



**“The UN, Peacekeeping, and the Troubled
Concept of Intelligence: A Comparative
Case Study on the UN Understanding of
Intelligence”**

July 2022

Glasgow Student N° 2573292

DCU Student N° 20109571

Charles Student N° 71243904

**Presented in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree
of
International Master in Security, Intelligence and Strategic Studies**

Word Count: 21,120

Supervisor: Berg, Julie

Submission Date: 26 July 2022



CHARLES UNIVERSITY

Abstract

When then UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld expressed his desire to ensure the UN would refrain from any intelligence, few questioned his words. Having been founded upon the wishes to make something right in a world haunted by the millions that perished in conflict not long before, the idea of the UN engaging in intelligence was not acceptable to an organisation that stood for the rights of all people instead of the interests of the few. But the world is changing and conflicts are becoming ever more complex. The UN cannot afford to ignore the concept, something the organisation realised after the horrors of the 90s. The genocides and famine of the early post-Cold War era have opened the floor for a strong discussion on intelligence. Using a generic peacekeeping missions of each of the three different peacekeeping generations - UNPROFOR, MINUSTAH, and MINUSMA – this thesis examines how the understanding of intelligence as a concept has transformed at the UN. It examines key policy documents on conflicting state and UN interests; looks at differences between the strategic and operational level; and researches the key methods used by the UN during peacekeeping missions. This research argues that the UN has developed its own understanding of intelligence in a parallel way to that of intelligence agencies. Its unique experiences with peacekeeping missions have required it to develop a concept that is overt and reliant on technology. But while this unique understanding of intelligence has been developed, it is still too early to speak of a UN intelligence culture, of which development is still hampered by endemic barriers like cultural and national differences.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisor Julie Berg who provided valuable feedback on this work. While my internship posed some barriers to our meetings, she went above and beyond to meet guide me outside her office hours for which I cannot thank her enough. I would also like to express my gratitude to LtCol Youssouf Diallo of the Marshall Center who provided valuable insights into the Sahel region.

Lastly, I would like to thank Riccardo Sietsma and Sven Maaskant of the Netherlands Institute for Military History (NIMH) for their invaluable help in locating and retrieving material related to the Dutchbat operations during UNPROFOR. I also want to take this last opportunity to thank Sven Rietjens of the Royal Netherlands Defence Academy who shared with me some of his work on his extensive fieldwork in Mali during operation MINUSMA as an army officer.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements	3
Introduction	5
Aim and Scope of the Thesis	7
Relevance of the Study	8
Purposes of Intelligence and its Usefulness	9
Chapter Outline	10
<i>Making sense of Intelligence and Peacekeeping</i>	12
Chapter 1: Literature Review	13
1.1 Intelligence as a Subject of Study	13
1.2 First and Second-Generation Peacekeeping Intelligence	17
1.3 Third Generation Peacekeeping Intelligence	22
Chapter 2: Design and Methodology	26
2.1 Epistemology and Ontology.....	26
2.2 Research Design.....	29
<i>The UN and Peacekeeping Intelligence in Action</i>	35
Chapter 3: The United Nations Protection Force – Bosnia Herzegovina 1992-1995	36
General Background: Yugoslavia Descending into War	36
The UN Security Council and Peacekeeping Mandates.....	37
UN Intelligence during UNPROFOR	39
Conclusion	43
Chapter 4: MINUSTAH in Haiti 2004-2017	44
General Background: From the Duvalier Dynasty to Aristide and Beyond.....	44
The UN Security Council and Resolution 1542.....	45
UN Intelligence during MINUSTAH: The Introduction of JMAC.....	46
Conclusion	50
Chapter 5 MINUSMA: the ASIFU and Intelligence-sharing	51
General Background: Mali, a Coup d'état and Ethnic Division.....	51
The UN Security Council and Resolution 2100.....	52
UN Intelligence during MINUSMA: The Rise and Fall of ASIFU	54
Conclusion	59
<i>The Road Forward</i>	60
Conclusion	61
UNPROFOR	62
MINUSTAH	63
MINUSMA	64
Rise of a New Definition or Concept.....	64
Convergences and Divergences in UN intelligence	66
References	68
Glossary of Abbreviations and Acronyms	87

Introduction

On 18 March this year, Poland prompted a lot of debate when it proposed sending a peacekeeping force to Ukraine after the Russian invasion earlier this year (Charlish and Pawlak, 2022). Yet, a report by UN director of the International Crisis Group Richard Gowan quickly concluded that any attempt of deploying peacekeeping troops, by the UN, NATO, or any other organisation, would be futile. As his report mentions, deploying peacekeepers to this conflict would likely require support from not only Ukraine but also from Russia, which agrees on the diplomatic stage that the conflict needs a quick solution but rejects any viable attempt to solve the issue (Gowan, 2022). This problem of consent is only one of the problems the Security Council has been facing since its inception. Regardless, the war in Ukraine has certainly thrust the role of international organisations like the UN back into the limelight of the discourse in Europe and beyond. Politicians and the general public are discussing the role of the European and international community in the conflict, and once again many highlight the failure of international diplomacy (Chemillier-Gendreau, 2022). In particular, many point fingers at the current structure of the Council. With the United States, Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom having the right to veto proposals, the Security Council is toothless when one of the major powers has vested interests in the conflict. The Russian aggression in Ukraine served as a perfect example of this when Russia vetoed a draft resolution denouncing the invasion and calling for action (Taylor and Rupert, 2022; UN, 2022).

And while the UN is a large organization with many departments that all have faced criticism to some extent, the Department of Peace Operations has probably bore the brunt of all criticism as its peacekeepers, its renowned blue helmets, have been deployed to all corners of the world. Much of this criticism on its peacekeeping arm stems from several notorious cases. Having been involved in many of the world's conflicts, the peacekeeping department has seen considerable success in reducing violence and prevention of conflict and simultaneously the expansion of human rights across the globe (Di Salvatore

and Ruggeri, 2017: 6). Yet, the blue helmets have also been deployed to war zones where they have been unable to prevent atrocities or have been sent to conflicts that have turned into long-lasting stalemates. The 1990s saw widespread human rights abuses and genocide in Rwanda and the Balkans, and civil war in Somalia where the UN's UNOSOM mission were unable to secure an effective ceasefire or protect aid convoys (Uvin, 2001: 87; Jan, 1998: 75). Today, UN peacekeepers are still involved in 12 active conflicts and only recently its mission in Mali was branded the deadliest UN mission (UN, 2022a; Goldberg, 2019). Besides the mission in Mali, missions in the Congo and the Sudan remain challenging and see fatalities among UN personnel. Only recently, French forces withdrew from Mali and the Malian population has criticised the UN mission for failing to prevent terrorism and human rights violations by the armed forces and mercenaries (Van der Lijn, 2019; Roger and Diallo, 2022). While the failure to achieve the objectives of its mandate, one of the oft-heard reasons that UN missions like this fail is a lack of intelligence (Cammaert, 2003: 13).

When the UN was founded in 1945, its founding charter emphasised neutrality and impartiality in conflict and equality for all nations. Article 2 states: "The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members" and "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state" (UN Charter). Intelligence gathering by peacekeepers without the knowledge of the parties involved was considered to violate the territorial sovereignty and therefore unacceptable. Generally, the gathering and use of intelligence has been considered the prerogative of nation-states that have national interests and not a prerogative of the UN which was tasked with serving the interests of humanity despite national interests (Chesterman, 2006: 151). Dag Hammarskjöld, second Secretary-General of the UN and arguably the person that shaped the organisation during its formative years, was clear about intelligence: while the lack of intelligence was regrettable, for the UN it was vital to have "clean hands" (Jeffreys-Jones, 213: 180). During the tumultuous 90s, then UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali stated "the UN has no intelligence" (Salton, 2017: 149).

While the fear for intelligence is understandable given the UN's unenviable task to mediate in conflict situations and be seen as impartial, this lack of intelligence has impacted the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations (Smith, 2003: 230). And while the UN could survive with make do solutions in its founding years, the ever more complex missions the UN is facing the last decade or so no longer allow these ad hoc practices, even identified in its own report (UN, 2017: 14). Since the peacekeeping failures in the 90s, discourse in the corridors of the UN have shifted towards a stronger intelligence capability, even though many seasoned officials only whisper the word or prefer to avoid it altogether. But where earlier official UN policy documents consistently referred to 'information' when talking about intelligence, since the turn of the millennium intelligence has become more common in official UN parlance and has even been the subject of some UN research (Nordlie and Morten, 2017: 7; UN: 2015; UN: 2021). In 2006, the UN established a dedicated intelligence unit to be used during missions and during its mission in Mali the UN also trialled a new unit that integrated civilian and military personnel and some highly skilled intelligence officers from various nations and with a variety of skills like OSINT (Kalsrud and Smith, 2015: 3; Chido, 2018: 26). These changes have led to some interesting discussions on the differences of UN intelligence as opposed to intelligence produced by nation-states, a discussion which will be researched further in this paper.

Aim and Scope of the Thesis

This thesis will aim to provide an overview of the evolution of 'intelligence' by using the UN as a case study. Intelligence is a hotly contested concept and while ancient practice, relatively new in academia as a topic of research as modern intelligence agencies were mainly created in the 20th century. The reluctance of the UN to talk about or use intelligence has made the available literature on intelligence within this organisation even more scarce. While literature exists that deals with intelligence in specific missions, this research looks at a more theoretical level so not only to understand operational practice, but also to be able to contribute to the academic literature. The lack of relevant literature amid these changes at the UN have led to the following main research question:

'How has the concept of peacekeeping intelligence evolved over time?'

Woven throughout the research are several key objectives. This paper identifies the role of intelligence collection within the UN as an organization. This especially involves UN policy on typical national government agency's collection methods such as covert action and the use of special forces instead of traditional UN practices of OSINT and foot patrols. It also explains that there are certain endemic drivers in the organisation that impede the development of intelligence in ways that would not impede development and improvement of intelligence assessments at a national level. Part of this objective is to use the case studies to show intelligence failures but also successes in several instances during these missions. Finally, the thesis will provide insight on the workings of UN intelligence in two intelligence mechanisms that have been developed based on experiences in previous peacekeeping missions. From this objective, the paper will present connections between the concept of state interests and supranational intelligence collection.

Relevance of the Study

Intelligence matters. As the common saying goes, "knowledge is power." For the UN this is not less so. Having information about the operating environment allows the UN to create a better picture for its peacekeeping forces and deploy forces to where needed (U.S. Government, 2014: IV-7). Some of the common purposes of intelligence might not necessarily be of any use to the UN, as it has other interests than nation states. Yet, despite the likely common understanding that having knowledge about a situation during a peacekeeping mission is preferential, the UN has a fraught relationship with having this knowledge. The focus of this thesis, namely when is knowledge and what is intelligence, and why does intelligence matter to the UN, can provide a stepping stone to more research as it contributes to and encourages exploration of a controversial topic that is largely shunned but should maybe be seen as a necessary evil. What this thesis also attempts is to break with what seems like a strict discipline on what constitutes intelligence. As the literature review explains, defining intelligence has thus far been a job of intelligence professionals and academics often linked

to the intelligence community or the armed forces, notably within the Anglo-Saxon sphere of influence (Gill, 2020: 48). Discussing intelligence using the UN as a case study could strengthen an opportunity to diversify the literature using an institution that is more approachable to academics from across the globe compared to studies looking into the US or the UK. The study also tries to highlight the argument that intelligence is a fluid concept and subject to transformations in intelligence practices and new inventions. The traditional static concept and rigidity of academia and professionals attempting to delineate the concept has forced intelligence customers to adopt the basics of this rigid concept without questioning if other approaches would suit it better. If the UN had questioned the conceptual framework of intelligence much earlier instead of resisting the status quo it might have prevented or at least lessened some of the problems that came onto its path during its peacekeeping missions.

Purposes of Intelligence and its Usefulness

Intelligence assessments produced by national agencies generally serve three purposes. First, intelligence improves situational awareness. It provides an overview of the different factors of any given situation and gives meaning to certain changes to specific factors in that overview (Omand, 2014: 24). Secondly, intelligence explains why certain events happen. Multiple pieces of information that might not make sense on their own can together create a picture explaining why an adversary took a certain course of action. Thirdly, intelligence serves to predict courses of action in the future, in what is called the predictive analysis (Omand, 2014: 24 and 25). Especially the last purpose, prediction, creates situations where states often gather intelligence by covert means. While open-source intelligence (OSINT) might be able to create a broader picture of the political and economic situation in a country or region, explaining or predicting specific events often requires more detailed information that can only be gathered from human intelligence (HUMINT) or other covert means (Omand, 2014: 5-7). While for many countries the prediction and explanatory function of intelligence seems to take priority over situational awareness, for the UN this has been the opposite. Major agencies like the CIA in the United States and the SIS in the United Kingdom have a

clear mandate to proactively gather intelligence to prevent future attacks. According to its mission statement, the main focus of the CIA is “to pre-empt threats and further U.S. national security objectives” while the SIS has three core goals: “stopping terrorism, disrupting the activity of hostile states, and giving the UK a cyber advantage” (CIA, 2022; SIS, 2022). This shows the active or rather aggressive nature of intelligence collection at these agencies. The UN, on the other hand, has a wider range of activities that include the protection of civilian populations and advancement of human rights (UN, 2008, 23; Peter, 2015: 351 and 355). This wide range of activities gives preference to situational assessments over predictive analysis. The aggressive nature of states’ intelligence, however, has seen the UN shying away from intelligence in its early days and developing its use and understanding of intelligence rather differently today. The following chapters will examine the evolution of intelligence thinking and practices at the UN.

Chapter Outline

Following this introduction is a literature review that will identify already existing literature on the theory of intelligence as well as peacekeeping intelligence. It will briefly explain the history of academic research in the intelligence field and the link between academia and professionals from the intelligence community, professions which are considerably intertwined. Understandably all early research focused on state intelligence as state agencies where arguably the only institutions where intelligence was produced at a large scale. It will look at attempts to define intelligence and historical general approaches to intelligence studies. From the literature, the paper will take one useful tool to serve throughout the paper: the intelligence cycle. The literature review will serve to briefly explain the intelligence cycle that has been developed and used by several agencies across the globe (U.S. Government, 2011: 10). It will then delve deeper into literature on the use of intelligence by the UN and the different generations of peacekeeping and peacekeeping intelligence. This will give a clearer view on what is out there and what is missing.

The methodology section that follows explains the research design and methodology of this paper. The choice for this design, a multiple case study design, allows for an analysis of three cases. The section ‘The UN and Peacekeeping Intelligence in Action’ contains three chapters that each discuss a different case study. To offer the reader an insight into the findings of the research but also provide a necessary background on the several case studies, this thesis will address each case study in a separate chapter to allow for each case study to be introduced thoroughly. The history and experiences gained during each peacekeeping mission contribute to the evolution of peacekeeping intelligence and its importance should not be understated. Each case study chapter is subdivided into three parts: an introductory section that explains the geographical and historical background of the conflict and common UN practices at the time; a second section that researches the collection and analysis part of the intelligence cycle during the mission, and a third section that looks at the dissemination and subsequent guidance that precedes and follows the mission and is circularly linked to the collection and analysis practices.

The first chapter of the section ‘The UN and Peacekeeping Intelligence in Action’ will look at first generation peacekeeping and intelligence in action during the UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia Herzegovina in the 1990s. It uses UN policy documents, Dutchbat reports and secondary sources to show the improvised solutions used during the peacekeeping deployment. It is followed by chapter 4 on the MINUSTAH mission that shows the creation of a new intelligence mechanism. Chapter 5 examines the current MINUSMA mission in Mali and elaborates on the experiences from the intelligence mechanism created during MINUSTAH and subsequent action by the UN. The last section, ‘The Road Forward’ first summarises the data shown in all three case study chapters and ends with the conclusion and an outlook on the future.

Making sense of Intelligence and Peacekeeping

Chapter 1: Literature Review

The collection of intelligence by spies is often said to be the second oldest job in the world after another controversial occupation, namely prostitution (Burds, 2011: 6). Intelligence gathering is a profession practiced since Biblical times and, while intelligence methods change, its use today is as necessary as it was in the days of the Egyptians and of Moses and the Twelve Spies. But while intelligence has been used since ancient times, the study in academic circles of intelligence and its application has been largely confined to the post-World War II period (Gill and Phythian, 2016: 6 and 8). By no means does the world lack historical works on intelligence, nor is there a shortage of works on espionage techniques. Intelligence features heavily in works by ancient strategists like Sun Tzu who wrote the 5th century BC ‘Art of War’ and the 3rd century BC Indian strategist Kautilya who wrote the ‘Arthashastra’ on statecraft and intelligence. Other, more recent, works include the work ‘On War’ by the 18th century Prussian general Von Clausewitz and several works by the famous ‘Lawrence of Arabia.’ Despite the vast number of historical monographs, intelligence has not received scholarly attention of a noteworthy amount until World War II when Western – predominantly American – scholars started to research ways to optimize the collection and analysis of intelligence gathered in the fight against the Nazis and the Soviets (for instance, in 1949 both Kent and Kendall debated the optimal amount of politicisation in intelligence to improve CIA intelligence). With the establishment of the CIA, the restructuring of British intelligence into MI5 and MI6 and the fight against the Soviet threat by other Western European intelligence agencies, Western governments started to invest in and recruit from academia which led to the rise in security and intelligence studies and subsequent research into intelligence (Cumings, 1997: 8). This early scholarly debate focused heavily on improving intelligence with the ultimate goal of supporting national interests (Price, 2011: 350).

1.1 Intelligence as a Subject of Study

Despite decades of scholarly debate since 1945, neither the intelligence nor the academic community have come up with a delineated definition of intelligence.

Until this very day, all intelligence agencies and academics rely on their own interpretation of the concept. A CIA study guide defines intelligence as “the collecting and processing of that information about foreign countries and their agents by a government for its foreign policy and for national security [...]” (Bimfort, 1958: 77). In the broader US intelligence community, intelligence is synonymous with ‘situational awareness’, or the “knowledge and foreknowledge of the world around us” with informing policymakers as a goal (Johnson, 2007: 1 and 5). Avoiding the whole process of collecting and analysing information, which is mentioned in the CIA guide, the Merriam-Webster dictionary defines ‘intelligence’ as “information concerning an enemy or possible enemy or an area” (Merriam-Webster, n.d.). Another range of authors, especially found in academia, is hostile to the idea of defining intelligence as information from the get-go, and instead refer to this as knowledge or information until all raw information has been analysed and made into a report (see, for instance, Warner, 2002, who believes that intelligence equals not only information but also the organisational process of collection and dissemination; and Lowenthal who argues in his 2012 work that intelligence requires guidance from policy makers). Before information has been turned into a report, they argue, it should not be called intelligence (George and Bruce, 2014: 137). Definitions are infinite and varied but many seem to have in common a shared understanding that there is a requirement of some level of secrecy needed given the fact that they are information about an enemy. A second common denominator present in many descriptions is the end-goal of intelligence, namely the advancement of national security interests. Intelligence is considered the prime product to influence political decision-making and brief consumers on what they want to know. This way, it serves a national purpose (Herman, 1996: 137).

The lack of a clear definition as well as a lack of a boundary between those that gather and analyse intelligence (commonly called a ‘producer’), and especially a lack of research into these debates make intelligence the “least understood, and most ‘undertheorized’ area of international relations” (Scott and Jackson, 2004: 141). While intelligence theory has become more commonplace at US and UK universities as a field of study, it remains undertheorized on the

European continent (Gill, 2020: 48). The ever more interconnected world and the arrival of IT has also brought new types of intelligence that require more theories. Intelligence will likely remain an undertheorized field given these new developments. In general, however, intelligence theory can be divided into three angles which most researchers of intelligence follow when researching the topic. Scott and Jackson summarize these angles clearly: the first approach focuses on the issue of politicization and examines the relationship between those who use intelligence (primarily politicians and military, but increasingly also NGOs) and those who produce intelligence. Likely the most famous example of this is the aforementioned Kent-Kendall debate of the 1940s, where Sherman Kent argued that intelligence officials should stay clear of any real interaction with politicians and decision-makers as they might be influenced and risk delivering information that would be cherry-picked to satisfy the needs of the decision-makers (Davis, 1992: 93). Vital intelligence might be overlooked in favour of intelligence that would please the politicians. On the other hand, Kendall rebuked Kent's assertions and advocated closer cooperation with decision-makers as it could improve US policy in a more efficient way (Davis, 1992: 95). This debate is at the heart of intelligence theory.

The second, more recent, approach analyses failures and successes of the different aspects of the intelligence cycle, ranging from planning/direction to dissemination. While every agency has its own intelligence cycle, one commonly used and referenced is the example of the Office of the National Director of Intelligence in the US, the overarching body that unites all US intelligence agencies (U.S. Government, 2011: 10). First, the Intelligence Community establishes what information requirements the US government has and how it can best gather this information. The second step involves gathering information from a range of sources which includes, amongst others, Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT), and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). Steps three and four involve transforming raw data like foreign language texts into legible data and analysing it. It is then made into a report and delivered to the client, which can be the government, the military, or an organization like the UN. Finally, the producer receives feedback on his report, which concludes the cycle which helps to improve assessing the

requirements judged in step one. This second approach can examine any failures and successes during any of those stages (Scott and Jackson, 2004: 143). Examples of this are, for instance, the analysis of what went wrong in the intelligence community in the lead up to the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center on 9/11 or more recently questions surrounding the failures of Western intelligence agencies to predict the quick Taliban takeover of Afghanistan (for instance, Marrin, 2011; Borch, 2003; and Santucci, 2022). Much research has gone into the 9/11 attack, both from a practitioner’s point of view with several reports (U.S. Government, 2004; U.S. Government, 2005) as well as academic research (Kamarck, 2021; McBride, 2022). To aid comprehension, picture 1 shows the Intelligence Cycle as understood by the UN.




Fig. 1 UN Peacekeeping Intelligence Cycle¹

The third approach researches the interaction between intelligence and oppression in a society (Scott and Jackson, 2004: 141). Within this approach, one can find a multitude of different approaches with regards to theoretical frameworks. For instance, several authors favour organisational theory (see Blas, 2009; Wilcox, 2007) but also common is the use of critical theory engaging with ‘settler-colonialism’ in the case of Israel and Palestine (Lentin, 2016). This approach has seen a surge in academic interest with the rise of IT and social media. The internet has offered autocratic regimes more means to

¹ Source: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Field Support Ref. 2017.07 Policy

surveil its society and use disinformation to counter protests and oppress political oppositions and human rights activists (Qiang, 2019). Some authors combine aspects of these approaches. With the terrorist attacks on 9/11, all focus from the Bush administration went into finding those responsible and convincing the American public that the administration had it under control. The Bush administration influenced the independence of the intelligence agencies with strong guidance as to what and who to focus on and by cherry-picking evidence presented to them by the agencies, ultimately justifying the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Hastedt, 2013: 26). Not only does this research the role of the US President in steering the intelligence process, but it can also examine the impact failures have had on post-9/11 society (consider Richard's 2012 article on intelligence and surveillance in liberal democracy, and Bauman *et al* 2015 article on mass surveillance in the post-Snowden era which both describe the unintended consequences of modern intelligence technologies on humans).

While intelligence theory is becoming more popular and more varied, one can notice an absence of overarching intelligence theory related to peacekeeping, notably with a focus on recent missions. Academic research into UN peacekeeping intelligence has only gathered widespread traction in recent years as the UN did not recruit scholars to study intelligence for the organization, and the attitude of the UN towards intelligence, one of shying away from developing significant intelligence capabilities, leaves little to research for those in academia. Peacekeeping intelligence research has focused mainly on the failures of single case studies. Notable in this regard are several case studies on the peacekeeping mission in the Balkans and studies on the genocide in Rwanda (Ahmad, 1998; Malcolm, 1995; Uvin; 1997; Barnett, 1997). A larger, more comprehensive yet outdated work is Kiani's research. Her work researched UN peacekeeping intelligence and identified three generations of peacekeeping intelligence on which this paper builds and which are outlined below (2004).

1.2 First and Second-Generation Peacekeeping Intelligence

The UN was founded in 1945 with three key purposes in mind: to prevent further conflict; to improve human security; and to promote human rights (Nadin, 2019:

12). It faced its first challenges with a variety of missions. Its first major task was the authorization of the deployment of forces to repel the invasion of South Korea by the forces of Kim Il-Sung of North Korea (Naidu, 1995: 3 and 6; Goodrich, 1953: 92 and 95). A few years later, in 1956, the first mission was established that can be considered the predecessor of the modern peacekeeping mission: United Nations Emergency Force (Cohen, 1967: 23). With Israel and Palestine having been partitioned after the end of the British Mandate, violence had erupted between Arab and Jewish forces over control of the former Mandate, with France and Great Britain also having vested interests in the Suez Canal that had become nationalized. After an armistice, the UN sent in UNEF to observe the peace between the warring parties (Kiani, 2004: 182). Several of the early peacekeeping missions showed that the main function of these forces was to observe the behaviour of the opposing parties and mediate where necessary in order to preserve law and order and improve the lives of the population (Kenkel, 2013: 125). The UN sent peacekeeping forces to Cyprus, the Levant (several missions to observe the withdrawal of Arab and Israeli forces after the Yom Kippur War), and to India and Pakistan after wars over Kashmir. All these missions saw lightly armed UN peacekeeping forces patrolling and reporting on the behaviour of both parties and the progress made, but no armed intervention was conducted. Of all missions at that time, the only UN mission that was not purely observing and mediating was the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) between 1960 and 1964 (Kiani, 2004: 183). Peacekeeping forces became engaged in combat when several actors in the conflict systematically attacked the civilian population and the UN had a duty to protect the population and the functioning of the country, in line with their key purposes (Kiani, 2004: 184; Power, 2013: 123).

Until the 1990s, the UN was relatively well-equipped to deal with the tasks at hand. While the changing nature of several of its missions in the '70s and '80s had led to criticism of several high-ranking figures, the UN maintained its role as a respected institution in peacekeeping, both in conflict and in normative sense (Goodwin, 1958: 27; Young, 1968: 906). The '80s had shown that the UN was well-equipped with the majority of conflicts that it had seen until the late '70s, mainly interstate conflict and conflict between large parties that required

mediation to settle a conflict (Boutros-Ghali, 1996: 19). However, in the '80s more complex conflicts also started to emerge. Civil wars in Latin America required more than just observer warring parties. The overthrow of dictatorial regimes in Africa required the observance of political rights, the rebuilding of society and maintaining law and order between large masses that had no economic possessions and those few that were wealthy and had enjoyed much power under the regimes (MacQueen, 2014: 22 and 32). In the late 1980s, the United Nations was involved with its mission UNTAG in Namibia where it was tasked with overseeing the transition of Namibia as a part of South Africa to an independent and democratic state (Howard, 2002: 99 and 110). A traditional ceasefire-enforcing mission in El Salvador was combined with disarmament attempts in order to reintegrate rebels into society (Rubio Reyes, 2000: 17 and 21). While purely in a non-combat function, the UN was responsible for disarmament of several armed groups and did so with considerable success (Wood, 2005: 189). Notwithstanding the success, these missions showed, however, that the UN would require more tools to face what was ahead. The 1990s ushered in a new chapter for UN peacekeeping, one that was an especially bloody one.

The 1990s saw several new conflicts, among which civil war in Rwanda and the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The breakup of Yugoslavia was paired with calls for independence by multiple ethnic parties spread out across the territory of Yugoslavia. The UN established the United Nations Protection Force, UNPROFOR for short (UN, 1992; UN, 1992a; UN, 1993; Rogel, 2004: 160). Initially established to ensure demilitarization and protection of civilians in newly independent Croatia that was at war with other parties over territory and recognition of independence, the mission later expanded to include large parts of the former Yugoslavia including Bosnia-Herzegovina (UN, 1996: 478). Bosnia-Herzegovina consisted of three main ethnic groups: Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Serbs, and Croats (Recchia, 2022: 3). Increased fighting over independence and territorial claims ultimately led to the creation of 'safe areas' by the UN which stood under protection of UN peacekeepers. Lack of heavy weaponry and controversial decisions ultimately led to the fall of the Srebrenica safe area in July 1995 and led to the genocide of more than 8,000 Bosnian

Muslims (Li, 2000: 36). As mentioned, before the era of missions like Srebrenica, the UN's peacekeeping department had translated peacekeeping as offering mediation and observation between warring parties as a neutral outsider party. It rejected using intelligence gathered through covert means or received from either party in order not to look to be favouring one of the warring parties (Salton, 2017: 149). While previously the majority of intelligence required was all about watching the parties and see if neither broke the truce, Srebrenica showed that complex missions would require more intelligence than the UN could then provide.

The connotation of intelligence with covert operations and national security leads people to associate intelligence with national intelligence agencies like the CIA and clandestine, violent methods. In the West, the aftermath of 9/11 has resulted in an association with practices of torture and extrajudicial rendition. One can think of the case of Abu Ghraib prison scandal, the detention camp at Guantanamo Bay and extraordinary rendition of EU citizens like the case of Abu Omar (Nino, 2007: 117 and 122). In non-Western countries, national history could invoke a plethora of associates, none of them positive. In the former Soviet bloc, secret services like the Stasi and the KGB have oppressed the population for decades, a memory that lasts until this very day (Rose, 1994: 18; Révész, 2007: 108). Many African countries that obtained independence after WW2 have seen situations where its colonizer was replaced by an authoritarian regime, using intelligence agencies to dispose of political opponents and stay in power (Ingiriis, 2020: 254). Especially in countries that have been scarred by civil conflict, intelligence agencies have often been a source of oppression and a source of violence towards the general population (Shiraz and Aldrich, 2019: 1319). Because of this long history of abuse of power in many areas around the world, the use and mention of 'intelligence' within the UN has always been controversial, despite having been recognized as beneficial to its operations. The UN shunned the word in fear of tarnishing its reputation as an independent organization and in old guides, the word intelligence is consistently replaced by the word 'information' (Herman, 2003: 158 and 164; International Peace Institute, 2016). In the inner circles of the UN and notably among those of a military background, calls by military officials have existed

much earlier for increased intelligence capabilities. For instance, already in the 1990s, Canadian General Dallaire, commander of the UN mission during the genocide in Rwanda, openly criticized the lack of intelligence capabilities (Champagne, 2006: 16). Even earlier, during the Katanga crisis in the 1960s, Irish troops deployed as peacekeepers complained about the lack of intelligence capabilities (Dorn, 2010: 285 and 290). Similar comments were made by Dutch troops in Bosnia Herzegovina and several high-ranking officials of UNPROFOR, including Canadian General Mackenzie, complained to UN headquarters that officials in New York had no idea what was really going on at the theatre-level (Wiebes, 2003: 15).

When one researches the use of intelligence in UN operations, literature is available but scarce especially considering the large role peacekeepers have played around the world in the many conflicts since the end of WW2. While there is a vast amount of literature available on UN peacekeeping, this mostly pertains to the ethical and legal aspects of UN peacekeeping (see, for instance, Western, 2011; Bhojwani, 2012; and Damboeck, 2012). The older works available mainly focus on the success rate of UN peacekeeping operations in war zones where criticism existed on the nature of armament available to peacekeepers when confronted with heavily armed warring parties and the role of UN officials and state officials, similar to the Kent-Kendall debate. For instance, Bloomfield examined the role of then UN Secretary-General Hammarskjöld and his policy on engagement with armed parties and how US volunteers could privately sponsor peacekeeping (1966: 676). With the rise of large-scale massacres like the Rwandan genocide in 1994 and the Srebrenica massacre in 1995, the world community hastily sought for a way to deal with conflicts of this nature. This gave rise to literature that criticized the UN's passive monitoring missions where peacekeeping forces remained for prolonged periods of time in areas with frozen conflicts and where its power was ineffective (e.g. Novosseloff, 2021; Herta, 2012). With it came the invention of the 'Responsibility to Protect' principle which gave rise to a whole new range of critical literature (consider Matori and Kagu, 2019; Badescu and Weiss, 2008; or Luck, 2009) that examined the moral and legal sides of nations

violating art. 2 of the UN Charter which guaranteed state sovereignty (UN, 1945).

1.3 Third Generation Peacekeeping Intelligence

At the end of the 90s, the UN saw yet again the emergence of a new type of conflict. While not new per se, the endemic persistence and regionality of the conflicts were not comparable to before (Schnabel, 1997: 565). States on the brink of collapse or already collapsed had to be stabilized and supported with the help of military forces, police trainers, and civilians specializing in elections and democratic mechanisms (Sigri and Basar, 2014: 391). The new ‘multidimensional stabilization’ missions required more intelligence on a wider range of topics than before (Díaz, 2007: 28). The continued failures during UN peacekeeping missions forced the UN leadership to open their eyes and admit that the issues surrounding the outdated UN understanding of ‘intelligence’ can no longer be ignored. It acknowledged that consent cannot always be gained, and neutrality cannot always be maintained (Doyle and Sambanas, 2007: 504). The UN Policy Paper of 2019 on Peacekeeping-Intelligence states that the “operating environments of United Nations Peacekeeping missions have evolved” to be followed by “there is a need for peacekeeping to better understand their operating environment and context [...]” (United Nations, 2019: 2). Similar attitudes could be found during internal debates at UN offices and also in the field. Earlier examples that indicate the change in strategic thought on intelligence have been the publication of the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (commonly known as the Brahimi Report) in 2000 and the High-level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations (HIPPO) in 2014. The Brahimi Report concluded that there was a strong lack of commitment of member states to contribute resources to UN missions, and notably in the intelligence functions. It recommended the strengthening of intelligence analysis at the strategic level and improvement of capabilities at the operational level (UN, 2000; Martin-Brûlé, 2021: 494 and 494). In 2015, the publication of HIPPO determined a structural lack of capabilities across most missions to carry out the mandate given and, crucially, noted that the UN lacked information capabilities (UN, 2015: 57 and 59; Van der Lijn et al, 2017: 31).

The UN has gone through trial and error in its attempts to improve its intelligence capabilities since the turn of the decade. In 2006, the UN created a comprehensive analysis centre called the Joint Mission Analysis Centre, or JMAC. It became standard for the so-called ‘integrated missions’ where civilian and military staff were collaborating (Ramjoué, 2011). The complexities of Srebrenica showed that military personnel only were no longer sufficient, hence the addition of civilian support staff specialized in police matters as well as language specialists and experts on local culture (Fetherston *et al*, 2007: 195). Its intelligence products do not only serve the needs of military personnel but also non-military personnel in the field, for instance those that are tasked with strengthening democracy in the country (Norheim-Martinsen and Aasland Ravndal, 2011: 460). Lauded for improving intelligence analysis, issues with JMAC have included personnel problems – countries only deliver analysts to missions that take place in countries that are of interest to the sending nation – as well as refusal to share vital intelligence due to fear of compromising national security interests (Martin-Brûlé, 2021: 508). In 2013, the UN got its mandate for the creation of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. After the Tuareg rebellion in 2012, the UN Security Council mandated the mission to stabilize the country, improve the capabilities of the Malian armed forces and strengthen the democratic process in the country (UN, 2013). The Malian JMAC was supported by a new concept that took into account the recommendations of the HIPPO report. Implementing lessons learned from using JMACs on previous missions, the UN created the All-Source Intelligence Fusion Unit, or ASIFU, which was meant to create intelligence reports specifically on the operational level as opposed to the JMAC (Chido, 2018: 31). However, a range of issues with the ASIFU have led to its cancellation a few years into its existence. Some early literature exists on the ASIFU that explores the inner workings of this new unit, a unit whose primary aim was to enhance non-military intelligence and improve the information available to the boots on the ground. Likely the most prolific writer on the ASIFU is Rietjens, a former Dutch Army officer turned scholar, who wrote a dozen of articles including two comprehensive reviews of his experiences with ASIFU from a military perspective. He concluded, among other things, that the ASIFU is plagued by different interpretations of what an intelligence report should entail as well as

cultural differences among analysts (Rietjens and de Waard, 2017: 547; Rietjens and Zomer, 2017: 8). On the other hand, it was lauded since it was the first real attempt of the UN to incorporate SIGINT, HUMINT, OSINT, and IMINT into operational assessments that also served the needs of the UN both operationally and strategically (Rietjens and Dorn, 2017: 206).

The persistent failures of the UN have led to a plethora of separate case studies into intelligence failures in UN missions, but a clear gap exists in the literature with regards to a comprehensive overview that links the existing literature on intelligence studies with UN peacekeeping intelligence. Many case studies exist in the scholarly literature that try to assign blame on particular actors, ranging from the widespread condemnation of the Dutchbat battalion during the Srebrenica genocide to Nepalese troops responsible for the cholera outbreak that cost the lives of many in Haiti (for instance, Dannenbaum, 2012; Rijdsdijk, 2011; Li, 2000; Orion, 2016; and Menkhaus, 2007). Yet, little research has been done on the success of operational practices, especially in the latter case. As a result, the impact this has had on the way of thinking with regards to intelligence at the strategic level has never been properly researched. UN forces under the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSTAH) were able to stabilize the security environment, providing protection in the rural areas of the country after disarming violent gangs (Dorn, 2009: 808). The UN mission in Haiti was partly led in a 'peace-enforcing' way, with contingents of UN forces heavily armed and well-equipped actively searching for gang leaders instead of merely patrolling to keep the peace (Dorn 2009: 814). The increased use of well-armed, pro-active military forces and an early form of central intelligence fusion units was successful in its mission but largely overshadowed by a scandal whereby Nepalese peacekeepers infected the local population with cholera (International Crisis Group, 2012: 10). This shows one of the key issues with the UN, namely the negative image that often comes with the presence of scandals surrounding UN peacekeeping forces. For an organization that hails its legitimacy from an image of impartiality and human rights, being associated with the practices of those intelligence services is thought to add a negative perception to an already tarnished image, hence the UN's long-held suspicion of anything intelligence-related (Barry, 2012: 8). The All-Source Intelligence Fusion Unit (ASIFU) in

Mali has become a learning ground for the increasing need for intelligence and the challenges that it brings, despite its short-lived existence (Baudet *et al.*, 2017: 17). The most pressing barriers identified have been an overreliance on Western material in UN intelligence capabilities, national security interests from several countries, and cultural differences (Theunens, 2015: 16). Others have pointed out the financial cost of sustaining a separate centre of analysis with a myriad of expensive technological equipment, and the uncertainty that comes with admitting non-Western nations into this centre (Duursma, 2018: 465).

The conclusions of the early literature on the ASIFU are useful when assessing the operational theatre aspect of peacekeeping intelligence, a vital aspect. However, they do not assess the wider framework of state contribution to intelligence capabilities and the wider impact operational practice has on thinking at the strategic level. With the JMACs and ASIFU having been fusion units consisting of military analysts from UN member states as well as relying heavily on military forces of member states to collect information, the role of state sovereignty cannot be overlooked. For instance, in 2015 declassified documents made clear that the US, France, and the UK had made a deal with Mladic without informing Dutch blue helmets that no air power would be used to protect them since British and French peacekeepers had been taken hostage (Lynch, 2015: 4). This clear conflict of interest between national interests and UN peacekeeping interests is present in many areas, also ranging from the strategic to the operational level of intelligence gathering within the UN. More research into the extent of this phenomenon will provide a clearer understanding of the problem and thereby aid in finding solutions to improve the credibility of UN intelligence collection and provide a clearer understanding of questions raised about the viability of the ASIFU. It will also help show how intelligence has been historically understood and how it is understood today by the UN, highlighting areas where the UN still struggles with the traditional concept of intelligence and how it could potentially adapt to include a different approach to the concept.

Chapter 2: Design and Methodology

2.1 Epistemology and Ontology

The ever more intricate and multifarious nature of new peacekeeping missions requires more research into how best to approach the different complexities of the mission. Standard operating procedures fit for purpose in the early days no longer suffice. Recognizing that increased intelligence capabilities are vital for these new ‘multidimensional’ peacekeeping missions, increased academic research into intelligence - and specifically peacekeeping intelligence - can aid in supporting the UN in future missions and at the same time add to a relatively unexplored field of academic study. As a start, this thesis will try to bridge the gap between intelligence theory and UN peacekeeping literature. It aims to examine the transformation of peacekeeping intelligence, hoping to provide a comprehensive overview of change in understanding of the concept at the UN but also provide an outlook for future development. To assist this endeavour, the paper has three objectives which have been briefly mentioned above:

1. To understand the role of intelligence collection within the UN as an organization and compare this to national intelligence practices and methods.
2. To recognize the historical drivers of UN intelligence failures as well as successes. To examine key drivers in those successes and failures and the role of intelligence in those both.
3. To provide insight on the workings of UN intelligence mechanisms and compare the differences and similarities between intelligence in the contemporary type of missions compared to that in former missions. Furthermore, to provide connections between the concept of state power and supranational intelligence collection.

But attempts to research intelligence are futile without understanding the intricacies of research practices. Here, it is important to note that academic research is a complex matter which can be understood through different lenses. In many cases, researchers approach issues from an interpretivist or positivist approach. IR consists not of a dichotomy of positivism and interpretivism and these two approaches are fluid and not mutually exclusive and can be shared

with some other approaches. However, it is important to understand the meaning of these two major approaches to understand the methodology of this thesis. First, it is necessary to incorporate a brief glance at what constitutes epistemology and ontology. Ontology reflects the understanding of how we view the world. Ontology requires researchers to think if certain concepts are socially constructed or set in stone, and if the world is independent of the knowledge they have about it (Marsh *et al.*, 2002: 18). On the other hand, epistemology asks questions on how to gather knowledge. Following on the understanding of ontology, it especially asks if phenomena are observable (Marsh *et al.*, 2002: 19). This broadly determines if researchers understand the world as a place where phenomena can be observed and be used to generalize statements (positivist) or that social constructs make every observation different (interpretivist). Thus, a positivist approach to IR seeks to “uncover law-like regularities and generalized statements through testing” (Lamont, 2021: 24). Positivist works generally utilize hypotheses to test ideas against cases in order to create a general statement that can be verified by other researchers and potentially be applied to other cases with different information.

On the other hand, an interpretivist approach assumes that theories cannot just be generated from hypothesis-testing and that all cases are different depending on contextual matters like ethnicity, history, and norms and values (Lamont, 2021: 24). Values, norms, and theories all underpin international politics. Research is inductive, meaning that the information gathered can influence research further down the line and change the way questions are asked, as opposed to the ‘objective’ version of positivism that assumes that all observations fall within a strict set of categories (Creswell, 2017: 21). Furthermore, interpretivists assume that research cannot be done objectively due to the personal experiences and opinion of the researcher him/herself. The way we ask questions and design research methods is shaped by our understanding and will influence how we approach and analyse information (Creswell, 2017: 21). This flexibility in research methodology and philosophical underpinnings means that there are a myriad of theories out there, and it leaves room for combinations. So, where positivists mainly approach research questions with a quantitative approach, or sometimes with a mixture, the interpretivists are

almost always focused on the opposite side of the paradigm, utilizing qualitative methods to make sense of the topic. Qualitative research tends to be holistic in nature, blending a myriad of observations into a final product. 'Qualitative' is seen as an overarching term for a combination of methods that can involve hermeneutics (the interpretation of texts), ethnographic research, and many others (Yilmaz, 2013: 312). So where quantitative research seeks a hypothesis that can create a generalizable theory, qualitative research recognizes that factors exist that make cases unique. Interpretivists do not seek to answer the what-question or the if-question that can be researched by testing cases against a number of variables but seek to answer the why or how. In researching the why or how, quantitative research usually does not suffice since it does not leave room for a range of interpretations (Heyink and Tymstra, 1993: 293). Before testing, a researcher will need to set a number of acceptable or 'correct' responses which does not allow for examination or interpretation of experience (Yilmaz, 2013: 313). In this paper, it will not allow for appropriate research due to the multifaceted nature of the overarching concept of intelligence as well as the nature of observations.

Intelligence is a highly context-driven concept which is understood and practiced in many different ways depending on culture and capacity (Aldrich and Kasuku, 2012: 1013). With its focus on the dynamics between the UN as an organization, the practices of peacekeeping intelligence and the intelligence processes of nations, the issue of context is highly important. Many of the missions the UN executes are highly complex with ethnic and religious violence as well as historical and geographical issues. With this comes the fact that its employees are drawn from all over the world. This can lead to missions where some countries bear the brunt of the casualties which can lead to opposing views on how to proceed. According to Gauthier Vela, this can be seen as well in Mali where technological innovation among Western forces has led to a situation where Western (often NATO) forces are contributing equipment like drones and poorer, non-Western nations contribute troops (2021: 848). The majority of casualties, therefore, fall among non-Western personnel since they are more exposed to danger given that they often patrol without the use of advanced equipment. They are also often based in less protected camps, as the UN and

NATO often create better defences for bases with advanced weaponry and helicopters. This creates a binary of NATO ‘allies’ vs non-NATO ‘partners’ that impacts operational readiness (Gauthier Vela, 2021: 852). It is important to recognize these issues when addressing the research question of this thesis: “How has the UN understanding of intelligence transformed over time?” The thesis analyses the context of different case studies with a closer look at the context of each case. With this approach, it falls within the interpretivist approach of research methodology.

2.2 Research Design

To map how states interact with the UN with regards to intelligence, and research the way the UN has viewed intelligence at the strategic level over time, it is necessary to gather data ranging from earlier cases to today’s missions. It is necessary to understand general intelligence theory before being able to examine the specifics of peacekeeping intelligence and how it behaves conceptually within the UN as an organization. To guide the analysis of the data and answer the research question, it is helpful to refer to a few key objectives that should guide the evaluation and help in breaking up the different pieces of the data into coherent sections. The first objective of this thesis is to understand the role of intelligence collection within the UN as an organization. This involves UN policy on how to gather intelligence and its attitude towards traditional intelligence collection practices. The second objective is to recognize the historical drivers of UN intelligence failures as well as successes. The drivers behind both failures and successes can give an overview of how the UN interpreted and allowed for practices from the intelligence cycle as well as give an overview of the dynamics between intelligence from state agencies versus that of UN peacekeeping troops. The third objective is to provide insight on the workings of UN intelligence in practice.

The nature of this research requires a qualitative approach. A potential transformation of thinking within the UN and the UN-state dynamics are dependent on context and time. To research the role of intelligence collection within the UN, this paper will mainly rely on archival research and cross-combined case study research. The case study method is mainly identified by

its focus on one or a few cases “with the ambition to understand and capture broader and more general underlying dynamics” (Ruffa, 2020: 1133). Case studies are distinct in that they combine aspects of both interpretivism and positivism. While using a small N-number which allows for an interpretivist approach of interpreting and examining the identities and experiences of participants and cases, it also allows for some degree of generalization (Ruffa, 2020: 1134). A case itself is defined as “an instance of a class of events” or, in the more interpretivist tradition, “an attempt to understand and interpret a spatially and temporally bounded set of events” (George and Bennett, 2005: 17; Levy, 2008: 2). The paper uses three cases in a collective case study, outlined below. A collective case study compares multiple cases to search for differences and similarities and in this case can allow for the drawing of some generalised conclusions (Mills, Durepos and Wiebe, 2010: 163; Baxter and Jack, 2008: 547-549).

To a lesser extent, interpretive policy analysis will be used to analyse different guidance manuals that have been provided to peacekeepers as well as official policy documents and speeches from the UN and countries involved in the peacekeeping missions. Interpretive policy analysis is a method mainly found in the social sciences which allows for interpretation of the meaning behind speeches and policy and explains the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of certain decisions found in policy (Yanow, 2007: 110 and 115; Weimer and Vining, 2017: 32). While the UN guidance manuals indicate how to perform intelligence in the field and are meant for ground personnel, they give an overview on how the UN as an organization understood what intelligence meant and what their preferred option of gathering information was. This method is similar for the second objective. Archival research can provide original sources, which, together with secondary material, will be used to analyse the history of UN peacekeeping intelligence and their failures and successes. The third objective serves to understand better if UN policy is indeed functioning as it is proposed at the strategic level or if the different cultures on the ground make correct implementation impossible.

The objectives are best answered using a case-study that allows for the comparison of a sample of different UN operations. Thus, to answer the research question, this paper will examine three UN peacekeeping missions:

- United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)

UNPROFOR lasted from 1992 to 1995. This mission is considered one of the biggest, if not the biggest, failure of the United Nations Peacekeeping office. The genocide of thousands of Bosnian Serbs created a new wave of questioning globally about the role of the UN and why it had failed. Within the UN, this specifically looked at why the organization failed to predict the genocide and how to improve intelligence. This case study will offer the opportunity to study the mission itself and thereby understand the old method of intelligence gathering as well as look at the direct aftermath where UN officials started questioning the traditional way of collection. Together with this, it also offers a glimpse into early suggestions that had already been proposed but now found wider traction.

- United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)

The mission in Mali is considered to be one of the best successes of the second-generation peacekeeping missions in terms of intelligence. The ‘intelligence-driven’ operation managed to reduce gang violence in Port-au-Prince and arrest key leaders of the violence. This case study was the largest mission where the new JMAC was implemented and took place only a few years after the publication of the Brahimi Report. While the mission has been overshadowed by negative publicity due to the cholera outbreak that was brought by Nepalese peacekeepers, it is still considered a success for peacekeeping intelligence. Knowing that intelligence in UNPROFOR failed, MINUSTAH will be able to show differences and similarities in operational practices, the role of different state actors and UN leadership, and ultimately provide a checklist that will serve as a toolbox for the analysis of the third case study.

- United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

The third, and most recent, case study is currently ongoing, but its continuation is being questioned given the arrival of Russian mercenaries and Malian criticism at the UN. Regardless, MINUSMA is the first mission to have a dedicated fusion unit for intelligence. With analysts from different countries and incorporating different collection methods, it was hailed as a transformation of operational practice. The trust placed by the leadership in it also shows a change of how intelligence is recognized at the strategic level in New York. Yet, despite some successes, it has been shut down only a few years in. Academic debate is mixed on its usefulness. Especially for this mixed academic debate, this case study has been chosen. Mali displays similarities with the Srebrenica case study but also differences. Besides the historical and ethnic differences, the main difference is the presence of the ASIFU, how short-lived it might have been. The case study will allow for the examination of a project that followed on the JMAC project that proved successful during earlier missions; in doing so it can give an overview of the reasons it failed but also show how the strategic level in New York engaged with the ASIFU project, and more importantly, what drivers were behind its cessation.

Primary material on the different missions can be found in several online databases. Especially for the first mission, a wealth of information can be found in the CIA declassified online repository, several US Presidential libraries, but also in the Royal Netherlands Army archive in the Hague and on online databases like JSTOR and Google Scholar. Primary sources like policy documents will be compared to secondary material and compared with the sources from the other cases to give an overview of potential transformation. While all sources are open-source or declassified material, all work is stored on an encrypted hard drive and backed up on an encrypted flash drive. While not classified, the information gathered deals with personal experiences and sensitive topics of human suffering. Notably the genocide of Srebrenica, but also the gang-related aggression which contains stories of rape and extortion, and experiences of failures to protect Malian civilians, leading to indiscriminate killing and maiming. With researching these case studies come ethical implications. Genocide in Srebrenica, human rights violations by UN peacekeepers in Haiti and jihadism and violent action by peacekeepers of

different ethnic groups all require careful thinking on privacy and respect to those involved in these missions, be it the population or the peacekeepers. Coming from a country heavily involved in two of the missions, it is also important to recognise my own biases and sense of national pride which have left me with preconceived judgments.

Given the time constraints and language barriers of foreign articles that will require translation, each case study will use approximately 5 UN policy documents and a few other national documents, mainly Dutch – the Netherlands being the primary or one of the primary actors in the first and last case study – and Portuguese and Spanish as native language of many of the peacekeeping forces in the second case study. Combined with secondary sources that analyse UN policy this will give a considerably large dataset to analyse. Research using interpretive policy analysis mainly relies on interpreting policy documents, its meaning and its process of creation. Main aim of focus in this thesis lies on the explanation of the concept of intelligence in UN policy documents and the perception of the UN and its abilities by involved countries.

Researching this topic remains difficult since intelligence theory overall is undertheorized and UN peacekeeping intelligence in particular. Peacekeeping intelligence theory not only requires knowledge of the UN but will also require a better understanding of wider political theory overall in order to write a research paper that falls primarily within the IR domain but still applies to intelligence studies. At the same time, its unique makeup of different countries also allows for crossing into other academic domains like history, anthropology, and sociology. The variety of case studies involves acquiring a basic cultural and historical background of the case studies involved. This all requires a lengthy process of reading that is time-consuming. It is imperative to acknowledge the time-constraints that come with this type of contextual research. Besides time constraints it is necessary to acknowledge geospatial constraints. Given several large mishaps within the UN that resulted in disastrous consequences, the UN and contributing member states are not always eager to share information on the missions they contributed to. While archival research provides a rich source of information, gaining access to the military

archives is difficult and time-consuming. Furthermore, the largest element within the MINUSTAH mission consisted of Brazilian armed forces personnel. Their reports and information are generally written in Portuguese. Translation services would be too costly and achieving access to the archives in Haiti or Brazil would be even more difficult given the location of the archives. The decision, therefore, has been taken to rely mainly on English-language primary material found online and secondary material.

The UN and Peacekeeping Intelligence in Action

Chapter 3: The United Nations Protection Force – Bosnia Herzegovina 1992-1995

The first case study will examine intelligence during the wars in the Balkans. The UNPROFOR mission overall, and the genocide of roughly 8,000 Muslim Bosnian Muslims is one of the most known and well-documented UN peacekeeping missions to date. During a time when Europeans celebrated the fall of the USSR and thought that war was over, the mission changed UN peacekeeping and stirred the debate on intelligence that had been long overdue.

General Background: Yugoslavia Descending into War

The mission, officially called the United Nations Protection Force but UNPROFOR for short, took place in what is today the Balkan region, on the territory of then Yugoslavia that was in the midst of a dissolution. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was made up of six republics: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. It was divided territorially, but also ethnically and religiously. For example, the Serbian republic consisted of 66% (Orthodox) Serbs, 2.5% Muslims and 1.1% Croats. In the republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Muslim Bosnians constituted the largest single ethnoreligious group, namely 44%. Serbs constituted 31% and Croats 17% (Remington, 1993: 366). The other republics were similarly mixed, although Bosnia and Herzegovina was arguably the most diverse of them (UN, 1996: 478). Under the long leadership of Yugoslavia's leader Josip Tito, from 1953 until 1980, Yugoslavia remained relatively united due to a range of unifying measures, like rotation of personnel on military and ministerial posts to include all ethnicities on different positions. However, after Tito's death in 1980, the already deteriorating economic situation gave rise to ethnonationalism which in turn set the stage for large-scale ethnic violence. The failure to find a new charismatic yet autocratic leader combined with a young generation that had not gone through the struggle of uniting as a communist bloc but simultaneously remaining independent from the Soviet Union meant that pride for its country was lost (Lendvai and Parcell, 1991: 257). Disillusioned people sought scapegoats which were easy to find in the centuries-old ethnic divisions

which had been hastily patched together after World War 2 (NIOD, 2002: 93). In 1990, Yugoslavian leaders discussed elections in the hope to decrease tensions and give a voice to the different parties. However, this plan backfired and only increased tension when Croats and Slovenes walked out (NIOD, 2002: 74). The elections ultimately highlighted the deep mistrust along ethnic lines and Serbian president Milošević became to be the major player in the region. Milosevic was generally considered to be the most influential president of the federation due to Serbia hosting Yugoslavia's capital Belgrade and Serbs making up Yugoslavia's largest ethnic group (Cohen, 1992: 370 and 372). Claims that the Serbian president Milosevic was looking to annex other territories of the federation that contained sizeable minorities of ethnic Serbian citizens led to anti-Serbian sentiment while among the Serbs in Croatia a strong anti-Croat sentiment already existed since the Croats had fought alongside the Nazis in World War 2 (Bjelajac and Žunec, 2009: 240 and 241). Isolated violent incidents turned into strings of violence between different ethnic groups and paramilitary units and a declaration of independence of a small part of Croatian territory by ethnic Serbs, the Republic of Serbian Krajina. Supported by Serbian forces, they struggled for control against Croatian forces. On 19 May 1991, Croats declared themselves independent as the first of the former Yugoslav states. This would start a chain reaction that would also see Bosnia and Herzegovina declare independence on 3 March 1992 (ÓTuathail, 2002: 602; Mesic, 2004: 82).

The UN Security Council and Peacekeeping Mandates

When several UN resolutions calling for an end to the violence had no effect, the UN Security Council implemented resolution 743, calling for the creation of a larger protection force which would become UNPROFOR. High-level discussions between the UN and country leaders ultimately resulted in the promise of several countries to support the mandate by delivering troops and equipment. When, despite the sanctions and presence of initial contingents of UN peacekeepers, Croat and Serb army elements remained in parts of Bosnia Herzegovina in 1993, the UN voted in favour of resolutions 819 and 824, declaring several cities as safe areas under protection of UN peacekeepers

(Tardy, 2015: 384). According to the two UN resolutions, all parties were called upon to refrain from “committing ethnic cleansing” and a demand that “all parties [...] treat Srebrenica and its surroundings as a safe area” (UN, 1993: 2). In order to protect these safe areas, the UN was looking for countries to contribute troops and equipment to the mission. While outraged by the massacres and the violence in the Balkans, the Bush administration considered it a European problem to be solved by the Soviet Union and the Western European powers (White House, 1991: 3). Clinton, US president from 1993 onwards, was much more engaged with the war but also saw no active role for US boots on the ground. While willing to commit to air support and economic measures, peacekeeping troops had to come from Europe and elsewhere (Daalder, 2002: 6; Trenta, 2014: 68).

Meanwhile, the Dutch government, keen to assert itself on the global stage, was one of the biggest proponents of the peacekeeping mission and offered a battalion to serve as peacekeepers. While the military leadership strongly doubted the effectiveness of participating under such a weak mandate, the government under prime minister Kok decided to send several rotations of approximately 450 peacekeepers of the air mobile brigade (Tweede Kamer, 1993; Van Krieken, 2004: 132). In line with the UN mandate, which strongly focused on humanitarian action and peacekeeping rather than peace-enforcing, the unit was to be lightly armed with small weapons, some machine guns, and some armoured vehicles (UN, 1999: art. 228). While the military leadership advocated for a more heavily armed mission, the UN mandate did not allow for this. To safeguard its image as a neutral and non-military organisation, no heavy equipment was desired. Reflecting this desire and belief in the mission, the UN resolution stated that “the safety of personnel is assumed to be guaranteed by all parties” (UN, 1993: 3).

This ultimately meant that the unit, internationally known as Dutchbat, would be sent to protect the safe area of Srebrenica and its surroundings by means of consent from the warring parties (Rapp, 2015: 11). To keep the peace and monitor enforcement of promises made with regards to weaponry that each side could have, the Dutch blue helmets made patrols either by armoured vehicle or

on foot which was standard procedure for UN missions at the time (Dorn, 2010: 276). Violations of agreements that were reported by one side about the other side were written down in a report and weekly reports were sent with observations on troop strength and equipment. Important to note is that the mandate also did not allow for ‘hard action,’ that is to say that when the armed faction of the Bosnian Muslims – part of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina – sheltering in Srebrenica prevented Dutchbat from patrolling no swift military action could be undertaken to restore control over the area by UN forces (Klep and Winslow, 1999: 104).

UN Intelligence during UNPROFOR

The first generation of peacekeeping missions generally dealt with ‘intelligence-observing’ practices. As mentioned in previous academic literature stated above, these missions generally consisted of a contingency of peacekeepers deployed to a hot zone to ‘keep the peace’ by observing truces and potentially oversee disarmament procedures (Doyle and Sambanas, 2007: 498). The UNPROFOR mission is generally considered to be one of the first large-scale missions that heralded in an end to first generation peacekeeping. And despite attempts by the UN to be remain neutral, UNPROFOR has the dubious honour to be seen as one of the finest examples of state influence in peacekeeping and of national intelligence practices conflicting with UN practices (Rieff, 1994: 6).

The concept of strategic intelligence at UN headquarters and the UN as an organization overall during the first few decades was arguably non-existent. The concept of ‘intelligence’ as roughly understood by national agencies – data gathered by a range of covert and overt means to further national interests – had no place in a neutral organization like the UN as is argued by the organization itself in its handbook (UN, 2019: art. 6.5.1). Furthermore, the nature of the early missions and mandates did not necessarily require a sophisticated, permanent intelligence capability (Smith, 1994: 174). The mandate of UNPROFOR reflected this traditional type of mission with regards to intelligence capabilities.

Acquisition and Examination

Daily operations of the Dutch battalion were obstructed by a lack of a broader picture. The situational awareness of the commanding officers of all UN contingencies in the different safe areas was known to be poor, as is expressed by the first commander of the Canadian UN detachment when he sent a cable to the government complaining that the most useful information he received was not from his own men or UN headquarters but from news channels like the BBC (Johnston, 2008: 102). Collection of information was mainly limited to observations made by units in charge of the different observation points, or on patrol. The small size of these patrols and light armament meant that patrols could only observe and patrol close to the confrontation line with consent of both parties. The traditional definition of intelligence, that collection is conducted without the other party knowing and therefore by definition without consent, shows how ill-fitting the term is with UN intelligence acquisition in the early days. The need for consent of the party to be inspected ultimately resulted in Dutchbat often failing to be able to gather effective intelligence and missing vital clues. Lack of petrol led to a reduction in patrols in dangerous zones and interaction with human assets was strictly forbidden (De Graaff and Wiebes, 2014: 156). In fact, the mandate not allowing them more robust action, created a worse understanding of the situation. Due to the situation, Dutchbat had no capability to patrol further than areas where the Bosniaks and Serbs allowed them to go. Lack of IMINT – forbidden by UN headquarters despite earlier calls to use it – meant that Dutchbat was not aware of some key numbers and movements of the Serbs in the final days before the fall of Srebrenica (Westerman, 2015; De Graaff and Wiebes, 2014: 157). Already in 1993, UNPROFOR commander Wahlgren, had complained to UN headquarters that UNPROFOR had no idea what was going on.

The typical information gathering by means of observing was not sufficient for a mission the size and complexity of UNPROFOR (Johnston, 2008: 104). This lack of situational awareness can be seen in the report sent back to Dutch military headquarters by Dutchbat. It states that an attack on the enclave is highly unlikely (Royal Netherlands Army, 1995: 5). At the same time, reports came in from observation points detailing troop increases and the situation

became more hostile towards Dutchbat peacekeepers (Royal Netherlands Army, 1995a: 5). So, while observation (according to the intelligence cycle 'acquisition) existed in a rudimentary form, it often remained locally known information only and was not combined with other data to create a wider picture.

The sharing of information with other actors was also very limited due to national concerns. For instance, the CIA had a much more extensive network of intelligence analysts whose expertise in the region was much better than any of the troops on the ground (De Graaff and Wiebes, 2014: 157). The CIA created regular reports on the situation on the ground with visual information gathered by overflights of planes and satellites and other collection methods (Wiebes, 2003: 133). On one instance, a Canadian peacekeeper received aerial photographs of an area vital to peacekeeping intelligence but could not show this to his superiors as they were French and therefore a non-NATO country (Dorn, 1999: 428).

And not only operational intelligence that could have aided Dutchbat and other peacekeepers was not shared. Unbeknownst to the Dutch government and the Dutch companies in Srebrenica and Tuzla, US president Clinton and French president Chirac had made an agreement that using air strikes was too much of a risk to take. The VRS surrounding Srebrenica had threatened to kill UN peacekeepers it had taken hostage which included a large number of French personnel. In response, French general Janvier confirmed to the Bosnian Serb Army that in private that air strikes would be halted (Daalder, 2014: 43 and 44; Li, 2000: 36; French Parliamentary Commission, 2001). This severely undermined effectiveness of the mandate as air strikes were considered vital for the success of the mission (Schulte, 197: 22). Furthermore, the French government publicly reconfirmed its support for air strikes on any aggression against UN peacekeepers. On 10 July, General Janvier confirmed to Dutchbat commander Karremans that air strikes were still the go to option in case the Bosnian Serbs were threatening to overrun the enclave (Zimmermann: 2005). Dutch intelligence assessments produced for consumption by the army command and the Ministry of Defence confirm the general assumption among Dutch policymakers and high-ranking officials that air strikes were still in play

(Netherlands Ministry of Defence, 1995: 5 and 6). Here, national interests prevented effective peacekeeping but also highlighted the lack of relevant intelligence on the side of the Dutch. Predictive analysis on the intent of French policymakers should have considered that a large number of French peacekeepers was taken hostage and had been threatened with execution. French officials had openly stated that they were wary of air strikes and that they were seeking ways to guarantee the safety of their peacekeepers. While not the only factor in the decision not to use air support, it serves as an example of the powerful role intelligence could have played in the preparation for the events that were to follow.

Dissemination; Decision-making and guidance

The UNPROFOR mission was highly complex, and its mandate can be considered ambitious but also lacking real awareness of the situation on the ground (Wiebes *et al.*, 2017: 157). UNPROFOR falls under the category of peacekeeping missions that arose after the Cold War and is often called ‘strategic peacekeeping’ (Burk, 1997: 323). Strategic peacekeeping differs from traditional peacekeeping in that the UN shapes the environment and “alters the strategic environment” by taking initiatives and decide on courses of action. This all opposed to traditional peacekeeping where the strategic direction and shape of the operational environment has already been created by the two opposing parties and the UN only serves to monitor the agreement (Dandeker and Gow, 1997: 334). With the UN Security Council relying on votes and propositions of member states, missions where the UN decides on mandates altering the operating environment mainly happens when major powers have vested interest in adjusting the situation in that region or country (Idem, 335).

In order to successfully execute a mandate that alters the strategic environment, the UN requires more than just consent of the parties involved. To change an existing situation to another, more desired situation likely requires violating the three key UN principles of consent, impartiality and non-use of force (Blouin, 2018: 56). Even in situations where strategic peacekeeping would be considered within the parameters of the UN principles and its founding chapter, the UN did

not have enough capabilities to have an impact on the strategic environment. Here, national intelligence could have played a vital role. Information from allies could have been used, but the UN's insistence on impartiality combined with national interests made it difficult for Dutchbat to successfully execute its mandate. It is likely that the UN leadership had not considered the implications of failing to update its intelligence practices, or in UN parlance, 'information' practices, as it seems that national intelligence agencies were much better informed and predicted the fall of Srebrenica. In May 1995, the American intelligence services judged an attack on Srebrenica highly likely, yet nothing of this intelligence was shared (Clinton Digital Library). While not sharing this likely had an underlying reason, there have been several instances where the CIA and other national intelligence agencies shared IMINT and VISINT with peacekeeping troops outside the official UN hierarchy (Johnston, 1997: 110).

Conclusion

Intelligence collection and dissemination was limited to observation only, with proactive intelligence gathering being non-existent. With the Cold War over, the UN tried to increase its scope of peacekeeping, but its resources did not match its ambition. This ultimately led to inadequate ad-hoc solutions. While peacekeeping troops in Srebrenica and Tuzla recognised their inadequate resources, UN officials maintained their stance on intelligence during the events. This dichotomy between troops and the senior staff in New York would only intensify during the mission until it came to an end when the safe zone was overrun. UNPROFOR also highlighted a new type of problems that would become more apparent during later missions, namely that the new type of missions like UNPROFOR come with major powers that have vested interests in the conflict. It involves controversial decisions that hamper intelligence and the mission.

Chapter 4: MINUSTAH in Haiti 2004-2017

With the experiences of the UN peacekeeping failings in the 90s, the turn of the millennium signalled a shift in the nature and set-up of mandates and capabilities. One of the major shifts in thinking, and consequently in capabilities, became the idea that there needed to be more situational awareness if UN peacekeepers wanted to confront the complexities of the new missions (UN; 2008; Martin-Brûlé, 2020: 1). The lack of understanding long-term intentions of the different parties had led to failing peacekeeping missions with devastating consequences. The use of intelligence, or in UN parlance ‘information,’ was put on the agenda and led to a change from ‘intelligence-observing’ peacekeeping missions to ‘intelligence-led’ peacekeeping.

General Background: From the Duvalier Dynasty to Aristide and Beyond

One of the best examples of this type of intelligence-led peacekeeping mission is the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (commonly known by its French acronym MINUSTAH). The UN mission in Haiti followed several years of civil unrest and the 2004 coup d'état. Haiti had long been home to the dictatorial regime of the Duvalier family that ruled the country from 1957 to 1986 (Smith, 1995: 56). After rebellion against the regime of Jean-Claude Duvalier and his subsequent flight to France, a transitional government created by Duvalier shortly before his exile took power until the first elections in 1988 (Hausotter, 2008: 150). Shortly after the first elections, a coup by the military overthrew the elected president until a new coup overthrew the perpetrators of the previous coup (Smith, 1995: 57; Girard, 2010: 116). In 1990, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected on a platform of national reconciliation with over 70% of the votes (Théodat, 2021: 28). A coup d'état overthrew forced him into exile in 1991 until his return by US force in 1994. Part of the opposition from 1996, he was elected president again in 2001 (Girard, 2010: 189). His presidency was marred with increased activity of paramilitary gangs and drugs smugglers. Former military loyal to the military coup perpetrators and smuggling gangs opposed Aristide by torturing and executing his supporters (Ciorciari, 2022: 395). Then-president Aristide fled the country after a group of rebelling gangs united into to the *Front pour la libération et la reconstruction nationales* and

besieged the capital Port-au-Prince (Girard, 2010: 201).² After Aristide had fled the country, a temporary government was installed while gangs retreated to the slums of the big cities, notably the capital city Port-au-Prince. These slums, called *cités*, are densely populated quarters with houses made of plastic and cardboard, open sewers, and small alleys, making it ideal locations for gangs to hide and smuggle without being seen. These slums, with the ‘Cité Soleil’ slum being the most notorious, were so riddled with gang violence that after the coup the Haitian national police was no longer in effective control (Ciorciari, 2022: 396; Guidi, 2009). Now, Haiti already the theatre of tension after accusations of fraud during the 2000 elections and widespread violence by paramilitary groups against activists and political opponents, it faced uncertain times with the rebels exercising control in parts of the country and challenging the mandate of the national police, combined with an unstable economic situation creating dire living conditions for large parts of the general population (Dziedzic and Perito, 2008: 2; Hausotter, 2008: 149). To restore order, a multinational force consisting of US Marines and several other nations’ forces temporarily deployed onto the streets until being replaced by UN peacekeeping troops (Crain, 2012: 35).

The UN Security Council and Resolution 1542

On 30 April 2004, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1542 which called on the peacekeepers to restore order, reform the national police forces, and assist in organising and improving elections and democratic institutions (United Nations, 2004: 3; Hausotter, 2008: 148). This mandate reflects the changed nature from first generation peacekeeping that called for mediation and observation between two parties, to second generation peacekeeping that included reforms and restructuring of institutions. While some might argue the UNPROFOR mission might be considered more complex given its ethnic and territorial component, the UN mandate for Haiti is much more robust in terms of rules of engagement and the use of resources since humanitarian protection is part of its mandate which allows for the use of force with the purpose of

² Described as a ‘rebel group’, a ‘gang’ or revolutionary force. In English known as National Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Haiti.

providing humanitarian protection (Yamashita, 2008: 622). However, the more intricate and robust mandate given to the peacekeepers did not necessarily materialise when looking at the capabilities needed to successfully execute the intelligence cycle. While UN officials started to recognise the importance of intelligence, willingness to give more capacity to the peacekeepers only materialised a few years later in 2006 when the UN officially created the so-called Joint Mission Analysis Centre, or JMAC (Ramjoué, 2011: 471). The JMAC serves to provide the senior management team of the mission with capabilities to gather overt information to produce medium and long-term assessments. Ultimately this enhances the picture of the situation on the ground which should enable improved guidance to decision-makers (ibid.).

UN Intelligence during MINUSTAH: The Introduction of JMAC

Acquisition and Examination

While the JMAC as a structure can be considered a revolutionary improvement for the UN and UN intelligence practices in particular, the means of collection to improve understanding of the challenges in itself still relied partly on the old interpretation. During UNPROFOR UN peacekeepers patrolled the areas to get a feeling for troop strengths of warring parties and assess the situation. In Haiti, UN peacekeepers patrolled daily through the cités together with the national police force and attached police experts from different nations (Gordon and Young, 2017: 68). MINUSTAH is generally considered to be a South American mission, with the majority of troops having come from South America (Tripodi and Villar, 2005: 22). The large contributions of several South American countries and MINUSTAH being under the military command of the Brazilian contingent and diplomatically led by Chile, the UN mission was able to transform part of the acquisition step of the intelligence cycle into something more wide-ranging compared to UNPROFOR. Besides the common foot patrols, South American forces brought with them experience with coup d'états and dictatorships. Many of the countries on the continent had a history of military dictatorships and were now led by governments heavily investing in human rights and social welfare. The military in several of the Latin American countries played a major role in daily life and the historical role of the armed

forces in daily life led to an approach with it a heavy emphasis on military solutions (Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas, 2005: 8 and 22). Furthermore, the proximity of the Latin countries to Haiti and a general sense of regional solidarity made it easier to acquire and ship heavy equipment and aviation units to the country (Passarelli Hamman and Ramires Teixeira, 2017: 11). While helicopters were present during UNPROFOR, during MINUSTAH they were first used on a large scale to gather aerial imagery of the slums. No longer did peacekeepers need to do regular and long-range foot patrols to count vehicles, weapons, and manpower. Helicopters made footage of entry and exit points to the slums, possible hide outs and locations for weapons caches and could quickly draw up tactical plans for peacekeeping troops when confronting gangs. MINUSTAH also saw the widespread use of IMINT to create pictures of gang leaders. Pictures were distributed to personnel at check points which managed to capture key ring leaders of the rebels. With the contribution of Brazilian equipment, MINUSTAH became also the first mission to use UAVs (Dorn, 2009: 825). When the Brazilian unit left the UAV was no longer available, instead the mission relied on commercial satellite imagery. This use of publicly available data shows that the UN progressed significantly compared to a decade earlier. During UNPROFOR, there was no policy or official guidance on the use of commercial services and commanders made ad hoc decisions based on information they retrieved from news channels and observations only. This all led to a militarisation of intelligence practices by peacekeepers.

This trove of collected information bore fruit when a new force commander took charge of MINUSTAH in January 2007. The new commander, a Major from the Brazilian armed forces, ordered the slums retaken and the gangs driven out. Using the aerial footage, observations from patrols, and SIGINT, UN peacekeepers mounted several offenses into the slums. All but one gang leader was arrested or killed, and order was restored (Dziedzic and Perito, 2008: 5 and 9; Cockayne, 2014: 752). The amount of crime reduced greatly, and civilians were able to go out onto the streets again without fear for extortion or kidnapping. Reports indicated that people felt that MINUSTAH had made a positive difference and that they felt safer after the initial anti-gang actions (King *et al.*, 2021: 18). The real-time intelligence provided by JMAC is

considered to have been vital for the success of the operation (Dziedzic and Perito, 2008: 14).

The earthquake in 2010 and scandals surrounding sexual abuse and the cholera outbreak likely introduced by Nepalese peacekeeping troops severely undermined trust in the MINUSTAH mandate. Later complaints about a lack of HUMINT can be tied to the unwillingness of the Haitian population to trust and talk to peacekeepers. The failure to systematically improve the situation in Haiti after 2010, rebuild trust and reduce violence during subsequent riots against UN troops greatly reduced the intelligence capability of the UN (Gordon and Young, 2017: 75; Edström and Gyllensporre, 2013: 159). Other areas where the UN has done little in terms of intelligence is investment in cross-agency relations. While intelligence-sharing among intelligence officers of different nations on a *quid pro quo* basis is not uncommon, the UN had no such links. And while UNPROFOR enjoyed some access to intelligence from the U.S. intelligence community due to NATO alliances, no real evidence seems to exist of forged bonds between the Latin countries and the U.S. intelligence community. Historically, the US has been heavily involved in Latin America and Haiti was considered close enough to be in the US sphere of influence under the Monroe Doctrine and a matter of national security (Whitney, 1996: 304 and 330). During the Cold War, the US maintained a large intelligence capacity focused on Middle and South America to contain the spread of Communism, and therefore had a relatively experienced desk on situations like during MINUSTAH (NACLA, 1986: 21). Yet, US agencies hardly shared any relevant intelligence with the UN mission due to the lack of secure storage and bad practices of dealing with classified intel. The common joke that the highest level of UN confidentiality was 'UN-classified' showed the degree of unwillingness of foreign governments to share sensitive data (Rietjens and Zomer, 2017: 148). Only in instances where national governments considered self-interest to align with UN interests did they share relevant data. For example, the US was willing to share data with the JMAC in cases where drug smugglers were the target of UN forces and the US Drug Enforcement Agency had no assets available (Dorn, 2009: 828).

Dissemination to Decision-making and guidance

With the new intelligence capacity at MINUSTAH, two things can be considered ground-breaking for the UN, namely the existence of a separate intelligence structure besides ordinary troops, and the existence of an intelligence structure that created a holistic picture not only for operational purposes – thus, troop protection- but also for strategic purposes and thereby guide decision-maker. While experiences in practice have been found to be flawed on numerous instances, the mere thought of having an intelligence mechanism is notably important as decision-making previously was assigned to UN officials in the Security Council (). Decision-making based on intelligence was common among security officials and politicians of nation-states but not in the UN where delegates of across the world had to vote on mission mandates. For the first time, much more power was delegated to commanders in the field who made decisions based on a much more comprehensive picture. Now, UN field commanders were much more in the same position as military commanders on NATO missions or other international operations. They were now in a position to steer intelligence units or ordinary units into the field to gather specific intelligence using the variety of means outlined before (Fagerland, 2017: 58).

But while commanders received much more freedom and a much stronger position in terms of knowledge, the lack of interest in intelligence at the strategic level remained. JMAC officials analysed collected VISINT and HUMINT and produced weekly reports on the political and economic situation. Yet, apart from weekly meetings with some other key UN agencies, this information was mainly kept to the operational level and rarely translated into a strategic analysis fit for guidance at the highest level (Dorn, 2009: 823). So, while part of the original reason that the JMAC was founded, namely guidance to the management team on the ground, UN headquarters showed hardly any interest in receiving the produced intelligence assessments and official policy even states that its intelligence produced is meant to be received by the mission commander and below only (UN, 2019: 15). The official UN Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy 2019 also states that the chief of the mission is “is the most important client” and therefore in charge of its direction (13). Yet, the head of mission and senior

management are more often than not military personnel or UN officials with no intelligence background. The lack of training in intelligence resulted in diffusion of tasks and confusion among analysts in JMAC, those collecting intelligence, and those working in other intelligence mechanisms about what to collect, whose task it is to collect what, and what to share with which mechanism (Abilova and Novosseloff, 2016: 9; Piché, 2018: 252). So, while the UN has received a relatively strong intelligence capability with the JMAC, its main flaw lies in the limited access to the produced intelligence, which is only received by the mission commander and a select group of officials.

Conclusion

The introduction of the JMAC has led to a shift from intelligence-observing missions seen during UNPROFOR to intelligence-led or intelligence-based peacekeeping missions like MINUSTAH in Haiti. For the UN, the introduction of the JMAC signalled a new period of peacekeeping where its resources started to match its mandate. It shows a changing attitude towards more aggressive use of resources like UAVs and helicopters. But more importantly, the end goal of intelligence has changed. Whereas it first served to give an overview of the situation, it now also served to conduct assaults on groups that were considered an enemy, a method that openly challenged the UN as an organisation. The combination civilian and military personnel working on analysis and dissemination as opposed to observation only shows a professionalisation of the subject but also a challenging of traditional attitudes.

Chapter 5 MINUSMA: the ASIFU and Intelligence-sharing

With the mission in Mali being recently branded the most dangerous mission in UN history, the mission in Mali could be considered one of the most complex missions to date (Vermeij, 2015: 2). Generally speaking, the mission in Mali could be considered a more complex variant of the mission in Haiti. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, MINUSMA for short, changed from an ordinary stabilisation mission like in Haiti to a ‘multidimensional’ and ‘integrated’ stabilisation mission. Integrated peacekeeping missions are understood by the UN as missions “with which the UN seeks to help countries in the transition from war to lasting peace or address a similarly complex situation that requires a system-wide UN response” (Munro, 2007: 10). Multidimensional missions are those that consists of a substantive civilian-led element. Whereas previous missions, especially in the first generation of peacekeeping, where largely military-led, this third generation of missions has a large component of civilian personnel to rebuild countries where democratic structures are disintegrated or under threat. This includes civilian police forces, experts on legal structures and academics (UN, 2003: 18). As the UN Security Council judged the situation in Mali so severe, it called for such a comprehensive mandate.

General Background: Mali, a Coup d’état and Ethnic Division

MINUSMA was established in response to a growing humanitarian and security crisis in Mali. The country, twice the size of France with only 20 million people, is roughly divided into two parts. The northern desert is mainly inhabited by Tuareg pastoralists and sparsely populated. The southern part of the country, which includes Mali’s major cities, is home to the majority of the population (CIA, 2022). Ever since its independence in 1960, the Tuareg population has had a fraught relationship with the southern central government, which the Tuareg people accuse of favouritism and contempt of their traditions (Kone, 2017: 69). The economic underdevelopment of the north and subsequently high unemployment combined with the failure of the Bamako government to invest in security in the north have created a strong sense of autonomy in the region

(Branson and Wilkinson, 2013: 90). A feeling of strong resentment against the central government had resulted in multiple Tuareg rebellions before, with the last in the 1990s (Keita, 1998: 16). With the fall of Qaddafi in 2011, Mali experienced an influx of combat-experienced young men that returned from Libya, many settling back in the northern part of the country. The year 2011 saw a return of at least 11,000 Malians with fighting experience (Branson and Wilkinson, 2013: 91).

The return of many young men without a job to a region already suffering from low socio-economic chances and feelings of resentment led to several attacks on towns and military outposts in the north. In a major victory for the Tuareg, they captured the several garrison towns and a weapons depot in the north within a few days (Yahaya, 2020: 81). The Malian armed forces, dissatisfied with the course of action taken by the government to suppress the Tuareg insurgents as well as the high toll of fatalities on their side, staged a coup d'état in March, taking over the capital Bamako and forming a national council (Elischer, 2022: 16). Not only led this coup to international condemnation, in fact the subsequent division and chaos among the armed forces led to the swift loss of the north to the insurgents (Solomon, 2015: 67). When Islamist organisation Ansar-Dine allied with the Tuaregs against the government, the north was swiftly captured with major losses for the Malian armed forces (Amoroso, 2019: 105). In April, the united Tuareg organisation 'National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad' proclaimed victory against the Malian army and declared its independence from Mali. However, not long after the declaration of independence, Islamist organisations Ansar Dine and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa defeated the secular NMLA to impose Sharia law in northern Mali and stated its desire to create an Islamic state in the Sahel region (Diallo, 2017: 300).

The UN Security Council and Resolution 2100

In response to the widespread violations of human rights and the coup d'état, the UN adopted resolution 2085, creating the African-led mission 'AFISMA' to fight the insurgents. At the same time the interim government of Mali requested

military assistance. France, Mali's former colonial power, answered Bamako's call for assistance and launched Operation 'Serval' to drive back terrorist forces (Boeke and Schuurman, 2015: 811). While the Tuareg independence movement ultimately signed a peace agreement with the central government, the French and Malian army have been unable to defeat the Islamists. To support the French operation and restore law and order and also help strengthen the Malian democracy, the UN launched MINUSMA to replace the smaller African Union mission AFISMA (idem: 809). According to the mandate, some of its key tasks are to ensure "stabilisation of key population centres and support for the reestablishment of State authority throughout the country" and "protection of civilians and UN personnel" (UN, 2013: 7 and 8). But being a multidimensional and integrated mission, resolution 2100 also mandated peacekeeping forces to create "support for cultural preservation" and "support for the implementation of the transitional road map³, including the national political dialogue and the electoral process" (ibid). So not only did resolution 2100 decree keeping, or better said restoring, peace, but it also included keeping track of local vigilante groups, organising elections and a training mission to reform local forces. Where MINUSMA differs from MINUSTAH, which also included support for the electoral process and restoring order, is the level of complexity to the conflict. MINUSTAH peacekeepers faced criminal gangs that were not battle-hardened fighters like the highly ideological and heavily armed Islamists in Mali. Peacekeepers in Haiti did not face an independence movement based on historical ethnic grievances. It was also much smaller, ethnically homogenous and not surrounded by other nations that also struggled with smuggling, Islamist terrorist groups and precarious democratic challenges. In order to execute this difficult mandate, the UN allowed for a military-civilian mission that totals at around 13,000 personnel, of which 10,000 military. Of the 13,000, almost 1,500 were civilian personnel that were non-military or non-police personnel (UN, 2022b). As MINUSMA was considered to be replacement of AFISMA, troop contributing countries to AFISMA were requested to continue contributing

³ The transitional road map followed the 2013 peace agreement with the Azawad insurgents and was meant to support national reconciliation between the Azawad insurgents and the rest of the population. In 2015, the agreement was complemented with a road map to rebuild the country in a democratic and inclusive way (Nyrabikali, 2016: 178 and 181).

peacekeepers. Therefore, MINUSMA's peacekeepers consist mainly of African personnel (Albrecht *et al.*, 2017: 12).

UN Intelligence during MINUSMA: The Rise and Fall of ASIFU

The early experiences from the introduction of the JMAC to peacekeeping operations provided satisfactory results and the UN changed its policy to require a JMAC intelligence structure in all future peacekeeping operations (Dorn, 2009: 806; Shetler-Jones, 2008: 518). The new military peacekeeping intelligence handbook states that the JMAC is a vital part of the intelligence hierarchy and the book has been a separate chapter on its functioning and integration within the hierarchy (UN, 2019: art. 2.1.4 and 2.2). However, despite its praise by officials, some scholars that interviewed personnel and analysed the inner workings of the structure criticised parts of the JMAC. Some points of criticism were to be expected when the JMAC concept was rolled out. Chido criticises the lack of access to civilian resources and Rietjens and Baudet point to the consequences of being it being a new unit, namely it having to compete in turf wars for resources (2018: 58; 2017: 216). However, one point of criticism is to be considered more structural and damaging to the effectiveness of the intelligence capability of the UNDPO. When researching the JMAC, Rietjens found significant confusion among personnel on what data should be discarded and what data should be disseminated and produced. While on paper the JMAC was meant to serve as intelligence capability to the senior management, personnel often also analysed data for operational purposes leading to an overload of produced intelligence (Rietjens and de Waard, 2017: 533). Not only does an overload of information bury relevant intelligence amidst unnecessary information, it could also cause headaches at the highest level, potentially impacting the mindset at that level with regards to the usefulness of intelligence (Mac Ginty, 2017: 701).

The new approach to peacekeeping in countries like Mali and Congo meant that basic intelligence was not good enough. The risks for UN personnel greatly increased due to the changing nature of UN peacekeeping missions. The 'stabilisation' missions often go alongside military operations against

insurgents or terrorist groups and therefore risk reprisal attacks against UN forces. In Mali, MINUSMA operated alongside French forces operating under the banner of Operation Barkhane and the Malian Army in the fight against Tuareg insurgents and Islamist groups like Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (Kjeksrud and Vermeij, 2017: 231). To reflect the increased awareness of the need for intelligence and the impact good intelligence can have on the security of its personnel, the UN established a new intelligence-sharing model alongside the previously established JMAC structure: the 'All-Source Intelligence Fusion Unit' or *ASIFU*. The ASIFU is primarily based on the model of intelligence collection and dissemination used by Dutch forces during their time leading the Provincial Reconstruction Team Uruzgan between 2006 and 2010.

After the traumatic experience in Srebrenica, the Netherlands was long hesitant to take on a major role in peacekeeping missions again. Furthermore, its military resources were exhausted after budget cuts and its participation in the war in Afghanistan (Willingen, 2016: 707). However, with calls for assistance during MINUSMA, the Dutch government under Mark Rutte felt it was time again for a sizeable contribution, especially given the government's attention on the world stage for human rights and development assistance (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014: 5). It therefore decided to contribute an initial 385 military personnel and a range of civilian experts, bringing the total contribution to about 450 (Tweede Kamer, 2013: 14). With its fighting capacity greatly reduced due to exhaustion from the mission in Afghanistan, it decided to spearhead the intelligence capacity needed for the mandate, an area in which it felt it had considerable experience after the war in Afghanistan (Van Willigen, 2016: 716). By creating the ASIFU, it responded to the previous criticism aimed at JMAC. Now, the focus of JMAC could be fully aimed at collecting and disseminating intelligence at the strategic level whereas the ASIFU was tasked with providing peacekeepers with operational intelligence. This ensured greater protection for UN personnel and enhance the execution of the mandate by providing timely analysis to peacekeeping units (Rietjens and De Waard, 2017: 536). While meant to aid operational and tactical operations, its collection capabilities would also support strategic planning (idem 534).

Acquisition and Analysis

The Dutch intelligence techniques used in Uruzgan and now used in Mali followed the so-called PMESII-approach (Rietjens and Dorn, 2017: 201). The PMESII-approach is used extensively by civilian and military intelligence agencies aiming to create a comprehensive picture of the situation on the ground by means of interconnectedness. Using PMESII, the operating environment is divided into six domains: Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure (Kodalle et al., 2020: 12). Intelligence collection was done in a variety of ways, and some countries made available to the mission state-of-the-art equipment. At the base of ASIFU was a Dutch special forces unit, the 1 (NLD) Special Operations Land Task Group (SOLTG). The SOLTG consisted of small teams of 6-8 commandos from the Dutch Korps Commandotroepen, special forces of the Royal Dutch Army (Rietjens and Zomer, 2017: 139). Given the risk that small patrols carry when performing long-range patrols in such a large area as Mali, intelligence units from the special forces were complemented by the deployment of mortar groups, electronic warfare units and a bomb disposal unit (ibid). This has resulted in well-equipped, well-armed mobile units that approach people to gather intelligence under the banner of the UN, and being recognisable as such. Intelligence collection was further militarised when the SOLTG was complemented by a Swedish Intelligence and Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) unit. Besides the special forces available for collecting HUMINT, extra resources included UAVs for IMINT, civil-military interaction groups (CMI) for cross-sector analysis and easier access to the local population, and OSINT analysts (Rietjens and Dorn, 2017: 206). This mix of civilian and military personnel served to speed up the processing and production of information (Rietjens and Zomer, 2017: 150).

It is important to highlight the different route the UN has taken with regards to intelligence gathering by using special forces. Special forces are well-suited to gather HUMINT due to their specialised nature in stealthily approaching targets and being small and mobile. Their background in reconnaissance often results in higher quality intelligence gathering skills, and in most cases those belonging

to special forces units are better trained in sensitivities like ethnic and religious affairs (Resteigne and Van den Bogaert, 2017: 56). They usually possess the best military equipment of an army, and in this case, this included technology to create maps of who is who in order to identify local strongmen and village leaders as well as high value targets of Islamist organisations. The UN and troop-contributing countries to the AISFU also recognised this value (Duursma, 2018: 465). The one problem that special forces face is their usual secretive nature, the one thing the UN has always resisted against. Special forces customarily operate in darkness and not seldom having to capture targets on foreign soil by violating state sovereignty or sabotaging infrastructure. So, while the UN recognised the usefulness of special forces in collecting intelligence, it could not allow for secretive operations to target individuals for intelligence. Hence, during MINUSMA, personnel gathering HUMINT is always recognisable as UN personnel and HUMINT gathered or used by UN personnel has to be overt according to UN rules (Rietjens and De Waard, 2017: 536).

With regards to the analysis and dissemination factors of the intelligence cycle, the UN also diverges from the traditional intelligence producing process. All gathered data is analysed by a team of analysts employed by a national government. There is a respective end goal, namely, to advance national interests by supporting decision-making at the national level. At the UN, analysts from multiple countries are required to collaborate and set aside their national interests in favour of the interests of the UN and the mission (Ruffa and Rietjens, 2022: 18). During the initial stages, analysts at the ASIFU were Dutch military and civilian personnel. However, after the first rotation this expanded to become a multinational analyst team. Besides common problems in multinational teams like cultural differences, other problems presented itself. In fact, there probably could not have been a mission that made the binary between Western nations non-Western nations clearer. Interviews with Dutch intelligence officers from the ASIFU highlighted these problems. To provide personnel with a secure communications network, European personnel were granted access to TITAAN, the Theatre Independent Tactical Army and Air Force Network. Out of fear for espionage, UN personnel from non-European countries were not granted access to this network which hampered the sharing

of information and thus the improvement of situational awareness of the operating environment from different parts of the country (Rietjens and Baudet, 2017: 217). One respondent in the study also revealed that, despite high-tech cameras installed on Dutch Apache helicopters, mainly ordinary reflex cameras were used as using the on-board cameras would result in sharing operational details of the quality of the camera when sharing IMINT with non-NATO peacekeepers (idem, 209).

Furthermore, ASIFU suffers from an endemic excess of data. The ASIFU receives information from the different long-range reconnaissance units that gather data on a regular basis, it receives IMINT from the use of UAVs and also receives OSINT and other information from the JMAC and other allied intelligence agencies. The problem here lies in the storage capacity of the UN. While there is no lack of data, there is no efficient storage capacity for much of the data. All gathered aerial footage is saved with a tag of date and location but hardly ever analysed. When relevant, analysts pull it from archive to see if it contains anything useful (Dorn and Giardullo, 2020: 92). The PMESII techniques that are used in reports shared among troops are mainly used by NATO countries and therefore interoperability remains an issue when having an intelligence branch staffed by multinational personnel that is not familiar with these techniques (Rietjens and Dorn, 2017: 216).

Dissemination to Decision-making and guidance

Cultural differences have also seeped into the UN. This is understandable at a multinational organisation, but poses problems during multinational collaboration. Peacekeeping missions, MINUSMA and others, are typically set up in a very top-down hierarchical structure. In the intelligence field, this has resulted in the JMAC collecting intelligence, the ASIFU collecting intelligence, and the Force Commander having his own intelligence staff. Notably the latter, consisting of a dozen or so personnel, caused friction with ASIFU. While the intelligence staff of the Force Commander consisted mainly of military personnel untrained in intelligence practices, the ASIFU was specifically set up to consist of intelligence personnel. Therefore, the ASIFU saw itself as the real

intelligence unit as opposed to the Force Commander's intelligence staff (Rietjens and Baudet, 2016: 210 and 2011)

Conclusion

MINUSMA has shown that enemy-centric intelligence is no longer sufficient in peace operations. While states have the luxury to focus mainly on this type of intelligence, multidimensional missions require intelligence on a far broader scale. States do not require intelligence to inform decisions surrounding nation-building or democratisation. With the ASIFU, the UN has gained a strong base in intelligence collection. While it might have been disbanded, its function will likely be incorporated into the wider intelligence mechanism and its experiences will provide vital experiences. One key learning point for the UN has been the confusion of responsibilities and turf wars that followed ASIFU's creation. In this light, it is understandable that the decision was made to disband the ASIFU. The 2017 report recognises that the UN's intelligence cycle is still not fully functional, and that information is not properly translated into actionable products. As it states: "we have a clear lack of tactical information in the field. And when we do have it, we are not proactive" (UN, 2017: 14). Even the ASIFU was not able to overcome these UN's level of barriers.

The Road Forward

Conclusion

While academic literature on peacekeeping intelligence is becoming more commonplace, overarching literature to UN intelligence is still in its infancy compared to the wide range of literature that researches national security intelligence. With intelligence at the UN remaining a sensitive topic despite the increasing recognition of the need for intelligence, this cannot be considered surprising. However, recent missions have shown the need for actionable, quick, and comprehensive intelligence, as has been explained throughout this paper. As identified in the introduction and literature review, a comprehensive overview of the evolution of intelligence as a concept remains under researched and while this thesis has attempted to do so, it still has not been able to touch upon many aspects of the topic due to the sheer scope of the subject. To be able to add some new thoughts to the existing literature, this thesis discussed convergences and divergences of UN peacekeeping intelligence while comparing case studies, in order to provide an answer to the research question:

*How has intelligence as a concept evolved in UN
peacekeeping missions?*

Throughout the thesis, use was made of a series of drivers guiding the research towards the main research question. The key principles of UN peacekeeping, consent, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defence, were elaborated upon to provide an answer to historical arguments that have been used to ignore intelligence at the UN. To research barriers to the development of an intelligence culture at a more practical level the paper addressed the issue of national interests and culture.

To effectively research the key differences and similarities between generations of peacekeeping intelligence, use was made of several case studies. These three cases were reflective of the three generic peacekeeping generations commonly identified in academic literature and which have been used to study the key principles and drivers. Furthermore, some key objectives were identified before the research, the first looking to understand the separation between tactical/operational intelligence as opposed to strategic intelligence within the

UN. State influence and sovereignty has been used in an attempt to understand if changing mandates – reflective of the changing types of peacekeeping missions – resulted in changing attitudes at the UN towards its key principles. While it was mentioned just above that the UN has three key principles, the choice was made to focus on state influence and sovereignty as these are closely tied to traditional definitions of intelligence and have been identified as one of the main reasons the UN has traditionally ignored any attempts to provide intelligence capabilities to the organisation. Failures and successes of each mission were identified in an attempt to describe the influence of UN missions on the development of its conceptual understanding of intelligence.

To differentiate between the traditional most secretive part of intelligence, collection, and the more strategic level of intelligence, the guidance and decision-making, the intelligence cycle has been used as the key tool throughout this research. Historically a tool to guide intelligence practices at the state level, it has been adopted by military organisations like NATO and subsequently by the UN. Dividing the cycle into two offered the chance to see the difference between the evolution at the theatre level, where collection and dissemination took place, and the much slower evolution at the headquarter level. While the operational side remains difficult to assess given that much remains restricted, this paper has shown an indicative overview that argues that the evolution at the theatre level has evolved much more rapidly due to a necessity for reliable intelligence combined with the driving force of military personnel that, at some key moments, brought with them experience with military intelligence practices which resulted in success. This facilitated the discussion at UN headquarters with regard to intelligence and introduced a slow beginning of an UN intelligence culture.

UNPROFOR

Using intelligence reports from Dutch UN peacekeepers in Srebrenica in 1994/1995, the Dutchbat IV rotation, as well as Dutch, Canadian, US and UN policy documents, research has shown that the first steps of the intelligence cycle consisted of foot patrols and observations only with the sporadic exception

of information that was gathered from news channels and basic data from headquarters. All UN peacekeeping forces on the ground suffered from these failures in operational intelligence: the lack of willingness to consider intelligence as a necessary part of peacekeeping and failure of the mandate to allow for proactive intelligence collection led to severe barriers in effective peacekeeping and contributed to the fall of Srebrenica. This is reflected in the Dutch government documents and in Dutchbat reports from only two weeks before the fall of Srebrenica, that indicated that no attack on the safe area was to be expected. The lack of available data on the ground in turn affected the dissemination process: as the mandate only allowed for basic observations the quality of available intelligence, affecting the situational awareness and the predictive quality the UN had available.

MINUSTAH

The MINUSTAH case study introduced the Joint Mission Analysis Centre to this research. The JMAC proved to be a large shift in UN thinking on the concept of intelligence. The introduction transformed intelligence at the UN not only at the strategic level – as was intended – but also upgraded the operational capabilities which in turn introduced a new bottom-up effect of using intelligence in UN peacekeeping missions. Heavier use of helicopters and UAVs, brought by the Latin countries, resulted in some considerable successes which made intelligence more appreciated at the senior management level at the mission-level. While it did bring a militarisation to intelligence, it did introduce a predictive side to understanding analysis at the UN. While situational awareness had been used on a small, tactical scale at the UN, predictive analysis to support military action was unprecedented when it happened during MINUSTAH. Aerial imagery combined with photographs were used to predict actions by what was now openly called the adversary (Yamashita, 2008: 626). While during UNPROFOR Dutchbat was supposed to be neutral and a middle ground between the Bosnian Muslims and the Serbs, during MINUSMA the peacekeepers clearly took a side against the criminal gangs. This clearly showed a violation of one of its key principles and a shift to an understanding of intelligence similar to state agencies. At the same time, the UN insisted on

remaining transparent and overt; when approaching assets peacekeepers had to be clearly identifiable as UN personnel and the UN categorically refused – at least openly – to allow intelligence to be used when they knew it came from covert action (Rietjens and De Waard, 2017: 536).

MINUSMA

In the final case presented in this research, the creation of the ASIFU served to take a closer look at the attempt to widen situational awareness and predictive assessments in order to safeguard its own personnel and also the civilian population. As mentioned earlier, effective HUMINT collection can only be achieved when the civilian population trusts the peacekeepers and the usefulness of the mission. In most cases, and as has been explained in this paper, UN peacekeeping missions can only achieve results when it enjoys access to effective and comprehensive intelligence. The All Source Intelligence Fusion Unit was an logic continuation in the exploration of intelligence in the UN. It managed to provide high-quality and reliable intelligence to its peacekeepers, and in that sense also cleared previous confusion on who was responsible for operational and tactical intelligence and who was responsible for strategic intelligence. The dissolution of the unit only a few years later, in 2018, showed that the UN is still struggling to find its way around the idea of having dedicated intelligence units. Being an international organisation made up of many suborganisations and being multinational, it suffers a lot of red tape and clashes of interests, which more than once hampered the effective sharing of intelligence within MINUSMA. Its importance cannot be understated, however, as the ASIFU provided the UN with invaluable experience with multinational, civilian-military intelligence units and allowed it to see if operational intelligence could be gathered by overt means only.

Rise of a New Definition or Concept

By analysing these three case studies, the paper has argued that the UN has undergone a considerable evolution with regards to its understanding of intelligence. From a total abhorrence and refusal to incorporate real-time, actionable intelligence, the UN has changed to an organisation that is

recognising and slowly adapting to a new operating environment where intelligence is not only at the base of operations, but also a tool to develop a more unified organisation. Where, during MINUSTAH, the concept of intelligence-based operations gained traction, the concept of ASIFU laid bare issues with intelligence-sharing due to NATO/non-NATO loyalties and Western high-tech equipment versus African non-high-tech equipment. While this has no place in the organisation, the UN should laud that interviews by academics – some mentioned in this research paper – have indicated that UN intelligence officers were highly frustrated by these issues and that their professionalism meant they were willing to cross bridges to solve these intercultural issues in order to fulfil their task. In this sense, the UN has come a long way from the highly compartmentalised and loyalty-to-country attitude that reigned during UNPROFOR.

With its strong stance on impartiality, the UN has continued to refuse covert action in order to gather intelligence, and hence it has had to develop its own concept of what intelligence is. Ultimately the paper can conclude that the UN has seen an evolution of intelligence as a definition to an intelligence ‘light’ version. Given its history of intelligence being gathered by military personnel and only lately by civilian personnel too, intelligence within the UN is more militarised compared to intelligence theory that came forth from studying civilian agencies. A few key differences identified in this research between intelligence at a state level and at the UN level concern the acquisition step of the intelligence cycle and the dissemination factor. The UN has created its own version of acquisition, where it has changed concept of intelligence from a concept that permanently includes covert means to one that is solely overt. Those that gather HUMINT are always recognisable in order to increase transparency and trust. The UN’s interpretation of what states would consider an intelligence agency is the JMAC where there is much higher range of intelligence fusion compared to national agencies. Most countries have separate military intelligence and civilian intelligence agencies whereas the UN has created a mechanism that sees a high level of collaboration between civilian experts and military officers, a feature probably unique among the major intelligence players in the world.

Convergences and Divergences in UN intelligence

However, it is important to note the difficulties the UN still faces. While it has sophisticated means and capabilities to gather data, it still lacks experience in the basic functions of intelligence. The UN still lacks a strong intelligence culture that now consists of ad hoc solutions by willing intelligence officers on the ground but still faces a lack of support from the higher level to improve. UN peacekeepers encounter a consistent pattern of unwillingness to consider intelligence at the strategic level which creates confusion about mandates among operational forces and its mechanisms. A clear need for a shared UN intelligence culture has been identified to break loyalty to national cultures and national interests. This could, for instance, break the West's overreliance on high-tech ways of collecting data and improve intelligence by sharing means with other countries that have more personnel.

In terms of its dissemination, militarisation of the intelligence cycle has led to peacekeepers replacing intelligence officers in some units and still gather relatively high-quality products in a more overt way. This has influenced the traditional definition of intelligence like that of Lowenthal or of Kent mentioned earlier in this paper which mainly focus on the end goal of intelligence, which they consider to be focused on influencing decision making for national interests towards the goal of advancing state interests. With the UN, multinational peacekeepers come together to gather intelligence in order to advance nation-building and peace. The willingness to create a culture to achieve this goal is strong among ground personnel. Yet, senior personnel continues to disregard requests for more capabilities. First and foremost, senior staff face a mindset problem where they ignore the importance of intelligence on a practical level.

Still, the development of intelligence capabilities, slow as it may be, can only be lauded as a welcome development. Even more important is the start of a special UN intelligence culture, separate from national intelligence cultures. Long heard criticism within the organisation that peacekeepers and intelligence officers always kept their country's interests in mind hampered the development

of an effective intelligence culture. Even to this day, the UN is plagued by the separation between Western, NATO-member states and poorer non-NATO states. This is a criticism that gives cause for further research. The aforementioned overreliance on high-tech means of intelligence stems mainly from the use of Western nations as intelligence-collectors. As the richer countries in most missions, they supply most sophisticated material. However, for the fear of having to divulge NATO intelligence practices, most NATO military personnel deployed as peacekeepers are hesitant to share intelligence with non-NATO peacekeepers, leading to a decrease in efficiency of available capabilities. While these capabilities have grown since UNPROFOR, the underlying turf wars and state interests challenging the effective use remain. The UN will have to look to solutions to overcome barriers like leaking of information and national interests to have NATO and non-NATO countries collaborate under the banner of the UN. How this can be overcome warrants further research.

The outcome of this thesis is only a small drop in the pond of knowledge but hopefully one that has shown that intelligence is not as rigid a concept as once thought. The UN has the ability to change its conceptual framework thanks to its diverse and historical experiences. The diversity among UN personnel could lead to a plethora of new interpretations of intelligence and add to the academic literature which, so far, is mainly limited to Western experiences. Ultimately, the identified findings on the evolution of intelligence can inform others and form the basis of further research. More research and more awareness on UN intelligence can hopefully alleviate some of the criticisms the institution faces in these difficult times where many question the role it plays in conflicts like Ukraine and hopefully improve the use of intelligence in future missions.

References

Primary Sources

- French Parliamentary Commission on Srebrenica. (2001). Meeting Between General Janvier and General Mladic on June 4 1995. Available at: <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB519-Srebrenica-conference-documents-detail-path-to-genocide-from-1993-to-1995/Documents/DOCUMENT%2015.pdf> (Accessed 17 January 2022).
- Netherlands Ministry of Defence. (1995). Bijlage bij SITUATIE RAPPORT VREDESOPERATIES, nr. 137/95: Toestand in de enclave Srebrenica in periode 10/11 juli 1995. *Netherlands Institute for Military History* [Stg. CONF].
- Royal Netherlands Army. (1995). SITREP 30MEI95 – 06JUN95. *KL Crisisstaf* [Stg CONF].
- Royal Netherlands Army. (1995a). WEEKSITREP 07JUN95 – 12JUN95. *KL Crisisstaf* [Stg CONF].
- Royal Netherlands Army. (1995b). INTREP 04JUL95 – 10JUL95. *KL Crisisstaf* [Stg CONF].
- Tweede Kamer. (1993). Motie van Vlijmen/Van Traa – Kamerstuk 22 975, nr. 20. *Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal*.
- Tweede Kamer. (2013). Nederlandse Deelname aan Vredesmissies 29 521, nr. 213. *Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal*.
- United Nations. (1945). *United Nations Charter*. Available at: un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text (Accessed 12 July 2022).
- United Nations. (1992). Resolution 743. *United Nations Security Council*. Available at: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/743> (Accessed 19 March 2022).
- United Nations. (1992a). Resolution 758. *United Nations Security Council*. Available at: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/758> (Accessed 19 March 2022).
- United Nations. (1993). Resolution 819. *United Nations Security Council*. Available at: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/819> (Accessed 19 March 2022).

- United Nations. (1996). *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping* (3rd ed.). New York: UN Department of Public Information.
- United Nations. (1999). Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica. *United Nations General Assembly*. Available at: <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/348/76/IMG/N9934876.pdf?OpenElement> (Accessed 19 March 2022).
- United Nations. (1999a). General Assembly document A/54/549 of 15 November 1999. *United Nations General Assembly*. Available at: <https://police.un.org/en/report-of-secretary-general-pursuant-to-general-assembly-resolution-5335-fall-of-srebrenica-a54549> (Accessed 23 April 2022).
- United Nations. (2000). *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report)*. Available at: peacekeeping.un.org/en/report-of-panel-united-nations-peace-operations-brahimi-report-a55305 (13 February 2022).
- United Nations. (2003). Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations. Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/peacekeeping-handbook_un_dec2003_0.pdf (Accessed 2 February 2022).
- United Nations. (2004). Resolution 1542. *United Nations Security Council*. Available at: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1542> (Accessed 2 May 2022).
- United Nations. (2008). United Nations Peacekeeping: Principles and Guidelines. *Department of Peacekeeping Operations*. Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/capstone_eng_0.pdf (Accessed at 22 March 2022).
- United Nations. (2013). Resolution 2100. *United Nations Security Council*. Available at: unscr.com/en/resolutions/2100 (Accessed 19 February 2022).
- United Nations. (2015). *Report of the Independent High-Level Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO)*. Available at: peacekeeping.un.org/en/report-of-independent-high-level-panel-peace-operations (Accessed 17 February 2022).

- United Nations. (2017). Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers: We need to change the way we are doing business. *Office of the Secretary-General of the United Nations*. Available at: dag.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/400600/Santos%20Cruz%20Report_Final.pdf (Accessed 13 May 2022).
- United Nations. (2019). United Nations Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence Handbook. *Department of Peace Operations*. Available at: dag.un.org/handle/11176/324835 (Accessed 1 March 2022).
- United Nations. (2021). Strategy for the Digital Transformation of UN Peacekeeping. *Department of Peace Operations*. Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/strategy-for-the-digital-transformation-of-un-peacekeeping_en_final-01_15-08-2021_final.pdf (Accessed 23 May 2022).
- United Nations. (2022). Russia Blocks Security Council Action on Ukraine, 26 February. *UN News*. Available at: <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/02/1112802> (Accessed 13 July 2022).
- United Nations. (2022a). United Nations Peacekeeping: Where we Operate. Available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/where-we-operate> (Accessed 11 July 2022).
- United Nations. (2022b). United Nations Peacekeeping: MINUSMA Personnel. Available at: <https://minusma.unmissions.org/en/personnel> (Accessed 9 March 2022).
- U.S. Government. (2004). The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Report). *National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*. Available at: <https://www.govinfo.gov/features/911-commission-report> (Accessed 12 May 2022).
- U.S. Government. (2005). Office of the Inspector General Report on CIA Accountability With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks. *Office of the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency*. Available at: <https://irp.fas.org/cia/product/oig-911.pdf> (Accessed 19 March 2022).
- U.S. Government. (2011). U.S. National Intelligence: An Overview. *Office of the Director of National Intelligence*. Available at: <https://www.dni.gov>

- hsdl.org/c/us-national-intelligence-an-overview-2011/ (Accessed 30 December 2021).
- U.S. Government. (2014). Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. *Joint Chiefs of Staff*. Available at: <https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/jp2-01-3.pdf> (Accessed 13 January 2022).
- White House. (1993). Memorandum of Conversation: Meeting with Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis of Greece, 12 December. Available at: [https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/memcons-telcons/1991-12-12--Mitsotakis%20\[3\].pdf](https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/memcons-telcons/1991-12-12--Mitsotakis%20[3].pdf) (Accessed 15 March 2022).
- White House. (1995). Department of State Memorandum re Bosnia and Diplomatic Strategic Sarajevo Airport, 1995-05-09. *Clinton Digital Library*. Available at: <http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/> (Accessed 16 March 2022).

Secondary Sources

- Abilova, O. and Novosseloff, A. (2016). Demystifying Intelligence in UN Peace Operations: Toward an Organizational Doctrine. *International Peace Institute*.
- Ahmad, S. Z. (1998). The UN's Role in the Bosnian Crisis: A Critique. *Pakistan Horizon*, 51(2), pp. 83–92.
- Albrecht, P. et al. (2017). *African Peacekeepers in Mali*. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies.
- Aldrich, R.J. and Kasuku, J. (2012). Escaping from American intelligence: culture, ethnocentrism, and the Anglosphere. *International Affairs*, 88(5), pp. 1009-1028.
- Amoroso, A. M. (2019). Mali: The Overlap and Combination of Separatist, Jihadist and Intercommunal Conflicts. In: Bellal, A. (ed.). *The War Report: Armed Conflicts in 2018*. Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, pp. 102-116.
- Badescu, C. G., & Weiss, T. G. (2010). Misrepresenting R2P and Advancing Norms: An Alternative Spiral? *International Studies Perspectives*, 11(4), pp. 354–374.

- Barnett, M. N. (1997). The UN Security Council, Indifference, and Genocide in Rwanda. *Cultural Anthropology*, 12(4), pp. 551–578.
- Barry, J.A. (2012). Bolstering United Nations Intelligence. *American intelligence journal*, 30(1), pp. 7-16.
- Baudet, F. *et al.* (2017). Military Intelligence: From Telling *Truth to Power* to Bewilderment? In: Baudet *et al.* (eds.) *Perspectives on Military Intelligence from the First World War to Mali*, pp. 1-22. The Hague: Asser Press.
- Bauman, Z. *et al.* (2015). Repenser l’impact de la surveillance après l’affaire Snowden: Sécurité nationale, droits de l’homme, démocratie, subjectivité et obéissance. *Cultures et Conflits*, 98, pp. 133-166.
- Baxter, P. and Jack, S. (2008). Qualitative Case Study Methodology: Study Design and Implementation for Novice Researchers. *The Qualitative Report*, 13(4), pp. 544-559.
- Bhojwani, D. (2012). Responsibility to Protect Issues of Legality and Legitimacy. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 47(46), pp. 28-30.
- Bimfort, M.T. (1958). A Definition of Intelligence. *Central Intelligence Agency*. Available at: https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000606548.pdf (Accessed 10 February 2022).
- Bjelajac, M. and Žunec, O. (2009). *The War in Croatia, 1991-1995*. In: Ingrao, Charles, and Thomas A. Emmert, editors. *Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholars’ Initiative*. Purdue University Press, 2013.
- Blas, A.K. (2009). Intelligence in Afghanistan: Why Is It Hard? *American Intelligence Journal*, 27(1), pp. 49-54.
- Blouin, M. (2018). Peacekeeping: A Strategic Approach, *The Canadian Journal of Economics/ Revue canadienne d’Economie*, 51(1), pp. 41-63.
- Bloomfield, L.P. (1966). Peacekeeping and Peacemaking, *Foreign Affairs*, 44(4), pp. 671-682.
- Boeke, S. and Schuurman, B. (2015). Operation ‘Serval’: A Strategic Analysis of the French Intervention in Mali, 2013–2014, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 38(6), pp. 801-825.

- Borch, F.L. (2003). Comparing Pearl Harbor and 9/11: Intelligence Failure? American Unpreparedness? Military Responsibility? *The Journal of Military History*, 67(3), pp. 845-860.
- Boutros-Ghali, B. (1996). UN peacekeeping: an introduction. *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, 3(1), pp. 17-22.
- Branson, K. and Wilkinson, H. (2013) Analysis of the Crisis in northern Mali: Sahel and West Africa Club. In: OECD, *Conflict over Resources and Terrorism: Two Facets of Insecurity*, pp. 87-97.
- Burds, J. (2011). *The Second Oldest Profession: A World History of Espionage*. Northeastern University.
- Burk, J. (1997). Why Peacekeeping? *Armed Forces and Society*, 23(3), pp. 323-326.
- Cammaert, P.C. (2003). Intelligence in Peacekeeping Operations: Lessons for the Future. In: Steele, R.D. et al. (eds.). *Peacekeeping Intelligence: Emerging Concepts for the Future*, pp. 11-30. Oakton: OSS International Press.
- CIA. (2022). World Factbook: Mali. *Central Intelligence Agency*. Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/mali> (Accessed 19 May 2022).
- Champagne, B. (2006). The United Nations and Intelligence. *Peace Operations Training Institute*. Available at: <https://cdn.peaceopstraining.org/t-heses/champagne.pdf> (Accessed 21 February 2022).
- Charlish, A. and Pawlak, J. (2022). Poland to propose Ukraine peacekeeping mission at NATO summit, says PM, 18 March. *Reuters*. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/poland-propose-ukraine-peace-keeping-mission-nato-summit-says-pm-2022-03-18/> (Accessed:13 July 2022).
- Chemillier-Gendreau, M. (2022). UN's failure over war in Ukraine: The time has come to imagine a new world organization that will ensure peace, 31 May. *Le Monde*.
- Chesterman, S. (2006) Does the UN have intelligence? *Survival*, 48(3), pp. 149-164
- Chido, D.E., 2018. *Intelligence Sharing, Transnational Organized Crime and Multinational Peacekeeping*. Cham: Springer International Publishing.

- Ciorciari, J.D. (2022). Haiti and the Pitfalls of Sharing Police Powers *International Peacekeeping*, 29(3), pp. 384-412.
- Cockayne, J. (2014). The Futility of Force? Strategic Lessons for Dealing with Unconventional Armed Groups from the UN's War on Haiti's Gangs, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 37(5), pp. 736-769.
- Cohen, M. (1967). The Demise of UNEF. *International Journal*, 23(1), pp. 18–51.
- Cohen, L. J. (1992). The Disintegration of Yugoslavia. *Current History*, 91(568), pp. 369–375.
- Crain, N.T. (2012). Haiti: Two Decades of Intervention and Very Little to Show. Fort Leavenworth: CGSC.
- Creswell, J.W. (2017). *Qualitative inquiry and research design (international student edition): Choosing among five approaches* (4th ed.). London: SAGE Publications.
- Cumings, B. (1997). Boundary Displacement: Area Studies and International Studies During and after the Cold War, *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, 29(1), pp. 6-26.
- Daalder, I.H. (2002). The United States, Europe, and the Balkans, *Problems of Post-Communism*, 49(1), pp. 3-11.
- Daalder, I.H. (2014). *Getting to Dayton: The Making of America's Bosnia Policy*. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
- Damboeck, J. (2012). Humanitarian interventions: western imperialism or a responsibility to protect? An analysis of the humanitarian interventions in Darfur. *Multicultural Education & Technology Journal*, 6(4), pp. 287-300.
- Dandeker, C. and Gow, J. (1997). The Future of Peace Support Operations, *Armed Forces and Society*, 23(3), pp. 327-347.
- Dannenbaum, T. (2012). Killings at Srebrenica, Effective Control, and the Power to Prevent Unlawful Conduct. *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, 61(3), pp. 713-728.
- Davis, J. (1992). The Kent-Kendall Debate of 1949. *Central Intelligence Agency*.

- Díaz, G. (2007). Intelligence at the United Nations for Peace Operations. *Revista UNISCI*, 13, pp. 25-41.
- De Graaff, B. and Wiebes, C. (2014). Fallen off the Priority List: Was Srebrenica an Intelligence Failure? In: Walton, T.R. (ed.). *The Role of Intelligence Ending the War in Bosnia in 1995*. Lanham: Lexington Books, pp. 149-166.
- Diallo, O.A. (2017). Ethnic Clashes, Jihad, and Insecurity in Central Mali, *Peace Review*, 29(3), pp. 299-306.
- Di Salvatore, J. and Ruggeri, A. (2017). Effectiveness of Peacekeeping Operations. In: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. Available at: <https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-586?print=pdf> (Accessed 16 July 2022).
- Dorn, W.A. (1999) The Cloak and the Blue Beret: Limitations on Intelligence in UN Peacekeeping, *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, 12(4), pp. 414-447.
- Dorn, A.W. (2009). Intelligence-led Peacekeeping: The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), 2006-07, *Intelligence and national security*, 24(6), pp. 805-835.
- Dorn, A.W. (2010). United Nations Peacekeeping. In L.K. Johnson (Ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence* (pp. 275-295). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Dorn, A.W. and Giardullo, C. (2020). Analysis for Peace: the Evolving Data Tools of UN and OSCE Field Operations, *Security and Human Rights*, 31(1-4), pp. 90-101.
- Doyle, M.W. and Sambanis, N. (2007). The UN record on peacekeeping operations. *International Journal*, 62(3), pp. 495-518.
- Duursma, A. (2018). Information Processing Challenges in Peacekeeping Operations: A Case Study on Peacekeeping Information Collection Efforts in Mali. *International Peacekeeping*, 25(3), pp. 446-468.
- Dziedzich, M. and Perito, R. (2008). Haiti: Confronting the Gangs of Port-au-Prince, 1 September. *United States Institute of Peace*.

- Edström, H. and Gyllensporre, D. (2013). *Political Aspirations and Perils of Security: Unpacking the Military Strategy of the United Nations*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Elischer, S. (2022). Populist civil society, the Wagner Group and post-coup politics in Mali, *West African Papers*, (36). OECD Publishing, Paris.
- Fagerland, G. (2017). *UN Peace Operations and Intelligence: Can the Joint Mission Analysis Centre Succeed?* Oslo: Forsvarets hogskole.
- Fetherston, A.B., Ramsbotham, O. and Woodhouse, T. (1994) UNPROFOR: Some observations from a conflict resolution perspective, *International Peacekeeping*, 1(2), pp. 179-203
- Gauthier Vela, V. (2021). MINUSMA and the Militarization of UN Peacekeeping, *International Peacekeeping*, 28(5), pp. 838-863.
- George, A.L. and Bennett, A. (2005). *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- George, R.Z. and Bruce, J.B. (2014). *Analyzing Intelligence: National Security Practitioners' Perspectives*, 2nd ed. Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
- Gill, P. and Phythian, M. (2016). What Is Intelligence Studies? *The International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs*, 18(1), pp. 5-19.
- Gill, P. (2020) Explaining Intelligence Failure: Rethinking the Recent Terrorist Attacks in Europe, *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, 33(1), pp. 43-67.
- Girard, P. (2010). *Haiti: The Tumultuous History – From Pearl of the Caribbean to Broken Nation*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Goldberg, M.L. (2019). The United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Mali is on the Front Lines of Fighting Terrorist Groups. *UN Dispatch*.
- Goodrich, L. M. (1953). The United Nations and the Korean War: A Case Study. *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science*, 25(2), pp. 90–104.
- Goodwin, G. (1958). The Role of the United Nations in World Affairs. *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, 34(1), pp. 25–37.
- Gordon, G.M. and Young, L.E. (2017). Cooperation, information, and keeping the peace: Civilian engagement with peacekeepers in Haiti, *Journal of Peace Research*, 54(1), pp. 64-79.

- Gowan, R. (2022). The Ukraine War and UN Reform, 6 May. *International Crisis Group*. Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/ukraine-war-and-un-reform> (Accessed 13 July 2022).
- Guidi, R. (2009). MINUSTAH Focuses on Security in Haiti's Cité Soleil Slum, 20 August. *Americas Quarterly*. Available at: <https://www.americasquarterly.org/blog/minustah-focuses-on-security-in-haitis-cite-soleil-slum/> (Accessed 15 May 2022).
- Hastedt, G. (2013). The Politics of Intelligence and the Politicization of Intelligence: The American Experience, *Intelligence and National Security*, 28(1), pp. 5-31.
- Hausotter, J.O. (2008). The Uses of Peacekeeping: The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, 32(1), pp. 145-160.
- Herman, M. (1996). *Intelligence Power in Peace and War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Herman, M. (2003). Intelligence Doctrine for International Peace Support. In: Steele, R.D. et al. (eds.), *Peacekeeping Intelligence: Emerging Concepts for the Future*, pp. 152-170. Oakton: OSS International Press.
- Herta, L.M. (2012). Peacekeeping and (mis)management of ethnic disputes: The Cyprus case, *Studia Europaea*, 57(3), pp. 59-76.
- Heyink, J.W. and Tymstra, T.J. (1993). The Function of Qualitative Research. *Social Indicators Research*, 29(3), pp. 291-305.
- Honig, J.W. and Both, N. (1996). *Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
- Howard, L.M. (2002). UN Implementation in Namibia: The causes of success. *International Peacekeeping*, 9(1), pp. 99-132.
- Ingiriis, M. (2020). Predatory Politics and Personalization of Power: The Abuses and Misuses of the National Intelligence and Security Agency in Somalia, 119(475), pp. 251-274.
- International Crisis Group. (2012). MINUSTAH: Achievements and Setbacks. In: Crisis Group Latin America/Caribbean, *Towards a Post-MINUSTAH Haiti: Making an Effective Transition*.

- International Peace Institute. (2016). Demystifying Intelligence in UN Peace Operations, July 18. Available at: <https://www.ipinst.org/2016/07/intelligence-un-peace-operations-2#5> (Accessed 1 July 2022).
- Jan, A. (1998). Somalia: Failure in Peacebuilding. In: Grandvoinnet, H. and Schneider, H. (eds.). *Development Centre Seminars Conflict Management Africa: A Permanent Challenge*, pp. 73-78.
- Jeffreys-Jones, R. (2013) *In Spies We Trust: The Story of Western Intelligence*. Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Johnson, L.K. (2007). *Handbook of Intelligence Studies*. Abingdon: Routledge Publishing.
- Johnston, P. (1997). No cloak and dagger required: Intelligence support to UN peacekeeping, *Intelligence and National Security*, 12(4), pp. 102-112.
- Kalsrud, J. and Smith, A.C. (2015). Europe's Return to UN Peacekeeping in Africa? Lessons from Mali. *International Peace Institute*.
- Kamarck, E. (2021). 9/11 and the reinvention of the US intelligence community, August 27. *Brookings*. Available at: [9/11 and the reinvention of the US intelligence community \(brookings.edu\)](https://www.brookings.edu/event/9-11-and-the-reinvention-of-the-us-intelligence-community) (Accessed at 16 February 2022).
- Keita, K. (1998). *Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg Insurgency in Mali*. Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute Publications.
- Kendall, W. (1949). The Function of Intelligence, *World Politics*, 1(4), pp. 542-552.
- Kenkel, K.M. (2013). Five generations of peace operations: from the “thin blue line” to “painting a country blue”, *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, 56(1), pp. 122-143.
- Kent, S. (1949). *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Kiani, M. (2004). The Changing Dimensions of UN Peacekeeping. *Strategic Studies*, 24(1), pp. 177-209.
- King, C. *et al.* (2021). MINUSTAH is doing positive things just as they do negative things: nuanced perceptions of a UN peacekeeping operation

- amidst peacekeeper-perpetrated sexual exploitation and abuse in Haiti, *Conflict, Security, and Development*, pp. 1-31.
- Kjeksrud, S. and Vermeij, L. (2017). Protecting Governments from Insurgencies: The Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mali. In: De Coning, C., Aoi, C. and Karlsrud, J. (eds.). *UN Peacekeeping Doctrine in a New Era: Adapting to Stabilisation, Protection and New Threats*, pp. 227-246.
- Klep, C. and Winslow, D. (1999). Learning lessons the hard way — Somalia and Srebrenica compared, *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 10(2), pp. 93-137
- Kodalle, T. et al. (2020). A General Theory of Influence in a DIME/PMESII/ASCOP/IRC2 Model, *Journal of Information Warfare*, 19(2), pp. 12-26.
- Kone, K. (2017). A Southern View on the Tuareg Rebellions in Mali, *African Studies Review*, 60(1), pp. 53-75.
- Lamont, C. (2021). *Research Methods in International Relations* (2nd ed.). London: SAGE Publications.
- Lendvai, P., & Parcell, L. (1991). Yugoslavia without Yugoslavs: The Roots of the Crisis. *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, 67(2), pp. 251–261.
- Lentin, R. (2016). Palestine/Israel and state criminality: exception, settler colonialism and racialization. *State Crime Journal*, 5(1), pp. 32-50.
- Levy, J.S. (2008). Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 25(1), pp. 1-18.
- Li, D. (2000). Anatomy of a Balkan Massacre: The Failure of International Peacekeeping at Srebrenica. *Harvard International Review*, 22(3), pp. 34-37.
- Lowenthal, M.M. (2012). *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*. Fifth Edition. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications.
- Luck, E. (2009). Sovereignty, Choice, and the Responsibility to Protect, *Global Responsibility to Protect*, 1(1), pp. 10-21.
- Lynch, C. (2015). The Bosnian War Cables, 22 November. *Foreign Policy*. Available at: https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/media_men

- tions/2015-11-22_the_bosnian_war_cables_-_foreign_policy.pdf
(Accessed 12 January 2022).
- Mac Ginty, R. (2017). Peacekeeping and Data, *International Peacekeeping*, 24(5), pp. 695-705.
- MacQueen, N. 2014, *United Nations peacekeeping in Africa since 1960*. New York: Routledge Publishing.
- Malcolm, N. (1995). Bosnia and the West: A Study in Failure. *The National Interest*, 39(3), pp. 3–14.
- Marsh, D. *et al.* (2002). A Skin Not a Sweater: Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science. In: V. Lowndes *et al.* (eds.) *Theory and Methods in Political Science*. London: Palgrave, pp. 17-41.
- Marrin, S. (2011). The 9/11 Terrorist Attacks: A Failure of Policy Not Strategic Intelligence Analysis, *Intelligence and National Security*, 26(2), pp. 182-202.
- Martin-Brûlé, S-M. (2020). Finding the UN Way on Peacekeeping Intelligence. *International Peace Institute*.
- Martin-Brûlé, S-M. (2021). Competing for Trust: Challenges in United Nations Peacekeeping- Intelligence, *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, 34(3), pp. 494-524.
- Matori, S.S. and Kagu, A.B. (2019). Cloaking Neo-Imperialism in the Shadows of Human Rights and Liberal Peacebuilding, *Journal of Law, Policy, and Globalization*, 88, pp. 60-63.
- McBride, S. (2022). How the CIA, FBI, and Presidential Administrations Failed to Prevent 9/11. *Claremont Colleges Scholarship*. Available at: https://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/2901/ (Accessed 22 February 2022)
- Menkhaus, K. (2007). Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping. *International Security*, 31(3), pp. 74-106.
- Merriam-Webster Dictionary. (n.d.). *Intelligence*. Available at: <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/intelligence> (Accessed 09 January 2022).
- Mesic, S. (2004). *The Demise of Yugoslavia: A Political Memoir*. Budapest: Central European University Press.

- Mills, A.J., Durepos, G., and Wiebe, E. (2010). Collective Case Study. In: *Encyclopedia of case study research* (vol. 1-0). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.
- Munro, E.J. (2007). Multidimensional and Integrated Missions. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway*. Available at: https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/ud/vedlegg/fn/multidimensional-and-integrated/geneva_proceedings.pdf (Accessed 19 December 2021).
- NACLA. (1986). The CIA's War. *NACLA Report on the Americas*, 20(4), pp. 19-39
- Nadin, P. (2019). The United Nations: A History of Success and Failure. *Australian Quarterly*, 90(4), pp. 11-17.
- Naidu, M. V. (1995). The Origin of UN Peace-Enforcement and Peacekeeping: Re-examination of the Crises in Korea (1950), Kashmir (1948) and the Suez (1956). *Peace Research*, 27(1), pp. 1–29.
- Nino, M. (2007). The Abu Omar case in Italy and the effects of CIA extraordinary renditions in Europe on law enforcement and intelligence activities, *Revue internationale de droit pénal*, 78(1), pp. 113-141.
- NIOD. (2002). Srebrenica: Reconstruction, background, consequences and analyses of the fall of a 'safe' area. *Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie*. Available at: http://publications.niod.knaw.nl/publications/srebrenicareportniod_en.pdf (Accessed 13 February 2022).
- Nordlie, D. and Lindboe, M., 2017. *Intelligence in United Nations Peace Operations: A case study of the All Sources Information Fusion Unit in MINUSMA*. A joint publication of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment and the Norwegian Defence International Centre.
- Norheim-Martinsen, P.M. and Aasland Ravndal, J. (2011). Towards Intelligence-Driven Peace Operations? The Evolution of UN and EU Intelligence Structures, *Intelligence Peacekeeping*, 18(4), pp. 454-467.
- Novosseloff, A. (2021). Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). *Norwegian Institute of International Affairs*. Available at: <https://nupi.brage.unit.no/nupi-xmlui/handle/11250/2999483> (Accessed 13 February).

- Nyirabikali, G. (2016). The Mali Peace Process and the 2015 Peace Agreement. In: Sköns, E. (ed.). *SIPRI Yearbook 2016: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security*. Available at: <https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2016/05> (Accessed 15 March 2022).
- Omand, D. (2014). *Securing the State*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Orion, A. (2016). UNIFIL II, Ten Years On: Strong Force, Weak Mandate. *The Institute for National Security Studies*.
- ÓTuathail, G. (2002). Theorizing practical geopolitical reasoning: the case of the United States' response to the war in Bosnia, *Political Geography*, 21(5), pp. 601-628.
- Passarelli, Hamann, E. and Ramires Teixeira, C.A. (2017). Brazil's Participation in MINUSTAH (2004-2017): perceptions, lessons, and practices for future missions. *Igarapé Institute*. Available at: <https://www.igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Brazils-Participation-in-MINUSTAH-2004-2017.pdf> (Accessed at 01 March 2022).
- Peter, M. (2015). Between Doctrine and Practice: The UN Peacekeeping Dilemma, *Global Governance*, 21(3), pp. 351-370.
- Piché, G.R. (2018). Challenges and prospects for interoperability in UN peace operations, *International Journal*, 73(2), pp. 241-256.
- Pion-Berlin, D. and Trinkunas, H. (2005). Democratization, Social Crisis, and the Impact of Military Domestic Roles in Latin America, *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, 33(1), pp. 5-24.
- Power, D. (2013). From the Congo to Mali: Changing Perspectives on Peacekeeping in Africa, *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, 24, pp. 121–136.
- Price, D. (2011). *Weaponizing Anthropology: Social Science in Service of the Militarized State*. Oakland: AK Press.
- Qiang, X. (2019). The Road to Digital Unfreedom: President Xi's Surveillance State, *Journal of Democracy*, 30(1), pp. 53-67.
- Ramjoué, M. (2011). Improving United Nations Intelligence: Lessons from the Field. *Geneva Center for Security Policy*, GCSP Policy Paper No 19.
- Rapp, K. (2015). Protection from Tragedy: Developing Effective and Legitimate Safe Zones after the Tragedy of Srebrenica, *International Social Science Review*, 91(2), pp. 1-35.

- Recchia, S. (2022). Protecting civilians or preserving NATO? Alliance entanglement and the Bosnian safe areas. *Journal of Strategic Studies*, pp. 1-25.
- Remington, R. A. (1993, 11). Bosnia: The tangled web. *Current History*, 92, pp. 364-369.
- Resteigne, D. and Van den Bogaert, S. (2017). Information Sharing in Contemporary Operations: The Strength of SOF Ties. In: In: I. Goldenberg, Soeters, J. and Dean, W.H. (eds.) *Information Sharing in Military Operations*. Cham: Springer International, pp. 51-66.
- Révész, B. (2007). How to Consolidate the Secret Services in East-Europe after the Transition, *Regio-Minorities, Politics, Society-English Edition*, 10(1), pp. 106-116.
- Richards, J. (2012). Intelligence Dilemma? Contemporary Counter-Terrorism in a Liberal Democracy, *Intelligence and National Security*, 27(5), pp. 761-780.
- Rieff, D. (1994). The Illusions of Peacekeeping, *World Policy Journal*, 11(3), pp. 1-18.
- Rietjens, S. and Baudet, F. (2016). Stovepiping Within Multinational Military Operations: The Case of Mali. In: I. Goldenberg, Soeters, J. and Dean, W.H. (eds.) *Information Sharing in Military Operations*. Cham: Springer Publishing, pp. 201-220.
- Rietjens, S. and Dorn, A.W. (2017). The Evolution of Peacekeeping Intelligence: The UN's Laboratory in Mali. In: F. Baudet *et al* (eds.) *Perspectives on Military Intelligence from the First World War to Mali*. The Hague: Asser Press
- Rietjens, S. and de Waard, E. (2017). UN Peacekeeping Intelligence: The ASIFU Experiment, *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, 30(3), pp. 532-556.
- Rietjens, S. and Zomers, J. (2017). In Search of Intelligence: The Dutch Special Forces in Mali. In: J. Glicken *et al*. (eds.) *Special Operations Forces in the 21st Century*, pp. 137-151.

- Rijsdijk, E., 2011. The politics of hard knowledge: uncertainty, intelligence failures, and the 'last minute genocide' of Srebrenica. *Review of international studies*, 37(5), pp. 2221-2235.
- Rogel, C. (2004). *The Breakup of Yugoslavia and its Aftermath*. Greenwood: Greenwood Publishing.
- Roger, B. and Diallo, F. (2022). Mali : la MINUSMA peut-elle encore faire son travail d'enquête ?, 7 April. *Jeune Afrique*. Available at: <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1336634/politique/mali-la-minusma-peut-elle-encore-faire-son-travail-denquete/> (Accessed 19 April 2022).
- Rose, R. (1994). Rethinking civil society: Postcommunism and the problem of trust, *Journal of Democracy*, 5(3), pp. 18-30.
- Rubio Reyes, R.O. (2000). *The United Nations and Peace Operations in El Salvador*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College.
- Ruffa, C. (2020). Case study methods: case selection and case analysis. In: L. Curini, and R. Franzese (eds.). *The SAGE handbook of research methods in political science* (vol. 2, pp. 1133-1147). London: SAGE Publications.
- Ruffa, C. and Rietjens, S. (2022). Meaning making in peacekeeping missions: mandate interpretation and multinational collaboration in the UN mission in Mali, *European Journal of International Relations*, pp. 1-26.
- Salton, H.T. (2017). *Dangerous Diplomacy: Bureaucracy, Power Politics, and the Role of the UN Secretariat in Rwanda*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Santucci, J. (2022). After Afghanistan: Intelligence Analysis and US Military Missions, *Survival*, 64(1), pp. 157-178.
- Schnabel, A. (1997). A future for peacekeeping?, *Peace Review*, 9(4), pp. 563-569
- Schulte, G.L. (1997). Former Yugoslavia and the new NATO, *Survival*, 39(1), pp. 19-42.
- Scott L. and Jackson, P. (2004). The Study of Intelligence in Theory and Practice, *Intelligence & National Security*, 19(2), pp. 139-1169.

- Shetler-Jones, P. (2008). Intelligence in Integrated UN Peacekeeping Missions: The Joint Mission Analysis Centre, *International Peacekeeping*, 15(4), pp. 517-527.
- Shiraz, Z. and Aldrich, R.J. (2019). Secrecy, spies, and the Global South: intelligence studies beyond the 'Five Eyes' alliance. *International Affairs*, 95(6), pp. 1313-1329.
- Sigri, U. and Basar, U. (2014). An Analysis of Assessment of Peacekeeping Operations. *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, 26(3), pp. 389-406.
- Smith, H. (1994). Intelligence and UN Peacekeeping, *Survival*, 36(3), pp. 174-192.
- Smith, G. (1995). Haiti: From Intervention to Intervasion, *Current History*, 94(589), pp. 54-58.
- Smith, H. (2003). Intelligence and UN Peacekeeping. In: Steele, R.D. *et al.* (eds.). *Peacekeeping Intelligence: Emerging Concepts for the Future*, pp. 229-252. Oakton: OSS International Press.
- Solomon, H. (2015). *Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Africa: Fighting Insurgency from Al-Shabaab, Ansar Dine and Boko Haram*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Tardy, T. (2015). United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR - Bosnia and Herzegovina). In: J.A. Koops *et al.* (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 383-394.
- Taylor, W. B. and Rupert, J. (2022). The Ukraine War Escalates Demands to Reform the United Nations, 29 April. *United States Institute of Peace*. Available at: <https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/04/ukraine-war-escalates-demands-reform-united-nations> (Accessed 3 June 2022).
- Théodat, J-M. (2021). Haïti: un trou noir dans la Caraïbe, *Diplomatie*, 112, pp. 27-31.
- Theunens, R. (2015). Achieving Understanding in Contemporaneous UN Peace Operations: The Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) – the All Source Information Fusion Unit (ASIFU). In: Baudet *et al.* (eds.) *Perspectives on Military Intelligence from the First World War to Mali*. The Hague: Asser Press, pp. 173-196.

- Trenta, L. (2014). Clinton and Bosnia: a candidate's freebie, a president's nightmare, *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 12(1), pp. 62-89.
- Tripodi, P. and Villar, A. (2005). Haití: la encrucijada de una intervención latinoamericana, *Revista Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad*, 19(1), pp. 17-35.
- Uvin, P. (1997). Prejudice, Crisis, and Genocide in Rwanda. *African Studies Review*, 40(2), pp. 91–115.
- Whitney, K. M. (1996). Sin, Fraph, and the CIA: U.S. Covert Action in Haiti, *Southwestern Journal of Law and Trade in the Americas*, 3(2), pp. 303-332.
- Uvin, P. (2001). Reading the Rwandan Genocide, *International Studies Review*, 3(3), pp. 75-99.
- Van der Lijn, J. *et al.* (2017). Progress on UN peacekeeping reform: HIPPO and beyond. *Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations*. Available at: https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdf/Progress_on_UN_peacekeeping_reform.pdf (Accessed 31 January 2022).
- Van der Lijn, J. (2019). The UN Peace Operation in Mali: A Troubled Yet Needed Mission, 29 November. *International Peace Institute Global Observatory*. Available at: <https://theglobalobservatory.org/2019/11/un-peace-operation-mali-troubled-yet-needed-mission/> (Accessed 15 March 2022).
- Van Krieken, P. J. (2004). Srebrenica and the Safe Area Dilemma, *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, 23(4), pp. 125–146.
- Van Willigen, N. (2016) A Dutch return to UN peacekeeping?, *International Peacekeeping*, 23:5, 702-720
- Vermeij, L. (2015). MINUSMA: Challenges on the Ground. Copenhagen: *Norwegian Institute for International Affairs*.
- Warner, M. (2002). Wanted: A Definition of 'Intelligence.' *Central Intelligence Agency*. Available at: <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA52816.pdf> (Accessed 7 March 2022).
- Weimer, D.L. and Vining, A.R. (2017). *Policy Analysis: Concepts and Practice* (6th ed.). New York: Taylor and Francis.
- Western, J. (2011). Protecting States or Protecting Civilians: The Case for R2P. *The Massachusetts Review*, 52(2), pp. 348-357.

- Wiebes, C. *et al.* (2017). Blindfolded in the Dark. The Intelligence Position of Dutchbat in the Srebrenica Safe Area. In: Baudet *et al.* (eds.) *Perspectives on Military Intelligence from the First World War to Mali*. The Hague: Asser Press, pp. 145-172.
- Wilcox, F. (2007). Intelligence Reform: Winning the “For Keeps” Game, *American Intelligence Journal*, 25(1), pp. 51-62.
- Winks, R.W. (1996). *Cloak and Gown: Scholars in the Secret War: 1939-1961*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Wood, E.J. (2005). Challenges to Democracy in El Salvador. In: F. Hagopian and S.P. Mainwaring (eds.) *The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America: Advances and Setbacks*, pp. 179-201.
- Yahaya, J.U. (2020). 2012 Crisis and Emerging of Conflict in Mali, *International Journal of Social Sciences and Conflict Management*, 5(3), pp. 76-96.
- Yamashita, H. (2008) Impartial’ Use of Force in United Nations Peacekeeping, *International Peacekeeping*, 15(5), pp. 615-630.
- Yanow, D. (2007). Interpretation in policy analysis: On methods and practice, *Critical Policy Analysis*, 1(1), pp. 110-122.
- Yilmaz, K. (2013). Comparison of Quantitative and Qualitative Research Traditions: epistemological, theoretical, and methodological differences. *European Journal of Education*, 48(2), pp. 311-325.
- Young, O. R. (1968). The United Nations and the International System. *International Organization*, 22(4), pp. 902–922.
- Zimmermann, O. (2005). Regional Report: Netherlands Srebrenica Probe. *Institute for War and Peace Reporting*.

Glossary of Abbreviations and Acronyms

ASIFU	All Sources Information Fusion Unit
DUTCHBAT	Dutch Battalion
HIPPO	High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

JMAC	Joint Mission Analysis Centre
KCT	Korps Commandotroepen (Dutch)
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (French)
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (French)
MNLA	Azawad National Liberation Movement
OE	Operational Environment
OP	Observation Post
OSINT	Open-Source Intelligence
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
SOLTG	Special Operations Land Task Group
SOF	Special Operations Forces
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UNDPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNDPO	United Nations Department of Peace Operations
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNSC	United Nations Security Council