Brothers in Espionage: Examining the Relationship between the Stasi and the KGB

July 2022

Student Numbers:

2573877B (University of Glasgow)

20109644 (Dublin City University)

69460233 (Charles University)

Presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of International Master in Security, Intelligence and Strategic Studies

Abstract

This dissertation seeks to answer the research question "what was the relationship between the Soviet KGB and the East German Stasi". Based on the maxim that "there are no such thing as friendly intelligence services, just intelligence services of friendly states" this work analyses the KGB-Stasi relationship through a theoretical framework grounded in the work of Sophia Hoffmann and Joseph Hatfield. In order to provide an answer to the research question this dissertation analyses the KGB-Stasi relationship at the levels of state, institution, and individuals. Throughout, this project argues that there are no such thing as friendly intelligence services, and that the relationship between the Stasi and the KGB was far from friendly despite shared goals, adversaries, and history.

Acknowledgements

Table of Contents

Abbreviations

Cheka

Всероссийская чрезвычайная комиссия (Vserossiyskaya chrezvychaynaya komissiya), the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission. The first Soviet secret police tasked with combating counterrevolutionary groups.

DDR

Deutsche Demokratische Republik, the German Democratic Republic, also East Germany.

GULAG

Главное управление лагерей (Glavnoye upravleniye lagerej), the Soviet system of forced labour camps.

HVA

Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung, the foreign intelligence arm of the East German Ministry for State Security.

KGB

Комитет государственной безопасности (Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti), the Soviet secret police and intelligence service.

MfS

Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, the East German Ministry for State Security. Also referred to as Stasi.

PGU

Первое главное управление (Pervoye glavnoye upravleniye), the First Chief Directorate, the foreign intelligence arm of the KGB.

SBZ

Sowjetische Besatzungszone, the Soviet Occupation Zone, also known as the Soviet Sector or the East Sector.

SED

Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, the Socialist Unity Party of Germany. The SED was the ruling party in the DDR.

SMAD

Sowjetische Militäradministration in Deutschland, the Soviet Military Administration in Germany, the ruling authority in the SBZ until the creation of the DDR.

Dramatis Personae

Soviet Union

Andropov, Yuri Vladimirovich – General of the Army, Head of the KGB from 1967 to 1982, later General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1982 to 1984.

Dzerzhinsky, Felix Edmundovich – Bolshevik revolutionary and the head of the Cheka from its creation in 1917 to his death in 1926.

Korotkov, Alexander Mikailovich – Lieutenant General, KGB Resident (station chief) of the Karlshorst KGB headquarters in Berlin from 1957 to 1961.

Kryuchkov, Vladimir Alexandrovich – General of the Army, Head of the First Chief Directorate from 1971 to 1978. Kryuchkov became head of the KGB in 1988 until leading an unsuccessful coup against Gorbachev in 1991.

Lazarev, Anatoly Ivanovich – Major General, KGB Resident (station chief) of the Karlshorst KGB headquarters in Berlin from 1966 to 1974.

Novikov, Anatoly Georgievich – Major General, KGB Resident (station chief) of the Karlshorst KGB headquarters in Berlin from 1989 to 1991.

Pitovranov, Evgeny Petrovich – Major General, KGB Resident (station chief) of the Karlshorst KGB headquarters in Berlin from 1954 to 1957.

German Democratic Republic

Fischer, Bernd – Colonel of the MfS, one of many officers tasked with dissolving the HVA and the MfS.

Grossmann, Werner – Colonel General of the MfS and the last head of the HVA between 1986 and1990. Deputy to Markus Wolf between 1983 and 1986.

Guillaume, Günther – MfS and HVA officer who operated under the code name HANSEN in the government, and eventually office, of West German Chancellor Willy Brandt from 1969 to 1974.

Honecker, Erich – General Secretary of the SED and head of state of the DDR from 1971 until 1989.

Mielke, Erich – Head of the MfS from 1957 to 1989. Gained much of his experience in the Weimar republic and alongside Wilhelm Zaisser during the Spanish Civil War.

Ulbricht, Walter – First Secretary of the SED in the DDR from 1950 to 1971.

Wolf, Markus – Colonel General in the MfS. Wolf served as the Head of the HVA and deputy head of the MfS from 1951 until he retirement in 1986.

Wollweber, Ernst – Head of the MfS from 1953 to 1957. Wollweber helped supply the republican forces with weapons during the Spanish Civil War and was an active communist saboteur during the Weimar Republic.

Zaisser, Wilhelm – First Minister for State Security in the DDR from 1950 to 1953. Served as a Soviet Military Advisor to the Spanish Republican Army during the Spanish Civil War.

Introduction

Any discussion of the Cold War era invokes images of two Great Powers and their allies pitted against one another in a struggle over influence, technology, and culture. From the Cuban Missile Crisis and the escalation at Checkpoint Charlie, to the proxy wars in Angola and Vietnam and the activities of spies in capital cities around the world, the Soviet Union went to great lengths to promote and protect its ideology. The Soviet *Комитет государственной безопасности*, the Committee for State Security, better known by its acronym, KGB, played a central role in these efforts. The KGB was not only the secret police of the Soviet Union but also its primary intelligence service with representations in nearly every Soviet embassy, and officers and agents even further afield. Even before the collapse of Soviet Union, the KGB has been the focus of scholarship (Bissell, 1979; Knight, 1984; Kux, 1985). Raymond Rocca, a CIA counterintelligence officer who spent much of his career investigating Soviet infiltration operations, coined a phrase that has persisted in the field of intelligence studies. Rocca said: "There are no friendly services, there are services of friendly foreign powers" (Martin, 1983, 177; Pearson, 1993). This maxim is often applied to the relationships between the United States, its allies, and partners (Andrew, 1977). There is a lack of study as to whether Rocca's words also apply to allies and relationships outside of NATO and the Anglosphere. This dissertation was incepted around Rocca's maxim and the question whether there are indeed no such thing as friendly intelligence services. Specifically, this research project will investigate the question: What was the nature of the relationship between the KGB of the Soviet Union and the East German Ministry for State Security? At every interval this dissertation will argue that despite first impressions and rhetoric, the Committee for State Security (KGB) and the Ministry for State Security (MfS, also known as the Stasi) did not have a friendly relationship.

To answer the question of the nature of the relationship between these two well-known intelligence services of the Cold War, this dissertation will evaluate their interactions across three chapters. The first chapter will view the relationship from the state level. It will begin with the Soviet role as administrator, occupier, and security guarantor in the remnants of Nazi Germany in 1945. From there the chapter will follow the evolution of security and intelligence in Soviet occupied Germany through to the creation of the State of East Germany and the founding of the MfS. The chapter will conclude by discussing the succession of Erich Mielke as Minister for State Security in 1957. Throughout the first chapter, the role of Soviet administration, influence and decision making will highlight the involvement of the KGB in the MfS and its effect on their relationship.

A further chapter will focus on the relationship between the Soviet and East German intelligence services from the institutional level. To do so, the chapter will zoom in on the interactions and joint operations of the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), the Main Directorate for Reconnaissance, and the *Первое главное управление* (PGU), the First Chief Directorate, which were the foreign intelligence arms of the MfS and the KGB respectively. This chapter will explore the most successful joint operation between the MfS and the KGB, as well as their cooperation in the Global South. It will also examine documents from the Stasi archives that illuminate the precise nature and details of the relationship between the HVA and the PGU. This chapter will conclude by underlining the unequal nature of the relationship between the MfS and the KGB and demonstrate the Soviet reliance on, and manipulation of, the Stasi.

A final chapter of this research project will consider the relationship between the KGB and the MfS from the individual and personal level. Beginning with Erich Mielke, the chapter will discuss how several key individuals related to their German and Soviet colleagues. Next, the memoirs

of Markus Wolf, the long serving head of the HVA will show how relationships can change and develop over time. Next, Wolf's deputy and the final head of the HVA, Werner Grossmann's reflections on his service further elucidate the nature of the individual relationships among the leaders of the MfS and the KGB. The chapter will draw to a close by presenting the reactions and statements of these men during the dissolution of the MfS and East Germany. This chapter will once again present evidence supporting the argument that the relationship between the KGB and the Stasi was far from friendly despite close cooperation and friendships.

Before delving into previously discussed chapters, this research project will first provide a background as well as present the framework and methodological process of the research that went into creating this dissertation. The theoretical framework for this project is grounded in two very recent scholarly works. On the one hand, Hoffmann (2021) explores the opportunities and possibilities of researching international intelligence relationships. On the other hand, Hatfield (2022) explores the fundamental differences between the intelligence services of democratic and authoritarian governments and what this means for how they operate. Together these works provide the necessary perspective to present a nuanced analysis of the relationship between the MfS and the KGB and the literature surrounding both organisations.

A review of the literature will not only provide the academic context for this work, but also explore the prevailing arguments and literature at the intersection of three fields. The first of these is the field of intelligence studies, but more specially the scholarship and theories surrounding international intelligence sharing and cooperation. The second body of work focuses on the KGB of the Soviet Union and includes works that not only plumb its history but also its legacies and influence on contemporary Russia. The third and final group of sources that will be considered for this project concentrates on the

history and archives of the MfS as well as the most recent research on the legacy and history of the Stasi.

There are two final points that must be considered. The first of these is a definition of terms and concepts as they are used in this dissertation. The term cooperation is central to the arguments made by Hoffmann (2021) and will frequently be replaced by the term collaboration in order to avoid confusion. However, collaboration in this work does not carry the English language context of traitorous cooperation. Next, from its inception in 1917 as the Cheka, to its nominal reform in 1991, the Soviet secret police has gone through several mutations and evolutions, each with their own acronym, but little substantial change. As such, this work has adopted the approach used by Yevegnia Albats (1994, 4) to refer the Soviet secret police exclusively as the KGB to provide greater clarity and a more coherent text. A running theme through the course of his work is the Cheka, the first secret police established in the weeks after the successful October revolution in 1917 at the behest of Vladimir Ilych Lenin by Felix Edmundovich Dzerzhinsky. Readers should bear in mind the notion of Chekism, the idea that the security and intelligence services, the Chekists, are "the sword and shield" of the party. What is more, Chekists not only can, but should, use any means necessary to accomplish their goals and maintain state security (Gieseke, 2014, 8). This understanding is invaluable to comprehend the MfS, the KGB and contemporary Russian security services. Moreover, it is important to note the difference between an agent and an officer when speaking about intelligence services of any nation. Intelligence officers are official employees of the intelligence service. Agents are handled and directed by officers and are not in the official employ of a service.

The final points that remain to be discussed are some of the factors that influence the topic at hand but cannot be explored as they do not fall within

the immediate scope of this work. This includes the economic and financial relationship between the Soviet Union and its client states, among them the DDR. A further aspect that will not be discussed is the evolution of the Soviet Intelligence service, as well as the terror and purges it perpetrated at Josef Stalin's behest. The culture of fear and surveillance cultivated by both the KGB and the Stasi in their respective states will not be mentioned further in this work. However, the terror tactics used by both, such as *Zersetzung* and arresting citizens in the middle of the night had a profound psychological effect on citizens. It is worth remembering that in the name of security, these services committed horrible crimes against their own.

Methodology and Theoretical Framework

Theoretical Framework

This dissertation is rooted in the work of Sophia Hoffmann (2021) and Joseph Hatfield (2022). Hoffmann contends that contrary to significant evidence, political science scholarship has neglected international intelligence relationships as a field of study and as a result has produced a knowledge gap in this area (Hoffmann, 2021, 807). Hoffmann goes on to critique the prevailing concept of cooperation as the lens through which to understand and analyse international intelligence sharing relationships (Hoffmann, 2021, 809). The strengths of the cooperation concept are that intelligence organisations are portrayed as actors with separate interests instead of merely cogs in the great machine of a government. This in turn opens the scholarship beyond the narrow focus on the Anglosphere that has taken a central role in intelligence studies (Ibid). Hoffmann crucially notes however, that the conceptual notions of how intelligence organisations are portrayed and spoken about in mainstream intelligence literature do not match up with how intelligence organisations operate in authoritarian regimes. "In many countries of the Global South experiencing authoritarian rule the idea of a disinterested intelligence agency is a concept far off the mark: instead, governments frequently engage in coup-proofing their intelligence agencies to prevent the emergence of independence" (Hoffmann, 2021, 810).

Hoffmann's criticism of the dominant cooperation model to explain intelligence relationships can be boiled down into three core points. First of these is that the cooperation model does not provide a specific, well-rounded lens through which to analyse intelligence relationships (Hoffmann, 2021, 812). Second, is that cooperation also includes Western assumptions about intelligence services, such as their role in "defenders of their freedoms against foreign adversaries" (ibid). The Rocca statement about friendly intelligence

agencies, which his often misattributed to Kissinger, is viewed by Hoffmann as the quintessence of the assumptions at the foundation of cooperation model. Namely that intelligence cooperation is a necessary evil and is only pursued in order to fill gaps in domestic collection capabilities (ibid). Third, is that although the cooperation model helps answer normative and practical considerations for types of cooperation, it neglects a large number of documented instances of intelligence cooperation that stretch beyond mere information exchange.

Hoffmann proposes a new framework as a viable alternative to the useful if flawed cooperation model. Built upon the foundation of James Secord's argument "that scholars should give interaction between agents a central role in epistemology" (Hoffmann, 2021, 814), Hoffman's framework posits that the circulation of knowledge as a concept to analysing international intelligence relationships. Hoffman cites the work of Guihot and others in utilising knowledge circulation theory to broaden the scholarship on international relations (Ibid). Furthermore, this theory focuses less on "why knowledge was communicated" but instead how knowledge moves and is shared (Hoffmann, 2021, 814).

Knowledge circulation relies upon three methods of how information moves. Firstly, is knowledge reception, where information is "absorbed from elsewhere". Second is exchange, the process in which new knowledge is created by two or more parties by "mutual communication". The third method is negotiation, in that parties discuss and debate knowledge. According to Hoffmann a deep reading of each of these highly theorised methods would be very beneficial for intelligence studies. Hoffmann also proposes three levels of analysis as well, namely a state level, institutional level, and individual level. Each of these analytical levels allow scholars to elucidate the nuances more clearly within international intelligence relationships. Within this framework Hoffmann also places emphasis on two key points. First, is that knowledge

circulation does not replace or degrade the role of "strategic interest" which plays a central role in prominent scholarship on intelligence relationships (Hoffmann, 2021, 816). Instead, however, knowledge circulation compliments and contributes to existing analysis. Secondly, Hoffman highlights the importance of materiality of intelligence relationships at all three levels of analysis. This includes pursuing the histories and paths of people, objects, and other resources beyond finances to understand the various aspects and dynamics of international intelligence relationships more fully.

However, Hoffmann's framework serves better as a starting point for further research than a one size fits all approach for the future of study into international intelligence. Among the limitations of Hoffmann's approach is the previously mentioned difference in governmental and societal and even cultural role of intelligence organisations in authoritarian states. Here the work of Joseph Hatfield (2022) more clearly explores this divide. Hatfield's article *Intelligence under democracy and authoritarianism: a philosophical analysis* will be examined in more depth in the following literature review. In summation it explores the intellectual and practical differences between intelligence organisations in democratic and authoritarian governments. This difference is crucial when discussing the relationship between the intelligence services of two of the most ruthless and repressive regimes of their era.

In order to answer the research question, this dissertation will rely upon the levels of analysis as described by Hoffmann. It must be noted that the scope of this research project does not allow for the kind of research made possible by utilising the full extent of the framework presented by Hoffmann. However, as previously discussed, knowledge circulation is an additional lens to evaluate the parties, actors, and individuals in intelligence relationships. The very nature of some of the sources on the KGB and MfS requires the inclusion of the aspect of materiality, as archival records of meeting minutes and personal memoirs and biographies are just as much evidence of relationships

as the formal agreements and treaties that initiate and regulate them. A further conceptual foundation within this dissertation is the continuation of Hatfield's astute study of intelligence within authoritarian regimes. For both the KGB and the MfS this can be extended to the very specific philosophy, culture, and legacy of the Cheka, the first Soviet secret police in the weeks following the October revolution. Its founder, Felix Dzerzhinsky, had a cult of personality that has remained potent nearly a century after his death (Light, 2021; Moscow Times, 2021). Chekism and the influence of the Cheka will be a recurring topic in each level of analysis presented in the three main chapters of this work. The following section will briefly explore the methodological steps taken in the research for this project.

Research Methodology

The first thoughts about this research project began to gather around the quote by CIA officer Raymond Rocca: "There are no friendly services. There are services of friendly powers" (Martin, 1983, 177). Further, there seemed to be a large focus within the realm of both intelligence and security studies on the Anglosphere. Following an enduring academic interest in Russia and the KGB, a research project examining the intelligence relationships between the KGB and other Soviet Bloc intelligence organisations began to crystallise. This was in part inspired by the work of Molly Pucci and her book *Security Empire* (2020) which explores the origins of the secret police services in communist Eastern Europe. I chose the relationship between the Soviet KGB and the MfS of the DDR as specific case to focus on for several reasons. Chief among these reasons is the efficient and ruthless reputation the MfS had as a service despite being smaller and more junior to the KGB. Additionally, as a native German speaker, source material of the MfS is much easier to analyse than the records of the security services in Czechoslovakia or Poland. I then began by gathering sources on three specific areas, Intelligence studies, with a

focus on the theory and scholarship on international intelligence relationships, the KGB, and the MfS. The research process revealed that an important metric for analysing international intelligence relationships is information sharing. The article *Circulation, not cooperation* by Sophia Hoffmann (2021) provided a new and broader framework for analysing intelligence relationships. The very recent article by Joseph Hatfield (2022) provided the necessary counterbalance of Hoffmann's work to create a framework for assessing the relationship between the KGB and the MfS. The framework used for this project will analyse the relationship of the KGB through three perspectives, namely state, institution and individual. While the merits and details of Hoffmann's framework were previously discussed, the value and contribution of Hatfield to the debate will be discussed in the literature review.

I next began reading broadly on the histories of both the KGB and the MfS as well as reviewing the available sources for both organisations. Throughout the reading process it became apparent that there were not many comparable sources on both organisations. While the KGB is widely written about by a variety of scholars, its archives are very much closed to the public and are likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. The MfS on the other hand is the subject of a much smaller amount of scholarly work, much of which benefits from the limited albeit growing archival sources. Moreover, unlike much of the leadership of the KGB, several senior MfS officials wrote biographies about their experiences and careers. One of the key outcomes of this process was a shift in approach to the research question. It would not be sustainable to focus exclusively on information sharing as metric for assessing the relationship. A further aspect that became clear during the research process was the lack of clear methodology defined by other researchers within Intelligence studies. Instead, many of the sources weave a narrative that follows course of events or utilise specific case studies to illustrate their arguments. This dissertation has followed in these footsteps as best possible. Additionally, it became clear throughout the research that focusing on two

departments, the HVA and the PGU, in the MfS and KGB respectively would make for a more concise and coherent project. As a result, some of the sources I found, particularly about the Soviet Union and the KGB were not specific enough for the current project. However, they do provide important detail about the context about the time and persons in question.

Having chosen the majority of my source material, my next step was to read through the sources and take meticulous notes about the course of events, the wording of conversations and agreements as well as the memoirs of senior officials. Much of the research was conducted by search through relevant sections and chapters of the sources, focusing on instances of collaboration between the MfS and the KGB. I additionally surveyed the indices of the sources where possible for key terms such as MFS, Stasi, KGB, First Chief Directorate, East Germany, Mielke, Andropov, Markus Wolf, Werner Grossmann, and others. The goal here was to find the relevant passages and paragraphs that would shine further light on the nature of the relationships between the DDR and the USSR, the MfS and the KGB as well as individuals such as Mielke, Andropov, Wolf and Kryuchkov. This in turn allowed me to sort the sources and sections into their relevance for the three main chapters of this research project.

My research faced several setbacks and changes. The first of these was due to the pandemic and other restrictions, I was unable to conduct primary research in the Stasi Archives in Berlin as I had originally planned when first proposing this research project. I was able to overcome this limitation however as a number of relevant documents pertaining to the relations between the KGB and the MfS have been digitised and are openly accessible online. A further known limitation was the lack of archival and first-hand material of the operations of the KGB. This limitation has been circumvented as best possible given the available scholarly and journalistic literature. This will be examined more fully in the literature review.

Literature Review

To assess the nature of the relationship between the KGB of the Soviet Union and the MfS of the DDR, a wide selection of literature must be considered and analysed. This dissertation sits at the intersection of three bodies of literature. First is the academic study of intelligence, and therein the topic of intelligence sharing. Second, are the sources and works surrounding the KGB of the Soviet Union, including its relationships and operations abroad as well as its legacy. The third body of literature includes the archival, personal, and scholarly work about the MfS of the DDR. This literature review will briefly examine some of the key elements of each group of writing and underline some of the biases and gaps within each. The first section groups the authors and their works together thematically and discusses the commonalities and differences among them. The second section focused on the KGB is organised thematically and chronologically. The final section on the MfS surveys the literature through the lens of proximity beginning with archival material before moving to biographies, reporting and then academic work. The purpose of this literature review is to provide a concise overview of the existing source material as well as situate this dissertation among these works.

Intelligence Studies and International Intelligence Sharing

There is no lack of literature on intelligence. The spy novels of Ian Fleming and John le Carre remain popular well after the end of the Cold War, and the so-called golden era of espionage (Kitfield, 2007, 71). The same is true for the academic field of intelligence studies which spans the historical, the theoretical and the practical facets of intelligence collection and analysis, as well as the organisations involved in intelligence. One of the foundational works in intelligence studies is Gill & Phythian's *Intelligence in an Insecure World* (2012) which documents every step in the intelligence collection and

analysis processes. The work of Gill & Phythian also examines the various types of actors involved in national security intelligence, the role of covert action, the limits of intelligence, and the relationship of intelligence actors to policymakers, governments, and democracies. However, two of the topics that Gill and Phythian only touch on are intelligence sharing and international intelligence cooperation. This section of the literature review will explore some of the prevailing authors and debates within these two topics. It will first discuss the commonalities shared by the authors and then move on the differences before identifying gaps within the field.

Common Themes

At the core of intelligence sharing and international intelligence relationships is the fundamental nature of intelligence services. Sir Stephen Lander posits in his article *International intelligence cooperation: an inside Perspective* (2004), that intelligence services are "manifestations of individual state power and of national self-interest" (2004, 481). This position is widely accepted among the scholarship, if not explicitly as with Walsh, then at least tacitly. Because of this Lander describes intelligence cooperation as a bit of an oxymoron. However, such cooperation does occur. It is not unreasonable to conclude that the interests of any two intelligence services, even within the same state, must overlap for cooperation of any type to take place. One of the most important factors when it comes to intelligence sharing is trust. Both partners need to not only trust each other but have a minimum degree of trust in the information that is being shared. This rings especially true in the realm of intelligence relationships at an international level. In his book *The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing*, James Igoe Walsh (2010) sets the stage of the various aspects and relationships involved in intelligence sharing and cooperation. Through a series of case studies Walsh examines three expectations surrounding the dynamics of such cooperation. Walsh

contends that large intelligence gains are one of the primary motives for international intelligence cooperation. Moreover, Walsh argues that trust is not only crucial to intelligence, but an absence of trust leads to anarchical institutions of sharing. Walsh also finds that most intelligence sharing arrangements are defined by hierarchical relationships between two or more partners (Walsh, 2010, 134).

The work of former Canadian Strategic Analyst Stephane Lefebvre weighs in in this topic of dynamics within intelligence sharing relationships. In his article *The Difficulties and Dilemmas of International Intelligence Cooperation* Lefebvre identifies even among long-standing intelligence relationships in the West, such relationships are occasionally marked by competition instead of cooperation (Lefebvre, 2003, 527). One of the core tenets of Lefebvre's work is that bilateral intelligence relationships are the most common and most preferred intelligence sharing format (ibid, 532). This is due to six key limitations of these relationships. In part these limitations are informed by a lack of trust and confidence between partners, while other limitations stem from differences in priorities and legal frameworks. Lander ultimately argues that intelligence relationships are rooted in a quid pro quo mentality, which echoes the self-interest postulated by Lander. Lefebvre concludes by underlining the necessity in any intelligence sharing relationship to striking the right balance between the two or more parties involved to avoid any imbalance or even collapse of the relationship.

In their article *Democracy and the depth of intelligence sharing: why regime type hardly matters*, Brown and Farrington (2017) carry on an argument made by Lefebvre that trust is one of the most important elements of a successful intelligence relationship. Throughout their work Brown and Farrington make the argument that ultimately regime type does not greatly influence the success of intelligence relationships, citing Anglo-Soviet relations during the Second World War. Their article and proposed framework

rely heavily on realist thought. According to Brown and Farrington the first aspect for any functioning intelligence relationship is a reason to engage in it (Brown and Farrington, 2017, 79). By arguing this, Brown and Farrington are mirroring the scholarship discussed above that contends that self-interest lies at the core of international intelligence relationships.

Differences

While self-interest may be fundamental to the nature of both humans and intelligence services, there are important differences within the scholarship that are worth highlighting. First and foremost among these, is the notion proposed above that government type does not matter in intelligence relationships. Lander argues to the contrary that regime type and the basic philosophies and assumptions it makes, even within Western democratic countries plays a significant factor in the success or failure of intelligence relationships (Lander, 2004, 491-493). Lander focuses as far down as the collection and analytical level and shows that such seemingly small differences are not negligible when it comes to cooperating internationally in a field as murky and complex as intelligence.

An additional dissenting voice is that of Joseph Hatfield, who establishes the differences between the intelligence organisations in democratic and authoritarian governments. In his article *Intelligence under democracy and authoritarianism: a philosophical analysis* (2022), Hatfield stands in direct opposition to some of the arguments made by Brown and Farrington. Hatfield uses some of the schools of thought in philosophy to parse the fundamental separation of the role of intelligence organisations in the two types of government. The first of these is a yawning divide in the understanding of the term security. While both types of governments use the same word, they mean very different things (Hatfield, 2022, 3). Moreover, while the role of an intelligence service in a democracy is to support the

government in its national security goals and decision-making process, Hatfield likens the intelligence organs of authoritarian regimes to palace guards, whose *raison d'etre* is to prop up the existing regime through maintaining national (internal) security (ibid, 9). On the whole, Hatfield concludes that "that the nature of intelligence cultures within political communities are determined by the type of regime they serve" (ibid, 12). If Hatfield's arguments are viewed in conjunction with the other literature, it becomes clear just how important the nature of a political regime is to its international intelligence relationships.

Further differences in the literature are highlighted by Sophia Hoffmann who makes the case that much of the intelligence cooperation literature thus far is too deeply rooted in the realist school of thought. Hoffmann challenges the theoretical underpinnings of how scholars view and discuss intelligence relationships as a whole. She argues that the field intelligence studies suffer from too narrow a perspective when it comes to evaluating the nature of international intelligence relationships. As a result, her proposed framework seeks to break free of this single school of through and provide new approaches to the study of international intelligence relationships. Hoffmann's work agrees with Hatfield's position on the fundamental differences between intelligence services in democratic and authoritarian governments (Hoffmann, 2021, 810).

Gaps and Opportunities

After a review of the literature on intelligence cooperation and intelligence relationships, a number of gaps have emerged. The first of these is that much of the intelligence cooperation literature is not only grounded in realism, but it is also almost exclusively focused on the Anglosphere. This is an issue that affects much of intelligence studies as a wider field of study as many of the most well-known authors are men from the United States and the United

Kingdom. One of the outcomes of this is a long-standing cultural bias towards Western and democratic intelligence organisations. This bias in turn presents a gap in the literature of intelligence sharing relationships within the Warsaw pact, or between non-Western states. In addition to this is the need for more female academics within the field of intelligence studies. More scholarship from women in the field of intelligence will not only broaden the field more generally, but also present hitherto underrepresented perspectives and nuances. A further gap of course is within the schools of thought within intelligence studies as applied to intelligence cooperation. This will shift the debate away from the hegemony of realism and allow for more varied approaches to understanding the nature of intelligence service and their relationships.

Beyond exploring the relevant literature and delving into the commonalities and differences within this body of work, this section of the literature review has presented some of the themes that will be present in following chapters. One of these is the understanding that self-interest rests at the heart of intelligence services and how they operate. This is doubly so for intelligence services in authoritarian states whose role it is to support and maintain the ruling power, as outlined by Hatfield (2022). The concerns about imbalance within intelligence relationships as raised by Lefebvre (2003) are worth bearing in mind as the relationship between the Stasi and the KGB is being discussed and analysed. Finally, the importance of the debate between different regime types, collection and analysis philosophies, and the world view of intelligence organisations is neatly summed up by Stan and Bastiuc (2018) in their analysis of active measures in the Warsaw Pact. "Understanding an opponent is only possible if the analysis uses his concepts instead of our own" (Stan and Bastiuc, 2018, 156). This too gives cause for the re-iteration of the mentality of Chekism throughout this research project.

The KGB of the Soviet Union

The KGB is central to any discussion of Intelligence, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War itself. While the KGB was long seen as a near omnipotent monolith (Yasmann, 2006) its organisation, operations and legacy continue to capture the fascination of readers and academics alike. This is partially due to the nature of the security and intelligence bodies in the Russian Federation today, but also due to President Vladimir Putin's formative experience as a KGB officer in East Germany during the end of the Cold War. There are many places one can start in order to begin understanding the nature and role of the KGB as an intelligence organisation (as opposed to secret police force) in the Soviet Union. One of these starting point's is *Soviet Leaders and Intelligence* by Raymond Garthoff (2015), which chronicles how each of the leaders of the Soviet Union dealt with and relied upon the KGB. Among the finest aspects of Garthoff's work is that it traces not only the differing opinions of leaders from Stalin to Gorbachev on the importance of the KGB, but also paints these relationships among the wider geopolitical backdrop of relations with the United States and the West. While some leaders like Brezhnev relied heavily upon reports provided by the KGB, Stalin distrusted the analysis and demanded to see raw information while Gorbachev distrusted the KGB and the intelligence apparatus entirely. Garthoff's work is further enriched through his considerable personal contact with former Soviet leaders and officials after the end of the Cold War. Despite his background as a Western diplomat, Garthoff seemingly overcomes the Western institutional and cultural bias outlined by Hatfield (2022) that often plagues such works.

Garthoff's book however only scratches the surface when it comes to the vast depths of the KGB and its role in Soviet society and government. One of the most confounding aspects of research on the KGB is that with exception of a brief time in the 1990s, the archives of the KGB have remained under lock and key (Knight, 1993). One of the best sources on the inner workings of the KGB is the result of the efforts Christopher Andrew and the Soviet

defectors Oleg Gordievsky and Vasili Mitrokhin. *KGB: The Inside Story* (1990) is the result of years of conversation and research between Andrew and Gordievsky after the latter defected to the UK in 1985. It is one of the first in depth explorations of the inner workings of the KGB, its operations abroad, and history of Soviet intelligence organs since the creation of the Cheka weeks after the October Revolution in 1917. As such it serves as a valuable foundation into understanding the KGB.

This was not to be Andrew's only contribution to the study of the Soviet intelligence organs however, as in 1991 disillusioned KGB archivist Vasili Mitrokhin defected to Britain with over 25'000 documents he copied by hand from the KGB archives over decades of service. Although Mitrokhin's original archives are still classified, edited and redacted versions of some of the archival materials are available at Churchill College of Cambridge University (Churchill Archives Centre, No Date). As the sole researcher with access to Mitrokhin's files, Christopher Andrew has published two tomes *The Sword and the Shield* (1999) and *The World was going our Way* (2005). The first of book details even further the operations, methods and functioning of the Soviet intelligence organs going as far back as the 1930s. The second book is more focused on KGB operations abroad especially in the Global South, referred to then as the Third World. To date, the works of Andrew stand as the best source on the KGB outside of the official archives of the Russian and Soviet security services in Moscow. They are certainly the most well-known sources on the KGB and serve as a first port of call for research into the KGB. However, Hatfield (2022, 12) contends that despite its prominence, Andrew's work does face some justified criticism of Western bias. This however does not detract meaningfully from the value of the Mitrokhin archives as a source.

For a brief time in the early 1990s, during the confusion and uncertainty of the end of the Soviet Union and the first days of the Yeltsin presidency, the archives of the KGB were open to the public. One intrepid

Russian journalist, Yevgenia Albats, dared to enter the inner sanctum of the organisation that had held so much sway over public life in the Soviet Union. The result of her investigation and interviews is *The KGB: The State within a State* (1994). Albats' work is significant in that instead of focusing on the operations and actions of the KGB, it provides a scathing critique of the Soviet system and provides a snapshot into the transformatory period of the early 1990s in the Russian Federation. Moreover, Albats identifies the roots of inherent secret police nature of the KGB as also described by Hatfield (2022). In her book Albats warns of the potential that the KGB could rise out of the ashes of Perestroika, Glasnost, and the chaos of the 1990s in Russia. Through her interviews and contact with many senior KGB officials, Albats came to understand the roots of the Chekists run far deeper than any of the reform efforts experienced in Soviet society from Khrushchev to Gorbachev to Yeltsin. Albats ends her work by emphasizing the regenerative and revival capacity of the KGB. Unfortunately, Albats was correct when she predicted that "this book will not lose its currency until the KGB is destroyed". For this dissertation, Albats work plays an important role in understanding the language, culture, and mentality of the Chekists, past and present. As will be elaborated upon later, the vision of the Cheka under the leadership of Felix Dzerzhinsky is central to the culture of the KGB, the MfS and the Russian security services today.

Albats is not the only author to notice the horrible symmetry between the Soviet KGB and the security services of the Russian Federation, most notably the SVR and the FSB. Journalist duo Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan have written a number of books about the resurgence of the security and surveillance state under the leadership of President Vladimir Putin. Their book *The New Nobility* (2010) follows the evolution of the FSB from its beginnings in the 1990s to the juggernaut of Russian security it is today through important events including the Dubrovka Theatre siege, the Beslan school massacre and other actions at home and abroad. Soldatov and Borogan

contend that the FSB is the lasting legacy of the KGB and ultimately aims to regain a similar role and status in Russian society. While *The New Nobility* does not directly deal with relationship between the KGB and the MfS it was a formative book in my interest and research into the KGB and security architectures in Russia. Moreover, it reinforces the argument made by Albats in the 1990s that the intelligence and security organs in Russia are indeed a "state within a state". Understanding this symbiotic and parasitic relationship is central to understanding both the KGB and the MfS as individual organisations but also in their dealings with each other. Further this first work of Soldatov and Borogan is also an important snapshot of Russia in the middle of Dmitri Medvedev's term as President of the Russian Federation. It was a time when genuine hope for reform and change towards good governance. This is very much reflected in the book, especially in the concluding pages which call for a need of new defenders of the state which are not "mired in the past" (Soldatov and Borogan, 2010, 242).

If Albats began documenting the transformation of the KGB at the end of the 20th century, and Soldatov & Borogan traced the evolution through the first decade of the 21st century, then Catherine Belton's definitive work *Putin's People* (2020) carries that task forward into the present day. Beginning in the late 1980's Belton chronicles how a young Vladimir Putin and his KGB comrades in East Germany saw the proverbial writing on the wall and began preparing for the collapse of the DDR and the Soviet Union (Belton, 2020, 32-34). The rest of Belton's book chronicles Putin's meteoric rise to power from the organized crime groups of 1990's St. Petersburg to the halls of the Kremlin. Belton's work shines a light on the inner workings of the Putin regime and how the methods of the KGB have been used by Putin and his inner circle of *siloviki* to take and retain power in Russia. *Putin's People* is an important addition to the story of the KGB for three reasons. First, it directly confronts the narratives spread by Putin and his regime. Second, it provides a granular examination of the dirty money and financial impropriety that helped

catapult Putin to the Russian presidency. Finally, it shines a critical light on the role of the KGB in the final days of the DDR and operational relationship of the KGB and the Stasi at the end of the 1980s. While every work and author have biases, and Belton's work is no exception, *Putin's People* seems to have struck a nerve with the Russian oligarchs. Roman Abramovich, Mikhail Fridman and Petr Aven have all brought lawsuits against publisher HarperCollins over *Putin's People* (Sabbagh, 2021). Whether this speaks to the veracity of Belton's work or is simply a libel suit is unclear, but a vehement reaction speaks volumes.

Understanding the history, methods and operations of the KGB is central to understanding the MfS and the intertwined relationship between the two. Despite the above literature on the KGB, the biggest gap is the lack of access to the KGB archives in Moscow. Research in the field is reliant upon secondary sources, especially Mitrokhin's files and the accounts of Oleg Gordievsky. This difficulty underlines the importance of the work of Albats, Soldatov and Borogan as well as Belton. There is a case to be made that the archives of the KGB in Ukraine and Moldova cast more light on the history of the infamous Cold War intelligence service. Until the archives of the KGB see the light of day however, the true depth, extent and influence of the KGB is likely remain shrouded in mystery and conjecture. However, one of the most important aspects that all these sources explore, and trace is the legacy of the Cheka and generations of intelligence and security officers who view themselves as Chekists. The foundation mythos surrounding the Chekists is central to both the KGB and the MfS.

The MfS of the DDR

The East German Ministry for State Security, known better by its acronym "Stasi" was one of the most pervasive and successful intelligence organisations of the Cold War era (Schmeidel, 2008, i). Unlike its brother

organisation in the Soviet Union, the collapse of the Stasi spelled the end of the security state in Germany. Due to the bravery and swift response of concerned citizens, a large amount of the archives of the MfS were not permanently destroyed. Since then, the Stasi archives have been integrated into the Federal Archives of Germany and efforts have been made to reconstruct as many of the torn files as possible (Stasi Records Archive, No Date). As a result, the Stasi archive remains a treasure trove for information on the inner workings of the MfS and its operations in the DDR, the BRD and further afield. Part of the archives have been digitised and a collection of archival materials on the cooperation and collaboration between the Soviet KGB and the MfS are publicly available on the Stasi archives website (Stasi Records Archive, No Date). Many of the files are meeting protocols that detail the precise cooperation agreements between the two intelligence organisations, including specific responsibilities, mechanisms to change and improve the cooperation as well as concrete goals to be achieved by the joint work of the two organisations.

One of the issues with archival material is that tone, inflection, and interactions are not well captured by minutes of meetings. There are several documents wherein the dialogue between East German and Soviet officers could be interpreted as less than friendly, but it is hard to discern based purely on text alone. Moreover, one of the issues of any archival source are gaps in the records of documentation or meetings that were not included by the archiving staff. While Germans generally, and the MfS especially, fall victim to the stereotype of meticulousness and precision, there are certainly gaps in the Stasi archives due to the destruction and exfiltration of files and records in the days and months following the fall of the Berlin Wall (Belton, 2022, 34).

Another unique source on the operations, relationships, and history of the MfS comes in the form of the biographies and autobiographies of the leaders of the Stasi. Chief and most well-known among these is Markus Wolf,

known also as the "man without a face". Wolf was the deputy head of the Stasi and the head of the HVA, (Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung), the foreign intelligence arm of the MfS. Wolf has written two books, *Man without a Face* (1997) and *Spionage Chef im Geheimen Krieg* (1997), about his time and central role in the MfS. Wolf prefaces his work by saying that he is not looking to redeem himself, or even apologise for his role in the DDR (Wolf, 1997, xii). It should be noted that the German book is an expanded and edited version of first publication *Man without a Face*. In his works, Wolf seeks to reflect upon his career and make a case for a cause that he had dedicated his life to.

A further biography is that of Werner Grossmann, Wolf's deputy, and the last head of the HVA before the collapse of the DDR. Grossmann's book *Bonn im Blick* (2007), details his experiences from humble construction worker to Colonel in the MfS. Among Grossmann's reflections are also descriptions of the HVA and its operations as well as the personal relationships Grossmann forged throughout his career. One of the most interesting and seemingly strong relationships was Grossmann's friendship with Vladimir Kryuchkov, the head of the PGU of the KGB. Kryuchkov not only went on to head the KGB but was also one of the ring leaders of the failed 1991 August Coup.

The third biography is one of the relationship between the KGB and the MfS through the eyes of Bernd Fischer, rather than a biography of Fischer's life and career. Fischer ended his career in the MfS as Head of Department I, and in April 1990 was tasked with overseeing the dissolution of the HVA altogether (Sontheimer, 1999). Fischer's book *Der Grosse Bruder* (2012) follows the intertwined relationship of the KGB and the MfS from the end of the Second World War right up to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the DDR. Fischer provides unique insight on the collaboration, including the contractual basis for the joint work between the two

organisations, as well as their mutual activities and interests in the BRD and further afield. It must be noted that as a source, autobiographies are victim to grandstanding and the subject looking to present themselves in the best light possible. This bias must be borne in mind especially with the works of Wolf and Grossmann. Nevertheless, such accounts provide one-of-a-kind perspectives that, when combined with further research and other sources result in a clearer picture of historical events.

In the mid-1990s Anna Funder worked and lived in Berlin and made it her mission to better understand the former East Germany and its newly incorporated residents. Her book *Stasiland* (2003) is the result of conversations and interviews of those who resisted the societal oppression and surveillance state enforced by the MfS. Funder also used classified ads to find and interview former members of the MfS. *Stasiland* paints a jarring picture of what life was like behind the Berlin Wall, from the claustrophobic control of every aspect of daily life to the perpetual fear that family, friends, and neighbours might be spying on you. *Stasiland* was one of my first encounters the history of East Germany and the Stasi. While the book does not directly deal with the research question at hand, it holds a unique value in capturing the physical and emotional landscapes of the effect of the Stasi and the SED on the citizens of East Germany. It is a grounding work that brings readers and researchers back to the horrible reality of what life was like in the DDR.

The work of historian Jens Gieseke has been central to accurately, and factually compiling the history of the MfS and the role it played in East Germany (Stasi Records Archive, No Date). Gieseke previously worked as a researcher in the Stasi Archives in Berlin. His book *The History of the Stasi* (2014) follows the key moments and facets of the MfS from its predecessors and creation in the days following the end of the Second World War to its dissolution and legacies in the 1990s and beyond. Gieseke's work makes for an excellent companion to not only the Stasi Archival documents and

materials but also the books by Wolf, Grossmann, and Fischer. It allows readers and researchers to compare and contrast accounts while providing a German perspective on the MfS tempered by both time and distance from the subject matter. It is important to include a variety of accounts and histories in order to overcome the biases inherent in all sources. Gieseke provides a broad overview of much of the MfS that acts as a steppingstone for further research into specific persons, events, and relationships. The bias of Gieseke's work is not immediately clear, though as a German citizen and a researcher very familiar with the DDR, the MfS it is possible that unconscious bias has crept into his work. If it has, it was not evident to me during my research.

The latest addition to the scholarship on the MfS is the book *Der «Grosse Bruder»* by Douglas Selvage and Georg Herbstritt. Their work is a collection of studies into the relationship between the KGB and the MfS between 1958 and 1989. Selvage has dedicated much of his academic career to the studying the MfS and this book is a culmination of much of that work thus far. Each study focuses on specific aspect of the relationship ranging from the Soviet espionage in East Germany, KGB and MfS partnership on border control to the KGB and MFS perspective on Romania and the case of Nobel prize laureate Andrei Sakharov. The book relies on the latest research in the Stasi archives and incorporates other important sources including the Mitrokhin Archive (Selvage, 2022, 21). Another aspect of *Der «Grosse Bruder»* as a source is that it too benefits from both time and distance from the events, people and relationships examined within. Together with the above-mentioned sources and authors it will provide a nuanced and concise evaluation of the relationship between the Soviet KGB and the MfS of the DDR.

One of the largest gaps in the literature surrounding the MfS is the lack of variety and numbers. While the KGB was seen as the main adversary (Bearden and Risen, 2003, 3) of the Western intelligence organisations, the

Stasi's efficiency and efficacy was not widely known or spoke about until the end of the Cold War. As a result, there is less writing and research on the Stasi. This research project endeavours to contribute to filling that gap.

Conclusions

This literature review set out to present the state of the art of three bodies of scholarship central to this research project. At the same time one of the aims of this review is to identify the gaps in the literature and source and in so doing frame this dissertation within that literature. The first group of literature followed the progression of intelligence studies literature beginning with the foundations of intelligence literature and focusing in on the theoretical underpinnings of intelligence sharing and international intelligence relationships. Here the major gap in the literature is a long-standing culture bias towards Western and democratic intelligence organisations. The second body of works are those dealing with the history, nature, and leadership of the KGB of the Soviet Union. The biggest gap is that the archives not openly accessible. This compels researchers to rely on a handful of sources or the sources of other institutions, such as the CIA, which inevitably have their own biases. The third and final collection of literature is that covering the creation, history, and legacy of the MfS of the DDR. The identified gaps herein are that much of archives are still being pieced together and provide a certain type of perspective. However, when viewed in conjunction with first-hand accounts and scholarly research a more distinct image emerges. This dissertation strives to contribute to filling the gaps in the research and add to the growing body of scholarship into the intelligence organisations of the Warsaw Pact.

Chapter 1: Blood Brothers

"Only he with a cool head, a warm heart and clean hands can be a Chekist"

-Felix E. Dzerzhinsky[1]

This first chapter will analyse the relationship between the MfS of the DDR and the KGB of the USSR at the state level. To do so, it is only reasonable to start at the beginning, in the immediate aftermath of the end of the Second World War, before the official beginning of the Cold War, as the allied powers liberated and occupied Germany. This chapter will follow the creation of the MfS from its inception and early forms through to the leadership of Erich Mielke, who as its longest serving minister was instrumental in making the Stasi into one of the most feared and infamous intelligence services to date (DDR Museum, No Date; Binder, 2000). Here the key moments are the years following the end of the Second World War, the creation of the MfS alongside the founding of the DDR, the Berlin Uprising of June 1953 and its aftermath, as well as the previously mentioned rise of Erich Mielke.

Aside from examining the relationship between the KGB and the MfS, this chapter will set a backdrop for subsequent chapters by portraying a first image of the historical and cultural factors at play throughout these early years. It should be noted however that the broader history of communist political parties in both Germany and Russia, and later the Soviet Union, are the prelude to many of the events that are examined in this chapter. Unfortunately, the scope of this research project does not allow for this history to be explored. Among the goals of this chapter will be to on the one hand present instances in which the Soviet Union and its representatives aided, supported, and collaborated with German authorities and the MfS. On the

---

[1] (Gieseke, 2018, 32)

other hand, this chapter will question the motives behind these actions and in so doing make the case that the brotherly relationship between the KGB and MfS was not so fraternal after all.

Soviet Occupation

After the unconditional surrender of the Third Reich, the allied powers divided Germany into their respective zones of occupation and administration. Throughout their advance West, the Soviet Red Army began "cleansing" the territories it occupied (Gieseke, 2014, 16). This practice included pillaging, raping, and the pursuit of Nazi war criminals in order to expunge the roots of Nazism from German society. The Soviet treatment of Germans was in part revenge for the racially motivated war conducted by the Nazis on the East Front against the Soviet Union and Slavic peoples. Moreover, the Soviet treatment of Germans was influenced by Stalin, and his understanding of how best to deal with domestic enemies deemed to threaten the state (ibid). As part of their occupation the Red Army established the *Sowjetische Militäradministration in Deutschland* (SMAD), the Soviet Military Administration in Germany, which was led by Marshal Zhukov and had control over all aspects of life in *Sowjetische Besatzungszone* (SBZ), the Soviet Occupation Zone in Eastern Germany.

The sole exception to the Zhukov's authority was the local representation of the KGB in Germany (Childs and Popplewell, 1996, 34). The influence of the KGB during the de-Nazification process was felt almost immediately as Soviet Prisoner of War (POW) camps resembled the Soviet GULAG system more than anything else. The so-called special camps for "active Nazis", war criminals and political opponents (Gieseke, 2014, 17) were particularly brutal. It remains unclear how many of those held in Soviet camps in eastern Germany were in fact former Nazis and war criminals, or merely what the Soviet administration deemed to be "forces of diversion".

Between 1945 and 1950, the SMAD had interned 189'000 Germans and foreigners of which at least 82'000 Germans had been arrested by October 1945. In the following years the Western allies began releasing prisoners whose Nazi involvement was judged to be inconsequential. The Soviet government in Moscow however not only did not release any prisoners, but instead lowered the rations and standard of living in the Soviet camps to levels below that of the harsh GULAG camps in the Soviet Union (Gieseke, 2014, 18). Despite protests from the SMAD leadership, Stalin and his government sentenced the prisoners to "unlimited punishment without trial". Amid this all, the KGB in the Soviet Occupation Zone pursued Stalin's ideas of anti-fascism. This was instrumental to allowing the Soviets to seize and retain power in the Soviet Occupation Zone. It is amid this backdrop that the Soviets began recruiting Germans as unofficial informants to support their security efforts in the Soviet Occupation Zone.

Security in Eastern Germany

As early as May 1945 the Soviet occupiers create the *Volkspolizei* (People's Police) in the SBZ as a German police force. While the *Volkspolizei* was less discriminating about the backgrounds and history of those who joined their ranks, the elite unit within the *Volkspolizei*, the *Kommissariat 5* (K-5) excluded anyone who remotely had anything to do with the Nazi regime in Germany (Pucci, 2020, 134). The K-5 became the first political police in the SBZ and worked closely alongside the KGB (Pucci, 2020, 134; Gieseke, 2014, 25). The K-5 was tasked with rooting out political criminals and supporting the de-Nazification of eastern Germany. However, the K-5 had a broad understanding of opponents to the communist regime, which included members of the still legal political parties including the Social Democratic Party of Germany (Schmeidel, 2008, 6). In April 1946, Stalin forced a merger between the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) and the Socialist Party of

Germany (SPD) which resulted in the creation of the *Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands* (SED), the Socialist Unity Pary, which had free reign over the political landscape in the SBZ.

The SED leadership took its instructions from the SMAD (Childs and Popplewell, 1996, 35). The security situation in the SBZ worsened to a state where the SMAD was compelled to take action and reform the security arrangement by instituting a centralised German authority that was "capable of coordinating and controlling the police in Germany" (Childs and Popplewell, 1996, 35). The *Deutsche Verwaltung des Innern* (DVdI), the German Administration of the Interior, nominally acted as German central control for the police forces in the SBZ, however Soviet officers were de facto in control. Moreover, the Soviets, especially the KGB were responsible for picking which Germans would serve the state administration of the SBZ (Pucci, 2020, 123). Most of these Germans had a long history of revolution, fighting fascism and education or exile in the Soviet Union, among them Erich Mielke, who in his role as Vice-President for General Affairs of the DVdI used his position to expand the size and mandate of K-5. Up to this point, despite Soviet assistance and training, the K-5 lacked manpower, and the staff it did have were inadequately trained. The newly formed East German Government recognized the need for a further security force in order to retain social control (Childs and Popplewell, 1996, 40). In early 1950, the SED took the final steps to transform the K-5 into the Ministry for State Security (MfS), known better by its abbreviation "Stasi" (Pieck, 1950). The Soviet authorities picked Spanish Civil War veteran, Wilhelm Zaisser, as their candidate to head up this new ministry (Gieseke, 2014, 29). Mielke had served as Zaisser's right hand man during the Spanish Civil War and reprised this role in the MfS (Childs and Popplewell, 1996, 47).

Evolution of the Ministry for State Security

From the moment of its creation, the Stasi saw itself as the Sword and Shield of the SED, following the rhetoric and practices of the Cheka. However, the Stasi was also a subsidiary of the KGB, and despite rhetoric, the ministry had mixed loyalties. The MfS continued to rely upon the KGB in the same way that K-5 had previously (Popplewell, 1998, 262). The MfS also modelled itself after the KGB and had very similar internal organisational structures. The ideological heritage of the Cheka was very present in the Stasi as many of the K-5 officers in the MfS were trained by KGB officials who in turn were trained during the Stalinist terror and repression of the 1920s and 1930s in the Soviet Union (Pucci, 2020, 122). And yet the Stasi continued to face both quality and quantity issues among its staff. In May 1953, leader of the SED and head of the DDR Walter Ulbricht said: "The first duty is significantly to improve the ideological education of the members of the MfS and to increase their knowledge of their jobs" (Childs and Popplewell, 1996, 48). The workers strike in June 1953 presented a critical and traumatic moment for the MfS. Construction workers first began to strike due to higher work quotes demanded by the SED government, with no increase in pay or standard of living (Schmeidel, 2008, 9). This was seen as an existential crisis for the SED because the workers and working class represented the primary source of legitimacy for the nominally socialist government.

Beginning in Berlin, workers clashed with MfS and People's Police officers across the DDR. The leadership of the MfS commanded its officers to act with restraint against the rioting workers. This resulted in MfS offices and prisons being ransacked. Prisoners were set free, and files were stolen and destroyed (Gieseke, 2014, 41). The riots could only be quelled when the Soviet military intervened with force and began arresting protestors (Schmeidel, 2008, 9-10). The strike made clear to the MfS what could happen to them as secret policemen if in future there was ever a popular revolt, it also underlined to the SED just how little support they enjoyed from the citizens of

the DDR. As one of the immediate consequences of the June uprising, Zaisser was removed from office amid false accusations of a coup attempt. Despite accusations from SED of incompetence, the MfS was not significantly hindered or minimised in the political landscape of the DDR at the intercessions of Walter Ulbricht (Gieseke, 2014, 42). Additionally, the KGB and Soviet leadership were also in turmoil following the death of Stalin in March 1953. Had Stalin lived longer, the aftermath of June 1953 might have been much worse for the MfS.

Rise of Erich Mielke

The death of Stalin brought with it a power struggle in the USSR that ultimately ended with execution of KGB chief Lavrentiy Beria and eventually allowed Khrushchev to become the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Stern and Tismaneanu, 2022, 113). This struggle had repercussions in the DDR and in the MfS. Despite being an ideal choice for the head of the MfS, and preferred by both Ulbricht and the Soviets, Mielke was once again passed over this time due to his role in not recognising and pre-empting the events of June 1953. Instead, long time Soviet agent Ernst Wollweber was appointed as the Minister for State Security (Popplewell, 1998, 270), and Ulbricht was forced to accept a staffing decision made by Soviets (Gieseke, 2014, 42). However, Wollweber ran afoul of both the Soviets and the SED despite his efforts to prove the Berlin uprising was the result of fascist and capitalist provocateurs and arresting many scapegoats in the DDR (Childs and Popplewell, 1996, 61). Ulbricht did not like or trust Wollweber despite his success at the head of the MfS. Moreover, he did not have the long-term support or trust of KGB resident Alexander Mikhailovich Korotkov and his Germany Department (ibid, 64). After illness and accusations of creating a political faction within the MfS, Wollweber was eased out of office at the end of 1957 and was replaced by Mielke. Mielke is

credited with at least in part coordinating Wollweber's dismissal (Popplewell, 1998, 273; Schmeidel, 2008, 11).

A further repercussion of the change in leadership in the USSR for the DDR was Khrushchev's policy of de-stalinisation. As part of this policy, Wollweber advocated that the MfS focus more on foreign intelligence, specifically on West Germany while reducing the resources and manpower for domestic counterespionage and internal policing. The Ulbricht government took steps to limit the effects of Khrushchev's secret speech, claiming that the necessary course corrections had already been taken in the DDR in 1953 after the Berlin Uprising (Gieseke, 2014, 45). Within the MfS, de-stalinisation was met with confusion. Stalin and his writings had served as guiding lights for the MfS and its officers (ibid.) 1957 represented decisive change between in the relationship between the MfS and the KGB in that through Wollweber's downfall Ulbricht was not only able to strengthen his position but also strengthen the SED's control over the MfS through Mielke (Englemann, Herbstritt, and Süss, 2018, 62). De-Stalinisation was quickly halted by Ulbricht, and as such the MfS remained heavily influenced by Stalin's ideals for secret police and the ideal image of a Chekist set forward by Dzerzhinsky (Gieseke, 2018, 32). Mielke was now at the helm of the MfS and ensured his continued leadership by remaining politically loyal to Ulbricht and as acceptable as possible to the KGB and Soviet leadership (Childs and Popplewell, 1996, 65; Popplewell, 1998, 273). Mielke made little secret of his adoration of Stalin, and through his actions the MfS remained a sanctuary for Stalinist thought, especially where internal security was concerned (Gieseke, 2014, 47).

Conclusion

In retrospect the influential role of the Soviet Union and the KGB on the political and security of the SBZ and later the DDR becomes crystal clear. In

analysing the relationship between the MfS and the KGB at state level, this chapter has presented some of the key moments in the sordid and bloody history of both organisations from the fall of Berlin to the ascent of Mielke as head of the MfS. The DDR and the USSR as well as the MfS and the KGB shared the rhetoric of two socialist nations locked in a struggle together against the imperialist, capitalist nations of the West (Bruce, 2010, 111). KGB also relied upon the MfS for accurate information on both East and West Germany, but not without a certain amount of Soviet distrust (Fischer, 2012, 35). Despite its defining role in the creation of the MfS the KGB and Soviet leadership cannot be describe as friendly. The Soviets helped create the security organs in the SBZ out of necessity more than for the good of their German comrades. Well into the 1950s there was lingering distrust that characterised the Soviet attitude towards East Germany. An example of this is the fact that the Soviets never wanted to give up their own intelligence networks and informants even after the creation of the Stasi (Gieseke, 2014, 24). A further example is the large KGB representation at the Karlshorst offices in Berlin that existed until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 (Schmeidel, 2008, 118).

While the MfS may not have been aware of the deteriorating situation among workers in East Germany that led to the events of June 1953, the KGB certainly was (Childs and Popplewell, 1996, 53). The KGB leadership received continuous reports from their agents in Karlshorst and elsewhere about the state of the East German economy and chose not to intervene or to inform the SED leadership. This casts a shadow of doubt upon the friendly nature of the relationship between the two. Why the information was not relayed to the MfS or the SED leadership is unknown, but clearly the interests of the SED and the MfS were not best served by the decision not to share this information, and warn authorities in the DDR about the impending crisis. It seems then that at state level, even considering the nature of intelligence and security services in authoritarian governments, the time worn maxim about

friendly intelligence services rings true. Under the guise of support, camaraderie and the struggle of the people, the true nature of intelligence services remains one of immediate self-interest. In order to further analyse the facets and nature of this intertwined relationship, the next step will be to narrow the focus and to explore at the institutional level.

Chapter 2: Brothers in Arms

> "I repeat once again: We must know everything!
> Nothing can get past us… That, precisely, is the dialectic
> of class warfare and the work of the Chekists."
> -Erich Mielke[2]

Following the creation of the DDR and the MfS under the guidance of the Soviet Union and the KGB, the Soviet authorities continued to direct and rely upon their German brothers in the struggle against the imperialistic forces of capitalism. This chapter will examine the relationship between the MfS and the KGB at the institutional level. To do so this chapter will focus primarily on interaction between the *Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung* (HVA), Main Directorate for Reconnaissance of the MfS and the *Первое главное управление* (PGU), the First Chief Directorate, of the KGB. Both were the foreign intelligence arms of their respective organisations. While other directorates collaborated and worked together in the DDR, the USSR and elsewhere, focusing on the HVA and the PGU will provide a more nuanced and coherent impression of the relationship between the two intelligence organisations. Moreover, this chapter will argue that while the MfS and KGB saw each other as brothers and worked together towards their larger goals of countering the US and West Germany, their priorities often diverged (Stan and Bustiuc, 2018, 163). The difference in priorities and mentality will be discussed further below and will reinforce the argument that the relationship between these two intelligence services was not nearly as friendly or fraternal as it seemed or was touted to be. In order to establish a baseline and a backdrop, the first section of this chapter will explore some of the archival

---

[2] (Gieseke, 2014, v)

documents describing the details and levels of the collaboration between the HVA and the PGU. Next a number of joint HVA and PGU operations will be considered to underline the differences between the relationship on paper and the facets of the relationship in practice. This expedition into the institutional level of the collaboration and brotherhood between MfS and the KGB will conclude with a brief exposition into some of the problematic behaviours of the relationship. It will also connect some of the historical events and documents to the theory discussed at length in the Methodology of this dissertation. However, before delving into the archives of the MfS, it is important to once again bear in mind the importance that the legacy of Felix Dzerzhinsky's Cheka played in the culture and mentality of both the MfS and the KGB, as the sword and shield of their governments and their ideology (Andrew and Mitrokhin, 1999, 23).

The Stasi Archives

The archives of the MfS are a unique resource that help capture part of the relationship between the KGB and the MfS. Specifically, the documents that deal directly with the collaboration of the two organisations offer insight into the tone, topics, and parties present in discussions of future joint action and information sharing. An excellent example of this is the 06 December 1973 *Agreement on the Cooperation between the MfS and the KGB* (Andropov and Mielke, 1973). The document states that the goal of the collaboration is to increase the long running and close cooperation in order to "increase the detection and disruption of the adversary's hostile plans" as well as a "more expedient use of available means in the fight against the subversive activities of the secret services and centres of ideological diversion of the imperialist states" (Andropov and Mielke, 1973, 1). The language of the document is steeped in the rhetoric of the era and goes on to describe the specifics of the future collaboration. The entire first article of the agreement underlines the

importance of information exchange to the relationship. Further articles describe other aspects including document exchanges between the archives of the MfS and the KGB, the presence of the KGB special guard regiment in the DDR as well as plans for an operational group from the MfS to be stationed in the USSR.

This agreement demonstrates a concrete and formal aspect of the relationship between the two agencies. It goes beyond merely stating common goals, but specifically describes actions, plans, and processes. Additionally, it includes both a review process in order to assess the success of the collaboration and an obligation for both parties to raise, discuss, and rectify any issues that are discovered throughout. As part of this process, the 29 March 1978 *Protocol Guiding Cooperation between the MfS and the KGB* (Andropov and Mielke, 1978) re-affirms the agreement made five years previous and goes further to solidify the precise details of which departments and sections will work together, as well as the type of work foreseen by the heads of the MfS and the KGB. It is worth noting an unusual aspect of both of these documents is that they allow the KGB to recruit East German citizens as agents (Andropov and Mielke, 1973, 8; Andropov and Mielke, 1978, 8). This peculiar facet elevates the duality of the relationship. Despite being partners, the needs and actions of the KGB supersede those of the DDR and its citizens. By allowing itself to recruit citizens of the DDR, the KGB and the USSR calls in question the legitimacy of both the MfS and the SED leadership.

The Guillaume Affair

The most successful joint operation between the HVA and the PGU was the running of their officer Günther Guillaume. West Germany was a major target for the operations of both the KGB and the HVA. The goals of these operations, especially in the 1950s and 1960s, was to discredit as many West German politicians as possible (Andrew and Mitrokhin, 1999, 439). In 1956,

Günther Guillaume and his wife Christel successfully staged their "escape" from the DDR and installed themselves in Frankfurt. They both joined the local Social Democratic Party (SPD), and by 1968 Günther was not only the chairman of the Frankfurt SPD, but also an elected member of the Frankfurt city council (ibid). According to Markus Wolf, the head of the HVA at the time, the Guillaumes were more active and engaged than the MfS had imagined (Wolf, 1997, 167). Günther played an important part in the 1969 election cycle, and with his help the SPD coalition government was able to secure electoral victory. The HVA advised Gunther not to be too keen for a position in the new government under the leadership of its new socialist chancellor Willy Brandt. However, by November, Günther had a role in the Chancellor's office tasked with working with trade unions and political organisations. Before gaining employment in the Brandt government, Günther had been under intense investigation by both the Federal Intelligence Service and the Federal Officer for the Protection of the Constitution (Wolf, 1997, 171).

By 1972 Günther had advanced to the role of the Chancellor's aide to the SPD (Andrew and Mitrokhin, 1999, 443). Guillaume had nearly unfettered access to Brandt, so too did the HVA. Both the KGB and the HVA received detailed insights into the plans of the Brandt government, especially its *Ostpolitik*. Despite years of trying to discredit Brandt, Moscow and Berlin were able to get clear reports on the mentality and personality of the leader of West Germany. Suspicion eventually increased around Guillaume and in April of 1974 both Günther and Christel were arrested. Upon his arrest, Günther declared himself to be both a citizen and officer of the DDR. Guillaume's arrest and admission of guilt shocked the leadership in both East and West Germany, so much so that it led to Brandt's resignation in May of 1974 (Wolf, 1997, 181; Whitney, 1974). Guillaume was the most successful of the HVA moles in the government of West Germany, but Soviet defector Oleg Gordievsky contends that by 1958 there were several thousand already in

place, the many more "waiting in the wings" (Andrew and Gordievsky, 1990, 450). Both the DDR and the USSR leadership benefitted from the exploits of the Guillaumes it was the HVA alone that bore the risk and responsibility for their officer, despite direction from both MfS and KGB leadership. German officers and agents were far better suited for undercover work than citizens of the Soviet Union. But this division of labour begs the question whether this was a camaraderie and part of a fraternal relationship, or whether the cynical, Chekist nature of the KGB leadership exploited he assets of their German allies for their own gains, with no need to care about the consequences.

Operations Abroad

The MfS was not only engaged in infiltrating and discrediting West German politics and surveilling the citizens of the DDR, but the Stasi also took part in operations alongside the KGB further afield. Fidel Castro's rise to power in Cuba made the Caribbean Island an outpost for socialism in Latin America. Between the Bay of Pigs fiasco and the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviet support to Cuba and the Castro government is well documented. The MfS helped train the officers of the *Dirección General de Inteligencia* (DGI), the Intelligence Directorate in Cuba. The East German-Cuban relationship was always fraught though, with many DGI officers complaining to the KGB that the MfS officers lectured them, instead of treating the Cubans as colleagues (Andrew and Mitrokhin, 2005, 95). However, the MfS training and education of intelligence officers in Cuba has left a long legacy that can be traced into 21st century Cuban Ministry of the Interior (Levitin, 2007). Part of the Cuban-East German friction will have been the difference between Latin American and Germanic cultures. The Soviets were aware of the quarrels but instead of attempting to ameliorate them, the Soviets placed a premium on the publicly visible support for new Marxist governments in Africa (Andrew and Mitrokhin, 2005, 95).

An example of this is international Marxist-Leninist support for Mengistu's regime in Ethiopia and the subsequent war with its neighbour Somalia between 1977 and 1978. The Soviets coordinated the support efforts which culminated in 17'000 Cuban soldiers, 1'000 Soviet military advisors, and 400 East Germans, not to mention logistics and arms shipments from Moscow to Addis Ababa. The East Germans supported the war effort by training the Ethiopian intelligence and internal security forces (Andrew and Mitrokhin, 2005, 459). East German support in Ethiopia continued right up until the collapse of the DDR in 1990 (Andrew and Mitrokhin, 2005, 478). Moreover, the Soviet authorities, especially Andropov, preferred to let other Soviet bloc intelligence services deal directly with terrorist groups and their leadership. So much so that according to the DDR's final interior minister Peter-Michael Diestel the country had become an "Eldorado for Terrorists". The Stasi had contacts among the Provisional IRA and the Basque ETA, and of course the *Rote Armee Fraktion* (Andrew and Mitrokhin, 1999, 392; Wunschik, 2012, 164-166). The MfS supported Soviet and KGB efforts elsewhere in the Global South, but the above-described instances show a pattern of utilising and even exploiting the capabilities of the HVA and the MfS. Over time the MfS had come to perfect intelligence gathering and surveillance techniques, in the instances of terrorist organisations, it is not unreasonable to think that the Soviet Union pushed the MfS to do its dirty work when it did not want to get its own hands dirty. This dynamic casts a critical light on the purportedly fraternal relationship of the MfS and the KGB.

Friction on the Homefront

The MfS was certainly the KGB's most important partner service, however, the relationship was far from equal. The KGB representation at Karlshorst was the largest KGB installation outside of the USSR (Schmeidel, 2008, 119). The DDR contributed around 1.3 million Marks (the equivalent of $1.06 million in

2022) to the operating costs of the Karlshorst complex yearly. While one might argue that this falls into the category of being generous hosts or a self-evident part of the relationship. However, in other areas of joint operation, archival documents reveal that both parties commit to paying for any and all costs incurred while training or operating in the partner countries (Andropov and Mielke, 1973, 10; Andropov and Mielke, 1978, 9). While Walter Ulbricht often tolerated the unseemly conduct by Soviet diplomats and KGB agents, Erich Honeker took issue with the "domineering behaviour" and arrested several Soviet officers. Honeker's complaints were first met with contempt by chief of the Karlshorst headquarters General Anatoli Ivanovich Lazarev who felt the Stasi were using "Nazi methods against a fraternal power". Honeker's complaints resulted in both Lazarev and eventually Soviet Ambassador Petr Andreevich Abrasimov to be recalled to Moscow (Andrew and Gordievsky, 1990, 640).

The MfS was also involved in one of the most well-known operations conducted by the KGB. Operation RYAN (the Russian acronym for Nuclear Missile Attack) was focused on uncovering a US/NATO plot for a nuclear first strike in against the Soviet Union. Contrary to Soviet suspicion and Cold War paranoia, there was no such plot (Michels, 2020). As part of RYAN, the Soviets moved their mobile intermediate range ballistic missiles to forward positions in East Germany. However, the KGB kept the location of these missiles secret from even the most senior MfS officers like Markus Wolf. According to Wolf, this perceived arrogance on the part of the Soviets both aggravated and alienated otherwise loyal East Germans (Wolf, 1997, 246). As part of the MfS efforts towards RYAN, the HVA set up a special staff as well as situation and emergency command and control centres. HVA staff underwent special training and was exercised in alarm drills. Wolf and his colleagues perceived these efforts to be "a burdensome waste" of time and resources, but orders from Moscow and the KGB were not up for debate (Wolf, 1997, 247). The frank statements made by Wolf, the resentment, and

complaints by DDR leadership and thinly veiled Soviet arrogance make for strong indicators that the relationship between the MfS and the KGB was not always brotherly or even friendly.

Conclusion

This chapter has explored the complex and multi-faceted relationship between the MfS and the KGB at the institutional level by delving into what that relationship looked like both on paper but also in practice in the DDR and in the Global South. The signed documents between the MfS and the KGB of 1973 and 1978 give a clear perspective into the concrete nature and desired state of the relationship. MfS Colonel Bernd Fischer notes in his book *Der Grosse Bruder* that both agreements in fact only established what was already common practice (Fischer, 2012, 104). However, having a written agreement the gave the MfS greater independence as well as a legal document that determined all the details of collaboration. Additionally, the archival sources of the MfS are also important in regard to Hoffmann's work. First, the 1973 and 1978 documents place a large importance on information and sharing information between the two parties. This is very much in line with Hoffmann's use of information as a metric for exploring international intelligence relationships. Next, the documents themselves are two prime examples of the materiality and material evidence of the relationship between the two intelligence services. According to Hoffmann (2021, 817) materiality is an important way of mapping the facets of intelligence relationships.

Beyond the archival documents, this chapter has focused on some of the practical instances where the MfS and KGB worked together to achieve their common goal of understanding and undermining their main adversaries. One can argue that although the Guillaume Affair led to the ousting of Willy Brandt, it also robbed the leadership of the DDR and the USSR of an important insight into the mentality and decision-making process of the West

German government. Here the Soviets allowed the MfS to take much of the risk upon themselves in running Guillaume. Further instances of joint field work, for example in Cuba and Ethiopia, reveal that the KGB relied on the MfS for support. However, the KGB was often depicted as arrogant, self-interested, and willing to ignore complaints among its purported friends. Moreover, the instances presented above show a trend of the KGB relying upon its partners to take risks, do work and get involved on their behalf. It is not unreasonable to assume that this behaviour of the Soviets disillusioned many officials among the partners and allies of the USSR. In addition to this comes the "Chekist" attitude of omnipotence and the use of any means necessary to accomplish goals (Coalson, 2007). These examples of have further clarified the nature of the relationship between the MfS and KGB. Despite these frictions and what seems to be an unequal relationship, the fearsome intelligences services were able to work together towards their shared objectives. In order to present an even clearer picture of this complex relationship, it is necessary to continue with Hoffmann's recommendation to analyse individual actors and their relationships.

Chapter 3: Oh Brother, Where Art Thou?

> "The Cheka is not an investigating commission, a court, or a tribunal…
>
> it destroys all who are caught on the other side of the barricade."
>
> -Martin Latsis, Founding Member of the Cheka[3]

This third chapter of this research project is focused on the individual and personal relationships of the leadership of the MfS in order better evaluate the nature of the collaboration and interaction between the MfS of the DDR and the KGB of the Soviet Union. Personal relationships were not just forged at the highest echelons, but wherever the KGB and MfS collaborated. Bernd Fischer notes in his book *Der Grosse Bruder* (2012) that KGB and MfS residents posted to embassies enjoyed deep running friendships stemming back to days spent studying together at various institutes in Moscow (Fischer, 2012, 149). In fact, in some countries the friendship became near permanent institutions with regularly occurring friendship meetings in which MfS and KGB officers exchanged information and experiences. The meetings were also social occasion that included spouses and partners. However, as with most relationships, there was disagreement between the parties. A shockingly forthright example of this occurred in a meeting between Erich Mielke and Semyon Kuzmich Tsvigun, the KGB First Deputy, on 13 November 1969. During the meeting Mielke noted that not only could the MfS have done more if the KGB had not eliminated a certain operational program, but also felt that the decision making of the KGB did not make sense (Wilson Center, 1969).

  The first step in analysing the relationships at a personal level, will be to discuss the notorious figure of Erich Mielke, who was involved in state security in the SBZ form the creation of the K-5 and went on to be the longest

---

[3] (Figes, 1996, 631)

serving head of the MfS. As such, Mielke and his relationships had a profound effect on the MfS right up until its end in 1990. A further section of this chapter will examine the legendary Markus Wolf, who was the longest serving head of the HVA and after Mielke, most well-known Stasi officer. Next, this chapter will present the experiences and relationships of Werner Grossmann, Wolf's deputy, and the final head of the HVA before its dissolution. A final section will delve into some of the reactions and statements made by these men in the days after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of their service and the collapse of the DDR. In this section especially it is important to remember the intrinsic human nature of these relationships, and how swiftly attitudes can turn during moments of great change and upheaval.

Erich Mielke

One of the most important and contentious figures in the MfS was its longest serving chief, and for many the image of the MfS, Erich Mielke. Mielke was an old school communist, a member of the Communist Part of Germany during the Weimar Republic who gained practical intelligence experience serving alongside Zaisser and Ulbricht in during the Spanish Civil War. Mielke saw himself as an "old school Chekist", steeped in the traditions of Dzerzhinsky and a "student of Beria", the equally ruthless head of the KGB under Stalin (Gieseke, 2014, 35). However, the Soviets never fully trusted Mielke, especially during this early career in the SBZ and DDR, because his whereabouts during the Second World War were largely unknown (Gieseke, 2014, 29). At the time of his appointment to the head of the MfS, Mielke was seen as "the ideal bureaucrat" to head up the ministry. He had both the right background and a good relationship with Ulbricht, allowing for the end of the fractious divisions within the SED in the early 1950s (Popplewell, 1998, 273). Mielke immediately embraced Stalinist methods as state secretary and until the end of his career thought the only way to deal with any opposition

movements or forces in the DDR was to combat and arrest them (Gieseke, 2014, 32; Grossmann, 2007, 145). Despite his approval by Ulbricht and to a degree the Soviet leadership, Mielke was not necessarily well liked by his colleagues and subordinates. From the moment he began as Minister for State security he disliked Markus Wolf.

According to Wolf, in 1957 the KGB resident in Berlin Yevgeni Petrovich Pitovranov told Ulbricht that he had a perfect successor for Wollweber in Wolf. Mielke was appointed Minister though as he was Ulbricht's "watch dog" (Wolf, 1997, 71). The friction between Mielke and Wolf was no secret, so much so that senior leadership in the KGB frequently discussed how to prevent the two from coming to blows (Andrew and Gordievsky, 1990, 640-641). Mielke did not have the same strong relationship with Honecker as he had with Ulbricht. Instead, Wolf, who was deputy Minister for State Security as well as head of the HVA, characterised Honecker and Mielke as two hostile brothers who rose to power together (Gieseke, 2014, 70). It was certainly an uneasy relationship, as Soviet defector Oleg Gordievsky noted, Mielke felt the Honecker was standing in the way of closer and better collaboration between the MfS and the KGB. Wolf notes in his memoirs that Mielke had a "warped personality" even by the unusual moral standards within the world of intelligence and security (Wolf, 1997, 71). Nevertheless, it is clear that Mielke's personality and relationships helped him rise to a position of nearly unlimited power within the DDR. Mielke may not have been liked by all in the Soviet leadership or the KGB, but with at least their tacit approval, Mielke was able to create one of the most effective and pervasive intelligence services ever (Walker, 2019).

Markus Wolf

Markus Wolf has become an almost legendary figure since his identity even before his identity was revealed in the early 1980s (Grossmann, 2007, 100;

Deutsche Welle, 2006). Part of his reputation has been inflated by Western media and intelligence services who attributed a number of the MfS' successes to him. According to the Mitrokhin Archives, Wolf did not "suffer from a false sense of modesty" (Andrew and Mitrokhin, 1999, 437). As with most autobiographies, the subject is biased towards itself and often paints themselves in a more favourable light. Nevertheless, Wolf's colleagues and partners in both the MfS and KGB speak highly of him. However, the Mitrokhin archive does call into question the veracity of some of Wolf's memories and actions, a specific example being the assassination of Dr. Alexander S. Trushnovich (Wolf, 1997, 235; Andrew and Mitrokhin, 1999, 361). Beyond his well-documented disagreement with Mielke, Wolf recalls having a good relationship to both Andropov and Kryuchkov. Wolf was not only friendly with Andropov, but also looked up to him as an intelligence officer, politician and a friend. Wolf thought less of Kryuchkov than Andropov. Wolf felt that Kryuchkov "lacked Andropov's breadth of understanding and was not a leader by nature" (Wolf, 1997, 250). Nevertheless, Wolf's visits to Kryuchov in Moscow went beyond mere business but included personal discussions over glasses of scotch and cultural outings including visits to the theatre.

In his memoirs, Wolf is unafraid to criticise both his KGB friends as well as the wider Soviet system and world view. Wolf's critique extended to the operational realm as well, most notably in Africa and Afghanistan. Wolf recalls what he called "senseless exercises" in Africa. The KGB required Wolf and his staff to count the number of portraits of Mao Zedong were on display in the socialist African countries in which the MfS operated (Andrew and Mitrokhin, 2005, 274). The KGB also requested DDR and MfS support for their war in Afghanistan. In a highly unusual response to a request from Moscow, both Mielke and Wolf refused outright, with the justification that MfS resources were already spread too far in foreign operations (Wolf, 1997, 298). It is unclear whether during his tenure at the head of the HVA Wolf

voiced these criticisms or instead chose to save them for his memoirs. Given the nature of authoritarian regimes and the Chekist nature of both organisations, the latter is more likely. On the whole however Markus Wolf, in spite of his criticism seems to have fostered genuine friendships within his service and among the leadership of KGB. Wolf's recollections must be tempered the perspective of German historian of the Stasi Jens Gieseke who points out that Wolf was not only a master of his craft, but also knew how to best capitalise upon his mystique as both a spy master and an intellectual (Gieseke, 2014, 155).

Werner Grossmann

Werner Grossmann was the final chief of the HVA and the long serving deputy of Markus Wolf. In his own memoirs, Grossmann recounts his impressions of the final years of the MfS and the DDR. Grossmann looked up to and admired Markus Wolf as both a colleague and his direct superior during Wolf's time as the head of the HVA (Grossmann, 2007, 98). This opinion changed somewhat after Grossmann read Wolf's book and was confused by much of Wolf's doubt and criticism, much of which Grossmann never experienced in the decades the two men worked side by side. However, in his Eulogy for Wolf, despite these differences, it is clear just how close the two men were to each other, and the impact Wolf had on Grossmann's life (Grossmann, 2007, 105-107). Werner Grossmann enjoyed an even closer relationship to Vladimir Alexandrovich Kryuchkov than Wolf did. The last head of the KGB and long-time head of the PGU wrote the dedication to Grossmann's work in which he thoroughly describes the relationship their two organisations shared. Krychkov calls Grossmann a true German patriot and a great friend of the Soviet Union. Moreover, Kryuchkov highly praised the MfS for its decades of loyal service and support of the cause. In his own memoirs Kryuchkov admitted that while both the MfS and the KGB shared information

and supported each other, this relationship was far from equal and that despite all the mutual support and comraderie, Kryuchkov said: "we must recognise the DDR reconnaissance did far more for us" (Fischer, 2012, 11).

Grossmann fondly remembered one of Kryuchkov's visits to the DDR in the summer of 1987. Grossmann was impressed by Kryuchkov's interest in the East German economy, society, and geography as they drove through the German countryside together. Encouraged by Glasnost and Perestroika, Kryuchkov wanted to see and speak with as many working-class East Germans as possible. During his trip to the DDR Kryuchkov was also witness to some of the friction at the highest echelons of the DDR leadership, between Mielke, Honecker and others (Grossmann, 2007, 140-143). As with any autobiography, the memories and thoughts of Grossmann need to be taken with a degree of scepticism. However, it does seem that at least Grossmann had deep running personal friendships with many of his Soviet partners that went beyond the normal level of collaboration and joint projects. This type of friendship is also reinforced by the experiences of Bernd Fischer, who served as a Colonel and Deputy Head of Section I in the HVA until the collapse of the DDR. Fischer fondly recalls his comrades and friends among the KGB and in the PGU (Fischer, 2012, 2; Fischer, 2012, 8).

The End of the Stasi

On the evening of 9 November 1989 East German official Gunter Schabowski told the press that as of midnight that night, the border between East and West Germany, and the checkpoints with West Berlin would be open to members of the public of both countries (Hasic, 2019). This was the beginning of the end for the MfS, and for the fine-tuned surveillance apparatus the Mielke and his ministry had painstakingly created over more than three decades. Officials in the Soviet Union and the DDR were shocked and concerned by fall of the Berlin Wall. Many in both the USSR and DDR blamed Mikhail Sergeevich

Gorbachev and his reform polices as the catalyst that led to the fall of the Berlin Wall. Both Honecker and Mielke expressed frustrations at Gorbachev's reforms which put pressure on the DDR government and the Chekists of the MfS (Gieseke, 2014, 190). In his final public appearances Mielke was described as being eccentric, and in some cases even senile (Popplewell, 1998, 273).

Despite the swift changes that were occurring during the final weeks of December in the DDR, neither the Soviet Union nor the KGB were able to support the crumbling government and intelligence service of their own creation. In the winter of 1989-90, Werner Grossmann sought support from the Soviets. Grossmann visited KGB resident in Karlshorst, Anatoli Georgievich Novikov on multiple occasions and requested that Novikov report to Moscow in no uncertain terms that the MfS was in urgent need of support. Novikov was in complete agreement with Grossmann and yet Moscow did not respond. Little did Grossmann know that Kryuchkov had already decided to give up on the DDR. At that time Grossmann and his colleagues still believed in the "unbreakable friendship" and the "solid fighting community" (a term for the shared struggle against the West) with their "Soviet friends" (Grossmann, 2007, 186). By the end of 1990 the DDR had ceased to exist and many Stasi officers were scheduled to be tried in West German courts. At this time Markus Wolf appealed to Gorbachev in a letter saying "We were your friends… Now, in our hour of need, I assume that you will not deny us your help" (Andrew and Mitrokhin, 1999, 459). No help came. Wolf described the situation as the "Soviets' ultimate betrayal of their East German friends" (ibid). it is unclear what help the Soviet government might have been for the former MfS officers. However, this last moment of inaction is telling of the nature of the relationship between the DDR and the USSR as well as the KGB and the MfS. It becomes quite clear then that despite deep running personal relationships, the KGB was unable and or unwilling to help their friends in the MfS.

Conclusion

This final chapter of this research project has explored the relationships between some of the leading figures of the MfS and their colleagues within the MfS and KGB. This has allowed for a further and more nuanced perspective on the overarching relationship between the KGB and the MfS. Despite the unequal nature of the relationship between the USSR and the DDR, the KGB and the MfS and even the PGU and the HVA, genuine, deep-rooted friendships seem to have formed between East Germans and Soviets. The example of Erich Mielke shows the complex and confusing nature of human relationships, even among individuals in the same institution, with similar cultural backgrounds. Erich Mielke may not have been well liked by many in the MfS or the KGB, but his importance to the development of the MfS and its relationship to the KGB is undeniable. Among these difficult relationships was that of Markus Wolf, whose legendary status as the head of HVA and spy master lives on today. Wolf's relationships to both his colleagues and the Soviets were good despite portraying himself with a degree of intellectual superiority (Wolf, 1997, 250-251). Most striking however is Wolf's disappointment and bitterness at the lack of aid by the KGB who had long relied upon the MfS for all manner of support around the world.

The greatest disappointment however may well have been that of Werner Grossman. Grossmann was not only shocked by the lack of KGB support in the final days of the DDR, but also the criticism of his friend and mentor Markus Wolf, who claims to have seen the end coming and yet expressed none of this to Grossmann. Within five months of the fall of the Berlin Wall, the MfS was being incorporated into a smaller, leaner service as the DDR government began to dissolve. Grossmann recalls the meeting on 23 February 1990 in which it was decided that the HVA would oversee its own liquidation, in order to prevent state secrets to be revealed and to ensure national security. At that time some members of the KGB and the MfS argued it would be best to supply all the MfS' documents, files, and materials to the

KGB for safekeeping. Grossmann refused and took steps to hinder this because he did not trust the stability of the Soviet Union and was unwilling to give another nation state secrets, regardless of how close and friendly their relationship (Grossmann, 2007, 187-188). This chapter clearly underlines that the collaboration between the MfS and the KGB did result in close personal relationships, these relationships are not static and can sour from friendship to enmity and resentment in a few short months.

Analysis and Discussion

The previous chapters in this work have explored three different layers to the relationship between the MfS of the DDR and the Soviet KGB. The findings of these chapters will now be summarised and discussed as well is put into a wider context to support the overall position taken in this dissertation. The first step in doing so will be a brief analysis of each level and the core finding. The next step will examine the most recent scholarship on the Stasi and Mitrokhin archives, this will provide a broader backdrop not only of the relationship between the MfS and the KGB, but also of the USSR and the DDR throughout their existence. A further section will delve into the topic of the Cheka, Chekism and the legacy of Felix Dzerzhinsky which has been recurrent throughout this work. This section will shine a light specifically on the long shadow of Chekism in the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation. A final part will explore areas of further research that this project has uncovered. They range from the very topic specific of a joint MfS-KGB operation, to the broader international intelligence relationships in the Warsaw pact and beyond the Anglosphere. Overall, it will show that further research is needed to expand the field of intelligence studies.

Analysis

This dissertation has presented the argument that the maxim that "there are no such thing as friendly intelligence agencies, just the intelligence services of friendly states" holds true beyond the Anglosphere. To prove this argument, this research project has explored the relationship of the East German Ministry for State Security (MfS) and the State Security Committee (KGB) of the Soviet Union across three different levels. At the state level, the first chapter laid a foundation for this relationship beginning with the role of the Soviet Union in the origins of security in East Germany the Soviet occupation zone to

the establishment of the MfS. At this level, it was demonstrated that while the Soviet forces and the KGB were heavily involved in the creation of the MfS, the Soviets never fully trusted their German brothers and repeatedly took actions to undermine the authority of the MfS (Selvage, 2022, 29). It was not until the 1970s that the MfS was able to assert itself and gain some independence from the KGB (Fischer, 2012, 159). When viewed at the state level, the relationship of the KGB and MfS is clearly one of senior and junior partners.

The KGB often relied upon the capabilities of the MfS, and especially the HVA in its operations abroad. Within these operations a pattern of using the MfS in situations where the KGB did not want to tarnish its image or get involved. One might argue that this is just part and parcel of this type of relationship. It could also be argued that this was specific to the Cold War mentality, fighting the capitalist and imperialist powers on all fronts. However, when combined with the analysis of the relationship at the individual level, it becomes clear that the KGB acted primarily in its own interests instead of the shared interests of the relationship with their East German brothers. This is most evident in highs of the relationships of Markus Wolf and Werner Grossmann with their Soviet counterparts when contrasted with the bitterness, confusion, and resentment when the MfS and DDR collapsed. The KGB was more interested in the files and records of the MfS than it was in supporting and protecting the officers who for nearly four decades had supported Soviet efforts and policy around the globe. MfS Colonel Bernd Fischer provided unique insight when he said: "Were we abused for the interests of a great power? This question only arose in our own ranks after the end of the service. The idea of being taken advantage of never crossed our minds before" (Fischer, 2012, 21).

Big Brother

Der «Grosse Bruder» (2022), edited and released by Selvage and Herbstritt, represents the latest research on the research into the relationship between the MfS and the KGB. Among its broad reaching chapters, this work reinforces the pattern of Soviet exploitation of the MfS throughout their relationship. Selvage contends (2022, 14) that the MfS and KGB were often in direct competition with each other for sources, informants, and information. One of the many examples of this is that the KGB staff at the Karlshorst headquarters actively tried to recruit members of the SED leadership as sources of information (Selvage, 2022, 23). Additionally, the Soviet and KGB leadership were very sceptical of the relationships of East Germany after Erich Honecker became leader of the SED in 1971. Not only did the Soviet leadership cast critical gaze upon the growing closeness between East and West Germany but was very sceptical of the relationship between the USSR and the DDR (Selvage, 2022, 41). The Soviet leadership and the KGB constantly called into question and undermined the sovereignty of the DDR (Selvage, 2020, 23, 44). Part of this can be understood within the context of the KGB and its role in the Soviet government. Among the tasks of the KGB was to maintain loyalty and stability within the "outer imperium" of the USSR (Selvage, 2022, 45). What better way to maintain control of a client state than to constantly question the client's sovereignty and underline their need for the support and protection of the patron. The work of Selvage and the other contributors highlights the exploitive and self-interested nature of the KGB in its relationship with the MfS. This dynamic is consistent with the wider relationship between the USSR and DDR. Ultimately, *Der «Grosse Bruder»* is a resounding confirmation that there are no friendly intelligence services, just those of (questionably) friendly states.

The Long Shadow of Felix Dzerzhinsky

One of the themes running through this research project has been the idea of Chekism and the lasting legacy of Felix Dzerzhinsky. Until the final days of the Soviet Union, a statue of Dzerzhinsky towered over the square in front of the KGB's Lubyanka headquarters in central Moscow. Mielke saw the MfS as not only the "sword and shield" of the SED but as the "combat detachment of the glorious Soviet Cheka" (Selvage, 2022, 17). The imagery of the Sword and Shield is taken directly from the first emblems of the Cheka, and more broadly describes the role of the secret police in an authoritarian regime as described by Hatfield (2022, 9), to act as palace guards and prop up the regime. The MfS ceased to exist with the end of the DDR in 1990. Nominally, the KGB was disbanded and reformed when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. However, the successors to the KGB, the *Федеральная служба безопасности* (FSB), the Federal Security Service, and the *Служба внешней разведки* (SVR), the Foreign Intelligence Service, experienced a change of uniform and name more than anything else. Both services trace their origins back to the KGB and in turn the Cheka. Investigative journalist Yevgenia Albats traced this evolution and the revival of Chekism in Russia through the early 1990s (Albats, 1994). The KGB did its best to feign reform during the years of Perestroika and Glasnost, and in the short term after the collapse of the USSR, some changes were made (Garthoff, 2015, 84; Albats, 1994, 297). In the years since Russian president Vladimir Putin's rise to power, Chekist nature of the FSB has continued to be documented.

In their 2010 work *The New Nobility* investigative journalists Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan document the increasingly brutal and extrajudicial practices of the FSB (2010). Moreover, Soldatov and Borogan underline the resurrection of the Cheka, Dzerzhinsky and Andropov as idols (2010, 3). This metamorphosis of the KGB was traced further by Catherine Belton (2020) who follows the career of Putin in East Germany to his seemingly never-ending control of Russia. Belton shows that even during his time running

agents in and around Dresden, Putin learned the lessons of the Cheka and made preparations to use any means necessary to return the KGB to power in Russia (Belton, 2020, 33). It would seem that the state within a state of the KGB in Russia is all too alive and well. Having witnessed the end of the USSR, Albats wonders whether her fellow countrymen and women missed an opportunity by not storming the archives of the KGB like the citizens of East Germany did in 1990. The ominous words of Soviet dissident and political prisoner Lev Timofeev paint a bleak future: "The KGB is a state of society, an illness of the public conscience. Society will heal only when the KGB is destroyed" (Albats, 1994, 359).

Wohin des Weges[4]

This dissertation has shone a light on several different areas of further research. First and foremost among these is continued research into the relationship between the KGB and the MfS. A very specific topic of further research is Operation *Луч* (Luch), which is mentioned by various MfS sources, the Mitrokhin Archive and Catherine Belton. While nominally it was the Soviet operation to steal technical and technological secrets from the West during the Cold War, Belton ties it to the steps taken by Markus Wolf, the HVA and Putin during his time in Dresden to prepare for the collapse of the communist bloc (Andrew and Mitrokhin, 1999, 271; Belton, 2020, 28-31; Fischer, 2012,183; Selvage, 2022, 25). The sources disagree on the extent of Operation Luch and therefore this topic deserves additional scholarly consideration. Further research could be considered beyond this scope of this research project and might focus on a single aspect and dive deeper. Other possible future scholarship could have a broader orientation and include more aspects of the KGB and MfS relationship beyond those presented here.

---

[4] Whither the way?

Another avenue of continued research includes other aspects of the MfS and its relationships to other intelligence services, for example in Cuba or Ethiopia as discussed in the second chapter. A similar topic could instead concentrate on the relationship between the KGB and its partners, both within the Warsaw Pact and further afield. The aim of such projects would be to not only dispel lingering Cold War paranoia and propaganda, but also shine a light on the reality of foreign and domestic operations of the secret police of the Cold War era, and what if any legacies they have left in the 21st century. Moreover, intelligence scholars may well choose to examine other intelligence relationships beyond the Anglosphere and rely upon the work of Hoffmann as a touch stone to craft their analytical perspective and framework. This ties in with another glaring gap in research that can be filled. Intelligence studies as a subject would benefit from a strong addition of female, non-Anglosphere research and authorship in order to shift the imbalance that currently dominates the field. Authors such as Albats, Belton, Borogan, Hoffmann, and Pucci tend to be the exception instead of the norm. This will allow for more nuanced perspectives, local cultural and historical works that require native linguistic skills, as well as move the field of study into the 21st century.

Conclusions

An analysis of the findings presented and explored in each chapter of this dissertation has underlined and reinforced the exploitative nature of the KGB relationship to the MfS. While some genuine friendships were forged at an individual level, they pale in comparison to the nature of the relationship at both state and institutional level of analysis. Moreover, these relationships quickly soured when in their moment of crisis and need the USSR and KGB chose not to support the officers of the MfS. This was further supported by the newest scholarship on the Stasi archives which highlights the confrontational nature of the relationship between the USSR and the DDR, especially after

Erich Honecker came to power in 1971. In addition to this, was the goal of the KGB to maintain stability and loyalty to the USSR in the DDR by undermining the legitimacy and sovereignty of the MfS. Furthermore, the recurring theme of Chekism that runs throughout this work was discussed in more detail and traces the legacy of the Cheka from its origins to the contemporary Russian government. Finally, this section presented opportunities for further research. They range from the topic of MfS and KGB collaboration, to the wider Cold War and intelligence relationships outside the Anglosphere, concluding that in all cases more scholarship is needed to both widen and deepen the field.

Conclusion

This dissertation was conceived around the proverb that there is no such thing as a friendly intelligence service, but merely the intelligence services of friendly states as first stated by CIA officer Raymond Rocca (Martin, 1983, 177). From that starting point this project sought to answer the question "What was the nature of the relationship between the KGB of the Soviet Union and the Ministry for State Security of the German Democratic Republic?". In order to answer this question, it was first necessary to establish a framework combining contemporary scholarship on international intelligence relationships and how to assess them as well as the nature of intelligence services within authoritarian regimes. The next step was to frame the question around the debates and existing bodies of literature on intelligence relationships, the MfS and the KGB. Herewith this dissertation analysed three different levels of the collaboration between the MfS and the KGB and argued that the relationship was far from friendly despite its appearances. The following section will briefly re-iterate the main aspects of this research and conclude this project.

Hostile Brotherhood

In order to evaluate the relationship between the KGB of the Soviet Union and the MfS of the DDR, the first chapter of this project aimed to analyse the interactions between the two at the state level. It did so by appraising the origins of the MfS and the Soviet role therein. The story of the Stasi began in the final days of the Second World War as the Red Army occupied and administrated their part of Nazi Germany. This chapter followed the Soviet influence and role in rebuilding, securing, and governing the Soviet Occupation Zone. From here, the first chapter followed the rise of the secret police in the SBZ from the K-5, to the DVdI to the MfS. In so doing the ever-

present hand of the Soviet administration and the KGB was made clear. This was demonstrated in the creation of the MfS which was a near carbon copy of the structures of the KGB, in the importance of Chekism and the legacy of Felix Dzerzhinsky, as well as the direct influence the Soviets exerted over the leadership and succession in the DDR. This chapter focused on the nature of the relationship between the MfS and the KGB at state level and found that despite friendly platitudes, and communist rhetoric, the relationship was far from friendly.

The following chapter assessed the relationship between the Stasi and the KGB by viewing it through the lens of the institutional level. It did so by focusing specifically on the relationship between the foreign intelligence arms of the MfS and the KGB, the HVA and the PGU respectively. By examining several joint operations conducted by HVA and the PGU this research project was able to elucidate a pattern of exploitation and reliance that shines through much of the relationship between the MfS and the KGB. The second chapter also analysed archival sources, specifically the cooperation agreements between the HVA and the PGU. The agreements formally laid down the operational details of how the HVA and the PGU worked together in the DDR and abroad. While these documents exhibit mutual agreement and long-term partnership, they also provided the MfS with a legal basis to draw upon in case of dispute or discussion with their Soviet colleagues. Moreover the 1973 and 1978 agreements provided the MfS with more independence, while formalising the norms of collaboration that had been established over years. At the institutional level, despite these years of fruitful joint operations, manipulative nature of KGB within this relationship becomes evident.

With the goal of more fully comprehending the nature of the relationship between the KGB and the MfS, the third and final chapter of this dissertation considered the individual level of the relationship between the MfS and KGB. By focusing on a handful of individuals and their experiences,

a truer nature of both organisations, and their leaders came to light. The first of the individuals explored in this chapter was Erich Mielke, who had been involved in intelligence and security in communist Germany from early days of K-5 in the SBZ. Mielke was not particularly well liked or trust by his German or Soviet colleagues and even outright refused requests from Moscow on occasion. Mielke was never really trusted by the Soviets because despite his previous association with the USSR during the Spanish Civil War, his activities during the Second World War remain largely unknown. The chapter also presented some of the thoughts and feelings of the legendary head of the HVA, Markus Wolf. Wolf was devoted to the cause, the fight against imperialist powers of the West, and the success of the DDR. In his memoirs however he recalls his concerns and criticism of the system, both in the DDR and the USSR. One of the most jarring aspects is Wolf's bitter resentment of the KGB and the USSR in their failure to help MfS officers in their hour of need after the collapse of the DDR. Wolf's deputy and successor Werner Grossmann appears to have forged genuine friendships with many of his Soviet colleagues, most notably Vladimir Kryuchkov. However, like his predecessor and mentor Wolf, Grossmann's pleas for support as the MfS and DDR collapsed around him went unanswered. This ultimate betrayal brings the true nature of the relationship between the MfS and the KGB into focus. All three chapters of this work support the paradigm coined by Raymond Rocca that there are no friendly intelligence services, just those of friendly states (Martin, 1983, 177).

Risen from Ruins

After thorough investigation across three perspectives, it was necessary to analyse the findings. To accomplish this the subsequent portion of this dissertation placed the events, people and relationships described above into the wider context of the most recent research by staff and researchers of the

Stasi archives. This work bolstered the main argument of this research project but also underlined further examples of the manipulative relationship the KGB had with its purported brother service, the MfS. The efforts of Selvage et al. (2022) also go on to show that this dynamic was not specific to the KGB and the MfS, but in fact a part of the wider relationship between the USSR and the DDR. An additional perspective is that the role of the KGB was to ensure obedience and stability among the client states of the Soviet Union, including the DDR. Cast in this light, it is unlikely that the relationship between the KGB and the MfS could have been purely fraternal without some edge of self-interest and manipulation.

A further section discussed the prevalence of Chekism throughout the material and this dissertation. The knowledge, history, and legacy of the Cheka is not only central to understanding the mentality and practices of both the KGB and the MfS but has relevance in contemporary international politics. The works of Albats (1994), Soldatov and Borogan (2010), and Belton (2020) trace this Chekist legacy from Putin's days as a KGB officer in the DDR, to Putin's rise to power in the Russian Federation on to the current culture among the political elite surrounding Putin after more than two decades at Russia's helm. Together these authors diagnose part of the malaise that is likely to afflict the future of Russia for the foreseeable future.

The analysis and discussion of the Stasi archives, and the legacy of the Cheka further set the backdrop for a discussion on further areas of research identified during the process of investigation and writing this dissertation. A topic which merits additional research is the particulars of Operation Luch. A specific focus could be on what Operation Luch meant for the end of the DDR and its legacy into the Putin era in Russia. Other future research projects could be equipped with Hoffmann's perspective on intelligence relationships and investigate the collaboration of the KGB and its other client services in the Soviet Bloc as well as the Global South. Any of the above proposed research

direction will not only expand the available scholarship, but also broaden the field of intelligence studies as whole.

KGB Now and Forever

It becomes clear then that the ghosts of the Cold War are still very much relevant today and have implication for the politics of tomorrow. By analysing the relationship of the KGB and the MfS at three different levels, this dissertation has argued that this relationship was far from friendly. Instead, it has shown numerous instances in which both parties exhibited less than friendly behaviour. All of this supports the paradigm that there are no such thing as friendly intelligence services, even on the other side of the Berlin Wall. In doing so this research project has sought to dispel Cold War paranoia and myth about the KGB and its allies, and instead shine a light upon the reality of the "state within a state" in the Soviet Union and its influence in Soviet client states. While the MfS is dead and gone, its patron the KGB is alive and will in the leadership of the Russian Federation. The words of President Vladimir Putin ring as true now as they did in 1999: "There is no such thing as a former Chekist" (Riehle, 2022, 17).

Bibliography

Albats, Y. (1994) *The State within a State.* New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux.

Andrew, C. (1977) 'Whitehall, Washington and the Intelligence Services', *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-),* 53(3), pp. 390-404. Available: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2615311 (Accessed: 20 July 2022).

Andrew, C. and Gordievsky, O. (1990) *KGB: The Inside Story.* New York: HarperCollins.

Andrew, C. and Mitrokhin, V. (1999) *The Sword and the Shield.* New York: Basic Books.

Andrew, C. and Mitrokhin, V. (2005) *The World was Going Our Way*. New York: Basic Books.

Andropov, Y. and Mielke, E. (1973) Vereinbarung über die Zusammenarbeit zwischen dem MfS der DDR und dem KfS beim Ministerrat der UdSSR, BStU, MfS, ZAIG, Nr. 13730, S. 1-15. Berlin, Stasi Unterlagen Archiv, Das Bundesarchiv. Available at: https://www.stasi-unterlagen-archiv.de/informationen-zur-stasi/quellensammlungen/das-mfs-und-die-zusammenarbeit-mit-anderen-kommunistischen-geheimdiensten/ (Accessed: 15 July 2022).

Andropov, Y. and Mielke, E. (1978) Protokoll über die Regelung des Zusammenwirkens zwischen dem MfS der DDR und der Vertretung des KfS beim Ministerrat der UdSSR beim MfS der DDR, BStU, MfS, BdL/Dok. Nr. 1862, S. 1-11. Berlin, Stasi Unterlagen Archiv, Das Bundesarchiv. Available at: https://www.stasi-unterlagen-archiv.de/informationen-zur-stasi/quellensammlungen/das-mfs-und-die-zusammenarbeit-mit-anderen-kommunistischen-geheimdiensten/ (Accessed: 15 July 2022).

Bearden, M. and Risen, J. (2003) *The Main Enemy*. New York: RandomHouse.

Belton, C. (2020) *Putin's People.* London: William Collins.

Binder, D. (2000) 'Erich Mielke, Powerful Head of Stasi, East Germany's Vast Spy Network, Dies at 92', The New York Times, 26 May. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2000/05/26/world/erich-mielke-powerful-head-of-stasi-east-germany-s-vast-spy-network-dies-at-92.html (Access: 12 July 2022).

Bissell, R. (1979) 'Soviet Policies in Africa', *Current History,* 77(450), pp. 124-127, 135-136. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/45319374 (Accessed: 20 July 2022).

Brown, J. and Farrington, A. (2017) 'Democracy and the depth of intelligence sharing: why regime type hardly matters', *Intelligence and National Security*, 32(1), pp.68-84. Available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02684527.2016.1208379 (Accessed: 22 July 2022).

Bruce, G. (2010) *The Firm.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Childs, D. and Popplewell, R. (1996) *The Stasi: The East German Intelligence and Security Service.* New York: Palgrave.

Churchill Archives Centre (No Date) *The Papers of Vasiliy Mitrokhin (1922–2004).* Available at: https://archives.chu.cam.ac.uk/collections/mitrokhin/ (Accessed: 05 July 2022).

Coalson, R. (2007) 'Russia: Why The Chekist Mind-Set Matters', RFERL, 15 October. Available at: https://www.rferl.org/a/1078954.html (Accessed: 15 July 2022).

DDR Museum (No Date) "I love – I love all – all humans" – Erich Mielke Biography. Available at: https://www.ddr-museum.de/en/blog/archive/i-love-i-love-all-all-humans-erich-mielke-biography (Accessed: 12 July 2022).

Deutsche Welle (2006) Former East German Spy Chief Dead at 83, 09 November. Available at: https://www.dw.com/en/former-east-german-spy-chief-dead-at-83/a-2231536 (Accessed: 17 July 2022).

Dylan, H. et al. (2017) 'The way of the Norse Ravens: merging profession and academe in Norwegian national intelligence higher education', Intelligence and National Security, 32(7), pp. 944-960. Available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02684527.2017.1328833 (Accessed: 05 July 2022).

Engelmann, R., Herbstritt, G., and Süss, W. (2018) 'The MfS in and ist Socialist "Brother Organisations"', Münkel, D. (ed.) *State Security, a Reader on the GDR Secret Police.* Berlin: Federal Commissioner for the Records of the State Security Service of the former German Democratic Republic, pp. 61-68.

Figes, O. (1996) *A People's Tragedy: The Russian Revolution, 1891–1924.* London. Jonathan Cape.

Fischer, B. (2012) *Der Grosse Bruder*. Berlin: Das Neue Berlin.

Funder, A. (2003) *Stasiland*. London: Granta.

Garthoff, R. (2015) *Soviet Leaders and Intelligence*. Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press.

Gieseke, J. (2014) *The History of the Stasi.* New York: Berghahn.

Gieseke, J. (2018) 'What did it Mean to be a Chekist', in Münkel, D. (ed.) *State Security, a Reader on the GDR Secret Police.* Berlin: Federal Commissioner for the Records of the State Security Service of the former German Democratic Republic, pp. 29-39.

Gill, P. and Phythian, M. (2012) *Intelligence in an Insecure World.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Grossmann, W. (2007) *Bonn im Blick.* Berlin: Das Neue Berlin.

Hatfield, J. (2022) 'Intelligence under democracy and authoritarianism: a philosophical analysis', *Intelligence and National Security,* pp. 1-17. Available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2022.2076340 (Accessed: 05 July 2022).

Hasic, A. (2019) ''The Gates in the Wall Stand Open Wide.' What Happened the Day the Berlin Wall Fell', Time, 07 November. Available at: https://time.com/5720386/berlin-wall-fall/ (Accessed: 17 July 2022).

Hoffmann, S. (2021) 'Circulation, not cooperation: towards a new understanding of intelligence agencies as transnationally constituted knowledge providers', *Intelligence and National Security*, 36 (6), pp. 807-826. Available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02684527.2021.1938371 (Accessed: 05 July 2022).

Kitfield, J. (2007) 'Espionage, the sequel', *Air Force Magazine*, (March), pp. 71-14. Available at: https://www.airforcemag.com/PDF/MagazineArchive/Documents/2007/March%202007/0307espionage.pdf (Accessed: 05 July 2022).

Knight, A. (1984) 'Soviet Politics and the KGB-MVD Relationship', The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review, 11(1), pp. 157-181. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1163/187633284X00080 (Accessed 20 July 2022).

Knight, A. (1993) 'The Fate of the KGB Archives', *Slavic Review*, 52(3), pp. 582-586. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2499726 (Accessed: 05 July 2022).

Kux, D. (1985) 'Soviet Active Measures and Disinformation: Overview and Assessment', *The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters*, 15(1), pp.

19-28. Available: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol15/iss1/17/ (Accessed: 20 July 2022).

Lander, S. (2004) 'International intelligence cooperation: an inside perspective'*, Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 17(3), pp. 481-493. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/0955757042000296964 (Accessed: 05 July 2022).

Lefebvre, S. (2003) 'The Difficulties and Dilemmas of International Intelligence Cooperation', *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, 16(4), pp. 527-542. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/716100467 (Accessed: 05 July 2022).

Levitin, M. (2007) 'East Germans drew blueprint for Cuban spying', Michael Levitin, 04 November. Available at: https://www.michaellevitin.com/politics/east-germans-drew-blueprint-for-cuban-spying/ (Accessed: 15 July 2022).

Light, F. (2021) 'A Vote on Restoring a Secret Police Chief's Statue Opens Old Wounds in Russia', The Moscow Times. 25 February. Available at: https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2021/02/25/a-vote-on-restoring-a-secret-police-chiefs-statue-opens-old-wounds-in-russia-a73068 (Accessed: 07 July 2022).

Martin, D. (1983) 'OSS into CIA', *Grand Street*, 2(2), pp. 177-186.

Michels, M. (2020) 'Crying Wolf?: Project RYaN, US Intelligence, and the 1983 'War Scare'', Wilson Center, 02 September. Available at: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/crying-wolf-project-ryan-us-intelligence-and-1983-war-scare (Accessed: 15 July 2022).

Moscow Times (2021) 'New Russian Monuments to Soviet Secret Police Founder Spark Controversy', 13 September. Available at:

https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2021/09/13/russias-opposition-candidates-are-fighting-among-themselves-again-a75027 (Accessed 07 July 2022).

Pieck, W. (1950) Gesetz über die Bildung eines Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit [online]. Die Grundsatzdokumente des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit, GBl. DDR Nr. 15 v. 21.2.1950, S. 95. Berlin, Stasi Unterlagen Archiv, Das Bundesarchiv. Available at: https://www.stasi-unterlagen-archiv.de/informationen-zur-stasi/quellensammlungen/die-grundsatzdokumente-des-ministeriums-fuer-staatssicherheit/ (Accessed: 12 July 2022).

Popplewell, R. (1998) 'The KGB and the control of the Soviet bloc: The case of East Germany', *Intelligence and National Security,* 13(1), pp. 254-285. Available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529808432470 (Accessed: 12 July 2022).

Pearson, R. (1993) 'Raymond G. Rocca, CIA official, Dies', *Washington Post*, 13 November. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1993/11/13/raymond-g-rocca-cia-official-dies/f71248f8-f133-4f79-9a2b-a909ca0ff1e8/ (Accessed: 20 July 2022).

Pucci, M. (2020) Security Empire. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Riehle, K. (2022) 'Post-KGB Lives: Is There Such a Thing as a Former Chekist?', *International journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence,* pp. 1-24. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2022.2064201 (Accessed: 19 July 2022).

Sabbagh, D. (2021) 'High court hears opening salvos in libel case brought by Roman Abramovich', *The Guardian,* 30 July. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2021/jul/30/high-court-hears-opening-salvos-in-libel-case-brought-by-roman-abramovich (Accessed: 05 July 2022).

Schmeidel, J. (2008) *Stasi: Shield and Sword of the Party.* New York: Routledge.

Selvage, D. (2022) 'Einleitung', in Selvage, D. and Herbstritt, G. (ed.) *Der «grosse Bruder».* Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, pp. 7-20.

Selvage, D. (2022) 'Kleiner Bruder. Das Ministerium für Staatssicherheit und die SED im Licht des Mitrochin-Archivs', in Selvage, D. and Herbstritt, G. (ed.) *Der «grosse Bruder».* Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, pp. 7-20.

Selvage, D. and Herbstritt, G. (2022) *Der «grosse Bruder».* Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

Soldatov, A. and Borogan, I. (2010) *The New Nobility*. New York: PublicAffairs.

Sontheimer, M. (1999) 'Das Ende einer Legende', *Spiegel,* 17 January. Available at: https://www.spiegel.de/politik/das-ende-einer-legende-a-60c39629-0002-0001-0000-000008509126?context=issue (Accessed: 05 July 2022).

Stan, M. and Bustiuc, F. (2018) 'The Importance of the Active Measures Program within the Collaboration and the Intelligence Sharing among the Warsaw Treaty Organization Member States Security and Intelligence Services against the West and NATO Allies during the Cold War', Romanian Intelligence Studies Review, 19(20), pp. 147-172. Available at: https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=874138 (Accessed: 15 July 2022).

Stasi Records Archive (No Date) *DDR-Staatssicherheit und sowjetischer KGB.* Available at: https://www.stasi-unterlagen-archiv.de/informationen-zur-stasi/quellensammlungen/das-mfs-und-die-zusammenarbeit-mit-anderen-kommunistischen-geheimdiensten/ (Accessed: 05 July 2022).

Stasi Records Archive (No Date) *Staatssicherheit und Gesellschaft*. Available at: https://www.stasi-unterlagen-archiv.de/informationen-zur-stasi/publikationen/publikation/staatssicherheit-und-gesellschaft/ (Accessed: 05 July 2022).

Stasi Records Archive (No Date) *The Reconstruction of Torn Documents.* Available at: https://www.stasi-unterlagen-archiv.de/en/archives/the-reconstruction-of-torn-documents/#c6543 (Accessed 05 July 2022).

Stern, R. and Tismaneanu, V. (2022) *Communism and Culture.* Cham: Springer.

Walker, I. (2019) 'The 20th century's forgotten monster: Erich Mielke', The New European, 14 December. Available at: https://www.theneweuropean.co.uk/brexit-news-the-history-of-east-germany-s-erich-mielke-67874/ (Accessed: 17 July 2022).

Walsh, J. (2010) *The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Wilson Center (1963) 'Stasi Note on Meeting with KGB Officials, 13 November 1969', November 13, 1969, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Office of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records (BStU), MfS, MfS, SdM 577, p. 88-110. Available at: https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115714 (Accessed: 17 July 2022).

Whitney, C. (1974) 'The Painful Road to Brandt's Resignation', The New York Times, 23 May. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/1974/05/23/archives/the-painful-road-to-brandts-resignation-leadership-failure-as-well.html (Accessed: 15 July 2022).

Wolf, M. (1997) *Man without a Face.* New York: PublicAffairs.

Wolf, M. (1997) *Spionage Chef im geheimen Krieg.* Munich: List.

Wunschik, T. (2012) 'Combat and Conciliation: State Treatment of Left-wing Terrorist Groups in West and East Germany', in Fahlenbrach, K. et al. (ed.) The Establishment Responds Power, Politics, and Protest since 1945. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 157-178.

Yasmann, V. (2006) 'Russia: The KGB's Post-Soviet 'Commercialization'', *RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty*, 20 December. Available at: https://www.rferl.org/a/1073587.html (Accessed: 05 July 2022).