IMSISS
International Master
Security, Intelligence
& Strategic Studies

Erasmus
Mundus

The securitisation of human development in Russia – Does it allow for a Russian human security doctrine?

August 2020

Clara Ribeiro Assumpção

UofG: 2400477R

DCU: 18114121

Charles: 63605907

Presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of

International Master in Security, Intelligence and Strategic Studies

Word Count: 22.000

Supervisor: Dr Ammon Cheskin

Date of Submission: 02/08/2020

CHARLES UNIVERSITY

Acknowledgements

I would thank the EMJMD scholarship, which allowed me to undertake this amazing adventure. I am also thankful for the University of Glasgow, Dublin City University and Charles University, which challenged me in different ways and aided me in becoming a better aspiring academic.

To the IMSISS team, my sincere gratitude for believing in my potential and for supporting me throughout the past two years. To my lecturers, thank you for the wisdom, the constructive feedback and for sparking my curiosity and interest. For my friends from IMSISS, thank you for being my constancy when everything else was changing. Your support and the incredible memories we share make me certain this was all worth it.

To my parents, thank you for your support even when you did not understand. It is your unwavering belief in me that makes me confident and brave. To my friends in Brazil, thank you for always being there for me, even from a distance. And to all of the amazing friends I made along the way, at each one of my stops, thank you for helping me live some of the most memorable years of my life.

Finally, to my supervisor, Dr Ammon Cheskin, thank you for your support in taking a puzzling idea and transforming it in a work I am proud of. Your insights and recommendations were of immense value and made this research much better.

Abstract

This work sets out to find whether Russia's security doctrine is compatible with an understanding of human security. The main theoretical underpinnings guiding this research is an understanding of human security as an instance of securitisation, as well as an expanded approach to securitisation theory that takes ordinary politics into consideration. In order to analyse the Russian case, this work first constructs a framework of what human security entails by organising the most prevalent definitions of the term in a spectrum of broadness. Subsequently, a thematic content analysis of the founding documents of the Russian security doctrine is executed, and its findings are compared to the previously established baseline of human security definitions. Through this comparison, the author is then capable of answering the research questions *"Does Russia's security doctrine securitise development issues using the individual as a referent? If so, does it make for a Russian definition of human security?"*.

Keywords: Human Development; Human Security; Russia; Securitisation.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements 2
Abstract 3
Table of Contents 4
List of Figures and Tables 5
Introduction 6
On Securitisation and Human Security 9
Securitisation 10
Human Security as Securitisation 14
Epistemological Choices on Human Security and Securitisation 16
Considerations on Methodology 18
Three Working Definitions of Human Security 22
Broad Working Definition – The UN Definition 24
Narrow Working Definition 28
Broader Definition 31
Concluding Remarks on the Working Definitions 35
Case Study – Securitization and Human Security in Russia's Security Doctrine 36
Literature Review 36
Content Analysis of the Founding Documents of the Russian Security Doctrine 44
Comparative Analysis Between Russia and The Three Working Definitions 56
Is there a Russian Understanding of Human Security? 64
Conclusion 66
Bibliography 69
Appendix 79
Appendix 1. Table - Content Analysis of the United Nations Development Program 1994 Report 79
Appendix 2. Table - Content Analysis of the Founding Documents of the Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation 83

List of Figures and Tables

Figure 1. The Human Security 'Definitional Continuum'..23

Figure 2. The Human Security 'Definitional Continuum' – Similarities Between Working Definitions..36

Figure 3. The Place of Russia in the Human Security 'Definitional Continuum' 66

Table 1. Content Analysis of the UNDP Human Development Report 1994 (Summary) 25

Table 2. The Three Working definitions of Human Security 35

Table 3. Content Analysis of the Federal Law on Security 46

Table 4. Content Analysis of the Russian National Security Strategy...............................47

Table 5. Content Analysis of the Annual Messages of the President of the Russian Federation to the Federal Assembly of the Federation 52

Introduction

Russia employs discursive elements that are broadly associated to human security, such as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the defence of human rights, to justify some of its most contentious and anti-liberal foreign policy moves. The war in Georgia in 2008 (Thakur 2016, 424–30), the annexation/reunification of Crimea in 2014 (Putin 2014) and Russia's participation in the Syrian war (Averre and Davies 2015), for example, were all justified in such terms. However, the domestic public discourse in Russia constantly dismisses human rights as an inferior western value and even as a foreign weapon aimed at destroying the Russian identity (Østbø 2017, 205–7). This disconnection between foreign and domestic discourses hints to an outward-facing political instrumentalization of human rights, thus raising the question on whether Russia has a human security doctrine.

Human security, albeit a broad concept, has a few distinguishing features. In this work, the term will be understood as the furthering of human development with a focus on the individual and through securitisation. This means the aim to retain the political urgency tied to using the term 'security' while applying it to the people's experiences of harm within the state (Stuvøy 2014, 231). However, as this work set out to explore human security in Russia, it grappled with a vast challenge: the definition of human security, notwithstanding these distinguishing points, is inherently vague.

Even though this vagueness has proven useful as a way to mobilise different actors and interests around a common discourse of shifting resources away from the military and into development (Krause 2014, 85; King and Murray 2001, 4), it also gets in the way of developing sound academic research. Moreover, as the western countries are the ones typically articulating and employing their own interpretations of human security (Tadjbakhsh 2013, 54), analysing the concept outside of the West is a difficult endeavour.

In order to overcome these challenges and reach a satisfactory answer to the research questions *"Does Russia's security doctrine securitise development issues using the individual as a referent? If so, does it make for a Russian definition of human security?"*, this work first established an approach to defining human security based on a continuum. In it, three working definitions of human security were crafted, which reflected the main

approaches to the term. Having crafted these definitions, this work then set out to answer the first research question. In order to gauge whether Russia securitises development issues using the individual as a referent, documents from the country's security doctrine were submitted to thematic content analysis. The results of this analysis were then compared to the three working definitions of human security in order to answer the second research question, thus shedding light on whether a Russian definition of human security exists.

With regard to the structure, this work is divided into four main sections. The first section, named "On Securitisation and Human Security", revises the literature around securitisation and human security, conceptualising the expanded understanding of securitisation theory that guides this work, as well as its linkage to human security. This expanded understanding of both securitisation and human security directs the empirical analysis in two ways: first, by correlating human security to the securitisation of human development; and second, by expanding the scope of securitisation theory beyond a context of exceptionality and into ordinary politics and discourses.

The second section, "Considerations on Methodology", details the methodology employed in this work, from the literature review and critical scrutiny of the relevant literature, to the content analyses employed throughout the research. This section also details the sub-set of research questions that are at the base of the constitution of the three working definitions of human security, and which also guided the interpretation of the content analysis of the Russian documents.

Furthermore, the third section, "Three Working Definitions of Human Security", constitutes the first empirical study of this work, as the author maps the predominant and diverging discourses around human security through literature review and content analysis, and organises them in a continuum from 'narrow' to 'broader'. Even though this detailed study does not contribute directly to answering the main research questions of this work, this step is essential. This is so because the lack of a consensus around what human security encompasses means that just comparing Russia to any case or checklist would be arbitrary, as the breadth of competing human security definitions means that what is considered as such in one case might not be in the other. Thus, it is only through the establishment of a

well-grounded baseline of human security, built upon the same set of parameters, that a comparative study of the Russian doctrine could be undertaken.

Finally, the fourth section, "Case Study", embodies the bulk of the empirical contribution of this research. Based on the 'definitional continuum' of human security and on the aforementioned expanded understanding of securitisation, thematic content analysis was applied to the founding documents of the Russian security doctrine. This analysis pinpointed the instances where human development was securitised in the Russian security doctrine, and determined, through the same set of parameters used to establish the working definitions of human security, whether the Russian securitisation of development is coherent with human security, and if so, where does it fall in the continuum.

The relevance of this work resides at its four main original contributions to knowledge. The first one relates to epistemology, as the theoretical development over the use of security doctrine documents in securitisation analysis, as discussed in the section 'On Human Security and Securitisation', provides an original epistemological justification to a methodology which, albeit predominant in Russian securitisation studies (as evidenced by Gorr and Schünemann 2013; Fedor 2013; Østbø 2017; Bashirov 2018; Bækken and Due Enstad 2020), had not yet been justified. The second contribution is in respect to the development of the continuum of human security definitions, which is based on a fixed set of research questions and constitutes a novel and sound framework upon which this and other comparative studies on human security can be built.

The third contribution is related to Russia and the current underdeveloped literature around securitisation and human security in the country. By relating human security to securitisation, the author fully expressed a connection that was already bourgeoning in some of the relevant literature (for example, in Sjöstedt 2008; Stuvøy 2010; 2014; Sebina 2016; Gjørv et al. 2016; and Loginova 2018). Moreover, by articulating different critical approaches to securitisation, this work expanded the predominant narrow understanding of securitisation in the relevant scholarship and brought forth a useful methodology for conceptualising and understanding the different roles securitisation play when analysing human security.

Lastly, the fourth contribution is with regard to the analysis of human security in Russia. The preceding literature on the theme, albeit enriching in its in-depth case studies, was extremely limited in scope. Thus, by building a systemic analysis of the human security discourse in the country and by unveiling the state's central discursive approach to the theme, the regional and local case studies on human security acquire a general framework against which they can be compared, gaining even more depth. Furthermore, the extremely centralised configuration of the Russian Federation (Goble 2017) means that the local and regional levels are mandated to coordinate their human security strategies with the federal one (Sergunin 2018, 64). This means that the findings from the analysis of the federal documents here undertaken have also regional and local relevance.

Finally, Security Studies scholarship usually addresses Russia through a focus on traditional territorial security, ethno-national disputes, energy security and hybrid warfare (Stuvøy 2014, 236; Giglietto et al. 2016, 4). By analysing human security in Russia, this research also aims to expand this scholarly focus and explore an understudied aspect of the country, while also strengthening a broader and more encompassing approach to security. Moving forward, the next section of this work develops the literature review around securitisation and human security, establishing the important link between those two theories. It also brings forth the theoretical framework guiding this work, which is based on an expansion of securitisation theory, a post-structuralist approach to discourse, and the understanding of human security as an instance of securitisation.

On Securitisation and Human Security

As the understanding of human security as an instance of securitisation is a guiding assumption of this work, the sound establishment of the epistemological link between securitisation and human security is a vital endeavour. In order to achieve this goal, this section will first craft a general literature review around securitisation and human security. The objective is not to provide an exhaustive revision, but to touch upon the main aspects of each theory in a pragmatic way. This review will then allow for the substantiation of the argument that securitisation theory and human security can work as complementary tools for security analysis, instead of as competing theories. It will be this link that will be at the

base of this work's understanding of human security, as well as of the analysis of the Russian security doctrine.

Securitisation

As it is the case with many concepts in the political sciences, security also lacks an uncontested definition. There are so many alternative definitions to the term, that David Baldwin compared redefining security to "something of a cottage industry" (1997). The main debate, which persists to this day, is whether the term security should be applied only in relation to 'objective threats', that is, those related to state survival in the international system; or should it also be expanded to "subjective threats", meaning that the existence of a threat would depend on its perception as such (Munster 2018). However, regardless of the debate on what security is or should be, "there is agreement that security is crucial" (Booth 1997, 83).

It is based on this inherent cruciality attached to the word security, as well as on the aforementioned debating views on the breadth of the term, that Ole Wæver (1995) coined "securitisation." The term, which was subsequently refined in the book "Security – A New Framework for Analysis (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998), aimed to scrutinize the process of embedding security connotations to an issue in order to declare "an emergency condition" and thus claim the "right to use whatever means are necessary to block a threatening development."(Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998, 21).

Sidestepping the debate on what security is, the securitisation theory – also known as the Copenhagen School – redefines security as a "move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics" (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998, 23). The theory then envisages a continuum in which any public issue could be located in a spectrum ranging from nonpoliticised – that is, the private sphere; politicised – or part of public policy; and finally, securitised – meaning that the issue is taken as a threat requiring emergency measures and justifying actions beyond normal politics.

According to the Copenhagen School, an issue would be elevated to a security threat through a securitising speech act. That is, a specific rhetorical structure aimed at

constructing a shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat. It this sense, it is the utterance of the speech act that constitutes the securitisation move. However, a speech act does not necessarily have to contain an explicit reference to the word security. Instead, the essential component is a designation of an existential threat requiring emergency action or extraordinary measures. When this speech act – that is, the securitisation move – is accepted by the intended audience, then it would make for a successful securitisation process (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998, 25–27).

Even though the Copenhagen School aims not to attach any inherent value neither to the securitisation process nor to security itself (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998, 204), there seems to exist a preference for desecuritisation over securitisation, as the latter would reflect a "failure to deal with issues as normal politics" (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998, 29). In this traditional conception, securitisation has been critiqued for undermining ideological pluralism, disempowering citizens, legitimising otherization and surveillance, normalising 'panic politics', stimulating the creation of new threats to justify exceptional responses, and posing a threat to democracy (Krasteva 2017, 316–18; Aradau 2004, 391–93; 405–6). These condemnations, however, do not take into consideration that the theory refers only to the tools employed in a specific form of social praxis, and does not encompass the analysis of the context-dependent values and consequences attached to the actual practice (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998, 204). Hence, the aforementioned criticisms mistake the consequences of 'negative securitisation', a specific form of securitisation (Floyd 2007b, 327), for the securitisation process as a whole.

In her efforts to deepen the understanding of securitisation as it is employed in the real world, Rita Floyd established an "evaluative bifurcation of the concept of securitisation into positive and negative securitisation" in which "the outcome of a securitisation […] is always issue dependent" (Floyd 2007b, 327). Thus, "securitisation is neither a priori positive nor negative, what form it takes is always entirely dependent on the issue and situation in question" (Floyd 2007b, 348). In this sense, positive securitisation is that in which the results are better than what would have been possible through mere politicisation, and this trade-off can only be defined case by case (Floyd 2007b, 337).

Negative securitisation, however, is either "an intense political solution that benefits the few", a solution with a "too narrow focus to address the underlying problems" or a securitising move done only with the aim of "looking good", that is, when the "securitising actors perform a securitising speech act, but without the intention of sticking to the truth conditions which are required to keep the speech act felicitous" (Floyd 2007b, 342–45). Floyd also argues that the same is true for desecuritisation, with positive desecuritisation being that which leads to politicisation, and negative desecuritisation being that in which the issue is no longer securitised, but is not politicised either, instead being completely dropped from the political agenda (Floyd 2007b, 343). Hence, the Copenhagen's school preference for desecuritisation over securitisation would be considered a conceptual mistake.

Moreover, critical takes on securitisation also reconstruct further points of the theory and question its mandatory requirements of 'emergency condition', 'extraordinary measures', 'existential threats', and even the use of 'audience acceptance' as the only measure for defining a securitisation move as successful. For Paul Roe, the extent to which the Copenhagen School attaches a lack of openness and deliberation to the securitisation process has been overexaggerated (Roe 2012, 250). He highlights how in actual practice some securitisation processes are handled in accordance with the normal mode of politics, not requiring emergency action nor bypassing democratic checks and balances. He even gives the Counter Terrorism Act in the United Kingdom as an example, as the bill was subjected to the debates and deliberation of normal politics and took 10 months to pass (Roe 2012, 257).

Roe's example also highlights Rita Floyd's argument that "securitising actors do not always revert to exceptional security policies when they address a threat" (Floyd 2016, 678). Even though when not taken in a hurry nor entailing extraordinary measures, instances such as the exemplified above would still characterise a securitisation process and not a mere politicisation because they elevate an issue to the level of security, attach urgency to the theme and justify a change in behaviour on the part of the securitising actor. In Floyd's words:

> To this end I propose that securitization is 'successful' only when (1) the identification of a threat that justifies a response (securitizing move) is followed by (2) a change of behaviour (action) by a relevant agent (that is, the securitizing actor or someone instructed by the same), and also (3) the action taken is justified by the securitizing actor with reference to the threat they identified and declared in the securitizing move. (Floyd 2016, 684)

By requiring a change in behaviour by a relevant agent, usually the securitising actor, Floyd also questions the use of the audience's acceptance as the only qualifier for a successful securitisation move (Floyd 2016, 681). Hence, this flexibilization of securitisation broadens the scope of the theory and allows its use to analyse more encompassing and ordinary every-day securitisation processes, in their context-dependent negative or positive manifestations.

These critical approaches to securitisation guide the employment of the theory in this work. The analysis of Russia's securitisation moves will be based on the constitutive documents of the country's security doctrine, which are typically related to ordinary politics and non-extraordinary circumstances. This approach will be explicated in detail in the subsection "Epistemological Choices on Human Security and Securitisation".

Finally, as aforementioned, securitisation was originally aimed as a tool with which to analyse securitisation processes, and not as a tool to scrutinise what real security is, or what the actual security problems are. For the Copenhagen School (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998, 204) and other theoreticians of securitisation (Floyd 2007b; 2016; Roe 2012), the definition of security and the consequences of the securitisation process are context dependent. Hence,

> [I]n order to talk about these issues [security problems], one has to make basically different ontological choices than ours and must define some emancipatory ideal. Such an approach is therefore complementary to ours"(Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998, 35).

Human security, thus, presents itself as one of such ontological choices with an emancipatory ideal that could work as a complement to the securitisation theory. In the next section, this article will expand on human security and why it can be understood as an instance of (potentially) positive securitisation.

Human Security as Securitisation

There are many ways to define human security. However, what all the contesting definitions agree on is that its main feature is its shift in referent from the state to the individual (Tanaka 2019, 22). The concept's goal is to retain the political urgency tied to using the term 'security' while questioning the privilege of the sovereign nation in being its sole referent (Hansen 2013, 31).

In this sense, issues that do not pose a threat to the 'national self' are acknowledged by human security as threats nonetheless, recognising people's experiences of insecurity within the state as an issue to be dealt with by the international community (Stuvøy 2014, 231; Hansen 2013, 31–32). Moreover, Responsibility to Protect, which attributes to the international community the responsibility for intervention in the cases where states fail in their in protecting their citizens from "genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, and war crimes" (Hehir 2017), is also often mentioned as one of the practices that embody human security (Krause 2007, 2, 14; 2014, 87; Peterson 2013, 319; Tadjbakhsh 2013, 43).

However, the main contention within human security is the scope of threats to the individual that should be embraced by the concept. This discussion is framed mainly between the proponents of human security as freedom from fear, in which the threats to the individual are related to the use or the risk of violence (Owen 2004, 375); and those that advocate human security as freedom from fear and want, also including human rights and development issues such as poverty, hunger and lack of healthcare as threats to the individual (Schittecatte 2006, 130).

In this work, the diverging definitions of human security will be categorised as 1. ***narrow*** – when the referent is the individual, in a state-centric framework, and the focus is on freedom from fear; 2. ***broad*** – when the referent is the individual in a state-centric framework, and the focus is on both freedom from fear and want; and 3. ***broader*** – when the referent is the individual in a post-liberal framework and the focus is also on freedom from fear and from want. The details of each category will be expanded upon in the section "Three Working Definitions of Human Security".

Those who are critical of human security see it as interventionist by nature (Franceschet 2006, 33), a way to hierarchise states between effective and ineffective (Duffield 2007, 122), a way to locate the post-Cold War threats in the developing world (Ambrosetti 2008, 440), a form of biopower through which intervention is designed to affect intimate aspects of human life, a reminiscence of practices of colonialism (Richmond 2007, 470) and a translation of human rights to a necessarily oppressive securitarian discourse (Krasteva 2017, 319).

These criticisms, albeit valid, concentrate mainly on the negative consequences of human security as practised according to narrow interests, majorly from the states. They do not address, however, the fact that human security, as a policymaking agenda, can be employed in a potentially positive securitisation move by a multitude of actors in different contexts (Floyd 2007a, 38) to defend a multitude of different practices and values.

It is this heterogeneous place of human security as a policymaking agenda with securitising powers that allows for its conceptualisation as a phenomenon of securitisation. Hence, those who employ the rhetoric of human security perform securitising moves themselves, wishing to achieve the securitisation of individual human beings (Floyd 2007a, 42). In this context, as human security works as an empirical outlet for those interested in achieving human development by securitisation (Floyd 2007a, 45), it defines and qualifies what the real security issues are through an emancipatory ideal, thus complementing the ontological blank spaces left open by Buzan, Waever and Wilde (1998, 35).

Moreover, as it is the case with any theory, human security is "for someone and for some purpose" (Cox 1981, 128). Hence, by applying Rita Floyd's (Floyd 2007b) conceptual bifurcation of positive and negative securitisation to human security's vast array of definitions and practices, one can arrive at two conclusions. First, that when a human security framework leads to results that are better for the individual referent of security than those achieved by politicisation or other forms of securitisation of the same issue, then it is an instance of human security as a positive securitisation. Second, that when the results are worse for the individual referent, then it is a case of human security as a negative securitisation, thus justifying the aforementioned criticisms. This evaluation, however, can only be applied to factual applications of human security, and not to the theory itself.

Finally, despite the criticisms and the conceptual ambiguity, human security has occupied a significant place in global discourses of peace, development and diplomacy (Tanaka 2019, 21). Hence, the understanding of its plurality of definitions as well as of applications remain relevant, and securitisation, as a tool for analysis, works complementarily in this effort. Moreover, the bifurcation into positive and negative also adds a qualifying level to the analysis of the diverse practices within the scope of human security. More importantly, it also allows for a critical understanding and response to such practices, thus fulfilling an emancipatory goal.

This work, however, does not aim to analyse actual practices of human security, but discourses around it. Hence, the focus hereafter will be to understand whether Russia has elements of human security in its security doctrine that allow for a Russian definition of the term. Qualifying if the Russian human security practices are either positive or negative securitisation is thus an effort complementary to that of this work, and one that could be built upon the theoretical framework here established. In the next section, epistemological choices such as this one will be further discussed.

Epistemological Choices on Human Security and Securitisation

In this work, this conceptualisation of human security as securitisation, as well as the critical understanding of securitisation that expands the theory to encompass non-urgent and non-exceptional behaviour from the securitising actor, will be predominant in the analysis of Russia's security doctrine.

For clarity reasons, securitisation moves will be henceforth labelled as cohesive when they fulfil Wæver, Buzan and Wilde (1998) request for urgency and exceptional behaviour; and not cohesive, when they do not. Additionally, and borrowing from post-structuralist tradition, the documents constituting the Russian doctrine will also be interpreted as discursive practices (Hansen 2013, chap. 1) and the requirement from traditional securitisation theory for explicit speech acts will be dismissed for practical reasons.

This choice will not, however, incur the loss of quality of this work, as the limitation of securitising moves to speech acts is actually restrictive as it ignores diffuse security processes (Huysmans 2011, 371–72); and also superfluous, as it is not the audience's

acceptance of the speech act that is decisive for a successful securitisation, but the change in behaviour from the securitising actor and the justification of this change based on the securitisation move (Floyd 2016, 683–91).

Hence, this work proposes an approach to securitisation that interprets the raising of an issue as a security threat in a country's national security doctrine in two ways: 1. as an indicator of a successful securitisation, as well as 2. a new securitisation move. In this interpretation, the construction of a threat in the pages of a new security doctrine reflects both a change in behaviour by the state - which felt the need to readdress its perceived threats through a new document - as well as the justification of the securitisation move, which is given by the context in which the threat is addressed. A current security doctrine would then serve as a comprehensive list of the issues successfully securitised by the state, as well as self-constituted discursive practices that further securitisation moves in themselves.

Nonetheless, the measurement of the audience's reception to securitisation moves remains relevant, as it signals the acceptance of the securitisation process. However, this measurement in relation to the Russian case study here put forth will not be undertaken due to constraints in research feasibility. Understanding the degrees of audience acceptance would require measurements within the two audiences (Floyd 2016, 688–90) targeted by the documents – the audience identified as that of the aggressors, which the security doctrine aims to warn off; and that of the referent objects in need of protection, here understood as the Russian state. This measurement, however, falls outside of the scope of this work as it would require extensive first-hand human data collection.

Nevertheless, since the vertical accountability of the government is lower in illiberal democracies (Merkel 2004, 40–41), it is the hypothesis of the author that the audience's reception to securitisation moves does not pose great weight in the securitising behaviour of the Russian state. This hypothesis, however, remains to be confirmed through extensive field research.

Finally, as mentioned above, the diversity in positions within the debate around what human security should entail has created an aura of vagueness around the subject. This vagueness, however, has served to mobilise a diverse set of actors with varied interests

around the opportunity of using human security to capture political and financial resources away from traditional 'military' security (Krause 2014, 85; King and Murray 2001, 4).

However, even though this vagueness has proven to be empirically useful, it also hinders academic analysis on the theme. For this reason, before delving into the analysis of the Russian approach to human security, this work will first craft three working definitions of human security based on distinct points of the spectrum of its application. A deeper review of the variances among those points will also be explicated in further detail in parallel to the crafting of the definitions.

The delineation of such working definitions is imperative for the research endeavour here undertaken, as it creates a sound baseline encompassing the diverse approaches to human security. Without this baseline, it would be impossible to find whether Russia has its own understanding of the term without falling into rampant arbitrariness. Before diving in this empirical study of the working definitions, however, the next section will further detail the methodology employed in this research.

Considerations on Methodology

As asserted in the Introduction, the goal of this work is to answer the research questions *"Does Russia's security doctrine securitise development issues using the individual as a referent? If so, does it make for a Russian definition of human security?"* In order to answer these questions, this work is split between theoretical and empirical analyses. The theoretical parts overview the current scholarship and its gaps with regards to human security, securitisation and Russia; as well as substantiate the argument that human security can be understood as an instance securitisation.

The empirical parts, on the other hand, first create a baseline of definitions of human security, reflecting its diversity and broad spectrum, and then analyse Russia's security doctrine compared to this baseline in order to understand whether the country's policies and approach to securitisation and development are coherent with any of the working definitions of human security, thus answering the main research questions.

The section “On Securitisation and Human Security” summarised, through literature review, the scholarship around both themes. Through this revision, and through a critical understanding of securitisation theory, the author substantiated an understanding of human security as an instance of securitisation. Imbued with this understanding, and acknowledging the polarising theoretical debates within human security, three working definitions of human security were crafted in the section “Three Working Definitions of Human Security”, with each one reflecting a different position in the ‘definitional continuum’ of human security. In doing so, this work aims to do justice to the depth of the debate as well as to create a common epistemological base upon which to build the case study on Russia.

These working definitions, which are labelled as ***broad***, ***narrow*** and ***broader***, are constructed through literature review and critical analysis of the works of the main advocates for each theoretical position. Additionally, thematic content analysis is also applied to the United Nations Development Program 1994 report on Human Development, as this document is broadly accepted as the birthplace of human security as a theoretical and political concept (King and Murray 2001, 585; Paris 2001, 89; Bajpai 2003, 198; Schittecatte 2006, 130; Chandler 2008, 427; Martin and Owen 2013, 1; Krause 2014, 98; Tanaka 2019, 21).

The thematic analysis of the UNDP report is done through contextual reading of the document and coding of the sections concerning human security. These were categorised both inductively and deductively into “Objectives”, “Threats”, “Approaches” and “Definition. In order to attenuate inconsistencies and confirm coding adequacy and relevance, all categories were double-checked and complemented with the results of thematic queries executed on the texts. Moreover, the parent codes were used both as nodes when there was a high word match, as well as indexers of related themes.

Furthermore, the working definitions were built by answering the following sub-set of research questions:

1. What are the securitised objects?; **2.** Do the securitised objects make for a cohesive securitisation move – that is, are they “presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political

procedure"? (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998, 23–24); **3.** What are the frameworks for securitisation and for action?; **4.** Which values are underlying the securitisation move?; **5.** What are the issues not addressed by this definition?; and **6.** Is this definition narrow, broad or broader?.

Built upon these research questions, the 'narrow', 'broad' and 'broader' working definitions became the theoretical base against which the analysis of the Russian case was built. Albeit the categories of 'narrow' and 'broad' had been used before to differentiate the competing approaches to human security (such as in Owen 2004, 375), these categorisations were never before qualified according to a fixed set of parameters, nor had they incorporated post-structuralist and critical understandings of human security into a 'broader' category. Thus, the thorough crafting of three categories of human security, making for a definitional continuum that is useful as a baseline for human security studies, constitutes one of the novel contributions of this work.

Moving forward, and before analysing the Russian documents, this work also submitted the current scholarship on securitisation and human security on Russia to a critical literature review. In this effort, the author analysed the texts by themes, highlighting similarities, differences and main gaps. The empirical study of Russia's security doctrine was then done through content analysis of its 'founding documents' (as labelled by the Security Council of the Russian Federation n.d.), namely the 1. National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation, the 2. Federal Law "On Security", the 3. Article 83 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, and the 4. four most recent Annual Messages of the President of the Russian Federation to the Federal Assembly of the Federation. This temporality is necessary due to this work's guiding hypothesis that security doctrines are only relevant to contemporary securitisation analysis in their most recent form.

For the content analysis, official translations from Russian to English were used whenever available, with only the federal law and the constitutional article being submitted to automated translation. As it was the case with the thematic content analysis of the UNDP document, the one on the Russian doctrine was also done both inductively and deductively, with pre-defined categories being complemented by additional ones developed during the contextual reading and coding process. In order to attenuate inconsistencies and confirm

coding adequacy and relevance, all categories were also double-checked and complemented with the results of thematic queries executed on the texts.

The main categories established for all security documents were "Securitised Issues"; "Values"; and "Reference to the Individual". Ad hoc categories such as "National Interests" and "Strategic National Priorities" were also coded in the documents which explicitly categorised items through such themes. Due to the interconnectedness of the themes, some text extracts were coded multiple times under different categories. For example, the excerpt "introduction of promising energy-saving and energy-efficient technologies" (Russian Federation 2015 para. 61) was coded both under "Energy" and "Technology" in the categorisation of securitised issues.

In order to maintain theoretical coherence and allow for a relevant analysis, the founding documents were also subjected to the above-mentioned sub-set of research questions that guided the working definitions on human security, with one additional question*: 'Does this doctrine allow for the individual as a referent for security?'*. As the acknowledgement of an individual referent is the uncontested base of human security (Tanaka 2019, 22), the addition of this question is required to differentiate the Russian documents, which do not necessarily allow for an individual referent.

It is also important to highlight that the content analyses developed in this work employ a mixed-methods approach, where there is a quantification of objectives, threats and approaches to human security, in the case of the UNDP Report; and of the instances of securitisation and the prevalence of values, in the case of the Russian documents. However, this quantitative aspect should be taken as a peripheral and complementary element of this study.

This work's goal is not to enumerate the most securitised issues nor the most prevalent values in the Russian security doctrine, but to analyse whether is there space for the individual as a referent for security in Russia, and if this entails a Russian understanding of human security. Analysing how potentially peripheral this tentative Russian approach to human security is by comparing the frequency of securitisation moves thus escapes the objectives of this study and is not relevant to answering the research questions. Hence, no

numerical comparison will influence the analysis of this case study, even though the numbers will be available for scrutiny.

Moreover, as this work follows a post-structuralist understanding of discourse, security is understood as a "historically formed discourse cantered on the nation state" (Hansen 2013, 16) whose state centrality is questioned by a different discourse, that of human security. Thus, the governmental documents are interpreted as social discourses tied to spatial, temporal and ethical instantiations (Hansen 2013, 41) that, just as the speech acts from the presidential messages, aim at institutionalising one understanding of identity and policy options over others (Hansen 2013, 1). As such, the doctrines were not materially differentiated from the speech acts in terms of discourse interpretation. They were differentiated, however, in their securitising potentialities.

Hence, all of the issues touched upon by the security documents were automatically taken as securitisation moves, due to their innate security-related context. The presidential messages, however, are political discourses that do not necessarily include securitising speech acts and were only taken as such when securitising language was used. The author considered the following as securitisation markers: direct reference to security; correlation with traditional security issues through the use of vocabulary relating to defence, war, armaments, military forces, threats and fight; inferences to existential threat or critical need, such as "otherwise, there will be no future for us" (Putin 2018); and association with extreme urgency, like in "[…] work to achieve these strategic goals has to begin today. Time is always in short supply […]" (Putin 2019).

Moving forward, the next section will construct the three working definitions of human security, which constitute the base for the development of the case study on Russia. In order to allow for this construction, the next section will also incur in a detailed review of the different approaches to human security.

Three Working Definitions of Human Security

As it was mentioned above, the innate vagueness of the concept of human security does not allow for a sound epistemological base for analysis. As the focus of this research is to investigate Russia's security doctrine concerning human security, the lack of a clear

definition of the term poses a challenge. As a way to overcome this challenge, however, this paper establishes working definitions of human security based on the range of diverse definitions already existing. As the main agreed-upon component of human security is the shifting of the security referent to the individual (Tanaka 2019, 22), this will be the common denominator around which these working definitions will be built.

However, even though this focus on the individual entails a framework that is broader than that of "traditional security"[1], within human security itself there are debates about what should constitute a security threat. This debate ranges mainly around what should be human security's openness to 'non-traditional' security issues. This extensive debate in the scholarship is mainly divided, as aforementioned, between two rival positions (Floyd 2007a, 39) – the one that sees human security as freedom from fear – that is, that the threats securitised should only be those accrued from violence (Owen 2004, 375); and the one that advocates human security as freedom from fear and want – that is, the securitised threats should be both those accrued from violence as well as from human development issues, such as poverty, hunger and the lack of healthcare.

In order to reflect this ongoing debate in the field of human security while also defining an epistemological base upon which to analyse Russia's security doctrine, the working definitions hereafter developed will aim to capture the views of the three main positions in this debate. They will be labelled as 1. ***narrow*** – when the referent is the individual, in a state centric framework, and the threats securitised are only the ones accrued from violence, that is 'freedom from fear'; 2. ***broad*** – when the referent is the individual in a state centric framework, and the threats securitised are the ones accrued from violence and also from human development issues – that is, freedom from fear and want; and 3. ***broader*** – when the referent is the individual in a post-liberal framework and the threats securitised are those related to freedom from fear and from want. It is based on these definitions that Russia's security doctrine will be compared in order to elucidate by which understanding of human security, if by any, the country abides.

Figure 1. The Human Security 'Definitional Continuum'

[1] The so-called "traditional security" focuses on the state and the threats to its constitution, which are mainly military. (Hama 2017, 2–4)



Broad Working Definition – The UN Definition

The first working definition here developed is the one related to the original substantiation of human security, which remains relevant to this day and also constitutes the base against which the competing approaches to human security were built throughout the years. Due to its central position, this definition was crafted not only based on literature review and critical analysis, but also on a detailed empirical study.

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Human Development Report from 1994 is broadly accepted as the birthplace of human security (King and Murray 2001, 585; Paris 2001, 89; Bajpai 2003, 198; Schittecatte 2006, 130; Chandler 2008, 427; Martin and Owen 2013, 1; Krause 2014, 98; Tanaka 2019, 21). As the originator of the term, the document was submitted to thematic content analysis in order to trace the genealogy of human security as well as to highlight the original context and application of this contested concept.

However, in order to complement this understanding with more contemporary applications of the concept by the UN, reference is also made to the much more recent "common understanding on the notion of human security" present in the resolution A/RES/66/290 authored by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in September 2012. Finally, as the understanding guiding this work is that of human security as an instance of securitisation, the efforts to analyse the UN's securitisation moves are guided by a sub-set of research questions, which, in the name of methodological coherence, are also applied to the other working definitions as well as to the analysis of the Russian security documents. As aforementioned, these questions are:

> **1**. What are the securitised objects?; **2**. Do the securitised objects make for a cohesive securitisation move – that is, are they "presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political

procedure"? (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998, 23–24); **3**. What are the frameworks for securitisation and for action?; **4**. Which values are underlying the securitisation move?; **5**. What are the issues not addressed by this definition?; and **6.** Is this definition narrow, broad or broader?

In order to answer these questions, the author categorised the discourses related to human security in the 1994 report among "Objectives", "Threats", "Approaches" and "Definition." From analysing these categories, it became evident that the report highlights the goals of human security as establishing community security through intergenerational equity, people centred development and social integration; economic security through employment, poverty reduction and economic growth; environmental security; sustainable development; health security; reduced military spending and regulated arms trade; fertility reduction; gender equality and food security, among others. These objectives are then opposed to the threats to human security, namely environmental problems, the military and the "arms security" tradition, diseases, hunger, economic problems, drugs, terrorism, pollution, etc.

Table 1. Content Analysis of the UNDP Human Development Report 1994 (Summary)[2]

Name	References
UN_DEFINITION	**185**
HUMAN SECURITY OBJECTIVES	**125**
New Development Paradigms	46
Community Security	11
Economic Security	10
Environmental Security	8
Sustainable Development	7
Health Security	6
Reduced Military Spending	5
Regulated Arms Trade	5
Fertility Reduction	4
Gender Equality	4
Food Security	3
Education	3
Other	13
HUMAN SECURITY THREATS	**60**
Environmental Problems	9
Military	9
Disease	7
Hunger	5
Economy	5

[2] For the detailed categorisation, please refer to the Table 1. in the Appendix.

Drugs	4
Terrorism	3
Pollution	3
Ethnic Conflicts	3
Other	12

These sets of objectives and threats, which intersect with the liberal human development agenda, are inserted in a security context – that is, securitised – in a cohesive securitisation move aimed to bring urgency to the theme and highlight the necessity of setting up an international cooperation fund under the UN's auspice. The main theme throughout the document is the need to endorse a new development paradigm in which a Global Human Security Fund would be created through a collective contribution from UN members, who would direct resources to this fund through the reduction of military spending and the taxation of arms trade, pollution and speculative international movements (UNDP 1994, 5–11).

The aforementioned proposal also highlights how the UN attaches Human Security to a state centric framework, which is not surprising as the UN is a state centric organisation itself. This state-centrism is reinforced in the 2012 resolution, where it is detailed that "human security is based on national ownership. […] [H]uman security strengthens national solutions which are compatible with local realities"(UNGA 2012, 2).

Moreover, even though the threats to human security are acknowledged as global – "when human security is under threat anywhere, it can affect people everywhere"(UNDP 1994, 34), the framework for action is also state centric, with the states taking the front through national and international collaboration.[3] This understanding is also reinforced in the 2012 resolution, as it affirms that

> Governments retain the primary role and responsibility for ensuring the survival, livelihood and dignity of their citizens. The role of the international community is to complement and provide the necessary support to Governments[…]. (UNGA 2012, 2).

The values underlying the UN's understanding of human security, through its state centric framework, are a broad understanding of security – "There have always been two major components of human security: freedom from fear and freedom from want." (UNDP 1994,

[3] Refer to table 1. in the appendix for detailed examples.

24); the respect for states' self-determination – "the prospects for self-determination have never looked brighter […]" (UNDP 1994, 1); the respect for the social contract between individuals and their states – "the negotiation of new social contracts in the industrial nations […]" (UNDP 1994, 5); and the respect for state sovereignty – "[h]uman security must be implemented with […] full respect for the sovereignty of States, territorial integrity and non-interference in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of States" (UNGA 2012, 2).

However, the state centric focus given to human security means that it is limited by existing political, legal and normative constraints (Martin and Owen 2013, 10) as well as by liberal ideals of democratic peace, which excludes non-liberal actors (Peterson 2013, 326–27). Moreover, in this context, human security is almost powerless before states that inflict human insecurity on their populations, as the only tool in such cases being the bureaucratic 'UN mandated international interventions' (UNDP 1994, 57) which might become in themselves sources of human insecurity (Peterson 2013, 320). Finally, considering the wide range of threats securitised by the UN, and its explicit goal of bringing about 'freedom from fear and freedom from want' (UNDP 1994, 24), the UN's approach to human security will be classified as broad.

From the comprehensive text analysis which can be seen in detail in Table 1. in the appendix of this paper, and answering the aforementioned research questions, it was devised a working definition of Human Security that both reflects the context of its creation as well as the framework in which it is currently applied by the UN. This definition will be henceforth denominated as the "Broad Working Definition" and will be one of the benchmark definitions against which the Russian approach to Human Security in its Security Doctrine will be compared.

Broad Working Definition: The UN Definition of Human Security securitises violence as well as human development aspects in a cohesive way with the aim of establishing a new development paradigm. It does so through a state centric framework focused on the national and international levels. The threats to human security are portrayed as transnational, but the framework for action is also international and national, through state collaboration and international institutions. There is an emphasis on economic action and

resource redistribution through a UN supported framework. In order to reach Human Security, states must collaborate and redistribute resources among each other, with the states themselves being responsible for guaranteeing the human security of their citizens. The self-determination of states, their sovereignty, liberal democratic peace and the social contract are underlying values present in the definition. Due to its state centric framework, the UN Definition does not address the issue of states being the source of the threat to Human Security in an adequate way. The tool presented for such cases is an international intervention, which is also state centric. Finally, due to its focus on both freedom from fear and from want, this is a broad definition of human security.

Narrow Working Definition

Moving forward with the development of the three working definitions of human security that will guide the upcoming analysis of the Russian Security Doctrine, this section will now focus on establishing a narrow working definition of human security. As a reminder, the criteria for a definition to be labelled as narrow is that it be more restricted than the broad one with regard to the scope of the securitised issues. Thus, in a narrow conception of human security, the referent is still the individual, in a state centric framework, but the threats securitised are only the ones accrued from violence, that is 'freedom from fear'.

The advocates of a narrow approach to human security acknowledge the importance of the concept in furthering "important and interesting foreign and security policy initiatives" (Krause 2014, 76). However, they tend to approach the term more as a concept built as a consequence of a change in policymaking, rather than a 'new development doctrine' that challenges the status quo and produces change (for examples of this rationality, see Krause 2014, 83; 2007, 2; Bajpai 2003, 197–98; King and Murray 2001, 585). Thus, in its narrow conception, human security is understood as an *ex post facto* label under which new approaches to security and development meet (King and Murray 2001, 585).

However, as human security developed into a foreign policy concept, it became more than just a label and led states and policy-makers to focus on "different issues, to ask different questions, and even to promote different policies"(Krause 2014, 85). Thus, the narrow approach puts the state, with its use of human security, at the centre of the securitisation

move – or as Krause (2007, 6) puts it, "human security is unavoidably and inextricably about the state."

For the advocates of a narrow approach, the UNDP definition based on *freedom from fear* and *freedom from want* is laudable, but too broad to be useful in policymaking (Krause 2014, 83; 2009, 150; 2004, 44; Bajpai 2003, 224–25; King and Murray 2001, 591). Thus, the proponents of a narrow definition consider that, as "most of the practical or policy initiatives that have been associated with the human security agenda have […] generally adopted a much narrower understanding of human security" (Krause 2014, 83), the consensus around the definition of the term should also share of this understanding. Consequently, these proponents of a narrow definition prioritise establishing human security as a concept that is policy-relevant to decision-makers (Krause 2014, 83; Bajpai 2003, 195; King and Murray 2001, 591), thus, establishing a framework for action that is also state centric.

As the framework for securitisation and action within the narrow approach to human security are state centric, so are its underlying values. The dominant conception of security is a negative one, that is, the term is understood in relation to its gaps, or the "fragilities, failures and pathologies of the Westphalian state"(Krause 2014, 84). The relationship between the state and their citizens is also understood in liberal-democratic terms, with great importance given to the social contract – "promoting human security is about making states and their rulers keep their side of the basic social contract" (Krause 2004, 46). Moreover, this conception does not aim to be critical, but pragmatic, aiming to define human security in a way that is "useful in making public policy" (King and Murray 2001).

Even though there is no strict consensus amongst its proponents on what should be the focus of 'narrow' human security, they tend to agree on the need for a quantifiable and actionable definition. Keith Krause, one of the most vocal crusaders for a narrow definition of human security, bases his allegations on his academic as well as practical experiences with the human security agenda (Krause 2004, 43). For him, as "human security has, in practical terms, narrowed to focus on problems associated with the threat and consequences of organized violence and conflict,"(Krause 2014, 83) the definition should follow this practical turn and concentrate only on freedom from fear.

Gary King and Christopher Murray, on the other hand, vouch on setting the focus of human security on poverty. Their understanding of poverty, however, goes beyond the lack of income and encompass "the deprivation of any basic capabilities"(King and Murray 2001, 594) below a defined and measurable threshold (King and Murray 2001, 592). However, their definition of basic capability is that of what "is important enough to provoke violence"(King and Murray 2001, 598), thus coming back to freedom from fear. Finally, Kanti Bajpai's proposition also concentrates on violence, as he defines human security as the "protection of the individual's personal safety and freedom from direct and indirect threats of violence" (Bajpai 2003, 224).

Hence, in the narrow approach, the main threats to human security are either centred directly around violence, like small arms, light weapons, anti-personnel landmines, and child soldiers (Krause 2014, 82–83; 2004, 46), or indirectly related to violence or to the threat of violence, such as concerns with personal safety and freedoms (Bajpai 2003, 226).

Moreover, the main objective is to use human security as a concept around which to coordinate "a concrete agenda for political action" (Krause 2004, 45) that will be enacted through national and international efforts. The guiding principle of the hierarchisation of freedom from fear over freedom from want is that "you cannot achieve freedom from want without achieving freedom from fear"(Krause 2004, 45), which establishes a one-way causality between the two. Consequently, this definition glosses over the co-causality between violence and development issues.

The brief literature review outlined above showcases how there is no consensual definition even in the narrow end of the spectrum of human security. Hence, it is necessary to go back to the sub-set of research questions delineated in the previous section in order to establish a working definition of the narrow approach to human security.

1. 'What are the securitised objects?'; **2**. 'Do the securitised objects make for a cohesive securitisation move – that is, are they "presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure"?' (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998, 23–24); **3**. 'What are the frameworks for securitisation and for action?'; **4**. 'Which values are underlying the

securitisation move?'; **5**. 'What are the issues not addressed by this definition?'; and **6.** 'Is this definition narrow, broad or broader?'.

Narrow Working Definition: The narrow definition of human security securitises objects that revolve around direct and indirect violence. The security threats are related to traditional security issues, but with a consideration of their impacts on the individual. However, as the documents advocating for its adoption are fragmented across authorship and time, there is not one homogeneous hierarchisation of threats, nor advocacy for consistent emergency measures. Thus, the securitisation move is not cohesive. However, the frameworks for securitisation and for action are also state centric, as the focus is on being serviceable to policymakers and actionable within the current international framework. The values underlying the securitisation move are that of sovereignty, the social contract, and pragmaticism. Due to its neglect of the freedom from want aspect, however, this definition prioritises violence over development issues, and does not address the co-construction between those two aspects. Finally, due to its strict focus on freedom from fear, this is a narrow definition of human security.

Broader Definition

Finally, moving on to the third working definition of human security guiding this work, this section will now focus on the broader definition of human security. As aforementioned, the criteria for a definition to be labelled broader is that it focuses on *freedom from fear* and *want*, while being more comprehensive than the UN definition with regard to the framework for securitisation and action. Thus, the broader definition surpasses the state-centrism of the previous definitions by calling for an expansion of the political space (Peterson 2013, 318) in a way that is inclusive of local actors (Richmond 2007, 476).

The advocates for a broader approach are critical of the state-centrism of the narrow and broad definitions of human security, as well of the discretionary application of the concept by hegemonic actors such as states and international organisations. Their argument is that because the narrow and broad conceptions have been co-opted by these actors, mainstream human security does not present a challenge to the international system (Chandler 2008, 430–31; Ambrosetti 2008, 442).

Thus, because human security is treated as a plastic term and is used according to the convenience of the most powerful actors in the international system (Ambrosetti 2008, 442), the term ends up being applied to shift threats to the developing world and to allow for interventionism and the maintenance of the power hierarchy between the North and the South (Black 2006, 60–61; Ambrosetti 2008, 439–40; Chandler 2008, 429–36). In this sense, human security is perceived as reinforcing dominant power relations and structures, which are themselves taken as threats to human security (Peterson 2013, 319).

Therefore, for the proponents of the broader approach, the fact that the actions dubbed as human security are mostly related to freedom from fear is not a reason to delimitate the definition of human security to it (as suggested by the advocates of a narrow approach) but an evidence of the co-option of the term that must be questioned (Schittecatte 2006, 129–30). Hence, a critical understanding of human security brings emphasis to the notion of emancipation, here understood as the identification and critique of the mainstream relations of power and domination as well as the empowering of the local in global governance.

In this sense, the goal is not an endpoint of total emancipation (Peoples 2020, 57–58), but a continued progress towards human security where people increasingly enjoy the autonomy to carry out what they freely choose to do (Booth 1991, 319). This, in turn, will be achieved by keeping a live set of questions and challenges that are constantly addressed (Peoples 2020, 68).

In this broader purview, human insecurity must not be defined by consensus, but in contextually specific ways (Peoples 2020, 67). In order to be emancipatory, human security must reflect the life-world experiences of the people, which is only possible through its contextually mediated application (Richmond 2011, 51). Thus, the securitised objects potentially range within all spheres of social life and encompass freedom from fear and want. However, they are not (and should not be) clearly pre-defined nor hierarchised. Instead, the securitisation of issues should depend on the context, fear and desires of contextually bound individuals.

An emancipatory understanding of human security also focuses on creating direct challenges to the hegemonic practices of liberal peacebuilding. This means questioning the state centric values tied to the narrower definitions of human security by concentrating on

individual action and the opening up of political spaces (Peterson 2013, 318). This would be done by the inclusion of actors beyond states and international institutions, as well as by valuing subaltern voices and by allowing individuals to define and debate human security (Peterson 2013, 321; Richmond 2007, 476).

The framework for securitisation and action thus encompasses the individual level, as well as the reshaping of international structures, which are currently bound by liberal values and organisations (Peoples 2020, 64; Richmond 2004, 144). In their new form, they would include actors that are traditionally excluded from the formulation of human security policies, such as representatives from Islamist organisations, anti-globalisation movements and the 'new left'.

Even though these are non-liberal, and sometimes even anti-liberal actors, their voices would be considered as long as they were engaged in the negotiation and accepting of the plurality and conflict. This dialogue between rival – but not intrinsically inimical – parties would not aim for consensus, which is taken as a liberal (and utopian) ideal, but for the contextual increase of human security, whatever it may be defined to entail in that specific circumstance (Peterson 2013, 326–27).

Finally, in this broader understanding of human security, the opening up of political spaces involves a special concern with critically appraising the relations of oppression, patriarchy, marginalisation and racism embedded in the dominant political structure (Peoples 2020, 58). The ubiquity of western liberal standards - democracy, the adoption of a free market and the universality of human rights (Peterson 2013, 322) - is also problematised, with their colonialist and imperialist legacy as well as their artificial notion of historical progress put in question (Peoples 2020, 68; Allen 2016, 3–16).

The broader framework, however, does not take the liberal paradigm as intrinsically bad. It acknowledges its value, but questions its absolute disregard for diversity and dissent (Peterson 2013, 322–23), while also criticising the conditionality it embeds to international aid. This conditionality, in consequence, is blamed for furthering an uncritical, top-down and decontextualized promotion of human security (Chandler 2008, 429; Tadjbakhsh 2013, 53; Richmond 2007, 463, 474).

The literature review executed in the previous paragraphs aimed to condense a wide-ranging debate that has spanned decades. However, the broader continuum of human security is especially complex due to the vast diversity in approaches within the feminist, post-colonial, post-structuralist and other critical frameworks. Nonetheless, a cohesive working definition is necessary for the execution of this research endeavour, and it will be attempted by answering the sub-set of research questions already delineated in the previous sections.

1. 'What are the securitised objects?'; **2**. 'Do the securitised objects make for a cohesive securitisation move – that is, are they "presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure"?' (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998, 23–24); **3**. 'What are the frameworks for securitisation and for action?'; **4**. 'Which values are underlying the securitisation move?'; **5**. 'What are the issues not addressed by this definition?'; and **6.** 'Is this definition narrow, broad or broader?'.

Broader Working Definition: The broader definition of human security acknowledges the securitisation of issues related to freedom from fear and want but does not securitise specific subjects. Instead, it defends securitisation according to the specific contexts of the people in a situation of insecurity. Hence, due to its intentional lack of definition and hierarchisation, this approach does not make for a cohesive securitisation move. The frameworks for securitisation and for action are a rebuilt international system which is not intrinsically tied to liberal values, allows for the inclusion of dissenting voices, and empowers individuals to discuss and act on their contextually defined human insecurities. The values underlying the securitisation move would be empowerment, post-liberalism, and equality. As it rejects a consensual and hierarchised listing of human security threats, the broader approach does not address how to accommodate the application of limited resources to a broad range of issues. The coordination problem resultant from allowing for individual securitisation and action is also not addressed. Finally, due to its contextually bound securitisation of freedom from fear and freedom from want issues, as well as its proposition of a post-liberal non-state centric international framework, this is a broader definition.

Concluding Remarks on the Working Definitions

As evidenced in this section, there is no right definition of what human security is, and it is not in the scope of this work to aim to craft one. The three working definitions formed here aimed solely to do justice to the vastness of the debate around human security, and to build a sound epistemological base upon which to construct the analysis of the Russian security doctrine.

In the next section, the literature versing upon securitisation and human security as applied to Russia will be reviewed in order to evidence the existing gap in the mapping of the country's understanding of the terms. Thereafter, the founding documents of the Russian security doctrine will be submitted to content analysis, which will allow for a deeper understanding of what development issues are securitised in the country, and how. After analysing the securitisation moves, they will be compared to the ones encompassed by the three working definitions crafted above. The overarching objective of this analysis will be to identify whether Russia's approach to the securitisation of development is congruent with the continuum of human security definitions.

Table 2. The Three Working definitions of Human Security

	Narrow	Broad (the U.N)	Broader
Securitised Objects	Freedom from Fear	Freedom from Fear and Want	Freedom from Fear and Want
Cohesive or Not cohesive Securitisation Move	Not cohesive	Cohesive	Not cohesive
Framework for Securitisation	State centric	State centric	Post-liberal
Framework for Action	State centric	State centric	Open Political Space
Issues not addressed	Co-constitution between freedom from fear and want	Inclusion of non-liberal actors; States as a source of insecurity.	Resource constraints; Coordination between securitising actors.

Figure 2. The Human Security 'Definitional Continuum' – Similarities Between Working Definitions



Case Study – Securitization and Human Security in Russia's Security Doctrine

Literature Review

The selection of Russia as the case study for this work is due to four reasons: 1. to expand the studies of human security beyond the West by ascertaining whether Russia's security doctrine is coherent with an understanding of human security; 2. to expand the Security Studies scholarship on Russia beyond the overwhelming focus on the country's role as a destabilising force to the international system; 3. to expand the limited literature on securitisation and Russia; 4. to expand the extremely limited literature on human security and Russia.

Human Security, as originally coined by the UN, has its origins in the liberal international order (Bell 2016) and is particularly known for being advocated by western powers, most prominently Canada, Norway, Switzerland, Japan, the Netherlands and Austria (Krause 2014, 85). Russia, thus, makes for a novel and fascinating case study on human security due to its non-western context, as well as its emphasis on the importance of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values (SMVs) over the western-liberal understanding of human rights.

As it will be further evidenced through the content analysis in the next section, the SMVs are embedded in the Russian security doctrine and constitute essential part of its guiding

values. They refer to a somewhat abstract category encompassing religious supremacy, traditional family values, the duty of serving the country and continuing its history, as well as national union and collectivism (Russian Federation 2015, para. 78). Moreover, as the term is rather flexible, it is instrumentalised and securitised as the very foundation of the Russian way of life, of which the destruction would lead to the destruction of the Russian nation itself (Fedor 2013, 160, 178–79).

This idiosyncrasy with respect to the SMVs also translates to the way the civil society is dealt with in the country. With the official goal of preserving these rights from foreign influence, the state organises Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in a statist structure that is interdependent with the government and which prioritises economic and social rights (Bindman 2015, 344–47). Political and civil rights, on the other hand, are associated with the western human rights agenda, foreign influence and the erosion of the SMVs, being actively persecuted (Ibidem). In this sense, the domestic public discourse in the country constantly dismisses human rights as an inferior – and dangerous - western value when compared to the spiritual and moral values (Østbø 2017, 205–7).

Furthermore, the emphasis on the SMVs also means the preponderance of tradition and religion over secular principles, including those enshrined in the international human rights legislation (Østbø 2017, 201). However, the Russian Federation has signed and ratified most of the UN treaties and conventions related to human rights (OHCHR 2020), also using the discourse around humanitarian intervention to justify some of its most contentious foreign policy moves, such as the war in Georgia in 2008 (Thakur 2016, 424–30), the annexation/reunification of Crimea in 2014 (Putin 2014) and Russia's participation in the Syrian war since 2015 (Averre and Davies 2015).

This disconnection between foreign and domestic discourse hints to an outward-facing political instrumentalization of human rights with possibly no domestic adherence to its values. However, as it has been discussed in depth in the previous section when developing the 'broader' definition, human security is not restricted to human rights and can be extended to post-liberal contexts. Hence, it raises the question on whether Russia's emphasis on its own spiritual and moral values as a defensive weapon against human-rights led westernization (Østbø 2017, 207), allied with a potential space for the individual as a

referent for security, could be characterised as a Russian understanding of human security. In answering such question, this works deepens the study of human security beyond its attachment to western-liberal values, while also approaching a previously unexplored aspect of Russian policy.

The second reason why Russia was chosen as a case study for this work has to do with the gap in security scholarship that encompasses more than the traditional security issues related to the country. Even though Russia is a hot topic in Security Studies, this scholarship overwhelmingly focuses on traditional territorial security, ethno-national disputes, energy security and the protection of energy resources (Stuvøy 2014, 236). Since the 2016 elections in the United States, there has also been a surge of research on Russian hybrid warfare and influence campaigns (Giglietto et al. 2016, 4). One can thus observe a disregard in security studies toward a broader understanding of security as well as the domestic implications of security doctrines when it comes to Russia.

In order to better understand how Russian security is studied in the fields of Politics and International Relations, the author surveyed the current state of the field through a superficial content analysis of the articles published under the section Politics & International Relations at Taylor & Francis. This publisher was chosen due to its prominence and reputability, and the survey considered only the article's titles, abstracts and keywords. In order to avoid a bias toward traditional security threats, no search category explicitly involved the word "security."

Out of the 147 articles published from October 30th 2018 to October 30th 2019 and which were explicitly about Russia, 38 discussed systemic issues such as Russia's relationship with other states or blocks; 22 were about Russian political elites and foreign policy; 13 versed about Russian international influence through the media; and 12 were about strategic issues, such as military exercises and nuclear weapons. Only three articles from the sample approached Russia through a broader understanding of security: David Barry's article on the conflation of religion and ethno-national identities among ethnic Russians and its consequences in xenophobia (Barry 2019); Lisa Sundstrom and Valerie Sperling's analysis of LGBT discrimination cases in Russia and how those cases are more likely to find litigious success in international courts (Sundstrom and Sperling 2019); and Emil

Edenborg's work on how the "Kremlin-promoted heteropatriarchal definition of community" influences the visibility of gendered and sexualized bodies in Russia (Edenborg 2019).

The results of this survey corroborates the understanding that, whereas there is an overabundance of studies about how Russia's security doctrine, actors and practices relate to other states and the balance of the international system, there is a gap in analysing how these same matters affect the individuals residing in Russia. This also reflects a general trend in security studies where political realism – which ignores individual security while emphasising state security - has occupied a prominent position since the Cold War (Williams 2012, chap. 1). Thus, by analysing Russia's security doctrine through the lenses of securitisation and human security, and by unveiling if is there a Russian understanding of the later, this work collaborates in filling the vast gap in current Russian security studies on broader and non-traditional security issues, while also strengthening a broader approach to security studies in general.

The third aim accomplished by this work in choosing Russia as a case study is to expand the literature that applies securitisation theory to the country. Throughout the years, there has been sporadic research on securitisation in Russia. From this modest body of work, the author selected for analysis the most relevant as well as the most recent articles explicitly concerning securitisation and the country. The selection of texts was based on keyword relevance, impact factor as well as publication date.

From the 15 articles and chapters which were explicitly concerning Russia and securitisation, the vast majority put forth a clear conceptualisation of securitisation theory drawing from the Copenhagen School (Morozov 2002; Sjöstedt 2008; Khrushcheva 2011; Fedor 2013; Gorr and Schünemann 2013; Sebina 2016; Snetkov 2017; Wilhelmsen 2016; Kuczyńska-Zonik 2017; Østbø 2017; Bashirov 2018; Nuñez-Mietz 2019; Bækken and Due Enstad 2020). Only two articles did not, with Andris Spruds (2017) using the term securitisation with no theoretical development, and Szkola (2017), which used the term along with ontological security theory.

Interestingly, eight of the 15 works applied an empirically adapted approach to classical securitisation theory. Nuñez-Mietz (2019), Wilhelmsen (2016) and Bækken and Due

Enstad (2020) discounted the traditional requirement that the securitising actor take an emergency action; Wilhelmsen (2016) and Bashirov (2018) explicitly denied that securitisation only happens through speech acts; Bashirov (2018) and Sjöstedt (2008) disregarded the role of the audience's acceptance of a speech act in order to measure the success of a securitization move, and, finally, Wilhelmsen (2016) explicitly expanded the actors capable of securitising moves. These expanded methodologies, which go along with the one employed in this work, corroborate the relevance of the methodological choices here made with regard to securitisation theory.

Moreover, five of the analysed texts (Østbø 2017; Fedor 2013; Bækken and Due Enstad 2020; Bashirov 2018; Gorr and Schünemann 2013) used documents from Russia's security doctrine in their securitisation analysis, although not as formally detailed as in this work. This phenomenon showcases that the use of security documents in securitisation analysis, at least concerning Russia, is a predominant methodology employed intuitively. Although common, however, none of the surveyed articles and chapters that employed the practice justified their use. The theoretical justification of why security doctrine documents reflect successful securitisation moves as well as entail new ones (as explained in detail in the section "Epistemological Choices on Human Security and Securitisation") thus also makes for a relevant original contribution of this work.

The most prominent issue touched upon by 13 (Morozov 2002; Sjöstedt 2008; Khrushcheva 2011; Fedor 2013; Gorr and Schünemann 2013; Sebina 2016; Kuczyńska-Zonik 2017; Østbø 2017; Spruds 2017; Szkola 2017; Bashirov 2018; Nuñez-Mietz 2019; Bækken and Due Enstad 2020) of the 15 texts related to the securitisation of identity, history and collective memory, both in Russia and abroad with regard to Russian minorities. In most of the works surveyed, there is an explicit or implicit negative understanding of securitisation, as well as a preference for desecuritisation over securitisation. Snetkov (2017), for example, put forth an original argument on how Russia desecuritised Chechnya in order to convey strength.

Even though Sebina (2016) is the only one to acknowledge positive securitisation, she does not expand on it. Sjöstedt (2008), however, develops a case study on an instance of positive securitisation, even though not explicitly acknowledging it as such, when analysing the

delayed securitisation of HIV and AIDS in Russia. She argues that the disease was not securitised in Russia at the same time as in the rest of Europe due to stigmatisation and resistance to what was perceived as western values and ideals. However, the securitisation meant a better control over the pandemic, and an acknowledgement that anyone could be a victim of HIV, which led to the reduction in the otherization of target groups, such as foreigners, non-ethnic Russians, the LGBTQ population as well as sex workers.

This in-depth overview of the scholarship relating to Russia and securitisation reveals a growing body of literature concerning the two, with approaches that go beyond analysing the country only at a systemic level. However, only Sjöstedt's work on the securitisation of HIV (2008) mentions human security, and she only does so in passing. This lack of articulation between human security and securitisation, even in a case study of a phenomenon of positive securitisation, signals the gap in Russian security studies where this work becomes relevant. Moreover, the securitisation framework here developed, which provides a theoretical justification for the use of security doctrines in securitisation analysis, also adds depth to the previous works using such technique.

Moving forward to the fourth goal of this work, which is to expand the extremely limited literature on human security and Russia, a review of such works highlight a small body of literature mostly connected to a project on Arctic security entitled “Impacts of Oil and Gas Activity on Peoples of the Arctic using a Multiple Securities Perspective (GAPS)” (Gjørv et al. 2016, 182). Due to the Arctic focus of the research project, all of the relevant works on human security in Russia concentrate on the region. Even though the current scholarship is very enriching in its in-depth case studies, the fact that all of them analyse the same region means that there is no basis for generalisation or comparison for the whole of Russia. Hence, the relevance of works such as this, which explore human security in the country through a systemic perspective.

For this review, the author analysed nine book chapters and peer-reviewed articles. It is important to highlight that no methodological choices were necessary when selecting the works for revision, as the small amount of available academic literature on human security

in Russia allowed for the scrutiny of all of them.[4] From the nine texts, the only one not to offer a conceptualization of human security was Lvova's (2014), which, confusingly enough, only used the term as a header for one of the sections of her chapter, never to mention it again. From the remaining eight articles and chapters, seven (Stuvøy 2010; Stuvoy 2011; Stuvøy 2014; Gjørv et al. 2016; Loginova 2018; Sergunin 2018; Stammler, Hodgson, and Ivanova 2020) mentioned the 1994 UNDP Human Development report, which attests to the relevance of the in-depth analysis incurred in the sub-section "Broad Working Definition – The UN Definition" of this work.

In the body of works analysed, it prevails a broader conceptualisation of human security, focusing on a bottom-up perspective, with a subjective and localised/grassroots understanding of security, and an emphasis on the agency of indigenous peoples and women in identifying and increasing their own human security. Stammler, Hodgson, and Ivanova (2020) and Loginova (2018) analyse how indigenous communities adapt and produce security when dealing with extractive industries, concluding that they are able to increase human security for themselves albeit in precarious ways due to power imbalances and lack of governmental support.

Stuvøy (2011) analyses the gendered consequences of this interplay between human security and indigenous communities in the Arctic, whereas her other articles (2010; 2014) focus on the work of women's crisis centres in north-western Russia and their role as security providers. Sergunin (2018), on the other hand, approaches how the concepts of human security and sustainable development impact local policymaking and development strategies in the arctic Russia, concluding that economic and environmental concerns prevail. He also develops an interesting overview of the Russian scholarship around human security, and states that "it remains unclear what, specifically, Russian decision-makers and academics mean by these concepts" (Sergunin 2018, 52). Finally, Prior (2018) makes a case for the use of digital storytelling as an alternative non-masculinist representation and articulation of local understandings of security.

---

[4] Considering the scope of academic articles and chapters indexed by Google Scholar in March and April 2020.

Three of the surveyed texts somewhat recognise the interconnection between securitisation and human security, with Stuvøy (2014) and Gjørv et al. (2016) making explicit mentions to securitisation theory, but correlating it exclusively to militarisation. However, Gjørv et al. make an interesting assertion about negative and positive security, relating negative security to the use of force, and positive, to human security (Gjørv et al. 2016, 189). In a previous work, Stuvøy (2010) also acknowledges negative and positive security, linking the later to human security (2010, 286). Their militarised understanding of securitisation, however, does not allow the authors to connect securitisation to positive security and human security.

The third author to mention securitisation is Loginova (2018), who albeit not explicitly mentioning securitisation theory at all, is the one who gets the closest to a conceptualization of human security as positive securitisation. She does so when correlating the role of the local communities as securitising agents with improvements in the living conditions of the indigenous peoples (2018, 191). The examples of Stuvøy, Gjørv et al., and Loginova highlight how authors analysing Russia through a human security lens correlate the later with positive security, even when they do not employ an expanded understanding of securitisation that goes beyond mere militarisation of an issue. Hence, a methodical expansion of securitisation theory and its connection to human security, as developed in this work, provides researchers with a useful methodology for conceptualising and understanding the different roles securitisation play when analysing human security.

Finally, beyond the aforementioned theoretical matters that guided the selection of Russia as a case study for this work, this choice was also made in order to maximise the relevance of the analysis. Russia is an extremely centralised federation (Goble 2017), and as such, the local and regional strategies are based on "numerous conceptual and normative documents issued by Moscow" (Sergunin 2018, 58), with the municipalities being mandated by federal law to coordinate their local development plans with the federal human security/sustainable development strategies (Sergunin 2018, 64). Hence, due to its centralized nature, the notions around human security present in the documents of the national security strategy are the ones guiding the regional and municipal human security

and development strategies all around the nation. Thus, an analysis of the federal documents is relevant not only nationally, but also at a regional and municipal level.

In the next section, the main results from the content analysis on the documents from the Russian security doctrine will be put forth and analysed. This will allow for a deeper understanding of the securitised issues in the country, and whether they encompass human development issues and a focus on the individual as their referent. The analysis of the Russian case will then be compared to the three working definitions of human security crafted in this work, which will allow for the identification of whether Russia's approach to securitisation of development is congruent with the continuum of human security definitions.

Content Analysis of the Founding Documents of the Russian Security Doctrine[5]

In order to answer the main research questions guiding this work, that is *"Does Russia's security doctrine securitise development issues using the individual as a referent? If so, does it make for a Russian definition of human security?",* the author applied thematic content analysis on the "founding documents" of the Russian security doctrine (Security Council of the Russian Federation n.d.). Those are the 1. Article 83 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation; the 2. Federal Law "On Security"; the 3. National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation from 2015; and the 4. Annual Messages of the President of the Russian Federation to the Federal Assembly of the Federation. Only the four most recent annual messages were selected – 2016, 2018, 2019, and 2020[6], as they are the ones delivered after the release of the most recent security doctrine.

The constitutional article (Russian Federation 1993) concerns itself exclusively with establishing the presidential prerogatives when it comes to national security. Even though the establishment of such a constitutional article as a founder of Russia's security doctrine attests to the country's emphasis on a powerful presidential figure, it does not give any

[5] A in-depth version of the tables presented in this section can be found in the Appendix. For the complete database, access https://bit.ly/researchdtb

[6] There was no presidential address in 2017.

relevant indicators of either the individual as a referent of security nor of the securitisation of human development, thus not being relevant for this analysis.

Moving forward to the federal law "On Security" (Russian Federation 2010), the document gives some indications of a potential space for the individual as a referent for security in Russia when referring to ensuring personal safety (Art. 1) and the "observance and protection of the rights and freedoms of man and citizen" (Art. 2). These instances mark an acknowledgement of the existence of a sphere of personal safety that is within the scope for protection from the Russian state, and also substantiate the "man and citizen" as referents for security.

The main securitised objects are socio-economic issues, military capability, information and sovereignty. Human rights and freedoms are also securitised in the excerpt "observance and protection of the rights and freedoms of man and citizen" (Art. 2), even though the document does not explain what it means by the use of those terms. The main values underlying the law are the supremacy of the federal sphere over the local one, the strength of the presidential power, constitutionalism, and international cooperation. Concerns about sovereignty and territorial integrity are also present, along with mentions to international law, human rights and civil responsibility. The "protection of the rights and legitimate interests of Russian citizens abroad" (Art. 7), the country's participation in international organisations as well as in peacekeeping missions are also mentioned.

This being a federal law, it is unsurprising that federalism, presidentialism and constitutionalism are high on the list of underlying values. It is also unsurprising that the frameworks for securitisation and action are all state-centric, and that no mention to the state possibly becoming a source of insecurity is made. However, as this document acknowledges a sphere of personal security, and recognises the protections of rights and freedoms of individuals, represented by the "man and citizen", the law does allow for the individual as a referent for security. Moreover, it also securitises socio-economic issues and an unspecified version of human rights, which is coherent, at a superficial glance, with the understanding of human development and human security found in the UNDP Human Development Report (UNDP 1994).

Table 3. Content Analysis of the Federal Law on Security

Name	References
FEDERAL_LAW_ON_SECURITY_2010	108
SECURITISED ISSUES	30
Socio-Economic Issues	7
Military Capability	5
Information	4
Sovereignty	4
International Cooperation	3
Human Rights & Freedoms	2
Technology & Research	2
Others	3

Moving to the most current National Security Strategy (Russian Federation 2015), the document explicitly defines the individual as a referent for security when establishing national security as the "state of protection of the individual, society, and the state against internal and external threats" (Para. 6). It also includes the fulfilment of individual requirements as a part of the national interests (Para. 6), and emphasises the role of the state in guaranteeing "the security of the person" (Para. 44) and in creating conditions for the development of the individual (Para. 55). Moreover, individuals are also securitised as potential threats to Russia, when "individuals that cause harm to national interests" are classified as one of the main threats to state and public security (Para. 43). However, contrary to the federal law "On Security", the security strategy does not make any direct mention to a sphere of personal safety.

The main securitised objects are the economy, military capability, technology, health, environment and natural resources, and education. Interestingly, Russian history, culture, language and spiritual and moral values are also highly securitised, with human rights being encapsulated by those. Thus, this document consolidates a Russian understanding of human rights, as highlighted in the following excerpt:

> *Traditional Russian spiritual and moral values include* [emphasis added] the priority of the spiritual over the material, protection of human life and of *human rights and freedoms* [emphasis added], the family, creative labor, service to the homeland, the norms of morals and morality, humanism, charity, fairness, mutual assistance, collectivism, the historical unity of the peoples of Russia, and the continuity of our motherland's history. (Russian Federation 2015, para. 78)

The information sphere, foreign influence, international cooperation, energy and the stability of the Russian borders and territories are also highly securitised. Additionally, a few extra topics that are coherent with human development are also securitised, such as food, transportation, quality of life and well-being, right to property, migration, social and interethnic conflicts, demography and social inclusion.

The main values underlying the security doctrine are stability, both domestic and abroad, the aforementioned Russian spiritual and moral values, modernisation, human rights and freedoms (understood through the lenses of the traditional spiritual and moral values), the pursuit of a polycentric world and sovereignty. There are also mentions to international law, the protection of Russians abroad, the participation in humanitarian aid and peacekeeping missions as well as in international organisations, and to sustainable development, all indications of Russia's struggle to become – and be acknowledged as - a consolidated "leading world power" (Para. 30).

As it was the case with the federal law, the security doctrine also predictably establishes state-centric frameworks for securitisation and action through the "inviolability of the Russian Federation's constitutional order" (Para. 30), while also predictably not addressing instances where the Russian state might be the source of insecurity. However, as highlighted above, this strategy acknowledges the individual as a referent for security in a much more explicit manner than the federal law, recognising individuals as actors in the sphere of security, both as referents for security as well as sources of insecurity. There is also insipid accountability of civilians as a source of security in excerpts such as "educating young people as responsible citizens of Russia" (Para. 70). Moreover, many of the securitised objects are consistent with human development issues as well as the human security threats enumerated in the UNDP Human Development Report, which attest to a consistent securitisation of human development.

Table 4. Content Analysis of the Russian National Security Strategy

Name	References
RUSSIAN_NATIONAL_SECURITY_STRATEGY_2015	876
SECURITISED ISSUES	737
Economy	139

Military Capability	69
Technology	60
Health	58
Environment & Natural Resources	51
Education	42
History, Culture and Values	41
Information	31
Foreign Influence	27
International Cooperation	26
Energy	23
Stability of Borders and Territory	22
Terrorism and Extremism	18
Food	15
Social and Political Stability	15
Crime	14
Transportation	13
Quality of Life & Well-being	10
Corruption	9
Arms Control	8
Right to Property	7
Migration	7
Sovereignty	7
Infrastructure	6
State Bureaucracy	6
Social and Interethnic Conflicts	5
Demography	5
Social Inclusion	3

Moving over to the Annual Messages of the President of the Russian Federation to the Federal Assembly of the Federation, these will be analysed separately and in chronological order. It is also important to remember that, even though the post-structuralist understanding of discourse present at this work does not differentiate the speeches from the documents in terms of discourse materiality, the presidential messages are political discourses that do not necessarily entail the securitisation of every theme by its mere mention. Thus, even though the overall themes broached by these speeches are vast, the author only analysed the securitised issues, which were defined as securitised by the securitisation markers detailed in the methodology section.

Starting by the 2016 presidential address, it only has one – not securitised - reference to the individual in the passage "they [people] expect respect for their person, their rights, freedoms, and labour" (Putin 2016). The securitised issues are international cooperation, as in "[…] the comprehensive partnership and strategic cooperation between Russia and China have become one of the key factors in ensuring global and regional stability" (Putin 2016); foreign influence, as in "[e]verywhere, the result [of foreign influence] is the same: human tragedies and victims, degradation and ruin, and disappointment" (Putin 2016); the sanctions on Russia which "attempt to get us [Russia] to dance to another's tune and ignore our own fundamental national interests" (Putin 2016); sovereignty as in "[w]e do not want confrontation with anyone. […] We want to decide our destiny ourselves […]." (Putin 2016); and finally, unity as in "[l]et's remember that we are a single, united people, and we have only one Russia" (Putin 2016).

Terrorism, crime and migration are also mentioned, along with the bridge to Crimea, technological independence, strategic parity with the US and the Russian troops in Syria. These securitised topics are coherent with the security doctrine, and so are the speech's underlying values of modernisation, international cooperation and civil responsibility. There is no mention of human rights, but an emphasis on Russian values, as highlighted in the passage "our efforts are aimed at supporting the traditional values and the family" (Putin 2016). The framework for securitisation and action are state-centric, and again the state is not acknowledged as a potential source of insecurity.

The 2018 presidential address has a larger emphasis on the individual, as the president declares that "we consider every person important and valuable" (Putin 2018). Even though this declaration does not constitute a securitisation move, it is coherent with the securitisation of the individual advanced in the federal law and the security strategy. The securitised issues are military capability, as "Russia has developed […] highly effective but modestly priced systems to overcome missile defence" (Putin 2018); the relations with the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) which "is deploying missile defences and bringing NTO infrastructure closer to the Russian border" (Putin 2018); technology which "will prove decisive for the country's future" (Putin 2018); development, of which "effective defence will serve as a guarantee" (Putin 2018);

infrastructure, as in the "critical task […] to improve safety on the roads […]" (Putin 2018); and health, as "[d]isease prevention is a vitally important task" (Putin 2018). The matter of preserving the Russian people, sovereignty, habitation, economy and demography are also mentioned. Moreover, the operation in Syria and the sanctions on Russia are also addressed through a securitarian approach.

As aforementioned, the individual is not explicitly securitised in this document, but it nonetheless occupies an important role as the referent for the state's efforts. Moreover, the securitisation of development, infrastructure, health, habitation, economy and demography are also coherent with a potential human security perspective. Finally, as it was the case in all of the documents previously analysed, the framework for securitisation and action are also state-centric, and even though there are reprimands to government officials and bodies that do not work properly or are corrupt, this is not done in a securitarian way.

The presidential address from 2019 is very much like the one from 2018 in its emphasis on the individual, affirming that "[p]eople are at the core of the national projects" (Putin 2019) especially with regard to fighting poverty, as "the support programmes will be tailored to meet the needs of every specific applicant" (Putin 2019). As seen by these excerpts, even though none of the speech acts referring to the individual are explicitly securitised, they are congruent with an understanding of the individual as a referent for security as put forth in the security law and security strategy.

The securitised issues in 2019 were related to military capability and the "primary goal" of "enhancing the country's defence capability and security" (Putin 2019), the United States and its "unilateral withdrawal […] from the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty" (Putin 2019); food independence, which is "literally a matter of national security" (Putin 2019); infrastructure upgrades, which are "essential for enhancing the country's connectivity […] and unleashing the country's potential" (Putin 2019); and technologic leadership, which "will determine the future of the world and the future of Russia" (Putin 2019). Issues related to sovereignty, international cooperation, Russian strategic goals and, again, the sanctions against the country were also mentioned.

The main underlying values of the 2019 discourse are international cooperation, as in "[w]e intend to promote deeper ties with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations" (Putin 2019); deterrence, when, for example, the president states that "Russia does not intend to deploy such missiles in Europe first" (Putin 2019); unity and an "unified society" (Putin 2019); the traditional Russian values, which "preserve Russia as a civilisation with its own identity" (Putin 2019); modernisation, as in "we will accelerate the modernisation of secondary vocational education" (Putin 2019); and finally, the role of Russia as a leading nation, which will allow the country, for example, to "win the reputation of high quality [technology manufacturer] both on the domestic and foreign markets" (Putin 2019).

There were also mentions to a polycentric world order, freedoms, sovereignty, and civil responsibility. As it was the case in the 2018 presidential address, the above-mentioned references to the individual as well as the securitisation of human development issues are coherent with a potential human security approach. Moreover, in his 2019 discourse, the president also acknowledged the role of the state in violating individual rights, especially when reprimanding instances of unlawful detentions in the passage "[a] person is kept behind bars while the investigator has left on holiday and has not questioned him for several months. This should not happen […]." (Putin 2019). These comments, however, are not made in a securitarian manner, and due to the sole focus on governmental actions, the main frameworks for securitisation and action are still state-centric, as it is to be expected.

Finally, the 2020 presidential address is especially relevant for this study due to its temporal proximity. In its reference to the individual, the president highlights that "Russia's greatness is inseparable from dignified life of its every citizen" as well as that "the opinion of people, our citizens as the bearers of sovereignty and the main source of power must be decisive " (Putin 2020). The tying of Russia's greatness to the individual, as well as the establishment of their opinions as the main source of the state's power are speech acts that, even though not strictly securitising, correlate with acknowledging the individual as a referent for security.

The securitised issues, moreover, verse around the need for a strong presidentialism, as when the president highlights that "our country […] cannot properly advance and even exist sustainably as a parliamentary republic. Russia must remain a strong presidential republic." (Putin 2020); the importance of the Russian values, as in the passage "Russia's future and historical perspective depend on […] the values they [Russians] choose as their mainstay in life" (Putin 2020); military capabilities, which "creates the basis for Russia's progressive and peaceful development" (Putin 2020); and demography, as the "top national priority" is "the preservation and increase of Russia's population" (Putin 2020). Income, international cooperation, sovereignty and foreign currency reserves are also securitised. Furthermore, technology, regional conflicts, domestic equality and the Russian political system are likewise mentioned.

The prevalent values are that of Russian as a leading nation and a "country whose opinion cannot be ignored" (Putin 2020); strong presidentialism and the president's undoubted "right to determine the Government's tasks and priorities" (Putin 2020); the "restored […] state's unity" (Putin 2020); the importance of dialoguing with civil society, who "quite often […] [has] better knowledge of what, how and when should be changed" (Putin 2020); and lastly, the traditional Russian values, which again are at the base of "guaranteeing Russia's development as a large and successful country". There are also mentions to freedoms, sovereignty, constitutionalism, nationalism and civil responsibility. Finally, as shown above, the 2020's approach to the individual as well as that of securitisation of some human development issues is coherent with the previous presidential addresses, as well as with the federal law on security and the security strategy, which confirms the continued relevance of the older documents.

Table 5. Content Analysis of the Annual Messages of the President of the Russian Federation to the Federal Assembly of the Federation

Name	References
PRESIDENTIAL_ADDRESSES	415
PUTIN_2016	103
SECURITISED ISSUES	23
International Cooperation	5
Foreign Influence	3
Sanctions	3

Sovereignty	2
Unity	2
Terrorism	2
Others	6
PUTIN_2018	155
SECURITISED ISSUES	80
Military Capability	47
Directed to contain the US & NATO	27
Weapons of Mass Destruction	5
US & NATO	14
Technology	5
Development	3
Infrastructure	2
Health	2
Others	7
PUTIN_2019	91
SECURITISED ISSUES	39
Military Capability	20
US Violations of the INF Treaty	11
Food	2
Others	6
PUTIN_2020	66
SECURITISED ISSUES	23
Strong Presidentialism	3
History, Culture & Values	3
Military Capabilities	3
Demography	2
Income	2
International Cooperation	2
Sovereignty	2
Others	5

The content analysis of the founding documents of the Russian security doctrine, when put together, reveal coherence between the different discourses in their approach to national security. In answering the sub-research question *'Does this doctrine allow for the individual as a referent for security?'*, the content analysis found that it consistently does. Indeed, the individual as a referent is well established specially in the security strategy, but also corroborated by mentions to the individual in the law on security, and in all of the presidential addresses. This finding is extremely relevant to uncovering if is there a Russian

understanding of human security, since the acknowledgement of an individual referent is the uncontested base of human security (Tanaka 2019, 22).

With the confirmation that the Russian security doctrine does acknowledge the individual as a referent for security, it then becomes relevant to submit the content analysis to the same sub-set of research questions used for the development of the three working definitions of human security, which, as aforementioned, is:

> **1.** What are the securitised objects?; **2.** Do the securitised objects make for a cohesive securitisation move – that is, are they "presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure"? (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998, 23–24); **3.** What are the frameworks for securitisation and for action?; **4.** Which values are underlying the securitisation move?; **5.** What are the issues not addressed by this definition?; and **6.** Is this definition narrow, broad or broader?.

Concerning the first question, there is a vast gamut of securitised issues in the analysed documents, with the military, the economy, international cooperation, technology, health, the environment, education, and Russian values being on top. Accordingly, the analysis also found a consistent securitisation of development issues, many of which are also salient in the list of human security threats found in the 1994 UNDP Development Report, such as economy, health and demography.

The emphasis, however, is on social and economic issues, which is coherent with the preponderance of social and economic rights over civil and political ones (Bindman 2015, 344–47) mentioned in the literature review. Moreover, not all of the securitised objects make for a cohesive securitisation move, since their presence in regular security-related documents from the government imply that they are subscribed to the normal bounds of political procedure.

Even though some of the securitisation found in the presidential addresses, such as when president Putin frames the United States' withdraw from the INF treaty as an urgent security issue, and then threatens to "respond with mirror or asymmetric actions" (Putin

2019), entail a cohesive securitisation move, these are restricted to traditional security issues.

The securitisation of development, on the other hand, is not cohesive as it escapes the requirements made by Buzan, Wæver et al. that securitisation moves justify actions necessarily outside the normal bounds of political procedure (1998, 23-24). However, as aforementioned, these securitisations within the normal mode of politics (Roe 2012, 250–57) remain relevant as they still elevate an issue to the level of security, attach urgency to the theme and justify a change in behaviour on the part of the securitising actor (Floyd 2016, 684).

Furthermore, it is unsurprising that all the frameworks for action and securitisation present in the documents are state-centric. There is, however, an acknowledgement and even a transfer of accountability to civil society in instances such as the declaration that "national development depends on them [the people]" (Putin 2019). Even though this does not take away from the state-centric framework, it expands the state-centrism somewhat while also being coherent with a securitisation of the individual.

Moving forward to the fourth question, the values underlying the analysed documents are also manifold, with modernisation, traditional Russian values, international cooperation, federal supremacy and Russia as a leading nation being on top. However, many values often associated with the liberal western order are also mentioned, such as freedoms (economic, constitutional, individual, etc), the rule of international law, democracy, peacekeeping and even human rights. These liberal values, however, are taken as within the scope of the ever-more encompassing Russian spiritual and moral values, which are securitised to become the very foundation of the Russian statehood (Russian Federation 2015 sec. 11).

The label of Russian spiritual and moral values is generously applied to history, identity, family, culture, education, traditions, morals, religion and unity, making their preservation a matter of national security. As mentioned in the literature review, however, there is a contradiction within this discourse. Whereas the Russian spiritual and moral values seem, on the surface, to encompass and agree with their western liberal counterparts, they are

actually constructed in opposition to them, which are portrayed in the domestic Russian debate as "godless, decadent and immoral" (Østbø 2017, 201). This contradiction can also be inferred by the consistent securitisation of the West, especially of the United States and NATO, along with the prime importance given to preserving Russian spiritual and moral values in a context of foreign influence which works "through inciting color revolutions and destroying traditional Russian religious and moral values" (Russian Federation 2015 sec. 43).

Moving to the fifth question, on the issues not addressed by the documents, it has been previously emphasised that the main absent issue is the recognition of the role of the state as a source of insecurity. This, however, is not a surprising finding in governmental documents. Finally, in order to answer the final question of the sub-set, which refers to the broadness of the definition of human security, one should first determine if the analysed documents provide enough central elements to be coherent with an understanding of human security.

This effort will be undertaken in the next section, where the author will compare the securitised issues and prevalent values found in the thematic content analysis of Russia's security doctrine to the ones in the three previously defined working definitions of human security. This will allow for a grounded understanding of whether Russia's security doctrine is coherent with an understanding of human security, and where does it fit in the spectrum.

Comparative Analysis Between Russia and The Three Working Definitions

As it has already been found, Russia's security doctrine does allow for the individual as a referent for security, as well as securitises human development issues. Now it remains to be found if these elements allow for the crafting of a Russian definition of human security. However, the lack of a consensus around what human security encompasses means that just comparing the development issues securitised in Russia to any case or checklist would be arbitrary, as the breadth of competing human security definitions means that what is considered human security in one case might not be in the other.

Thus, in order to do justice to the depth of the debate around human security, as well to avoid biases in the study, the author decided to build a framework for analysis based on a 'definitional continuum' of human security. The main positions on human security were mapped and placed on the spectrum of definitions according to the broadness of the issues securitised as human security threats.

As extensively detailed in the section "Three Working Definitions of Human Security", the three main definitions were placed in the spectrum under the label of 1. ***narrow*** – when the referent is the individual, in a state-centric framework, and the threats securitised are only the ones accrued from violence, that is 'freedom from fear'; 2. ***broad*** – when the referent is the individual in a state-centric framework, and the threats securitised are the ones accrued from violence and also from human development issues – that is, freedom from fear and want; and 3. ***broader*** – when the referent is the individual in a post-liberal framework and the threats securitised are those related to freedom from fear and from want. The establishment of this grounded epistemological base will then allow for a comparative analysis of the Russian case that will not be restricted to one case or approach, but to a vast array of them.

Table 2. The Three Working definitions of Human Security

	Narrow	**Broad (the U.N)**	**Broader**
Securitised Objects	Freedom from Fear	Freedom from Fear and Want	Freedom from Fear and Want
Cohesive or Not cohesive Securitisation Move	Not cohesive	Cohesive	Not cohesive
Framework for Securitisation	State centric	State centric	Post-liberal
Framework for Action	State centric	State centric	Open Political Space
Issues not addressed	Co-constitution between freedom from fear and want	Inclusion of non-liberal actors; States as a source of insecurity.	Resource constraints; Coordination between securitising actors.

As aforementioned, the narrow definition securitises objects that revolve around direct and indirect violence – that is, freedom from fear. In this context, the security threats are related

to traditional security issues, but with a consideration of their impacts on the individual. However, there is not one homogeneous hierarchisation of threats, nor advocacy for consistent emergency measures. The frameworks for securitisation and for action are state-centric, as the focus is on being serviceable to policymakers and actionable within the current international framework. The values underlying the securitisation move are that of sovereignty, the social contract, and pragmaticism. Due to its neglect of the freedom from want aspect, however, this definition prioritises violence over development issues, and does not address the co-construction between those two aspects.

There are some aspects of this narrow understanding of human security that are congruent with the Russian approach, such as the state-centric framework, the policy-oriented focus and the preoccupation with sovereignty. Moreover, traditional security issues such as military capability and terrorism are on top of the Russian security agenda, and there are a few instances where this securitisation is done through the consideration of their impacts on the individual. For example, when the security strategy highlights the need to "increase the protection of citizens and society from the influence of destructive information from extremist and terrorist organizations" (Russian Federation 2015 sec. 47). This approach, however, is not frequent and most of the securitisation of traditional threats is done with the state as the sole referent.

Furthermore, one could argue that, contrary to the narrow definition which centres around the maintenance of the status quo in the international framework, Russia aims to carve a more prominent space for itself. This becomes evident through the consistent importance given to establishing Russia as a leading nation in a context of a polycentric world order (Russian Federation 2015 sec. 30). The securitisation of human development is thus also seen as a tool to reach those goals, as evidenced for example when the president asserts that "[w]e need to master creative power and boost development so that no obstacles prevent us from moving forward with confidence and independently." (Putin 2018).

Hence, the narrow working definition of human security does not define the Russian approach, as Russia seldom refers to traditional security issues through the lenses of human security, and, more importantly, does not aim for the maintenance of the current international framework. Moreover, as it has been highlighted by the content analysis, the

country also consistently securitises aspects of human development, which are encompassed by the freedom from want aspect that the narrow definition rejects.

Moving forward to the broad definition of human security, it is important to highlight that it is based on the interpretation developed through the content analysis of the UNDP Human Development Report from 1994, which is broadly accepted as the founding document of human security (King and Murray 2001, 585; Paris 2001, 89; Bajpai 2003, 198; Schittecatte 2006, 130; Chandler 2008, 427; Martin and Owen 2013, 1; Krause 2014, 98; Tanaka 2019, 21). This approach to human security securitises violence as well as human development aspects in a cohesive way with the aim of establishing a new development paradigm. It does so through a state-centric framework focused on the national and international levels. The threats to human security are portrayed as transnational, but the framework for action is also international and national, through state collaboration and international institutions.

The broad definition also emphasises economic action and resource redistribution through a UN-supported framework. In order to reach Human Security, states must collaborate and redistribute resources among each other, with the states themselves being responsible for guaranteeing the human security of their citizens. The self-determination of states, their sovereignty, liberal democratic peace and the social contract are underlying values present in the definition. Due to its state-centric framework, the UN Definition does not address the issue of states being the source of the threat to Human Security in an adequate way. The tool presented for such cases is an international intervention, which is also state-centric.

The findings from the content analysis on the Russian security doctrine documents present many aspects in common with the ones highlighted by this definition. The encompassing of the freedom from want aspect is congruent with the Russian securitisation of development, as it is often done with the setting of the individual as the referent, as exemplified by the following excerpts: "ensuring the balance of the interests of the indigenous population and migrant workers, including foreign citizens, with due account being taken of their ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and religious differences" (Russian Federation 2015 sec. 62); "everything hinges on efforts to preserve the people of Russia

and to guarantee the prosperity of our citizens" (Putin 2018); and "[t]he rights, opportunities and guarantees […] are not provided equally in different regions and municipalities. This is unfair to people and is directly threatening our society and national integrity." (Putin 2020, 2020).

The goal of the UN's approach to human security is furthering the establishment of a new development paradigm based on a state-centric international framework centred around the organization. As aforementioned, Russia also has the goal of establishing a new state-centric international framework. Russia's, however, is not strictly related to development as the UN one, but centred around a polycentric order based on equal relationships between states and where Russia has a consolidated status of a leading world power. These competing goals, however, are explainable by the different nature of the actors involved – one being an international organisation, and the other, a state. However, both share the focus on state-centrism, sovereignty and self-determination. Furthermore, in both approaches, the state is the main responsible for guaranteeing the protection and development of their citizens. Hence, the role of the state as a source of insecurity is scarcely mentioned in the UN definition, and even less so in the Russian security documents.

Moreover, Russia, as well as the UN, emphasise the economy in their approaches to development. The UN does so through its push for an international framework of resource redistribution, and Russia, through the consistent and marked securitisation of economic issues. Russia also values its participation in international organisations, and is explicit in advocating the "accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter" (Russian Federation 2015 para. 104) especially with regard to international intervention and peacekeeping missions.

Furthermore, both actors stress the importance of international collaboration, with Russia's approach focusing especially on regional integration through the Commonwealth of Independent States, and the strengthening of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, the BRICS, the Eurasian Economic Union and finally, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (Russian Federation 2015 sec. 88-96). These choices of privileged partners highlight Russia's goal of strengthening its influence in its

immediate neighbourhood, as well as of furthering a world order based on the collective power of emerging nations.

There is, nevertheless, a marked discrepancy between the UN's definition of human security and Russia's approach, and it has to do with the essential battle between those two actors' predominant values. The preservation of the liberal democratic peace is central to the UN conception, and this means the pursuit of a universal homogenisation of values based on the western liberal consensus (Peterson 2013, 322–23). This overarching goal, however, makes the liberal democratic peace necessarily exclusionary of non-liberal values and actors as it does not have any space for moral relativism or dissent (Peterson 2013, 321–27).

Russia, as seen through the content analysis of its security documents, adheres to the liberal democratic rhetoric, often mentioning the importance of democracy, international law, humanitarian interventions, peacekeeping and human rights. However, a closer look at its political system and predominant values paints a different picture. For the past decades, Russia has been going through a process of progressive concentration of powers, becoming an electoral authoritarian regime (Golosov 2011, 623). In such regimes, the elections fail to meet the standards to be considered free and fair, but remain the principal source of regime legitimacy (Levitsky and Way 2002, 52–54). Thus, the rhetorical emphasis on protecting democracy – which could be interpreted as adherence to liberal values – is actually an emphasis on protecting the regime, as it becomes evident in speeches that securitise the need for a strong presidentialism, such as "I would like to emphasise that our country […] cannot properly advance and even exist sustainably as a parliamentary republic. Russia must remain a strong presidential republic." (Putin 2020).

Hence, the discourse around democracy, which seems liberal on the surface, is actually an instrumentalisation made by the government in order to gain regime legitimacy both at home and abroad. Moreover, as it has been aforementioned, the same is true to the mentions of humanitarianism and human rights. The discourse around these values, especially when paired with mentions to international organisations and international law, may seem coherent with the western liberal framework, but the Russian interpretation is different.

Russia understands them through its own notions of traditional spiritual and moral values, which are "self-evident, eternal, absolute, and unchangeable – but also something that is under attack and must be protected" (Østbø 2017, 201). The source of the attack, however, is the West, to whom the spiritual and moral values stand in intrinsic opposition (ibidem). Thus, the values advocated by the UN and by Russia are inherently antagonistic and cannot be conciliated.

To conclude, there a lot of similarities between the broad definition of human security and the Russian approach, such as the encompassing of the freedom from want aspect, the focus on economic development, the state-centric focus and the goal of establishing a new international framework. However, the broad definition is not adequate for describing Russia due to the irreconcilable conflict between the predominant values of liberal democratic peace and the Russian spiritual and moral values.

At last, moving to the third and final working definition of human security, the broader one acknowledges the securitisation of issues related to freedom from fear and want but does not securitise specific subjects. Instead, it defends securitisation according to the specific contexts of the people in a situation of insecurity. Hence, due to its intentional lack of definition and hierarchisation, this approach does not make for a cohesive securitisation move. The frameworks for securitisation and for action are a rebuilt international system which is not intrinsically tied to liberal values, allows for the inclusion of dissenting voices, and empowers individuals to discuss and act on their contextually defined human insecurities – in short, a post-liberal non-state centric international framework. The values underlying the securitisation move would be empowerment, post-liberalism, and equality. As it rejects a consensual and hierarchised listing of human security threats, the broader approach does not address how to accommodate the application of limited resources to a broad range of issues. The coordination problem resultant from allowing for individual securitisation and action is also not addressed.

At first, it may seem counterintuitive to compare such a post-structuralist understanding of human security to a content analysis built on governmental documents, which are by nature based on a fixed structure. However, comparing Russia's security doctrine to this broader definition allows for the better potential placement of the Russian approach in the human

security ‘definitional continuum’. The broader definition encompasses both freedom from fear and want, which is coherent with the findings on Russia. The definition’s lack of specificity on the securitised issues, and its focus on local realities and contexts, allows for an even broader understanding of what figures as human security, with the Russian securitisation of spiritual and moral values becoming a legitimate human security concern in this definition.

Moreover, the definition’s post-liberal stance, which allows for the inclusion of dissenting voices and values, also opens up space for the Russian spiritual and moral values as legitimate guiding values in the international system. As a definition that presupposes no hierarchies in the international system, this is also congruent with Russia’s desired polycentric world order. The focus on equality is also fitting with the Russian discourse, as the country securitises both the equality between states - “[t]he safeguarding of national interests is furthered by a […] system of international relations […] based on the principles of equality […]” (Russian Federation 2015 sec. 87); and between individuals – “[t]he rights, opportunities and guarantees, that are legally equal for all citizens, are not provided equally […]. This […]is directly threatening our society and national integrity.” (Putin 2020).

Furthermore, the core of the broader definition is the empowerment of the individual, which is not entirely at odds with the Russian approach, which emphasises the role of the individual in its security and public policy. However, acknowledging the individual is different from empowering them, and Russia’s focus on federalism, a strong presidentialism and unity attest to it. Additionally, as it has been thoroughly explicated, Russia’s approach to securitising development is inherently state-centric. This is, of course, not compatible with the broader definition, which advocates for a post-liberal non-state-centric international framework. Hence, the broader definition is also not completely adequate to describe the Russian approach. The next section will explore whether is there a Russian understanding of human security, even if the country’s approach is not fully compatible with any of the three working definitions.

Is there a Russian Understanding of Human Security?

As seen by the analysis developed in the previous section, Russia's approach is not fully compatible with any of the three working definitions of human security developed in this work. It does have points in common with all of them, but not enough to be fully categorised as either narrow, broad or broader. This, however, does not rule out the possibility that the country may have an understanding of human security that fits within the 'definitional continuum' here established.

Figure 1. The Human Security 'Definitional Continuum'



The definition with the least similarity to Russia is the narrow one, as the country does not sufficiently securitise traditional threats through an individual perspective. Moreover, Russia does securitise human development issues, which makes it an adherent of the freedom from want perspective. This positions Russia beyond the narrow definition in the continuum. The broad definition, on the other hand, is the most similar to the Russian approach, as both acknowledge freedom from want, focus on economic development and state-centrism, and aim to establish a new international framework. However, the irreconcilable differences in values mean that Russia could not be considered as an adept of the broad definition of human security, either. This also locates the country beyond the broad definition in the continuum.

Finally, Russia's approach to the securitisation of development is also mostly at odds with the broader definition of human security. Even though both encompass freedom from want, and the broader approach is congruent with the Russian emphasis on its spiritual and moral values, the lack of empowerment of the individual and the state-centric focus in the Russian approach means that it also could not be comfortably explained by a broader approach to human security. Hence, Russia is positioned somewhere behind the broader definition in the continuum.

However, as aforementioned, the fact that the country does not entirely fit within any of the major definitions of human security does not mean that it does not have its own. Placing Russia in the continuum is thus helpful in clarifying the country's approach to human security as well as locating its level of broadness. As the analysis of the securitised issues and predominant values of the country's security doctrine revealed, the Russian approach is most similar to the broad definition of human security, but adheres to the post-liberal values of the broader one. Thus, the Russian take on human security can be classified as selectively broader. This classification then allows for the final answering of the research questions guiding this work.

For the main research questions, which are *Does Russia's security doctrine securitise development issues using the individual as a referent? If so, does it make for a Russian definition of human security?,* the answer is that the Russian security doctrine does indeed securitise development issues using the individual as a referent, and does so in a way that is compatible with a Russian definition of human security. In order to clarify why the Russian approach is compatible with human security, the many times aforementioned sub-set of research questions must come up again, this time to be fully answered.

> **1.** What are the securitised objects?; **2.** Do the securitised objects make for a cohesive securitisation move – that is, are they "presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure"? (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998, 23–24); **3.** What are the frameworks for securitisation and for action?; **4.** Which values are underlying the securitisation move?; **5.** What are the issues not addressed by this definition?; and **6.** Is this definition narrow, broad or broader?

Russian Definition of Human Security: The Russian Definition of Human Security securitises issues related to freedom from fear and want, but with a marked focus on freedom from want, and especially, on economic and social development. Furthermore, the securitised objects that were analysed do not always make for a cohesive securitisation move, as many of them are part of governmental doctrines, which are inside the normal bounds of political procedure. Regarding the frameworks for securitisation and action, they are consistently state-centric, with the predominant underlying values being that of

modernisation, traditional Russian values, international cooperation, federal supremacy and the role of Russia as a leading nation in the world. Additionally, issues not addressed are predictably those related to the role of the state as a source of insecurity for the individual. Finally, because the Russian definition allows for the securitisation of both freedom from fear and want in a state-centric framework, but is also post-liberal in its approach to the values attached to human security, this is a selectively broader definition.

Figure 3. The Place of Russia in the Human Security 'Definitional Continuum'



Conclusion

Human security occupies a significant place in global discourses of peace, development and diplomacy (Tanaka 2019, 21). Hence, figuring out whether Russia's security discourse is coherent with a definition of human security is a relevant and novel endeavour that expands the understanding of human security beyond western liberal contexts. It was in this effort that this work answered the questions *"Does Russia's security doctrine securitise development issues using the individual as a referent? If so, does it make for a Russian definition of human security?"*.

In order to answer such questions, this study first established a theoretical framework based on a conceptualisation of human security as an instance of securitisation. It also furthered a critical understanding of securitisation that expanded the theory to encompass non-urgent nor exceptional behaviour from the securitising actor. This expansion then allowed for the use of documents from Russia's security doctrine as a basis for the analysis of the country's securitisation of human development.

Moreover, as a tool to overcome the lack of consensus around the definitions of human security, this work first established a baseline of human security through a 'definitional

continuum' that encompassed 'narrow', 'broad' and 'broader' approaches to the term. The narrow working definition referred to approaches to human security where the referent is the individual, in a state centric framework, and the threats securitised are only the ones accrued from violence, that is 'freedom from fear'. The broad definition, on the other hand, referred to approaches whose referent is the individual in a state centric framework, and the threats securitised are the ones accrued from violence and also from human development issues – that is, freedom from fear and want. Finally, the broader definition encompassed understandings of human security that had the individual as its referent in a post-liberal framework and the threats securitised as those related to freedom from fear and from want.

Based on the same sub-set of research questions that guided the construction of these working definitions, the 'founding documents' of Russia's security doctrine were then investigated through content analysis in order to elucidate whether the country complied with the two pre-requisites for having a human security doctrine: the securitisation of human development aspects, and the establishment of the individual as a referent for security This analysis found that indeed Russia does securitise human development with the individual as a referent.

In a step further to identify if this securitisation was coherent with an understanding of human security, this work then set out to compare the findings from the content analysis of the Russian documents to the three pre-established working definitions of human security. In doing so, it found that the Russian approach is compatible with an understanding of human security as it securitises issues related to freedom from fear and want, with a marked focus on freedom from want and economic development. Furthermore, Russia's approach to human security establishes frameworks for securitisation and action that are consistently state-centric, with the predominant underlying values being that of modernisation, traditional Russian values, international cooperation, federal supremacy and the role of Russia as a leading nation in the world. Additionally, the issues not addressed are those related to the role of the state as a source of insecurity for the individual. Also, because the Russian approach to human security shares the focus on economic development, state-centrism, and the establishment of a new international framework with the 'broad'

definition, but is post-liberal in its values as the 'broader definition', it is labelled as selectively broader.

A strictly western liberal understanding of human security would immediately dismiss Russia's approach as incompatible due to the irreconcilable conflict between the values of liberal democratic peace and the Russian spiritual and moral values. The broader comparative methodology of this work, however, takes critical and post-liberal understandings of human security in consideration. This leads to a deeper comprehension of Russia's idiosyncratic approach to human security, allowing for its placing in the continuum and for the detailed comparison of which of its aspects are shared and which are intrinsically Russian.

The main limitations of this work, however, had to do with research feasibility and scope. For example, the measuring of the audience acceptance to the securitisation moves analysed in this paper would have been desirable, as it would have allowed for a more complete picture of the human security discourse in Russia. However, as this effort would require extensive first-hand human data collection, it was not undertaken. Moreover, this work conceptualised human security as an instance of potential positive securitisation. Nevertheless, confirming this potentiality would require analysing the results of the securitisation moves (Floyd 2007b, 337) and not only the discourses around them. However, as this research does not focus on actual policies or practices, but only on discourses, the analysis of empirical results is outside of its scope.

Hence, even though it has been found that Russia's securitisation of human development is coherent with an understanding of human security, it does not mean that the practices of the Russian government are coherent with its own discourse. This study, however, proves that, at least in the discursive and ideational realm, Russia has what could be referred to as a selectively broader human security doctrine. This is relevant to security scholarship in two ways: first, in providing the empirical studies on human security in Russia with a robust theoretical framework for comparison; and second, in establishing a comparative methodology of human security that takes in consideration the wide variety of approaches to term, is inclusive of non-western contexts, and can be infinitely expanded with novel case studies for comparison and analysis.

Bibliography

Allen, Amy. 2016. ‘Critical Theory and the Idea of Progress’. In *The End of Progress: Decolonizing the Normative Foundations of Critical Theory*, 1–34. New York: Columbia University Press.

Ambrosetti, David. 2008. ‘Human Security as Political Resource: A Response to David Chandler’s `Human Security: The Dog That Didn’t Bark’’. *Security Dialogue* 39 (4): 439–44. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010608094040.

Aradau, Claudia. 2004. ‘Security and the Democratic Scene: Desecuritization and Emancipation’. *Journal of International Relations and Development* 7 (4): 388–413. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jird.1800030.

Averre, Derek, and Lance Davies. 2015. ‘Russia, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: The Case of Syria’. *International Affairs* 91 (4): 813–34. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12343.

Bækken, Havard, and Johannes Due Enstad. 2020. ‘Identity under Siege: Selective Securitization of History in Putin’s Russia’. *The Slavonic and East European Review* 98 (2): 321–44. https://doi.org/10.5699/slaveasteurorev2.98.2.0321.

Bajpai, Kanti. 2003. ‘The Idea of Human Security’. *International Studies* 40 (3): 195–228. https://doi.org/10.1177/002088170304000301.

Baldwin, David A. 1997. ‘The Concept of Security’. *Review of International Studies* 23 (1): 5–26. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210597000053.

Barry, David. 2019. ‘Ethnodoxy, National Exceptionalism, and Xenophobia: A Case Study of Contemporary Russia’. *National Identities* 21 (3): 223–39. https://doi.org/10.1080/14608944.2018.1431876.

Bashirov, Galib. 2018. ‘Between Strong and Weak Securitization: A Comparative Study of Russian and Turkish Approaches to Migration from Central Asia’. In *Eurasia on the Move: Interdisciplinary Approaches to a Dynamic Migration Region*, edited by Marlene Laruelle and Caress Schenk, 13–26. Washington, D.C.: Central Asia Program.

Bell, Duncan. 2016. ‘Liberal Internationalism’. In *Encyclopedia Britannica*. Accessed July 30 2020. https://www.britannica.com/topic/liberal-internationalism.

Bindman, Eleanor. 2015. ‘The State, Civil Society and Social Rights in Contemporary Russia’. *East European Politics* 31 (3): 342–60. https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2015.1063488.

Black, David R. 2006. ‘Mapping the Interplay of Human Security Practice and Debates: The Canadian Experience’. In *A Decade of Human Security: Global Governance and New Multilateralisms*, edited by Sandra J. MacLean, David R. Black, and Timothy M. Shaw, 53–62. Global Security in a Changing World. Aldershot, England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate Pub.

Booth, Ken. 1991. ‘Security and Emancipation’. *Review of International Studies* 17 (04): 313. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210500112033.

———. 1997. ‘Security and Self: Reflections of a Fallen Realist’. In *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases*, edited by Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, 38. University of Minnesota Press.

Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. 1998. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner.

Chandler, David. 2008. ‘Review Essay: Human Security: The Dog That Didn’t Bark’. *Security Dialogue* 39 (4): 427–38. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010608094037.

Cox, Robert W. 1981. ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory’. *Millennium* 10 (2): 126–55. https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298810100020501.

Duffield, Mark. 2007. ‘Human Security and Global Danger’. In *Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples*, 111–32. Oxford, United Kingdom: Polity Press. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/gla/detail.action?docID=1179717.

Edenborg, Emil. 2019. ‘Russia’s Spectacle of “Traditional Values”: Rethinking the Politics of Visibility’. *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 0 (0): 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1080/14616742.2018.1560227.

Fedor, Julie. 2013. ‘Securitizing the Russian Soul’. In *Russia and the Cult of State Security - The Chekist Tradition, From Lenin to Putin*, 160–81. London: Routledge.

Floyd, Rita. 2007a. ‘Human Security and the Copenhagen School’s Securitization Approach:’ *Human Security Journal* 5 (37): 38–49.

———. 2007b. ‘Towards a Consequentialist Evaluation of Security: Bringing Together the Copenhagen and the Welsh Schools of Security Studies’. *Review of International Studies* 33 (2): 327–50. https://doi.org/10.1017/S026021050700753X.

———. 2016. ‘Extraordinary or Ordinary Emergency Measures: What, and Who, Defines the “Success” of Securitization?’ *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 29 (2): 677–94. https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2015.1077651.

Franceschet, Antonio. 2006. ‘Global Legalism and Human Security’. In *A Decade of Human Security: Global Governance and New Multilateralisms*, edited by David R. Black, Sandra J. MacLean, and Timothy M. Shaw, 31–38. Aldershot, England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate Pub.

Giglietto, Fabio, Laura Iannelli, Luca Rossi, and Augusto Valeriani. 2016. ‘Fakes, News and the Election: A New Taxonomy for the Study of Misleading Information within the Hybrid Media System’. SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2878774. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network.

Gjørv, Gunhild Hoogensen, Brigt Dale, Maria Lvova, Kari-Anne Bråten, Victoria González, Dawn Bazely, Julia Christensen, Andrew Tanentzap, and Evgeny Bojko. 2016. ‘Human Security in the Arctic: The IPY GAPS Project’. In *Implications and Consequences of Anthropogenic Pollution in Polar Environments*, edited by Roland Kallenborn, 181–201. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg. http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-642-12315-3_10.

Goble, Paul. 2017. ‘Hyper-Centralization of Russia Threatens Its Development and Survival’. Think Tank. *The Jamestown Foundation* (blog). October 2017. Accessed June 21 2020. https://jamestown.org/program/hyper-centralization-russia-threatens-development-survival/.

Golosov, Grigorii V. 2011. ‘The Regional Roots of Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia’. *Europe-Asia Studies* 63 (4): 623–39. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2011.566427.

Gorr, David, and Wolf J Schünemann. 2013. ‘Creating a Secure Cyberspace – Securitization in Internet Governance Dis- Courses and Dispositives in Germany and Russia’. *International Review of Information Ethics* 20 (December): 37–51.

Hama, Hawre Hasan. 2017. ‘State Security, Societal Security, and Human Security’. *Jadavpur Journal of International Relations* 21 (1): 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1177/0973598417706591.

Hansen, Lene. 2013. *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*. London ; New York: Routledge.

Hehir, Aidan. 2017. ‘Responsibility to Protect’. *Oxford Bibliographies*, May 2017. Accessed May 25 2020. https://doi.org/10.1093/OBO/9780199743292-0024.

Huysmans, Jef. 2011. ‘What’s in an Act? On Security Speech Acts and Little Security Nothings’. *Security Dialogue* 42 (4–5): 371–83. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010611418713.

Khrushcheva, Olga. 2011. ‘The Creation of an Energy Security Society as a Way to Decrease Securitization Levels between the European Union and Russia in Energy Trade’. *Journal of Contemporary European Research* 7 (2): 216–30.

King, Gary, and Christopher J. L. Murray. 2001. ‘Rethinking Human Security’. *Political Science Quarterly* 116 (4): 585–610. https://doi.org/10.2307/798222.

Krasteva, Anna. 2017. ‘Editorial of Special Focus: Securitisation and Its Impact on Human Rights and Human Security’. *Global Campus Human Rights Journal* 315: 315–22. https://doi.org/20.500.11825/427.

Krause, Keith. 2004. ‘Is Human Security “More than Just a Good Idea”?’ In *Promoting Security: But How and For Whom? Contributions to BICC’s Ten-Year Anniversary Conference*, edited by Michael Brzoska and Peter J. Croll, 43–46. BICC Brief.

———. 2007. ‘Towards a Practical Human Security Agenda’. Policy Paper 26. Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).

———. 2009. ‘Human Security’. In *Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: A Lexicon*, edited by Vincent Chetail, 147–57. Oxford: OUP Oxford.

———. 2014. ‘Critical Perspectives on Human Security’. In *Routledge Handbook of Human Security*, edited by Mary Martin and Taylor Owen, 1st ed., 76–93. London; New York: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315885926.

Kuczyńska-Zonik, Aleksandra. 2017. ‘The Securitization of National Minorities in the Baltic States’. *Baltic Journal of Law & Politics* 10 (2): 26–45. https://doi.org/10.1515/bjlp-2017-0011.

Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan Way. 2002. ‘The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism’. *Journal of Democracy* 13 (2): 51–65. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2002.0026.

Loginova, Julia. 2018. ‘Achieving Human and Societal Security in Oil Producing Regions: A Komi-Izhma Community Perspective from Pripechor’e, Russia’. In *Human and Societal Security in the Circumpolar Arctic: Local and Indigenous Communities*, edited by Kamrul Hossain, Jose Miguel Roncero Martin, and Anna Petrétei, 191–211. Leiden ; Boston: Brill Nijhoff.

Lvova, Maria. 2014. ‘The Political Exclusion and Commodification of Women’. In *Environmental and Human Security in the Arctic*, edited by Gunhild Hoogensen Gjorv, Dawn R. Bazely, Marina Goloviznina, and Andrew J. Tanentzap, 250–68. London ; New York: Routledge.

Martin, Mary, and Taylor Owen. 2013. ‘Introduction’. In *Routledge Handbook of Human Security*, edited by Mary Martin and Taylor Owen, 1st ed., 1–14. London ; New York: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315885926.

Merkel, Wolfgang. 2004. ‘Embedded and Defective Democracies’. *Democratization* 11 (5): 33–58. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510340412331304598.

Morozov, Viatcheslav. 2002. ‘Resisting Entropy, Discarding Human Rights: Romantic Realism and Securitization of Identity in Russia’. *Cooperation and Conflict* 37 (4): 409–29. https://doi.org/10.1177/001083602762574487.

Munster, Rens van. 2012. ‘Securitization’. In *Oxford Bibliographies*. July 2018. Accessed May 18 2020. 10.1093/OBO/9780199743292-0091.

Nuñez-Mietz, Fernando G. 2019. ‘Resisting Human Rights through Securitization: Russia and Hungary against LGBT Rights’. *Journal of Human Rights* 18 (5): 543–63. https://doi.org/10.1080/14754835.2019.1647100.

OHCHR. 2020. ‘Ratification Status for Russian Federation’. United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner - UN Treaty Body Database. 2020. Accessed July 04 2020.
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=144&Lang=EN.

Østbø, Jardar. 2017. ‘Securitizing “Spiritual-Moral Values” in Russia’. *Post-Soviet Affairs* 33 (3): 200–216. https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2016.1251023.

Owen, Taylor. 2004. ‘Human Security - Conflict, Critique and Consensus: Colloquium Remarks and a Proposal for a Threshold-Based Definition’. *Security Dialogue* 35 (3): 373–87. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010604047555.

Paris, Roland. 2001. ‘Human Security - Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?’ *International Security* 26 (2): 87–102. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3092123.

Peoples, Columba. 2020. ‘Emancipation, Power, Insecurity: Critical Theory and Immanent Critique of Human Security’. In *Handbook of Critical International Relations*, edited by Steven C. Roach, 55–71. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Peterson, Jenny H. 2013. ‘Creating Space for Emancipatory Human Security: Liberal Obstructions and the Potential of Agonism’. *International Studies Quarterly* 57 (2): 318–28. https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12009.

Prior, Tahnee Lisa. 2018. ‘Digital Storytelling: A Bottom-Up Approach to Gender & Human Security in the Barents Region?’ In *Human and Societal Security in the*

Circumpolar Arctic: Local and Indigenous Communities, edited by Kamrul Hossain, Jose Miguel Roncero Martin, and Anna Petrétei, 309–38. Leiden ; Boston: Brill Nijhoff.

Putin, Vladimir. 2014. 'Address by President of the Russian Federation'. President of Russia. March 2014. Accessed June 04 2020. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603.

———. 2016. 'Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly'. Annual Address, Moscow, Russia, March. Accessed June 04 2020. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53379.

———. 2018. 'Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly'. Annual Address, Moscow, Russia, March. Accessed June 04 2020. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957.

———. 2019. 'Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly'. Annual Address, Moscow, Russia, February. Accessed June 04 2020. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/59863.

———. 2020. 'Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly'. Annual Address, Moscow, Russia, January. Accessed June 04 2020. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/63133.

Richmond, Oliver P. 2004. 'The Globalization of Responses to Conflict and the Peacebuilding Consensus'. *Cooperation and Conflict* 39 (2): 129–50. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836704042865.

———. 2007. 'Emancipatory Forms of Human Security and Liberal Peacebuilding'. *International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis* 62 (3): 459–78. https://doi.org/10.1177/002070200706200302.

———. 2011. 'Post-Colonial Hybridity and the Return of Human Security'. In *Critical Perspectives on Human Security: Rethinking Emancipation and Power in International Relations*, edited by David Chandler and Nik Hynek, 43–55. London: Routledge.

Roe, Paul. 2012. 'Is Securitization a "Negative" Concept? Revisiting the Normative Debate over Normal versus Extraordinary Politics'. *Security Dialogue* 43 (3): 249–66. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010612443723.

Russian Federation. 1993. *Art. 83*. *Constitution*. Vol. 83. Moscow. Accessed June 04 2020. http://www.scrf.gov.ru/security/docs/document4/.

———. 2010. *On Security*. *Federal Law*. Moscow. Accessed June 04 2020. http://www.scrf.gov.ru/security/docs/document111/.

———. 2015. 'Russian National Security Strategy'. Moscow. Accessed June 04 2020. https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/589768.

Schittecatte, Catherine. 2006. 'Toward a More Inclusive Global Governance and Enhanced Human Security'. In *A Decade of Human Security: Global Governance and New Multilateralisms*, edited by Sandra J. MacLean, David R. Black, and Timothy M. Shaw, 129–43. Global Security in a Changing World. Aldershot, England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate Pub.

Sebina, Olga. 2016. 'Securitization of Past: Analysis of the Katyń Issue in the Context of EU Integration'. *Polish Political Science Yearbook* 45 (December): 45–59. https://doi.org/10.15804/ppsy2016004.

Security Council of the Russian Federation. n.d. 'Совет Безопасности Российской Федерации'. Accessed 25 May 2020. http://www.scrf.gov.ru/security/docs/document111/.

Sergunin, Alexander. 2018. 'The Interplay of the Human Security and Sustainable Development Concepts: The Case of Russia's Arctic Industrial Centers'. In *Human and Societal Security in the Circumpolar Arctic: Local and Indigenous Communities*, edited by Kamrul Hossain, Jose Miguel Roncero Martin, and Anna Petrétei, 50–75. Leiden ; Boston: Brill Nijhoff.

Sjöstedt, Roxanna. 2008. 'Exploring the Construction of Threats: The Securitization of HIV/AIDS in Russia'. *Security Dialogue* 39 (1): 7–29. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010607086821.

Snetkov, Aglaya. 2017. 'Theories, Methods and Practices – a Longitudinal Spatial Analysis of the (de)Securitization of the Insurgency Threat in Russia'. *Security Dialogue* 48 (3): 259–75. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010617701676.

Spruds, Andris. 2017. 'Russia in Latvia's Security Narrative: Back to Securitization'. In *Security Narratives in Europe*, edited by Wolfgang Zellner, 83–88. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft. https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845287508-83.

Stammler, Florian, Kara K. Hodgson, and Aytalina Ivanova. 2020. 'Human Security, Extractive Industries, and Indigenous Communities in the Russian North'. In *Routledge Handbook of Arctic Security*, edited by Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv, Marc Lanteigne, and Horatio Sam-Aggrey, 1st ed., 377–91. London ; New York : Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, 2020.: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315265797-31.

Stuvøy, Kirsti. 2010. 'Human Security Research Practices: Conceptualizing Security for Women's Crisis Centres in Russia'. *Security Dialogue* 41 (3): 279–99. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010610370226.

Stuvoy, Kirsti. 2011. 'Human Security, Oil and People'. *Journal of Human Security* 7 (2): 5. https://doi.org/10.3316/JHS0702005.

Stuvøy, Kirsti. 2014. 'Human Security and Women's Security Reality in Northwest Russia'. In *Environmental and Human Security in the Arctic*, edited by Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv, Dawn Bazely, Marina Goloviznina, and Andrew Tanentzap, 1st ed., 231–50. London ; New York: Routledge.

Sundstrom, Lisa McIntosh, and Valerie Sperling. 2019. 'Seeking Better Judgment: LGBT Discrimination Cases in Russia and at the European Court of Human Rights'. *The International Journal of Human Rights* 0 (0): 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1080/13642987.2019.1671826.

Szkola, Susanne. 2017. 'Discursive Reconstructions of Boundaries in the South Caucasus Countries Vis-a-Vis the EU and Russia and the Crux of Securitisation'. Working Paper 5/2017. Tartu: UPTAKE consortium.

Tadjbakhsh, Shahrbanou. 2013. 'In Defense of the Broad View of Human Security'. In *Routledge Handbook of Human Security*, edited by Mary Martin and Taylor Owen, 43–57. Oxfordshire: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315885926.ch3.

Tanaka, Akihiko. 2019. 'Toward a Theory of Human Security'. In *Human Security and Cross-Border Cooperation in East Asia*, edited by Carolina G. Hernandez, Eun Mee Kim, Yoichi Mine, and Ren Xiao, 21–40. Cham: Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95240-6_2.

Thakur, Ramesh. 2016. 'The Responsibility to Protect at 15'. *International Affairs* 92 (2): 415–34. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12557.

UNDP, ed. 1994. *Human Development Report 1994*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press.

UNGA. 2012. *Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 10 September 2012*. Accessed 29 April 2020. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/476/22/PDF/N1147622.pdf?OpenElement.

Wæver, Ole. 1995. 'Securitization and Desecuritization'. In *On Security*, edited by Ronnie Lipschutz, 46–86. New York: Columbia University Press.

Wilhelmsen, Julie. 2016. 'Introduction'. In *Russia's Securitization of Chechnya: How War Became Acceptable*, 1–18. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315643359.

Williams, Paul D. 2012. 'Security Studies: An Introduction'. In *Security Studies: An Introduction*, edited by Paul D. Williams, 2nd ed. London: Routledge.

Appendix

Appendix 1. Table - Content Analysis of the United Nations Development Program 1994 Report

Name	References
UN_DEFINITION	**263**
HUMAN SECURITY OBJECTIVES	**125**
New Development Paradigms	46
Economic Security Council	17
Global Human Security Fund	15
Strengthening of International Institutions	3
Integrate Peace and Development Agendas	1
Development Cooperation	1
Equitable Sharing of Global Economic Opportunities and Responsibilities	1
New Framework of Global Governance	1
Phase Third World Out of Cold War	1
North - South Cooperation	1
Community Security	11
Intergenerational Equity	5
People Centred Development	3
People Empowerment	1
Social Integration	3
Economic Security	10
Employment	5
Poverty Reduction	3
Income Security	1
Economic Growth	2
Environmental Security	8
Sustainable Development	7
Sustainable Human Development	4
Focus on Prevention	2
Health Security	6
Sanitation	1
Clean Water	1
Reduced Military Spending	5
Regulated Arms Trade	5
Reduced Arms Trade	3
Eliminate Arms Subsidy	1
Fertility Reduction	4
Gender Equality	4
Food Security	3
Education	3
Peace	2
Enlargement of Human Capacities	2
Personal Security	2
Security from Crime	2
Political Security	2
Democratization	1
Security from Repression	1

Human Rights	2
Housing	1
Increased Social Spending	1
Better Information Systems	1
HUMAN SECURITY THREATS	**60**
Environmental Problems	9
Military	9
Disease	7
AIDS	4
Hunger	5
Economy	5
Poverty	1
Job Insecurity	1
Unemployment	1
Economic Disparity	1
Economic Collapse	1
Drugs	4
Terrorism	3
Pollution	3
Ethnic Conflicts	3
Crime	2
Social Disintegration	2
Nuclear	1
Social Conflict	1
Political Repression	1
Wrong Policy Choices	1
Human Tragedy	1
Population Growth	1
Migration	1
Social Neglect	1
STATE CENTRIC APPROACHES	**46**
bring all poor nations up to at least a minimum threshold of human development.	1
a certain proportion of existing foreign assistance should be channelled to the poorest nations as a global social safety net.	1
far-sighted internationalism, not stubborn nationalism.	1
Human security is relevant to people everywhere, in rich nations and in poor.	1
community of nations to achieve any of its major goals	1
The new demands of global human security require a more positive relationship among all nations	1
Industrial nations should also compensate the developing countries for economic damage they suffer from certain market barriers imposed by the industrial countries,	1
Future conflicts may often be within nations rather than between them	1
There are several countries where current national and international efforts need to be reinforced to promote human security.	1
The threats to their security may differ-hunger and disease in poor nations and drugs and crime in rich nations	1
the rich nations should be prepared to pay the poor nations for certain services that are in the global interest and for which the poor countries may not have sufficient resources themselves	1

Greater attention should be paid to the freer movement of non-aid flows, as these are more decisive for the future growth of the developing countries than aid flows.	1
help our member countries realize their sustainable human development goals.	1
donor nations reflect this new development perspective in their aid allocations	1
assisting countries in the formulation of their own development strategies	1
new frontiers of human security with more democratic partnerships between nations.	1
a more pragmatic solution is simply for industrial countries to be generous in supporting programmes that are vital to global human security and development	1
And countries that lack the means to combat them, but are nevertheless willing to take initiatives, act not only in their national interest-but in the global interest	1
The international community has a lot to gain by assisting in dealing with health threats in developing countries	1
Developing countries should in many cases be able to commit a sizable proportion of their demilitarization funds for human security measures in their own countries.	1
broad range of human security issues in both industrial and developing countries.	1
Western industrial countries should be able to do more-allocate human security funds both domestically and internationally.	1
all nations pledge to ensure the provision of at least the very basic human development levels for all their people	1
Some of the poorest countries, however, will require substantial international assistance, in addition to their own domestic efforts.	1
donor countries should reduce allocations of official development assistance (ODA) if a recipient country insists on spending more on its armies than on the social welfare of its people.	1
Persuade all nations to allocate a proportion of the potential savings to a global human security fund	1
The major powers might consider that they have a moral obligation to create such alliances for peace	1
Endorse the establishment of a national demilitarization fund in each country as well as the creation of a global fund for human security.	1
People in rich nations seek security from the threat of crime and drug wars in their streets,	1
People in poor nations demand liberation from the continuing threat of hunger, disease and poverty	1
Some global challenges to human security arise because threats within countries rapidly spill beyond national frontiers.	1
To the extent that these projects serve the interest of industrial countries-and humanity-the funds to support them should be considered not as aid but as payment for services rendered.	1
One question that preoccupies the international community is whether it is possible to get early warning signals of the risk of national breakdown.	1
Identifying potential crisis countries is not an indictment	1
There are several countries where current national and international efforts need to be reinforced to promote human security	1
When human security is threatened within nations, UN peacekeeping operations can succeed only when the organization has a clear and workable mandate.	1

Although the international community can help prevent future crises, the primary responsibility lies with the countries themselves.	1
unless governments make firm commitments at the outset to allocate a significant proportion of the demilitarization fund to human security	1
Requesting national governments in rich and poor countries to adopt policy measures for human security	1
Global taxation may become necessary in any case to achieve the goals of global human security.	1
Many projects that the industrial countries support in the Third World have global effects and thus also serve their own interests-as well as those of other developing countries that may not be the direct recipients of their aid.	1
a new framework of international cooperation for development should be devised	1
But future progress will clearly demand a higher level of cooperation between industrial and developing countries	1
special attention must be paid to the problems of the developing countries.	1
Some threats are indeed common to all nations	1
When the security of people is attacked in any corner of the world, all nations are likely to get involved.	1
TRANSNATIONAL APPROACHES	**16**
Payment for services to ensure global human security	1
Recommending, furthermore, the design of global human security compacts to address the major challenges currently facing humankind.	1
promoting human security at a global level will be a long and complex process.	1
today's framework of global institutions be reviewed and redesigned	1
And no nation can isolate its life from the rest of the world.	1
So, when human security is under threat anywhere, it can affect people everywhere.	1
There are many threats that are common to all people	1
Human security is a universal concern.	1
Global sustainability without global justice will always remain an elusive goal.	1
Let us keep reminding ourselves that the imperatives of human security are bringing people together in all parts of the world.	1
The idea is to establish a global account to pool contributions to meet the needs of global human security.	1
A fixed proportion of the reductions in global military spending should be credited to the global human security fund	1
so the growing consensus on the new compulsions of global human security requires social contracts at the global level.	1
the emerging concerns of human security all over the world.	1
Their grim consequences travel the world.	1
The threats to human security are no longer just personal or local or national. They are becoming global	1
DEFINITION AS IN THE REPORT	**16**
freedom from fear and freedom from want.	2
The components of human security are interdependent. When the security of people is endangered anywhere in the world, all nations are likely to get involved.	1
safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression.	1
it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life-whether in homes, in jobs or in communities.	1
It is relevant to people everywhere, in rich nations and poor.	1
It is embedded in a notion of solidarity among people.	1

It is concerned with how people live and breathe in a society, how freely they exercise their many choices, how much access they have to market and social opportunities and whether they live in conflict or in peace.	1
It cannot be brought about through force, with armies standing against armies. It can happen only if we agree that development must involve all people.	1
Human security is therefore not a defensive concept	1
Human security is people centred.	1
Human security is not a concern with weapons-it is a concern with human life and dignity.	1
Human security is easier to ensure through early prevention than later intervention.	1
human security is an integrative concept. It acknowledges the universalism of life claims	1
Human security is a universal concern.	1
Human security is a critical ingredient of participatory development.	1
human security is a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread, a job that was not cut, an ethnic tension that did not explode in violence, a dissident who was not silenced.	1

Appendix 2. Table - Content Analysis of the Founding Documents of the Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation

Name	**References**
RUSSIAN_NATIONAL_SECURITY_STRATEGY_2015	876
SECURITISED ISSUES	737
Economy	139
Economic Stability, Development and Diversification	34
Development	20
Diversification	9
Stability	5
State Oversight & Control Mechanisms	26
International Economic Profile	22
Employment	12
Foreign Economic Influence & Sanctions	12
Economic Security	7
Domestic Economic Disparities	7
Financial System	6
Shadow Economy	3
Poverty & Inequality	3
Raw Materials and Environment	3
Currency Control	2
Pension System	2
Military Capability	69
Deployment & Defence	16
Structure	15

Weapons of Mass Destruction	14
Cooperation	9
Conflict & Risk	7
State Control & Oversight	6
Modernisation	2
Technology	60
Development & Expansion	31
Capacitation	12
International Profile	6
Information Technology	6
State Oversight & Control	5
Health	58
Expansion & Development	24
Health System	18
State Oversight & Control	6
Capacitation	6
Diseases	4
Environment & Natural Resources	51
Environment	29
Natural Resources	11
Disasters, Accidents, and Catastrophes	8
Waste Management	3
Education	42
School System	30
International Educational Profile	6
Professional Training & Qualification	6
History, Culture and Values	41
History and Culture	23
Spiritual and Moral Values	15
Language	3
Information	31
Information Sphere	20
Information Systems & Infrastructure	6
International Information Sphere	5
Foreign Influence	27
USA & NATO	10
Information & Influence Campaigns	9
Colour Revolutions	4
Intelligence	3
International Cooperation	26
Energy	23
Stability of Borders and Territory	22
Terrorism and Extremism	18

Food	15
Social and Political Stability	15
Crime	14
Transportation	13
Quality of Life & Well-being	10
Corruption	9
Arms Control	8
Right to Property	7
Migration	7
Sovereignty	7
Infrastructure	6
State Bureaucracy	6
Social and Interethnic Conflicts	5
Demography	5
Social Inclusion	3
VALUES	104
Stability	16
Identity, Traditions and Russian Values	15
Spiritual and Moral Values	12
Modernisation	14
Human Rights & Freedoms	8
Polycentric World	8
Sovereignty	8
Right to Property	7
International Law	4
Humanitarian Aid & Peacekeeping	4
Russia as a Leading Nation	4
Constitutionalism	4
United Nations Charter	3
Protection of Russians Abroad	3
Participation in International Organizations	3
Sustainable Development	2
Civil Responsibility	1
INDIVIDUAL AS A REFERENT FOR SECURITY	12
national security) -- the state of protection of the individual, society, and the state against internal and external threats	1
National security includes the country's defense and all types of security envisioned by the Russian Federation Constitution and Russian Federation legislation -- primarily state, public, informational, environmental, economic, transportation, and energy s	1
national interests) -- objectively significant requirements of the individual, society, and the state with regard to ensuring their protection and sustainable development	1
criminal offenses targeting individuals,	1

strengthening the role of the state as a guarantor of security of the person and property rights	1
the creation of the conditions for the development of the individual,	1
the activities of radical public associations and groups using nationalist and religious extremist ideology, foreign and international nongovernmental organizations, and financial and economic structures, and also individuals, focused on destroying the uni	1
observe citizens' rights in the sphere of health protection and to ensure the state guarantees associated with these rights.	1
The main indicators necessary for an evaluation of the state of national security are~ ~~-- the citizens' degree of satisfaction with the protection of their constitutional rights and freedoms and personal and property interests, including against criminal	1
security of the person and property rights;	1
foundations of personalized medicine	1
organizations of foreign states and individuals that causes harm	1
STRATEGIC NATIONAL PRIORITIES	12
science, technology, and education	1
state and public security	1
strategic stability and equal strategic partnership.	1
strengthening national accord, political and social stability,	1
strengthening the country's defense	1
the ecology of living systems and the rational use of natural resources	1
utilization of military force to protect national interests is possible only if all adopted measures of a nonviolent nature have proved ineffective	1
utilization of primarily political and legal instruments and diplomatic and peacekeeping mechanisms	1
culture	1
economic growth	1
national defense	1
healthcare	1
NATIONAL INTERESTS	9
consolidating the Russian Federation's status as a leading world power, whose actions are aimed at maintaining strategic stability and mutually beneficial partnerships in a polycentric world.	1
developing democratic institutions	1
ensuring the country's stable demographic development	1
ensuring the inviolability of the Russian Federation's constitutional order, sovereignty, independence, and national and territorial integrity	1
improving the population's health	1
increasing the competitiveness of the national economy	1
preserving and developing culture and traditional Russian spiritual and moral values	1
raising living standards	1
refining the mechanisms for cooperation between the state and civil society	1
SCOPE	2
domestic and foreign policy	1

National security includes the country's defense and all types of security envisioned by the Russian Federation Constitution and Russian Federation legislation -- primarily state, public, informational, environmental, economic, transportation, and energy s	1
PRESIDENTIAL_ADDRESSES	415
PUTIN_2016	103
VALUES	79
Modernisation	16
International Cooperation	11
Identity, Traditions and Russian Values	9
Solidarity & Union	8
Freedoms	7
Justice	5
Dialogue with Civil Society	4
Democracy	3
Civil Responsibility	3
Sovereignty & Independence	2
Respect for the Environment	2
Polycentric World Order	2
Participation in International Organisations	2
Transparency	1
International Law	1
Strategic Parity	1
Self-Sufficiency	1
SECURITISED ISSUES	23
International Cooperation	5
Foreign Influence	3
Sanctions	3
Sovereignty	2
Unity	2
Terrorism	2
Crime	1
Migration	1
Crimea	1
Technology	1
Strategic Parity with the US	1
Syria	1
REFERENCE TO THE INDIVIDUAL	1
They expect respect for their person, their rights, freedoms, and labour.	1
PUTIN_2018	155
SECURITISED ISSUES	80
Military Capability	47
Directed to contain the US & NATO	27
Weapons of Mass Destruction	5

US & NATO	14
Technology	5
Development	3
Infrastructure	2
Health	2
Preserving the people of Russia	1
Sovereignty	1
Habitation	1
Economic Growth	1
Syria	1
Sanctions	1
Demography	1
VALUES	69
Russia as a Leading Nation	16
International Cooperation	8
Modernisation	7
Identity, Traditions and Russian Values	6
Spiritual Moral Values	1
Unity	4
Strategic Parity	4
Participation in International Organisations	4
Freedoms	3
Deterrence	3
Democracy	2
Dialogue with Civil Society	2
International Law	2
Sustainable Development	2
Justice	2
Free Market	1
Right to Property	1
Civil Responsibility	1
Polycentric World Order	1
REFERENCE TO THE INDIVIDUAL	6
each Russian citizen and all of us together must be able to see what is going on in the world, what is happening around us, and what challenges we are facing.	1
We consider every person important and valuable.	1
For this purpose, the whole of Russia will have to make a quantum leap in its development, so that the life of every person is transformed.	1
They forgot about the main thing~ the people, their interests and needs, equal opportunities and justice.	1
I understand how important it is for everyone, for every family, to have their own house, their own home.	1
the decisive role is played by the people, as well as conditions for every individual's development, self-assertion and creativity.	1

PUTIN_2019	91
VALUES	42
International Cooperation	7
Deterrence	4
Unity	3
Identity, Traditions and Russian Values	3
Modernisation	3
Russia as a Leading Nation	3
Participation in International Organisations	3
Polycentric World Order	3
Freedoms	2
Sovereignty	2
Civil Responsibility	2
Protectionism	1
Self-Sufficiency	1
International Law	1
Strategic Parity	1
Sustainable Development	1
Right to Property	1
Dialogue with Civil Society	1
SECURITISED ISSUES	39
Military Capability	20
US Violations of the INF Treaty	11
Food	2
Infrastructure	1
Technology	1
Sovereignty	1
International Cooperation	1
Sanctions	1
Strategic Goals	1
REFERENCE TO THE INDIVIDUAL	10
People are at the core of the national projects, which are designed to bring about a new quality of life for all generations.	1
It is important for people to see what is really being done and the impact it has on their lives and the lives of their families.	1
Those most often faced with poverty are large or single parent families, families with members with disabilities, as well as single pensioners and people who cannot find a good job, a well-paid job because there are no openings or they lack qualifications.	1
There are many reasons for poverty, not only in our country, but also in the world, but it always literally crushes a person, dimming their life prospects.	1
The state provides financial resources to families to run a household farm or to start a small business, and by the way, these are substantial resources of tens of thousands of rubles. Let me emphasise that support programmes will be tailored to meet the n	1

Let me emphasise that as we seek to overcome poverty and develop the social security net, we need to reach every family in need and understand the problems it faces	1
It should not be possible to refuse assistance simply because the life circumstances a person is facing are slightly inconsistent with the criteria set by a programme.	1
Yes, it is less than 1.5 percent of all schoolchildren, but when their parents see these conditions, any words about justice and equal opportunities only irritate them. I want to draw the attention of the heads of the regions where poorly equipped schools	1
Let me recall that in making such decisions we should be guided by the interests of the people of Russia rather than corporate interests or interests of some individuals.	1
I want to stress that all this is being created for young people to take advantage of these opportunities. I urge you to take a chance and use them, be bold, realise your dreams and plans, do something of value for yourself, your family and your country.	1
PUTIN_2020	66
VALUES	36
Russia as a Leading Nation	6
Strong Presidentialism	6
Unity	3
Dialogue with Civil Society	2
Identity, Traditions and Russian Values	2
Freedoms	2
Sovereignty	2
Constitutionalism	2
Nationalism	2
Civil Responsibility	2
Equal Opportunities	1
Modernisation	1
Stable World Order	1
Participation in International Organisations	1
International Cooperation	1
Human Dignity	1
Power Rotation	1
SECURITISED ISSUES	23
Strong Presidentialism	4
History, Culture & Values	3
Military Capabilities	3
Demography	2
Income	2
International Cooperation	2
Sovereignty	2
Foreign Currency Reserves	1
Technology	1

Regional Conflicts	1
Domestic Equality	1
Political System	1
REFERENCE TO THE INDIVIDUAL	7
Quite often, they have better knowledge of what, how and when should be changed where they live and work, that is, in cities, districts, villages and all across the nation.~~The pace of change must be expedited every year and produce tangible results in at	1
The most sensitive and crucial issue is the opportunity to enrol one's child in a day nursery.	1
What decisions have already been made~ From January 2020, families with incomes below two subsistence minimums per person will receive monthly benefits for their first and second child.	1
People think about their lives, their health, about how to get high-quality and timely medical aid without obstacles and when they need it. This is why now we must focus our efforts on primary care, which all people and all families have to deal with. This	1
Our government reserves confidently cover our gross external debt. And here I am not talking about some abstract or theoretical indicators – I would like to emphasise that these figures are directly influencing the life of each and every person in our coun	1
Russia's greatness is inseparable from dignified life of its every citizen.	1
The opinion of people, our citizens as the bearers of sovereignty and the main source of power must be decisive.	1
FEDERAL_LAW_ON_SECURITY_2010	108
VALUES	73
Federal Supremacy & Strong Presidentialism	33
Constitutionalism	17
International Cooperation	8
Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity	3
International Law	2
Human Rights	2
Freedoms	2
Civil Responsibility	1
Protection of Russians Abroad	1
Participation in International Organizations	1
Peacekeeping	1
Prioritisation of Prevention	1
Nationalism	1
SECURITISED ISSUES	30
Socio-Economic Issues	7
Military Capability	5
Information	4
Sovereignty	4
International Cooperation	3
Human Rights & Freedoms	2
Technology & Research	2

Science	1
Terrorism & Extremism	1
Crime	1
SCOPE	3
defines the basic principles and content of activities to ensure state security, public safety, environmental safety, personal safety, other types of security stipulated by the legislation of the Russian Federation (hereinafter - security, national security	1
the powers and functions of federal bodies of state power, bodies of state power of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, local authorities in the field of security, as well as the status of the Security Council of the Russian Federation (here	1
The state policy in the field of security is a part of the domestic and foreign policy of the Russian Federation	1
INDIVIDUAL AS A REFERENT FOR SECURITY	2
This Federal Law defines the basic principles and content of activities to ensure state security, public safety, environmental safety, personal safety, other types of security	1
observance and protection of the rights and freedoms of man and citizen	1
CONSTITUTION_RUSSIA_ARTICLE_83_1993	3
PRESIDENTIAL PREROGATIVES - SECURITY	3
appoint and dismiss the high command of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation;	1
approve the military doctrine of the Russian Federation;	1
forms and heads the Security Council of the Russian Federation, whose status is determined by federal law	1