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Global corporate tax reforms and how they might reduce profit shifting of multinational corporations

Master's thesis

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Prague, January 3, 2023

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Abstract

This study examines whether global corporate tax reforms might increase tax revenue which was reduced by the profit shifting of multinational corporations. These reforms have been built on the minimum corporate tax rate and redistribution of undertaxed profits. Tax revenue gains of jurisdictions under all three tested global models show significant improvement in contrast to the status quo. Pillar II proposal would bring USD 198 billion in extra revenue, METR proposal USD 305 billion and the Tax deficit model USD 214 billion in 2017. However, significant differences are observed between geographical regions and income groups. North America and the EU are the largest recipients of extra tax revenue whereas Africa and Latin America & the Caribbean Islands are the smallest. Income group results show the same composition with high-income countries contributing by around three-quarters to the extra revenue gains. BEFIT Scenario 2 would result in USD 33 billion in extra tax revenue for the EU Member States, which is double the amount of Scenario 1.

JEL Classification	F23, H25, H32
Keywords	effective tax rate, multinational enterprises, country-by-country reporting, corporate taxation
Title	Global corporate tax reforms and how they might reduce profit shifting of multinational corporations

Abstrakt

Táto štúdia skúma, či globálne reformy korporátnych daní môžu zvýšiť príjmy z dane, ktoré boli znížené presúvaním ziskov nadnárodných spoločností do zahraničia. Tieto reformy boli postavené na minimálnej korporátnej dani a prerozdelením nedostatočne zdanených ziskov. Zvýšenie daňových príjmov jurisdikcií v rámci všetkých troch testovaných globálnych modelov vykazuje výrazné zlepšenie v porovnaní so statusom quo. Návrh Pillar II by priniesol 198 miliárd USD dodatočných príjmov, návrh METR 305 miliárd USD a model Daňového deficitu 214 miliárd USD v roku 2017. Medzi geografickými regiónmi a príjmovými skupinami sú však viditeľné výrazné rozdiely. Severná Amerika a EÚ sú najväčšími príjemcami dodatočných daňových príjmov, zatiaľ čo Afrika a Latinská Amerika & karibské ostrovy sú tými najmenšími. Výsledky príjmových skupín vykazujú rovnaké zloženie, pričom krajiny s vysokými príjmami prispievajú k zvýšeniu dodatočných príjmov približne tromi štvrtinami. BEFIT scenár 2 by priniesol členským štátom EÚ dodatočné daňové príjmy vo výške 33 miliárd USD, čo je dvojnásobok scenára 1.

Klasifikace JEL	F23, H25, H32
Klíčová slova	efektívna daňová sadzba, nadnárodné podniky, vykazovanie na úrovni krajín, zdaňovanie právnických osôb
Název práce	Globálne reformy korporátnych daní a ich možný vplyv na na zníženie presunu ziskov nadnárodných spoločností

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Contents

List of Tables **ix**

List of Figures **x**

Acronyms **xi**

Thesis Proposal **xii**

1 Introduction **1**

2 Literature review **4**

2.1 Profit shifting 4
2.2 Two-Pillar Solution 7
2.3 CCCTB 9
2.4 Business in Europe: Framework for Income Taxation 13
2.5 Minimum Effective Tax Rate for Multinationals 15
2.6 Tax deficit proposal 16
2.7 Hypotheses 17

3 Data **18**

3.1 Country-by-country-reporting 18
3.2 Dataset adjustments 20

4 Methodology **22**

4.1 Pillar Two model 22
4.1.1 Theoretical assumptions 22
4.1.2 Effective tax rate 23
4.1.3 Minimum tax rate 24
4.1.4 Tax revenue gains under Pillar Two 24
4.2 BEFIT model 25

4.2.1 Theoretical assumptions . . . 25
4.2.2 Tax rates . . . 27
4.2.3 Tax revenue gains in Scenario 1 . . . 27
4.2.4 Tax revenue gains in Scenario 2 . . . 27
4.3 METR model . . . 28
4.3.1 Theoretical assumptions . . . 28
4.3.2 Tax rates . . . 29
4.3.3 Tax revenue gains . . . 29
4.4 Tax deficit model . . . 29
4.4.1 Theoretical assumptions . . . 29
4.4.2 Tax rates . . . 30
4.4.3 Tax revenue gains . . . 30

5 Results **31**
5.1 Pillar Two results . . . 31
5.1.1 Africa . . . 31
5.1.2 America . . . 32
5.1.3 Asia and Oceania . . . 33
5.1.4 Europe . . . 33
5.2 BEFIT results . . . 34
5.2.1 Scenario 1 . . . 34
5.2.2 Scenario 2 . . . 35
5.3 METR results . . . 35
5.3.1 Africa . . . 35
5.3.2 America . . . 36
5.3.3 Asia and Oceania . . . 37
5.3.4 Europe . . . 37
5.4 Tax deficit results . . . 39

6 Comparison of models **40**
6.1 Global proposals . . . 41
6.2 BEFIT Scenario 1 vs Scenario 2 . . . 43

7 Conclusion **45**

Bibliography **51**

A Tax rates **I**

B Tax revenue gains **IX**

List of Tables

5.1 TOP 10 recipients under GloBE proposal (USD billion) 34
5.2 TOP 10 recipients under METR proposal (USD billion) 38

6.1 Comparison of key aspects of models 40
6.2 Tax revenue gains in models (in USD) 41
6.3 Tax revenue gains under BEFIT 44

A.1 Effective and statutory tax rates in jurisdictions I

B.1 Tax revenue gains in Africa (USD mil.) IX
B.2 Tax revenue gains in Aggeragated groups (USD mil.) XI
B.3 Tax revenue gains in Asia (USD mil.) XI
B.4 Tax revenue gains in the EU (USD mil.) XIII
B.5 Tax revenue gains in non-EU countries (USD mil.) XIV
B.6 Tax revenue gains in Latin America (USD mil.) XV
B.7 Tax revenue gains in North America (USD mil.) XVI
B.8 Tax revenue gains in Oceania (USD mil.) XVI

List of Figures

2.1 Scale of profit shifting from and to countries in 2016 (OECD) . 6

6.1 Tax revenue gains for geographical regions 42
6.2 Tax revenue gains for income groups 43

Acronyms

BEFIT Business in Europe: Framework for Income Taxation

BEPS Base Erosion and Profit Shifting

CbCR Country-by-Country Reporting

CCCTB Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base

CCTB Common Corporate Tax Base

CGE Computable general equilibrium

CIT Corporate income tax

DST Digital Service Tax

EC European Commission

ETR Effective Tax Rate

EU European Union

FDI Foreign Direct Investment

GloBE Global anti-Base Erosion Rules

GILTI Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income

IIR Income Inclusion Rule

METR Minimum Effective Tax Rate for Multinationals

MNE Multinational Enterprises

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

SME Small and Medium Enterprise

TRG Tax Revenue Gains

UTPR Undertaxed Payment Rule

Master's Thesis Proposal

Author	Bc. Matúš Pravda
Supervisor	doc. Petr Janský, Ph.D.
Proposed topic	Global corporate tax reforms and how they might reduce profit shifting of multinational corporations

Motivation Profit shifting of multinational corporations (MNCs) to tax havens has come yet again under the spotlight, because of the G7 proposition of 15% global minimum tax. However, this topic has been discussed for years within the OECD and G20 platforms and various proposals have been introduced to battle tax evasion and profit shifting. It has been estimated that MNCs shifted around $1 trillion of profits to tax havens in 2016, which in turn implies $200 to $300 billion in revenue losses for other countries (Garcia-Bernardo & Jansky, 2021). Developed countries have finally released the massive scale of profit shifting and the necessity of cooperation with the rest of the world in order to tackle this issue.

The European Commission has also very recently adopted a plan to promote a robust, efficient and fair business tax system in the European Union. The aim of the "Business in Europe: Framework for Income Taxation" (or BEFIT) is to provide a single corporate tax rulebook for the EU, reduce administrative burdens, remove tax obstacles and create a more business-friendly environment in the Single Market. BEFIT will replace the pending proposal for a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB). As pointed out by Cobham et. al. (2021) implementation of the CCCTB only at the EU level would overlook the extent of profit shifting out of the EU and could lock in further unnecessary revenue losses. Consequently, a similar analysis of the BEFIT proposal would help project the impact of the new tax legislation.

Thanks to the Country-by-country reporting (CbCR) dataset based on OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Action 13, a complex and detailed analysis of current and future policies can be assessed. One of the most evident advantages of CbCR data over other data sources is that it covers a considerably larger number of countries.

Hypotheses

Hypothesis #1: EU tax policies will have only a regional impact.

Hypothesis #2: Profit shifting will grow from the previous year.

Hypothesis #3: Global minimum tax will have a severe impact on profit shifting.

Hypothesis #4: Logarithmic function is preferable to linear and quadratic one for modelling the extremely non-linear relationship between profits and tax rates.

Methodology In the first part of my thesis, I will use a linear; quadratic and logarithmic model to estimate the scale and distribution of profit shifting to tax havens using the CBCR dataset for 2017. I will use the logarithmic model developed by Garcia-Bernardo J. and Jansky P. (2021). Moreover, I will include the misalignment model as an alternative to the semi-elasticity model. Consequently, I will compare the results of the above-mentioned models to estimate the scale of profit shifting to tax havens.

In the second part of my thesis, I will estimate the effect of the recently proposed tax policies such as BEFIT or previous policy proposals CCCTB by using the methodology developed by Cobham et. al (2021). In their paper, three specifications were estimated: 1, a sum of positive profits under separate accounting 2. a sum of profits and losses after the profit and loss consolidation 3. a sum of profits and losses under unitary taxation (after the profit and loss consolidation at the MNC level and their apportionment according to a formula based on economic activity). Thanks to the CBCR dataset the results will be more precise since the first two specifications are already available and do not need to be estimated. I will use a methodology developed by Barake et. Al (2021) to evaluate the impact of global minimum tax to profit shifting of MNCs as well as on selected companies. The results will be then presented as the relative relationship between each specification.

Expected Contribution I will analyze what is the scale of international corporate tax avoidance by multinational corporations by using the newly available CBCR dataset for 2017. These results may help policymakers to better understand the scale of profit shifting of MNCs in 2017 and see the development from 2016. Moreover, I will evaluate the effects of proposed policies such as the CCCTB and BEFIT I expect to obtain the overall scale of profit shifting as well as identify what countries lose and what countries benefit most from profit shifting. Additionally, I will evaluate how global corporate tax reforms might reduce the profit shifting of MNCs and what effect it would have on the selected number of companies.

Outline

1. Motivation: : MNCs have been exploiting loops in tax systems for decades and have been benefiting from the "race to the bottom." New policies have been introduced in recent years and their assessment is necessary.
2. Studies on profit shifting: I will describe how different tax policies affect profit shifting.
3. Data: I will explain the structure and benefits of using the CBCR dataset.
4. Methods: I will explain the differences between linear and logarithmic models.
5. Results: I will discuss my baseline regressions and robustness checks.
6. Concluding remarks: I will summarize my findings and their implications for policy and future research.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Globalization and digitization have had a significant impact on economies all over the globe, and this influence has only grown stronger in the 21^{st} century. Even though societies and companies have been adapting to the ever more digital world, the global tax system has not been adjusted to fully reflect these changes. Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), which is a term used to describe tax optimisation strategies adopted by Multinational Enterprises (MNE), is one of the symptoms of the archaic tax system. MNEs have been exploiting differences and inconsistencies in tax regulations to avoid having to pay corporate taxes for decades. Tech giants such as Google, Facebook and Amazon are prime examples of MNEs, which have been benefiting from this mismatch. Estimates shows that the scale of profit shifting could reach USD 1 trillion Garcia-Bernardoa & Jansky (2021). However, for a long period of time jurisdictions have been competing by offering lower Corporate income tax (CIT) to attract foreign investments.

After decades of a "race to the bottom" environment, several tax reforms have been introduced to tackle this issue. Jurisdictions realised that this strategy only benefits MNEs and governments of 137 countries have agreed to change their approach and cooperate. Under the joint effort of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS, a historic agreement to reform the global tax system was achieved in October 2021. The objective of the global minimum tax accord is not to abolish tax competitiveness, instead, to ensure that MNEs are taxed fairly in all jurisdictions where they do business and create profits.

The two-pillar approach introduced by the Inclusive Framework on BEPS is combining two principles: profit allocation and global minimum tax. Pillar

One defines two approaches. Firstly, the "nexus" rules, which defines where tax should be paid. Secondly, the "profit allocation" rules, defines a new mechanism for governments and jurisdictions to share taxation rights. Pillar Two introduces a global minimum corporate tax rate set at 15%. OECD estimates that because of Pillar One, over USD 125 billion of profit taxing rights could be transferred to market jurisdiction every year. It also predicts that developed nations would obtain smaller revenue gain than developing economies, as a percentage of current revenues. Pillar Two is expected to yield roughly USD 150 billion in additional worldwide tax collections per year, according to the OECD.[1]

Prior to this effort, the European Commission (EC) introduced a tax reform tackling heterogeneous tax systems within the European Union (EU) and their impact not only on MNEs but also on the Member States. The EC originally introduced the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) in 2011 and reintroduced it in 2016 with the goal to lower the administrative burdens, high tax compliance costs and legal uncertainties for MNEs by introducing a single set of rules. This policy should result in extra tax revenue for the jurisdiction. However, as pointed out by (Cobham *et al.* 2021b) implementing the CCCTB only within the EU would ignore the magnitude of profit shifting outside of the EU, perhaps resulting in substantial revenue losses.

The CCCTB has never been implemented and the EC introduced the Business in Europe: Framework for Income Taxation (BEFIT) instead. This new proposal should better take into account how business is changing and improve the conditions, under which MNEs do business in the Single Market. The BEFIT is currently under review from key stakeholders and the final version is yet to be introduced. Since the framework would be running along the Two-pillar solution, the EC is proposing a complementary solution which would primarily influence the Single Market and redistribute profits based on the formulary apportionment among Member States.

In addition to the institutional proposals, alternative proposals have been introduced. Barake *et al.* (2021) designed the model under the EUTAX initiative for the EU which estimated the extra revenue generated by undertaxing jurisdictions. Under "Tax deficit model" all these profits would be reallocated to the parent jurisdictions. Another alternative proposal which aimed to improve the parts of the Pillar Two solution was introduced by (Cobham *et al.*

[1] OECD, Press release from 08/10/2021 on "International community strikes a groundbreaking tax deal for the digital age"

2021a). The Minimum Effective Tax Rate for Multinationals (METR) would create a framework which is more easily implemented and redistributes a bigger proportion of shifted profits based on the location of economic activity. Both proposals are considering the introduction of a minimum tax rate.

The Country-by-Country Reporting (CbCR) dataset has been playing a key role in the analysis of profit shifting and the estimation of its impact on the jurisdictions. This dataset provides a unique view of how MNEs operate on a global scale and links countries based on this factor.

Since one of the goals of global corporate tax reforms has been to tackle the issue of profit shifting, this thesis aims to estimate the effect of these proposals on the tax revenue of participating jurisdictions. Results compare the effectiveness of models and show how much revenue could be obtained from the introduction of a redistribution scheme and minimum tax under each proposal in contrast to the status quo. Benchmarking of models is done by comparing tax gains in geographical areas and income groups.

The results show a significant increase in the tax revenue gains under each of the models for 2017 dataset. Implementation of Global anti-Base Erosion Rules (GloBE) rules would bring extra USD 198 billion, METR proposal would result in extra USD 305 billion and Tax deficit model would result in USD 204 billion increase in Tax Revenue Gains (TRG). After implementing global tax reforms, the USA would be the biggest beneficiary of the tax revenue, followed by the EUs countries. On the other hand, Africa, Oceania and Latin America & the Caribbean Islands would experience a middler increase in tax revenue. Implementation of the BEFITs would redistribute profits from the Investment hubs to countries, where the economic value was created with better results under the minimum tax. Scenario 1 would bring extra USD 16 billion and Scenario 2 would bring extra USD 33 billion in tax gains.

The structure of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 summarizes the background and impact of the proposed models with respect to the current literature. Chapter 3 describes the reason behind the dataset selection and its importance in the estimation of profit shifting. Chapter 4 presents the methodology used to estimate the effects of each proposal. Comparisons between results of models and status quo are described in Chapter 5 and models are compared between each other in Chapter 6. Lastly, Chapter 7 brings conclusions and recommendations for further research.

Chapter 2

Literature review

Since currently used tax systems are linked to the physical presence of the company in the jurisdiction, they are mostly focused on production-oriented businesses. This no longer fits the modern trend of the digital economy and service-oriented businesses. The EC estimates that digital businesses pay a lower Effective Tax Rate (ETR) than production ones.[3] The OECD (2019) identified three factors frequently observed in certain highly digitised business models. Firstly, "scale without mass" refers to the potential of digital companies to grow and be profitable from doing business in some jurisdictions without being physically present. It is due to fact that businesses in several sectors have been able to locate various phases of their manufacturing processes across different nations while also gaining access to a larger number of clients throughout the world thanks to digitisation. Secondly, the business model has a high degree of dependence on intangible assets, in particular, intellectual property. Intellectual property assets including algorithms, software or data design are representing a central piece of the business model in the digital economy. Thirdly, "consumer data" collection plays and the ability to process big data are playing a key role especially for platform-oriented (social media) firms.

2.1 Profit shifting

The Panama Papers, a massive data breach, revealed more than 11.5 million accounting and legal documents, which exposed a system that allows for crime, corruption, and misconduct to be disguised behind the veil of secrecy

[3]EPRS, Briefing from 08/10/2021 on "Taxing the digital economy. New developments and the way forward"

of offshore firms. The Tørsløv *et al.* (2018) analysis shows that the that if all nations implemented the same corporate ETR, the location of profits would shift while having worldwide profits and investment unchanged. Beneficiaries of this change would be the high-tax EU countries, with a potential increase of 15% in profits, followed by the USA, with a potential increase of 10% in profits. On the other hand, profits would plummet by 60% in today's tax havens.

The usage of accountancy businesses is also linked to the development of tax havens. Jones *et al.* (2018) showed in their study the link between using Big 4 accounting companies (EY, Deloitte, KPMG and PwC) and those businesses that do not engage a Big 4 auditor have a much higher tax haven rate of occurrence. Tørsløv *et al.* (2018) show that affiliates of MNEs in low-tax nations are an order of magnitude more prosperous than local enterprises. MNEs' subsidiaries, on the other hand, generate less profit than local businesses in high-tax jurisdictions.Authors estimated that around 40% of profits earned by MNEs are transferred to tax havens around the world as a result of this unequal profitability.

Inflow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is usually considered as a positive sign of the country to be considered as an attractive destination for foreign investors. But as shown in Jansky & Palansky (2019), the percentage of inward FDI from tax havens and the rate of return on FDI shows a statistically significant negative correlation. Moreover, they projected that the 79 economies lost USD 125 billion in yearly tax income attributable to profit-shifting.

However, offshore profit shifting had also a severe impact on the productivity of countries. As shown in Guvenen *et al.* (2017), A growing trend among U.S. MNEs to shift profits resulted in low recorded GDP expansion. from 1994 to 2008. Profit shifting MNEs has resulted in significant revenue losses for the US government in recent years. Cobham & Jansky (2015) found that a small group of near-zero ETR jurisdictions (namely Ireland, Luxembourg, Bermuda, and the Netherlands) is a destination for the vast bulk of lost profits created by US MNEs in countries in which real business is done.

Clausing (2020) argues that The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act altered the environment for profit shifting importantly: the lower corporate tax rate in the United States should reduce the incentive to move earnings out of the country. Their estimates predict that the Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income (GILTI) would modestly boost the tax base in the USA as well as in other countries with the high-tax regime. On the other hand, there is an expected decrease in the range from 12 to 16% of corporate profits generated by U.S. MNE affiliates

in haven nations. It would represent a USD 15-30 billion boost in the business tax base in the United States every year.

Base erosion and profit shifting is problem not exclusive for high-income countries. The Crivelli *et al.* (2015) that base spillovers from other nations' tax rates may be considerably greater and statistically more significant for non-OECD countries than for OECD ones. This is supported by Johannesen *et al.* (2020), the sensitivity of reported profits to profit-shifting incentives is continuously adversely associated with the degree to which economic and institutional growth has occurred, according to the findings. This might explain why, despite pressing revenue demands and restrictions on the use of alternative tax bases, many developing countries choose low CITs rates. Tax treaties with higher withholding tax rates are more likely to be signed by developing countries that rely more extensively on CITs than wealthy countries, but they are not more likely to achieve generally better results based on the Hearson (2018) paper.

The overall scale of profit shifting reached an enormous dimension when Garcia-Bernardoa & Jansky (2021) estimated that the magnitude of profit shifting reached USD 1 trillion in 2016. The most frequent destinations for shifting were countries with the ETR between 1% and 10%, while American and Chinese MNEs were those shifting most. As shown in Figure 2.1, blue countries are the sourcing countries of profits and red ones are the destinations.

Figure 2.1: Scale of profit shifting from and to countries in 2016 (OECD)



Source: Garcia-Bernardoa & Jansky (2021).

2.2 Two-Pillar Solution

The global financial crisis of 2008, as well as subsequent tax controversies, served as a wake-up call for authorities. Globalization and digitization have had many positive effects on the global economy, but it has also made tax fraud and avoidance easier, leading to a strong feeling of injustice.The Panama Papers exposed that bank confidentiality and insufficient transparency aided wealthy individuals in concealing their holdings overseas. MNEs were also able to use loopholes in global tax legislation to artificially, but within the bounds of the law, transfer their earnings to low- or no-tax nations. To bring some type of tax control to globalization, international collaboration was essential.

The introduction of a certain type of tax control linked to globalization required international coordination. Through the G20/OECD Inclusive Framework on BEPS, member nations have collaborated to develop strong international standards, synchronize tax cooperation, and restore faith in the global tax system. Through the Inclusive Framework on BEPS, 15 Actions are being implemented by 141 nations and jurisdictions to tackle tax evasion, improve the concordance of international tax regulations, increase tax environment transparency, and meet the tax issues posed by the digitisation of the economy.

A historic agreement to reform the global tax system was achieved in October 2021. This major reform, supported by 137 nations exceeding 90% of the world's GDP, is aiming to change the international tax system so it fits the digital age, but crucially to make it fairer. As a result, MNEs will be taxed at a minimum of 15% starting in 2023. The two-pillar approach does not aim to abolish tax competition; but to some extent aims to limit it through international agreements and guarantee that MNEs contribute with appropriate amount of taxed regardless of jurisdiction where they run business and generate profits.

In the case of the biggest and wealthiest MNEs, Pillar One will provide a more balanced allocation of revenues and taxes between countries. As a result, some taxing power over MNEs from their parent jurisdictions to countries where they do business and produce profits would be transferred, not taking into account if the businesses are physically present on the market. Corporations specifically covered by this new criteria are MNEs with worldwide sales above EUR 20 billion and profit margin above 10%. New rule states that 25% of the profit exceeding the 10% threshold would to be reassigned to other countries.

Pillar One will also impact the international tax system by requiring coun-

tries to remove any Digital Service Taxs (DSTs) they have implemented. This should lower trade tensions and unify conditions for all MNEs regardless of the industry. The removal of the DSTs will impact several major economies such as France, Spain and Italy, as well as the Central-European cluster of Slovakia, Hungary, Poland and Austria.

An international minimum corporate tax rate of 15% is established under Pillar Two. This newly set minimum rate, which would apply to MNEs with revenues exceeding EUR 750 million, is anticipated to increase annual global tax revenues by USD 150 billion. Additional benefits include improved tax certainty for individuals and tax authorities as well as the stabilization of the global tax system.

Mechanisms incorporated in Pillar Two are crucial for this thesis. As described in the OECD (2020b) the proposal is composed of two core rules: i) Income Inclusion Rule (IIR) and ii) the Undertaxed Payment Rule (UTPR), which are collectively named the GloBE. The IIR gives a right to the jurisdiction where MNE is headquartered to additional tax profits created by its subsidiaries abroad by a top-up tax. The UTPR, which serves as a complementary mechanism for the IIR, gives partner jurisdictions a tool to use the top-up tax principle by making adjustments to the intra-group settlements linked to the subsidiary of the MNE. In addition to the GloBE rules, the Subject to tax rule permits partial source taxes to be applied by partner countries to some intra-group transactions that are undertaxed. This rule, however, would require changes in tax codes and international treaties. The last rule is the switch-over rule, which also requires changes in the legislature. Both GloBE rules count with the same methodology for the determination of the tax base and the ETR.

The OECD presented its OECD (2020a), which tested the effects of both pillars under the minimum tax of 12.5%, redistribution on the 20% level and exclusion of the USA. The results show that the high-income countries would increase their revenue gains most under Pillar Two. Low- and middle-income countries would still profit from participation in the scheme.

2.3 CCCTB

Large costs are associated with global profit shifting, and it also results in a major shift of national corporation tax income in Europe. Most other nations, according to Huizinga & Laeven (2006), may have gained some corporation tax income at Germany‘s expense.

The original CCCTB proposal, firstly introduced in 2011, aimed to tackle the negative results of heterogeneous and frequently changed tax systems within the EU. Companies had been facing several tax obstacles like additional compliance costs, double- or over-taxation. These obstacles had negatively affected the attractiveness of investment in the EU and made doing business harder. Compliance with twenty-seven tax codes significantly increased the administrative burden.

In practice, the EC European Commission (2011) original proposal MNEs would be able to combine all profits and losses accumulated in the EU, allowing their cross-border activities to be recognized. The single consolidated tax return referred to as a “one-stop-shop“ system, would mean computation of one tax base of the MNE. Following that, every Member State in which the enterprise operates would be able to tax a percentage of its base using a formula based on three equally weighted variables (assets, labour and sales). MNEs could opt-in to the new tax system voluntarily for at least five years.

Implementation of this proposal would not be the first step towards harmonized tax rates, because the Member States will still hold absolute power to choose their tax rates. The CCCTB only aimed for an increase in transparency and creating a more uniform approach in the EU's taxation. The proposal should have resulted in more favourable conditions for small and medium enterprises and encouraged them to expand within the EU. It was estimated that implementation of the CCCTB would save a medium-sized company growing inside the EU 67% on tax-related expenditures. [4] By allowing full deduction of researchers' wages and salaries, the CCCTB would also encourage companies to invest more in R&D activities and boost innovation within the EU. The EC estimated that the CCCTB might increase total investment inside the EU by up to 3.4% when fully established.

The original plan to implement the CCCTB proposal in one step turned out to be too ambitious even with estimated savings of reduced compliance expenses of EUR 700 million and EUR 1.3 billion via consolidating across the

[4]EC, MEMO/11/171 from 16/11/2011 on “ Questions and Answers on the CCCTB“

EU. In addition, companies expanding to the other Member States would take full advantage of up to EUR 1 billion in reductions. From an implementation point of view, Roder (2012) argued that implementing the Common Corporate Tax Base (CCTB) would be much easier than implementing the CCCTB because it could be adopted incrementally not in a single step.

The EC European Commission (2016) reintroduced the proposal in 2016 as one of the key actions to create the "a fair and efficient corporate tax system in the EU." The re-launched CCCTB should have been implemented in two steps. [5] In the first step, the common base should be implemented and the consolidation should be put in place in the second place. A key change will be that the CCCTB would be required for major MNEs with annual worldwide revenues of more than EUR 750 million. The re-launched initiative aimed to combat tax avoidance by making new tax rules mandatory for the largest MNEs, by eliminating mismatches between national tax systems and by containing robust measures to battle base erosion and profit shifting to non-EU jurisdictions.

The EC considered five scenarios in the original proposal European Commission (2011) , where four policy scenarios were compared to the “no-action“ or status-quo scenario. Policy scenarios were combinations of optional/compulsory rules and versions of the proposal. There were two possible versions: Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base and CCTB without consolidation of profits. All five scenarios were compared by using the Computable general equilibrium (CGE) model CORTAX. In the case of the CCTB scenarios, there is a tradeoff between a low statutory CIT rate and a low effective marginal tax rate. Cuts were demonstrated to diminish aggregate welfare in the EU as a result of the changed definition of the common tax base and the consequent rate. The principal positive consequence of the CCTB reform is the predicted cut in compliance expenses. Overall, a mandatory CCTB keeps welfare in Europe approximately unchanged, but making a CCTB optional for multinationals results in little welfare improvements. The welfare impacts of the CCTB choices are more favourable than the CCTB options in any of the scenarios studied. In aggregated terms, the EU receives a modest net positive welfare benefit of around 0.02% of the GDP or around EUR 2.4 billion in 2009.

Calibrated CORTAX model was, as described in Alvarez-Martinez *et al.* (2016a), also used to calculate the impact of the re-introduced proposal. The results of Alvarez-Martinez *et al.* (2016b) suggests that that a fairer and more

[5] EC, “A Fair and Effi cient Corporate Tax System in the European Union: 5 Key Areas for Action“, No. COM(2015) 302 final,Brussels 2015, European Commission.

efficient tax system can be implemented while GDP and welfare in the EU are maintained, if not improved.The calibrated CORTAX CGE model was used in the recent study of Barrios *et al.* (2019) focused on the effect of the CCTB on the reduction of the tax compliance costs. Findings indicate that increased economic efficiency is linked to lower tax compliance costs. Before the adjustment, the member states with the lowest compliance costs, as well as those with a high stock of inbound foreign investment, would profit more than others. Domestic corporate activities would profit less than cross-border businesses. The impact on non-EU nations like the United States and Japan would be minor.

On the other hand, Bettendorf *et al.* (2010) found that nIn Europe, neither a single base nor consolidation based on formula apportionment would result in significant welfare improvements, with lump-sum funding yielding the biggest welfare increase of 0.08% of GDP. The economic consequences vary greatly between countries, with some countries gaining and others losing. The distributional impact, on the other hand, is highly dependent on the apportionment formula chosen. Consolidation does not weaken the motivation for tax competitiveness in the EU, according to the model.

However, CORTAX, like any general equilibrium model, relies on simplifying assumptions and specifications that are not without flaws, and it cannot eliminate the ambiguity regarding the severity of some tax policy impacts. As pointed out by Cobham *et al.* (2021b), there is a high sensitivity to, and the often low visibility of, assumptions in the CGE models. More crucially, CORTAX does not account for the long-term dynamic benefits of increasing Internal Market integration, such as a rise in the number of globally engaged businesses.

When looking into the formula itself, Zagler (2009) argued that because all four weighing variables, revenues, payroll, labour, and capital, could be linked to revenue indicators, only revenue weights depending on source and destination should have been included in the algorithm. When defining employment, a study presented by Eberhartinger & Petutschnig (2014) shows that corporations would employ factor shifting to reduce their overall tax burden and that the most likely reaction of businesses would be shifting employees from a high-tax jurisdiction to a low-tax country. The amount of factor shifting required by the corporate group to avoid any less desirable Member State definition interactions is determined by the size of atypical employment that may be included in or excluded from the "Employee" definition.

There would be a misallocation of profits under the CCTB apportionment formula according to Hundsdoerfer & Wagner (2020). Moreover, the profit

deviation induced by the apportionment formula was systematic, according to an examination of probable factors of profit deviation. Profit misallocations are primarily driven by a business's profitability as well as within-group variability in company size and generated profit. Cobham *et al.* (2021b) found that profit-shifting centres could be affected by the significant transfer of tax base out of the economy as a result of the implementation of the CCCTB proposal. This could occur because linking the profits to the country, where they were created could lead to a significant redistribution of tax base among Member States. Enabling losses to be transferred abroad could result in a significant decline in the EU's tax base, especially if consolidation is implemented only on a regional level and not on the international stage or if cross-border transfers would be carried out independently of the use of a unitary approach.

The impact study of Nerudova *et al.* (2016) shows that the adoption of the CCTB and CCCTB might help close the sustainability gap by reducing fierce business tax competitiveness, tax fraud, and tax compliance. In their later impact study Nerudova & Solilova (2019), the effect of the CCCTB was projected into three groups of entities that would enter the new tax system either compulsory (MNEs above the EUR 750 million thresholds) or voluntarily (Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and MNEs below the threshold), because of the incentives offered (e.g. less tax to be paid by the MNE). When compared to the existing scenario, in the group of major MNEs over the thresholds, the adoption of CCCTB would culminate in a 4.2 % fall in the total tax base in the EU. The estimate is EUR 798 billion. In the SMEs dataset, the effect of the CCCTB application was assessed as an increase of 8.9-12.8 % in the overall tax base in the EU, dependent on the number of businesses willing to join the scheme. The impact in the dataset of MNEsthat do not exceed the threshold in consolidated turnover requirement is linked to the number of entities entering the system as well. According to the CCCTB, the EU's overall tax base will expand by 7.5-11.9 %. The drop in the present tax base was identified in the datasets as being primarily attributable to cross-border loss offsetting resulting from the consolidation mechanism because this practice is not widely allowed in EU Member states.

2.4 Business in Europe: Framework for Income Taxation

The EC adopted a communication on the 18^{th} of May 2021 on Business Taxation for the 21^{st} century to "promote a robust, efficient and fair business tax system in the EU." Besides the short-term visions shaped by the current COVID-19 pandemic, the EC presented a long-term vision for corporate taxation - the "Business in Europe: Framework for Income Taxation". The new business tax framework will be presented by 2023 with the aim to minimize administrative costs, lower compliance expenses, limit tax evasion chances, and encourage companies to create jobs in theEU and investment in the Single Market. The proposal would try to harmonize filing taxes within the EU by introducing one set of CIT rules for all Member States and redistribute profits by formulary apportionment based on economic activity. The BEFIT will take the role of the CCCTB proposal, which will not be implemented. In 2022, the EC will initiate a larger discussion on the future of taxes in the EU, culminating in a Tax Symposium on the "EU tax mix on the road to 2050."

While the CCCTB proposal includes the principles of a common tax base and formula apportionment, the Communication acknowledges that there are some variations between the two approaches. The BEFIT will take into account substantial changes in the economy and international framework, basing its proposals for the determination of the tax on which its policy for determining the tax base is based. The EC will design a new apportionment formula to consider structural changes in the economy, namely by taking digitization into account.

The EC published the call for evidence for an impact assessment of BEFIT [2] and asked relevant stakeholders such as MNEs groups, business associations and academia to express their views on the initiative and its objectives and various policy options. The stakeholders have twelve weeks to submit their perception of the current state of income taxation for MNEs and their evaluation of the proposed approach.

The call for evidence contains a list of key objectives as well as a non-exhaustive list of policy options. This list compares two scenarios: a) status quo and b) EUs action. The second scenario then describes five essential compo-

[2]EC, Call for evidence from 13/10/2022 on "Business in Europe: Framework for Income Taxation (BEFIT)"

nents of the proposal in detail: i) scope, ii) tax base calculation, iii) formulary apportionment, iv) transfer pricing rules and v) impact on the administration.

Two options were outlined for the scope of the proposal. In the first option, the rules would apply to groups with consolidated global revenues above the threshold of EUR 750 million. In the second option, the proposal counts with the opt-in for SMEs with cross-border activities. As is described in a detailed article published by KPMG's EU Tax Centre, stakeholders were asked to evaluate several thresholds in the second option namely thresholds of EUR 250 million, EUR 50 million and no threshold. Lastly, the EC aspires to have as low number of sectoral carveouts as possible and would especially evaluate the impact on the financial sector.

Stakeholders should evaluate two options for how to calculate the tax base. In the first case, all entities within the MNE would need to use a single set of accounting rules. This condition is necessary because the net income and loss reported in the financial accounting of the MNE would be adjusted by a predetermined list of tax adjustments. Listed adjustments are factors that account for a substantial portion of the tax base (up to 90 per cent). Depreciation of fixed assets, anti-abuse rules and different types of exceptions are among the proposed tax adjustments. The second option relies on the creation of a comprehensive set of tax rules where financial accounting would not play a crucial role. EU member states would need to administer two sets of tax rules at the same time if this approach was adopted.

The third component of this scenario is the determination of the formula for allocating taxable profits. The first formula would reflect the three most frequently used elements used to distribute the profits between different tax jurisdictions: a) tangible assets (excluding financial assets), b) labour (equal combination of salaries and number of employees) and c) sales by destination. The second formula would use all elements from the first one but also incorporate intangible assets in form of a proxy. This proxy variable could be composed of marketing and advertising or research and development expenses.

Since any EU law applies only to activities happening within the area of EU Member states, the fourth component tackles the allocation of profit to related entities outside the MNE. The first transfer pricing approach describes a system, where companies would still have to perform the required transfer pricing analysis, but the proposed regulations would only offer guidelines on how tax authorities should evaluate transactions between firms and associated entities outside the consolidated group in terms of risk. The second approach

proposes to preserve the transfer pricing rules as they are set right now.

Lastly, the call for evidence is asking stakeholders for opinions on how to decrease the red tape and costs connected to the process. This should be achieved through simplifications of the process and techniques for the prevention of and resolving disputes.

2.5 Minimum Effective Tax Rate for Multinationals

As a complement to the proposals introduced by the OECD and EC, an alternative proposal was included in this study as well. Cobham *et al.* (2021a) introduced a METR with the idea to bring a more simple yet effective practical proposal to tackle the unfair taxation of MNEs. The METR was designed to redistribute the revenue generated by the MNEs to countries, where the real economic activity is as well as offer a fair taxation system with a transparent methodology. This alternative approach should also be easily applicable in countries since it does not affect international tax conventions and can be incorporated into national legislation.

This proposal was to a substantial extent inspired by the Pillar Two model, thus, uses identical or similar building blocks and assumptions with differences in some calculations. The scope of the proposal is aligned with the general definition of the MNEs, however, argues for broadening of application to SMEs as well. The same principles for the calculation of ETR are used. On the other hand, the definition of undertaxed profits differs, with adjustments in the determination of the non-effectively taxed profits and formulaic apportionment rule.

Firstly, each country‘s real ETR is compared to the minimum rate and only considered for the calculation of undertaxed profits only if the real ETR is below the set minimum. In the case of an equal and higher rate, the profits are excluded from the reallocation framework. Secondly, the share of undertaxed profits is calculated for each country and then aggregated on the MNE level. The reallocation framework is based on three variables: i) sales generated in the jurisdiction, ii) tangible assets held in the jurisdiction and iii) the number of employees working in the affiliates in the jurisdiction as well as iv) salary costs of these employees.

Each country, where the MNE has generated the economic value would be

eligible for reallocation of the aggregated non-effectively taxed profits regardless of the level of the MNE. Hence, each jurisdiction could set its own taxation strategy: i) use minimum ETR or ii) use statutory CIT rate and not lose competitive advantage, since this framework would be only applicable to the proportion of undertaxed profits reflecting the share of economic value created in the jurisdiction. Hence, the METR would create a fair taxing environment for all jurisdictions.

Implementation of such a proposal is conditional on its effect on multi- and bilateral treaties and required changes in legislature. Since taxing privileges under METR are designed separately for domestic and partner countries, it is reasonable to expect an easier process of implementation and adaption.

2.6 Tax deficit proposal

As part of the debate about the minimum corporate tax, Barake *et al.* (2021) published a study estimating the tax deficit of countries from the perspective of the ultimate parent jurisdiction. Under this framework, all the profits should be taxed at least by the minimum rate without exception. In other words, if the domestic profits are taxed below the minimum rate, the parent jurisdiction should tax the MNEs with the top-up tax. In the world with a 15% minimum rate, if France has only a 12% effective tax rate, all the French MNEs should pay the difference of 3% in the top-up tax to France.

This approach does not consider the location of the economic value and reallocates all the undertaxed profits to the parent jurisdiction. Hence, only the location of the headquarters would play a key role in the redistribution process. Under these circumstances, MNEs would pay the same tax in all participating jurisdictions, but the end beneficiary would be only one country. At the same time, all countries would be free to set their tax rates separately. It is reasonable to assume that jurisdictions would try to narrow the gap in order not to lose tax revenue. However, some may choose not to follow this strategy and keep their "competitive advantage" to attract foreign investors and benefit in a non-momentary way for example by keeping the jobs created by these MNEs.

Three scenarios were projected in this study with each of them assuming a different number of jurisdictions to be involved in the scheme, where the model assuming participation of countries is the closest one to the Pillar Two framework. All the estimated scenarios would bring significantly higher revenue for the EU, as a primarily observed jurisdiction. These estimations were supported

by the company-level deficits projected on a sample of banks and other MNEs from oil, telco and other industries, which voluntarily published their country-by-country data. In conclusion, the introduction of the minimum tax would result in an increase in collected tax revenue.

2.7 Hypotheses

As shown in the previous section, profit shifting is resulting in tax revenue losses for many jurisdictions. Mentioned tax reforms have been designed around two key principles setting a minimum corporate tax and redistribution of under-taxed profits based on the location of economic activity. Hence, the following hypotheses will be tested on the CbCR dataset:

(i) Global corporate tax reforms will generate extra tax revenue for participating jurisdictions

(ii) High-income countries will receive more revenue than low-income countries

(iii) Minimum tax and formulary apportionment might reduce the negative effects of profit shifting

Chapter 3

Data

3.1 Country-by-country-reporting

The CbCR data published in July 2021 will be used in this thesis to evaluate the tax proposals. The CbCR dataset was developed as part of the OECD/G20 BEPS Project's Action 13 to assist governments in fighting BEPS.

MNEs with revenues over EUR 750 million are required to submit CbCR yearly, normally in their headquarters country, under Action 13. For each jurisdiction in which they do business, the CbCR contain a wide range of aggregate business information. Firstly, the CbCR contain information on the MNE's worldwide revenue distribution and tax costs, as well as specific Details about real revenue-generating centres/branches inside the MNE group. Secondly, the CbCR contain information on which enterprises conduct business in each jurisdiction, as well as the kind of businesses they do.

The first release of aggregated CbCR statistics in 2020 included data, which were submitted in 26 jurisdictions in 2016 and encompass over 4,000 MNE organisations. The second release of CbCR statistics in 2021 included data, which encompass around 6,000 MNE organizations and include CbCRss filed in 38 jurisdictions for the year 2017. Even though the Inclusive Framework had 137, respectively 139 members, only a fraction of them implemented mandatory reporting. For 2016, CbCR were received by 58 jurisdictions with only 46 implementing required reporting and 12 receiving CbCR through voluntary filing. Only 35 of the jurisdictions that received CbCRss were expected to have received enough CbCR to give aggregated information while maintaining taxpayer confidentiality. For 2017, only 62 states have made required reporting mandatory, with three allowing voluntary submission. Given the confidentiality of the tax-

payer, only 40 nations were expected to have received sufficient numbers of CbCR to provide data on the aggregated level.

The primary goal of CbCR reports is to assist tax administrations in detecting and assessing transfer pricing and other BEPS-related concerns at a high level. Aside from assisting with high-level risk assessment, the data obtained by CbCR can also help with a general study on MNEs as well as a complex study on BEPS behaviour. There have been several studies using US ((Clausing 2020); (Cobham *et al.* 2019); (De Mooij *et al.* 2019); (Garcia-Bernardoa & Jansky 2021)), Italy CbCR data ((Bratta *et al.* 2021)) or Germany ((Fuest *et al.* 2021)). The first paper to use the 2016 OECD CbCR dataset was (Garcia-Bernardoa & Jansky 2021) to calculate the global scale of profit shifting of MNEs. From a national respective, (Santomartino *et al.* 2021) produced a descriptive study of domestic and international MNEs having a base in Italy.

The biggest advantage of the newly released 2017 dataset is the inclusion of USA MNEs data, which were reported on a voluntary basis in 2016. Consequently, there is no need to replace the incomplete dataset with other data such as from US Internal Revenue Service as done in (Garcia-Bernardoa & Jansky 2021).

According to the OECD (2021), the data provide considerable new perspective on MNEs and their actions, by providing more detailed data, by securing the involvement of all of the mentioned MNEs' worldwide activities, by allowing requiring MNEs' local and international operations to be recognized separately and by including detailed information about MNEÂ´ operations. This dataset provides also advantages in other aspects of profit shifting analysis.

Firstly, CbCR guarantees that taxes and profits are calculated in line with the tax rules and corporate profit. As a result, double-counting in sales and profit is not viable with CbCR data (except for stateless entities, which were excluded from the research, and intercompany dividends, since there are no guidelines or incentives for firms to double-count). This dataset represents the first relevant cross-country comparison of high quality because it includes the finest available information on MNE' tax payments for numerous nations.

Secondly, various versions of the CbCR dataset allow for a more accurate estimation of ETR in each country. The dataset contains data for all sub-groups but also data for subsidiaries with only positive profits.

Even though the OECD CbCR dataset represents the best source for tax analyses related to the cross-border activities of MNEs, they still have its short-

comings mainly regarding the coverage and quality of data. OECD itself lists several limitations in the disclaimer related to the dataset.

From the coverage perspective, the overall scope of the coverage is significantly smaller than the number of participating jurisdictions. From the overall 139 jurisdictions included in the Inclusive framework, only 65 jurisdictions accepted the CbCRs for the year 2017. Out of this group, only 40 jurisdictions received a sufficient number of CbCRs. Prioritization of taxpayers' privacy resulted in the final 38 jurisdictions. Voluntary reporting in some countries (most notably the USA) resulted in underreporting of financial variables as noted by (Clausing *et al.* 2021).

Because of the different fiscal year coverage in years 2016 and 2017, the comparison between these two years is very limited. The dataset also contains stateless entities, which are either non-transparent entities or transparent entities residing in either different or the same jurisdiction. These entities, however, are excluded from further analysis. From a quality perspective, data lacks information about several important financial categories such as intangible assets, amount of debt or taxable income. Data provides only the quantity of component entities conducting business activities such as research and development, sales or marketing in the applicable tax jurisdiction. Data providing a view on intangible assets will be crucial for future analysis of tax proposals.

As a result of not having detailed rules on the inclusion of intracompany dividends in the profit before tax, jurisdictions implemented a different framework for accounting such payments within MNEs. However, until the moment clear rules are set, there is a very limited way how to address this limitation.

3.2 Dataset adjustments

Following the methodology outlined in (Garcia-Bernardoa & Jansky 2021), (Cobham *et al.* 2021a) and Barake *et al.* (2021) , the sub-group with positive profits was used to calculate the ETR of each jurisdiction. The same dataset was used for calculations of tax gains from proposals, since it is assumed that only positive profits can be taxed. Since the sub-group with positive profits does not cover all the jurisdictions, the respective corporate income tax rate was used instead in the jurisdiction. The CIT rates were gathered from KPMG's Corporate tax rates table and Deloitte's Global corporate income tax overview. Since both of these datasets do not cover all the jurisdictions in the study, aggregated regional averages from the KPMG's reporting were used for missing

countries.The CIT rates were also used for countries, for which the negative ETR was calculated. It was a result of positive profits booked, but negative income tax paid. The same approach was applied to countries with missing data on the amount of paid income tax. Lists of these jurisdictions are part of the Appendix.

One of the disadvantages of the dataset is a different level of aggregation from the perspective of ultimate parent jurisdiction. Each country had used a different approach, which resulted in a heterogeneous dataset. The way how was dealt with each of the variables is described separately.

For each ultimate parent jurisdiction, there is an aggregate variable, where the partner jurisdiction is the sum of all non-domestic jurisdictions ("Foreign Jurisdictions Total"). This pair was excluded from the analysis for thirty-four countries, however, it was considered for the four remaining jurisdictions: Finland, Ireland, Korea and the Netherlands. All these four jurisdictions reported only two partner jurisdictions: domestic and aggregated non-domestic partner jurisdiction. Hence, the exclusion of the only variable describing the foreign profits could result in the undervaluation of the tax gains for these countries. For the purpose of this study, they were considered as countries, hence, the ETR calculation applied to them as well. In the case of the negative ETR, the global CIT rate calculated in the KPMG dataset would be used.

Several ultimate parent jurisdictions based their aggregation strategy on geography and grouped jurisdictions based on this factor into four groups: Africa, Americas (continent), Asia and Europe. Five countries, which divided their partner jurisdiction solely based on geography are Austria, Greece, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Other countries including Australia, Denmark, France and Germany, aggregated only some of their partner jurisdictions into five groups: Other Africa, Other Americas, Other Asia, Other Europe and Other Groups. For the purposes of the study, all these geographical groups were considered as countries, hence, the ETR calculation applied to them as well. In the case of the negative ETR, the respective continent CIT rate calculated in the KPMG dataset would be used.

Chapter 4

Methodology

In this section, the model for OECD's Pillar Two proposal is introduced as the first one. The model for BEFIT proposal is introduced as the second one and is divided into two scenarios. Lastly, two models, the METR and "Tax deficit" proposals are introduced as an alternative to the existing initiatives. All models are connected to the data presented in the 2017 CbCR dataset with positive profits.

4.1 Pillar Two model

4.1.1 Theoretical assumptions

The OECD (2020a) examined four scenarios of possible responses to the implementation of the proposal in practice. Same as in the case of (Cobham *et al.* 2021a), only Scenario 1 was calculated in this thesis. This scenario is focused solely on the effect of the Pillar Two proposal and is not taking into consideration the effects of Pillar One or potential adjustments in the behaviour of stakeholders. In other words, it is a ceteris paribus scenario which would theoretically happen immediately after the implementation.

Since the IIR should be the core top-up tax introduced in the proposal, the model used in this thesis counted with 100% of participating countries starting to use the scheme. This is, however, different to the OECD (2020a) assumption of no participation from no corporate income tax countries and half participation from the rest of the jurisdictions.

This proposal is giving more taxing rights to the jurisdictions of incorporation of MNEs and redistributes only a smaller fraction of undertaxed profits.

Hence, countries with a larger number of headquarters would benefit more than the rest of the jurisdictions as a consequence of this policy.

Since the CbCR dataset published for the year 2017 also contains data for the USA, the effect of GloBE rules is also calculated for MNEs headquartered in the USA. Moreover, no formulaic substance-based carve-outs are assumed for the model used in this thesis. The OECD estimates only a small, limited effect and their inclusion would require firm-level data.

Another assumption is connected to the profitability of the companies. The dataset used in the Impact assessment (OECD 2020a) counted only with companies with positive profits, which simplifies reality. The same dataset is used in this study, since companies can pay taxes only on positive profits.

Cobham *et al.* (2021a) used in their Pillar II estimation a variable C, which is the proportion of international foreign profits of MNEs with headquarter in the jurisdiction x. This variable would only affect destination of redistribution not the overall number of redistributed profits. Since the source dataset does not cover all the jurisdiction and several sources used for estimation are not publicly available, this variable was not included.

4.1.2 Effective tax rate

One of the most essential parts of the examined model is the ETR. Contrary to the OECD (2020a), where the ETR was estimated as the median value of three datasets: i) the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, ii) the OECD CbCR dataset and iii) the dataset created by Tørsløv et al, the ETR is calculated solely from the OECD CbCR dataset in this thesis. Using only one source of the ETR calculation should prevent tax rates from being biased upwards as is the case of the ETRs estimated from the USBEA dataset.

The ETR is calculated not from the main subset, containing all MNEs and countries, but from the subset containing data with positive profits only. This approach is aiming to reflect the business reality, where only profitable companies pay taxes. The respective tax rates are calculated from the perspective of partner jurisdiction since this view shows all profits booked in the country.

For each country, it is a tax rate calculated from the income tax paid on a cash basis and labelled ETR_x. This tax is as then divided by the total profits before income tax and looks as follows:

$$ETR_x = \frac{\sum \text{Income tax paid as cash in jurisdiction x}}{\sum \text{Profits booked in jurisdiction x}}$$

4.1.3 Minimum tax rate

The OECD Pillar Two is built on a 15% minimum corporate income tax; hence, this rate is set as the minimum tax rate in the model.

4.1.4 Tax revenue gains under Pillar Two

TRG in country x is under status quo defined as:

$$TRG_x \text{ (Status quo)} = \pi_x \alpha_x$$

where the π_x represents profits before income tax generated by all MNEs doing business in jurisdiction x, and α_x represents the tax rate, which is applied. The effective tax rate is only considered if it is positive. In case of a negative ETR, the statutory CIT is used to calculate the TRG.

Since the GloBE proposal is relying on the top-up tax, an additional variable needs to be added to the equation. Hence, the equation for the GloBE proposal looks as follows:

$$TRG_x \text{ (GloBE)} = \pi_x \alpha_x + TT_x$$

where the TT_x represents the top-up tax gained by jurisdiction x. It is generated in partner jurisdictions with an ETR lower than the minimum tax rate, α_m. There are two ways how to distribute the TT_x. In the first case, the TT_x is fully reallocated and credited to jurisdiction x (parent jurisdiction) only if the ETR in country x is above the α_m. Hence, if $\alpha_x > \alpha_m$, the TT_x is calculated as follows:

$$TT_x = \sum_{y:\alpha_y < \alpha_m} \pi_y(\alpha_m - \alpha_y)$$

where π_y represents profit before income tax generated by an affiliate in partner jurisdiction y and α_y is the ETR applied in the jurisdiction y.

In the second case, the portion of size $\frac{\alpha_x}{\alpha_m}$ is reallocated to jurisdiction x, while $1 - \frac{\alpha_x}{\alpha_m}$ is reallocated based on where the actual business activity is located. These allocation rules serve as a simplification of the IIR and UTPR rules. Hence, the TT_x is calculated as follows:

$$TT_x = \frac{\alpha_x}{\alpha_m} \sum_{y:\alpha_y < \alpha_m} \pi_y(\alpha_m - \alpha_y) + \frac{R_x}{\sum R_x} \sum_{z:\alpha_z < \alpha_m} \left(\frac{(\alpha_m - \alpha_z)}{\alpha_m} \sum_{y:\alpha_y < \alpha_m} \pi_y(\alpha_m - \alpha_y)\right)$$

where the R_x represents the share of real economic activity. To accurately identify the source of the income, the R_x takes into account several factors and

is calculated as follows:

$$R_x = \frac{1}{3}\frac{A_x}{\sum A_x} + \frac{1}{3}\frac{S_x}{\sum S_x} + \frac{1}{3}(\frac{1}{2}\frac{P_x}{\sum P_x} + \frac{1}{2}\frac{E_x}{\sum E_x})$$

where A represents tangible assets, S represents sales or revenue, and P represents payroll costs and E number of employees. Since the CbCR dataset does contain only information about the number of employees and not the payroll costs, it is necessary to multiply the number of employees by the GDP per capita in the jurisdiction. Hence, P in jurisdiction x is calculated as:

$$P_x = (E_x) * (\text{GDP per capita})$$

Data for payroll costs are sourced from the World bank's dataset containing data on GDP per capita in countries and geographical regions. Since the information is not available for all the countries, the missing values were substituted by respective regional values. The aggregated geographical values such as Europe, Other Asia and Foreign jurisdictions total were also substituted by the regional values.

4.2 BEFIT model

4.2.1 Theoretical assumptions

Since the BEFIT is the replacement for the CCCTB, a lot of the theoretical assumptions are linked to the previous proposal. Hence, the proposal would be built on key aspects of proportion distribution among the EU countries executed through a distribution formula as well as on a common tax base applicable across the EU. The proposal should also tackle not only the rules determining the common tax base but also the framework for its consolidation on the union level. It is also characterized by a shift from separate accounting rules to unitary rules. In this new approach, the MNE is seen as a profit-maximizing entity, instead of an individual subsidiary, and the profit generated by the whole organisation is then redistributed based on the defined formula.

The effect of the BEFIT proposal was estimated in two scenarios. This framework should be implemented only within the EU, hence, for the purposes of this thesis, the scope of this proposal was limited only to the country pairs including the member states. In the first scenario, only the EU implemented

the framework and no other tax initiative is in place. Hence, this ceteris paribus scenario models that the unitary taxation and formulary apportionment is implemented by the Member States and no minimum effective tax rate had been set. In other words, this scenario lets each jurisdiction keep its statutory tax rate and redistributes profits only once based on the source of the economic activity. This would still allow Member States such as Hungary, Estonia or Malta to keep their competitive advantage and attract foreign investors by keeping the tax rates lower than the rest of the Union.

In the second scenario, the EC plans to develop BEFIT rules in alignment with the Two Pillar frameworks. As a result, the BEFIT would be functioning in the world with implemented global minimum corporate tax. The same assumptions about the unitary taxation and formulary apportionment were applied, however, the minimum effective tax rate was set to 15%. In other words, if profits were about to be taxed in the jurisdiction with the effective tax rate lower than the minimum effective tax rate, the proportionate amount of these profits would be reallocated based on economic activity to all countries regardless of the effective tax rate. In this scenario, Member States would be more discouraged to set their statutory corporate rates lower than the set minimum because of the lower potential tax revenue gain.

This thesis aimed to explore only a specific set of options outlined in the five essential components of the proposal. Only MNEs with consolidated international income above the level of EUR 750 million were considered. This selection ensured consistency with the CbCR dataset. No sectoral carve-outs were currently considered for the model. In order to establish the tax base used for calculation, no tax adjustments were assumed. In terms of the allocation of profits among the EU Member states, the formula should include information on sales, tangible assets and labour, where labour reflect the number of employees and payroll costs. This model assumed that the current framework for the transfer pricing rules would be preserved under BEFIT. Lastly, even though the administrative component plays a crucial role in the proposal and has a potential impact on the overall functionality of the scheme, this model did not reflect the proposed improvement in the ways the MNEs are handling the administrative tasks related to the framework.

4.2.2 Tax rates

Same as in the previous model, the 15% tax rate was considered to be the minimum tax rate and the ETRs were calculated using the CbCR 2017 dataset. To preserve consistency, statutory tax rates for jurisdictions were also from the year 2017.

4.2.3 Tax revenue gains in Scenario 1

The TRG in Scenario 1 of the BEFIT model relies on unitary taxation and formulary apportionment based on economic activity. Hence, the model in Scenario 1 looks as follows:

$$TRG_x \text{ (BEFIT Scenario 1)} = R_x \sum \pi_x \alpha_x$$

where the π_x represents the profits of the MNEs from jurisdiction x in all partner jurisdictions, the R_x represents the share of real economic activity and α_x is the ETR in jurisdiction x.

4.2.4 Tax revenue gains in Scenario 2

The TRG in Scenario 2 of BEFIT model relies on unitary taxation, implementation of the global minimum tax rate and formulary apportionment based on economic activity. In this scenario, it is necessary to compare the overall tax revenue gains for all jurisdictions after the redistribution with the expected tax revenue gains under the minimum tax rate, where the aggregated estimated revenue is:

$$TRG_x \text{ (Minimum tax rate)} = \alpha_m \sum \pi_x$$

In other words, if the sum of the tax gains in parent as well as partner countries is above the expected level, no other redistribution is needed and the model looks as follows:

$$TRG_x \text{ (BEFIT Scenario 2)} = R_x \alpha_x \sum \pi_x$$

where the π_x represents the profits of the MNEs from jurisdiction x in all partner jurisdictions, the R_x represents the share of real economic activity and α_x is the ETR in jurisdiction x.

However, if the overall tax gain after redistribution is below the estimated

minimum tax gain, the undertaxed profits on the jurisdiction level will be reallocated based on the source of economic activity. Hence, the model in Scenario 2 looks as follows:

$$TRG_x \text{ (BEFIT Scenario 2)} = R_x \alpha_x \sum \pi_x + TT_x$$

where all variables are the same as in the previous case plus the TT_x represents the top-up tax to the expected revenue from global minimum tax rate (α_m). The TT_x is calculated in this way:

$$TT_x = R_x \alpha_x \frac{\alpha_m \sum \pi_x - \sum (R_z \alpha_z \sum \pi_x)}{\sum (R_z \alpha_z)}$$

where the fraction represents profits necessary for redistribution in orders TRG to be on the level of expected gains. The nominator represents the difference between the expected revenue from profits in all jurisdictions (parent as well as a partner) and the sum of TRGs in all jurisdictions from profits generated by MNEs from jurisdiction x. The denominator represents the sum of products of R and ETR in all jurisdictions.

4.3 METR model

4.3.1 Theoretical assumptions

Since the METR proposal is tightly linked to the Pillar Two proposal, the majority of the assumptions could be applied to this framework as well. Under the scheme, the undertaxed profits would be redistributed based on the formulary apportionment to the source countries generating economic value regardless of the ETR used in these countries. Hence, the number of jurisdictions eligible for redistribution would be bigger than the one for the Pillar Two model.

The scope of the METR was for the purpose of this study same as of the previous two proposals. In other words, the only effect on the MNEs was taken into consideration and SMEs were excluded now. Calculation of the ETR for each jurisdiction followed the approach outlined in the Pillar Two proposal and included profits before the tax and tax paid on a cash basis.

4.3.2 Tax rates

Same as in the previous two models, the 15% tax rate is considered to be the minimum tax rate and the ETRs will be calculated using the CbCRs 2017 dataset. To preserve consistency, statutory tax rates for jurisdictions were also from the year 2017.

4.3.3 Tax revenue gains

The TRG in the METR model relies on the identification of non-effectively taxed profits and their redistribution based on formulary apportionment. Hence, the model looks as follows:

$$TRG_x \text{ (METR)} = \alpha_x \pi_x + \alpha'_x \pi'_x$$

where the π_x represents profits before income tax generated by all MNEs doing business in jurisdiction x, and α_x represents the ETR, which is applied. The second part of the equation represents the reallocated undertaxed profits from the partner jurisdictions π'_x, which are then multiplied (taxed) by the respective statutory corporate income tax rate α'_x.

The calculation of the undertaxed profits is linked to the ETRs used and only countries where α_y is below the minimum effective tax rate, α_m, are considered. The share in partner jurisdiction is calculated as $\frac{(\alpha_m - \alpha_y)}{\alpha_m}$. Hence, the overall proportion of redistributed profits is:

$$\pi'_x = R_x \sum_{y:\alpha_y < \alpha_m} \pi_y \frac{(\alpha_m - \alpha_y)}{\alpha_m}$$

where R_x represents the share of real economic activity.

4.4 Tax deficit model

4.4.1 Theoretical assumptions

This model is partially linked to the OECD's proposal for a minimum global tax but attributes all the taxing rights on the undertaxed profits to the parent jurisdiction. Moreover, it does not distinguish between domestic and foreign profits and aims to fairly tax any profits. In other words, if Denmark is undertaxing Danish MNEs, the model assumes the application of a "top-up" tax to cover the

tax deficit. Consequently, this model would bring equal taxation on the level of minimum corporate tax in all participating jurisdictions. For simplification, this model is assumed that all countries would join the scheme, apply the "top-up" tax and send it to the parent jurisdiction plus all the reporting countries would fairly tax all their companies.

The scope of the proposal copies the rest of the models, hence, being applied to theMNEs covered by the CbCR reporting. Calculation of the ETR is also linked to the methodology used in this paper.

4.4.2 Tax rates

The 15% tax rate is considered to be the minimum tax rate and the ETRs will be calculated based on the same methodology as in previous cases.

4.4.3 Tax revenue gains

The TRG in this model relies on a minimum tax rate and redistribution of all undertaxed profits to the parent jurisdiction. Hence, the model looks as follows:

$$TRG_x \text{ (Tax deficit)} = \alpha_x \pi_x + \sum_{z:\alpha_z<\alpha_m} \pi_z(\alpha_m - \alpha_z)$$

where the first product in the equation gives revenue generated from profits booked in the jurisdiction and the second product aggregates revenue from all undertaxing countries, including the domestic one in case the α_x is below the minimum level plus all jurisdictions where the MNE has its affiliates.

Chapter 5

Results

This section is divided into four parts, where each describes tax revenue gains under the respective proposal and in comparison, to the status quo. Each proposal was evaluated from the geographical perspective, where jurisdictions were divided based on their location. European countries were then divided into two groups: the EU Member States and non-EU countries. This division is due to the BEFIT proposal and its limited application to the EU countries only. Jurisdictions were also divided based on income groups. These groups follow the same grouping as had been used in the OECD (2020a). Newly covered countries were then attributed to the same income and geographical groups.

All three models with global reach were calculated with the inclusion of aggregated geographical groups such as Other Africa and Americas. Hence, these groups were separated while describing the tax revenue gains for geographic areas under these models.

5.1 Pillar Two results

Since this proposal is to some extent favouring the parent jurisdiction, the reporting countries would generally accrue more tax revenue than the non-reporting ones. However, this redistribution policy does not affect the overall amount of extra revenue generated by undertaxing jurisdictions.

5.1.1 Africa

African countries would gain 20% of extra tax revenue under the Pillar Two model than in the status quo scenario. The biggest increase in the high-middle-income category was attributed to South Africa. The reason for the 38.4%

increase is attributed to the overall size of the economy, but also to the fact that South Africa is a reporting country, hence, a bigger proportion of the undertaxed profits was reallocated to it. Both the low-income and the middle-low-income groups recorded only a small increase in tax revenue (around 3%), mainly due to the overall size of reported profits booked in them as well as the fact that none of these jurisdictions was considered as parent one. Even though Mauritius is considered the investment hub and is popular for profit shifting due to its low effective corporate tax rate with almost USD 8 billion booked profits, it still would benefit from the introduction of the minimum tax rate and redistribution scheme. Aggregated groups linked to Africa would together gain 12.3% in extra taxes.

5.1.2 America

Since the ETR in the USA is above the minimum, all the global undertaxed profits of American MNEs would be distributed there would substantially increase revenue gains by 28.15%. Moreover, the USA would be the biggest beneficiary under Pillar Two because of the number MNEs and their global reach. On the other hand, Canadian profits would be redistributed based on the location of economic activity even from domestic activity. Nevertheless, Canada would gain almost 40% more than under the current system.

Latin America and the region of the Caribbean Island would gain 7% of extra revenue. All the investment hubs would collectively gain 31.5%, even though they primarily serve as destinations of profit shifting and generally do not contribute to economic value creation. The Cayman Islands as the jurisdiction with the largest booked profits from this group would increase its revenue by 6.5% and Bermuda with USD 63 billion booked profits would increase its revenue by 28.5%. Moreover, two outlying jurisdictions, Barbados and the British Virgin Islands would gain 143% respectively 234% of extra revenue. All four reporting middle-low-income countries have ETR above the minimum, thus, would be eligible for reallocation of all undertaxed profits of their MNEs, accrued revenue gains ranging between 2.7% and 34.3% with Peru gaining substantial extra revenue. Aggregated groups linked to America would accrue an increase of 21.3%.

5.1.3 Asia and Oceania

Singapore would be the jurisdiction with the highest absolute increase in tax revenue in the whole region. It would gain USD 13.4 billion under the new circumstances, mainly because of revenue generated after the redistribution of undertaxed profits, where almost half of the economic activity of MNEs headquartered in Singapore was generated in the domestic jurisdiction. In other words, the high share of sales generated, and tangible assets held by MNEs from Singapore contributed to the allocation of almost half of the extra tax revenue to Singapore. All six reporting countries had ETR above the minimum, hence, were entitled to collect all undertaxed profits, where India gained only 3%, Japan and China both gained around 7%, and Korea, Indonesia and Malaysia all gained above 10%.

Australia accrued almost all extra revenue attributed to the Oceania region and increased its gains by 11.1% since collecting all its foreign undertaxed profits. Except for New Zealand, tax gains in the rest of the region were either 0% or near 0%. Aggregated groups linked to Asia would accrue an increase of 14.9

5.1.4 Europe

The EU would record the biggest increase in revenue under GloBE rules among all groups. Only three countries would gain less than 10% in the high-income category. On the other hand, Belgium would earn three times more than before and the rest of this group would record a substantial increase. Some of the investment hubs within the EU would also experience a considerable increase from participation in this initiative even though the majority of the profits would be reallocated to other jurisdictions. However, there is a clear difference between jurisdictions and their absolute gains. A similar number of profits was booked in France and the Netherlands, but France would gain three times more than the Netherlands both in status quo and after the implementation of Pillar two. The biggest factor contributing to this difference is the level of ETR, which is around three times lower for the Netherlands.

The United Kingdom and Switzerland accounted for almost all the gains contributed to this group, where both would benefit from the redistributed profits. Switzerland represents a similar case to the Netherlands, where both profits booked, and tax revenue has comparable proportions. All three British Crown Dependency islands considered a destination for shifted profits with

Table 5.1: TOP 10 recipients under GloBE proposal (USD billion)

Jurisdition	**TRG**
United States	692,15
Singapore	134,06
Belgium	132,74
China (People's Republic of)	100,81
United Kingdom	93,98
Germany	91,21
Canada	78,43
France	61,59
Japan	57,89
Switzerland	37,07

all having ETRs below the 1% would benefit from this framework by keeping a proportion of the undertaxed profits booked in them. Aggregated groups linked to Europe recorded the highest tax gains out of all aggregated groups with a 23.3% increase.

5.2 BEFIT results

An important disclaimer for this proposal is the limited number of engaged jurisdictions. Since the EU does not have the power to force jurisdictions outside the block to comply with the tax initiatives implemented within the EU, only the participation of member states was projected in both scenarios. Since Finland, Ireland and Netherlands reported all foreign profits in one aggregated variable, deleting it would lead to an overestimation of the tax revenue gain from the activity of MNEs headquartered in these jurisdictions. Although the target jurisdictions of the redistributed gains from the aggregated variable are unknown, the inclusion of this group at least gives an overall view of the economic activity produced in the home country and abroad. Another important disclaimer is the exclusion of the United Kingdom from this model, even though it was still a member of the EU in the reporting year because it decided to leave the EU.

5.2.1 Scenario 1

In this scenario, twenty-one out of twenty-seven Member States ended up with higher tax revenue than in the status quo scenario, where every jurisdiction has the authority to collect taxes only on profits booked in the country. Among

the four investment hubs of Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta and the Netherlands were also two Nordic states: Finland and Denmark. In the case of Finland, the difference was only 12%, whereas for Denmark it was 19%. Three investment hubs except for the Netherlands would gain more than 80% less than in the status quo scenario. In the case of Croatia, MNEs from the EU generated negative profits in the country, whereas under the BEFIT model jurisdiction would gain around USD 31 million in taxes. Three countries would gain more than 100% extra revenue under the scheme and two jurisdictions would receive almost 250% extra tax revenue. On average, each receiving jurisdiction would gain 68% more revenue than before. The redistribution of the profits highlights the disparity between the jurisdictions, where the economic value is created and where the profits are booked.

5.2.2 Scenario 2

In the second scenario, the total tax revenue gains from only three countries would exceed the estimated revenue under minimum tax. The rest of the jurisdictions had to reallocate the profits, so the aggregated revenue in all participating countries was at least the minimum level. Only four investments hub would gain less revenue than in the status quo scenario whereas the rest of Union would be better off. Croatia, same as in the previous scenario, would gain positive revenue instead of negative gains. Six jurisdictions recorded significantly higher revenue under the proposed framework, contrary to the status quo. Three countries would gain more than 100%, two countries would gain more than 200% of extra tax revenue and Lithuania would gain more than 300% of extra revenue under this scheme. Hence, the implementation of the BEFIT proposal under the existence of the minimum tax rate would result in a 36% surplus for the EU Member States.

5.3 METR results

5.3.1 Africa

In absolute terms, Africa would be the geographical area with the lowest calculated tax revenue gain. Within the African countries, the high-middle-income group represented by countries such as Angola, South Africa, Ghana and Nigeria gained almost all tax revenue where South Africa was the jurisdiction, which

contributed by 64% to the overall extra revenue gain. This is a result of higher GDP per capita, which is part of the economic activity computation, as well as generally the size of the business done in these countries. Hence, the tax revenue gains for these countries are significantly higher than for the rest of the continent. The same applies to the middle-low-income group represented by North-African countries such as Egypt, Morocco and Algeria, which contributed to an overall gain of 9%. The rest of the African tax gains are distributed among low-income countries and investment hubs.

Aggregated groups ("Africa" and "Other Africa") combine USD 1.9 billion of extra tax revenue gains, which are not attributed to concrete jurisdiction. However, this amount would vary in a disaggregated scenario, since all countries have their separate ETRs and CIT rates. It is also reasonable to assume that some proportion of the "Foreign jurisdictions total" tax revenue gains) and "Other Groups" would be redistributed to Africa.

5.3.2 America

North America, which in this study contains only two jurisdictions, the United States of America and Canada, is the biggest recipient of the extra tax revenue gains with around USD 160 billion whereas the USA were the jurisdiction which gained the most under the METR framework: USD 149 billion. This is almost three times the amount of the region of Asia and represents almost half of the increase. The reason behind this result could be the size of the domestic economy, global economic status and overall number of MNEs incorporated in the jurisdiction.

In the region of Latin America and the Caribbean, the middle-low-income group represented by Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Peru was the biggest recipient of redistributed undertaxed profits with around USD 11.3 billion. This is a result of the size of the economies included in this group, which translated to a 94% share of all extra profits in the region. Investment hubs in the region such as Barbados, Bermuda and Cayman Islands do not gain much of the tax revenue because their ETR is close to zero, as well as their CIT rates, even though USD 149 billion of profits were booked on the Cayman Islands and almost USD 63 billion of profits were booked on Bermuda. Moreover, these jurisdictions do not receive a big share of the undertaxed profits through reallocation, because theMNEs have only a small number of employees working there and most of the revenue is generated by the related parties within the entities.

Aggregated groups ("America" and "Other Americas") combine USD 5.7 billion of surplus tax revenue gains. The same assumption applies to the other groups.

5.3.3 Asia and Oceania

There is one big recipient of tax revenue in each of the income groups in Asia. The tax revenue gains in the middle-low-income countries were mostly driven by the Chinese economy, which accounts for USD 15.7 billion out of USD 25 billion, generated in this group. In the high-income group, the majority of tax revenue is generated in Japan, which accounts for USD 9.8 billion out of USD 11.7 billion, generated in this group.

Singapore, as a prominent Asian investment hub, reported higher booked profits than South Korea but gained less because of lower tax rates even though South Korea recorded only a mild increase in tax revenue. This is the result of Korea's aggregated reporting of all foreign profits. Since the ETR for the variable "Foreign Jurisdiction Total" was above the minimum 15%, no profits were reallocated in this model. This does not fully reflect the reality, since some jurisdictions, in which the Korean MNEs do business, would have their ETRs below the minimum level. Hence, some of the USD 78.5 billion profits booked abroad would be reallocated back to South Korea.

Australia, as the biggest economy in the Oceania region, accounted together with New Zealand for almost all tax gains with a combined USD 5.82 billion share out of the USD 5.86 billion. Aggregated groups of "Asia" and "Other Asia" generated an extra USD 4.9 billion in tax revenue.

5.3.4 Europe

The high-income group within the EU generated almost all extra tax revenue. The biggest economies of the continent such as Germany, France, Italy and France are among the high-income EU states and together accrued USD 42.3 billion more than under the status quo. The Mediterranean islands of Cyprus and Malta are considered favourite destinations for profit shifting. Cyprus with over USD 2.2 billion in profits would receive only USD 64 million because of its low ETR (3%) and the low number of employees. The same applies to Malta with USD 5.7 billion in profits, ETR on the level of 2% and attributed taxes of USD 142.6 million. Hungary, Ireland and Luxembourg, favourite countries for European headquarters of digital giants, would be attributed with only a small

Table 5.2: TOP 10 recipients under METR proposal (USD billion)

Jurisdition	**TRG**
United States	1487,33
China (People's Republic of)	157,08
Germany	118,00
Belgium	117,43
Canada	106,39
Japan	98,15
United Kingdom	90,18
Singapore	81,85
France	79,72
Australia	54,84

proportion of profits booked in them. Luxembourg concludes the list of the top 18 jurisdictions with booked profits above USD 100 billion with its USD 106.4 billion. However, under the METR proposal, only a small fraction of undertaxed profits would be reallocated to Luxembourg, because of the relatively smaller proportion of unrelated party revenues, number of employees and tangible assets. Yet, these reallocated profits would increase the tax revenues by 125.8%. The Netherlands represents a similar case in absolute terms with an extra gain of USD 2.3 billion

The United Kingdom is the country, which gained the most tax revenue, even though its calculated ETR is only 6%. The factor affecting the amount of gained revenue from the domestic activity is the overall size of the British economy and the global reach of its MNEs. Two English Channel Islands, Guernsey and Jersey, are considered popular profit-shifting destinations and recorded similar results as the Caribbean peers. Out of USD 15.1 billion in profits booked in Jersey, the island gained only USD 160.1 million in taxes. American MNEs, which generated almost all profits in Jersey (USD 14.2 billion, equally sourced from related and unrelated party revenues), reported only 369 employees. Several other parent jurisdictions reported zero employees. Even though almost all undertaxed profit was reallocated abroad, these jurisdictions were able to increase their revenue.

Aggregated groups "Europe" and "Other Europe" accounted for USD 6.1 billion in extra tax revenues. These gains could be in some proportion attributed to the EU member states, as well as to non-EU countries.

5.4 Tax deficit results

Since only the parent country would benefit from the reallocation of all undertaxed profits, the results presented in this section focus on the tax revenue gains of 36 reporting jurisdictions. In other words, all the remaining countries would gain only the revenue generated by taxing profits booked in them, regardless of the ETR level. Since twenty reporting countries are undertaxing profits booked in them, they would need to impose a top-up tax on MNEs making business within their economy. This revenue was predominantly generated in European countries with the UK being the recipient gaining the largest revenue in absolute terms among all reporting countries. This gain would be even bigger, however, Austria's profits nor tax paid is not included in the dataset with positive profits. The same applies to Chile. Canada and Singapore would gain similar extra revenue of USD 11.2 billion from domestic profits.

From the perspective of reallocating foreign undertaxed profits, the USA would gain almost half of the top-up revenue. They would be followed by European countries, where the Belgian MNEs were undertaxed most. In the case of 4 jurisdictions, whose foreign profits were reported only on the aggregate level, only Irish were undertaxed, hence, could be reallocated to the parent jurisdiction. Moreover, since Korea was taxing MNEs with 16% ETR and foreign affiliates of Korean MNEs were taxed above the minimum rate on the aggregate level, Korea would not gain extra revenue under this framework. The opposite case is the Isle of Man, which represents an outlier in the group since all the profits on the aggregate level were undertaxed, its extra revenue would be more than 3300% higher than in the status quo scenario. In absolute terms, the global tax gains would be 26% higher if all jurisdictions tax the MNEs with a 15% corporate income tax.

Chapter 6

Comparison of models

All included models have a unique approach to the taxation of MNEs and as shown in the Table 6.1, a comparison of all models on the jurisdiction level is possible only for the EU countries, which are reported as the ultimate parent company within the CbCR dataset.

However, the comparison of relative extra revenue gained to the status quo is universally applicable. All the proposals would bring significant increases in tax revenue gains in comparison to the status quo scenario, as shown in the Table 6.2.

METR proposal generated more extra revenue than the other two global proposals. The reason behind this result is the taxation of undertaxed profits by statutory, not effective tax rates. Since in most jurisdictions, the STR is above the ETR, METR improved total TRG by 31%, while Pillar Two by 20% and Tax deficit by 22%. The introduction of the minimum tax rate would double the TGR in the EU under the BEFIT rules. BEFIT Scenario II represents

Table 6.1: Comparison of key aspects of models

Proposal	**Scope**	**Results coverage**	**Inclusion**	**Source**	**Recipient**	**MTR**	**Tax rates**
Pillar II (GloBE)	Global	All	Yes	Mixed	Mixed	Yes	ETR
METR	Global	All	Yes	Partner	All	Yes	ETR, STR
Tax deficit	Global	Parent	Yes	All	Parent	Yes	ETR
BEFIT	Local	EU	Yes	All	All	-	ETR
Scenario 1	Local	EU	No	All	All	No	ETR
Scenario 2	Local	EU	Yes	All	All	Yes	ETR

Notes: Table compares three key aspects of each proposal. Firstly, the impact of the proposal in terms of possible member jurisdictions and coverage in this thesis, where parent and partner jurisdictions are linked to OECD's CbCR dataset. Secondly, the inclusion of redistribution of undertaxed profits plus the contributing (source) and receiving (recipient) jurisdictions. Thirdly, the inclusion of the minimum tax plus tax rates used in the model

Table 6.2: Tax revenue gains in models (in USD)

Proposal	Profits	Status quo TRG	Proposal TRG	Difference	TRG Change %
Pillar II (GloBE)	7 229	977	1 175	198	20%
METR	7 229	977	1 282	305	31%
Tax deficit	7 229	977	1 191	214	22%
BEFIT	-	-	-	-	
Scenario 1	833	91	107	16	18%
Scenario 2	833	91	123	33	36%

Notes: Table compares tax revenue gains under each of the models and absolute as well as relative change to status quo. Profits and TRG variables are in USD billion.

the proposal with the highest increase since it assumes that all profits would be reallocated based on the location of economic activity and the undertaxed profits would be taxed to match the expected revenue gain under the minimum tax.

One of the key principles behind these proposals is to redistribute undertaxed shifted profits to the location of economic activity based on several factors such as sales, number of employees and tangible assets. Another important aspect of these proposals is the introduction of the minimum tax rate, which should ensure that all profits are fairly taxed regardless of where they were booked. Since global minimum tax would practically mean that MNEs would pay the same taxes everywhere, this should discourage them to shift their profits overseas and tax them in jurisdictions in which they were generated. Plus the formulary apportionment would enable the matching of profits with the original jurisdictions, hence, discouraging MNEs to shift profits abroad. Both mechanisms are part of all models, hence, besides the increased tax revenue, would tax reforms have a discouraging effect on MNEs.

6.1 Global proposals

METR, BEFIT and Tax deficit proposal,three globally applicable proposals, would each bring substantial amount of extra revenue in absolute terms, but they would differ in regional results. However, the number of recipient countries is different. While only 36 countries would be eligible to receive extra revenue under the Tax deficit proposal, all participating jurisdictions could benefit under METR and BEFIT. The GloBE proposal would bring extra USD 198 billion and Tax deficit proposal would result in USD 214 billion. While under GloBE rules the undertaxed profits would be also redistributed to the aggregated groups, under Tax deficit only parent jurisdictions were eligible to

collect undertaxed profits. This particularly translated to a sharp increase in tax revenue gains for the UK and Switzerland. METR would bring extra revenue of USD 305 billion, from which almost 50% would be attributed to the USA. and other big economies such as Brazil, Mexico, Japan and China. Moreover, significantly lower proportions of undertaxed profits were allocated back to profits-shifting destinations such as Singapore, Ireland or Bermuda under METR.

Figure 6.1: Tax revenue gains for geographical regions



From an income perspective, the high-income group would be benefiting most from each of the models with around three-quarters of all extra tax revenue being redistributed there. This reallocation is linked to the fact, that majority of the MNEs are headquartered in high-income countries and the location of economic activity correlates with income. The second most beneficial group are Investment hubs, which would benefit from the introduction of a minimum tax rate and redistribution of undertaxed profits even though do not extensively participate in the creation of economic value. Lastly, the middle-low-income group would be the last group benefiting from the implementation of the proposals.

Figure 6.2: Tax revenue gains for income groups



6.2 BEFIT Scenario 1 vs Scenario 2

The overall effect of the BEFIT framework would result in revenue gains in both scenarios as shown in Table 6.3. However, Scenario 2 would bring double the extra revenue because of the top-up tax generated to match the expected revenue from the minimum tax since only one-third of all jurisdictions have the ETR above the minimum level. Even though not all countries tax profits above the set minimum, they would still benefit from the redistribution of profits. The list of jurisdictions losing revenue is very similar in both frameworks, supporting the assumption that several investment hubs serve the purpose of profit shifting and the redistribution based on the location of the real economic activity would harm them. Despite this observation in results, Ireland and Hungary would still significantly increase their tax gains under both scenarios. This shows that some economic activity was located in these countries their participation in the BEFIT framework would benefit them. Given the negative impact on their income, it would be significantly harder to convince remaining jurisdictions to vote for the framework.

Table 6.3: Tax revenue gains under BEFIT

Jurisdiction	**Status QUO**	**BEFIT I**	**BEFIT II**
Austria	733	869	985
Belgium	4 088	5 243	5 463
Bulgaria	80	106	119
Croatia	- 1	31	35
Cyprus	30	5	6
Czech Republic	1 163	1 409	1 600
Denmark	4 148	3 381	4 162
Estonia	10	33	40
Finland	2 111	1 858	2 694
France	21 167	26 234	26 885
Germany	27 101	31 537	35 505
Greece	664	724	760
Hungary	488	1 154	1 289
Ireland	999	2 776	3 705
Italy	8 696	11 090	11 681
Latvia	7	16	18
Lithuania	14	50	58
Luxembourg	977	146	166
Malta	121	9	11
Netherlands	3 539	2 369	2 507
Poland	1 395	2 326	2 612
Portugal	388	479	573
Romania	546	960	1 041
Slovak Republic	421	611	679
Slovenia	86	119	143
Spain	7 198	8 616	10 406
Sweden	4 501	4 741	10 201
TOTAL	90 669	106 890	123 343

Notes: Table reports tax revenue gains for the EU Member states under status quo and Scenario 1 (BEFIT I) as well as Scenario 2 (BEFIT II). All values are in USD million.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

Profit shifting has become a serious issue over the years with an estimated value of USD 1 trillion in 2016 (Garcia-Bernardoa & Jansky 2021). This profit-maximizing strategy of MNEs results in lost revenue for many countries all over the world. Tax codes have not been updated along with the changes in the structure of the global economy and race-to-the-bottom has only magnified the losses for jurisdictions. Several tax reforms such as the Two Pillar model, CCCTB and BEFIT have been introduced to tackle this issue and redistribute shifted profits as well as disincentive MNEs from such behaviour. Complementary tax reform frameworks such as the METR and "Tax deficit collection" have aimed to further explore the mechanisms and bring alternative options for taxation schemes.

Hence, this thesis has aimed to estimate the tax revenue gains under these proposals and determine if their implementation would result in the taxation of profits in the location of economic activity and how much extra revenue would be generated. Two key building blocks of those proposals, the introduction of the redistribution scheme and setting a minimum tax rate, should reduce the profit shifting and mitigate its negative effects on tax revenue.

From a methodological perspective, the key studies from which models were derived were the Cobham *et al.* (2021a), Barake *et al.* (2021), Cobham *et al.* (2021b) estimation and OECD (2020a) . Since the final version of BEFIT has not been introduced yet, a new estimation model is introduced in this study. It considers the theoretical foundations of the previous proposal and presents information published by the EC. The CbCR dataset is used to estimate the tax revenue gains under each model.

The results of all models clearly show a significant improvement in tax

revenue gains after the implementation. Redistribution of profits based on the location of economic activity and the introduction of the minimum tax have proven to be mechanisms of reduction of negative effects resulting from profit shifting. From the global tax reforms, METR has achieved the biggest increase in tax revenue gains whereas the Pillar Two and Tax deficit proposal yield similar results. Implementation of GloBE rules would bring extra USD 198 billion, METR proposal would result in extra USD 305 billion and Tax deficit model would result in USD 204 billion increase in TRG in 2017.

However, the important aspect of the redistribution is the number of receiving countries and the proportion in which they are reallocated to parent and partner jurisdictions. While both METR and Pillar Two redistribute undertaxed profits based on economic activity, Pillar Two is giving more weight to the parent jurisdictions. The Tax deficit proposal is reallocating undertaxed profits solely to parent jurisdictions, ignoring the true location of economic activity. Hence, only a limited number of parent jurisdictions could benefit from reallocation.

Even though the BEFIT has a smaller scope than the rest of the proposals, it would still significantly improve the tax gains of EU Member States. Moreover, results show that its introduction along with the minimum tax rate would bring double the extra profits than under its separate implementation.Scenario 1 would bring extra USD 16 billion and Scenario 2 would bring extra USD 33 billion in tax gains in 2017.

From a geographical perspective, all the regions would be benefiting from the proposals. However, when looking at the drivers of the change, there are visible disparities. The North American region and particularly the USA would be the region with the largest share of the extra revenue followed by the EU. This is given by the global reach of MNEs headquartered in these jurisdictions and their strong position in creation of the economic value. On the other end of the spectrum are Africa and Latin America & Caribbean Islands with a very limited share of the overall tax gains. From an economic perspective, high-income countries would contribute around three-quarters to the total tax gains. The rest is shared between the Middle-low-income jurisdictions and investment hubs while leaving high-middle and low-income countries with insignificant shares.

Implications of these results are that global cooperation and redistribution mechanisms supported by the minimum tax are a way how to improve the tax revenue from MNEs operations. However, the long negotiations accompanying the implementation of the OECD proposal show how extremely difficult is to

achieve a consensus among countries on a global scale. On the other hand, since all participants, including Investment hubs, would benefit from the introduction of these proposals gives motivation for countries to participate. Moreover, these frameworks would further disincentivise MNEs to shift profits since all the profits would be taxed at least at a 15% rate. Hence, shifting profits would no longer be increasing their private revenue and they might reduce the scale of it.

Further research on this topic could help policymakers better understand the behaviour of MNEs and help them create a fair system for all stakeholders. The final version of the BEFIT proposal is expected to be published in 2023. The decision on whether to include intangible assets in the redistribution formula and form of key blocks would allow for a more precise estimation. Further publications of CbCR datasets would allow better identification of connections between jurisdictions and help not only researchers to understand the scale and form of profit shifting.

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Appendix A

Tax rates

Table A.1: Effective and statutory tax rates in jurisdictions

Region/Jurisdiction	**ETR**	**STR**
Africa	**-**	**-**
High - Middle	**-**	**-**
Angola	54%	30%
Botswana	15%	22%
Cabo Verde	7%	28%
Cameroon	13%	33%
Congo	24%	0%
Cote d'Ivoire	29%	25%
Equatorial Guinea	3%	35%
Eswatini	21%	21%
Gabon	28%	30%
Ghana	8%	25%
Kenya	37%	30%
Lesotho	29%	25%
Mauritania	17%	25%
Namibia	20%	32%
Nigeria	38%	30%
Senegal	11%	30%
Seychelles	31%	30%
South Africa	14%	28%
Sudan	79%	35%
Zambia	17%	35%

Table A.1 continued from previous page

Region/Jurisdiction	ETR	STR
Zimbabwe	35%	25%
Investment hubs	**-**	**-**
Liberia	0%	28%
Mauritius	2%	15%
Mozambique	22%	32%
Low	**-**	**-**
Benin	30%	30%
Burkina Faso	4%	28%
Burundi	30%	30%
Central African Republic	90%	28%
DRC	17%	35%
Ethiopia	29%	30%
Gambia	21%	31%
Guinea	30%	28%
Guinea-Bissau	795%	35%
Chad	145%	28%
Madagascar	32%	20%
Malawi	43%	30%
Mali	25%	28%
Niger	47%	28%
Réunion	59%	33%
Rwanda	30%	30%
Sierra Leone	19%	30%
Somalia	167%	28%
South Sudan	0%	20%
Tanzania	35%	30%
Togo	16%	28%
Uganda	8%	30%
Middle - Low	**-**	**-**
Algeria	26%	26%
Egypt	21%	23%
Libya	20%	20%
Maldives	17%	15%
Morocco	20%	31%
Tunisia	16%	25%

Table A.1 continued from previous page

Region/Jurisdiction	ETR	STR
Aggregate	**-**	**-**
Aggregate	**-**	**-**
Africa	11%	28%
America (Continent)	16%	28%
Asia	15%	21%
Europe	9%	20%
Foreign Jurisdictions Total	11%	24%
Other Africa	26%	28%
Other Americas	5%	28%
Other Asia	12%	21%
Other Europe	8%	20%
Other Groups	28%	24%
Asia	**15%**	**21%**
High	**-**	**-**
Bahrain	1%	0%
Brunei Darussalam	0%	19%
French Polynesia	34%	28%
Chinese Taipei	13%	21%
Israel	19%	24%
Japan	19%	31%
Korea	16%	22%
Kuwait	1%	15%
Macau, China	11%	12%
Oman	25%	15%
Qatar	8%	10%
Saudi Arabia	17%	20%
United Arab Emirates	31%	55%
Investment hubs	**-**	**-**
Hong Kong, China	7%	17%
Singapore	4%	17%
Middle - Low	**-**	**-**
Afghanistan	8%	20%
Armenia	0%	20%
Azerbaijan	20%	20%
Bangladesh	33%	25%

Table A.1 continued from previous page

Region/Jurisdiction	ETR	STR
Bhutan	17%	21%
British Indian Ocean Territory	4%	28%
Cambodia	17%	20%
DKPR	31%	21%
China	18%	25%
India	31%	35%
Indonesia	24%	25%
Iran	11%	21%
Iraq	6%	15%
Jordan	8%	20%
Kazakhstan	13%	20%
Lao	6%	24%
Lebanon	13%	15%
Malaysia	14%	24%
Mongolia	17%	25%
Myanmar	12%	25%
Nepal	30%	21%
Pakistan	41%	31%
Philippines	20%	30%
Sri Lanka	12%	28%
Tajikistan	89%	21%
Thailand	16%	20%
Timor-Leste	6%	28%
Tonga	27%	28%
Törkiye	17%	20%
Uzbekistan	3%	8%
Vanuatu	34%	34%
Viet Nam	15%	20%
Yemen	20%	20%
EU Europe	**-**	**-**
High	**-**	**-**
Austria	11%	25%
Belgium	18%	34%
Croatia	3%	20%
Czech Republic	17%	19%

Table A.1 continued from previous page

Region/Jurisdiction	ETR	STR
Denmark	12%	22%
Estonia	11%	20%
Finland	11%	20%
France	18%	33%
Germany	13%	30%
Greece	18%	29%
Italy	15%	24%
Latvia	7%	15%
Lithuania	15%	15%
Poland	17%	19%
Portugal	15%	21%
Slovak Republic	18%	21%
Slovenia	12%	19%
Spain	11%	25%
Sweden	7%	22%
Investment hubs	**-**	**-**
Cyprus	3%	13%
Hungary	21%	9%
Ireland	8%	13%
Luxembourg	2%	27%
Malta	2%	35%
Netherlands	5%	25%
Middle - Low	**-**	**-**
Bulgaria	11%	10%
Romania	14%	16%
Latin America & Caribbean	**-**	**-**
High	**-**	**-**
Aruba	15%	25%
Curacao	0%	22%
Chile	14%	26%
Panama	8%	25%
Puerto Rico	1%	0%
Saint Kitts and Nevis	33%	33%
Trinidad and Tobago	38%	25%
United States Virgin Islands	7%	28%

Table A.1 continued from previous page

Region/Jurisdiction	ETR	STR
Uruguay	13%	25%
Investment hubs	**-**	**-**
Bahamas	0%	0%
Barbados	1%	25%
Bermuda	1%	0%
British Virgin Islands	0%	0%
Cayman Islands	0%	0%
Low	**-**	**-**
Bouvet Island	28%	28%
Middle - Low	**-**	**-**
Argentina	29%	35%
Belize	28%	28%
Bolivia	25%	25%
Brazil	17%	34%
Colombia	92%	34%
Costa Rica	12%	30%
Dominica	26%	25%
Dominican Republic	16%	27%
Ecuador	13%	22%
El Salvador	22%	30%
Guatemala	10%	25%
Guyana	45%	28%
Honduras	16%	25%
Jamaica	31%	25%
Mexico	30%	30%
Netherlands Antilles	0%	28%
Nicaragua	30%	30%
Paraguay	8%	10%
Peru	17%	30%
Suriname	36%	36%
Venezuela	8%	34%
Non-EU Europe	**-**	**-**
High	**-**	**-**
Andorra	11%	10%
Faeroe Islands	1%	20%

Table A.1 continued from previous page

Region/Jurisdiction	ETR	STR
Greenland	6%	20%
Iceland	14%	20%
Liechtenstein	7%	13%
Monaco	12%	33%
Norway	19%	24%
United Kingdom	6%	19%
Investment hubs	**-**	**-**
Gibraltar	10%	10%
Guernsey	1%	0%
Isle of Man	1%	0%
Jersey	1%	20%
Switzerland	7%	18%
Middle - Low	**-**	**-**
Albania	15%	15%
Belarus	19%	18%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	8%	10%
Georgia	15%	15%
Kosovo	25%	10%
Moldova	2%	12%
Montenegro	11%	9%
North Macedonia	13%	10%
Russia	23%	20%
Serbia	8%	15%
Ukraine	12%	18%
North America	**-**	**-**
High	**-**	**-**
Canada	9%	27%
United States	16%	40%
Oceania	**-**	**-**
High	**-**	**-**
Australia	15%	30%
Guam	5%	28%
New Caledonia	12%	28%
New Zealand	20%	28%
Northern Mariana Islands	21%	21%

Table A.1 continued from previous page

Region/Jurisdiction	ETR	STR
Palau	28%	28%
Investment hubs	**-**	**-**
Marshall Islands	28%	28%
Middle - Low	**-**	**-**
American Samoa	9%	28%
Fiji	19%	20%
Micronesia	12%	28%
Papua New Guinea	9%	30%
Samoa	16%	27%
Solomon Islands	7%	30%

Appendix B

Tax revenue gains

Table B.1: Tax revenue gains in Africa (USD mil.)

Region/Jurisdiction	Status Quo	GloBE	METR	DEFICIT
Africa	**10 275**	**12 335**	**12 625**	**12 083**
High - Middle	**8 391**	**10 333**	**10 417**	**10 199**
Angola	868	872	944	868
Botswana	46	51	56	46
Cabo Verde	2	2	2	2
Cameroon	4	5	9	4
Congo	34	35	34	34
Cote d'Ivoire	146	147	154	146
Equatorial Guinea	8	8	9	8
Eswatini	18	20	22	18
Gabon	21	22	23	21
Ghana	103	121	175	103
Kenya	234	251	269	234
Lesotho	20	22	24	20
Mauritania	0	0	0	0
Namibia	72	79	94	72
Nigeria	1 778	1 794	2 027	1 778
Senegal	7	7	8	7
Seychelles	6	6	7	6
South Africa	4 847	6 706	6 352	6 655
Sudan	3	3	4	3
Zambia	95	98	111	95

Zimbabwe	76	83	93	76
Investment hubs	**252**	**324**	**328**	**252**
Liberia	0	0	2	0
Mauritius	157	222	209	157
Mozambique	95	102	117	95
Low	**257**	**265**	**294**	**257**
Benin	5	5	7	5
Burkina Faso	4	4	5	4
Burundi	0	0	0	0
CAR	1	1	1	1
DRC	14	14	16	14
Ethiopia	35	35	38	35
Gambia	0	0	0	0
Guinea	41	42	44	41
Guinea-Bissau	0	0	0	0
Chad	1	1	2	1
Madagascar	2	2	2	2
Malawi	25	25	27	25
Mali	7	7	8	7
Niger	1	1	1	1
Réunion	5	5	5	5
Rwanda	2	2	2	2
Sierra Leone	0	0	0	0
Somalia	1	1	2	1
South Sudan	0	0	0	0
Tanzania	87	90	100	87
Togo	3	4	4	3
Uganda	23	25	31	23
Middle - Low	**1 375**	**1 413**	**1 586**	**1 375**
Algeria	289	292	301	289
Egypt	620	636	718	620
Libya	0	0	0	0
Maldives	5	5	5	5
Morocco	448	462	539	448
Tunisia	13	17	23	13

Table B.2: Tax revenue gains in Aggeragated groups (USD mil.)

Region/Jurisdiction	Status Quo	GloBE	METR	DEFICIT
Aggregate	**94 285**	**110 065**	**112 967**	**94 285**
Aggregate	**94 285**	**110 065**	**112 967**	**94 285**
Africa	2 773	3 314	3 530	2 773
America (Continent)	10 695	13 120	14 120	10 695
Asia	18 475	21 134	21 237	18 475
Europe	11 904	15 476	15 950	11 904
Foreign Jurisdictions	32 426	36 783	32 426	32 426
Other Africa	4 833	5 231	5 987	4 833
Other Americas	3 191	3 728	5 497	3 191
Other Asia	3 850	4 522	6 013	3 850
Other Europe	6 119	6 738	8 188	6 119
Other Groups	19	20	20	19

Table B.3: Tax revenue gains in Asia (USD mil.)

Region/Jurisdiction	Status Quo	GloBE	METR	DEFICIT
Asia	**345 719**	**384 236**	**391 955**	**382 869**
High	**128 330**	**137 610**	**140 076**	**133 797**
Bahrain	7	9	7	7
Brunei Darussalam	0	0	1	0
French Polynesia	1	1	1	1
Chinese Taipei	1 580	1 672	1 918	1 580
Israel	918	938	1 084	918
Japan	93 847	99 637	103 662	99 315
Korea	24 766	27 971	25 316	24 766
Kuwait	1	2	4	1
Macau, China	201	215	215	201
Oman	203	204	221	203
Qatar	204	210	223	204
Saudi Arabia	488	526	603	488
United Arab Emirates	6 114	6 225	6 821	6 114
Investment hubs	**12 064**	**26 326**	**21 549**	**35 735**
Hong Kong, China	5 622	6 479	6 923	5 622
Singapore	6 442	19 847	14 626	30 113

Middle - Low	**205 325**	**220 301**	**230 329**	**213 336**
Afghanistan	0	0	0	0
Armenia	0	0	0	0
Azerbaijan	60	60	61	60
Bangladesh	245	248	264	245
Bhutan	3	3	3	3
BIOT	0	0	0	0
Cambodia	63	64	68	63
DKPR	5	5	5	5
China	147 648	157 729	163 356	153 831
India	30 714	31 731	34 162	31 351
Indonesia	9 226	10 851	11 279	9 273
Iran	38	38	39	38
Iraq	4	4	4	4
Jordan	6	6	6	6
Kazakhstan	895	1 014	1 127	895
Lao	12	12	14	12
Lebanon	18	19	20	18
Malaysia	7 876	9 370	9 545	9 020
Mongolia	17	17	17	17
Myanmar	99	100	107	99
Nepal	40	40	41	40
Pakistan	793	834	885	793
Philippines	1 262	1 435	1 968	1 262
Sri Lanka	58	62	68	58
Tajikistan	1	1	1	1
Thailand	3 964	4 127	4 506	3 964
Timor-Leste	0	0	0	0
Tonga	0	0	0	0
Türkiye	1 419	1 532	1 686	1 419
Uzbekistan	0	0	0	0
Vanuatu	1	1	1	1
Viet Nam	857	994	1 092	857
Yemen	2	3	3	2

Table B.4: Tax revenue gains in the EU (USD mil.)

Region/Jurisdiction	Status Quo	GloBE	METR	DEFICIT
EU Europe	**124 707**	**168 563**	**172 359**	**177 976**
High	**106 158**	**144 149**	**148 464**	**149 655**
Austria	1 662	2 395	2 108	2 472
Belgium	6 162	19 436	17 906	18 769
Croatia	29	43	61	29
Czech Republic	1 577	1 716	1 897	1 577
Denmark	4 673	5 587	5 258	6 630
Estonia	13	16	19	13
Finland	2 382	2 970	2 522	3 065
France	25 436	31 595	33 409	28 357
Germany	34 001	43 121	45 801	44 386
Greece	746	1 009	2 107	2 764
Italy	11 398	13 165	13 929	12 760
Latvia	8	13	13	8
Lithuania	48	53	60	48
Poland	2 155	2 385	2 855	2 155
Portugal	618	673	760	618
Slovak Republic	598	642	741	598
Slovenia	119	143	150	136
Spain	8 992	11 029	11 742	12 304
Sweden	5 542	8 157	7 126	12 969
Investment hubs	**17 674**	**23 440**	**22 792**	**27 440**
Cyprus	59	64	64	59
Hungary	1 736	1 806	1 840	1 736
Ireland	5 677	8 179	6 185	7 203
Luxembourg	1 700	2 187	3 839	5 855
Malta	124	130	143	124
Netherlands	8 378	11 073	10 720	12 464
Middle - Low	**876**	**974**	**1 104**	**882**
Bulgaria	109	128	135	109
Romania	767	846	969	773

Table B.5: Tax revenue gains in non-EU countries (USD mil.)

Region/Jurisdiction	Status Quo	GloBE	METR	DEFICIT
Non-EU Europe	**50 978**	**65 290**	**64 063**	**82 533**
High	**37 558**	**47 586**	**47 090**	**61 167**
Andorra	1	1	1	1
Faeroe Islands	0	0	0	0
Greenland	1	2	2	1
Iceland	12	12	18	12
Liechtenstein	5	12	9	5
Monaco	9	9	10	9
Norway	10 564	11 186	11 065	10 782
United Kingdom	26 965	36 364	35 984	50 356
Investment hubs	**9 375**	**13 132**	**12 027**	**17 322**
Gibraltar	4	4	4	4
Guernsey	3	5	3	3
Isle of Man	3	23	3	92
Jersey	118	145	160	118
Switzerland	9 247	12 954	11 856	17 105
Middle - Low	**4 044**	**4 573**	**4 946**	**4 044**
Albania	3	3	3	3
Belarus	23	23	24	23
Bosnia & Herzegovina	6	8	8	6
Georgia	11	11	12	11
Kosovo	-	-	-	-
Moldova	0	0	0	0
Montenegro	2	2	2	2
North Macedonia	7	9	8	7
Russia	3 771	4 231	4 566	3 771
Serbia	59	70	83	59
Ukraine	163	215	240	163

Table B.6: Tax revenue gains in Latin America (USD mil.)

Region/Jurisdiction	Status Quo	GloBE	METR	DEFICIT
Latin America & C.	**56 944**	**60 938**	**68 931**	**61 074**
High	**3 337**	**3 533**	**4 000**	**3 342**
Aruba	1	1	1	1
Curacao	3	3	4	3
Chile	2 212	2 365	2 726	2 217
Panama	194	221	285	194
Puerto Rico	515	519	515	515
Saint Kitts and Nevis	0	0	0	0
Trinidad and Tobago	199	199	212	199
US Virgin Islands	4	4	9	4
Uruguay	208	221	249	208
Investment hubs	**1 183**	**1 565**	**1 184**	**3 445**
Bahamas	0	0	0	0
Barbados	1	2	2	1
Bermuda	941	1 218	941	3 203
British Virgin Islands	38	128	38	38
Cayman Islands	203	216	203	203
Low	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**
Bouvet Island	1	1	1	1
Middle - Low	**52 424**	**55 841**	**63 746**	**54 287**
Argentina	5 056	5 194	5 686	5 063
Belize	1	1	1	1
Bolivia	190	193	201	190
Brazil	21 906	23 507	27 310	23 320
Colombia	4 186	4 252	4 530	4 186
Costa Rica	216	222	345	216
Dominica	0	0	0	0
Dominican Republic	198	203	251	198
Ecuador	236	250	347	236
El Salvador	100	101	142	100
Guatemala	120	133	180	120
Guyana	3	3	3	3
Honduras	54	55	91	54
Jamaica	30	36	45	30

Mexico	17 492	18 188	21 479	17 830
Netherlands Antilles	4	4	12	4
Nicaragua	57	57	60	57
Paraguay	25	26	28	25
Peru	2 505	3 364	2 955	2 608
Suriname	0	0	0	0
Venezuela	46	55	79	46

Table B.7: Tax revenue gains in North America (USD mil.)

Region/Jurisdiction	**Status Quo**	**GloBE**	**METR**	**DEFICIT**
North America	**268 988**	**346 045**	**428 360**	**353 484**
High	**268 988**	**346 045**	**428 360**	**353 484**
Canada	23 117	30 959	33 756	40 556
United States	245 871	315 086	394 604	312 928

Table B.8: Tax revenue gains in Oceania (USD mil.)

Region/Jurisdiction	**Status Quo**	**GloBE**	**METR**	**DEFICIT**
Oceania	**25 199**	**27 889**	**31 064**	**26 636**
High	**25 026**	**27 714**	**30 846**	**26 463**
Australia	23 012	25 583	28 496	24 449
Guam	1	1	1	1
New Caledonia	3	3	4	3
New Zealand	2 007	2 125	2 343	2 007
Northern Mariana Is.	0	0	0	0
Palau	2	2	2	2
Investment hubs	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**
Marshall Islands	1	1	1	1
Middle - Low	**173**	**174**	**216**	**173**
American Samoa	2	2	2	2
Fiji	21	21	22	21
Micronesia	41	41	41	41
Papua New Guinea	108	109	150	108
Samoa	0	0	0	0
Solomon Islands	0	0	0	0