action frames throughout the course of his research.

The first component refers to the moral indignation expressed in this form of political consciousness - the injustice component. The injustice component is cognition driven by emotions and cannot be merely described as a cognitive or intellectual judgment. Its focus is usually on righteous anger. "As injustice frame requires a consciousness of motivated human actors who carry some of the onus for bringing about harm and suffering." (Gamson, 1992, p. 7) At the same time, the injustice frame does not require that the subjects responsible for the wrongful injury bear all and complete responsibility for their actions as long as they are a concrete target of collective action. This way the underlying source of injustice is brought to light and the heat of the movement is not misdirected. In Gamson's opinion, media coverage often supports concretization tendencies and serves as an obstacle to social control strategies that place the roots of undeserved hardship beyond human agency. However, Gamson adds that people do not copy the injustice frames completely from the media, they forge the cognitive link by also using awareness of different public discourses.

The second component of Gamson's theory refers to the consciousness of collective action effectiveness - the agency component. Social movements rely on outer forces encouraging collective helplessness sourcing from a centralised and hierarchical history-making process that gives very little opportunity for ordinary people to participate in setting their living conditions. On the contrary, they empower people to act through a personalised call to change their own history and alter the conditions and terms of their daily lives through their own actions. As for media coverage of group protests, they are frequently and inadvertently

transmitted in various collective action images. Following that, in Gamson's opinion, an exaggeration might be seen on how media discourse contributes to social control. "It clearly does in many respects on many issues, but there is enormous variability among issues." (Gamson, 1992, p. 82)

At this point, bringing attention to power dynamics in the process of politicisation shall be emphasized as one of the book's strengths. Not only Gamson highlights how marginalized groups might be excluded from political discourse, but also how language and narrative might reflect and reinforce existing power structures. This significant contribution to the academic field shows the need for more inclusive and unbiased political discourse.

The third component addresses issues of identity, differentiation between "we" and "they" and drawing the line between contradicting values, beliefs and interests. "Collective action requires a consciousness of human agents whose policies or practices must be changed and a "we" who will help to bring the change about." (Gamson, 1992, p. 8) As for the role of media in addressing the issue of identity during a political conflict, they become an ambivalent target of action as they serve the cultural code that the group is challenging but also might be seen as a potential ally capable of reinforming the challenge and expanding the audience.

It is worth mentioning that an injustice frame might include a clearly defined antagonist (they) responsible for a group's suffered injustice as well as an adversarial frame might imply an injustice. However, the conditions are not necessarily set. The combination of those frames can be easily avoided in different situations. As Gamson points out, people can be treated badly through the lack of awareness by those pursuing their own selfish interests and at the same time the rivals might have competing interests that bring them into conflict without acting in ways that arouse moral indignation (Gamson, 1992, p. 112). Nevertheless, there is a logical reasoning for certain challenging groups who use injustice in their rhetorics to incorporate adversary elements. According to Gamson's research, the incorporation of adversarial aspects into frameworks of injustice heightens awareness of social movements and fosters empathy for their attempts at collective action. In fact, such inclusion encourages personal identification with a challenging group feeling wronged and specifies the targets who are accountable for the group's harm and suffering. Therefore, the symbiotic relationship between two frames seems essential for combining the three components of collective action frames.

The components of collective action frames studied by William Gamson in his publication "Taking Politics" support each other and cannot exist in isolation from one another. Political consciousness built on these components is forged in the process of collective action, according to Gamson. The way in which such action will be interpreted by people is unpredictable and depends on the extent to which people already share the elements of its frames. The process of political consciousness construction consists not only of individuals' attitudes and persuasions but also of negotiating shared meaning through conversations.

Despite the influential nature of Gamson's theoretical framework, a couple of nuances might be pointed out in the book. First of all, it is its researched data focused on the United States. This fact complicates the generalization of his findings to other cultural and political contexts. The second general critique of the book is its narrow focus on language and narrative which does not adequately account for other factors that shape political discourse, the role of conversation partners and group dynamics in shaping political attitudes and behaviours (e.g. media ownership or political institutions).

Nevertheless, Gamson's theoretical framework can be still applied to study the process of sharing political discourses beyond its original source of data. The framework places a strong emphasis on the value of narrative and language as well as how group dynamics influence political attitudes and behaviours. These are factors that are relevant to political communication in any context, regardless of geographical location. However, it is crucial to consider the particular cultural, historical, and political variables that are essential to that context in order to provide a more thorough understanding of the factors that influence political discourse.

Overall, by applying Gamson's theoretical framework in order to study how Russian narratives frame political issues and how they shape public opinion and attitudes toward Russia in chosen countries we can gain a deeper understanding of the ways in which propaganda can be used to build international relations.

Hybrid Warfare in Information Sphere

The role of information technology in strategic competitiveness has grown substantially during the last two decades. This transformation gradually influenced the perception of the relationship between information and conflict in international politics. Russian perception of modern technology use in national security, strategic competition, and defence strategy altered the evolution of information and communication significance.

Russia's activities in Ukraine (and Syria) have widened a grey zone that blurs the line between war and peace, ushering in a new era of security challenges. While observers often portray Russia's approach as "new" with regard to waging wars, it is important to keep in mind that other global actors are also challenging the Western hegemony by developing and combining other, less resource-consuming means (Weissmann, Nilsson, Thunholm, Palmertz, 2021, p. 3). Hybrid warfare is a term referring to a phenomenon described by a variety of distinct but overlapping concepts such as asymmetrical warfare, sixth-generation warfare, contactless warfare or unconventional warfare (Weissmann, Nilsson, Thunholm, Palmertz, 2021, p. 2). Hybrid threats are exceptional in their extent over the virtual or digital realm, enabling new tools and bringing down their respective costs to a source while maintaining the highest level of damage to the target's political system and cohesion. This type of military strategy blends together conventional and unconventional warfare targeting opposing societies. Simultaneously, it implies a range of other influencing methods and instruments of power such as cyber-attacks, propaganda, diplomacy and foreign political intervention.

2.1. Information Confrontation

Informatsionnoe protivoborstvo or else the concept of information confrontation is a strong component of contemporary Russian strategic thinking and has deep roots in Soviet and Russian military thinking. Authors of the "Rivalry in the Information Sphere" research explain this concept with the help of the Military Encyclopedic Dictionary of the Russian Ministry of Defence which defines information confrontation as a "form of conflict between opposing sides (states, social-political movements and organizations, armed forces, etc.), each of which seeks to defeat (inflict damage on) the enemy through informational effects in the information sphere (aggregate of information, information infrastructure, and subjects that collect, organize, distribute, and use information, as well as systems that regulate the

social relations that arise during such actions), while resisting or reducing such effects on one's own side." (Grisé, Demus, Shokh, Kepe, Welburn and Holynska, 2022, p. 7)

Furthermore, the researchers point out the concept's evolution through time which is presented in the Military Encyclopedic Dictionary as follows: "Information confrontation is becoming an independent type of warfare in which information is appearing as a resource, means, and objective." (Grisé, Demus, Shokh, Kepe, Welburn and Holynska, 2022, p. 7) In addition, the Dictionary recognizes the scale and consequences of this transformation. In this regard, it introduces the concept of information war "in which political, economic, and other goals are achieved through the destruction of the information space of the opposing side and gaining ownership of its information resources." (Grisé, Demus, Shokh, Kepe, Welburn and Holynska, 2022, p. 9) Grisé and his colleagues conclude that the Russian military-scientific literature reflects the official understanding of information confrontation in general.

As the research mentions, there are two main subtypes of information confrontation identified by Russian military scholars. The first one is represented by efforts to influence the enemy's population with a focus on the public consciousness. A so-called informational psychological confrontation "forc[es] the population of the victimized country to support the aggressor, acting contrary to their interests." (Grisé, Demus, Shokh, Kepe, Welburn and Holynska, 2022, p. 12) In addition to that, informational psychological confrontation targets military forces by means that "mislead[ing] the enemy, undermin[ing] its will to resist, produc[ing] panic in its ranks, and generat[ing] betrayal." (Grisé, Demus, Shokh, Kepe, Welburn and Holynska, 2022, p. 11)

The second subtype of information confrontation involves the physical manipulation of information networks and tools, including the "destruction of information, radio-electronic, [and] computer networks, and [gaining] unauthorized access to the information resources of the enemy." (Grisé, Demus, Shokh, Kepe, Welburn and Holynska, 2022, p. 12) This tactic is called informational technical confrontation.

The concept of information confrontation was first incorporated into the Russian National Security Strategy (NSS) with the 2000 National Security Concept (NSC) and gained particular attention in the aftermath of the annexation of Crimea in 2014. In 2015, the words "information confrontation" were replaced with the more general notion of confrontation in

the information sphere. However, the term was introduced again in the most recent NSS signed by President Putin in 2021.

From the beginning, the document warned of the increased threat to Russian national security in the information sphere and the desire of a number of countries to dominate the global information space in order to expel Russia from the external and internal information market (Grisé, Demus, Shokh, Kepe, Welburn and Holynska, 2022, p. 44). The 2000 NSC emphasized the seriousness of such a threat to Russia.

The renewed NSS of 2015 mentions the aspirations of some countries in reaching their geopolitical objectives through the utilization of information and communication technologies, including the manipulation of public awareness in Russia and the falsification of history. Subsequently, it emphasizes the potential risk of new forms of illegality associated with transnational organized crime connected to it. In order to protect Russian citizens from external ideological influences, Kremlin advocates for control over the information sphere. As a final note, the 2015 NSS describes informational means as a tool that can be employed to achieve strategic deterrence and maintain Russia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Despite the hostile notion of the document, it mentions Russia's continuing interest in establishing a full-fledged partnership with the USA.

The latest update of NSS from 2021 brings back the establishment of the forces and means of information confrontation in order to prevent destructive informational impact from extremist and terrorist organizations, intelligence services and propaganda structures of foreign states on Russian citizens. In the document, it is notable that the threat is now posed by "unfriendly countries" which are determined to weaken Russia militarily, technologically, economically and even spiritually. Russia is portrayed as a country that has been deliberately targeted by external efforts to undermine its role and place in world history on the background of the disintegrating liberal global order. Moreover, there are concerns about the revival of fascist ideology and the instigation of inter-ethnic and inter-faith conflicts. In addition, the document explicitly mentions "destructive forces from abroad and within the country" that are trying to exploit Russia's domestic problems to support terrorist and extremist activities. Another significant innovation in the 2021 NSS is an emphasis on defending traditional Russian values threatened by foreign propaganda that aims at creating a hostile image of Russia. It is notable that in the 2021 strategy document, the European Union has been completely omitted, unlike the 2015 version, where it was mentioned as a

possible collaborator. On the other hand, Western countries have been explicitly blamed for exacerbating disparities in state development, increasing social inequality and decreasing the effectiveness of the global system security in order to maintain its hegemony.

The idea of information confrontation must be viewed in the wider scope of Russia's national security and defence strategy, which outlines the country's global and domestic ambitions, threat perceptions, national identity, and the government's perspective on Russia's position in the world. For Moscow, information confrontation is not only a threat to its information space, but also an opportunity for achieving its aims and promoting its interests by manipulating public opinion and disrupting policymaking processes through various kinds of propaganda, disinformation, and cyberattacks.

Binding Elements of pro-Russian Sentiment

The impact of Russian propaganda extends beyond the country's borders, as it has been found to influence policymaking processes in other countries. This chapter examines the binding nature of Russian propaganda and its defining characteristics in Serbia and Belarus. The study begins by outlining the historical and cultural connections between Russia and chosen countries, which have laid the groundwork for Russian efforts to cultivate its influence. By analyzing the key grounds of binding elements in Russian strategy towards the alignment with Serbia and Belarus, the study will further explore the specific narratives employed in potential propagandistic efforts.

3.1. The Case Study of Serbia

Balkan Peninsula has long been considered Moscow's frontline in its geopolitical confrontation with the West and soft-power ties where Serbia simply overshadows its neighbours. Even though Russia's influence and economic impact in the region are declining to advance the EU and NATO presence, Serbian society still fosters enormous respect and support for the Russian Federation. Despite the EU's significant funding, surveys indicate that a large majority of Serbian citizens still consider Russia to be their true ally, even after the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Serbia shares cultural and historical similarities with Russia that contribute to a sense of common identity between the two nations and grants Moscow considerable soft power. Russian nationalism, increasingly featured in Russian society and public discourse, is fundamentally shaped around Slavophilism and Pan-Slavism (Laruelle, 2019, p. 19), which emphasize the importance of shared Slavic ethnicity in achieving cultural and political goals. This fact ties Serbia to Russia historically as far back as the pan-Slavic movement of the nineteenth century. Along with the Slavic brotherhood go shared values of Orthodox Christianity that are used to fortify the Kremlin's ties with the country (Stanicek and Caprile, 2023, p. 5).

According to the Balkan Defence Monitor 2022 report by the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP), countries of the Balkan region prioritize cooperation with NATO and regional initiatives. Nevertheless, the report highlights Serbia's indecisive position regarding collaboration and conducting exercises with Russia and Belarus. While still having more

bilateral exercises with NATO partners (14 exercises in 2021), Serbia has also been holding annual joint military exercises with the Russian Federation (4 exercises in 2021) since signing a cooperation agreement in 2013 (Bjeloš, Ignjatijević and Šterić, 2022). Exercises such as “Slavic Shield”, “Brotherhood of Aviators of Russia and Serbia” (BARS) or “Slavic Brotherhood” emphasize the bond of Slavic brotherhood at their core.

Researchers at the BCSP Maxim Samorukov and Vuk Vuksanovic point out in one of their articles from January 2023 that “46% of Serbs believe that their country should stay neutral in the Russia-Ukraine war, confirming that a balancing act appears to be the least costly strategy for the Serbian government.” (Samorukov and Vuksanovic, 2023) According to a public opinion poll carried out by the Open Society Foundation and Datapraxis in mid-2022, the Kremlin's invasion of Ukraine had changed very little in Serbs' beliefs toward Moscow. Overall, Serbia stands out as a country with a strong pro-Russian sentiment, even in comparison with Western-skeptic countries in the developing world (Samorukov and Vuksanovic, 2023). In their article, Samorukov and Vuksanovic refer to the results of the Open Society Foundation poll that show “63% of polled Serbs held the West responsible for the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war: significantly more than in all other polled countries, including Indonesia (50%), Turkey (43%), and India (34%).” (Samorukov and Vuksanovic, 2023)

Hostility towards the West and Western institutions is another aspect that leans Serbian people towards Russia which sees its uniqueness in three metanarratives, according to Marlène Laruelle’s study of Russian nationalism. First, the territorial dimension elevates Russia among other countries as geographically the biggest (Eurasianism). Second, its connection to the universe and the essence of the “Russian soul” as a new way of continuing territorial expansion that has messianic meaning (Cosmism). The last Laruelle’s metanarrative presents Russia’s active expansion towards the north as revenge for the lost Soviet territories (Arctism). These metanarratives are driven by a sense of loss in comparison to Russia's claimed natural and legitimate size, resulting in resentment directed abroad, misunderstandings about the Soviet Union's collapse, and fear of continued territorial fragmentation (Laruelle, 2019, p. 38).

Furthermore, given Russia's dominant role in the global trend of illiberalism, it is worth exploring the origins of these tendencies. Again in Laruelle’s explanation, illiberalism supplies an appealing framework for making sense of the world for Russians. Driven by the

traumas of the early 1990s associated with liberalism (the collapse of the communist regime, the loss of the Soviet empire, disruption of daily life, a decline in socioeconomic conditions, and a decrease in life expectancy) Russia quickly adopted an illiberal ideology, which in discussions within the country is referred to as conservatism (Laruelle, 2020, p. 116-117). Putin's étatization of illiberal beliefs and attitudes over the past two decades is reflected in the Russian NSS as mentioned earlier. On the same note, researchers of Russian soft power in Serbia see Moscow's appeal to the Serbian public in its frustration with the Western mode, the bitterness of 1990s memories, the frustration with Kosovo's independence, and the notion that Russia acts as a counterforce to the Western primacy (Vuksanovic, Samorukov and Cvijic, 2022, p. 5).

A different BCSP public opinion survey conducted in autumn 2022 revealed that "55% of the Serbs do not believe there is a viable alternative to the EU membership, as opposed to 21.6% who do and 23.4% who do not have an answer to this question." (Vuksanovic, Samorukov and Cvijic, 2022, p. 8) However, 47% of respondents who believe in an alternative to EU integration see cooperation with Russia as such an alternative (Vuksanovic, Samorukov and Cvijic, 2022, p. 8).

Based on the results of data analysis presented by comparative politics and statistical methods specialist Maria Snegovaya, "the electorates of pro-Russian parties tend to display significantly more Eurosceptic attitudes than the electorates of mainstream parties." (Snegovaya, 2021) Moreover, Snegovaya shows that the relationship between the Kremlin and pro-Russian actors in Europe is based on political calculus rather than ideology since euroscepticism is a binding force between Russia and its sympathizers across the whole political spectrum. Political actors who challenge the liberal social order adopt Eurosceptic principles and pro-Kremlin views. In return, the Kremlin takes advantage of their positions. The agendas of these political actors, however, are rarely established by Moscow, and their alignment with pro-Russian positions is only temporary (Snegovaya, 2021). According to Maria Snegovaya, as Euroskepticism fades, the number of political actors practising pro-Russian sentiments is likely to fall (Snegovaya, 2021).

Further questions of the BCSP survey revealed that many Serbs place high importance on cooperation with Russia. Over 50% of polled Serbian citizens felt that Russia is the most important international partner as opposed to 18.3% who thought it was the EU (Vuksanovic, Samorukov and Cvijic, 2022, p. 8). Besides, 65.8% considered Russia as the country's

greatest friend (Vuksanovic, Samorukov and Cvijic, 2022, p. 8). At the same time, 27.5% believed that Russia only looks after its own interests, while 56.3% felt the same about the EU (Vuksanovic, Samorukov and Cvijic, 2022, p. 8).

In the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, reliance on Moscow's popularity in Serbia became an even greater liability (Samorukov and Vuksanovic, 2023). The Serbian leadership is currently grappling with a dilemma as it faces building pressure to join the sanctions against Russia and fears that doing so could domestically weaken its public support. According to the results presented by the Open Society Foundation, 35% of the population of Serbia believes that Ukraine should give up parts of its territory that Russia currently controls (Vuksanovic, Samorukov and Cvijic, 2022, p. 5).

Even though Balkan countries continued their obligatory international military cooperation as NATO member states in the context of Russian aggression towards Ukraine, Serbia remains the regional outlier, upholding its military neutrality and foreign policy based on geopolitical balancing (Bjeloš, Ignjatijević, Starinac and Vuksanović, 2023). Serbia's challenge of balancing relations with Russia and the West, along with the unresolved Kosovo disputes, creates a difficult situation for the government to adjust national security policies and strategic documents. On the other hand, the Serbian security strategy identifies military neutrality as its main security concept, while also explicitly specifying Russia and China as key security partners (Bjeloš, Ignjatijević and Šterić, 2022).

The day after Vladimir Putin authorized a "special military operation" in Ukraine, Serbian president Aleksandar Vučić rejected Western sanctions toward Moscow as he announced that Serbia has its "vital national and state interests and respects traditional friendships." (Gadzo, 2022) Months later, Serbia was pursuing its independent policy. Despite a recent change in Vučić's rhetoric that strained ties with Moscow in January 2023 with words: "For us, Crimea is Ukraine, Donbas is Ukraine, and it'll remain so." (Dudik and Savic, 2023), Serbian media continue often transmitting pro-Russian narratives and referring to Russian aggression towards Ukraine as "conflict", "crisis" or "special military operation". Even though Serbian diplomacy has supported several UN General Assembly resolutions condemning the Russian aggression against Ukraine in March 2022 (Bechev, 2023), the country continues to be dependent on the Russian energy supply (especially natural gas) and relies on Moscow for support in the Kosovo dispute.

According to a 2022 poll by Belgrade-based Demostat found, nearly 80% of Serbs oppose sanctions against Russia (Vasovic, 2023). In the same year, Vučić agreed on a new three-year gas supply contract with Gazprom (Reuters, 2022) while the EU was pressing for extensive bans on Russian energy export. Serbia's unwavering adherence to Russia's interests and refusal of sanctions is possibly a result of the painful memory of the isolation imposed on Belgrade in the 1990s as a result of its involvement in the wars over the dissolution of federal Yugoslavia.

A degree of Serbian sensitivity to foreign threats to a state's territorial integrity seems to be unanticipated in the light of the 1999 Kosovo war and Kosovo's subsequent declaration of independence. However, Belgrade also relies on Moscow's backing on the grounds of the United Nations Security Council in debates over the independence of Kosovo, because Russia, as a permanent member of the Council, has veto power and, like Serbia, does not recognize the country. In the media, tensions between Serbia and Kosovo have been compared to the "Crimea scenario" on numerous occasions.

The issue of territorial integrity was recently revived after the vote on Kosovo's membership in the Council of Europe. In April 2023, Ukraine abstained from voting on Kosovo's membership application to join the Council, while months earlier, Serbia voted in favour of Ukraine's sovereignty before the United Nations. In reaction, the Serbian President pledged a revision of his country's attitude toward Ukraine with words: "If there is someone who ignores the territorial integrity of the Republic of Serbia, why should we respect their territorial integrity? <...> Why should we rush to protect someone else's territorial integrity, while we can remain silent, since those people are clearly against Serbia's territorial integrity?" (TASS, 2023)

Another exposure of Russian-Serbian connections was brought to the public attention in January 2023, when a Russian news video claimed to show Serbian volunteers training to fight alongside Russian troops in Ukraine (Delauney, 2023). Social media content was created in the Serbian language and spread by promoting advertisements to join Russia's Wagner mercenary group. Recruiters' encouragement for the war was criticised by Aleksandar Vučić who also reminded that the Serbian legislature bans any participation of the country's citizens in conflicts abroad (Vasovic, 2023). Regardless of the regulations, dozens of Serb volunteers signed up and took part in the fighting alongside pro-Russian

forces in Ukraine in 2014 and 2015 (Vasovic, 2023). Nevertheless, no reports exist to confirm their exact number.

In addition, the commitment of Putin's regime to conservative right-wing values attracts less-known and more fragmented neo-Nazi groups of neither Ukrainian nor Russian nationalities to join combat to personally experience war, as it is pointed out by Marlène Laruelle's study of Russian nationalism (Laruelle, 2019, p. 207). Among individuals from different European countries (Italy, France, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and the Baltic states), Serbian troops appear to be the most numerous, followed by Belarusians and former Soviet citizens from Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Uzbekistan (Laruelle, 2019, p. 207).

The Kremlin's deliberate employment of misinformation and disinformation tactics aimed at fostering pro-Russian sentiment and weakening Serbia's pro-Western orientation continues to strengthen connections between Moscow and Belgrade. As the country manages its challenges, the future of Serbia's geopolitical relationship with Russia and the West, as well as the consequences for the entire region and beyond, remains to be seen.

3.2. The Case Study of Belarus

One of Russia's long-standing economic and military partners in the post-Soviet region is Balarus. Minsk plays a crucial role of a politically allied regime that, as a matter of fact, provides a so-called buffer zone between Russia and NATO. Hence, its geographic position is essential in the formulation of Russian security policy. Additionally, both nations share historical, cultural and linguistic connections that contribute to a sense of common identity misused as a topic by propaganda in order to maintain and strengthen the countries' alliance.

Decades after the dissolution of the USSR Belarus is still the most 'Soviet' of all former republics that has also failed to establish a distinct national identity due to its proximity to Russia (Trenin, 2005, p. 67). In 2002, only one-fifth of the Belarusian school teachers firmly believed in the survival of Belarusian identity under the conditions of the time (Ioffe, 2003, p. 1241). As for religion, while being viewed as the borderland of Polish Catholics and Russian Orthodox, the issue of religious underpinnings of identity was no longer important for Belarusian people (Ioffe, 2003, p. 1242-1243). However, being a

predominantly Orthodox society the Moscow Patriarchate is used to treat Belarus as Russian Orthodox territory under attack from the Vatican and the various Protestant denominations (Trenin, 2003, p. 75). The Patriarchate has the support of the Kremlin on this matter as well as it keeps a good relationship with the Belarusian leadership.

Situated between Poland and Russia both geographically and linguistically, Belarus used to face two partially overlapping yet profoundly different sets of national symbols backed by different social myths (Ioffe, 2003, p. 1259). The first and more considerable set inclines to Russophilia and Soviet vintage. This set of national symbols reflects Belarus' ties to Russia and its memories of the Soviet legacy: flag and national emblem introduced in 1995, Soviet-era insignia, ruble as the national currency, and Russian as one of the official languages (Ioffe, 2003, p. 1259-1260). The second set of national symbols inclines to the glorification of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania[1] as a truly Belarusian state promoted by the nationally conscious Belarusian Westernisers who adopted the state symbols that had been used under two successive German military administrations (Ioffe, 2003, p. 1260). These symbols became the official emblem of independent Belarus in 1992 following the proclamation of the Belarusian language as the country's only official language. Nonetheless, the inclination toward Grand Duchy-based nationalism was later rejected and Soviet national symbols returned as it appears that relatively few people in Belarus embraced such Grand Duchy-related symbols as their own (Ioffe, 2003, p. 1262).

Following the outbreak of protests over the presidential election in August 2020, the Grand Duchy-based national symbols began to appear more regularly among those who disagreed with the official results. Data available from a public opinion poll conducted in September 2020 by the independent policy institute Chatham House show that 34% of the survey sample which corresponded in terms of age, gender, and town size to the general structure of the Belarusian urban population chose the white-red-white flag and the Pahonia emblem to represent themselves (Chatham House, 2021, p. 31). On the contrary, 44% of respondents chose the official Belarusian flag and insignia from 1995 (Chatham House, 2021, p. 31). By November 2021, the numbers changed to 26% for the Grand Duchy-based symbols and 49% for the official symbols (Chatham House, 2021, p. 31). The rest of the respondents

[1] The state existed from the 13th century until 1795 when the territory was divided among the Russian Empire, the Kingdom of Prussia, and the Habsburg Empire.

answered: “None of these symbols”.

When the same data are analysed by political stances, 97% of respondents who chose the official symbols of Belarus to represent themselves in the survey conducted in November 2021 were part of Lukashenka’s electorate (Chatham House, 2021, p. 32). The remaining 3% of the president's base who participated in the survey answered differently (Chatham House, 2021, p. 32). On the other hand, 70% of respondents who chose the Grand Duchy-based symbols in the same survey were hardcore protesters against Lukashenka’s victory in the 2020 elections (Chatham House, 2021, p. 32). Additionally, 22% of respondents who sympathized with protesters did not prefer any symbols and 8% chose the official flag and emblem of Belarus (Chatham House, 2021, p. 32). The majority of people who identified themselves as politically neutral (48%) chose the official symbols and 40% of them decided on none of the symbols (Chatham House, 2021, p. 32). The remaining 12% felt like the white-red-white flag and the Pahonia emblem meant the most to them (Chatham House, 2021, p. 32).

By analysing contemporary Belarusian society based on people’s attitudes towards national consciousness or identity, Philipp Bikanau, a researcher of the Friedrich-Ebert Foundation, identified five main segments forming it in 2022 (Bikanau, 2022, p. 6). According to Bikanau’s findings, three out of the five segments mentioned in his analytical report dominate the field. Of the total of 1 279 respondents, 29% recollect the country’s Soviet past and display views and values of those times, hence, they incline to the Russian-Soviet component while at the same time showing some attachment to the development of Balorussian national consciousness (Bikanau, 2022, p. 7-8). People of this group are described in the report as more likely to have secondary education and with preferences in both types of media (state and non-state). In this case, Bikanau sees very little differentiation between Russians and Belarusians as a result of people’s nostalgia towards the Soviet Union, however, with the overtones of admiration for the Belarusian language (Bikanau, 2022, p. 7-8). Furthermore, this group consists primarily of religious people (Bikanau, 2022, p. 16).

The second group (14% of respondents) shows a very strong attachment to the Belarusian component with a love for the Belarusian culture (Bikanau, 2022, p. 7). The report highlights their support for the development and greater presence of the Belarusian language in their day-to-day lives (Bikanau, 2022, p. 7). People of this group are described

in Bikanau's report as self-aware, mostly oriented towards Europe, typically represented by people with higher education and high income, with an over-half preference for non-state media (Bikanau, 2022, p. 7).

Nonetheless, the majority of respondents (39%) fall under the category of undecided about their position (Bikanau, 2022, p. 8). This group has a neutral attitude towards the Russian-Soviet or Belarusian components. When undergoing the survey, members of this group frequently found it difficult to respond to practically all questions or otherwise provided average answers (Bikanau, 2022, p. 8). In addition, they were more likely than others to be polarized once they were done shaping their principles and position (Bikanau, 2022, p. 8). Representatives of this group are described in the report as mostly workers of education or skilled workers who actively consume both state and non-state media. At this point, it is important to mention that the "fear factor" is recognized by the author as one of the study's limitations. Due to the sensitivity of discussions about political topics in Belarus, respondents tend to shift the distribution of answers towards neutral options (Bikanau, 2022, p. 5). Bikanau as well refers to a research poll conducted by Chatham House where politically neutral citizens were identified as most susceptible to fear (Bikanau, 2022, p. 5).

The fourth group identified in the report (13%) represent people who do not see national culture and language as something important and are marked by a very strong attachment to the nationally-indifferent component (Bikanau, 2022, p. 8). Their very little attachment to the Belarusian component influences their will to advocate the development of the Belarusian language and culture (Bikanau, 2022, p. 8). The report describes this group as mostly unskilled and service workers with secondary education and a preference for state media.

The smallest group (4%) is represented by people who identify themselves as Russians and show indifference to Belarusian culture (Bikanau, 2022, p. 8). The nostalgia for the Soviet Union is reflected in their support for the unification of Russia and Belarus as they see no difference between citizens of these countries (Bikanau, 2022, p. 8). The survey shows their fear of nationalism in over half of the responses and a lack of interest in cases when the rights of the Belarusian-speaking population are infringed (Bikanau, 2022, p. 8). The so-called "Russified" are committed consumers of state media and the study's oldest sample segment. These people are described in the report as usually high-earning unskilled workers with a secondary education who tend to work in agriculture.

According to the opinion poll by Chatham House conducted in November 2021, urban Belarusians held the most favourable attitude towards Russia of any foreign country at the time with overall 82% of respondents feeling at least somewhat positive about the country (Chatham House, 2021, p. 23). However, Moscow's support for Lukashenka's regime after the 2020 elections cost it the sympathy of part of the Belarusian population (Shraibman, 2020). Even though politicians and pro-regime media outlets have praised the ties between Minsk and Moscow, the pro-Russian feeling is increasingly associated with support for the regime that brutally suppressed the protesters. Nearly 50% of respondents to the Chatham House study stated that their opinion of Russia has worsened as a result of its backing for Lukashenko; this percentage rises to nearly 80% among protest participants (Shraibman, 2020).

The mass protests against the Belarusian president led to Minsk's international isolation and resulted in the regime's complete dependence on Moscow making it difficult for Lukashenka to resist Russia's pressure for unification or refuse any potential demand from the Kremlin (Chernyshova, 2022). However, considering how unpopular the idea of joining Russian aggression against Ukraine and sending troops to war is with Belarusians, it would most certainly jeopardize Lukashenka's hold on power.

Based on the results of an opinion poll conducted by Chatham House in March 2022, 52% of Belarusians did not support allowing Russia to use Belarusian territory to wage war with Ukraine while only 16% agreed with doing so (Chatham House, 2022, p. 5). The same survey showed that even though Belarusians are divided in their sympathies towards the parties of the war, they are quite united in the belief of not taking part in any military action (Chatham House, 2022, p. 7). At the same time, it is evident from the study that media rhetoric influenced public opinion about the conflict outcomes. Following the state-run media, the vast majority of respondents thought Russia would win (Chatham House, 2022, p. 10). On the other hand, those who relied on non-state media or Ukrainian outlets believed in the Ukrainian victory (Chatham House, 2022, p. 10). The same pattern is also evident from the opinions on Belarus' involvement in the conflict. The answers of the respondents differed widely depending on the information sources consumed. Overall, only 3% of the urban population supported the engagement of Belarusian troops in the war against Ukraine on the Russian side right after its outbreak (Chatham House, 2022, p. 15).

A year after Russian troops invaded Ukraine, the stance of the Belarusian majority has not changed towards Moscow's actions. According to the latest report from March 2023 by Chatham House on Belarusians' views on the war, 44% of the population still opposes it, while an additional 24% did not give a clear indication of their stance (Chatham House, 2023, p. 5). As for support indicated by the media segment, more opponents than supporters of Moscow's actions are indicated in all segments except the state media audience (Chatham House, 2023, p. 6). Participation in hostilities remains minor, although there has been a slight increase in scepticism about Ukraine's chances of victory over the last year (Chatham House, 2023, p. 7, 11). After February 2022, people's views on foreign policy shifted but have since stayed unchanged (Chatham House, 2023, p. 16). From the start of the full-fledged war, 20% of poll respondents felt very negatively or somewhat negatively towards Russia in contrast with the previous 7-10% results (Chatham House, 2023, p. 16).

The opposition to war and military action may have its roots in historically strong anti-war sentiments that were shaped by the tragic collective memory of World War II, which remained at the core of Belarusian national identity (Chernyshova, 2022). Possible deeper involvement in the war could result in unexpected and uncontrollable consequences for both Belarus and Russia. In particular, Belarus faces a delicate balancing act as it strives to protect the interests of its elite, maintain ostensible stability, and preserve Lukashenka's regime. The upcoming decisions and actions of its government might influence not only the outcomes of the Ukrainian war but also further geopolitical changes in Moscow's post-Soviet sphere of influence.

Research Methodology

Throughout the war in Ukraine, Russia has tried to deepen its connections with any potential ally while taking advantage of changing geopolitical realities. A particularly effective method through which Kremlin sways public opinion is propaganda. In the cases of Serbia and Belarus, a lot may be learned about the complex relationship between media and politics by comprehending the narratives and messages used in the Russian propaganda campaign against the West.

This chapter introduces the methodological perspective of the content analysis conducted in order to understand how Russia uses propaganda to build alliances with Serbia and Belarus. To study what specific narratives or messages are employed in this effort, the further discussion focuses on defining the operational categories of study, explaining the scope and the process of collecting data and acknowledging possible risks and limitations of the research.

4.1. Operational Definitions

Based on the two case studies discussed in the previous chapter, a variable of narratives and messages employed in the Russian propaganda campaign in Serbia and Belarus was chosen to be studied. To capture the key aspect of the research, eight potential theme categories were identified to select relevant information and develop a coding framework to analyze the content. The theme categories cover the issues of shared ethnicity and values, religious and historical ties, ideological argumentation, territorial integrity, demonization or degradation of opponents, and scepticism towards the West.

The categories' operational definitions come from the country-specific criteria for identifying a narrative. The category of shared ethnicity for both studied countries comes from the shared Slavic heritage which is a fundamental idea used by Russian propaganda moderators to legitimize the source of the international connection. In the research, the narratives of this category were identified by the embracement of pan-Slavism and cultural relations among the Slavic people of Russia, Serbia and Belarus. To interlink the narrative of shared ethnicity with the timeframe of the research, the definition for the category also incorporated shared ethnicity with Ukrainian people.

Hand in hand with shared ethnicity go shared values that strengthen the international connection between states and their people. As for shared values, the topics of cultural and historical traditionalism, Russian conservatism as a counterweight to Western liberalism, near abroad neutrality, zero nuclear capacity tolerance and pacifism were taken as a point of departure in the research.

Further bonding between Russia and the studied countries was identified in the previous chapter on the basis of the Orthodox religious ties. While the issue of religious identity core seems no longer important for Belarusian people, overall, religion continues to play a significant role in Easternerupian societies and is also actively used for propagandistic goals in politics. For that reason, the religious ties between Russia, Serbia and Belarus were incorporated as one of the analyzed categories. The dispute between Eastern Orthodoxy and Western Catholicism was determined to be the primary propaganda motif as well as the unity between people accepting the Orthodox doctrines. The definition of the category also included common religious ties with Ukraine in order to tie it with the period covered in the research.

On the same note, historical ties as specific references to historical events that connect Russia to Serbia or Belarus were studied as one of the framework categories. For Serbia, the references were identified as fellow feelings in comparison to events that revive frustration with the Western mode and Kosovo's independence, the bitterness of 1990s memories, and the collective memory of World War II. In the instance of Belarus, the references focused on Soviet vintage and the traumatizing memory of World War II were chosen as best suited to capture the people's identities that might resonate with the propaganda campaign.

In the context of propaganda characteristics, it is important to mention that the use of the four above-mentioned categories of narratives or messages is supplied by the knowledge of collective sociological presuppositions and fundamental social myths. This knowledge, according to Ellul, serves as the basis of a successful campaign. As discussed in one of the previous chapters, propaganda may be characterised by its emphasis on a symbiotic relationship between an individual and the masses to appeal to what people share as a society. Aligning with collective beliefs and conforming them to the needs of a targeted group determines the effectiveness of propaganda by boosting its comprehension and acceptance by the people. In addition to these categories, ideological argumentation is frequently used by propagandists for "academic" justification of their content in order to increase the

effectiveness of the produced messages meant to influence people's behaviour. Therefore, the analysis of chosen data sources followed such narratives and messages to incorporate them into the coding framework.

The next theme category studied in the research is territorial integrity. In the specific context of the Russian propaganda efforts in Serbia and Belarus, territorial integrity becomes significant as its narratives may have implications for territorial disputes, border demarcations, or perceptions of sovereignty in these countries. The topic is specifically valuable in the case of Serbia where the unresolved Kosovo disputes create a difficult situation for national security. In the research, the category is identified as a desire for different territorial arrangements or support for Russian imperial expansion. Based on Gamson, social movements use different frames as a form of explanation for the desired action. While referring to injustice in the Kosovo scenario, it becomes the Serbians' driving component of collective action.

Furthermore, the creation of a common enemy supported by the enforcement of fear is a powerful tactic in propagandists' inventory to corral public opinion and help effectively mobilize the audience. Therefore, demonization or degradation of opponents was chosen as one of the theme categories to follow in the coding framework. For both studied countries in the research, the criteria were filled by the appearance of verbal abuse directed at the opposing side such as Ukraine, NATO, the West, opposition or anyone holding a different opinion from the mainstream. Similarly, a category of scepticism towards the West was incorporated into the framework as it is the topic that Moscow has relied on for decades. Specific narratives or messages in the data sources were identified by the lack of ability notion in regards to Western politics.

The two above-mentioned categories are a combination of sociological and psychological components that embrace mass action. The emphasis of such narratives and messages is usually put on righteous anger and fear that effectively amplify a collective action towards a specific target. Hence, the psychological aspect is most effectively reinforced through the creation of a common enemy to manufacture public consent. In this context, Gamson's analysis of the identity components that serve to bolster the perception of being under attack supports the propaganda effect on strengthening the collective identity and reinforcing the sense of unity in opposition to the presented threat.

4.2. Selection of Media Outlets

By giving a sense of belonging and keeping the propagandist separated from the subjects, the presence of the physical organization "behind the curtains" further promotes the practice of successful propaganda. Such organizations can be of various types, therefore, this research uses local news outlets selected in each studied country. For the purpose of this study, pro-governmental outlets were chosen, due to their alignment with the official positions and narratives of the government, their access to official sources and significant influence on public opinion.

Daily broadsheet newspaper Politika (Политика)[2] presents the oldest and most influential outlet in Serbia. Even though the newspapers were privatized, the government still has a significant ownership stake in them, showing an excellent example of an issue in terms of transparency of ownership in Serbia's traditional daily newspapers (Media Landscapes Expert Analyses of the State Media, [no date]). Politika has a reputation for serious journalism despite being vehemently supportive of the ruling parties at various times (Media Landscapes Expert Analyses of the State Media, [no date]).

Belarus Today (Беларусь сегодня)[3] is the largest national media outlet and the official newspaper of the President's Administration published in Russian and Belarusian languages. The outlet was previously known by the name "Sovietskaia Belarus" (Советская Беларусь). The Council of the European Union called Belarus Today the main propaganda newspaper in its Decision 2012/642/CFSP of 15 October 2012 concerning restrictive measures against Belarus (The Council of the European Union, 2012).

4.3. Data Collection

The data used for the coding framework of the research consists of articles drawn from the most influential pro-governmental digital news sites in Serbia and Belarus. The data set for each studied country covers the ongoing war in Ukraine and consists of articles published from the 21st of February 2022 until the 24th of February 2023. The articles were selected following criteria of consisting any of the following key terms or tags: special military operation, Donbas, independence, Donetsk People's Republics, Luhansk People's Republics,

[2] https://www.politika.rs/
[3] https://www.sb.by/

Kherson, Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant, Mariupol, Bucha, Kharkiv, Cruiser Moscow, Azov, Azovstal, mobilization, Crimean Bridge, or war in Ukraine. These data sets were also expanded to include the articles published within the chosen timeline on the days of the major events that occurred during the year of Russian aggression in Ukraine.

Within these temporal and source parameters, 20 articles were quasi-randomly selected per case from each digital news site. In the analysis of the articles from the website of Belarus Today, the relevant data were collected from the pieces written as experts' opinions or reflective texts as it was expected to show a direct link to Russian attempts of building a stronger alliance with Belarus via the identified narratives and messages. On the other hand, the process of data collection from Politika involved analysing comments sections on the chosen news pieces as the Serbian policy of geopolitical balancing is seemingly present in the media information space. Hence, fertile soil for building an alliance with Serbia appeared to be through its people.

To examine the collected samples, a simple content analysis was adopted in order to generate a quantitative account of the material based on the frequencies of key categories. Each article was carefully read and searched for passages or sections that reflect or promote the targeted narratives. Attention was paid to statements, arguments, examples, or anecdotes that conveyed them. Finally, a coding framework based on operational definitions of studied categories was applied to the collected data.

After all of the selected data had been coded, it was evaluated to discover patterns and trends. The assessment of how frequently each targeted narrative or message occurred across the articles, as well as any fluctuations or variations between time periods during the year, might be helpful in gaining insights into the prevalence and focus of various narratives.

4.4. Risks and Limitations

Like any research method, content analysis for studying propaganda comes with certain risks and limitations that should be acknowledged. Content analysis involves the interpretation and coding of data, which can introduce subjectivity and bias. Researchers' personal perspectives and preconceived notions may influence the coding process, potentially

impacting the objectivity of the analysis. For that reason, clear coding criteria were established and followed.

The research involves analyzing articles in a language unfamiliar to the researcher. The nuances of language, cultural contexts, and idiomatic expressions may be lost in translation, potentially impacting the interpretation of the content. To ensure the accuracy and reliability of the analysis, rigorous translation methods were employed.

Empirical Findings

This chapter presents the empirical findings of the content analysis conducted as part of this thesis in order to answer the question, "How does Russia use propaganda to build alliances with Serbia and Belarus, and what specific narratives or messages have been employed in this effort?" Building upon the theoretical framework discussed in previous chapters, the emphasis now moves to the evaluation of real-world data and comprehension of its implications. This methodological approach provides a thorough understanding of the unique narratives and messages used in order to build stronger alliances with Serbia and Belarus in a time of hardship for Russia, giving insight into the role of propaganda in changing geopolitical dynamics in the region.

5.1. The Case Study of Serbia

In the comments sections of the articles drawn from Politika, the category of shared Slavic ethnicity rooted in the embracement of pan-Slavism and cultural relations among the people of Russia, Serbia and Ukraine appeared eight times in total (see Appendix no. 1). The overall notion of this category is related to the feeling of Slavic brotherhood between nations forged by time and shared history. Even lower results are shown in the categories of religious ties and ideological argumentation, counting only one mention each (see Appendix no. 1). The religious notion portrays Russia as a defender of Orthodox territories and at the same time associates Catholicism with nazism. Hence, the message endorses the narrative of the dispute between Eastern Orthodoxy and Western Catholicism. However, the outcome of the research makes both categories barely representative.

On the contrary, the category of historical ties as specific references to historical events that connect Russia to Serbia appeared at a higher volume of 29,5 (see Appendix no. 1). Previously, the references were identified as fellow feelings in comparison to events that revive frustration with the Western mode and Kosovo's independence, the bitterness of 1990s memories, and the traumatizing memory of World War II. After conducting the research the results show that all of the expected narratives are present in the studied sample. Special attention is paid to the comparison of historical events in order to make messages resonate with people's collective identity. As an example, references are made between the war in Ukraine and an international armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1992

and 1995. A further metaphorical link is drawn between the territories of Novorossia[4] and Kosovo since both areas went through the separation from their original administrative entity. It is assumed that these now independent territories are destined to be part of the once greater whole again. Additionally, similarities are seen even between the massacres in Bucha, Markale[5] and Račak[6]. The prevalent belief is that the events are staged and fabricated, which is in line with Russian state propaganda.

In the examined samples where a desire for different territorial arrangements or support for Russian imperial expansion was identified, the category of historical ties often overlaps with the category of territorial integrity, causing the count to be divided in half. However, identified narratives or messages related to the category of territorial integrity present in the studied samples count for three points in total (see Appendix no. 1), classifying this category as marginal.

As for shared values between Russia and Serbia, the category has six evident narratives or messages identified through the research (see Appendix no. 1). Of all the previously defined topics that were expected to appear in the debate, the topics of Serbian neutrality and general pacifism in regard to the war in Ukraine have come out as the most relevant. The notion of Russian conservatism as a counterweight to Western liberalism is more evidently present as a part of different categories that will be discussed next.

With a total of 64,5 points, scepticism toward the West emerged as the largest category in the study (see Appendix no. 1). Some of the messages in the examined data set had overlapping content that combined the categories of scepticism towards the West and historical ties, causing the count to be divided in half. The majority of narratives or messages examined in the research target NATO as an actively involved participant in the war in Ukraine as a proxy war against Russia often comparing the situation to the Serbian's own experience with the alliance's practices. The general sense of scepticism occasionally

[4] An administrative area of the Russian Empire that would later become the southern mainland of Ukraine.

[5] The Markale market shelling or Markale massacres were two bombardments believed to be carried out by the Bosnian Serb Army targeting civilians during the siege of Sarajevo in the Bosnian War.

[6] The Račak massacre or Račak operation was the murder of Kosovo Albanians that took place in January 1999. It is believed to be perpetrated by Serbian security forces in response to Albanian separatist activity in the region.

morphs into a full-fledged conspiracy scenario accusing the media of lying and fabricating events supported by the West.

Along with scepticism comes the category of demonization or degradation of opponents as a propaganda tactic of enforcing fear to corral public opinion and help effectively mobilize the audience, which scored 25 points in the examined data set (see Appendix no. 1). Even though the numbers of the narratives or messages appearance are not quite as high as in the previous category, verbal abuse directed at the United States, NATO, or the West is frequently present in the studied samples making this category the third most numerous in the research.

5.2. The Case Study of Belarus

Articles from the media website Belarus Today frequently rely on Russian sources, if not directly on President Putin's words. As a result, the data set under examination closely resembles Moscow's official propaganda narratives. The category of shared Slavic ethnicity among Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians has a frequency of 17,5 in terms of references (see Appendix no. 2). The narratives or messages related to this category are often mentioned in the sense of shared brotherhood between the nations rooted in their Eastern European Slavic heritage as well as nostalgia for the Soviet vintage. Hence, the category of shared ethnicity usually intersected with the category of historical ties, resulting in the count being divided by half.

Among the other studied categories in the research, the one focusing on the historical ties between Russia and Belarus stood out with a higher frequency of 38,5 points (see Appendix no. 2), ranking it as the third most prevalent category. Remarkably, a higher count of references is visible at the very beginning of the studied period. Previously in the study, the references were identified as uniting sense of the Soviet past and the traumatizing memory of World War II. The results of the research demonstrate that all of the expected narratives are present in the analyzed samples. For creating a bond with people's collective identity, the narrative that draws parallels between the events of 1941 and the present day is accorded particular importance. In addition to that, the comparison is extended to the Cold War era, accentuating the state of crisis and deterrence.

On the contrary, minimal or no results are registered in the categories of religious ties and territorial integrity (see Appendix no. 2). These findings align with the idea that the significance of religion has diminished among the Belarusians and no longer represents a relevant factor in shaping their national identity. Likewise, narratives or messages related to a desire for different territorial arrangements have not been identified in the examined samples (see Appendix no. 2). Therefore, the minimal representation of these categories in the research outcomes indicates their lack of prominence within the overall analysis.

A quite low number of appearances is detected throughout the research in the category of shared values between Russia and Belarus. The category has four evident narratives or messages recorded in the framework (see Appendix no. 2). However, the overarching theme prevalent in the analyzed articles is that of Belarus promoting peace. Despite the less numerous results of explicitly identified messages, the overall binding narrative across the articles that reinforces the connection between Belarus and Russia emphasizes the importance of peace as a collective aspiration. This notion portrays Russia as a defender of civilians and Belarus as a facilitator of peaceful resolutions in light of their experiences during World War II. Apart from this, the research has not identified the notion of Russian conservatism serving as a counterweight to Western liberalism. This finding suggests that the discourse surrounding this particular concept in the case study of Belarus is not prominent within the analyzed data.

Furthermore, propagandists often resort to ideological argumentation to provide additional credibility for their content. In this category 13 messages or narratives were identified (see Appendix no. 2), mostly appearing during the first two months of the analyzed period. The use of ideological arguments serves as a means to lend legitimacy to the propagated content.

Scepticism towards the West emerged as the second most prevalent category in the study, accumulating a total of 92 points (see Appendix no. 2). The majority of narratives or messages analyzed in the research specifically focus on the United States, as the leading state in NATO, and often suggests their incompetent approach toward implementing Western policies. At the same time, the notion of scepticism is evident in referrals to the American administration as the major capitalist force in the background of global geopolitical dynamics as well as behind the Ukrainian government.

Lastly, the category of demonization or degradation of opponents aimed at mobilizing the targeted audience received the highest score of 119 points in the analyzed dataset (see Appendix no. 2), making it the most extensive category in the study. In the context of Belarus, verbal abuse is usually directed at the United States, NATO, the EU, Ukraine, Poland, Germany or any other opposing party (e.g., opposition that left the country after the 2020 protests repressions). The authors of the studied articles from Belarus Today use plenty of colourful figures of speech to describe their chosen targets, resulting in content that is filled with hatred and degradation. Notably, this trend of negative portrayal intensifies over the duration of the study period.

5.3. Discussion of Empirical Findings

The research intends to explore Russia's propaganda tactics within the framework of social movement theory, with an emphasis on the formation of pro-Russian sentiment as a social movement that strives to bring about social change in the studied countries. Hence, Russian propaganda has to be understood in the context of collective action and political mobilization. Adopting this perspective allows a deeper understanding of propaganda as the key tool in mobilising support, shaping public opinion and recruiting members.

As discussed in a previous chapter, one of the characteristics of propaganda highlights a symbiotic relationship between an individual and the masses. When addressing individuals, propaganda must strike a balance between a sense of personal recognition and a mass appeal to what people share as a society (Ellul, 1965, p. 7). This relationship weakens an individual's psychological defences, making their emotional reactions more easily provoked (Ellul, 1965, p. 7). To archive it, the knowledge of the psychological terrain, collective sociological presuppositions and fundamental social myths help propagandists utilize existing opinions or ideas and conform them to the needs of a targeted group. The effectiveness of propaganda is determined by its comprehension and acceptance by the people (Ellul, 1965, p. 39). This result is only possible to archive when propaganda aligns with the existing collective beliefs (Ellul, 1965, p. 39). The collective sociological presuppositions, judgments indoctrinated by time and shared social consciousness play a crucial role in influencing people’s behaviour.

Four of the theme categories in the research focus on building symbiotic relationships between individuals and the masses while using the advantages of knowing the psychological terrain, collective sociological presuppositions and fundamental social myths

within the studied countries. The narratives or messages associated with the category of shared ethnicity often emphasize a sense of shared Slavic brotherhood. After analyzing the research results, it becomes evident that this topic significantly prevails in the case study of Belarus. The presence of these narratives highlights their mild importance in fostering a sense of unity or affinity among people.

Further, the analysis of historical ties between the studied countries shows the considerable significance of their connections. The narratives or messages of this category usually highlight similarities between historical and current situations by evoking memories and associations. This tactic aims to create a meaningful connection that resonates deeply with individuals and the masses. On the contrary, the results suggest that religious ties might play a relatively minor role in the broader propaganda tactics within the studied context. Their overall impact appears to be less pronounced compared to other categories. Although the research emphasizes a bigger significance of other categories, shared values represented by a positive portrayal of Russia might have a stronger influence in shaping perceptions and mobilizing support than it seems.

A combination of sociological and psychological components embraces the mass action and reassures an individual of their emotions towards a corresponding issue. Social movements shape their narratives into frames and use different collective action frames as a form of explanation for the desired action. The injustice component is one of the driving components of collective action (Gamson, 1992, p. 7). It is emotional cognition that cannot be described as a cognitive or logical judgment. Its emphasis is frequently on righteous anger, which, together with fear, is one of the most powerful emotions. To effectively amplify these emotions a collective action requires a specific target.

Following the above, the psychological aspect is most effectively reinforced through the creation of a common enemy. The creation of a phenomenon or entity to fear tends to corral public opinion. Emotions help to mobilize people against any suggested enemy. In this context, the components of identity serve to bolster the perception of being under attack by emphasizing the differentiation between “we” and “they”, highlighting contradicting values, beliefs and interests (Gamson, 1992, p. 8). These boundaries strengthen the collective identity and reinforce the sense of unity in opposition to the perceived threat.

In this regard, two of the theme categories in the research focus on attracting support by demonizing or demeaning opponents and fostering scepticism towards them as a means of mobilization. These categories also represent the largest samples in the research. Notably, the case study of Belarus exhibits a numerical margin within this category highlighting the particular significance of this tactic in that specific context. The prevalence of offensive narratives indicates their significance in fostering a sense of loyalty and alignment among the targeted audience.

According to Gamson, political consciousness built on the proposed components is shaped in the process of collective action. The interpretation of such action by individuals depends on the degree to which they already hold shared elements of its frames. The construction of political consciousness involves not only the attitudes and persuasions of individuals but also the negotiation of shared meaning through conversations. In this process, individuals engage in discussions to establish a common understanding of the political context. Hence, the incorporation of the comments sections in the research process provides valuable insights into the dynamic nature of political consciousness construction. There, users have an opportunity to express opinions, engage in debates, and share perspectives. These conversations allow for the negotiation and exchange of ideas, contributing to the formation of shared meaning and understanding among users.

However, it is important to mention, that while analysing comments sections online the researcher must be aware of disinformation operators that might be present within the community. The work of the operators is designed to transform broad narratives into precise messages and talking points. They do it by using societal schisms to segment audiences based on their views on divisive topics (Sedova, 2021). By creating fake user accounts or computational propaganda tools (e.g., automated accounts) operators build an infrastructure as a key element of their campaign. To develop a credible infrastructure operators use inauthentic accounts or so-called “sock puppets” led by individuals pretending to be something they are not to deceive the targeted audience. In order to appear authentic, operators are increasingly employing new machine-learning techniques to produce realistic outputs (Sedova, 2021).

The goal of modern propaganda is to provoke action and participation (Ellul, 1965, p. 26), while mobilization is a process of increasing the readiness to act collectively by building loyalty to an organization or to a group of leaders (Gamson, 1990, p. 15). In situations when

a state bureaucracy holds the reins of power, media outlets that serve the interests of a privileged elite establish a monopolistic control, reinforced by official censorship (Herman and Chomsky, 2002, p. 1). Consequently, media ownership naturally influences the scope of political discourse within society, shaping acceptable topics and adhering to predetermined guidelines. This control over the media allows the interests of the privileged elite to be favoured, while alternative voices may be suppressed or marginalized.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this thesis has explored Moscow's holistic approach to strengthening connections with potential or already existing allies through the use of propaganda tactics. These tactics have been examined within the framework of social movement theory where the formation of pro-Russian sentiment has been considered a social movement seeking social change. The thesis has explored the operational mechanisms of social movements and the various factors that contribute to their success or failure. By utilizing Gamson's theoretical framework, the thesis has provided insights into the strategies employed to cultivate relations with a targeted audience. This approach has enabled a fresh perspective on the potential applications of propaganda in the context of building international relations.

To further enhance the complexity of propaganda's role in building alliances with other nations, this research has focused on defining the phenomenon through its external and internal characteristics. Moreover, it has uncovered the aspects of the effectiveness of propaganda dissemination, aiming to comprehend the underlying mechanisms of persuasion and manipulation at work. This discussion has contextualized propaganda efforts within the broader social, cultural, and political framework.

Given the complexity of the subject, this research incorporated a review of Herman and Chomsky's concept of "manufacturing consent" to illustrate how the mass media creates the illusion of public debate while simultaneously limiting the range of acceptable opinions. Application of the propaganda model to the formation of pro-Russian sentiment in Serbia and Belarus enables us to identify the Russian strategies for controlling and influencing political debates in media outlets abroad. The research findings support the interconnectedness between the manipulation of political consciousness through propaganda and the artificial creation of an emotional environment in society ready for further mobilization.

In the context of building alliances with other countries, there are several potential ways in which propaganda may be employed. Through the analysis of different categories such as shared ethnicity, historical and religious ties or shared values the research integrated into the thesis has analysed the narratives and messages propagated by pro-governmental outlets within countries that maintain binding relations with Russia. The results highlight the

potential influence of these narratives or messages in fostering pro-Russian sentiment among the general public.

The prevalence of certain narratives and messages demonstrates their impact on shaping political consciousness and mobilizing collective action. Russia can shape the narrative surrounding specific issues or events in a favourable manner through the manipulation of information, ultimately generating a positive perception of itself within the targeted audience. Moreover, the significant presence of negative portrayal of opponents, as well as fostering scepticism towards them, can effectively cultivate a shared sense of threat through the identification of a common enemy. This tactic serves to foster solidarity between Russia and the targeted country, thereby increasing support for collaborative actions and the formation of alliances. This can have implications for foreign policy decisions, international cooperation, and potential shifts in geopolitical alignments.

Moscow's aim is to decrease support for issues perceived to be against Russian interests by confusing and dividing the public. Manipulation and persuasion play a crucial role in achieving this objective. By exploiting timely events or controversial topics, propagandists challenge the state and provoke instability. This thesis contributes to a deeper understanding of vulnerable aspects of political consciousness in Serbia and Belarus that could potentially be exploited by Russia in its efforts to mobilize people through propaganda. Understanding how propagandists operate and what potential impact on public opinion propaganda might have is crucial for promoting critical thinking and informed citizenship. By recognizing the role and impact of propaganda, this thesis emphasizes the significance of analyzing media ownership and the manipulation of identities by malicious actors. Such analysis is crucial for fostering an informed and diverse public discourse.

Summary

This thesis explores the use of propaganda through the lens of social movement theory, focusing specifically on Russia's efforts to build alliances with Serbia and Belarus. The study begins by examining the characteristics of propaganda and the concept of the propaganda model. It then discusses the topic of social movements in regard to social change and political mobilization of collective action. The thesis further focuses on the concept of hybrid warfare in the information sphere, specifically analyzing the Russian concept of information confrontation. The binding elements of pro-Russian sentiment are explored in case studies of Serbia and Belarus to understand the specific narratives and messages employed to shape public opinion and create a positive perception of Russia. The research methodology uses content analysis in order to provide practical insights. Finally, a discussion of the empirical findings summarizes vulnerable aspects through which propaganda influences public opinion in the studied countries.

List of References

BECHEV, Dimitar, 2023. Hedging Its Bets: Serbia between Russia and the EU. *Carnegie Europe*. Online. 19 January 2023. [Accessed 8 May 2023]. Available from: https://carnegieeurope.eu/2023/01/19/hedging-its-bets-serbia-between-russia-and-eu-pub-88819

BIKANAU, Philipp, 2022. *Belarusian Identity in 2022: A Quantitative Study* Online. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. [Accessed 19 May 2023]. Available from: https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/belarus/19777.pdf

BJELOŠ, Maja, IGNJATIJEVIĆ, Marija, STARINAC, Milica and VUKSANOVIĆ, Vuk, 2023. Balkan Defence Monitor 2023. *The Belgrade Centre for Security Policy*. Online. 28 February 2023. [Accessed 7 May 2023]. Available from: https://bezbednost.org/en/publication/balkan-defence-monitor-2023/

BJELOŠ, Maja, IGNJATIJEVIĆ, Marija and ŠTERIĆ, Luka, 2022. Balkan Defence Monitor 2022. *Belgrade Centre for Security Policy*. Online. 14 March 2022. [Accessed 7 May 2023]. Available from: https://bezbednost.org/en/publication/balkan-defence-monitor-2022/

CHATHAM HOUSE THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 2021. Belarusians' Views on the Political Crisis. *belaruspolls.org*. Online. November 2021. [Accessed 21 May 2023]. Available from: https://belaruspolls.org/wave1-5

CHATHAM HOUSE THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 2022. Belarusians' Views on the Military Conflict between Russia and Ukraine. *belaruspolls.org*. Online. March 2022. [Accessed 21 May 2023]. Available from: https://belaruspolls.org/wave-8

CHATHAM HOUSE THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 2023. Belarusians' Views on the War and Value Orientations. *belaruspolls.org*. Online. March 2023. [Accessed 22 May 2023]. Available from: https://belaruspolls.org/wave-15

CHERNYSHOVA, Natalya, 2022. Russia's War On Ukraine Is Deeply Unpopular In Belarus. *Australian Institute of International Affairs*. Online. 14 July 2022. [Accessed 21 May 2023]. Available from:

https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/russias-war-on-ukraine-is-deeply-unpopular-in-belarus/

CULL, Nicholas J., CULBERT, David and WELCH, David, 2003. *Propaganda and Mass Persuasion: A Historical Encyclopedia, 1500 to the Present*. Online. Santa Barbara, Calif.: Abc-Clio. [Accessed 23 March 2023]. ISBN 9781576078204. Available from: http://sipa.jlu.edu.cn/__local/6/6D/1E/232A61C0C90220A56BDF0D19829_C3ECAFC7_5FC175.pdf

CVIJIC, Srdjan, SAMORUKOV, Maksim and VUKSANOVIC, Vuk, 2022. *How Does Russian Soft Power in Serbia Really Work?* Online. [Accessed 7 May 2023]. Available from: https://bezbednost.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/How-does-Russian-soft-power-in-Serbia-really-work.pdf

DELAUNEY, Guy, 2023. Ukraine war: Serbia Uproar over Wagner Mercenaries Recruiting for Russia. *BBC News*. Online. 19 January 2023. [Accessed 8 May 2023]. Available from: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-64329371

DUDIK, Andrea and SAVIC, Misha, 2023. War in Ukraine Strains Ties between Putin and His Old Serb Ally. *Bloomberg.com*. Online. 18 January 2023. [Accessed 8 May 2023]. Available from: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-01-18/war-in-ukraine-strains-ties-between-putin-and-his-ally-vucic-in-serbia#xj4y7vzkg

ELLUL, Jacques, 1965. *Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes*. New York: Vintage Books. ISBN 9780394718743.

GADZO, Mersiha, 2022. "This Game Is Up": Serbia Urged to Take a Stand on Ukraine's War. *www.aljazeera.com*. Online. 11 May 2022. [Accessed 8 May 2023]. Available from: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/11/this-game-is-up-how-vucic-balances-his-ties-amid-ukraine-war

GAMSON, William A, 1990. *The Strategy of Social Protest*. Wadsworth Publishing Company.

GAMSON, William A, 1992. *Talking Politics*. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521436793.

GRISÉ, Michelle, DEMUS, Alyssa, SHOKH, Yuliya, KEPE, Marta, WELBURN, Jonathan W. and HOLYNSKA, Khrystyna, 2022. Rivalry in the Information Sphere: Russian Conceptions of Information Confrontation. *www.rand.org*. Online. 18 August 2022. Available from: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA198-8.html.

HELMUS, Todd C., 2018. *Russian Social Media Influence: Understanding Russian Propaganda in Eastern Europe*. Online. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation. [Accessed 6 May 2023]. ISBN 9780833099600. Available from: https://web-p-ebscohost-com.ezproxy.is.cuni.cz/ehost/detail/detail?vid=0&sid=843c82f6-4176-489b-a8c6-7301bd444b06%40redis&bdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWlwLHNoaWImbGFuZz1jcyZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmUmc2NvcGU9c2l0ZQ%3d%3d#AN=1795295&db=e000xww

HERMAN, Edward S. and CHOMSKY, Noam, 2002. *Manufacturing Consent. The Political Economy of the Mass Media*. New York Pantheon Books. ISBN 9780375714498.

IOFFE, Grigory, 2003. Understanding Belarus: Belarussian Identity. *Europe-Asia Studies*. December 2003. Vol. 55, no. 8, p. 1241–1272. DOI https://doi.org/10.1080/0966813032000141105.

JOWETT, Garth and O'DONNELL, Victoria, 2012. *Propaganda & persuasion*. Online. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage. [Accessed 23 March 2023]. ISBN 9781412977821. Available from: https://hiddenhistorycenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/PropagandaPersuasion2012.pdf

LARUELLE, Marlene, 2019. *Russian Nationalism: Russian Nationalism: Imaginaries, Doctrines, and Political Battlefields*. Online. Routledge. ISBN 9780429761980. Available from: https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/37217

LARUELLE, Marlene, 2020. Making Sense of Russia's Illiberalism. *Journal of Democracy*. Online. 2020. Vol. 31, no. 3, p. 115–129. [Accessed 7 May 2023]. DOI https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2020.0049.

MEDIA LANDSCAPES EXPERT ANALYSES OF THE STATE MEDIA, [no date]. Serbia. *Media Landscapes*. Online. [Accessed 18 June 2023]. Available from: https://medialandscapes.org/country/serbia/media/print

MICHEL, Duclos, 2021. Russia's National Security Strategy 2021: The Era of "Information Confrontation." *Institut Montaigne*. Online. 2 August 2021. [Accessed 6 May 2023]. Available from: https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/expressions/russias-national-security-strategy-2021-era-information-confrontation

OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATIONS, 2022. Fault Lines: Global Views of a World in Crisis. *www.opensocietyfoundations.org*. Online. September 2022. [Accessed 7 May 2023]. Available from: https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/publications/fault-lines-global-perspectives-on-a-world-in-crisis

REUTERS, 2022. Serbia's Vucic Says He Agreed a Three-year Gas Supply Contract with Putin. *Reuters*. Online. 29 May 2022. [Accessed 8 May 2023]. Available from: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/serbias-vucic-says-agreed-3-year-gas-supply-contract-with-putin-2022-05-29/

Russian National Security Strategy, December 2015 -Full-text Translation, 2015. Online. [Accessed 6 May 2023]. Available from: https://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/OtrasPublicaciones/Internacional/2016/Russian-National-Security-Strategy-31Dec2015.pdf

SAMORUKOV, Maxim, 2022. Last Friend in Europe: How Far Will Russia Go to Preserve Its Alliance with Serbia? *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. Online. 10 June 2022. Available from: https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/87303

SAMORUKOV, Maxim and VUKSANOVIC, Vuk, 2023. Untarnished by War: Why Russia's Soft Power Is so Resilient in Serbia. *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. Online. 18 January 2023. Available from: https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/88828

SEDOVA, Katerina, 2021. *AI and the Future of Disinformation Campaigns Part 1: The RICHDATA Framework* Online. Center for Security and Emerging Technology. [Accessed 5 July 2023]. Available from: https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/ai-and-the-future-of-disinformation-campaigns/

SHRAIBMAN, Artyom, 2020. Why Belarusians Are Turning against Russia. *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. Online. 16 December 2020. [Accessed 21 May 2023]. Available from: https://carnegiemoscow.org/commentary/83459

SNEGOVAYA, Maria, 2021. Fellow Travelers or Trojan Horses? Similarities across pro-Russian Parties' Electorates in Europe. *Party Politics*. Online. 19 March 2021. Vol. 28, no. 3, p. 409–418. [Accessed 6 October 2021]. DOI https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068821995813.

STANICEK, Branislav and CAPRILE, Anna, 2023. *Russia and the Western Balkans: Geopolitical Confrontation, Economic Influence and Political Interference* Online. European Parliamentary Research Service. [Accessed 7 May 2023]. Available from: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2023/747096/EPRS_BRI(2023)747096_EN.pdf

TARROW, Sidney G, 2011. *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*. Online. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. [Accessed 21 March 2023]. ISBN 9780521198905. Available from: https://web-p-ebscohost-com.ezproxy.is.cuni.cz/ehost/detail/detail?vid=0&sid=5c75a5ec-eb49-4155-89d5-522f4743bde0%40redis&bdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWlwLHNoaWImbGFuZz1jcyZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmUmc2NvcGU9c2l0ZQ%3d%3d#AN=357433&db=e000xww

TASS, 2023. Serbia to Rethink Its Position on Ukraine's Territorial Integrity, Says Vucic. *tass.com*. Online. 25 April 2023. [Accessed 8 May 2023]. Available from: https://tass.com/world/1609381

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 2012. *Council Decision 2012/642/CFSP*. Online. 15 October 2012. [Accessed 19 June 2023]. Available from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32012D0642&qid=1687184193818

TRENIN, Dmitri, 2005. Moscow's Relations with Belarus: an Awkward Ally. *JSTOR*. Online. 2005. [Accessed 23 November 2022]. Available from: https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep06940.8

Ukaz Prezidenta Rossijskoj Federacii ot 02.07.2021 g. № 400, 2021. *President Rossii*. Online. [Accessed 6 May 2023]. Available from: http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/47046/page/5

VASOVIC, Aleksandar, 2023a. West Gains Advantage as It Vies with Russia for Influence in Serbia. *Reuters*. Online. 1 March 2023. [Accessed 7 May 2023]. Available from:

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/west-gains-advantage-it-vies-with-russia-influence-serbia-2023-03-01/

VASOVIC, Aleksandar, 2023b. Serbia Asks Russia to End Recruitment of Its People for Ukraine War. MACFIE, Nick (ed.), *Reuters*. Online. 17 January 2023. [Accessed 8 May 2023]. Available from: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/serbia-asks-russia-end-recruitment-its-people-ukraine-war-2023-01-17/

WEISSMANN, Mikael, NILSSON, Niklas, THUNHOLM, Per and PALMERTZ, Björn, 2021. *Hybrid Warfare*. Online. London: Bloomsbury Publishing. [Accessed 21 June 2023]. ISBN 9781788319621. Available from: https://library.oapen.org/viewer/web/viewer.html?file=/bitstream/handle/20.500.12657/58862/9781786736550.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

Sources of Research

Blinken optužio Rusiju za namerno ubijanje civila u Buči, 2022. *Politika*. Online. [Accessed 6 July 2023]. Available from: https://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/504055/%D0%91%D0%BB%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%BA%D0%B5%D0%BD-%D0%BE%D0%BF%D1%82%D1%83%D0%B6%D0%B8%D0%BE-%D0%A0%D1%83%D1%81%D0%B8%D1%98%D1%83-%D0%B7%D0%B0-%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%BC%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%BD%D0%BE-%D1%83%D0%B1%D0%B8%D1%98%D0%B0%D1%9A%D0%B5-%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BB%D0%B0-%D1%83-%D0%91%D1%83%D1%87%D0%B8

Bogomaz: festival' "Slavyanskoye yedinstvo" - simvol nerushimoy druzhby bratskikh narodov, 2022. *www.sb.by*. Online. [Accessed 6 July 2023]. Available from: https://www.sb.by/articles/bogomaz-festival-slavjanskoe-edinstvo-simvol-nerushimoj-druzhby-bratskih-narodov-510094-2022-sb.html

DEMENT'YEVSKIY, Andrey , 2022. Kak denatsifitsiruyut okolofutbol'nuyu sredu. *www.sb.by*. Online. 3 April 2022. [Accessed 6 July 2023]. Available from: https://www.sb.by/articles/svastiku-pod-koren.html

GIGIN, Vadim, 2022a. Kak v Ukraine dolgiye gody vozrozhdalis' idei neonatsizma. *www.sb.by*. Online. 3 March 2022. [Accessed 6 July 2023]. Available from: https://www.sb.by/articles/natsistskiy-renessans.html

GIGIN, Vadim, 2022b. Chto pokazala kapitulyatsiya boyevikov v Mariupole. *www.sb.by*. Online. 23 May 2022. [Accessed 6 July 2023]. Available from: https://www.sb.by/articles/azov-ne-stal.html

GIGIN, Vadim, 2022c. Prezident Rossii ob"yavil o chastichnoy mobilizatsii. *www.sb.by*. Online. 22 September 2022. [Accessed 6 July 2023]. Available from: https://www.sb.by/articles/rossiya-perestaet-igrat-vpolsily-chto-dalshe.html

GLADKAYA, Lyudmila, 2022a. Donbass. Trevozhnyye svodki. *www.sb.by*. Online. 21 February 2022. [Accessed 6 July 2023]. Available from: https://www.sb.by/articles/tsel-shtatov-brat-na-brata.html

GLADKAYA, Lyudmila, 2022b. Sila — v pravde. *www.sb.by*. Online. 24 February 2022. [Accessed 6 July 2023]. Available from: https://www.sb.by/articles/nikakoy-chrezvychayshchiny.html

GLADKAYA, Lyudmila, 2022c. Donbass. Drama. *www.sb.by*. Online. 24 June 2022. [Accessed 6 July 2023]. Available from: https://www.sb.by/articles/donbass-drama.html

Kak povliyayet eskalatsiya konflikta vokrug Ukrainy na Belarus' — rassuzhdayut eksperty, 2022. *www.sb.by*. Online. [Accessed 6 July 2023]. Available from: https://www.sb.by/articles/na-perekrestke-vsekh-dorog-politika.html

Kako će svet da izgleda 24. februara 2024. godine, 2023. *Politika*. Online. [Accessed 6 July 2023]. Available from: https://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/539388/%D0%9A%D0%B0%D0%BA%D0%BE-%D1%9B%D0%B5-%D1%81%D0%B2%D0%B5%D1%82-%D0%B4%D0%B0-%D0%B8%D0%B7%D0%B3%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%B4%D0%B0-24-%D1%84%D0%B5%D0%B1%D1%80%D1%83%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%B0-2024-%D0%B3%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B5

KONONOVICH, Yevgeniy , 2022. Provokatsii Ukrainy i Zapada v informatsionnom pole povyshayut riski nachala tret'yey mirovoy voyny. *www.sb.by*. Online. 17 November 2022.

[Accessed 6 July 2023]. Available from: https://www.sb.by/articles/udarnaya-volna-provokacii.html

KURAK, Anna, 2022. Kak bogataya sovetskaya respublika prevratilas' v gosudarstvo s sotnyami tysyach bezhentsev. *www.sb.by*. Online. 26 February 2022. [Accessed 6 July 2023]. Available from: https://www.sb.by/articles/uslyshat-zaprosy-obshchestva.html

Lavrov: Događaj u Buči – lažni napad, cilj podrivanje Moskve, 2022. *Politika*. Online. [Accessed 6 July 2023]. Available from: https://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/503917/%D0%9B%D0%B0%D0%B2%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B2-%D0%94%D0%BE%D0%B3%D0%B0%D1%92%D0%B0%D1%98-%D1%83-%D0%91%D1%83%D1%87%D0%B8-%D0%BB%D0%B0%D0%B6%D0%BD%D0%B8-%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%BF%D0%B0%D0%B4-%D1%86%D0%B8%D1%99-%D0%BF%D0%BE%D0%B4%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%B2%D0%B0%D1%9A%D0%B5-%D0%9C%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B2%D0%B5

Ministarstvo odbrane Rusije: Marijupolj potpuno oslobođen, predali se svi iz „Azovstalja", 2022. *Politika*. Online. [Accessed 6 July 2023]. Available from: https://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/507738/%D0%9C%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%80%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B2%D0%BE-%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%B1%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B5-%D0%A0%D1%83%D1%81%D0%B8%D1%98%D0%B5-%D0%9C%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%B8%D1%98%D1%83%D0%BF%D0%BE%D1%99-%D0%BF%D0%BE%D1%82%D0%BF%D1%83%D0%BD%D0%BE-%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BB%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%BE%D1%92%D0%B5%D0%BD-%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%B4%D0%B0%D0%BB%D0%B8-%D1%81%D0%B5-%D1%81%D0%B2%D0%B8-%D0%B8%D0%B7-%D0%90%D0%B7%D0%BE%D0%B2%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%99%D0%B0

MUKOVOZCHIK, Andrey , 2022a. Prinudit' lyudey dumat' golovoy nevozmozhno. No inogda ochen' khochetsya. *www.sb.by*. Online. 25 February 2022. [Accessed 6 July 2023]. Available from: https://www.sb.by/articles/prinuzhdenie-k-razumu.html

MUKOVOZCHIK, Andrey , 2022b. Nikogda v svoyey istorii anglosaksy ne zhaleli chuzhoy krovi. *www.sb.by*. Online. 6 May 2022. [Accessed 6 July 2023]. Available from: https://www.sb.by/articles/chuzhaya-krov06052022.html

Naša istorijska sudbina je da zaustavimo sve koji hoće da zagospodare svetom, 2022. *Politika*. Online. [Accessed 6 July 2023]. Available from: https://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/518010/%D0%9D%D0%B0%D1%88%D0%B0-%D0%B8%D1%81%D1%82%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B8%D1%98%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B0-%D1%81%D1%83%D0%B4%D0%B1%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B0-%D1%98%D0%B5-%D0%B4%D0%B0-%D0%B7%D0%B0%D1%83%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BC%D0%BE-%D1%81%D0%B2%D0%B5-%D0%BA%D0%BE%D1%98%D0%B8-%D1%85%D0%BE%D1%9B%D0%B5-%D0%B4%D0%B0-%D0%B7%D0%B0%D0%B3%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BF%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%B5-%D1%81%D0%B2%D0%B5%D1%82%D0%BE%D0%BC

Pao Soledar, 2023. *Politika*. Online. [Accessed 6 July 2023]. Available from: https://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/532418/%D0%9F%D0%B0%D0%BE-%D0%A1%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%B4%D0%B0%D1%80

PLESKACHEVSKAYA, Inessa , 2022. V nashem regione tselenapravlenno razvyazyvayut konflikt. *www.sb.by*. Online. 24 February 2022. [Accessed 6 July 2023]. Available from: https://www.sb.by/articles/zhar-chuzhimi-rukami.html

Počela mobilizacija, 2022. *Politika*. Online. [Accessed 6 July 2023]. Available from: https://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/517927/%D0%9F%D0%BE%D1%87%D0%B5%D0%BB%D0%B0-%D0%BC%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%B8%D0%BB%D0%B8%D0%B7%D0%B0%D1%86%D0%B8%D1%98%D0%B0

POPOV, Anton, 2022. Zachem rossiysko-ukrainskiy konflikt pytayutsya prevratit' v religioznuyu voynu. *www.sb.by*. Online. 7 December 2022. [Accessed 6 July 2023]. Available from: https://www.sb.by/articles/tma-nad-kievom.html

POPOV, Anton, 2023. Kak rossiyskaya spetsial'naya voyennaya operatsiya v Ukraine izmenila mir. *www.sb.by*. Online. 23 February 2023. [Accessed 6 July 2023]. Available from: https://www.sb.by/articles/svo-god-spustya.html

Potonula ruska raketna krstarica „Moskva", 2022. *Politika*. Online. [Accessed 6 July 2023]. Available from: https://www.politika.rs/sr/clanak/504930/Potonula-ruska-raketna-krstarica-Moskva

Pozorište srušeno, ali su u skloništu skoro svi preživeli, 2022. *Politika*. Online. [Accessed 6 July 2023]. Available from: https://www.politika.rs/sr/clanak/502243/Pozoriste-sruseno-ali-su-u-sklonistu-skoro-svi-preziveli

Prva godina sukoba u Ukrajini donela niz iznenađenja, 2023. *Politika*. Online. [Accessed 6 July 2023]. Available from: https://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/539519/%D0%9F%D1%80%D0%B2%D0%B0-%D0%B3%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B0-%D1%81%D1%83%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%B0-%D1%83-%D0%A3%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%98%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8-%D0%B4%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%BB%D0%B0-%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B7-%D0%B8%D0%B7%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%92%D0%B5%D1%9A%D0%B0

Putin priznao nezavisnost Hersonske i Zaporoške oblasti, 2022. *Politika*. Online. [Accessed 6 July 2023]. Available from: https://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/519068/%D0%9F%D1%83%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%BD-%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%B7%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%BE-%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%B7%D0%B0%D0%B2%D0%B8%D1%81%D0%BD%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82-%D0%A5%D0%B5%D1%80%D1%81%D0%BE%D0%BD%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B5-%D0%B8-%D0%97%D0%B0%D0%BF%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%88%D0%BA%D0%B5-%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%BB%D0%B0%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B8

Putin: Završena globalna politička i ekonomska dominacija Zapada, 2022. *Politika*. Online. [Accessed 6 July 2023]. Available from:

https://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/502194/%D0%9F%D1%83%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%BD-%D0%97%D0%B0%D0%B2%D1%80%D1%88%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B0-%D0%B3%D0%BB%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%B0%D0%BB%D0%BD%D0%B0-%D0%BF%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B8%D1%87%D0%BA%D0%B0-%D0%B8-%D0%B5%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%BC%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B0-%D0%B4%D0%BE%D0%BC%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%86%D0%B8%D1%98%D0%B0-%D0%97%D0%B0%D0%BF%D0%B0%D0%B4%D0%B0

Putinovo istorijsko obraćanje, 2022. *Politika*. Online. [Accessed 6 July 2023]. Available from: https://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/519150/%D0%9F%D1%83%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%BE-%D0%B8%D1%81%D1%82%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B8%D1%98%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%BE-%D0%BE%D0%B1%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%9B%D0%B0%D1%9A%D0%B5

Rusi napadaju na svim pravcima - potrebno vreme da ukrajinska vojska napusti Severodonjeck, 2022. *Politika*. Online. [Accessed 6 July 2023]. Available from: https://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/510408/%D0%A0%D1%83%D1%81%D0%B8-%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%BF%D0%B0%D0%B4%D0%B0%D1%98%D1%83-%D0%BD%D0%B0-%D1%81%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BC-%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B2%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%BC%D0%B0-%D0%BF%D0%BE%D1%82%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%B1%D0%BD%D0%BE-%D0%B2%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BC%D0%B5-%D0%B4%D0%B0-%D1%83%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%98%D0%B8%D0%BD%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B0-%D0%B2%D0%BE%D1%98%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B0-%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%BF%D1%83%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B8-%D0%A1%D0%B5%D0%B2%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%BE%D1%9A%D0%B5%D1%86%D0%BA

Rusi tvrde da su došli u posed tajnih ukrajinskih dokumenata, 2022. *Politika*. Online. [Accessed 6 July 2023]. Available from: https://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/501454/%D0%A0%D1%83%D1%81%D0%B8-

%D1%82%D0%B2%D1%80%D0%B4%D0%B5-%D0%B4%D0%B0-%D1%81%D1%83-%D0%B4%D0%BE%D1%88%D0%BB%D0%B8-%D1%83-%D0%BF%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%B5%D0%B4-%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%98%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%85-%D1%83%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%98%D0%B8%D0%BD%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8%D1%85-%D0%B4%D0%BE%D0%BA%D1%83%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B0

Rusi uništili laboratoriju u Černobilju, 2022. *Politika* . Online. [Accessed 6 July 2023]. Available from: https://www.politika.rs/sr/clanak/502790/Rusi-unistili-laboratoriju-u-Cernobilju

SAVOSTENKO, Igor' , 2022. Segodnya zarozhdayetsya novyy global'nyy poryadok. Kakim on budet? *www.sb.by*. Online. 22 October 2022. [Accessed 6 July 2023]. Available from: https://www.sb.by/articles/sily-mira-globalnii-poryadok.html

SHAMKO, Dmitriy , 2023. Chto stoit za militarizatsiyey Pol'shi. *www.sb.by*. Online. 14 January 2023. [Accessed 6 July 2023]. Available from: https://www.sb.by/articles/vozhdelennye-kresy.html

Tajtus: Pozitivan znak što Srbija ne podržava rat u Ukrajini, 2023. *Politika*. Online. [Accessed 6 July 2023]. Available from: https://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/538980/%D0%A2%D0%B0%D1%98%D1%82%D1%83%D1%81-%D0%9F%D0%BE%D0%B7%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%B2%D0%B0%D0%BD-%D0%B7%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%BA-%D1%88%D1%82%D0%BE-%D0%A1%D1%80%D0%B1%D0%B8%D1%98%D0%B0-%D0%BD%D0%B5-%D0%BF%D0%BE%D0%B4%D1%80%D0%B6%D0%B0%D0%B2%D0%B0-%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%82-%D1%83-%D0%A3%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%98%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8

TSELYUK, Anastasiya and KRUSHEVSKAYA, Mariya, 2022. Govorili pyat' chasov, k otvetu ne prishli, prodolzhat pozzhe — o rezul'tatakh peregovorov Rossii i Ukrainy. *www.sb.by*. Online. 2 March 2022. [Accessed 6 July 2023]. Available from: https://www.sb.by/articles/voyna-i-mir-ukraina-rossiya.html

Ukrajinska vojska ušla u Herson, 2022. *Politika* . Online. [Accessed 6 July 2023]. Available from: https://www.politika.rs/sr/clanak/524655/Ukrajinska-vojska-usla-u-Herson

Više od 80 odsto građana Srbije protiv sankcija Rusiji i ulaska u NATO, 2022. *Politika*. Online. [Accessed 6 July 2023]. Available from: https://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/507677/%D0%92%D0%B8%D1%88%D0%B5-%D0%BE%D0%B4-80-%D0%BE%D0%B4%D1%81%D1%82%D0%BE-%D0%B3%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%92%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B0-%D0%A1%D1%80%D0%B1%D0%B8%D1%98%D0%B5-%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%B2-%D1%81%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BA%D1%86%D0%B8%D1%98%D0%B0-%D0%A0%D1%83%D1%81%D0%B8%D1%98%D0%B8-%D0%B8-%D1%83%D0%BB%D0%B0%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B0-%D1%83-%D0%9D%D0%90%D0%A2%D0%9E

Zelenski pozvao Moskvu da prekine napade, 2022. *Politika* . Online. [Accessed 6 July 2023]. Available from: https://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/500433/%D0%97%D0%B5%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8-%D0%BF%D0%BE%D0%B7%D0%B2%D0%B0%D0%BE-%D0%9C%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B2%D1%83-%D0%B4%D0%B0-%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B5-%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%BF%D0%B0%D0%B4%D0%B5

Zhitel' Mariupolya rasskazal, kak delali feyk o "rossiyskom udare" po roddomu, 2022. *www.sb.by*. Online. [Accessed 6 July 2023]. Available from: https://www.sb.by/articles/zhitel-mariupolya-rasskazal-kak-delali-feyk-o-rossiyskom-udare-po-roddomu.html

List of Appendices

Appendix no. 1: Research results based on samples drawn from Politika (table)

	shared ethnicity	religious ties	historical ties	ideological argumentation	shared values	territorial integrity	demonization /degradation of opponents	scepticism towards the West
A.1	-	-	-	-	1	-	2	3
A.2	-	-	1	-	1	-	1	1
A.3	3	-	1	-	-	-	-	6
A.4	-	1	1	-	-	-	3	-
A.5	1	-	2	-	1	-	3	8
A.6	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	4
A.7	-	-	9	-	-	-	1	7
A.8	2	-	3,5	1	1	0,5	6	7
A.9	-	-	1	-	-	-	2	2
A.10	-	-	1	-	1	1	-	7
A.11	2	-	1	-	-	-	1	4
A.12	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-
A.13	-	-	1,5	-	-	-	1	2,5
A.14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
A.15	-	-	1,5	-	-	1,5	1	1
A.16	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-
A.17	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
A.18	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1
A.19	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6
A.20	-	-	1	-	1	-	2	3
	8	1	29,5	1	6	3	25	64,5

Appendix no. 2: Research results based on samples drawn from Belarus Today (table)

	shared ethnicity	religious ties	historical ties	ideological argumentation	shared values	territorial integrity	demonization/ degradation of opponents	scepticism towards the West
A.1	1	-	2	-	2	-	6	3
A.2	3,5	-	4,5	1	-	-	3	10
A.3	2,5	-	1,5	-	-	-	2	4
A.4	1,5	-	2,5	2	1	-	6	5
A.5	-	-	1	-	-	-	12	1
A.6	-	-	2	1	-	-	-	2
A.7	-	-	4	-	-	-	17	7
A.8	-	-	3	4	-	-	16	3
A.9	-	-	-	1	-	-	2	-
A.10	-	-	1	-	-	-	8	-
A.11	-	-	1	-	-	-	12	-
A.12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
A.13	-	-	2	1	-	-	9	1
A.14	5	-	5	-	-	-	-	-
A.15	-	-	1	-	-	-	5	4
A.16	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	8
A.17	-	-	1	1	-	-	3	11
A.18	4	2	3	2	-	-	6	7
A.19	-	-	2	-	1	-	4	11
A.20	-	-	1	-	-	-	8	11
	17,5	2	38,5	13	4	-	119	92