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Influencing Peace: The Impact of Ethnocentrism in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

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Abstract

Since the end of the Cold War, the United Nations has been working to adapt its peacekeeping missions to the changing conflict environment. However, it still faces several key challenges in its approach to its peacekeeping missions. As the UN operates within increasingly complex conflict environments, it requires greater funding, more resources, and further commitment from its member states. The UN Security Council, which controls the design and implementation of peacekeeping operations, is dominated by the P5 nations of the US, the UK, France, China, and Russia. While the UNSC's failings are often discussed, this dissertation attempts to address a gap in the literature by exploring the foundational influences on the UN within the context of ethnocentrism. The concept of ethnocentrism is fundamental to the functioning of global society, as it influences international relations and structure. The presence of ethnocentrism promotes exploitative practices and the belief in dominance over other groups. This study addresses the UN's political challenges in its capability to engage in peacekeeping operations, within an ethnocentric framework, by focusing on UN documents, independent reports, secondary literature, and analysing voting patterns, mandate structure, and financial contributions. The findings of this study are that the UN has developed under ethnocentric influences and continues to practice and promote ethnocentric processes in its approach to peacekeeping. As such, the dominance of the US and the other P5 nations within the Security Council, enable these countries to exert their influence and shape the practices of UN peacekeeping to act within their own interests. This contributes to the inefficiency of the UN to adhere to its rhetoric as a global peacekeeping organisation. The impact and implications of these findings are also discussed, including attempting reform of the UN Security Council, or the potential replacement of the UN as the leading global peacekeeping body by regional organisations.

Contents

Abstract	page i
Introduction	page 1
Chapter 1: Conceptual Framework	page 5
1.1. International Relations theory	page 7
1.2. Introduction to the United Nations	page 14
Chapter 2: Research Design and Methodology	page 20
2.1. Theoretical Framework	page 20
2.2. Data	page 21
2.3. Research Methods	page 23
2.4. Limitations and Ethical Considerations	page 25
Chapter 3: The Theory of Ethnocentrism	page 27
3.1. Liberal Studies	page 28
3.2. Race Theory	page 29
3.3. The Evolution of Ethnocentrism	page 32
3.4. Facets of Ethnocentrism	page 35
3.5. Causes of Ethnocentrism	page 36
Chapter 4: Ethnocentrism in UN Peacekeeping Operations	page 41
4.1. Voting, the Veto, and Political Will	page 43
4.2. Mission Mandates	page 49
4.3. Mission Participation	page 53
Chapter 5: Discussion	page 59
5.1. The Impact of Ethnocentrism	page 59
5.2. Implications for the UN	page 61
Conclusion	page 66
Bibliography	page 68

Introduction

The world is incredibly varied and complex in how it operates, with many dominant actors competing against each other in global affairs to ensure their national survival, while smaller nations strive to keep up in the competition. It is primarily those prominent actors that are able to shape world affairs and influence others to set the terms of global discourse in what Noam Chomsky has termed 'the new imperial age'.¹ Within this setting, the United Nations (UN) acts as a global peace organisation, aiming to champion multilateral approaches to international peace and security. The UN, as an international institution, holds a great deal of power within the international arena, as well as within its own member states on whom it depends on to protect its power and provide economic support. However, while conflict trends indicate a growth in demand for UN peacekeeping action in increasingly complex environments, the organisation's effectiveness has been called into question.

Internal and independent reports all discuss the need for the UN to adapt to the changing conditions within global conflict. The UN faces new challenges within this post-Cold War era. There has been a steady and major increase in UN peacekeeping activity since 1999.² Yet, there are notable concerns surrounding the ability of UN peace operations to keep pace with recent changes in conflict to include more obscure and internal threats, such as violent extremism and civil unrest. Political will and capability often determine which values and preferences prevail within the UN system.³ Yet, the reliance on Western finance and the dominance of the P5 powers within the United Nation's Security Council, who strongly influence UN politics and monopolise the decision-making of peacekeeping missions, creates challenges of consensus, commitment, and organisation within UN peacekeeping. There is a risk of these powers using UN peace operations to their own benefit and this needs to be addressed, or the UN runs the risk of operating as an instrument of Western power rather than a global peace organisation. As the UN continues to promote and utilize norms based on liberal peace theories that validate Western approaches to peacekeeping in non-Western conflict environments, an examination

¹ Noam Chomsky (2017) *Who Rules the World?*, p1

² S. Ahmed, P. Keating, and U. Solinas (2007) 'Shaping the Future of UN Peace Operations: Is There a Doctrine in the House?', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, (20:1), p11

³ T.G. Weiss, D.P Forsythe, R.A Coate, and K. Pease (2017) *The United Nations and Changing World Politics*, p3

needs to be made of the influences on UN structures and practices. This presents a research question to be addressed:

In what ways does ethnocentrism within UN peacekeeping create political challenges in the capability of the UN to engage in peace operations in the post-Cold War era?

Through an examination of the theory of ethnocentrism, the dissertation looks to apply this theory to UN structure and actions and thus determine the effect of ethnocentrism of the UN's political activity and its capability to implement its peacekeeping operations.

Ethnocentrism, which primarily promotes feelings of cultural superiority, relates strongly to the experiences of the UN. Ethnocentrism has been determined as a 'natural condition of mankind'.⁴ In this sense, the world we see today has been shaped by ethnocentric values of superiority and exploitation. Societies and nations look at the world from the central position of their own group; as such, they perceive and interpret other societies within their own frames of reference, and they invariably judge them inferior.⁵ History can show us that this creates divides between the Western bloc and non-Western 'other'. Racist ideology, used historically as justification for colonialism and empire, has had significant consequences for global power relations and remain crucial to understanding challenges to peace and security.

To better understand how history and theory development affected the formation of the UN values and its views on peace and conflict, the foundations, beliefs, and dynamics of international relations must first be discussed. By examining political philosophies of the past, we are able to better understand the embedded racism and imperial views that contributed towards the founding of the UN.

The idea of peace originated with Immanuel Kant's theory of perpetual peace, which focused on the development of 'a scheme of organization which would guarantee universal and eternal peace', with an emphasis on a union of autonomous states that could develop peace between nations.⁶ The UN embodies this philosophy. But

⁴ I.M. Lewis (1976) *Social Anthropology in Perspective*, p13

⁵ Ken Booth (2014) *Strategy and Ethnocentrism*, p13

⁶ Carl J. Friedrich (1947) 'The Ideology of the United Nations Charter and the Philosophy of Peace of Immanuel Kant 1795-1945', *The Journal of Politics* (9:1), p12

Kant's ideals were not solely focused on developing such an institution for the universal freedom of the 'common man', as he also saw 'humanity in its greatest perfection in the race of the Whites'.⁷ Philosophical works, such as Kant's writings, set the foundations for hierarchical thinking about race that has subsequently shaped global society as it is today. As such, the history of racism underlying the Western world order is based on the erasure of non-Western modes of knowledge into actively racist Enlightenment thought processes. Thus, the UN should be understood as a continuation of a history of societal organisation based around a logic of Western superiority and imperialism. Therefore, despite the common goal of global peace and security, UN structures might instead encourage ethnocentric trends, as professional socialisation might be expected to increase tendencies towards ethnocentrism.⁸

The aim of this dissertation is to research the political challenges caused by ethnocentrism within UN peacekeeping processes and explore the impact this has on how the UN engages in its peace operations. By understanding the limitations and weaknesses of UN peacekeeping caused by ethnocentric inclinations, a better understanding of UN political practices can be gained. Until the reasons for perceived UN successes and failures from past and present missions are more widely debated and understood, including the influence of ethnocentrism within UN peacekeeping operations, it would be presumptuous to discuss a transformation of mandates and operations for the future. As such, within this discussion on the implications of ethnocentrism for UN peacekeeping, it is key to note that adapting a better approach towards ethnocentrism is not necessarily synonymous with better strategic practice, nor is a better strategic theory and practice synonymous with peace.⁹ As such, this dissertation does not aim to provide a solution to the political challenges faced by the UN as a result of ethnocentric influences, but merely aims to point these challenges out under such a theoretical framework so that solutions can be formulated into practice.

The first chapter of this dissertation describes the conceptual framework that underlies this study. A brief summarisation of various international relations theories

⁷ Immanuel Kant, quoted in Kehinde Andrews (2021) *The New Age of Empire: How Racism and Colonialism Still Rule the World*, p30

⁸ Booth (2014), p18

⁹ Ibid., p28

helps to situate the study within a global context, while the second half of the chapter delves into the UN as an institution, describing its origins, functioning, and development. This provides the background knowledge against which the data analysis and discussion can be built.

The second chapter explains the research design and methodology used to investigate the research question. It provides justification for the use of ethnocentrism as a theoretical framework. It then discusses the sources used within the study before explaining the methodology of choice for this research. The chapter then outlines the analysis performed under the selected methodology and finally considers conceptual limitations and ethical considerations of the dissertation.

The third chapter focuses on the theory of ethnocentrism that will be used to examine UN peacekeeping practices. It first lays out a range of ethnic-based social theories that have predated the conception of ethnocentrism. The chapter then examines the evolution of ethnocentric thinking, as well as its facets and causes. The fourth chapter then applies this theory to UN structures and discusses the presence and impact of ethnocentrism within the political challenges faced by the UN in its peacekeeping missions. The political challenges discussed include a lack of political will among UN member states, particularly those in the UNSC, the design of UN mission mandates around Western norms and values, and the participation of UN member states in providing funding and resources to UN peacekeeping missions.

The fifth chapter then initiates a discussion on the impact and implications of ethnocentric approaches within UN peacekeeping. This chapter considers the future of the UN as a global institution for peace, its need for reform, and the rising popularity of regional organisations as peacekeepers. The study is then summarised in a short concluding chapter.

Chapter 1: **Conceptual Framework**

UN peacekeeping missions have greatly evolved since the organisation's conception in 1945. The UN itself has advanced from a stage of frozen power relations to one of Western primacy following the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, this post-war era saw a dramatic increase in UN peacekeeping activity and operations. The reasoning behind such a development is varied, with the Security Council authorising larger and more ambitious operations, financial contributors have become seemingly more willing to pay for increasing expenses, and troop donors, particularly those from South Asia, have increased their contribution of troops.¹⁰ Overall UN peacekeeping missions have proved to be very adaptable, delivering significant support to ensure the positive resolution of conflicts.

Yet it is becoming increasingly difficult to accurately define the term of peacekeeping, as the boundaries between various approaches of conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and peace enforcement are becoming increasingly blurred.¹¹ Therefore, UN peace operations are rarely limited to one approach. As such, UN peacekeeping operations often engage more actively in peace-making and peacebuilding efforts. Peacekeeping operations have been adapted to take on a more multidimensional approach and work to support and facilitate political processes, protect civilians, monitor disarmament and demobilisation efforts, and promote human rights. Furthermore, these operations have evolved to include the use of force, but only under certain circumstances of self-defence, protection of the UN's mandate and civilians, and maintaining public order if the state is unable or unwilling to intervene.¹²

However, in order to understand the development and emergence of what can be considered 'modern-day peacekeeping', a wider understanding of the international world is needed. There are many theories regarding the workings of international relations. In order to recognize the role of the UN in today's global order, it is key to understand the mainstream theories of international relations and security studies

¹⁰ B. Jones (2009) 'Peacekeeping In Crisis?', *The RUSI Journal*, (154:5), p78

¹¹ United Nations Peacekeeping, 'Terminology', <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/terminology> [accessed 07/05/22]

¹² Ibid.

that influence our understanding of global affairs. The theoretical approaches in international relations and security studies all influence the functioning of the UN on a fundamental level and present many dividing views on the UN's place in global affairs; a liberal view argues that the UN acts as an instrument for the advancement of a stable international order, with a large focus on human rights and international cooperation; a realist perspective would view UN peacekeeping efforts as a reflection of power politics in which states could advance their own national interests, allowing dominant powers to expand their hegemony and assert their influence. The interaction between states and international organizations in fields such as politics, economics, and security, have shaped the world into what it is today. Thus, by examining these processes within an international context, a deeper understanding of UN practices might be gained. This would therefore allow for a more detailed discussion on the political challenges faced by the UN in terms of peacekeeping operations.

Furthermore, international relations theory will also provide a backdrop for the theories of ethnocentrism and how ethnocentric tendencies might affect international relations, and subsequently the operations of UN peacekeeping. The circumstances under which international relations theory was developed, in which many advocated for a racial hierarchy, is connected to understanding the development of the UN. Within the history of international politics, there are many examples of societies and nations projecting their own assumptions and attempting to fit the behaviour of others into their own preconceived outlook.¹³ Furthermore, as Wlard suggests, political theory largely has developed along a unilinear theme of exclusively Western perspectives, making it ethnocentric rather than universalistic and thus holds little relevance to non-Western nations.¹⁴ This therefore informs on the development of the UN within this context.

The first part of this chapter gives a brief overview of mainstream approaches to international political philosophies, such as realism and liberalism. This will provide a background against which the theory of ethnocentrism and its impact on UN peacekeeping processes can be examined later on. Next, I will analyse the major

¹³ Booth (2014), p71

¹⁴ Howard J. Wlarda (1981) 'The Ethnocentrism of the Social Science Implications for Research and Policy', *The Review of Politics*, (43:2), p165

themes and concepts within formative UN documents, through an examination of the organisation's founding documents, before investigating other major documents that have marked shifts in UN peacekeeping operations, including independent and UN-affiliated reports on peacekeeping development.

1.1. International Relations Theory

Classical Realism:

Classical realism theories are centred around the idea that the desire for more power is rooted in human nature, so states will be forever engaged in a struggle to increase their capabilities and thus placed into conflict against each other.¹⁵ The theories are largely derived from Edward Hallett Carr's *The Twenty Years' Crisis* (1939) and Hans Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (1948). Realism theory conceptualizes international relations as a structured anarchic self-help system in which states engage in an unrelenting struggle for security, each at the expense of others, and calculate their interests with regard to the power distribution in the system.¹⁶ The theory is based on the understanding that states will decide their strategies rationally, after taking into account the costs and benefits of various different possible courses of action. Rationalism focuses on traditional power-based approaches that are centred around national strategic interests. This framework explains that actors will comply with norms in a rational manner if the outcome is beneficial or there are material incentives.

While there are significant differences between the variations of realism, classical realism has exercised an enormous influence on international relation theories that are largely focused on power and anarchy. This can be seen within the example of the UN, which is based on a concept of collective security. In this context, a rationalist perspective would conclude that collaboration would be unlikely in such a multilateral environment, as the benefits and material incentives are not great

¹⁵ Colin Elman and Michael A. Jensen (2012) 'Realisms' in Paul D. Williams, *Security Studies: An Introduction*, p17

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p15

enough to warrant cooperation by those states not directly affected by conflict.¹⁷ This links to this study's theory of ethnocentrism, which is focused on ideas of superiority and exploitation by larger nations. Realism relates ethnocentrism to the actions of Western states, which are largely focused on increasing their power and influence through international structures. As such, realists provide a harsh criticism of the UN, as they believe that international institutions like the Security Council merely serve the interests of the great powers.¹⁸ These ideas will be discussed throughout this study.

Neorealism:

Neorealism replaced ideas of classical realism as Kenneth Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* (1979) replaced Morgenthau's ideas as a standard edition for realists. Neorealism posits that international systems are composed of a political structure based on anarchic principles, the units within this structure interacting on principles of self-help, and the distribution of capabilities among these units.¹⁹ Yet, in contrast to Morgenthau's assertions within classical realism that states are motivated by their desire for power, Waltz's theory omits these motivations and states characteristics as causal variables for international outcomes, except for the minimal assumption that states seek to survive.²⁰ Thus, instead of the international system being driven by aggressive foreign policies of states, neorealists see international politics as a system of tragic inevitability. This leads us to question the functioning of the UN in a system of inevitable conflict and the role of ethnocentrism in this inevitability.

Defensive Structural Realism:

Defensive structural realism developed from ideas of neorealism, yet while neorealism allows for multiple variables to justify state behaviour, defensive

¹⁷ Thomas Risse-Kappen (1997) 'Between a New World Order and None: Explaining the Reemergence of the United Nations in World Politics', in Krause and Williams (eds.) *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases*, p257

¹⁸ John J. Mearsheimer (1994) 'The False Promise of International Institutions', *International Security*, (19:3), p7

¹⁹ Elman and Jensen (2012), p18

²⁰ Ibid.

structural realism relies solely on the idea that states function on rational choice actions against the main threat of other states.²¹ As such, it is argued by defensive structural realists that states should in theory support ideas and actions that focus on maintaining the international status quo. In this way, a theory on balancing threats, developed by Stephen Walt, posits that in systems of anarchy, states will form alliances with each other in an effort to protect themselves against perceived threats of other powerful nations.²² Thus, the resulting system of alliances would help to explain an absence of hegemony within the international system. Such a system can be seen in the formation of the UN. However, the pseudo-leadership role of the US and the influence of the P5 powers within the UNSC negates the absence of hegemony, or the competition for hegemony, within the international system.

However, the practice of forming alliances between states can also present a security dilemma, a concept advocated largely by John Herz.²³ The concept of the security dilemma is that defensive actions can often be ambiguous and therefore misinterpreted as offensive acts of aggressive. As a result, those states that feel threatened by such actions can respond, 'leading to a spiralling of mutual aggression'.²⁴ This demonstrates the neorealist aspect of the inevitability of such aggression and violence within the international system due to its structure and functioning.

Offensive structural realism:

First presented by John Mearsheimer, this theory posits that states face an uncertain international environment in which any state might use its power to harm another.²⁵ In such circumstances, capabilities become of overriding importance and security is focused around acquiring as much power as possible in relation to other states. Similar to other realist theories, this approach assumes an international anarchic system in which each state is a rational actor with a key focus on survival as a primary goal. However, offensive structural realism also focuses on the perceptions

²¹ Ibid., p20

²² Stephen Walt (1987) *The Origins of Alliance*, p.x

²³ J.H. Herz, (1950) 'Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma', *World Politics*, (2:2)

²⁴ Elman and Jensen (2012), p22

²⁵ John J. Mearsheimer (2001) *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*

surrounding the military capabilities of larger states and the uncertainty each state holds regarding other states' intentions. As such, the theory demonstrates that each of the larger powers fear each other due to the others' apparent capabilities and subsequently can only rely on themselves for their own security; thus, states assume the best strategy for states to ensure their survival is to maximize their own relative power to become the most powerful state in the system.²⁶ As such, the attempts of the P5 states to dominate the UNSC, particularly the US, and thus heavily influence UN peacekeeping operations, can be seen as an attempt to gain power within the international system as a whole in order to ensure their own security and survival.

Rational Choice Institutionalism:

These theories of realism relate strongly to the theory of Rational Choice Institutionalism. This approach to the study of institutions explains that actors use institutions to maximize their advantage according to their own set of preferences and in return institutional norms affect an actor's individual behaviour.²⁷ Overall, institutionalism has a realistic approach in that it assumes that the principal actors in international relations are states, and that states rationally pursue their own interests in their international relations.²⁸ Therefore, a key question that is addressed within this approach, is why powerful member states such as the US, would use a multilateral institution such as the UN, to legitimize its foreign policy, thereby risking constraints on its own freedom of action through entanglement in the organisation's processes. Furthermore, Risse-Kappen claims that from a rationalist point-of-view, within the multilateral environment of the UN, many states would be encouraged to free-ride, while enforcing the cooperation necessary to produce successful outcomes would require excessive monitoring and compliance capabilities.²⁹ In this way, it would make little sense for states such as the US to use an institution such as the UN, as any advantage gained through the organisation would be limited by constraints within its operation.

²⁶ Elman and Jensen (2012), p22

²⁷ Randall L. Calvert (1995) 'The Rational Choice Theory of Institutions: Implications for Design', *Institutional Design: Recent Economic Thought Series*, (43), p64

²⁸ Kenneth W. Abbott (2007) 'Enriching Rational Choice Institutionalism for the Study of International Law', *Illinois Law Review*, (1), p1

²⁹ Risse-Kappen (1997), p257

Hegemonic Stability Theory

Similar questions are raised within Hegemonic Stability Theory. This theory argues that international order can be maintained if there is a hegemonic leader with such overwhelming power capabilities that she can impose cooperation among the lesser states, either through coercion or persuasion.³⁰ Upholding the international order is in the hegemon's best interest, as it confirms their status as a leading power. Erik Voeten maintains that the UNSC's value lies in its ability to constrain US power and maintain equilibrium in the international system.³¹ However, if powerful nations like the US can maintain international order and stability through unilateral strategies, bilateral, or multilateral arrangements, why then do they choose to operate through the UN and place limits on their own power.

Liberal theory:

Liberalist ideas present a different theoretical approach to international relations by refuting the argument that the balance of power acts as a peacekeeper.³² Academics such as Kant argued that moral behaviour resulted from moral choices guided by an inner sense of duty. Liberalism claims that these values can be reflected in the international system. Within liberalist theory, the 'democratic peace' thesis was created; it reasoned liberal states do not fight wars against other liberal states.³³ Michael Doyle noted that there was a difference in the practice of liberal states towards other liberal societies in comparison to liberal practice toward non-liberal societies.³⁴ Within international relations, this theory presents a clear argument that security ultimately depends on encouraging the spread of liberalism through international peace organizations such as the UN. This would therefore influence the decisions of democratic states within the UN to adopt a security policy to protect liberalism with long-term aims to spread liberalism to non-liberal states. However, the

³⁰ Ibid., p258

³¹ Erik Voeten (2005) 'The Political Origins of the UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force', *International Organization*, (59:3)

³² Cornelia Navari (2012) 'Liberalisms', in Williams, *Security Studies: An Introduction*, p34

³³ Ibid., p40

³⁴ M.W. Doyle (1983) 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs', *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, (12:4)

way in which liberal states attempt to spread liberal values to other states must be examined closely. This is what will be discussed in relation to ethnocentrism within the UN.

Constructivist Institutionalism:

This theory focuses on the structure of international institutions, such as the UN. It conceptualizes institutions as a collection of norms, rules and routines, rather than a formal structure.³⁵ This approach contends that states are central to shaping and forming international institutions, as they are the actors who design institutions in order to advance their joint interests. As such, this theory promotes the idea that those states that created the UN, in particular the P5 members of the UNSC, have shaped the UN according to their own interests. This theory contrasts with realist perspectives; according to liberals, states create institutions to maximize shared interests, while for realists, it is to realize and maintain domination.³⁶ For example, Risse-Kappen's proposes that norms with universal validity claims, such as the defending of human rights, serves the purpose of maintaining US power in international society. He states that the UN Security Council would be powerless to operate within peace operation humanitarian missions without American cooperation.³⁷ However, this does not mean that the US can dictate or coerce the other Security Council members to follow its will as the theory contests that the US holds such hegemonic power. Instead this theory suggests that the UN operates according to US interests as a matter of necessity.

Social Constructivism:

This approach focuses on the impact of socially-developed interests and practices of actors on the functioning of international institutions.³⁸ A lack of a hegemon state and with limited enforcement mechanisms, global institutions such as the UN rely on norms and ideas to engage with the global community. Furthermore the promotion of

³⁵ Navari (2012), p43

³⁶ Ibid., p44

³⁷ Risse-Kappen (1997), p267

³⁸ Ibid., p262

particular values is a core practice in the goal of achieving peace. To operate, international organisations establish rules, hierarchies, and values, that influence member states to behave in a particular way.

However, the interests and practices that influenced norms within the UN developed within the liberal internationalist worldview. In this way, the dominance of Western leadership within the UN could therefore be seen as a product of liberal values and norms that allow these actors to be challenged by smaller states, rather than based on realist values centred around material capabilities. Thus, rather than viewing the US as a hegemon or attributing the dominance of the P5 powers as unilateralism, the UN could arguably operate instead of a basis of liberal domination.

Risse-Kappen argues that social constructivism can be used to explain this development, as the preferences of the actors must be taken into account to explain international interaction.³⁹ Yet, the strategic interests of nations are rarely static and constantly develop according to world events and changing norms. This means that UN decisions and actions cannot be based on the interests of the P5 powers alone. However, the influence of ethnocentrism on the actions and interests of the P5 members can influence the UN to behave in such a way that the UN ultimately acts according to the interests of these powers. This study will discuss this argument in detail in relation to the UN's conduct of its peacekeeping operations.

Unilateralism:

These theories and the practice of the UN can also be related to the theory of unilateralism, or cooperation among core powers.⁴⁰ According to this theory, international institutions such as the UN are able to act as a neutral third party that is able to facilitate cooperation by offering guidelines and procedures for negotiating agreements, while also reducing uncertainty about the motivations of other actors. David Bosco argues that the Council performs well in this role, by defusing crises among the big powers, yet appears ineffective in managing many other tasks.⁴¹

³⁹ Ibid., p270

⁴⁰ Ibid., p259

⁴¹ David Bosco (2009) *Five to Rule Them All: The UN Security Council and the Making of the Modern World*

However, James Caporaso contended that a k group could be identified, a small number of key players whose cooperation would ensure resolution of any dilemmas, which in this case would be the P5 powers within the UN Security Council, it would not matter how the others ($n-k$) acted.⁴²

The theory of minilateralism seems most applicable to the UN as an international organisation; power and responsibility to provide the public good is largely held by a core group of powers, the P5 powers, who negotiate and vote on the peacekeeping practices and activities of the UN, largely in and on behalf of smaller nations.

However, Risse-Kappen argues that this theory, while certainly more theoretically applicable to the UN, does not accurately describe the processes and practices of the UN in reality.⁴³ In fact, while the P5 acts as a key group of member states within the UN's Security Council that address security issues and vote on UN participation, it is often the lesser states that implement any decisions that are made. In this way, it works out to be cheaper for great powers, such as the P5, to free ride on a multilateral organization like the UN than to act independently and pay the burden themselves.⁴⁴ This then leads us to question why non-Western UN member states would agree to operate under the liberal internationalist norms that the UN practice, if not for their own benefit in some way or other.

1.2. Introduction to the United Nations

The Covenant of the League of Nations acted as a forerunner to the UN during the inter-war period. The power within the League of Nations was similarly concentrated in its Council, the equivalent of today's UN Security Council, with permanent members Britain, France, Italy, and Japan, in addition to other elected, rotating members. In a similar manner within the UN, the definition of the more 'dominant' members can be focused on the UN Security Council, and in particular on its permanent members: the US, Britain, France, Russia, and China. Within the UN, the

⁴² James A. Caporaso (1992) 'International Relations Theory and Multilateralism: The Search for Foundations', *International Organization*, (46:3), p607

⁴³ Risse-Kappen (1997), p272

⁴⁴ Ibid.

permanent members of the Security Council hold a significant role, in particular the United States, France, and the United Kingdom.

The UN Charter states its purpose as an international institution to develop norms, practices, and laws centred around international cooperation, while ensuring international peace and security. The Charter is focused on the management of international conflict, prevention of war, and control over armaments. It is Chapter VII of the Charter specifically that discusses any actions that the UN Security Council can take when there is an apparent 'threat to peace' or 'act of aggression'; the UN is given the authority to act in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. At its conception, the UN Charter also promoted the idea of eventual self-government for those lands still under colonial rule, endorsing the political aspirations of these nations and the development of free political institutions.⁴⁵ However, within the Charter there is also paternalistic language use in relation to the 'stages of advancement' of colonies and former colonies. This demonstrates the racial hierarchical structure on which the UN was built, with Western countries assuming themselves to be more advanced and therefore able to impose their models of peace and advancement onto the world.

Within the UN's overarching mission of global peace, peacekeeping has become one of its most visible activities and one of its most important contributions to maintaining international peace and security.⁴⁶ The UN has the ability to act on behalf of its member states, as well as in non-signatory states. The legal basis for UN peacekeeping is provided by Article 1 of the Charter, which states that the UN may 'take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace'.⁴⁷ UN peacekeeping revolves around the 'bedrock principles' of consent, impartiality, and non-use of force.⁴⁸ However, before the publication in 2008 of the official peacekeeping doctrine, named as the Capstone Doctrine, UN peacekeeping was initially based on a combination of UN principles and peacekeeping mandate values.⁴⁹ These core principles were established through practice, rather than by law, which has led to disputed definitions and various interpretations within UN

⁴⁵ United Nations (1945) *United Nations Charter*, Article 73

⁴⁶ Joachim A. Koops, Norrie MacQueen, Thierry Tardy, and Paul D. Williams (2015) *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, p1

⁴⁷ United Nations (1945), Article 1

⁴⁸ United Nations (2000) *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, p9

⁴⁹ United Nations (2008) *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*

practices over the years.⁵⁰ These principles were established to ensure UN peacekeepers gained the consent of the host state to operate on its territory, that the UN would remain impartial in their dealings with the parties involved in the conflict, and UN troops would only use military force in self-defence.

However, while the organisation of strategy, mandates, and resources are one part of the challenge faced by the UN within its peacekeeping efforts, the delivery of these within peacekeeping missions is a different matter. Initially, UN peacekeeping missions focused on maintaining peace in classical missions, largely consisting of observing ceasefires. By the 1980s, the UN's peacekeeping operations were authorized exclusively by the Security Council, and thus largely enabled under the influence of these permanent members.⁵¹ Then in the period after the Cold War, there was an increase in demand for peacekeeping missions, raising the quantity and range of missions. The types of missions in which the UN engaged became increasingly complex, as initial efforts to deliver peace agreements and secure compromise between actors failed. Expectations surrounding UN peacekeeping missions grew, meaning that any failures, especially the high-profile failures of the 1990s, were highly scrutinized. The increasingly complex and insecure environments in which the UN is forced to operate has made it increasingly difficult for the UN to abide by its cornerstone values. Since its founding, armed peacekeeping has been a key tool utilized by the UN for conflict prevention and mitigation, yet the Charter's emphasis on the right to sovereignty puts it into potential conflict with issues relating to internal member state sovereignty and UN intervention. Thus, in its more recent activities, UN peacekeeping has strayed from the core principles within its doctrine and has fundamentally challenged the concept of peacekeeping.⁵²

In order to situate the functioning of the UN within international relations and global society as a whole, a more detailed examination of the structure and dynamics of the UN is needed. In the post-Cold War era, the UN saw a substantial increase in its peacekeeping activities, despite no obvious change to the UN operational systems to support these endeavours. The change in Russian support for Western liberal norms within the UN demonstrates their belief that they might benefit in some way by

⁵⁰ Alex Bellamy, Stuart Griffin, and Paul Williams (2010) *Understanding Peacekeeping*

⁵¹ Koops, MacQueen, Tardy, and Williams (2015), p3

⁵² M. Peter (2015) 'Between Doctrine and Practice: The UN Peacekeeping Dilemma', *Global Governance*, (21:3), p352

supporting US leadership in the UN and thus, they increased support for its practices. This demonstrates how much domestic discourse and internal politics of a state can affect its decision making and participation in global affairs. But the UN and its influential Western member states cannot rely on the stability of the UN's international liberal basis.

In discussing the re-emergence of the UN into world politics in the post-Cold War period, the 1990-1991 Gulf War presents a clear example of UN actions that validate realist and rationalist cooperation theories. Among the P5 powers, the US, France, and Britain all held power-based national interests in the area and subsequently became involved in the conflict. The Soviet decision to accompany US efforts can also be justified under realist and rational based theoretical explanations, as it benefited the Soviets to maintain good relations with the US, as well as hold on to Western economic support. In this instance, the US acted as the hegemon providing a public good of collective security, while the UN was only included in efforts to stabilize the region after US decisions had been made. Furthermore, the UN had no control over the military effort to stabilize the region, which was initiated and undertaken by US forces. In order to undertake these actions, the US used the UN Security Council for their own benefit. In this way, the UN acted as a multilateral frontman for unilateral American foreign-policy decisions. In fact, it was argued by many non-Western countries that the UN had been used during the Gulf conflict to 'legitimize Western strategic interests'.⁵³ Therefore, despite the resurgence of UN peacekeeping activities in the post-Cold War period, the organisation's credibility risked damage if it only adhered to the interests of its Western members, namely the P5 powers within the Security Council.

Another example of Western influence over UN activity was shown only a few years later during the Bosnian conflict of 1993-1994. The failure of the UN to intervene forcefully, from a realist and rationalist perspective, arguably came from a lack of strategic interests in the region from any of the larger powers. Instead, UN action actually contradicted any Western long-term strategic interests in the region. However, it could be argued that the decision not to intervene was based on previous historical alliances between the French and Soviets with the Serbs. Furthermore, any armed intervention would require a greater number of soldiers to

⁵³ Risse-Kappen (1997), p280

be exposed to hostile warfare situations, which the larger powers were not prepared to support. A large part of US involvement in the war was merely to restrict the spread of the conflict to other regions in which it held bigger strategic interests. However, despite US efforts to engage in more forceful actions, opposition from Britain, France and Russia in the UNSC prevented such action. This contradicts the idea that the US acted as a hegemon to control the UN and pressure the international community to support its interests in the post-Cold War era. Instead, it was the UK and France who resisted a more active approach by the Security Council, despite the possible fall-out in Europe and repercussions of a war in the Balkans. As Risse-Kappen explains, the Europeans, particularly the British government, influenced the UN in their arguments that almost nothing could be done about the ethnic hatred and atrocities in Bosnia, so a large intervention would be too costly and therefore no serious strategic interests were at stake.⁵⁴

In recent years, the power of the United States military has become dominant feature of international politics and its leading role within UN politics and financial matters makes it a key influencer within UN structures. However, US power is being challenged in key strategic areas, with the rise of China as a competitor in the now-contested waters of the Pacific and the interference of Russia in Syria as well as its more recent invasion of Ukraine. As the power of the US is challenged within a multipolar climate, the UN has become an international institute of collective security through which many major powers are aiming to spread their influence. Yet, high-profile failures in former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda during the early 1990s prompted arguments that the UN should not undertake peacekeeping, but regional organisations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), or even the African Union (AU) would be better suited to the task.⁵⁵

As we can tell, the UNSC has held an important place in international affairs since its establishment in 1946. During this time its norms and practices have evolved greatly. However, there are opposing viewpoints on how well it has carried out its duties over the past years. For the UN to be able to operate effectively, to overcome any challenges and be successful in its peacekeeping efforts, there needs to be consensus, commitment and organisation among its member states; they must be

⁵⁴ Ibid., p282

⁵⁵ Ahmed, Keating and Solinas (2007), p15

willing to provide financial support and set aside their own interests for the collective good.⁵⁶ There have been attempts to address these issues and failings within UN peacekeeping. Analysis of UN peacekeeping operations was few and far between before the publication of Boutros-Ghali's 1992 report 'An Agenda for Peace'.⁵⁷ This was later added to by the 1995 Supplement to An Agenda for Peace.⁵⁸ The 2000 Brahimi Report, an independent examination of UN peace operations, determined that the UN had repeatedly failed in its duties of 'saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war'.⁵⁹ This outlook was echoed in the HIPPO report, published in 2015, which claimed that UN peace operations were struggling to accomplish their goals and must better adapt to increase its effectiveness.⁶⁰ However, this dissertation aims to look at the UN on a more fundamental level, by investigating and analysing its sociological foundations and the influences of perspective on the UN's development and the subsequent impact of this on its peacekeeping processes and practices.

⁵⁶ Weiss, Forsythe, Coate, and Pease (2017), p26

⁵⁷ United Nations (1992) *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*

⁵⁸ United Nations (1995) *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*

⁵⁹ United Nations (2000), p.viii

⁶⁰ United Nations (2015) *Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations*, p9

Chapter 2: **Research Design and Methodology**

This study proposes to apply the theory of ethnocentrism within UN practices and processes, particularly among the UNSC, to investigate the impact on the capability of the UN to engage with its peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War period. This chapter will first address the theoretical framework utilised to explore this question. It will then discuss the source material that has been used before explaining the text-based content analysis, which is the primary methodology used within this research. Then it will outline the analysis performed under the selected methodology. Finally, it will address any conceptual limitations and ethical considerations regarding the study.

2.1. Theoretical framework

While the theory of ethnocentrism has been explained in the previous chapter, the decision to use this theoretical framework can be explained. Ethnocentrism is a sociological framework that is particularly relevant to international relations and global institutional practices. While there has been extensive research conducted on how actors have influenced norm development at the UN, there is considerably less on the internal sociological influence within the UN's structure and how this affects the organisation's operations. This study aims to address this gap in the literature.

Sociology itself looks towards theoretical generalisations in the understanding of social phenomena. It largely analyses norms and relationships in social settings, to help develop an understanding of interactions between and within groups. Global institutions, such as the UN, rely on such norms and ideas to maintain peace and security, while promoting certain values within their missions. Therefore, by understanding the influences over these norms and values, the processes and practices of the UN can be better understood.

To begin with, using a historical sociologist approach, I aim to investigate how the sociological influence of ethnocentrism affects actors, politics, and theories, and how this initially impacted the structures that were built. This will assist in the explanation

of how and why the UN now approaches peace and conflict as a result. In addition, by engaging with sociological approaches within a global organisation, as well as Security Studies and International Relations theories more broadly, theoretical perspectives of ethnocentrism can be applied to global institutions, such as the UN, more clearly.

2.2. Data

The following section lists the primary documents used in the analysis of UN peacekeeping operations and their reasons for inclusion within this study.

The founding document of the UN, the United Nations Charter, was published in 1945, in the aftermath of the Second World War.⁶¹ The United Nations can take action on a wide variety of issues due to its unique international character and the powers vested in its Charter, which is considered an international treaty and arguably the closest thing there is to a global constitution.

In 1992 'An Agenda for Peace' was published. This document discussed areas of preventive diplomacy, peace-making, and peacekeeping.⁶² Written for the United Nations by then Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the document outlines suggestions for the development of the UN towards issues of conflict in the post-Cold War era. This was later supported by the 'Supplement to An Agenda for Peace', published in 1995 in response to the failures in UN peacekeeping during the early 1990s.⁶³ This report reiterated the importance of the changing nature of conflict that required adapted and creative solutions. It stated that the UN needed to address the immediate as well as the root causes of conflict in its operations. Overall, the report stressed the need for deeper commitment to cooperation and true multilateralism within the organisation. The publication in 1994 of 'An Agenda for Development' turned further attention towards UN peacekeeping operations, stating they should act to address the underlying economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian causes of conflict in order to deal with conflict.⁶⁴ The 'Report of the Panel on United Nations

⁶¹ United Nations (1945)

⁶² United Nations (1992)

⁶³ United Nations (1995)

⁶⁴ United Nations Secretary-General (1994) *An Agenda for Development Report of the Secretary-General*

Peace Operations’, also known as the ‘Brahimi Report’, was published in 2000.⁶⁵ The report reviewed UN peacekeeping operations and discussed its activities, while also aiming to provide recommendations for future UN peacekeeping missions.

The United Nations published its doctrine of peacekeeping, ‘United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines’, in 2008.⁶⁶ Also known as the Capstone Doctrine, it provided a clear set of guiding principles and core objectives for UN peacekeeping operations. The doctrine largely focused on ‘multi-dimensional’ peacekeeping missions, which aimed to ensure stability by strengthening state structures and facilitating political processes of peace. Before these concepts were formalised within this report, the principles of UN peacekeeping could only be monitored through its practice of peacekeeping, as well as the resulting reports on these operations.

The ‘Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations’ was published in 2015.⁶⁷ Also known as the HIPPO Report, it revealed changes within international security, with a reversal of positive trends of peace as conflicts increased. More importantly, it was the HIPPO Report that recognised the need for a more tailored and flexible approach towards peacekeeping, rather than the ‘template missions’ provided by the UN. It therefore suggested collaborations and partnerships with regional organisations would be able to provide this. The documents were sourced from the online United Nations official document system, which provides a full text search of documents issued since 1993, as well as selected documents from previous years. This is an effective method of research, as it covers the post-Cold War era, which is this dissertation’s period of study.

These sources all contribute towards an understanding of the founding of the UN as a global institution, noting key states who shaped its structure and approach, as well as demonstrating major norm shifts over time. These core peacekeeping documents show major themes throughout the UN’s development, drawing conclusions regarding the institution’s shifting approaches to conflict and peacekeeping, as well as other issues. Many of these UN documents relate specifically to UN

⁶⁵ United Nations (2000)

⁶⁶ United Nations (2008)

⁶⁷ United Nations (2015)

peacekeeping efforts, although other aspects of peacemaking and peacebuilding are increasingly referenced by the UN alongside its peacekeeping missions.

Thus, these documents offer a window into discussions surrounding UN peacekeeping operations, and peace operations more broadly, and elaborate on the deliberations that have inspired the development of UN peacekeeping efforts in recent years. The UN has a far more documents within its repertoire, covering a broad range of issues from human development to climate change security. However, this dissertation will be limited to these reports and documents that discuss the UN's peacekeeping operations, in order to facilitate an efficient discussion.

I will also be analysing UN voting patterns. The data is derived from the Reports of the Security Council. Only those roll-call votes taken on agenda items classified under the heading of Political and Security Matters are included, to focus on alleged violence and threats towards states as understood by the UN Charter. Votes on procedural matters are therefore excluded from this analysis. The identification of voting patterns in the Security Council aims to provide an empirical basis for theorizing about the Council's decision-making processes.

2.3. Research Methods

International relations scholars use a wide range of both qualitative and quantitative methods in advancing their theoretical claims on global political relations in international affairs.⁶⁸ This dissertation aims to employ both methods to support the conclusions drawn from text-based content analysis.

Qualitative research methods primarily involve detailed and in-depth research that is focused on generating theories that are subjective and contextual.⁶⁹ This approach is used in order to better understand the world around us from varying perspectives and interpretations. Within this dissertation, a qualitative approach enables a focus on meanings and processes that make up international politics.⁷⁰ This can be achieved by first examining the theory of ethnocentrism, before discussing the

⁶⁸ Christopher Lamont (2015) *Research Methods in International Relations*, p77

⁶⁹ David L. Morgan (2013) *Integrating Qualitative and Quantitative Methods: A Pragmatic Approach*, p51

⁷⁰ Lamont (2015), p78

literature surrounding UN peacekeeping, including its structure and the challenges it faces.

In contrast, quantitative methods refer to data collection and analysis of numeric data. This data then allows us to determine whether a relationship exists between two or more variables.⁷¹ An analysis of this data demonstrates a 'desire to understand the behavior, decisions and choices of actors in international politics'.⁷² However, while the exploration of ethnocentrism within the UN cannot be described in quantitative terms, this data may provide insight. The analysis of UN data, such as voting behaviour, enables us to relate the theoretical aspects of this dissertation with the reality of UN practices.

The primary method of research used within this dissertation is that of content analysis, focused around key themes of 'peacekeeping', 'United Nations', and 'ethnocentrism'. This approach centres the study on the analysis of the UN documents mentioned above, as well as the incorporation academic literature and independent reports. Some of the major themes that are present in these documents are the changing concept of security from interstate to intrastate, the role of democracy in ensuring peace and aiding development, the prevention of conflict, and an recent increase in more localised approaches to peace.

By conducting a literature review on ethnocentrism and the UN within a global security context, I was able to compile previous research from a number of disciplines and integrate these findings into my study. This helped to developing a broad understanding of the core issues and actors. It also aided in my awareness of official UN discourse regarding its peacekeeping operations and how this interacted with developing global relations and the changing conflict environment. By combining this research with IR and sociological theory, I aim to develop a better understanding of the UN as a global peace institution, as well as its political and historical background which helped to shape its approach to conflict and peacekeeping. This comparative research design allowed the study to compare past and present situations, enabling an exploration of the necessary conditions to cause certain events and the likely effects of making certain decisions.⁷³

⁷¹ Ibid., p98

⁷² Ibid., p96

⁷³ Nicolas Walliman (2017) *Research Methods: The Basics*, p10

2.4. Limitations and Considerations

Further study in a broader international context, which takes account of all forms of peace operations, including non-UN peacekeeping missions, would help to develop a better understanding of UN peacekeeping. While the UN is a prominent actor within the field of international security and is arguably the most important peace actor in this field, it is important to note that the UN does not have a monopoly on conducting or authorizing peace operations.⁷⁴ Other organisations, such as the African Union (AU), European Union (EU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), also engage in peace operations. While many of these missions may be in conjunction with UN efforts, these other international organisations engage in independent peace operations, often in cases where the UN lacks support from its member states to intervene, or there is disagreement between the P5 powers on the UNSC to allow UN intervention. Discussion regarding the actions of other international organisations will be limited, as the focus of this dissertation is contained to the internal politics of the UN and the influence this has on how the UN approaches its peacekeeping missions.

It is also important to note that the standard convention is to assume that the dominant actors in world affairs are states. While this is largely the case, these states also have complex internal structures and the decisions of political leadership are heavily influenced by internal power concentrations. Furthermore, the development of theory in the post-Cold War period also began to challenge the emphasis on material capabilities as well as mainstream state-centric assumptions, instead focusing on the importance of ideas within international development and the shift in focus of the referent objects of security to things other than the state.⁷⁵ However, this dissertation will not delve into the internal workings of each major state discussed and how this might influence its decision-making processes and thus its involvement in the United Nation's framework. Furthermore, while an in-depth and thorough investigation could be made into a variety of theoretical aspects within international relations, as well as an historical evaluation of the UN's peacekeeping

⁷⁴ Koops, MacQueen, Tardy, and Williams (2015), p1

⁷⁵ Barry Buzan (2009) *The Evolution of International Security Studies*, p2

processes and practices to offer a comparison, it was limited to the post-Cold War period and a focus on ethnocentrism. Further study could draw comparisons between the influence of ethnocentrism in the post-Cold War era to the early stages of UN development and peacekeeping operations. In addition, the study could be expanded to discuss other theoretical influences that might affect how UN peacekeeping operates. While this dissertation does aim to provide insight into the ethnocentric influences within the UN and how these influence its approach to peacekeeping, there are other factors that should be taken into account.

There is also an issue of conceptualisation. The concept of ethnocentrism is subject to some confusion, as it has been defined and redefined in many ways over time, making the term fairly wide-ranging and open to interpretation. While this dissertation will make a clear definition of the concept, it is important not to ignore the presence of other definitions of the term. Furthermore, there must be a clear distinction between ethnocentrism and other discriminatory or prejudiced systems within international relations. This will help to demonstrate the choice in the use of ethnocentrism as a concept to study.

Lastly, it is important to be aware of my own character and the effect this might have on my approach to, and understanding of, the issues discussed within this study. As a white British citizen, I benefit from my nationality and positionality in the world. These considerations are particularly important when discussing the influence of ethnocentrism, as I will have been influenced by the ethnocentric structure of my upbringing in a Western country. It is therefore likely that my own identity will influence my analysis.

Chapter 3: **The Theory of Ethnocentrism**

Ethnocentrism is a social mechanism which underlies how societies approach group relations and is particularly relevant within international relations. While ethnocentrism might primarily be considered as a practice among ethnic groups, this does not exclude the possibility that facets of ethnocentrism may relate to many different kinds of groups. In particular, ethnocentrism can influence those groups that are structured around specific ideologies, such as political, national, or religious beliefs, as well as coalitions. Within this dissertation, the case of ethnocentrism can be related to processes and practices of the UN, a group that I will argue is structured around the dominance of the P5 nations and predominantly liberal norms and ideals that relate primarily to Western systems.

Before this discussion begins, it is important to make the distinction between ethnocentrism and other discriminatory or prejudiced systems within international relations that might appear to operate in a similar vein. Relationships between ethnic and national groups, and the relationship of ethnocentrism with nationalism and patriotism, are important as they present similar concepts. But while national groups need a territory with which to associate themselves, ethnic groups operate on a more sentimental basis and can thus be more widely connected. As such, ethnocentrism can be seen as a fundamental concept in the understanding of group, societal, and international relations. Furthermore, the concept of ethnocentrism has been conceptually and empirically distinguished from other theoretical social concepts, such as outgroup negativity and mere ingroup positivity. This distinction will be examined further within this theoretical overview.

The use of the concept of ethnocentrism is key to understanding the functioning of the UN and global relations as a whole. An understanding of the causes of ethnocentrism, particularly the view that ethnocentrism is caused by insecurity, is essential to understanding the role and functioning of the UN within international society. This enables the study to relate ethnocentrism to theories on international relations. Furthermore, the study focuses on those facets of ethnocentrism which strongly relate to international relations, such as in-group superiority and exploitation, which will be discussed in more detail below.

This section of the dissertation will briefly discuss a range of ethnic-based social theories that have predated the conception of ethnocentrism as a theory, before laying out the evolution of ethnocentric thinking. This will help create a better understanding of the facets of ethnocentrism, as well as the causes of ethnocentric behaviour, so that a clearer view of ethnocentrism as a concept can be established for the continuing sections of this study.

3.1. Liberal Studies

The focus within International Security Studies, as a whole, is largely a Western-centric. It stands out as one of the main sub-fields of Western international relations theory, giving it with a very Westernised approach.⁷⁶ Historically, conceptions of the 'West' and its definitions have changed over time, largely under the influence of imperial relationships between Europe and Africa in particular. As such, the concept of peace is in most cases given a liberal grounding that stems from European theories of enlightenment. The term 'West' within this dissertation is largely in reference to the US, the UK, and France, as the permanent Western nations within the UNSC. As Buzan argues, the concept of security has been based on these Western perceptions of state, with the experiences of other non-Western states only being considered according to their impact on Western interests and relations.⁷⁷ But as Ken Booth has noted, 'different worldviews and discourses about politics deliver different views and discourses about security'.⁷⁸ Despite this, Western nations argue that lasting societal peace is best achieved through liberal democracy. Waltz argues that it is this belief in democracy and security, which Western nations have defined for themselves, drives notions of peace within international organisations, such as the UN, and thus is imposed onto those states in conflict.⁷⁹ It is often the case that dominant states who are 'at peace' are given the task to take the lead in efforts to resolve disputes within conflict-affected states, often initiating efforts through diplomatic channels, using international organisations such as the UN. However, as

⁷⁶ Buzan (2009), p1

⁷⁷ Ibid., p19

⁷⁸ Ken Booth (1997) 'Security and self: Reflections of a Fallen Realist', in K Krause and M.C. Williams (eds.), *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases*, p83

⁷⁹ Kenneth N. Waltz (2000) 'Structural Realism After the Cold War', *International Security* (25:1), p12

Mearsheimer has argued, state behaviour is often driven by calculations over power rather than a commitment to building peace.⁸⁰ This then introduces the opportunity for a concept of ethnocentrism to emerge and inform the processes and practices within the UN, which are driven and enabled by the values and interests of powerful, Western states.

Differing theories present different perspectives on UN participation within the international sphere, as well as Western interaction within the UN itself. Under hegemonic stability theory, Risse-Kappen made the following proposition:

*The more the U.S. considers its national interests at stake, the more the UN Security Council will be willing to declare inter- and intrastate conflicts as threats to international peace and security (Chapter VII of UN Charter) and to implement such resolutions.*⁸¹

Within the theory of minilateralism, Risse-Kappen contended:

*The more the permanent members of the Security Council consider their national interests at stake, the more the Security Council will be willing to declare inter- and intrastate conflicts as threats to inter- national peace and security and to implement such resolutions.*⁸²

This demonstrates an argument about the influence that the P5 powers and powerful Western nations, such as the US, have over the processes and practices within UN peacekeeping.

However, the domination of liberal norms, views, and values within international relations and security studies is not a new phenomenon. As mentioned, imperial relationships have largely influenced relations between ‘the West’ and what we could call ‘the rest’. Yet it is the underlying views and beliefs driving these relations that are of key importance.

3.2. Race Theory

Racism portrays similarities with ethnocentric theories but is usually not understood as a comparable notion. The two theories can certainly be discussed together and their influences may be correlated. But while both approaches involve ideas of group

⁸⁰ Mearsheimer (2001), p49

⁸¹ Risse-Kappen (1997), p258

⁸² Ibid., p261

superiority and purity, racism also involves attitudes of aggression and hostility towards other races, while ethnocentrism focuses more on in-group self-importance than outwards enmity. However, a brief overview of racism within international theory is beneficial to understanding how ethnocentrism might be influenced and operate within the same international sphere.

Human similarities and differences, including race, religion, and nation, have largely shaped the way that many societies have defined themselves and their connections within the past centuries. Beliefs and attitudes widely shared among individuals or groups also affect the definition of each actor's 'universe of obligation'.⁸³ The belief in racial hierarchies and their justification throughout history has developed into a system of vast global racial inequalities, as well as motivating more localised national racial inequalities. Racism revolves around the components of *difference* and *power*; a sense of difference provides a motive or rationale for an actor to use their power advantage over another, which they see as different and lesser.⁸⁴ Racism has been used to rationalize past structures of colonialism and empire, therefore having significant impact on the development of global power relations. Yet efforts to understand the logic of racism within the Western world order has been limited.⁸⁵ The development of political science and international theory from racist Enlightenment thought has often been ignored or side-lined. Similarly, the origins of Enlightenment theories from non-Western modes of knowing has also been disregarded. The Enlightenment period promoted 'intellectual justifications of racial hierarchies with racist academic and social ideals. This acted to merge racial beliefs with capitalist thinking in order to justify a racially-divided empire, in which Western states felt they had a 'responsibility' to control states previously seen as independent. As such, racist thought appears to be synonymous with Enlightenment theories.

The history and formation of race theory, including theories on 'scientific racism', can establish origins of white supremacy beliefs that have persisted in the West up to the present day. The idea of eugenics, driven by racist views of white superiority, as well as discrimination, was largely discussed throughout the 20th century. Compulsory

⁸³ Helen Fein (1979) *Accounting for Genocide*, p9

⁸⁴ George M. Fredrickson (2002) *Racism: A Short History*, p9

⁸⁵ Andrews (2021)

sterilisations had origins in a wider area of Europe and in the United States.⁸⁶ These are the nations which we now view as ‘the liberal West’. Furthermore, the development of racial and ethnic discrimination throughout the 20th century, was put into practice, particularly in Germany with the rise of the Nazis to power. Although the Nazis are known for their antisemitic views and ideals, which ultimately led to the extermination of over six million Jews in the Holocaust during the Second World War, a cognitive model of eliminationist antisemitism was present in German society before the Nazi rise to power.⁸⁷ In fact, Kershaw argues there was ‘widespread latent antisemitism’ present within German society before the Nazi takeover of power.⁸⁸ Moreso, even when they were in power, information pointing towards genocidal policies was widely available in Germany, demonstrating a plain awareness of the racially-driven nature of Nazi policy.⁸⁹ While countries such as Britain and the United States openly opposed Nazi antisemitic policies, it is important to note that eugenic studies and antisemitic views were also widespread in these nations before the outbreak of war. Within the post-war period, the study of eugenics faded but imperial models of racial and ethnic relations still remained, while nationalist movements remained strong. Yet, there was also a strong desire for peace after the destruction of war. It was this combined environment, linking imperial views and a desire for peace, in which the UN was formed.

In today’s society, doctrines of white supremacy have a strong grip on culture within some countries. Within the United States, these ideas tie into a deeply conservative culture with strong religious undertones that still grips a large portion of the country. In 2016, this culminated in the election of Republican-nominee Donald Trump as President, who embodied these beliefs and acted as a political figurehead for right-wing values. Furthermore, there are also definite similarities between the election of Trump, the 2016 Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom, and the general rise of ultranationalist far-right groups in Europe.

These developments can certainly influence how the leadership of the P5 powers, particularly the US, UK, and France, participates in the UN. Traditionally, involvement with the fate of others has been balanced inversely against the distance

⁸⁶ Raul Hilberg (1992) *Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders*, p67

⁸⁷ Daniel J. Goldhagen (1996) *Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust*, p399

⁸⁸ Ian Kershaw (2008) *Hitler, the Germans and the Final Solution*, p148

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p142

between the actor and the affected state. The racist, supremacist values that are supported within national political institutions influence the involvement of these states within an international context, such as participation in UN peacekeeping missions. In particular, the concept of race appears central to conceptions of 'modernity' that were used by Enlightenment thinkers and are now embedded within the UN Charter. In fact, Mark Mazower argues the UN should be understood as a continuation of a history of world organisation underlined by the issue of, particularly British, imperialism.⁹⁰ This dissertation will focus particularly on how the operations of the UN are affected, rather than discussing the internal political make-up of UN member states in detail.

3.3. The Evolution of Ethnocentrism

Over time ethnocentrism has been defined and re-defined, conceptualized and reimagined, in many different and contradictory ways, making the term fairly wide-ranging and open to interpretation. In fact, the concept, like many other fundamental concepts, suffers from much conceptual uncertainty; it has been defined and redefined in so many ways that it is difficult to understand exactly what ethnocentrism is.

The ideas that underlie ethnocentrism as a concept were discussed by writers as early as 1879, when Charles Darwin's work discussed competition and cooperation between groups, and how these factors affected inter- and intra- group relations. These ideas were built upon in 1892 by social Darwinist, Herbert Spencer, who argued that societies in general are governed by two opposing moral codes: internal amity (towards members of one's group) and external enmity (towards everyone else).⁹¹

⁹⁰ Mark Mazower (2009) *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations*, p14

⁹¹ Boris Bizumic and John Duckitt (2012) 'What Is and Is Not Ethnocentrism? A Conceptual Analysis and Political Implications', *Political Psychology*, (33:6), p888

However, the concept of ethnocentrism is often attributed to Sumner, who referenced the term in an essay written in 1906 entitled 'War':⁹²

'The sentiment of cohesion, internal comradeship, and devotion to the in-group, which carries with it a sense of superiority to any out-group and readiness to defend the interests of the in-group against the out-group, is technically known as ethnocentrism.'

Sumner, who was also a social Darwinist, elaborated on and popularized the concept of ethnocentrism. In short, he regarded ethnocentrism as ethnic group self-centeredness or self-importance, in which positive ingroup attitudes and behaviours are often associated with preferential attitudes for the ingroup over outgroups, as well as hostility towards outgroups.

However, the first printed use of the term 'ethnocentrism' was in a paper by McGee, published in 1900, which focused on the issue of ethnic group self-centeredness.⁹³ McGee argued that the concept of ethnocentrism held similarities to egocentrism but was contained to ethnic group relations and largely based on ignorance. This idea also involved intergroup expressions of ethnic group preference, superiority, purity, and exploitativeness, and intragroup expressions of ethnic group cohesion and devotion.⁹⁴

LeVine and Campbell reapprached the concept in 1972, focusing on pro-ingroup attitudes that fuelled ethnocentrism, such as feelings of superiority and loyalty, as well as anti-outgroup attitudes, such as hostility and contempt towards others.⁹⁵ This approach largely saw ethnocentrism primarily as preference for the ingroup over outgroups, an attitude which was later contested by other scholars.⁹⁶

From these theories on ethnocentrism, several similar thematic nuances have emerged: group self-centeredness, outgroup negativity, and ingroup positivity. Using these themes, an actor gives a strong importance to their own group, as well as

⁹² W.G. Sumner (1906) *Folkways: A Study of the Sociological Importance of Usages, Manners, Customs, Mores, and Morals*

⁹³ W.J. McGee (1900) 'Primitive numbers', *Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology (1897-1898)*, (19)

⁹⁴ Bizumic and Duckitt (2012), p887

⁹⁵ R.A. LeVine and D.T. Campbell (1972) *Ethnocentrism: Theories of Conflict, Ethnic Attitudes, and Group Behavior*

⁹⁶ See J.C. Turner (1978) 'Social Comparison, Similarity and Ingroup Favouritism', in H. Tajfel (ed.) *Differentiation Between Social Groups: Studies in the Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*; and M.B. Brewer (1999) 'The Psychology of Prejudice: Ingroup Love or Outgroup Hate', *Journal of Social Issues*, (55)

giving their group a positive evaluation, while acting in a hostile manner towards other groups. However, as Bizumic and Duckitt elaborate on these ideas, they draw a parallel between the group-level approach of ethnocentrism and the individual approach of narcissism: in the same way as narcissism (personal self-centeredness) is different to misanthropy (hostility to others) and self-esteem (positive evaluation of oneself), ethnocentrism is different to outgroup negativity and ingroup positivity.⁹⁷ This challenged Sumner's original concept of ethnocentrism, which assumed group self-centeredness, ingroup positivity, and negative outgroup attitudes all corresponded to a single dimension of ethnocentrism. Instead, these factors are arguably all distinct from each other in influencing ethnocentrism.

In 1993, Phillips attempted to build on this argument, stating that ingroup positivity is not necessarily related to outgroup negativity, but when it is, this constitutes ethnocentrism.⁹⁸ Yet, this definition is difficult to conceptualize, as the two factors of outgroup negativity and ingroup positivity are quite distinct and can often be unrelated, making it hard to form a solid and reliable definition of ethnocentrism.

Furthermore, these interpretations of ethnocentrism have been questioned by numerous scholars due to their broad generalisations. Tajfel discusses ethnocentrism as an umbrella concept and questioned whether the variety of themes encompassed under such a broad concept would undermine its usefulness.⁹⁹ Similarly, Heaven, Rajab, and Ray spoke about 'the disutility of the ethnocentrism concept' due to its lack of stability in definition.¹⁰⁰ Thus, even though the concept itself is still used and studied, there is little agreement on what ethnocentrism is. As a result, theorists and researchers who have studied, developed, and rationalized ethnocentrism within their works have often addressed the fundamentals of the concept in very different ways.

⁹⁷ Bizumic and Duckitt (2012), p890

⁹⁸ Phillips et al. (1993) 'A Hermeneutic Rejoinder to Ourselves and Our Critics', *Journal of Black Psychology*, (19)

⁹⁹ H. Tajfel (1983) 'Prejudice', in R. Harre and R. Lamb (eds.), *The Dictionary of Personality and Social Psychology*

¹⁰⁰ P.C.L Heaven, D. Rajab, and J.J. Ray (1985) 'Patriotism, Racism, and the Disutility of the Ethnocentrism Concept', *Journal of Social Psychology*, (125)

3.4. Facets of Ethnocentrism

In order to discuss the impact of ethnocentrism on international relations and within United Nations proceedings, a clear understanding of ethnocentrism is needed. Throughout the evolution of ethnocentrism as a concept, the main view of group superiority has emerged clearly. In fact, six specific facets of ethnocentrism are visible within the concept: preference, superiority, purity, exploitativeness, group cohesion, and devotion. These factors all reflect and revolve around the view of central importance for an actor's own group. Some focus more on intergroup relations and promote the idea that the ingroup is more important than outgroups; others focus on intragroup dynamics and instill the idea that the ingroup is more important than its individual members. These six facets are key to understanding the influence of ethnocentrism that will be discussed throughout this dissertation.

The most prominent facet within the concept of ethnocentrism is the widespread notion of ingroup superiority: 'the belief that one's own ethnic group is better than or superior to others'.¹⁰¹ This feeling of superiority is normally related to certain areas that are significant to the ingroup, such as economic or military superiority, developmental superiority, or even moral and spiritual superiority. Initial cases of ethnocentrism that were discussed by Sumner in his initial conceptualisation suggested that ethnic groups often believe themselves to be superior to other groups. This ideal can be seen throughout history, with societies believing that their group has been 'chosen' and should be the dominant group in the world.¹⁰²

This notion relates strongly to a second facet of ethnocentrism, purity. This facet posits a desire to maintain the 'purity' of an ethnic group by promoting ingroup superiority and denying any mixing with outgroups, which creates a situation of ethnocentric isolationism.¹⁰³ The exclusivity of the ingroup, while outgroup members are rejected, projects an image of group self-importance. Yet, while the belief in ingroup superiority does not necessarily carry with it a feeling of outgroup negativity, it can also be seen as a defensive reaction by an ingroup that feels threatened by the close proximity and presence of outgroups members.

¹⁰¹ Bizumic and Duckitt (2012), p893

¹⁰² Sumner (1906)

¹⁰³ Bizumic and Duckitt (2012), p893

Another facet of ethnocentrism is exploitativeness, which promotes the pursuit of one's own ethnic group's interests with little or no consideration given to the interests of outgroups. In Sumner's initial conceptualisations of ethnocentrism, he stated that groups tend to pursue their own interests against outgroups.¹⁰⁴ However, once again this idea does not directly correlate to outgroup negativity, but can instead be a result of indifference towards outgroups.

The sense of group cohesion is another facet of ethnocentrism that revolves around the view that ingroup's need high levels of integration, unity, and cooperation, with the needs of the group outweighing individual needs.¹⁰⁵ Ingroup self-importance is held above all else within this facet, reflected in the view that individual wants, needs, or desires, must be rejected for the sake of the group and its unity. This sentiment was introduced by Darwin in his studies on group functionality and was later echoed by Sumner as a major facet of ethnocentrism.¹⁰⁶

The final two facets of ethnocentrism are preference and devotion. Preference within ethnocentrism focuses on the inclination of an actor to favour and prefer one's own group, particularly in regards to ethnic groupings, over other groups.¹⁰⁷ A stronger version of this facet is presented in the factor of devotion within ethnocentrism, which emphasises a strong and unconditional loyalty or dedication to one's own ethnic group and its interests.¹⁰⁸ These facets once again revolves around the idea of ingroup self-importance that underlines the concept of ethnocentrism. Yet, they do not necessitate outgroup hostility in order to operate; preference is not based on the view that the ingroup is superior while outgroups are lesser, while devotion does not require an opposite feeling regarding outgroups.

3.5. Causes of ethnocentrism

The alleged causes of ethnocentrism are varied, with theorists proposing six broad causes of ethnocentrism: threat and insecurity, self-aggrandizement, intragroup

¹⁰⁴ W.G. Sumner (1911) *War and Other Essays*

¹⁰⁵ Bizumic and Duckitt (2012), p894

¹⁰⁶ C. Darwin (1897) *The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex; and Sumner (1911)*

¹⁰⁷ Bizumic and Duckitt (2012), p892

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p895

similarity and outgroup difference, proneness to simplification and ignorance, social factors or influences located outside the individual, and evolutionary factors.¹⁰⁹

“Ethnocentrism Is Caused by Threat and Insecurity”

There are theories within international relations and social relations which assume ethnocentrism is caused by a variety of threats or insecurities, both globally, nationally, and locally. Accordingly, ethnocentrism could be viewed as a defensive reaction from an individual or group towards their perceived threats. This relates approaches to ethnocentrism theory to realist theories within broader international relations theory.

Realists theorists, such as LeVine and Campbell, and Sherif, contend that ethnocentric tendencies are a results of competition or conflict over resources, such as territory and material benefits, or a threat to the ingroup’s access to these resources.¹¹⁰

“Ethnocentrism Is Caused by Self-Aggrandizement”

Another theory that has been discussed assumes ethnocentrism is caused by the act of self-aggrandizement, even within groups. In this way, people or groups see themselves to be superior in comparison to others. Furthermore, this lead to subsequent exploitation of others and outgroups, either to their own or their group’s benefit. Major theories that engage with these ideals are social identity perspective, elite theory, and social dominance theory.

Social identity perspective is a theoretical approach that revolved around social identity. The theory proposes a case of depersonalisation within self-categorized groups.¹¹¹ In this way, a person’s identity becomes relatively interchangeable with other ingroup members. As such, there tends to be a form of discrimination by

¹⁰⁹ B. Bizumić (2012) *Theories of Ethnocentrism and Their Implications for Peacebuilding*, p40

¹¹⁰ LeVine and Campbell (1972); and M. Sherif (1966) *In Common Predicament: Social Psychology of Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation*

¹¹¹ J.C. Turner et al. (1987) *Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory*

persons in favour of the ingroup in order to create positive group distinctiveness or promote group superiority.

Another potential cause of ethnocentrism is posited in 'elite theory', an approach that is influenced by Marx's ideas of the ruling class. It argues that societies establish influential elites who are able to use various mechanisms to govern the rest of the society - ethnocentrism is one such mechanism.¹¹² The establishment of an 'ingroup' is extremely important, as this higher status can be used by the elites to maintain the status quo and mobilize the group for their own gains. However, this theory can be criticized for minimizing the role of non-elites, who would rarely be passive recipients of ethnocentrism.¹¹³

Social dominance theory, as presented by Sidanius & Pratto in 1999, explains a theory of social dominance orientation (SDO) which suggests that due to evolutionary influences, people have developed a 'basic human predisposition to form group-based social hierarchies'.¹¹⁴ This theory seems particularly relevant to the current conceptualization of ethnocentrism; 'the idea that one's own group is of extreme importance can be used to justify ethnic intergroup hierarchies, especially if the ingroup is high in status and power'.¹¹⁵

"Ethnocentrism Is Caused by Preference for the Similar"

There are several theories within ethnocentrism that argue it is caused by a preference for the similar. This relates to wider international theory as people, groups, and states have been known to show preference for others who have similar values, beliefs, and attitudes to themselves, while rejecting or discriminating against those who believe or behave differently.

Belief congruence theory involves preference for those who have similar beliefs to oneself.¹¹⁶ This theory indicates that members within an ethnic ingroup will prefer

¹¹² Bizumić (2012), p44

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ J. Sidanius and F. Pratto (1999) Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy and Oppression, p38

¹¹⁵ Bizumić (2012), p44

¹¹⁶ Ibid., p46

other members within their own group to outgroup members, because they see the former as having similar beliefs to themselves.

Optimal distinctiveness theory suggests that there are motivations to identify with groups in order to satisfy needs for inclusion and similarities, over differentiation.¹¹⁷ Groups that enable such a balance satisfy the need for people to identify with particular ingroups and favour them over outgroups. This theory relates strongly to the present conceptualization of ethnocentrism: intragroup ethnocentrism focuses on group cohesion and stems from a need to belong with similar members, while intergroup ethnocentrism concentrates on the need for differentiation.

“Ethnocentrism Is Caused by Proneness to Simplification”

This approach determines that the simplification of society and relations is strongly related to ethnocentrism. Allport argues that the process of forming social categories for simplifying the world has often been related to ethnocentrism because it involves only two easily manageable categories: us/ingroup and them/outgroup.¹¹⁸ Within this simplified model of societal relations, the ingroup is perceived as important and desirable, whereas the outgroup is often seen as less important or less desirable.

However, this separation into categories has contributed to a lack of knowledge between groups about the other. In particular, ingroup ignorance about outgroups has often been related to ethnocentric tendencies and discriminatory views. Bizumić emphasises that according to Allport’s contact hypothesis, ‘people need to experience optimal contact with outgroups to enhance intergroup relations’.¹¹⁹ This contact might occur through direct intergroup cooperation, connections in group interests, or through institutions, perhaps with institutional support.

“Ethnocentrism Is Caused by Social Factors”

This theory posits that ethnocentrism is enforced by a socialization in or conformity with social norms that have ethnocentric influence. These social norms can include

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p47

¹¹⁸ G.W. Allport (1954) *The Nature of Prejudice*

¹¹⁹ Bizumić (2012), p48

customs, traditions, values, and any other criteria of conduct which are standardized within groups, that might influence those who come into contact with it. For example, Bizumić suggests that past negative intergroup experiences might create strong ethnocentric, prejudiced, and violent intergroup norms, and as such the perception of extreme threat to the ingroup would create extreme intergroup reactions.¹²⁰ Thus, if conflict was to erupt between groups, in order to overcome any ethnocentric influence in group interactions to engage in peacebuilding, social relations between groups would need to be addressed.

“Ethnocentrism Is Caused by Evolutionary Factors”

The final theory suggested is that ethnocentrism is caused by the evolution of humanity and its accompanying social development. Darwin’s theories of evolution assumed that intergroup competition makes people more cooperative with ingroup members and that cooperative groups are more likely to prosper than non-cooperative groups.¹²¹ In this way, ethnic group survival has been arguably based on the view that the ingroup was seen as more important than others. However, the ethnocentricity of a group does not necessarily ensure its survival or make its survival more likely over other groups who do not operate ethnocentrically.

¹²⁰ Ibid., p50

¹²¹ Darwin (1879)

Chapter 4: **Ethnocentrism in UN Peacekeeping Operations**

The United Nations has conducted peacekeeping operations for over seventy years, operating within a changing global security environment and adapting to the developing nature of conflict. Over time peacekeeping has advanced from a 'traditional' model of conflict management to a more complex model of peacekeeping involving military and civilian elements, as well as adopting more sustainable approaches to peace.¹²²

Within the UN, the Security Council handles the political aspects of peacekeeping operations. It is the responsibility of the Security Council to adopt resolutions to establish peacekeeping operations, determine mandates for each mission, and authorise the deployment of troops. The scope of these operations range from facilitating political processes and promoting human rights, to observing ceasefires and assisting in disarmament and demobilisation of combatants, to maintaining security and protecting civilians. Within the UN Charter, Article 39 gives the Security Council responsibility to determine threats to peace or acts of aggression, while Article 41 allows the Council to decide what action might be taken in response to restore international peace and security.¹²³

Since the end of the Cold War there has been a significant rise in UN peacekeeping activity. This increase is largely based on more ambitious and cooperative politics within the UN Security Council after the end of the Cold War, as well as increased funding and troop contributions from member states.¹²⁴ But more recently, as new conflicts and challenges have arisen such as civil wars, terrorism, and extremism, it is becoming increasingly evident that UN missions are struggling to keep pace with these changes. The HIPPO report, published in 2015, outlined the struggle of UN peace operations to achieve their goals and argued the organisation needed to better adapt in order to increase its effectiveness.¹²⁵ The challenges faced by the UN in its peacekeeping operations are often due to the policies pursued by its own member states, who offer divided viewpoints, as well as weak political and material

¹²² United Nations (2000), p1

¹²³ United Nations (1945)

¹²⁴ Jones (2009), p78

¹²⁵ United Nations (2015), p9

support to missions. The structure of the UN itself has proved difficult in the implementation and management of peacekeeping missions. Furthermore, with decision-making power regarding peacekeeping operations within the hands of the UNSC, dominated by the P5 nations, actions taken by the UN can often be slow or limited, if taken at all.

However, there is a deeper cause for these challenges than merely disagreement, disinterest, or sluggish procedures. The social theory that underlines the UN's operations, and therefore encompasses its issues as well, is that of ethnocentrism. This theory, as mentioned previously, is centred on the concept that one group sees itself as superior to others. The widespread belief in racial categorizations has had enormous implications for the way in which the West have historically set out to dominate and exploit 'inferior' peoples, including through inaction or indifference to suffering in non-Western countries or interests.¹²⁶ At the time of the creation of the UN, the Western policymakers and academics that developed the institution's structures and operating processes incorporated the racist and discriminatory Enlightenment theories within its systems. As such, the processes and practices of the UN are shaped by these Western values and models. Furthermore, the veto power of the P5 members on the Security Council, which allows them to interfere with decision-making and commitment to actions, puts them in a more dominant position to other members of the Council, as well as other member states more broadly. In particular, the Security Council has been likened to a 'an elite pact', representing an institution of 'selective security'.¹²⁷ The Council has also been seen to share similarities in structure and approach with the 19th century Concert of Europe, an informal grouping of major powers that kept the peace for nearly half a century.¹²⁸

This chapter will discuss the impact of ethnocentrism within UN peacekeeping, particularly focusing on the political challenges faced by the UN in its efforts to engage in peace operations. The study will relate the theory of ethnocentrism to the political practices of the UN in their approach to peacekeeping operations. The challenges that will be focused on within this discussion are the primary functions of

¹²⁶ Neil MacMaster (2001) *Racism in Europe: 1870-2000*

¹²⁷ Voeten (2005), p541; and Adam Roberts and Dominik Zaum (2009) *Selective Security: War and the United Nations Security Council since 1945*, p6

¹²⁸ Bosco (2009), p5

the UNSC in terms of developing peacekeeping missions: voting and the power of the veto held by the P5 nations within the Security Council, which affects the issues that are addressed by the UN and thus demonstrates the political will of member states to become involved in conflicts, especially those out-with their national interests; the development of UN peacekeeping mission mandates, which are highly Westernised concepts of peace shaped by the models and values as put forward by the P5 powers; and the funding and troop contributions made to UN peacekeeping, which are largely ambiguous and limit the impact the UN can have in comparison to its rhetoric.

4.1. Voting, the Veto, and Political Will

The support of UN member states, particularly among the Security Council, is a key part of the design, organisation, implementation, and success of its peacekeeping operations. This is particularly relevant in recent missions, as the nature of peacekeeping develops into more complex missions involving political and human security issues. The Brahimi Report, published in 2000, emphasised that the use of force alone could not create peace within conflict areas, instead it would only be able to create the space in which peace could be built and thus, UN peacekeeping needs to maintain support, funding and resources in order to support its goals.¹²⁹

To be able to provide a strong level of support to its peacekeeping missions, the UN must first address the issue of political will among its member states. Lipson argues that the source of much of the UN's dysfunction lies within the gap between its rhetoric and reality of a lack of collective political will among its members.¹³⁰ The image presented by the UN to engage in peace operations contrasts the 'limited willingness' of its member states to provide funding and resources to resolve conflicts they might see as 'distant, complex and resistant to outside involvement'.¹³¹ This demonstrates a reluctance of member states to support or contribute to peacekeeping missions beyond their own national interests. In the post-Cold War

¹²⁹ United Nations (2000), p.viii

¹³⁰ Michael Lipson (2007) 'Peacekeeping: Organized Hypocrisy?', *European Journal of International Relations*, (13:1), p9

¹³¹ Roberts and Zaum (2008), p7

years, the efforts of the Security Council to address human rights violations and humanitarian crises in conflict scenarios were lacking.¹³² As shown by UN peacekeeping missions to Rwanda, Somalia, and Bosnia during this time, weak or inconsistent level of support from the member states can be a major source of ineffectiveness or failure. This issue of support is significant, as predictions of future conflict trends point towards a growth in demand for UN peacekeeping action in increasingly complex conflict environments.¹³³

The UN Charter plays a significant role in assigning power to the Security Council, in particular the P5. Chapter V of the UN Charter outlines the composition and operation of the UN Security Council, and grants the Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Through Article 25, the member states of the UN 'agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.'¹³⁴ This gives the UNSC a large amount of power and responsibility within the international system. Furthermore, its decisions and resolutions are binding on all members of the UN.

The involvement of the UNSC in decision-making regarding UN peacekeeping missions is done through voting procedures. The analysis of voting behaviour within in the Council helps to identify basic voting groupings and alignments within the politics of the Security Council. As such, the political will of member states, particularly the P5, to become involved in conflicts outside their own national interests can be monitored.

Article 27 pertains to voting by members of the Security Council.¹³⁵ It reads as follows:

- 27.1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.*
- 27.2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members.*
- 27.3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.*

¹³² David M. Malone (2004) *The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century*, p664

¹³³ Jones (2009), p83

¹³⁴ United Nations (1945), Article 25

¹³⁵ United Nations (1945), Article 27

In short, a draft resolution must have the approving vote of nine members of the Security Council, including the concurring votes of the P5 members: China, France, Russia, the UK, and the US. If the draft fails to win nine votes, or a permanent member casts a veto, then the draft fails to pass. This places a large amount of power with the P5 members, who have the power to veto any resolutions that don't agree with their own national interests. In this way, the UNSC can therefore only really be effective when the P5 powers are in agreement.

Between 16 February 1946, the date of the first veto cast, and 13 December 1971, the majority of vetoes were cast by the USSR, with a few exceptions of the UK and France concerning 'the Palestine question'.¹³⁶ Throughout the 1970s and most of the 1980s, it was primarily the US, the UK, and France who cast vetoes. However, China only cast its first veto in 1972 and did not veto again until 1997. The common perception of UN proceedings during the Cold War is that the international system was defined largely by a stalemate conflict between East and West. The rivalry between the Soviet Union and the West, primarily the US, is shown in the UNSC voting behaviour. Until the 1970s, the Soviet Union was largely alone in casting vetoes and also abstained from many votes, enabling the Western and Southern blocs to dominate UN processes through the monopolization of effective draft resolutions. Furthermore, while vetoes presented outright rejections of draft resolutions, abstention could act as a 'hidden' or 'silent' veto, not allowing the draft to pass. During this time, the US was able to rely strongly on voting support from France and the UK as the other permanent Western members, as well as China. Moreover, the US also had relatively high levels of representation, and thus support, from the non-permanent members of the Council. In this way, UN peacekeeping relied on the input of the smaller states during the early stages of the Cold War period; it represented the empowerment of smaller states within an international system as larger powers remained locked in a stalemate.

However, the end of the Cold War saw the dismantling of the bipolar system that had characterised international politics. A new era in international politics contributed to the rearrangement of issues in terms of importance and changed the interests of

¹³⁶ United Nations Digital Library, 'Vetoes', <https://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick/> [accessed 12/06/22]

those aligned on those issues.¹³⁷ There were scholars who argued that with the end of the Cold War, the alliance formed between the Western nations would fall apart, as they no longer faced the threat from the Soviets together.¹³⁸ In addition, the influx of developing countries to the UN with different interests resulted in a change to the issues taken up and the approach to those issues.¹³⁹ The permanent members, particularly the US, the UK and France, were forced to act in response to anti-colonial initiatives led by the developing world. This significantly changed the pattern of vetoes in the Council, with the Soviet Union using the veto less and the Western states exercising its veto power more.¹⁴⁰ However, rather than give smaller states a louder voice within UN peacekeeping, this newfound agreement among the permanent members on the Security Council allowed the P5 to control the politics within the UN and its proceedings.¹⁴¹ In particular, P5 veto privilege gave an advantage in determining the response of the UN to conflicts. The P5 nations used the lack of Cold War tensions to consolidate their control over the Council.

In the post-Cold War era, from January 1992 until December 2016, the Council adopted 1611 resolutions; the UNSC achieved unanimity in 1481 of 1611, approximately 91.93 per cent, of the resolutions.¹⁴² However, despite the trend toward unanimous voting among the P5 nations in the post-Cold War period, there are still many differences between the P5 nations themselves. Both Russia and China represent fundamentally different worldviews from the US, the UK, and France. Both nations value the importance of state sovereignty and respect for non-intervention, which relate to the more traditional peacekeeping missions originally conducted by the UN. This perspective can be shared with many developing countries who see their state sovereignty as a method of protection from Western interventionism. Both Russia and China's voting patterns demonstrate their adherence to sovereignty in conflict, while their voting patterns on human rights issues have more often than not, 'acted in tandem in using the veto to defeat draft

¹³⁷ Soo Yeon Kim and Bruce Russett (1996) 'The New Politics of Voting Alignments in the United Nations General Assembly', *International Organization*, (50:4), p629

¹³⁸ John J. Mearsheimer (1990) 'Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War', *The Atlantic*, (266:2), pp.35-50; and Kenneth N. Waltz (1993) 'The Emerging Structure of International Politics', *International Security*, (18:2), pp.75-76

¹³⁹ Loraine Sievers and Sam Daws (2014) *The Procedure of the UN Security Council*, p298

¹⁴⁰ United Nations Digital Library, 'Vetoes'

¹⁴¹ Philip Cunliffe (2009) 'The Politics of Global Governance in UN Peacekeeping', *International Peacekeeping*, (16:3), p326

¹⁴² United Nations Digital Library, 'Vetoes'

resolutions that contained human rights elements'.¹⁴³ This can be seen in voting on situations in Myanmar, Syria, and Zimbabwe, which all focused around elements of human rights. However, while Russia and especially China have become more assertive in their viewpoints in the post-Cold War era, and virtual unanimity has emerged among the P5 nations, the other P5 members have tightened their grip on UN activities. Overall, in the post-Cold War years, the UK, the US, and France have voted together as a bloc on adopted resolutions more often than the P5 as a whole.

But this unanimity has not solely been achieved through agreement among the P5 nations and with the elected UNSC members. In some cases, when it is clear that unanimity cannot be achieved, resolution drafts have been abandoned altogether after failed attempts at negotiation and compromise, or after a P5 member threatens to use its veto. Likewise, there may be drafts not even suggested for discussion due to a concern that they will be rejected by veto. This therefore effects the analysis of UNSC voting, as the Council can only vote on those resolutions brought before them and the P5 nations can force resolutions to be withdrawn under the threat of veto. Therefore, those resolutions that are then either vetoed or passed by the Security Council have already been screened by the power and influence of the P5 nations. In this way, the Security Council could represent a form of 'managed multilateralism' by the P5 powers. Or in other words, it could be described as an 'undemocratic institution'.

However, even unanimous voting on resolutions within the UNSC does not necessarily correlate to international peace and security. Even on those resolutions on which voting unanimity can be reached, this does not reflect a widespread commitment by the P5 nations, the Security Council, or UN member states to the outcomes produced. Furthermore, those resolutions that are agreed upon unanimously might be weaker or harder to implement due to a lack of political will that was created by the need to compromise to achieve agreement.

Debates on the potential reform of the Council have emphasised the projected 'unfairness' of the veto and the awareness that the views of the P5 might not accurately represent the geopolitical realities of current global affairs. The P5 nations were originally granted veto power and permanent positions in order to bring them

¹⁴³ Jared Genser and Bruno Stagno Ugarte (2014) 'Evolution of the Security Council's Engagement on Human Rights', *The United Nations Security Council in the Age of Human Rights*, p26

into the UN system and make sure they remained. However, the P5 members of the Council have come to recognize the range of options available to operate outside of the UN system, the US in particular due to its wealth and military might. Other members of the Security Council have recognised that their votes could not prevent it from exercising those options, so instead abstain or use their vote in exchange for concessions from the US and some influence in UN proceedings. It has often been the case that while the US has operated through the UN for reasons of legitimacy, it has still maintained other options for action, either unilaterally or bilaterally with allies.¹⁴⁴ This can be seen in the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the US without UNSC authorisation. Thus, the P5 powers are able to operate outside the UN or even against its objectives, despite their heightened position within its structure.

Furthermore, the Security Council also plays an important part in the foreign policies of France and UK, promoting their liberal values and 'helping them to maintain a privileged position in international society that exceeds their military and economic clout'.¹⁴⁵ This demonstrates that the P5 powers are able to use the legitimacy of the UN to operate within the international system, yet they are also able to operate individually, bilaterally or unilaterally, without fear of repercussion from the UN due to their own influence within its system.

This helps to explain the lack of political will by the P5 nations to become involved in conflicts that are not within, or jeopardise, their national interests. Furthermore, it also demonstrates the impact of ethnocentrism within UN structures; the P5 nations attempt to fit the behaviour of others into their own preconceived outlook through coercion and veto power. By refusing to compromise on proposed resolutions or threatening to veto its draft, the P5 powers are therefore dictating the directions in which the UN can operate. This therefore limits the UN's peacekeeping missions to those that the P5 nations are willing to vote on. Furthermore, the ethnocentric notion of 'superiority' among the P5 nations enables them to act without UN authorisation and without fear of repercussion. The actions of the P5 within the Security Council relate strongly to one of the main facets of ethnocentrism, exploitativeness, which promotes the pursuit of one's own ethnic group's interests with little or no

¹⁴⁴ Erik Voeten (2001) 'Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action', *American Political Science Review*, (95:4), p845

¹⁴⁵ Thierry Tardy and Dominik Zaum (2016) 'France and the United Kingdom in the Security Council', in Malone, Stagno Ugarte, and von Einsiedel, p136

consideration given to the interests of outgroups. In addition, this idea is supported by 'elite theory', which states that influential elites establish and utilize various mechanisms to govern the rest of the society. In the case of the UNSC, the P5 have been able to establish a system in which they hold a great deal of influence and are able to use the organisation's mechanisms to act within their own national interests, with little consideration given to the interests of the wider UN membership.

However, despite the control the P5 maintains within the UNSC over decision-making, there are still other factors that demonstrate the ethnocentrism present within UN structures. Alongside the 'strong and sustained political support' that is needed from the P5 member states for UN peacekeeping missions to operate, there is a need for more than just 'good intentions' within those operations that are authorised; the UN needs appropriate mandates and resources to carry out these peacekeeping missions.¹⁴⁶ The influence of the P5 nations within the Security Council greatly impacts which conflicts the UN becomes involved in. However, a mission's mandate can affect the decision of the P5 powers to enable UN involvement. These issues will be discussed in the following sections.

4.2. Mission Mandates

Gaining political support from member states, in particular the P5 powers, is the first step in how the UN engages with its peacekeeping operations. Once this support has been established, the way that the UN engages in its missions is crucial.

Article 39 of the UN Charter states as follows:¹⁴⁷

39. The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

This demonstrates that it is the responsibility of the Security Council to determine how to engage in its peacekeeping activities. A key aspect of the operation of UN peacekeeping missions is the mandate that is put into place to guide each mission.

¹⁴⁶ United Nations (2000), p.viii

¹⁴⁷ United Nations (1945), Article 39

UN peace operations are deployed on the basis of mandates designed by the Security Council. These mandates establish the mission and direct the types of activities to be carried out during the operation. Most mission mandates are reviewed every six months or each year, depending on the developments within the conflict region.

The Brahimi Report stated that many failures within the UN's peacekeeping history originated from 'ambiguous, inconsistent and under-funded mandates'.¹⁴⁸ Since the publication of this report in 2000, there have been improvements in the UN's approach to its peacekeeping missions, however the organisation still faces many challenges. Collective political will within the UNSC can be hard to achieve, especially considering member states might only act in support of UN peacekeeping operations if the mission's mandate endorses their own national interests. On those resolutions that are voted in, divisions within the UN's membership, particularly the P5, may complicate the implementation of the resolutions it adopts. The compromise and negotiation that led to unanimity can instead lead to poorly suited mission mandates that may conceal fundamental differences among UN members. Furthermore, within more recent UN peacekeeping missions, the range of tasks assigned within mandates has expanded significantly in response to shifting patterns of conflict. The will to implement these resolutions can be severely lacking and therefore cause operational and logistical problems. Thus, divisions among the P5 nations can influence the effectiveness of the mission's mandate to address the needs of the operation it is supporting.

Increasingly difficult conflict situations within peacekeeping missions have forced the UN to deviate from its core principles of consent, impartiality and non-use of force. The evolution of conflict in the post-Cold War era to a more complex environment of weak state and violent non-state actors, as well as active 'peace spoilers', has caused the UN to adapt its mandates to respond. The UN has been forced to intervene without the full consent of all belligerent parties, as well as respond with a stronger use of force. In addition, while attempting to build a more sustainable peace by developing peacebuilding activities that aim to strengthen state structures, the UN has altered its position as an impartial party. Mandates implemented by the UN are largely driven by the P5 powers and lean towards certain concepts and models of

¹⁴⁸ United Nations (2000), p44

peace. Due to the authority of the P5 powers within the Security Council, the drafting and negotiating of mandates has been dominated by the permanent members. In particular, the UK, the US, and France have often led the drafting of mandates within the post-Cold War era. This continued belief in the superiority and inevitability of the 'Western way' shows ignorance and disparagement towards more tailored approaches to peace. Furthermore, while other permanent members within the UNSC are able to contest policy options or draft outcomes, discussions on mandates were often more collaborative than in the current period.

The concepts of 'justice', 'good government', 'progress', and 'development', which the P5 powers include within UN peacekeeping mission mandates, are ultimately Western concepts. Within the UN, there are European and US efforts to entrench human rights, liberties, and multilateralism within its peace operations. Although China, and even Russia, may not be considered Western powers, as members of the P5 they often defer to the 'Western-driven' approach taken by the other members of the Council to mandate 'a wide range of highly intrusive measures' within internal conflicts.¹⁴⁹ The application of these methods by the UN demonstrates the ethnocentric assumption that other states would develop in accordance with Western models. This simplified idea of societal relations perceives the Security Council or Western approaches to peace as superior and desirable, whereas societal models in non-Western nations are considered unworthy of consideration.

As Howard Wlarda states: 'The world cannot be so simply divided...the developmental experience of today's emerging nations cannot repeat or mirror the experience of Western Europe'.¹⁵⁰ This issue is particularly prominent in those states that have suffered, or are suffering still, from the experience of colonial rule of Western nations in the past. Not only have these states developed under vastly different circumstances to their former colonisers, but the legacy of colonialism has created a deep-seated opposition to foreign-imposed solutions. In those nations where conflict has occurred, perhaps as a result of past colonisation and subsequently unstable regimes as happened in Rwanda, the imposition of Western values through UN peacekeeping missions can enhance tensions and deepen

¹⁴⁹ Zhu Wenqi and Leng Xinyu (2016) 'China in the Security Council', in D.M. Malone, B. Stagno Ugarte, and S. von Einsiedel (eds.) *The UN Security Council in the 21st Century*, p98

¹⁵⁰ Wlarda (1981), p165

cultural conflicts. This Western influence over the creation of UN peacekeeping mandates demonstrates the desire of Western powers to use UN peace operations as a way to reshape developing conflict states into liberal democracies, according to the global cultural norm. As such, UN peacekeeping missions can be interpreted largely as an unwanted Western intervention into regional or domestic matters.¹⁵¹ Furthermore, the Western ideal that the Security Council aims to impose through the implementation of Westernised mandates, can create hostility towards the UN from host states and other conflict actors.

This can be seen in the limited efforts of the US to compromise on the mandate of the UN mission to South Sudan (UNMISS). From October 2015, three resolutions on the mandate of UNMISS were adopted without unanimous support from the Security Council. Those on the Council who objected, including Russia and China, did so on the basis of the US attempting to interfere through the UN onto South Sudan's sovereignty. However, the decision of the US to forfeit the unity of the Council in exchange for pursuing what it believes to be superior mandate policies that support its interests, demonstrates an ethnocentric approach to peacekeeping. In their efforts to establish peace in conflict areas based on Western peace models, the UN's actions could be understood with the intent to create a 'client state' or impose a certain model of statehood that would not serve the needs of the nation but would instead focus more on the desires of the Western nations, such as the US.¹⁵²

Thus, the UN's image as 'an intervening Western force' needs to be addressed, otherwise the organisation is at risk of operating as an instrument of Western power, rather than a global peace organisation. While other states have become more involved in recent years as non-permanent members of the Council, their influence is still limited by the monopolization of power by the P5 nations. The implementation of 'Westernised' UN peacekeeping mandates demonstrates another effect of ethnocentrism that undermines the organisation's peacekeeping abilities. The exclusion of non-Western concepts of peace within the UN's approach shows how ethnocentric tendencies within the UN's structure interferes with the effectiveness of the UN to operate in non-Western environments.

¹⁵¹ Mateja Peter (2019) 'UN Peace Operations: Adapting to a New Global Order?', in C. de Coning and M. Peter (eds.) *United Nations Peace Operations in a Changing Global Order*, p1

¹⁵² Ahmed, Keating and Solinas (2007), p24

4.3. Mission Participation

Once support for a UN mission has been established and the mission's goal has been set through its mandate, the implementation of these decisions is the next key step. The Security Council plays a key role in establishing, renewing, and authorizing funding for such operations. This involves the allocation of resources, troops, and funding, to be able to support the mission's goals.

Within the UN Charter, Article 43 sets out the regulations for the contribution of member states towards UN peacekeeping missions.¹⁵³

Article 43

43.1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

43.2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.

43.3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

Meanwhile, Article 48.1 relates to the implementation of peacekeeping measures as decided by the Security Council:¹⁵⁴

48.1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.

¹⁵³ United Nations (1945), Article 43

¹⁵⁴ United Nations (1945), Article 48

The UN Charter ties each member state to the UN's peacekeeping efforts. The first two UN peacekeeping missions, the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), differed greatly from the peacekeeping operations we see today.¹⁵⁵ They were small and focused on observation and monitoring, as well as being funded from the UN regular budget. However, UN missions have greatly evolved since then and the financing of UN peacekeeping missions has changed drastically. Unlike the UN regular budget, there is no single peacekeeping budget; instead, each peacekeeping mission has its own dedicated budget from which member states are allocated a certain share. While all member states are required to contribute as a condition of membership, the amount each member must pay varies widely. The financing of peacekeeping was reformed in 2005 with the adoption of a new scale of assessments. This saw all UN members placed in one of ten financial categories to determine their share of the peacekeeping budget.¹⁵⁶

However, recent concerns over contributions to UN peacekeeping missions have highlighted certain issues and forced to the UN to address the declining support of some of its member states to its activities. In 2019, Secretary-General António Guterres expressed concerns for what he described as a 'financial crisis' for UN peacekeeping.¹⁵⁷ Some states are more willing and able to contribute funding, resources, and troops to peacekeeping operations, while others are reluctant to contribute towards missions that are not within their national interests or place their troops at risk. Unable to develop and deploy its own military force, which could respond rapidly to emerging crises, the UN relies excessively on the wealthier and more powerful nations within its membership for military support in its operations. This way, it is power politics that ultimately determines how member states contribute towards operations. Resolutions put forth by the UNSC specify how each operation will be funded. Therefore, it is those missions that achieve unanimous support within the UNSC that are more likely to have the support of the wider UN membership and for requests for contributions to be met. Thus, while UN is highly

¹⁵⁵ Wasim Mir (2019), 'Financing UN Peacekeeping: Avoiding Another Crisis', International Peace Institute, https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/1904_Financing-UN-Peacekeeping.pdf [accessed 16/06/2022]

¹⁵⁶ Koops, MacQueen, Tardy, and Williams (2015), p4

¹⁵⁷ Mark Leon Goldberg (2019) 'UN Peacekeeping Faces Massive Funding Shortfall', *UN Dispatch*, <https://www.undispatch.com/un-peacekeeping-faces-massive-funding-shortfall/> [accessed 16/06/2022]

dependent on the P5 states to support its missions politically, it also relies on their willingness to support the organisation's activities financially.¹⁵⁸

Financial challenges primarily impact troop-contributing countries, which are largely Asian and African nations. Rwanda, a significant troop contributor to UN peacekeeping missions, was forced to withdraw troops from the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) because it had not received reimbursements it was relying on to replace its troops and update its equipment.¹⁵⁹ Uniformed personnel and their equipment typically accounts for around 30 percent of the peacekeeping budget and are the largest part of the budget for most peacekeeping missions. As such, delayed reimbursement ultimately effects the operational quality and efficiency of each mission.

Thus, the financing of UN peacekeeping missions is based largely on the commitment of wealthier states, in particular the US, as well as the dedication of these states to the mission's goals. In 2020, the US contributed more than \$11 billion to the UN, which accounted for approximately 20 percent of funding for the body's collective budget; this funding was then divided to pay for 12 percent of the regular budget and 26 percent of the peacekeeping budget.¹⁶⁰ Other key contributors to UN peacekeeping include Japan, the United Kingdom, and Germany. These wealthier UN states have the potential to hold influence over debates, pressure operations, and sway opinion, through the payment or withholding of operational funding, a practice commonly associated with the US.¹⁶¹ The build-up of US debts to the UN corresponded with the dramatic surge in UN peacekeeping operations after the Cold War. More recently, under the Trump administration the US attempted to cut their contributions towards UN peacekeeping. As the US withheld a portion of its contribution, this placed a strain on UN peacekeeping capabilities, impacting the ability of troop-contributing countries to deploy, as well as the effectiveness of the overall mission. In this way, while the UN mission may have the budget and authority

¹⁵⁸ Cunliffe (2009), p329

¹⁵⁹ Paul D. Williams (2018) 'In US Failure to Pay Peacekeeping Bills, Larger UN Financing Questions Raised', *IPI Global Observatory*, <https://theglobalobservatory.org/2018/10/in-us-failure-pay-peacekeeping-bills-larger-financing-questions-raised/> [accessed 16/06/2022]

¹⁶⁰ Council on Foreign Relations (2022) 'Funding the United Nations: How Much Does the US Pay?', <https://www.cfr.org/article/funding-united-nations-what-impact-do-us-contributions-have-un-agencies-and-programs> [accessed 15/06/2022]

¹⁶¹ Mir, W. (2019)

to spend, it does not have the cash to carry out operations in full. Even a small decrease in funding to the UN's peacekeeping budget, especially from big contributors such as the US, can affect the success of missions.¹⁶² Thus, the US and other major financial contributors, maintain a strong influence over the implementation of peacekeeping operations.

Furthermore, the UN maintains a more cost-effective approach to peacekeeping. The UN is particular about the number of resources and amount of funding that it allocates to each of its peacekeeping missions. However, rather than fulfil the requirements for a mission's mandate with resources available from member states, instead the UN's member states adapt the mission's mandate around the amount of resources they are willing to commit.¹⁶³ This issue is further complicated by disagreement in opinion among the Security Council and other member states, each with a role of host nation, troop contributor, or financier, in its peacekeeping missions. In addition to the tentative commitment of resources, this has highlighted modern peacekeeping operations as resource-intensive and costly, 'requiring a larger scale of men and material as also expensive niche capabilities such as helicopters, special forces and maritime capabilities'.¹⁶⁴ As conflicts develop to become increasingly complex environments, often marred by 'peace spoilers', the UN requires larger forces that are better equipped in order to carry out its mission mandates. It is vital that the UN peacekeeping force provides a credible deterrent, rather than acting as a 'symbolic and non-threatening presence', which characterised its traditional peacekeeping methods.¹⁶⁵ Yet, within these modern and complex operation environments, where there is hostility towards UN intervention and perhaps no clear end to the conflict or exit strategy for peacekeeping forces, those nations such as the US, who contribute larger sums to peacekeeping missions in general despite their lack of involvement in the conflict itself, are increasingly reluctant to provide funding.¹⁶⁶ The continual need for troop presence and resources has proven to be draining for its financiers. Moreover, in conflicts where the issues have not been

¹⁶² Peter (2019), p2

¹⁶³ Simon Chesterman (2004) 'Virtual Trusteeship', in David Malone (ed.), *The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century*, p231

¹⁶⁴ B.S. Prakash and K. Nandini (2005) 'Issues and Challenges in Modern Peace Operations', *Strategic Analysis*, (29:1), p8

¹⁶⁵ United Nations (2000), p9

¹⁶⁶ Prakash and Nandini (2005), p8

resolved but merely frozen, missions have often been forced to withdraw as conflict has restarted. This makes member states reluctant to commit further resources to these missions, as well any potential prolonged conflict missions.

Furthermore, it is also important to consider the role of the other elected members of the Security Council. These members often spend a number of years and considerable political, as well as financial, resources campaigning for a desirable position within the Council that they then hold for a two-year term. This opportunity is therefore limited to those nations who are able to dedicate the time and the funding such a campaign. Even for those member states who are considered better-off, their impact can be limited. From 2010 to 2013, the elected members of the Security Council included Germany, Japan, India, Brazil, South Africa, Nigeria, Turkey, and Mexico. Yet despite this concentration of 'developed' nations, there was minimal impact on the power relationships between the P5 and the elected members, and on the output of the Council, as compared to other recent periods.¹⁶⁷ However, although many of the elected members of the UNSC encounter institutional barriers due to the power disparities with the permanent members, their role has frequently been downplayed. At the end of the Cold war, Western nations proceeded to downsize their military forces. As such, dependence on other member states, particularly those from the southern hemisphere with larger forces, such as India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, has increased.¹⁶⁸ But, as mentioned previously, while the involvement of smaller powers as non-permanent members of the UN Security Council has increased, their overall influence is still limited by the monopolization of power by the P5 nations. In this way, although the contribution of troops by southern states to UN peacekeeping missions has grown, the operations are still conducted under the influence of the major powers.¹⁶⁹ This demonstrates that increasing contributions of other, non-Western member states towards UN peacekeeping missions has not been matched by any advancement of their involvement within the functioning of the UN system.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁷ Colin Keating (2016) 'Power Dynamics Between Permanent and Elected Members', in Malone, Stagno Ugarte, and von Einsiedel (eds.), p149

¹⁶⁸ Ahmed, Keating and Solinas (2007), p16

¹⁶⁹ Cunliffe (2009), p328

¹⁷⁰ Kabilan Krishnasamy (2001) "'Recognition" for Third World Peacekeepers: India and Pakistan', *International Peacekeeping*, (8:4), p67

Overall, the commitment of UN member states to funding and supplying resources to UN peacekeeping missions is becoming increasingly ambiguous, as major financing states aim to provide minimal support, especially in more complex conflicts, unless the mission clearly benefits their own national interests. The financial dominance of the larger powers, such as the US, over UN peacekeeping budgets once again highlights the ethnocentric feeling of 'superiority' that dominates the organisation. It shows how countries prioritise sovereignty over globalism, despite their leading role in an international peace organisation. This is particularly important in regards to the P5 nations, who are able to use their influence and wealth to dictate how the UN engages with its peacekeeping operations, if it can agree to engage at all. Furthermore, despite the increasingly active role of non-Western member states in providing resources and troops for peacekeeping operations, the ethnocentric beliefs underlying the UN's institutional practices means that these member states are often exploited by the P5 powers and larger states for their contributions, rather than included in the UN's processes.

Thus, we are able to discuss the negative impact that ethnocentrism has on the capability of the UNSC to engage with peacekeeping activities. The next section of this study will discuss how these findings impact UN peacekeeping more broadly and the implications of these conclusions for the future of UN peacekeeping.

Chapter 5: **Discussion**

5.1. The Impact of Ethnocentrism

Overall, ethnocentrism has a negative impact on political processes and practices of the UNSC and thus, UN peacekeeping through its decision-making. The approaches taken by the UNSC towards peacekeeping operations are aptly summarised by Roland Paris, a notable IR scholar, who argued that 'UN peace operations seek to remake war-torn states as liberal democracies with the global cultural norm of the liberal peace, without due consideration of alternatives'.¹⁷¹

The UN does not offer itself as an effective peacekeeper because of ethnocentrism ingrained within its system. Instead, in contrast to its rhetoric as an international, impartial peace organisation, ethnocentrism within the UN creates a basis for exclusion and ignorance. These ethnocentric principles are largely centred within the Security Council, which offers a platform for the P5 nations to influence UN practices and dictate UN peacekeeping operations. This highlights how the UN operates on a basis of ethnocentrism favouring liberal democracy. The ethnocentric ideals of giving central importance for an actor's own group can be seen in the dominance of the Security Council, as well as more specifically in the pseudo-leadership role of the US, due to its financial contributions and status as a global superpower.

Furthermore, the dominance of the P5 nations through the power of the veto clearly reflects the facets of superiority and exploitation within ethnocentric theory. This dominance presents the issue of the UN being used as a political tool to impose liberal ideals on vulnerable states in an effort to expand Western influence. This could arguably make the West more effective through the UN, as it is acting in its own interests. However, the interests and security of remaining member states, particularly those in developing nations, are not incorporated into this approach. In fact, attention tends to only be given to other member states and towards conflicts to the extent that they have the potential to affect the national interests of the P5

¹⁷¹ Roland Paris (2003) 'Peacekeeping and the Constraints of Global Culture', *European Journal of International Relations*, (9:3), p450

powers.¹⁷² Furthermore, despite the growing involvement of global south states in recent years, especially in troop contributions, their impact on UNSC practices and processes has been limited. As such, these internal imbalances within the UNSC creates political challenges in the implementation of UN peacekeeping operations.

The developing nature of conflict from traditional interstate military affairs to include civilian and political elements, in addition to the impact of globalisation which acts to expand internal conflicts beyond their borders, has created new challenges for UN peacekeeping to address. With the end of the Cold War, the objectives given to peacekeepers were broadened considerably from observation to intervention and peacebuilding. Yet, the lack of political will among the P5 powers to boost UN peacekeeping efforts to match these changes creates financial challenges and resource issues. The US, due to its advantages in wealth and military resources, maintains an unofficial leading role within the UNSC. But its unwillingness to increase financial contributions restricts the operations of the UN and thus limits the organisation's effectiveness.

Furthermore, as peacekeeping operations have become more politicized, it has become common for peacekeepers to be mandated to support the establishment of liberal democracies and market economies in fragile post-conflict states.¹⁷³ This demonstrates how the ethnocentric basis on which the UNSC operates influences the responses of the UN to be biased towards Western interests and promotes Western peace models within non-Western environments that are often unstable, as well as being potentially hostile towards the West itself. Within developing states, the realist image of the state as the provider of security has been challenged, with the state itself becoming a source of insecurity.¹⁷⁴ However, the UN's approach to peacekeeping has not adapted to this unconventional view of security. Instead, the UN appears to be 'trying to impose a possibly misguided notion of liberal peace' upon post-conflict states that are weakened and often unwilling recipients.¹⁷⁵ This issue is particularly notable within former colonies, in which there may be strong feelings of opposition towards foreign-imposed solutions. In those states still

¹⁷² Amitav Acharya (1997) 'The Periphery as the Core: The Third World and Security Studies', in Krause and Williams (eds.) *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases*, p300

¹⁷³ Koops, MacQueen, Tardy, and Williams (2015), p3

¹⁷⁴ Acharya (1997), p300

¹⁷⁵ Koops, MacQueen, Tardy, and Williams (2015), p3

struggling with the legacy of colonialism under Western nations, efforts designed to help establish a 'capable state' can easily be interpreted or portrayed as the intention to create a 'client state' or impose a culturally inappropriate model of statehood that would not serve the needs of the host nation but would instead focus more on the desires of the Western nations attempting to intervene through the UN.¹⁷⁶ As such, ethnocentric influences can be seen to establish attempts of Western intervention, largely into domestic and regional matters in developing, non-Western states.

The composition of the Security Council and the privileges of the P5 members, which are supported by ethnocentric structures and fuelled by ethnocentric thinking, no longer reflect the realities of geo-politics. The changing global security environment and developing nature of conflict requires the UN to develop from its motif that Western values and models should be established in conflict areas. This development would allow the UN to better adapt its peacekeeping mission to conflict environments. As such, the approach to peacekeeping by the UN therefore needs to be addressed, or the organisation runs the risk of operating as an instrument of Western power, rather than a global peace organisation. The next section of this study will discuss these implications of the influence of ethnocentrism faced by the UN within its peacekeeping operations.

5.2. Implications for the UN

While analysing the impact of ethnocentrism on the capability of the UN to engage with its peacekeeping operations, it is also important to consider what these challenges might mean for the future of UN peacekeeping missions, as well as for the organisation as a whole. By discussing the political challenges created by ethnocentric tendencies within UN processes and practices, potential challenges for the future can be seen more easily, as well as areas that could be improved upon.

To provide more effective peacekeeping within increasingly complex conflict environments, the UN needs to gain greater funding, obtain more resources, and ensure further commitment from its member states. As the world's leading peacekeeping organisation, the UN is highly vulnerable to criticism. The focus on

¹⁷⁶ Ahmed, Keating and Solinas (2007), p24

these issues is particularly relevant as the rising popularity of regional organisations, such as the African Union and NATO, providing their own peacekeeping missions puts the UN at risk of becoming outdated and irrelevant. In order to overcome the political challenges, as discussed in this study, and achieve greater success in its peacekeeping efforts, the UN needs to have consensus, commitment and organisation among its member states; they must be willing to provide financial support and set aside their own interests for the collective good.¹⁷⁷ To do this, the UNSC in particular must recognise and address the ethnocentric structure around which it operates.

From this study, we can answer a fundamental question that was posed during original discussions among scholars regarding ethnocentrism: the social control which it promotes is not conducive to group effectiveness in the pursuit of goals.¹⁷⁸ While the P5 nations might see their dominance within the UN as beneficial in pursuing peacekeeping goals that match with their national interests, this practice of ethnocentrism does not make the UN effective as a peacekeeping organisation overall. Instead, the attempts made by the dominant P5 nations, in particular the US, through the actions of the UNSC and UN peacekeeping operations, do not correspond with regional realities in current conflict areas. In fact, this analysis of the impact of ethnocentrism on the activities of the UNSC has demonstrated that UN peacekeeping is often misguided in its attempts to impose unwanted or irrelevant concepts of peace. As such, the effectiveness and legitimacy of the UN as an international peacekeeping organisation that revolves around the principles of consent, impartiality, and non-use of force, can be called into question.

Thus far, efforts to address these issues have been made, although they are limited. In March 2019, the UN Secretary-General briefed member states on the financial situation of the UN, including in relation to peacekeeping, and offered several proposals to remedy the situation of underfunding, which is largely due to the US withholding funds. The Biden administration's budget for the 2022 fiscal year proposes to fully meet US obligations to the UN for the first time since 2017.¹⁷⁹ However, while President Biden appears more committed to the continued funding of

¹⁷⁷ Weiss, Forsythe, Coate, and Pease (2017), p26

¹⁷⁸ William R. Catton Jr. (1960) 'The Functions and Dysfunctions of Ethnocentrism: A Theory', *Social Problems*, (8:3), p202

¹⁷⁹ Council on Foreign Relations (2022)

the UN, this support cannot always be guaranteed. Any withholding of financial contributions by the US will have consequences for peacekeeping mission performance, including overall mandate implementation and the ability of missions to adequately respond to emerging crises. Becoming less reliant on larger financial powers to support its missions would allow the UNSC more freedom in its approach to peacekeeping, without having to appease the mission's financiers. However, due to the UN's ethnocentric structuring providing larger powers, such as the US, with privileges, they will be unwilling to give up their financial control over the Council and UN peacekeeping missions.

Furthermore, the dominance of the P5 powers over the drafting of UN mandates should also be addressed. While the US, the UK, and France draft most resolutions and manage negotiations, questions surrounding the Security Council's ineffectiveness in recent years, as well as about the right of France and the UK to serve as permanent members given their diminishing geo-political influence, have raised concerns about how long this practice might continue. In addition, the role of non-Western P5 powers, in particular China, is key to the development of the UN's approach to peacekeeping. Thus far, China has tended to be the least engaged of the P5 members in the UNSC negotiations and activities. However, with its more recent use of its veto in the Security Council, 'China has become increasingly active and assertive in the Security Council, both in defending its own interests as well as in displaying a greater readiness to challenge Western agendas.'¹⁸⁰ Thus, considering the economic development of the country, as well as its growing military power and increasing role in global security matters, this may mean that the country plays a larger role in the Security Council's work in the future. In this way, the waning power of the liberal Western P5 nations sits in contrast to the growing strength of the non-Western P5 nations. This shifting dynamic within the UNSC could alter the UN's approach to UN peacekeeping drastically and ultimately unhinge the ethnocentric processes and practices within the UN's system.

The most obvious solution to address these political challenges that are caused by ethnocentrism, would be the reform of the Security Council to lessen P5 and Western influence within the processes of UN peacekeeping. However, this reform is unlikely; the reluctance of P5 members to give up their positions of privilege and the

¹⁸⁰ Wenqi and Xinyu (2016), p99

inability of other member states to decide on an appropriate reform proposal removes the chance of reform in the near future. Any reforms made to expand the Council and include more voices from non-Western and developing nations are unlikely to make the Council more effective or responsive in preventing, managing, or resolving conflicts. The Council members already struggle to manage differences, so more members may only serve in complicating the political tensions among them. The challenge for the UN in current and future peacekeeping missions is that, in order to preserve its reputation as a global peacekeeping force, the opinions and judgements of smaller member states must not be overwritten by the desires and influence of the larger UN member states; there must be 'a fair globalization' of peace.¹⁸¹ However, objections against the US as a pseudo-leader of the UNSC will probably stay more subdued, as it remains the most powerful country in the world and therefore can arguably justify its influence.

Thus, in order to address this issue of dominance by Western nations within the UN, there is an increasing interest in the involvement of regional organisations in peacekeeping operations. Throughout the 1990s, the UN suffered a series of high-profile failures in its peacekeeping missions to former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda. The atrocities that occurred within these states due to the UN's apparent inability to intervene effectively led to a growing debate on whether the UN should be engaged in the business of peacekeeping at all, or whether external regional organisations might be better suited to the task.¹⁸² A regionalised approach would provide a more decentralised system through which more relevant peace models and peacekeeping methods could be better applied. Furthermore, this change to regionalised efforts of peacekeeping would also allow a more tailored approach to peacekeeping missions to be developed, rather than offering a 'template' UN peacekeeping model.¹⁸³ This 'regionalisation' of peacekeeping would ensure that missions were better equipped with more invested contributors, as well as being more politically prepared to deal with potential 'peace spoilers' and weakened state structures.¹⁸⁴ In the current global conflict environment, the rising sense of

¹⁸¹ United Nations (2019) 'Press Conference by Secretary-General António Guterres at United Nations Headquarters', <https://press.un.org/en/2019/sgsm19436.doc.htm> [accessed 02/07/2022]

¹⁸² Ahmed, Keating and Solinas (2007), p15

¹⁸³ United Nations (2015), p12

¹⁸⁴ Ahmed, Keating and Solinas (2007), p15

nationalism and independence is likely to be reflected in a new insistence on regional models of peace and development.

As such, a class of hybrid missions has developed as joint efforts between regional organisations and the UN to share political, financial, logistical and military burdens. Recent incorporations of regional organisations into hybrid UN missions, such as the African Union - United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) that ran from 2007 until 2020, demonstrates an effort to modify peacekeeping missions to be better suited to each country. As the legitimacy of regional organisations as peace and security providers has increased, so has the belief in their efficiency to act alongside, or even in place of, the UN in conflict areas.¹⁸⁵ In this way, the participation of regional organisations in hybrid UN missions gives these organisations a chance to showcase their abilities. As such, the increasing role played by regional organisations threatens to replace the UN as the leading peacekeeping body within each regional area. This places great strain on UN missions to be successful to ensure they maintain international support for their efforts.

However, with additional input from regional organisation over operational designs and practices, this has created more complexity in the implementation of the peacekeeping mission. Hybrid missions also pose a risk of creating constraints on the UN's political consensus and weakening its message of peace if the organisations' values are not aligned. Regional organisations tied to the UN through hybrid peacekeeping missions might damage the UN's reputation if it chooses not to act within UN principles and mandates. More practically, the inclusion of additional actors within peacekeeping missions also creates an issue of miscommunication or misdirection between the organisations, which could become a major problem for providing effective support to conflict-affected countries.¹⁸⁶ Therefore, while the collaboration between the UN and regional organisations to conduct peacekeeping operations might serve to create a more effective mission, there is also the possibility that the involvement of too many actors might endanger the success of the mission's mandate.

¹⁸⁵ Peter (2015), p4

¹⁸⁶ Alexander Ilitchev (2015) 'Implementing the HIPPO Report: Sustaining Peace as a New Imperative?', *International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations*, p5

Conclusion

This dissertation has explored the ways in which ethnocentrism has influenced peacekeeping practices within the UN and the subsequent political challenges faced in its capability to engage in peace operations. The study demonstrates how the understanding and functioning of the world, determined through social science, peace models, and IR literature, which claim to be universal, are in fact ethnocentric in their approach. Ethnocentrism has played an important role in influencing many norms, practices, and processes of international politics and, consequently, UN practices. The UN itself has developed within these ethnocentric understandings and norms, which have been shaped by and for Western states, and thus promotes the interests of the P5 nations who influence UN peacekeeping through their dominance within the Security Council.

From this study we can determine that despite its intentions, the UN system is not adapted to uphold its role as a global peacekeeping organisation. While there have been improvements in the UN's approach to its peacekeeping missions as it has adapted to the changing conflict environment in the post-Cold War period, the organisation still faces a variety of challenges. UN peacekeeping is challenged significantly by issues of ambiguity, indifference, and monopolisation of power. Its operations remain essentially dependent on the decisions of the UNSC, which is under the influence of the P5 nations, primarily the US. Operations are undermined by both political, logistical, and financial problems with ethnocentric bases, including a lack of political will among the P5 nations to engage in peacekeeping efforts that do not benefit their national interests and uncertain mandates that are shaped by parochial interests of the P5 nations working with inadequate resources. As the P5 members of the Security Council to utilize the UN to concentrate on those areas which benefits them, with little interest in using UN funding and resources to engage in conflicts they might view as distant or unimportant, the facet of exploitativeness within ethnocentric theory is shown. The UN's imposition of Western peace models onto conflict environments in developing nations, with little retrospection of adopting regional peace models to better suit the host nation's situation, reflects an issue of superiority. It promotes the notion that peace can be established if all other cultures, ethnic groups, and nations model themselves on Western culture, which is believed

to be superior. Furthermore, it demonstrates how ethnocentrism has led not just to continued misinterpretation, but also to immense and often negative practical consequences for those, often developing, nations in which it chooses to intervene. Thus, through these influences the UN continues to embed and promote norms based on liberal peace theories that support and justify Western approaches to conflict resolution, with little to no consideration of alternatives that might better suit the conflict environment. This presents a challenge to UN peacekeeping missions, as they aim to preserve the organisation's credibility and not be presented as a 'political tool' for Western powers to gain influence in unstable post-conflict regions.¹⁸⁷

These challenges demonstrate the UN's need for reform. The UN presents a more 'traditional' institution, underlined by fundamental ethnocentrism, that has proven to have remarkable staying power, flexibility, and adaptability in developing conflict environments and global affairs, despite its political challenges. However, it has largely been effective at acting as a mechanism for the P5 members of the Security Council to manage operations and impose models of peace according to their interests. Furthermore, until the UN is able to achieve a fair consensus within its structure, firm commitment from its member states, and good organisation of its duties, the UN risks losing influence and damaging its reputation by failing to adhere to its rhetoric. As spoken by UN Secretary-General António Guterres, 'global challenges require global solutions'.¹⁸⁸ The increasing role played by regional organisations threatens to provide this solution and replace the UN as the leading peacekeeping body within each regional area. However, rather than just reiterate the platitude that the UN needs to do better, there is a need to recognise and address the dominance of the P5 powers over peacekeeping operations to understand if the UN is to be relevant and effective in its international peace and security role.

¹⁸⁷ Peter (2015), p356

¹⁸⁸ United Nations (2019)

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