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**State of the field:
the concept of nativism in far-right
ideology**

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Abstract

During the past few years, nativist ideology and discourses have been more and more present in far-right parties. A remarkable amount of literature has been produced to study the phenomenon. However, this produces a cacophony in the research field that this dissertation seeks to address. This work is delineating the borders of the field and analysing the main themes, subthemes and debates about nativism. Through a systematic research analysis, this dissertation demonstrates that the field suffers from its Western and historical centrism and is often confused with populism or nationalism.

Overall, racist, economic and symbolic nativism are the three core components of nativist ideology and have different causes and consequences in political and social future of nation-states. This dissertation also questions the appropriateness of the concept in non-Western areas, finding a great potential for the future of the field.

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Introduction

Viktor Orban, 2015:

‘We do not consider these people as Muslims refugees.

We consider them as Muslim invaders.’¹


The declarations of political leaders such as Orban, or Trump, who depicted Mexican immigrants as rapists, or Syrian refugees as an army in disguise, brought an intense attention to the nativist ideology and rhetoric. With the electoral successes of radical-right parties in regional and national elections in Europe and elsewhere, racist and xenophobic discourses revealed the deeper, but far from new, phenomenon of nativism.

The topic of migration and immigration is characterized by different public actors as a vital threat to the well-being of a country (Bosniak, 1994: 440). Cas Mudde characterises radical-right parties by the conjunction of three concepts, that are: populism, nativism and authoritarianism (Mudde, 2012). As one of the most influential author on the subject, he defines nativism as ‘an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (the nation) and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state’ (Mudde, 2012: 2).

The term ‘nativism’ has known an astonishing increase in its use since 2000, it produces more than 10 000 results in the Nexis database, just for newspapers, and more than 2 000 for law reviews and journals. There are many factors explaining this abundance of results. Firstly, the augmentation of academic research on far-right groups and parties inevitably bring the issue of nativism to the front stage. Moreover, the concept is more and more used in broad public sphere, especially in journalism. It is therefore necessary to narrow the field of research. The following image shows the augmentation in the use of the term, with an exponential increase around 2015, which corresponds to the period of

¹ Interview from BILD, translated from German: “Wir betrachten diese Menschen nicht als muslimische Flüchtlinge. Wir betrachten sie als muslimische Invasoren.“

Trump's campaign and election and with the rise of nativist discourses caused by the refugee crisis and terrorist attacks in Europe.



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This amount of result could bring the hypothesis that the topic is already well researched, studied and understood. Paradoxically, it is not, for several reasons. The term 'nativism' is used in many different fields of science, such as psychology, linguistics and else. Moreover, even though nativism is more and more present in studies since 2010, the term is often ill-defined and confused with other terms, such as 'racism', 'xenophobia', and most of all 'populism'. For example, the term is often used to describe hostility toward Islam or Muslims in Christian majority countries (Hawley, 2019). Indeed, nativists today believe that true national identity requires a particular racial, ethnic, or religious background (Kleinfeld and Dickas, 2020), that consequently devaluates those who are seen as 'different'. With the election of leaders using nativist rhetoric like Donald Trump, or arguments for national decisions such as Brexit, the electoral success of radical-right parties in Europe and the increasing use of nativist discourse by mainstream political parties, it becomes more and more essential to study nativism and nativist ideology.

The enormous body of literature that emerged since the 1990's has attempted to explain the history of nativism (Meagher, 2012; Betz, 2013; Friedman, 1967; Hirota, 2017), the securitisation aspect of nativist ideology (Helly, 2009; Varsanyi, 2011; Özerim, 2013; Akbaba, 2018), the conceptualisation of nativism within far-right movements (Michaels, 1995; Mudde, 2004; Mudde,

² Timeline of the term "nativism", Nexis database

2007; Betz, 2017; Betz, 2019), the relationship between nativism and populism (Pirro, 2013; Rensmann, de Lange and Couperus, 2017; de Lange and Mudde, 2005; Mudde, 2010, Kešić and Duyvendak, 2019), the concept and importance of racist nativism (Lippard, 2011; Perez Huber, 2016; Perez Huber et al., 2008; Galindo and Vigil, 2006; Richardson and Wodak, 2009, Smith, 2016), the core relationship between nativism, immigration and anti-migrant attitudes (Guia, 2016; Kibria, 2018; Mierina and Koroleva, 2015, Mudde, 2012, Sanchez, 1997, Bosniak, 1994). This important amount of literature notwithstanding, the knowledge about nativism is still incomplete with regard to many aspects, for example about the consequences of nativist ideology in the society, or the applicability of the concept of nativism to non-Western countries.

The concept of nativism takes its origin in the 19th century North America, where the ‘natives’ - understood as Americans who descent from British colonials and previous immigration’ waves – opposed immigration and demographic change to the majoritarian white Anglo-Saxon protestant nation. This explains that most of the academic research written on the topic is studying North American nativism. However, it is possible to study the concept in other countries, and the recent years have seen an emergence of studies about nativism in Europe, in Central and South America, in Asia, and fewer, but promising, about Africa.

The concept evolved through time but kept its anti-migration core, and all forms of nativism encountered have in common to describe the portion of ‘any population who advocate, endorse, or believe in a racially, religiously, or ethnically defined nation or nationhood’ (Kleinfeld and Dickas, 2019: 3). The consequences of this ideology are for ‘natives’ to try to keep the ‘Others’, ‘undesirable’ groups out of their country, and to offer a ‘second-class citizenship’ to members of these groups. The social and political consequences of nativism are multiple, from racist violence to legal discrimination.

In other words, there is a vast amount of literature on an ill-defined concept, at a time where nativism has everyday life consequences for millions of people. However, there is no existing typology of current nativist ideology. The last extensive typology was done by Tyler Anbinder in 2006, in his chapter ‘Nativism and Prejudice against immigrants’, that focuses on the historiography

of the relation between nativism and immigration in the USA. His work is a model of systematisation of the nativist framework, used in the present dissertation.

Therefore, this dissertation questions the state of the field about the literature on nativism, to explore the role, causes and consequences of nativist ideology in radical-right movements and explore the potential future development of research on the topic.

The first research objective is to describe the historical evolution of the concept of nativism. This part answers two purposes: understand the roots of nativist movements, from the psychological sphere to the present political one; and offer a comprehensive definition of what nativism is, and more importantly is not, to avoid any conceptual misunderstanding.

The second research objective is to explain nativist ideology, its relation to specific discourses or actions, such as racism or islamophobia. A typology of concepts related to nativism is necessary to draw a conceptual frame of the phenomena. Moreover, it is necessary to evaluate the consequences of this ideology at the political and social level, such as law enforcement, violence or elections.

The third research objective is to analyse and correlate existing studies and debates, in an objective of constructive criticism, and to present potential gaps in knowledge that could be the object of future research.

This dissertation aims at dissecting the literature on nativism from the broader field of populism, in order to distinguish the origin of the concept, its main themes in order to give both more and less focus. More focus in the sense that nativism has been scholarly studied since the 1920's and has known a regain of popularity since the 1990's, however it was, and still is, often studied in margins of other topics, such as political radicalism, political discourse or racism, which brought confusions, but was not studied extensively per se. Less focus as well since this study will demonstrate that the concept of nativism has been mostly applied to democratic Western countries and even if there is an

increasing amount of qualitative studies about movements in Central and Eastern Europe (see Riedel, 2018), the focus is enormously put on political parties and some extreme-right movements. However, other regions of the world, or political movements, are still under-researched, yet have a great potential for studies on nativism, like India, Japan or South-Africa, which raise many interesting paths for the application of the concept of nativism for future research.

In other words, the goal of this dissertation is to scrape the field of nativism by the mean of an extensive literature review, in an attempt to highlight the salient issues of the academia on the topic. Due to the vastness of articles mentioning the term ‘nativism’, it was impossible to paint the entirety of the field. The choice was made to focus on articles and books with specific keywords and that made nativism their primary point of study, while trying to be as representative as possible regarding the type of study (case studies, comparative studies, theoretical approach etc.) the geographical representativeness (most of the comparative studies focus on different European countries) and the topic (nativism in political leader’s discourse, manifestations of racist nativism, legal and social consequences of nativism etc...). To obtain the most diversified results, the selected keywords have been entered in 5 databases or search engines, either generalists or specialised: Google Scholar, LexisNexis, JSTOR, ProQuest and Glasgow Library Catalogue. The guiding idea throughout the entire dissertation is to assemble the patchwork that constitutes the field of nativism studies to materialise a systematised framework of the field.

This dissertation proceeds as follow: in the first chapter, the author reconstructs a comprehensive conceptualisation of nativism. This part focuses on the definition in different scientific spheres, explores the connection of the concept to the radical-right sphere and how the concept intertwines with others, such as populism, nationalism or racism. The second chapter shapes the historical background of nativism and nativist movements, in order to analyse both the historiography on the topic and the main themes that are crucial to the analysis of present-day nativism. The third chapter displays the methodology used to

dissect the literature on nativism, along as the data research and process. Finally, the fourth chapter presents the analytical part and explores the concepts and processes related to nativism, such as the behavioural modification toward migrant in the last decades, from a socio-economic perspective, to a cultural-symbolic one. It explores as well as the necessity for more debates in the field about the applicability of the concept outside of the Western democratic sphere; and finally analyses recent literature opening new horizons for future research.

Chapter 1: Conceptualisation

The concept of nativism has been approached and defined by many different scholars, in different fields and disciplines. The goal of this part is firstly to lay out the concept of nativism in various academic disciplines which influenced the notion of nativism used in this work. Secondly, a thorough examination of different definitions of nativism according to the main authors in the historical and political fields is done, before engaging in further discussions about the relationship between nativism, populism and other concepts.

1. The concept of nativism in various academic field, source of thought for political science

‘The concept of nativism is used in various academic disciplines, including anthropology, education, history, linguistics, philosophy, and psychology, though not always in an identical manner.’ (Mudde, 2007 : 18)

In cultural anthropology, nativism is studied as a social movement belonging to the broader class of revitalistic attitudes, where can also be found other types of social movements, like Cargo cults or millenarism. This ‘revitalisation attitude’ has been defined as ‘a conscious, deliberate, organized effort on the part of some members of a society to create a more satisfying culture’ (International Encyclopaedia of the Social Science). Revivalism aims at returning to a former era of happiness, a ‘golden-age’ of social virtue framed as an ideal time to which society should tend. Nativism also refers to ethnocentric beliefs by referring to an ideational – monocultural – state but focuses on the threat that ‘non-native’ elements represent (Mudde, 2007, 139; Riedel, 2018, 20). This aspect is the very core idea of today political ideology, albeit encompassing many more features that will be further discussed. Anthropological studies about nativist and revitalistic movements is considered

to have begun in the 1850's with Lewis H. Morgan about Iroquois. The successive ethnographic studies led to the generalisation of the concept in the 1940's, which has known an increasing success in the 1950's (Ames, 1957; Linton, 1943; Smith, 1959; Wallace, 1956). Anthropologist usually reserved the term of 'nativism' to non-industrialised populations and cultures. On the contrary, historians have employed the term to describe Western attitudes toward immigrants, especially in the US American context.

According to Mannheim, who has been one of the first author to conceptualise the term of nativism (1929-1931), nativism is not only a social movement, but also a more global widespread attitude in a society of rejection of aliens persons or culture, therefore it can be classified as a Utopian thought (Mannheim, 1936). When studied as a social movement, anthropologists have established different phases toward a complete change of society. However, most of nativist movement do not achieve their utopian goal, because they are suppressed by force or because hopes are disappointed for example. Among the different phases, some are still relevant to study far-right nativism and have been adapted to define specific context in which nativist ideology spread more easily. In the first phase of 'premovement', phenomena of an increased individual stress and a period of cultural distortion (anomie) leads to a more and more dysfunctional society. From there, the second phase of movement happens, with the emergence of the formulation of a code (sometime from prophetic origins), communication and organisation into a larger group aiming to 'convert' others. This phase usually ends in political or physical combat where the movement either wins or is defeated. If the revitalisation movement is successful, it leads to a cultural transformation, and then to a third phase of routinisation and institutionalisation. It is not necessary here to detail the different school of thought that have emerged from these studies, however it is interesting to note that the encounter of different cultures and/or civilisation sometimes lead to 'cultural shock' that favours context of emergent nativist and revitalistic social movements. In nowadays nativist ideology, the idea of encountering civilisations that are 'too' different, and the fear (real or imagined) of being accultured is a strong motive for these movements. This aspect led to the evolution of the definition of nativism in cultural anthropology, and for authors,

it is about ‘movements that seek to preserve, restore or reconstruct selective aspects of native culture in reaction to a perceived external threat’ (Teuween, 2013, cited in Betz, 2017 : 337).

When referring to the conception of philosophical nativism, it is the theory according to which the perception of space is an immediate given sensation and is not acquired by experience or an intellectual work (French Academy Dictionary, 1992). It originates from the reaction against empiricist such as David Hume and John Locke, which states that knowledge is derived from experience.

In the educational field, nativism is related to the theory of recollection and Platonic innatism, which asserts that personal knowledge, understanding, and ability are innate rather than acquired or developed. The concept is strongly related to genetics and psychology, with the idea that knowledge and beliefs are programmed into minds and genes (Davis, B., & Francis, K., 2020).

Similarly, the concept of nativism in psychological and linguistic field is the view that certain abilities or skills are “naturally” existing in the brain and therefore do not necessitate specific acquisition or learning process, influenced by the work of philosophers like Noam Chomsky, Steven Pinker or Jerry Fodor. The main idea is that some specific cognitive abilities can be genetically inherited and facilitate the acquisition of certain skills, like language, without any obvious effort. This way of understanding nativism is sometime recognisable in discourse of extreme-right actors, for example to support arguments on the ‘natural’ impossibility for some people to ‘assimilate’ to other cultures, or that cultural specificities must be protected and distinct from other cultures and ‘races’ (Balibar, 1988; Taguieff, 1998). However, politically defined nativism does not always have racist arguments since the basis to support the separation of natives from the ‘Others’ can be built on cultural or religious background rather than ethnicity (Riedel, 2018: 20).

2. Historical and political definitions of nativism

The scholarly study of nativism dates back to the beginning of the twentieth century (Anbinder, 2006: 178) but really sparked interest in the late 1930's. The most influential studies of nativism in the twentieth century have been written by historians in the 1950's, with Richard Hofstadter's *Age of Reform* and John Higham's *Strangers in the Land*.

John Higham is an American historian (1920-2003), specialised in American culture and ethnicity. His work is considered as pathbreaking regarding nationalism nativism and historiography. He strongly criticised 'consensus' history and the lack of objectivism of historical current. Indeed, he disregarded the self-congratulatory historical current of the first half of the 20th century, that, according to him, let aside a significant part of diversity and conflict in the United States' past (Ross, 2003, American Historical Association). Moreover, he is one of the most significant contributors of the century about nativism. Even though studying it mainly through the historical frame, he helped setting the main ideas and concepts that are still relevant today to study the phenomenon in *Strangers in the Land*, first published in 1955, improved and re-edited several times.

John Higham not only set the path for an effective definition of nativism, but also drew the first comprehensive typology of nativism based on different types of American antiforeign traditions. He defines nativism as 'the intense opposition to an internal minority on the grounds of its foreign (i.e. 'un-American') connections' (Higham, 1955: 4 cited in Huber et al., 2008: 41). For him, nationalism functions as the ideological core of nativism, because it is the nationalistic ideology that justifies the fear of the 'other', the fear 'that some influence originating abroad threaten[s] the very life of the nation from within' (Higham, 1955 : 4). He states that:

'Specific nativistic antagonisms may, and do, vary widely in response to the changing character of minority irritants and the shifting conditions of the day; but through each separate hostility runs the connecting, energizing force of modern nationalism. While drawing on much broader cultural antipathies and ethnocentric judgments, nativism translates them into a zeal to destroy the enemies of a distinctively American way of life'. (Higham 1955: 4)

Nationalism is considered as a fundamental core of nativism, as it serves two different purposes. Firstly, it enlightens the process of defending national identity from perceived threats. Secondly, it generates a fear of the foreigner and both are still relevant in studying nativist movements nowadays. Regarding the typology, the three kinds of antiforeign traditions that are to be found in the American society according to Higham, are anti-Catholicism, anti-radicalism and racism. The historical part of this dissertation details the origins and processes of these traditions, are they strongly influenced nativism and its field of study. Even though each waves of nativism are associated with specific historical contexts, Higham usefully noted some constants that will be further detailed in this work. For example, he described the tradition of racism and how the notion of ‘Anglo-Saxon superiority’ justified the belief that ‘the United States belongs in some special sense to the Anglo-Saxon ‘race’’, which shows that nativism was rooted in notions of white supremacy (Huber et al., 2008: 42).

Higham’s life work, even though pathbreaking, still presents some flaws and gaps, often underlined by Higham himself. The works of Meagher (2012) and Anbinder (2006) usefully point out some interesting weaknesses, that will be scrutinised in other studies, in order to build a comprehensive approach to literature on nativism. One of the most important flaws in Higham work and definition of nativism is the absence of a gendered perspective (Meagher, 2012: 283). He rarely paid attention to women participating in nativist actions, nor in immigrant women, albeit they accounted for a large number of immigrants, and often worked in specific jobs or industries that were meaningful to study nativism. Another limitation is the absence of examination of ‘actions immigrants or ethnics made on their own behalf to counter nativist attacks’ (Meagher, 2012: 284). Indeed, the organisation of counter-nativist movements and reactions against nativist’ movements are crucial to study the scope and societal consequences of the extreme ideologies that are conveyed. Meagher points out the limitation of Higham’ sources, as he gathered information from middle-class journals, but let aside ‘popular culture’ like theatre or cartoons that are often a powerful conveyer and shaped attitudes about ethnic and racial groups. When studying nowadays nativist ideology, it is crucial to consider all

the aspects and levels of a given society, as the same ideas can be expressed very differently depending on the social class, genders, origins, professions and else.

On the other hand, Hofstadter's work has had a lesser impact in the long term, primarily due to its approach of American's immigration via 'consensus history'. However, he 'found nativism to be a defining aspect of populism, emphasizing its presence in its campaign platforms and in the writings of its leaders' (Anbinder, 2006: 182). This idea is of crucial importance as it shows that nativism is not a fringe movement of American political and social history, and had a major impact on current history.

Since 2000, one of the most prolific authors about nativism and populist radical right in general is Cas Mudde, a Dutch political scientist, who focused his work on political parties and ideologies (2004, 2007, 2012, 2014, 2019). According to him, nativism is a combination of nationalism and xenophobia, in other words 'an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (the nation) and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state' (Mudde, 2012,: 2). This definition has many qualities and is a good starting point to study nativist ideology, yet, in this work, nativism is considered to be more than the sum of nationalism and xenophobia, and draws its rhetoric from other themes like racism and religious symbolic. In that aspect, Lorde's definition of nativism (1992) emphasizes on the domination aspect, by saying that nativism is 'belief in the inherent superiority of the [native] over the [non-native] and thereby the right to dominance' (Lorde, 1992). The aspect of superiority is often at the centre of ideas that pretend that some population cannot assimilate to a specific nation because of 'differences' that are insurmountable. Other definitions exist, like Marable's, who states that nativism is a system of 'ignorance, exploitation, and power used to oppress non-natives' (Marable, 1992). As much as the ideas of exploitation and power are relevant to study the political consequences of nativist ideology, the notion of ignorance is more delicate to deal with, as a complete work of sociology and psychology would be necessary to prove such statement. Another interesting definition

comes from Memmi, for whom nativism can be defined as ‘the generalized and final assigning of values to real or imagined differences, to the [native’s] benefit and at the [non-native’s] expense, in order to justify the former’s own privileges and aggression’ (Memmi, 1968). The aspects of benefits and expenses given in that definition are an answer to the flaw of the previous one about superiority as it presents inequalities as a basis for further actions, such as aggression. Finally, the definition of Huber et al. (2008: 42), states that nativism is ‘the practice of assigning values to real or imagined differences, in order to justify the superiority of the native, to the benefit of the native and at the expense of the non-native, thereby defending the native’s right to dominance’.

When considering all these definitions, one should look for the smallest common denominator, which is the distinction that is done between native and non-native elements. There is a common understanding that these elements can be persons or ideas, but the base for a distinction is indispensable. One of the most common elements given is nationality or citizenship, in other words, based on legal designations. However, as much of the ideology and concepts of nativism are based on perceptions, the question of “native-ness” is too sociologically complex to be left to a purely legal definition (Huber and al, 2008, p.42). De Genova (2005) emphasizes on the opposition of ‘native’ and ‘foreign’, but he stresses that the importance the promotion of the priority of ‘natives’ is often considered as more important than the preoccupation of foreignness of any particular immigrant or minority. As Huber mentions,

‘this distinction between native and foreign is important to [the definition] of nativism because it centres on the natives, their identity, and their potential action to oppress others based on perceptions of being native. This [...] is the power of nativism. It allows us to connect nativeness to nativism in the same powerful way that we can relate white supremacy to racism – by tracing the ‘symptom’ back to the ‘disease.’’ (Huber and al., 2008: 42)

Another look at the definition of nativism is possible through the notion of symbolic nativism, given by Linda Bosniak (1994). She notes that the world re-emerged in the 1990’s with new waves of immigrations and that the concept of nativism is more and more employed by governments and public figures.

However, as she underlined, there is very little consensus on the definition. According to her, the consensus lays on that ‘everybody agrees that nativism is bad and should be avoided at all costs’ (Bosniak, 1994: 442). The term of nativism functions as a ‘powerful signal of illegitimacy, or of normative unacceptability’ in the 90’s debates about immigration. However, today, with regards to governments like Trump’s, one can think that nativism is more commonly politically accepted, even if it is rarely publicly embraced. Nativism has sometime been restrictively defined as a ‘hostility to foreigners’ (Dinnerstein et al., 1990, cited in Bosniak, 1994: 442), however that definition does not clear up what is considered as a ‘hostile’ position regarding immigration for example. There is a broad understanding of nativism as being associated with anti-immigrant sentiment motivated by ethnic or racial bias, and sometimes with anti-foreign feeling that resemble or is nationalism.

In short, nativism is commonly accepted as the ideology which holds that a given territory should be inhabited exclusively by ‘native’ members, but the latter term is immensely subjective. One of the most representative examples of subjectiveness is the fight in the USA between White Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP) and Indians (nowadays called native Americans) to bear the name of native, with more success for the second group (Mudde, 2007: 19).

3. Similarities and differences between nativism, populism and nationalism

a. The relationship between nativism and populism

The rise of radical-right parties in the last decade in Europe and Americas has induced an important augmentation of research about populism, to a much greater extent than nativism. As Rooduijn notes, between 2015 and 2016, newspapers have doubled their use of the terms ‘populist’ or ‘populism’, and the same trend was observable in academia. It was even declared word of the year by the *Cambridge Dictionary* (Rooduijn, 2018: 362). However, there is much confusion between populism and related terms, like nativism or

Euroscepticism. Therefore, it is necessary to dissect the relationship between terms and concepts and how they influence each other.

The origin of the confusion between nativism and populism lies for example in the incorrect description of nativist behaviour in medias. Political parties like the *Front National* in France or leaders like Trump are usually described and characterised as populist, while becoming increasingly successful. In these cases, populism is generally understood as a ‘set of ideas or argumentation that is catchy and attractive based on emotional and irrational grounds, longing for simple solutions to complicated problems and directly connected to the will of the majority’ (Riedel, 2018: 21). However, the core discourse of these parties is the potential threat caused by immigrants, Muslims and ‘Others’. The phenomenon of nationalistic exclusionism, in other words nativism, is wrongfully described as populism (Rooduijn, 2018: 365). Populism, according to Mudde (2007) focuses on the vertical relationship between ‘the people’, opposed to ‘the elite’. Other definitions of populism focus on its moralistic imagination of politics (Mueller, 2015: 83), or on the mobilisation of marginalised social sectors articulated with nationalistic rhetoric (Jansen, 2011: 82). Despite the different definitions, a common way of understanding populism contains the following components: ‘the ‘good people’ that is endangered by the ‘evil others’ (Riedel, 2018: 22). Yet, this definition comes across of established party lines and is in essence nativist.

Hans-Georg Betz calls the link between nativism and populism ‘a symbiotic relationship’ (Betz, 2019: 129). Indeed, nativism is often considered as a sub-theme of radical-right movements, along with populism and authoritarianism. Nativism is not inherent to radical-right, however, its exclusionist dimension is present in most of nativist movements, and therefore is a lot more common in radical-right ideology than in radical left. Moreover, most of the studies are linked with the exclusionary dimension of nativism, and therefore more focused on radical right, whereas the radical-left’ ideology is more focused on anti-elite discourse. For example, left-wing populist parties like *Podemos* in Spain or *Syriza* in Greece have a more inclusionary way to conceive ‘the people’ and do not present any particular sign of nativist ideology. For authors like Betz, the electoral success of radical-right political parties is ‘in

large part owed to these parties' mobilization of nativist tropes at the service of a populist agenda directed against the established elite and their discourse' (Betz, 2019: 129). He identifies a change in the relation between nativism and populism. According to him populist right's rhetoric in the past was directed 'primarily against economic elites benefiting from migrant labour at the expense of the native workers, against bureaucrats charged with according preferential treatment and services to migrants to the detriment of native citizens, and against the 'political class' accused of colluding with both' (Betz, 2019: 130). Whereas today, the rhetoric is mainly directed against 'the rootless liberal elite' of sociocultural specialists who dominate education, the media, social work etc, and imposing their 'cosmopolitan globalist vision' to the detriment of cultural roots of a nation. However, given the pejorative aspect of populism as used in journalism or else, nativism seems a more appropriate and moderate expression, yet still contains the same common denominator as populism.

Other authors, like Cas Mudde, have criticised the lack of attention given to the nativist ideology in studies about extreme and radical right movements. According to him, even though nativism, populism and authoritarianism are distinctive elements of radical right, nativism is its core, and central to many different political themes of these parties (regarding economy, culture, immigration etc...) (Hirth, 2007). Nativism has much more appeal to the voters, especially the lower working class, than populism, and was the core driver of both the Brexit and Trump votes (Mudde, 2017). In other words, populism and nativism have a lot in common, however they (and the attitudes concerning other in- and out-groups) are different phenomena that should not be conflated conceptually (Rooduijn, 2018: 368).

b. The relationship between nativism and nationalism

The relation between nationalism and populism relies mainly on the negative construction of the 'other'. Studies shows that nationalism is highly and positively correlated with conservatism, authoritarianism and ethno-centrism. On the contrary, it is often negatively correlated with internationalism (Riedel, 2018: 23). Alike populism, nationalism is pejoratively connoted and

mainstream parties often adopt localism or regionalism to avoid the label. Nativism is often used to replace the terms for economic nationalism, mercantilism or protectionism; however the essential components of both terms are dangerous. Their xenophobic and ethno-nationalist frames that are used to establish the differentiation of the 'other' are at the origins of the negative and aggressive discourse.

Albeit, radical-right parties using nativist ideology and rhetoric cannot always be categorised as nationalist. Indeed, even if these parties adhere to anti-immigration ideas and to cultural protectionism, the core assumption of nationalism is the strengthening of national identities via state institutions, such as education, sometime by the use of force. In the current supra-national integration of states, and the transformation of the nation, nationalism became often irrelevant with the imposition of human rights and minority protection. Unlike nationalism, 'nativism does not insist on imposing homogeneity through assimilation; rather, it emphasises integration' (Akbaba, 2016:42).

To conclude, nativism has been originally used in various scientific fields, such as education, psychology or anthropology. Some features such as the construction of alterity, or the idea that some differences are innate and natural can be found in nativist ideology in the field of political science. The term has firstly been researched by American historians before entering the political science sphere in the end of the twentieth century. The definition's evolution produced confusion with populism and nationalism, as all concepts share some common features. To extract the main characteristics of nativism, it is necessary to dig into the history of nativist movements.

Chapter 2: History of nativism and nativist movements

This part deals with the origin of nativism and demonstrate the evolution of the concept, which is essential to understand the complexity of its use nowadays. The second part shows how nativist movements have been influenced by the various radical-right waves since the end of the Second World War.

1. Nativism history, from the US to Europe, in the 19th century

a. Nativism in the US, witness of the construction of the American identity

The Know Nothing Movement

One of the first well documented populist and nativist movement is the ‘Know-Nothing’ insurgency in the middle of the 19th century. This movement, even though primarily based on a populist rhetoric, is seen as the prototype of nativism in the US, by calling to anti-immigrant and anti-Catholic sentiment.

The Know-Nothing movement coincides with the second wave of immigration in the United States, composed mainly from Europeans seeking new opportunities, political freedom or fleeing from poverty. The main group of immigrants was Irish Catholics, fleeing the Great Famine after 1845, who accounted for 40% of the immigrants. Another significant group of immigrants was German Catholic, who fled poor harvest and were attracted by cheap farmlands. This made Roman Catholicism the single largest religious body in the United States in 1850.

The movement was built on two main themes: antipartyism and antipolitic, both of which echo more toward populism than nativism. The former served as a powerful and unifying message to a diverse movement (Voss-Hubbard, 1999:

132 in Betz, 2017: 338). The latter focused on the disillusion of mainstream politics, and heavily criticized the political class, accused to be more interested in ‘patronage and intrigue than in addressing the critical public issue of the time’ (Betz, 2017: 338). Standing against establishment and corruption, the movement targeted primarily the Democratic Party in the big cities of the North East, where the percentage of immigrants was the highest. The Democratic Party gathered numerous votes from recent immigrants by helping them to get settled and to find jobs, especially in the railroad and steamship industry. In the 1854’s elections, the Know Nothings swept large part of the Northeast, before spreading the following year in California and the Southern Part, up to Texas. The movement, renamed in 1855 in ‘American Party’ split up between the abolitionists, who made up the majority of Know-Nothing partisans, and the southern wing who called for a proslavery platform in the 1856’s presidential elections.

The Know-Nothing movement represented two important forms of nativism: a socio-economic nativism, and a symbolic one, which are still significant drivers of today’s nativist rhetoric.

As in many other cases, the rise of this nativist-populist movement was due to a declining economic situation coupled with the arrival of thousands of immigrants. On the one hand, revolutions in transportations and industrialization called for the investment of financial resources and the rationalisation of banking and credit system (Betz, 2017: 339), which led to a devaluation of traditional craft and artisan skills. On the other hand, the harsh financial situation following the crisis of 1837 left thousands of workers jobless, and provoked a spike in unemployment, bankruptcies and prices decline (Damiano, 2016: 420). These two phenomena increased the competition for jobs and housing in the Northeast cities (Tichenor, 2007). It resulted in anti-immigration sentiment, resentments and tensions, with supporters of Know-Nothingism presenting themselves as the defenders of the American ideal, of liberty and equality.

The economic nativism presented by the Know-Nothing movement defended the idea that poor and unskilled immigrants would accept jobs in industries with wages significantly lower than what a ‘native’ American would ac-

cept, and that would not guarantee their subsistence. Moreover, the massive arrival of unskilled immigrant contributed to the acceleration of industrialisation, that in turn depreciated craft (Betz, 2017: 340). Therefore, it led to arguments that are still used by nativist movements today. Firstly, the call for protectionist measures, and secondly the argument of the suppression of fragile jobs, especially women's labour. Regarding women, a large number joined nativist's women organizations and called for protectionist measures. It is not surprising that the Know-Nothing Party consequently called for the expansion of women's right, in an electoral strategy (Taylor, 2000). Another argument that can still be heard today in the United States is the question of assimilation and adaptation of certain populations to the country, especially when it comes to pauperized and criminals. The Know Nothing Party built their anti-immigration discourse on the assertion that immigrants were sur-represented in hospitals, prisons and poor houses, and that therefore the United States could become the 'dumping ground of Europe's paupers and criminals' (Holt, 1992, in Betz, 2017). In states where the Know Nothing were in power, like Massachusetts, this led to deportation between 1854 and 1857 of a total of more than 4000 persons, that were either sent back to the United Kingdom, or to other British North America like Montreal or Quebec (Hirota, 2017: 106).

What distinguishes the Know-Nothing movement from others later in the US is its appeal to ethnocultural and symbolic fears. Referred to as 'symbolic nativism', it is, in the period before the Civil War, a representation of 'a confluence of civic republicanism and ethnocultural beliefs' that built and fuelled animosities against minorities, especially Irish Catholics, and Asian Americans later this century. Two core perspectives are to be explored here, as they are still present in today's nativist' rhetoric. The first idea is that Anglo-Saxon Protestants were somehow superior because of their alleged moral and intellectual capacities and qualities that made them successful in achieving the American 'Ideal' of democracy, liberty and economic success. Parallel to this argument is the idea that Irish Catholics do not belong to the same 'race' (Ignatiev, 1995) and therefore cannot assimilate in the American culture and society. The hostility toward Irish did not appear with the Know Nothing movement, but the latter successfully mobilized its supporters on this pre-existent assertion. The second idea is the

presentation of Irish immigration as subversive and dangerous regarding the sovereignty of the country. The Know-Nothing movements feared that Catholic's allegiance to the Pope would undermine the national authority, and called for further discriminatory bills, especially in Massachusetts, where the state constitution was amended 'to disqualify anyone who retained allegiance to 'foreign prince, power, or potentate' (namely, the Pope) from holding public office in the state' (Hirota, 2017: 102).

One can say that the Know Nothing Party is the first established and successful form of nativist political party. It presents some characteristics that survived until today in nativist populist parties, namely a context of economic hardship and of significant immigration, a decline of people's purchasing power that increased competition for jobs and housing, that in turn provoked tensions between the 'natives' and newcomers. These tensions led to racist and xenophobic discourse, based on the purported incompatibility of Catholic religion with American culture and ideal.

The People's party and the entanglement between nativism and populism

The end of the 19th century was marked by important economic difficulties, linked to financial depression and the structural economic changes due to industrialization and corporate' power expansion. The depression of the 1890's heavily hit the agricultural sector, and farmers, and more particularly in the South and Midwest regions. It resulted in general anxieties and resentment, leading to the appearance of new populist movements, like the People's Party (Betz, 2017: 340). Although the movement was primarily based on populist claims against big corporations, banks and political leaders, the atmosphere encouraged the resurgence of nativism and nativist rhetoric. Fragments of 1850's Know Nothing movement subsisted and reappeared with Anti-Catholic sentiments and secret patriotic societies, like the American Protective Association (APA) (Kinzer, 1964, in Betz, 2017).

In some regions of the US, like the Mountains and Pacific West, the important Asian and especially immigration prompted nativist reactions and calls

for exclusion of newly arrived Asians. Even though Asian immigration accounted for only 4% of the overall immigration of the United States in the 19th century, the reaction of ‘native Americans’ became disproportionately violent around 1870 and in the next decades (Tichenor, 2007). As in the Know-Nothing time, nativist and racist reactions were primarily based on economic fear of ‘natives’ to lose their jobs because of the competition with immigrants, especially in domestic services, laundry and common labour, where women, along with Chinese, were massively employed. The same happened with railroad industry, when the transcontinental railroad was completed, and thousands of workers had to look for employment at the same time. Nativism was expressed through racist depiction of Chinese in newspapers, depicting them as opium addicts and gamblers. Politically, nativism was expressed through the federal Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882 that prohibited all immigration of Chinese workers. Regarding nativism, this legislative moment is significant in US history, as it is the first one to target a specific community or national group from immigrating onto the United States soil.

Apart from anti-Chinese sentiment, the other representation of nativism in the US at that time was Anglophobia. Again, via cartoons and newspapers, ‘the populists fed into nativist fantasies, quite frequently attributing the farmer’s plight to English bankers, land speculators and (absentee) landowners’ (Betz, 2017: 343). The main idea from nativist populist movement of that period was that foreigners should not be holding real estates and lands in states. In states like Nebraska, Kansas or Missouri, alien land lawed were passed to restrain the access of foreign corporations to propriety.

However, one of the most interesting aspect of these nativist movements is the resistance they brought against themselves, especially regarding the surviving vestige of anti-Catholicism. According to Betz, movements like the American Protective Association never made it to the elected political sphere because their views divided Americans along racist and ethnical lines, therefore forgetting the original objectives of populist parties of the time. The latter ‘denounced the A.P.A charging that it had been created to divert public attention from the economic problems affecting the country’ (Betz, 2007: 342). Indeed, nativists targeting immigrants and their descendants pressured a horizontal shift

that would have jeopardised the effort of populist to assemble a strong electoral base to protest against banks and corporations. Some authors like Hild (2007) have demonstrated that, regarding Sinophobia, the motives for populists to include nativist rhetoric was mostly political and electoral arrangements, to forge alliances between farmers and workers, in order to gain organized labour votes. All in all, one can say that the 19th century was the stage for resurgent nativist ideas and movements in the United States. However, when it comes to the People's Party and the American Protective Association, similarities and more importantly differences must be underlined when compared to the Know Nothing Movement. Like in the 1850's, the end of the 19th century was marked by economic struggles, financial crisis and a significant immigration, that led to racist nativist feelings among workers that accused newcomers to lower wages and take agricultural, industrial and house jobs. However, populism and revolt against banks, big corporations and foreign influence was stronger in the late 19th century. Therefore, nativist ideas, and calls for Anti-British and Sinophobia were a 'safe-bet' to win voters but did not constitute the core ideology of political movements of that time (Ostler, 1995: 20, cited in Betz, 2017: 344).

In Europe, the first well documented appearance of a form of nativism was the "*Boulangisme*", followers of the General Georges Boulanger, in the 1880's, where the loss of the 1870's war with Prussia and the industrialization led to similar nativist and populist movements. Boulangism is often considered as the origins of radical right nativism in France.

b. Boulangism in France and the Europeanisation of nativism

The Boulangism movement started on the far-left side of the political spectrum, engaged against the parliamentary regime that was accused of creating and preserving a special cast, too far from the interest of French citizens. One of the interesting features of this movement is the importance of its leader, the General Boulanger, supported by royalist sponsors, Radicals and proto socialists. His republican credentials led him to the position of War Minister, where he gained most of his popularity by defending a desire for revenge against

Germany, a Constitutional revision and a return of Monarchy. However, at the peak of Boulangism popularity, the support did not result in electoral success, and the legislative elections of 1889 ended up in a severe defeat with only a dozen of candidates elected. The movement was brought back to life by Maurice Barrès, who introduced a nativist ideology much closer to the American movements and switch the core ideology from far-left to far-right.

Maurice Barrès has been elected as a Boulangist, and as a journalist and writer, he soon developed xenophobic and antisemitic arguments. His ideas fit into an overall nativist propaganda, denouncing ‘alien elements’ pictured as a threat to the French nation, especially the foreign workers. He introduced nativist themes that can still be found in the French radical right today. Firstly, he centred his political agenda on the question of immigration, that emerged to become a major political issue. By framing it as a problem that could turn into a threat to French citizens, the movement of securitization became clear, with more and more publications depicting the immigration as a ‘silent conquest’ (Dornel, 2014). In response to the immigration from Belgium and Italy, outburst of violence increased at this period. Secondly, like in the Know-Nothing movement, a central argument was that immigrants took ‘native French’ jobs and provoked a decrease of salaries, especially in the industrial sector. Yet, another central idea was that immigrants were a burden to public assistance, and therefore a ‘national preference’ should be instigated to protect French workers (Sternhell, 1973, cited in Betz, 2017: 345). In other words, Maurice Barrès defended the idea that the protectionist rules that benefited to French goods and companies should also be applied to French workers. This ‘national preference’ has been applied to different degrees in France throughout the 20th century, however, only the *Front National* explicitly calls for a continuation and reinforcement of this concept in electoral programs, since the 1980’s (Le Gallou, 1985).

In other words, Boulangism is seen as the birth of nativism as a political movement in France, in a context that reminds the American birth of the Know-Nothing movement. However, there are fundamental differences between the early days of Boulangism, and its transformation under leaders like Maurice Barrès. Where early Boulangism used nativism as a support of an overall populist

cause to change the political system, the nativism of Maurice Barrès strongly emphasized exclusionism in an effort to overcome social divisions and to rally lower classes. This rally was made around ‘the defence of the nation’ and in order to ‘re-establish a sense of national purpose and identity. In this way, Barrès transformed nativist *ressentiments* into a political concept of the first magnitude’ (Sternhell, cited in Betz, 2017: 346). The neo right-wing movement expressed itself largely few years later during the Dreyfus Affair, by taking a radical anti-Dreyfus and antisemitic position. The conjunction of nationalist and socialist rhetoric, based on a popular movement, can be seen as the prefiguration of mass movements of the 20th century.

These three examples of nativist movements show the different forms that this ideology can take and how ambiguous the concept of nativism can be. All of them are studied in relation to political movement, where nativism is used to mobilise specific margins of the population, usually in relation to a broader populist agenda. Commonly, the emergence of nativist movements come at a time of economic hardship, significant immigration (real or perceived) and the presence of leaders who emphasize and dramatize the alleged prejudice and hostility caused by newcomers. It also appears that nativism is never an exogenous nor spontaneous phenomenon and cannot be seen as a homogenous top-down ideology. Moreover, all three cases have in common to have a rather social and progressive, at least for their time, agenda, like the promotion of women’s rights for the Know-Nothing movement.

19th century nativism is formed by different characteristics that are: the rejection of “aliens” population, the idea that these populations are subversive because of their foreign connections or religions, and finally the association between the immigrant population and negative traits, leading to securitization discourses. It shed lights on concepts that will be further discussed in this dissertation, namely economic nativism, symbolic nativism and cultural, racialised nativism. When it comes to identity and more specifically ‘identity politics’, the notion of construction or reconstruction of what is seen to be ‘national’ often takes the forms of defensive and exclusionary nationalism, seen in a lesser extent in the Know-Nothing movement, and to its greater extent in Barrès’ agenda.

Overall, one can say that the Know-Nothing movement was a reaction to an important immigration wave at a time when American identity was still under construction, especially before the Civil War. Still, for the People's Party movement, nativism was built as a strategy to prevent the insider threat of foreign investment and corporations. Finally, Boulangism was primarily an attempt to reconstruct and mobilise a collective identity after a military defeat.

Yet, this introduction to different forms of nativism should not hide the flaws and limitations of this study. Indeed, there are little information about nativist movements that are not integrated in the institutionalised political game, such as gangs and secret societies. It is therefore necessary to explore other forms of nativism. The work of Anbinder (2006) usefully points out the flaws and gaps about the literature on USA nativism in the 20th century.

2. The four waves of extreme right and their nativist legacy

In *The Far Right Today* (2019), Mudde draws from the work of Klaus von Bayme (1988) to categorise and organise the different waves of far-right that appeared in Europe after the Second World War. Even though these waves of far-right are more centred on their shared populist and nationalist characteristics, it is interesting and necessary to look for nativist components, as they often shaped the rhetoric of nowadays nativist movements.

The first identified wave of modern far-right is the neo-fascist trend that appeared after the end of the Second World War, and last until the mid 1950's. It was mostly constituted of former combatants that stayed loyal to fascist and Nazi ideology. It was accompanied by racial nativism, with a call for stricter control of ethnic inter-marriages and scientific work and medical experimentation to improve the 'white Europeans genes' (Shields, 2007: 60).

From the example of this first wave, one can analyse the attempt to internationalise a far-right movement with significant nativist and racist components, that will be further discussed later in this work.

The second wave is situated between 1955 and the 1980's and is marked by its strong populist characteristic. Indeed, in France, Germany and the United Kingdom, political parties based their agenda on the revolt against post-war conditions and the defence of the agricultural, rural and peripheral areas and populations. Far-right movements were more focused on the denunciation of the political system and did have some features that reminded of neo-fascism, like a racist agenda, an important role and place for the movement's leader and finally a strong anti-parliamentarism. To these features, some new radical right ideas were added, like clearer statement and agenda against immigration, in particular in Switzerland and Germany. According to Cas Mudde, the most characteristic movement is Poujadism, which appeared in France after its leader, Pierre Poujade. After a striking victory in parliamentary elections in 1956, the Constitutional change of 1958 signed its decline. However, numerous features of this movement are still to be observed in today French far-right, partly because Jean-Marie Le Pen, founder of the *Front National* was the leader of Poujadist youth movement. Regarding nativism, it is interesting to evaluate how and why some characteristics of this second wave are still found today, and how they evolve over time, especially regarding racism and anti-immigration mobilisation.

The third wave happened between the 1980's and 2000's and was marked by economic crisis, a spike in unemployment unprecedented since the end of the Second World War, and the fall of the USSR that marked the entrance of far-right groups in national parliaments. In Central and Eastern Europe, far-right parties emerged initially in regional forms, like the Slovak National Party or the Croatian Party of Rights. Some ideological features could remind of fascist parties of the inter-war period, or of communist nostalgia that appealed to nationalism, in Romania for example. These parties were often characterised by high electoral volatility and a short duration. On the contrary, in Western Europe, some parties like the *Front National* in France, the *Lega Nord* in Italy and the *Vlaams Belang*, a far-right independent party in Flanders entered the institutionalised political life of their respective country, having representant in each legislative elections for the following decade.

The fourth wave appeared at the very beginning of the 21st century, taking a strong take-off after the 9/11 attacks. According to Cas Mudde, the electoral and political success of radical-right parties, and more broadly of nativist ideas come from the three successive ‘crises’, namely the terrorist attacks in 2001 that put radical Islam’ terrorism at the front stage of security issues in the political agenda; the economic crisis of 2008 that broaden the nativists ideas for economic nativism and welfare chauvinism, and finally, at least in Europe and the US, the “refugee crisis” of 2015, where the concordance with terrorist attacks in Europe provoked a securitisation of the issue.

One of the characteristics of the fourth wave is the sliding of radical-right ideas in mainstream political debates, and the adoption of radical right policies, albeit usually adopted in a more moderate form when voted by mainstream parties. Moreover, fourth wave’ radical right is very heterogenous, but one can say that nativism is often a common denominator. Moreover, some features and aspects of 21st century radical right and nativism should be underlined before any further analysis. Firstly, most of radical right parties increased their support and gained significant percentage of votes in the 2000-2020 period. Some leaders of mainstream right parties, yet who based most of their ideological electoral base on nativist ideas, like Donald Trump, or Benjamin Netanyahu accessed to presidency or Prime Minister positions. Secondly, nativist and radical right ideas broke through in countries that were known to be resistant to such ideologies, like Germany or Sweden, or in countries where extreme and radical right were usually marginalised, like in Hungary or the Netherlands. Finally, radical right parties have consolidated their positions in the political sphere to become part of leading political organisations, thus participating to national debates and making use of wider media coverage.

With this background in mind, it is already possible to perceive the main themes of nativism, that are mostly studied in the field. However, to achieve a comprehensive and complete analysis, a systematic research design is necessary.

Chapter 3: Research design and methodology

Drawing from the research objectives, a flexible research design is seen as the most appropriate to gather meaningful conclusions. This work is based on a qualitative approach and qualitative data, following a secondary research methodology and a research design based on systematic review. As this research is not of an empirical type, the theoretical framework is restricted to a constructivist analytical framework in terms of epistemology.

Given the political sensitivity of the topic, the emphasis brought by the realist approach on subjectivity and the appreciation of factors like power, meaning and the need for researcher reflexivity is essential (Curtis & Curtis, 2017: 233).

1. Theoretical framework and research design.

Regarding epistemology, the securitization theory has been developed in a constructivist analytical framework (Wilkinson, 2007). Constructivism challenges the notion of science as a legitimate concept and believe that ‘it is impossible to differentiate truth-claims based in social science [...] because individuals or actors create the social world and at the same time all the possible measures in that social world’ (Curtis & Curtis, 2017: 232). A research design based on systematic review has been selected.

This research design answers different objectives: understand the notion of nativism and its related concepts and understand the evolution of the concept and evaluate the gaps in knowledge.

As there is, to this date, no complete literature review or typology about nativism, it is necessary to draw the outline of the existing literature on the topic, synthesize and analyse it through systematic review. Using it as a design involves identifying existing studies on the topic, carefully analysing and synthesizing the data and find evidence about what is known and what is left to study

(Denver & Tranfield, 2009). It is useful both in the diagnostic part, to explore the different concepts that are influencing, and influence nativist ideology; and on the other hand, to sort out the debates and gaps in knowledge. Even though this design has been mostly used in healthcare, education and psychology studies, it is interesting to use it in social science, as it is suitable to answer research questions related to central tendencies, variations, causes and effect etc... (Littell & Corcoran, 2019: 313). The different steps of this design include formulating a problem (what is the state of research about nativism today?), finding relevant articles, gather data and information, analysis and interpretation. Systematic review permits to have an overview of a phenomenon, and to illuminate where knowledge is lacking, in order to guide future research. It enables the identification of the most salient and relevant concepts that are worthy of consideration. For example, nativist ideology relates to social issues via the notion of welfare chauvinism. It is used to underline the most common biases and to identify and refine hypotheses to serve in future studies. As nativism is a contemporary issue, and found in several countries, a systematic approach is well suited to formulate evidence-based guidelines and policies. The goal of a systematic review is to gain new insights of a specific topic and to determine gaps in the literature.

Combined with discourse analysis, the steps of a systematic review allow a comprehensive and reproducible strategy by screening titles and articles to identify potentially relevant studies. Once the different variables that constitute nativist ideology are identified, further research can be done by analysing the variations in radical-right actors' discourse (for example variation related to time, geographic location, specific context etc).

Limitation: In order to complete a thorough systematic review, all existing materials have to be considered, even the unpublished research and papers. However, due to the limited time and the closing of libraries due to the pandemic, only online published researches have been selected. Moreover, it is not creating new knowledge, nor it is reinventing the wheel with new theories or concepts. Therefore, one needs to keep in mind the limitation of this dissertation.

2. Methods and methodology

Secondary research

To complete the systematic review of the academic work that has previously been written about nativism, the secondary research method has been selected. Indeed, secondary research involves the collection and analysis of academic writing and is closely linked to documentary research and the literature review (Curtis & Curtis, 2017: 218). In this dissertation, secondary research serves two main objectives: to do an extensive literature review about the state of research on nativism, and as a means of triangulation and verification for other research, mainly the discourse analysis.

To conduct this secondary research, one must firstly develop strategies to collect data. This can be done by using relevant databases, be they general, like JSTOR, Proquest, SAGE Journals, Glasgow University online library, LexisNexis database; specific to some geographic regions, like the Central and Eastern European Online Library; or in different languages, like Cairn or OpenEdition.org (in French). The aim is to collect as much material as possible, to produce the least biased research. However, the language barrier hinders ideal universality.

Once the search engines and databases are identified, one can start gathering data by adopting strategies based on Boolean searches. For example, when researching general documents about nativism or nativist movements, researching the term 'nativism' allows a wide range of results. To conduct narrower searches, especially to find case studies on specific countries or concept, the expression 'nativism' AND '[name of the country]' or 'nativism' AND '[name of the concept]' is useful. However, on the mainstream search engines (Google, Bing etc), search for a single word provides an enormous amount of results. The term 'nativism' gives more than one million results on Google. In order to reduce this 'noise', it is necessary to narrow down search by multiplying research terms and leaving out known unnecessary results (for example the one dealing with psychological and language theories).

The second point is to analyse the findings and to contextualise the data. In this dissertation, the documents belong mainly to two of the three categories established by Scott (2006, cited in Curtis & Curtis). The first category is published sources, the mass media and cyber documents, that are especially relevant to study specific concepts at a given time. The second category is composed by official records, reports and statistics. It is relevant to study the tendencies and evolution of the concepts related to nativism and their consequences, like the evolution of racist acts, the results of local and national elections, and think tank reports (Centre for the Analysis of Radical Right, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Human Right Watch and others).

Once the data is collected, a consistent literature review needs to be written. As the last part of this work will be an analysis of the academic field of research about nativism, the literature review, the identification of gaps in knowledge and ideas for further research will be given there.

According to Louise Corti and Paul Thompson (cited in Given, 2012: 802), there are six different approaches in secondary analyses: description; comparative research, restudy or follow-up study; reanalysis; methodological advancement; verification; teaching and learning. Description is useful when combined with historical research design, as it allows the comprehension of contemporary and historical attitudes and behaviours taken from data at the individual, organizational or societal level (Given, 2012: 802). Reanalysis is particularly interesting for the systematic review and grounded theory, as it allows new interpretation and new questions to be asked of data.

However, the use and reuse of secondary data and research contains several limitations. Considering the field of nativism, the most salient issue is the representation, coverage and context of the research. Indeed, as 'nativism' is a concept that appeared in the USA, existing research is often north American or euro centric. Even though there are more and more case studies on different countries, studies about South-Asian, South American and African countries are still under-represented. Another limitation is the lack of time and resources to get fully acquainted with research materials created by others. Indeed, most of the articles, be they academic or media-related, do not explain how primary sources

and data were collected, which makes it more delicate to assess the argument's veracity (Given, 2012: 803).

To conduct a secondary research based mainly on secondary set of qualitative data, a precise protocol must be put into place to assess the quality of the documents used for the analysis. Following the work of Scott (2006, cited in Curtis & Curtis: 20), four steps are necessary to ensure quality. Firstly, a special attention is necessary about the meaning of the documents, and on literal and interpretative understanding, like the intended, received and internal content. Secondly, one must assess the authenticity of the document, its soundness and its authorship. It attests the problems of mistakes' repetition over different documents. It is especially true for unauthored documents or facts and quantitative data presented without any source. Thirdly, one must check the credibility, sincerity and accuracy of the documents and authors. It assumes that all authors have biases ranging from scholarly concerns to practical constraints about personal and institutional relations, and to self-interest. These biases are rarely known or mentioned in documents. Finally, the representativeness must be assessed. It is about survival of the research, and its availability. In other words, about what is represented in the document, and what is not. As Scott says, "the appropriate starting point of analysis is, that some ideas and voices will be systematically excluded. Emergent researchers should expect that revolutionary or radical positions are underrepresented" (Scott, cited in Curtis & Curtis: 21).

3. Protocols and findings

Due to the enormous amount of results given by the term 'nativism' on different search engines and databases (66 200 results on Google Scholars; more than 10 000 on Nexis database), it was essential to restrict the frame of research, while producing the least biased research product.

The first restriction on the frame of this study is the focus on radical-right parties. Drawing from Bobbio's philosophy, Mudde (2012: 3) identifies the key difference between right and left. Left usually considers that inequalities between people are primarily artificial and that an active involvement of the state

can overcome them. On the contrary, the right believes that inequalities between people are natural and outside the purview of the state. The distinction between radical and extreme can have legal consequences. Political extremism is profoundly anti-democratic in the sense that key aspects of democracy are rejected and can be a cause for the interdiction of a movement – negationism in France or Germany for example. On the other hand, radicalism, even if challenging some key aspects of liberal democracy, like the protection of ethnic or religious minorities, accepts the basic tenets of democracy. Because of data accessibility, most of academic research on nativism focuses on radical-right parties. However, this dissertation also looks into the potential adaptability of the concept of nativism outside of Western democracies and political actors.

When looking for academic articles and news dealing with nativism, correlated with other variables such as xenophobia, racism, immigration etc, it is necessary to underline the types of results.

Geographically, most of the literature is written by North American or European scholars. In the same vein, most of the literature deals with different aspects of nativism in the USA and Europe, then with other countries such as Brazil, Russia, South Africa and Japan. Almost all the articles dealing with the history of nativist movements are describing USA movements.

Politically, studies often focus on recurrent political parties, especially in Europe, such as the *Rassemblement National* (previously known as Front National) in France, the *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs* (Freedom Party) in Austria, *Jobbik* and *Fidesz* in Hungary, *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość* (Law and Justice) in Poland, *Dansk Folkeparti* (People's Party) in Denmark, *Partij voor de Vrijheid* (Party For Freedom) in the Netherlands, the *Lega* (The League) in Italy, the Swiss People's Party. Research is still scarce on smaller nativist movements, such as *Génération identitaire* in France, or about nativist discourse in South-East Europe.

Regarding the type of literature, case studies usually deals with specific events related to nativism, like legislative propositions (see Alvarez and Butterfield, 2000), about nativist discourse, or specific nativist parties. Comparative studies usually compare intra-European countries, or parties in Europe and movements in the USA. Moreover, most of research is based either on secondary sources or

on non-empirical data, which often produce circling studies, all related to the same few empirical studies.

After the research process, the articles for this dissertation have been selected through a process focused on the representativeness of literature. The gathered articles have revealed interesting, yet not surprising findings, that allowed the authors to classify the literature in themes and subthemes. The crucial aspects of nativism, identified as the main themes in the next part are: the evolution of nativism and nativist ideology; the causes and consequences of nativist ideology and movements, and finally the emerging horizon for new research in the field.

Regarding the evolution of nativism and nativist ideology, the identified subthemes are: the relation between immigration and nativism; the evolution of nativist ideology toward a securitisation frame; the increase of racist nativism on a global scale; the mainstreaming of nativist discourse since 2008 and the meaning of symbolic and cultural aspects of nativism.

Regarding the causes and consequences of nativist ideology and movements, the identified subthemes are: the difficult implementation of nativist ideology in national legislation; the different strategies of mainstream parties to adopt, resist or denounce nativism; the increasing violence and/or terrorist potential of nativist movements; and finally the universalisation of nativist ideology and the potential internationalisation of nativist movements.

Regarding the future on research about nativism, the identified subthemes are: the notable absence of strong debates in the field; the shortcomings and gaps that are most commonly found; the question of adaptability of nativism in non-democratic countries like China with Uyghurs or Hong-Kong; and finally the overall limitation of research on nativism due to the lack of empirical data.

Chapter 4: Analysis of the literature on nativism

1. State of the field about nativism

a. Immigration and security

Contemporary nativism is, according to James Cohen ‘a beam of different, but convergent movements that not only advocate for the restriction of migration’s flow, but also assail immigrants themselves by supporting state’s repressive measures, via stigmatising discourses and sometime by committing physical assault’ (Cohen, 2012). Therefore, it is necessary to analyse the literature combining nativism and themes such as immigration, racism or religion. As the core idea of nativism is the rejection of what, or who is seen as ‘the Other’, distinction between the ‘us’ and ‘them’ tends to be based on race, origin, religion or else. The relation between nativism and immigration has been the object of numerous studies, about the US (Sanchez, 1997; Alvarez, 2000; Lippard, 2011; Young, 2017; Kibria and al. 2018), or about nativist movements and ideology in Europe (Galindo and Vigil, 2006; Helly, 2009; Mierina and Kovoleva, 2015; Akbaba, 2018). All the studies converge on the idea that nativist ideology is the core of the rejection of immigration in every radical-right parties, extreme-right movements, from mainstream politics to extremists' groups. The aim of this part is to understand how nativism and immigration are interrelated, and framed by radical-right groups, especially in relation with racism and security.

According to Mudde (2007), the relation between mass immigration and radical-right is existent but not straightforward. It is built on ideological features that are interrelated, including nativist ideology, framed using cultural, religious, security and economic arguments. In the USA and in Europe, one of the common denominators is the identification of an ‘alien’ population as a security threat to the nation. For example, Mudde underlines how immigration and low-level crimes are linked in nativist ideology, using the suggestion that immigrants

become criminals because they have been uprooted from their natural environment (Mudde, 2012: 10). By highlighting specific events, like the series of physical assaults during the 2016 New Year's Eve in Germany, radical-right generalises the presupposed natural violence of migrants to call for immigration restriction. In recent years, these parties have linked immigration and terrorism. However, in other parts of Europe, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, where immigration is a less salient issue, nativism focuses on indigenous populations, like Roma. Indeed, most of the migration in these countries are from neighbouring countries, with similar culture, so the focus of radical-right parties is on populations that are already in the national territory, but not fitting to their 'standards' of culture, nationality or else. In other words, 'nativism played a role in Central and Eastern Europe, where even though mass immigration is a marginal concern, nativism is used to reinforce national sentiment by doing the distinction between "indigenous" minorities versus the majority population' (Mudde, 2007: 19).

Another interesting advancement of literature on nativism is the study of the separated, but related issues that are immigration and integration. The former is used to convey the message that Western countries are the favoured destination for 'mass immigration' which constitutes an existential threat to the nation and state. It is especially relevant for radical right populist parties (RRPPs), however, Mudde notes that extreme right groups put more emphasis on races, pushing the interpretation to defend the idea of a 'white genocide', caused by immigration and state-sponsored multiculturalism (Mudde, 2019: 31). Moreover, nativist ideology is often accompanied, especially in extreme-right groups but to be found increasingly in mainstream politics, by diverse conspiracy theories, warning against the 'Great Replacement', popularised by the French writer Jean Raspail. The idea is based on a racist tradition, that holds that 'the West' is overrun by a wave of non-Western immigration, composed of people who cannot, or do not want to accept nor adopt 'cultural norms'. The subjective distinction between 'natives' and 'aliens' depends on the RRPPS frame and definition. Indeed, for these groups, having the citizenship of the country does not

make one 'native' and many persons, born and bred in the country are considered as 'aliens', and referred to as 'immigrants' (Mudde, 2019: 32) or other derogatory and often insulting terms.

Framing immigrants as a threat to both individuals and collectives is possible for the far-right through a securitisation process, drawing from the Copenhagen School. Securitization "is the process by which issues become part of the security agenda" (Nyman, 2018: 101). According to Buzan et al. (1998), security is much more than traditional military sector, and occurs also in other sectors, like in the economic, environmental, political and societal sectors. On the other hand, the meaning of security is related to issues of survival and existential threat, that is common in nativist ideology. The interest of this approach regarding nativism is that Copenhagen School distinguishes three factors that are, combined together, leading to securitization: there is a need for (i) a favourable external context, (ii) a 'securitizing move' in which an actor designate an issue as an existential threat to something, and finally (iii), the audience acceptance for the designation of this threat. It is important to underline that according to the Copenhagen School, threats can be real or perceived, and are often dramatized. Furthermore, as the threat is represented as an issue of extreme priority, it calls for extraordinary and emergency measures and often state-centred solutions. The Copenhagen School also adds value to this study by considering the 'facilitating conditions' affecting the success of securitization. There are two conditions that have to be reunited: an internal one, concerning the speech act itself that 'follows the logic and grammar of security, creating a narrative that includes a clear existential threat' ; an external one, including 'the general circumstances of the act: both the securitizing actor and their position in society and the threat itself that has to be realistic and believable' (Nyman, 2018: 104).

In nativist rhetoric, 'aliens' are source of insecurity for the nation, or for the 'race', and has a cultural, economic and physical component. The securitization then joins the authoritarianism part, where far-right parties promise to deal with the main identified problem caused by immigrants, be it drugs, crimes,

or unemployment. For example, Trump created the Victims of Immigration Engagement Office, even if studies dismissed the idea that crime is always rampant and growing. These studies are rejected as a lie produced by a 'corrupt elite' and 'political correctness', thus joining the populist aspect of radical-right ideology.

Nativist rhetoric associating crime and immigration has been a predominant issue for the radical-right in Europe and the US at least since the 1980's. However, the connection between immigration and terrorism is more recent, dating mainly from the post 9/11 world, and focused on the relation between Islam and terrorism, making religion a predominant issue (Mudde, 2019: 34).

Racist nativism

The anti-immigration stance of radical-right groups presuppose the existence of racist arguments to separate the 'natives' from 'others'. However, there is a debate about the place of racism in nativist ideology. Mudde (2007: 20), notes that 'while nativism could include racist arguments, it can also be nonracist (including and excluding on the basis of culture or even religion)'. Racist nativism has been the object of studies, mainly about the USA, and about racist discourses linked with nativist ideology.

In the USA, academic researchers have pointed out the extremely racist discourse used by Trump against Mexicans, and more globally the far-right discourse against Latinos immigrants (Sanchez, 1997; Galindo and Vigil, 2006; Perez Hubert et al. 2008; Perez Huber, 2016). Racist nativism exhibits 'a virulent adherence to white supremacy that opens the discursive doors of public discourse to engage in more overt and violent practices of racism that targets people of colour in the U.S.' (Perez Huber, 2016: 215). The racial approach enlightens the discourses that lead to white supremacy, by delineating the process that creates hierarchies between whites and the 'people of colour' that, over time, has become a normalised social fact. As historically, in the US, 'whites have occupied a perceived superior status within a system of racial domination, justified by ideologies of white supremacy that has, over time, distributed power and resources inequitably to People of Colour' (Perez Huber, 2016: 218). Therefore, racist nativism allows to frame how perceived racial differences construct

false perceptions of people of colour as ‘non-native’, and not belonging to the monolithic ‘American’ identity. Racial nativism, even if not being a new phenomenon in the USA, has been brought to a central stage with Trump, who claimed in 2015 that ‘when Mexico sends its people, they're not sending their best.... They're sending people that have lots of problems, and they're bringing those problems with us. They're bringing drugs. They're bringing crime. They're rapists. And some, I assume, are good people...’ (Moreno, Huffington Post, 08/31/2015). Once again, this example underlines how immigration and violence are confused, leading to a securitisation discourse, and sometimes to violence, which will be discussed further in this dissertation.

However, some authors point out that inadequate attention has been paid to the distinctions between racism and nativism (Galindo and Vigil, 2006: 424). Even though both are based on fear, ‘nativism demands assimilation through the elimination of undesirable cultural, linguistic, religious, or political traits’. On the other hand, racism is more concerned with distinctions between the ‘civilized and barbarian than with boundaries between nation-states’, and with maintaining a lower societal status for those groups considered to be inferior (Higham, 1999: 384, cited in Galindo, 2006). Other authors, like Smith, agree with the distinction between the two concepts, and adds that they converge when both racism and nativism are considered as mechanisms used to justify the perceived superiority of whites as natives (Smith, 2016: 300).

Racist nativism however presents some shortcomings. Even if the concept has been theorised, mainly by the critical race theory in an effective manner, case studies remain scarce, focused on the USA (Lippard, 2011; Perez Huber, 2016), the UK (Smith, 2016) or Netherlands (Kešić & Duyvendak, 2019), but would benefit from more case studies, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, where questions of races, minorities and exclusion are coming from different historical background based on frequent changes of national boundaries.

The securitisation move in nativist discourse changed from a xenophobic discourse based on socio-economic arguments, to an anti-migrant discourse based on cultural-religious and symbolic arguments.

b. Economic nativism and welfare chauvinism

The relation between nativism and economy is not recent. The arguments built to oppose immigration often rested on economic reasons, especially in times of economic hardship (see historical section above, and Ernst, 1948). However, researches about specificities of economic nativism are still scarce (Mudde 2012, Goldstein and Peters, 2014; Pirro, 2017). The place of the socio-economic dimension in nativist ideology is thought to have changed over time, to an increasing importance of the cultural-religious dimension (Betz, 2019: 112). This question is central to a broader debate about the place of economic nativism and welfare chauvinism in nativist ideology, and about its influence on radical-right votes. Some authors, like Hans-Georg Betz, argue that the focus of nativists on socio-economic appeal is to be found primarily during the twentieth century and before, whereas nowadays the ‘identitarian’ aspect of nativism has eclipsed socio-economic concerns. The main ideas were to protect native workers from having to compete with migrant labour, and to protect a privileged access to social benefits provided by the welfare state. Other authors like Otjes et al. (2018), Ennsner-Jedenastik (2016) or Pirro (2017), argue that the socio-economic dimension is still extremely relevant in the study of nativist movements and ideology, but cannot be reduced to a ‘left versus right’ political nexus. As Mudde notes, ‘most contemporary studies of the radical right link its emergence to some form of crisis, though not always (exclusively) economic, connected to some type of modernisation process’ (Mudde, 2012: 29). The 2008 economic crisis, and the rise of radical-right parties at the same time can be an example, however, at least in Europe, electoral successes are very contrasted and therefore the place of economy in nativist ideology needs to be further explored.

The following paragraphs will explain how nativism frames the economic policies of radical-right movements today, through welfare chauvinism for example; and expose the shortcomings of studies about economic nativism,

calling for more empirical case-studies, like Pirro's work on the Hungarian Jobbik party.

Radical-right parties' electoral programs always possess a more or less extensive economic dimension and vision. This economic dimension is in a great extent shaped by nativist interpretations of the national labour market and the supposed cost of immigration. Indeed, immigrants are depicted as 'a financial burden to the host society' for two reasons.

Firstly, they supposedly take away jobs from natives, especially in jobs requiring low-level skills or education. Radical-right tends to draw their argumentation from trade theory, according to which migration would tend to create winners and losers. Even though empirical research has shown contradictory results, the perceptions suggest that native-born workers lose out to migrant workers (Betz, 2019: 115). As historically, for example in American immigration, a large number of migrants were often unskilled and with little formal education, the most affected groups have been unskilled native-born workers, the common sense tends to believe that the wages lower with the arrival of migrants. This produces unfair competition between newcomers and natives, and the latter sometimes risked losing their jobs altogether (Betz, 2019: 115). The current nativist ideology and radical right parties still holds these arguments, and call for a horizontal mobilisation against migrant outsiders, in parallel of a vertical mobilisation – which joins populist ideas – against the economic and political establishment.

Secondly, a recurrent argument of radical-right parties is that immigrants are draining social benefits and unfairly benefiting from the welfare state. In other words, that immigrants cost more to a society than they contribute to it. These ideas lead radical-right parties to the conclusion that sending immigrants back into their countries of origin will allow the state to have enough money to provide decent public services to natives (Mudde, 2012: 12). It is welfare chauvinism, that is, the belief that the fruits of the national economy should first and foremost (if not exclusively) come to the benefit of their 'own people' (Mudde, 2012: 10). As Betz notes, the appeal of radical-right parties to welfare chauvinism comes from the well-built suggestion that, as migrants tends to have lower-skilled jobs, they pay less taxes, and therefore do not contribute to the wealth of

the society. Even though it has been demonstrated that, on the contrary, migrants are often value-added to a society in terms of economic production, the appeal to emotions and perceptions allow radical-right parties to give the impression that migrants are eligible to receive many benefits from the state, while natives have 'to pay every cent' (Betz, 2019: 118). In the same vein, radical-right parties share the idea that migrants are more attracted by advanced capitalist countries to benefit from the generous welfare system. It is an argument usually used to call for a restriction or cancellation to the right to free education, health care or social assistance to immigrants, in order to rend the country less attractive. Welfare chauvinism has been identified as the most commonly identified element of the economic policies of radical-right parties (Mudde, 2007, Otjes, 2018).

An interesting outcome and evolution of economic nativism is its generalisation in mainstream political parties, calling for restrictions on benefits for non-natives, and constructing a breeding ground for a dualist welfare system.

Aside from the immigration sphere, economic nativism is also relevant to study the progressive shift of radical-right parties to a leftist rhetoric regarding national economy, calling for more protectionism of national companies against international competition. The distinction is built on the divergence of parties which favour government intervention, and those which support market-based solutions. Both can be accommodated with economic nativism (Otjes, 2018: 271). The economic position of radical-right populist parties (RRPPs) have always been the object of a discord in academia. Some, like Kitschelt and McGann (1995) believed that the electoral successes of these parties in the 1980's and 1990's could be understood by the 'combination of market-oriented solutions to economic problems and repressive, nationalist answers to cultural problems' (cited in Otjes, 2018: 271). However, since 2000, and even more after the 2008 economic crisis, studies have observed an increasing number of RRPPs which positioned themselves on the left regarding economic solutions, mixed with nativist cultural policies.

Overall, there has been only few extensive researches about the impact of economic nativism in case study (Enser-Jedenastik, 2016; Goldstein & Peters, 2014; Pirro, 2017). One of them is Enser-Jedenastik's and his typology of

the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), which explicitly positioned himself as a 'social homeland party' (2016: 416, cited in Otjes et al, 2018: 273). Moreover, it seems that economic nativism and protectionism are often related in RRPPs programs, as Otjes underlines:

'Whereas welfare state chauvinism is about protecting the welfare state against the external threat of immigrants, economic protectionism is about protecting the country against the external threat of unregulated free trade. Among right-wing populist voters, nativism is closely tied to opposition to trade openness (Van der Waal and De Koster, 2017). While liberal proponents of free trade argue that, in the long term, it is beneficial for economies to be open because it allows them to specialize, radical right-wing populists see trade in the short-term as a zero-sum game where the production of goods can either employ people in the one's own country or abroad' (Otjes, 2018: 273).

Moreover, it appears that, at least in Europe, RRPPs tend to become more nativist after an economic crisis, as it happened in 2008. Some parties, like the FN, FPÖ and DF were already characterised by their economic programs with strong nativist components, calling for example for the restriction of social housing to nationals. After the crisis, almost all parties (except for UKIP because of its engagement to free trade) have become more nativist, especially the Swiss People's Party and Italian *Lega* under Salvini's government. Regarding Italian's case, economic nativism was expressed via the strong opposition to financial interests and large corporations, alongside with the rejection of the EU and free trade agreements (Ivaldi, 2017, cited in Otjes, 2018: 279).

All in all, researches about economic nativism show a clear use of nationalist rhetoric to 'protect' natives against 'disloyal' competition from immigrants and international companies, by shifting from a liberal stance and a '*laisser-faire*' regarding national economy in the 1980's, to a more protectionist stance, especially since the 2008 crisis. One could argue that there is a lack of studies regarding the adoption of economic nativism and welfare chauvinism by main-

stream parties, and that extra-European research would light up how other countries were affected by the global crisis and how the RRPPs adapted their discourse.

c. Symbolic and cultural nativism

As facets of nativism are multiple and diverse, it is necessary to look into the idea of ‘symbolic nativism’, developed by Hans-Georg Betz (2019: 123-127). According to him,

‘Symbolic nativism is centred on the defence of the fundamental traditions, values and historically evolved institutional arrangements that define a particular community, its culture and identity. The term was originally advanced by Deborah Schildkraut to characterize the combination of civic republicanism and ethno-culturalism that has informed attempts to define US identity over the past few decades.’

The symbolism lays in the identification of the ‘foreignness’ of someone, often immigrants, and the consequences it has on the power, privileges or prerogatives of the ‘native’ population.

The place of ‘cultural nativism’ and overall, of culture in nativist ideology has a long history, with different magnitude over time and space. For authors like Walter Benn Michaels, cultural nativism is primarily to be found in the study of American modernism in the early twentieth century (1995, cited in Betz and Meret, 2009: 315). According to him, a shift of paradigm happened, as nativism was an attempt to establish a collective national identity via the invention of a distinct American cultural identity. The shift lies in that earlier forms of universalist racism were superseded by cultural pluralism, ‘based on the assumption that different cultures were of equal value but essentially incompatible with each other’ (Betz and Meret, 2009: 315). Instead of acquiring a culture by assimilation, the idea of cultural nativism is that assimilation is arduous if not impossible, and that culture can be acquired only through inheritance from one’s parents. The term ‘assimilability’ became central to the idea that some cultures are equal but incompatible, and that therefore, some persons

could never be truly part of a nation, or country or any other group. The differences between cultures could neither be bridged or overcome. It then allows supporters of nativist ideology to present themselves as defenders of the nation, to protect their country against the ‘social, political and economic evils’ and threat posed by immigration (Billington, 1964, cited in Betz and Meret, 2009: 316).

Cultural and symbolic nativism are used as an ideational ‘stock-in-trade’ for radical-right mobilisation, especially when it comes to the religious and anti-Muslim mobilisation. The process rests on assertions and claims that have been the object of studies (Michaels, 1994; De Genova, Rodriguez, 2008; Betz, 2019), outlining three core processes of symbolic and cultural nativism. Firstly, a process of racialisation, where, because of the ethnic background, culture, or religion, a group is designated as different and subject to unequal treatment. Secondly, a process of culturalization, where norms, values, ways of life or traditions are to be seen as central to an individual’s ‘capacity’ to become a full member or a national community. Finally, the process of essentialization attributes certain traits and characteristics and considers them as fixed and fundamental markers.

As seen in the historical part, religion has been an important theme in nativism, first with the Know-Nothing movement, particularly virulent against Catholic immigrants. Within nativism, the role of antisemitism and more recently Islamophobia have been particularly important. Regarding antisemitism, understood as the hostility to or prejudice against Jews, it is considered as the prevalent and key prejudice of the far-right in the 20th century, and has remained prevalent in many extreme-right groups today, especially in the ones embracing neo-Nazi or fascist ideologies. However, recently, it has been observed that few radical-right groups have switched their rhetoric to avoid antisemitism, and even sometimes embrace a philosemitic position, seeing Israel as a model of an ideal ethnocracy. Moreover, with the rise of Islamophobia, Israel is seen as an ally in the struggle against Islam (Mudde, 2009: 83).

In the nativist’ typology of enemies, Islam has become a number one priority for many radical-right parties. By promoting Islamophobia, radical-right parties have constructed and used the confusion between Islam and Islamism, to present

Muslims as hostile to non-Muslims, 'Western' values and democracy (Mudde, 2019: 27). Islamophobia have been observed as a global phenomenon in the world, not restricted to North America or Europe. Far-right groups have made 'Muslims' their key element in countries like India, China, or Israel. The fear of 'Islamisation' dominates their propaganda, made of domestic and foreign developments, combined with conspiracy theories based on dubious statistics or over-simplistic narratives (*ibid*, p.32).

The question of the radical-right discourse on Islam has been extensively studied. However, one should look at its relationship with nativism. The five-step social identity model set by Maykel Verkuyten (2013), in his case study about the PVV in Netherlands is instructive, even if the author does not mention the concept of nativism, it enlightens the construction of the out-group ideology, that is at the core of nativist ideology. The five steps include identification, exclusion, threat, virtue and celebration. The identification step consists in the construction of a distinctive category of people with specific norms, beliefs etc... It is often done by political leaders referring to 'our people', 'our nation' and so on. The second step consists in the distinction and exclusion of those who are not included in the community, based on the incompatibility of Islam (seen as a homogenous, static and essentialist) with the 'Judeo-Christian' values of Netherlands. The same strategy has been used by other leaders, like Marine le Pen or Donald Trump, presenting a class of different civilisations, between the 'backward' and 'uncivilized' Islam, versus the 'advanced' western defined social and moral order. The third step renders the out-group threatening, using war and conflict metaphors, painting Islam and Muslims as intrinsically violent via an anthropomorphic reification of Islam, and the emphasis on the continuing process of Islamisation. The fourth and fifth steps consists in the insistence on Western 'virtues', like freedom, tolerance and democracy, and their defence. As Verkuyten points out, in radical-right' leader discourse, 'freedom is not so much a part of a Western liberal ideology but rather stands for all that is good and just. In this way, Islamic values and beliefs are made ideological and political, whereas 'ours' are made to appear non-ideological and non-political. The more 'we' stand for the universal cause of freedom, peace, and justice, the more evil

‘their’ beliefs and actions are, and the more legitimate it becomes to treat Islam differently.’ (Verkuyten 2013: 353).

2. The role, causes and consequences of nativism

Historical studies of nativism have primarily regarded it as something that was preached rather than practised (Anbinder, 2006: 181). In *Stranger in the Land*, John Higham pays more attention to the cultural, economic and religious aspect of American nativist discourse than to its physical consequences. Several other studies later also focused on nativist ideology. However, with the rise of radical-right parties in the last decade, and their access to power, one needs to study the impact of nativist ideology on everyday politics and physical consequences.

One can study the impact of nativism according to two different aspects: an institutionalised one, regarding the influence of nativist parties in the public sphere, such as legislative work; and a non-institutionalised one, based on the action of people or groups who do not accept the rule of law and attempt to impose nativist ideas by the use of force. Therefore, this part will focus on the strategies of political parties to deal with nativism on the one hand, and the potential for a progression of nativist violence on the other.

a. Causes, Reaction and counter reaction to nativism

More and more studies are addressing the current causes of nativism, and their political consequences. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace have recently produced an interesting report that set the main findings of the field (Kleinfeld and Dickas, 2020).

Because of the conflicting definitions of nativism, added to the recurrent amalgam between nativism and other concepts such as populism, the root causes of nativism are difficult to disentangle. There is a relative consensus on the minor role played by the economic status in the rise of nativism. It appears that

belonging to the working class, or being unemployed, or living in poverty, in other words, the overall fear of economic loss, do not automatically lead to the support of nativist policies and nativist parties. Nevertheless, in as much as economy plays a role, inequality seems to be a major variable in the support for nativism. For example, even in a growing economy, those who are doing relatively less well than others seem to be attracted by nativism (Kleinfeld and Dickas, 2020: 13).

However, regarding the factors that could explain the support for nativism, there are multiple studies pointing to different directions. Some authors, like Abrajano and Hajnal (2017), suggests that large demographic changes, or rapid ones are a core driver of nativism. Others, like Hill (Hill et al., 2016), or Rydgren, suggest that the fear of change is even more important than the change itself, and is useful to predict nativist attitudes. The shared belief that social, political or economic status are declining more rapidly than others can also be a driver, and people who share this belief are more likely to be nativist (Gest et al., 2017, cited in Kleinfeld and Dickas, 2020). Nonetheless, there is a growing consensus in academia to point out the likeliness of nativist support in white-majority democracies if white voters perceive that their privileged position is eroding (Craig et al., 2018; Huber et al., 2008). In the same vein, political leaders seem to play a key role in the mobilisation of nativist sentiment via the appeal to voter's nostalgia, reminding of a real or imagined era in which voters and supporters privileges were either more secure, or less in a state of fear of a decline of their socio-economic position (Kleinfeld and Dickas, 2020: 13). As discussed in the previous section, the use of a population minority as scapegoats is a common strategy, each minority being linked with specific socio-economic or political issues (Muslims are labelled as terrorists, Romas or Latinos are accused of abusing the social safety net etc.).

When looking at the causes, one should also assert the consequences of nativism. If one considers only the nativist groups which accept and participate in institutionalised politics, then the question of the association of government and nativist ideology comes up. Regarding these issues, Cas Mudde (2012), recognises two main types of influence of nativists on policies: direct or indirect.

A direct influence means that ‘nativist groups directly influence immigration policy, either by implementing it themselves or by (directly) making other actors implement it’ (Mudde, 2012: 15). Indirect influence is slower and more unclear, it is the idea that nativist actors somehow influence non-nativist actors, via lobbying or else, in order for the latter to implement anti-immigrant policies. Even though Mudde points out the insufficient number of documented cases about nativist’ influence on governing actions in 2012, the elections of radical-right leaders like Trump or Bolsonaro give striking examples of implementation of nativist ideology.

Regarding the influence of radical right parties and nativist ideologies in national legislations, the works of Fallend (2004), Zaslove (2004), Heinisch (2003) and Minkenberg (2003) give a first clue about the implementation of anti-immigration policies. Only few radical-right parties have made it into European government so far, the most remarkable being in Austria, Switzerland, and Italy, with several periods of participation to national governments since the 1990’s. A common point of radical-right parties is that they all have been instrumental in introducing more restrictive immigration policies when they were part of government. However, when radical-right parties were present in the parliament but not the government, it appears that their influence on immigration policy is very limited, and that their legislative propositions are often not followed by laws, if not completely boycotted by governmental parties. Regarding indirect effects, it appears that even in countries where immigration is not a central topic for national politics, like in Central and Eastern Europe, it is considered as a fundamental challenge to the society by nativist groups, i.e Jobbik in Hungary, and had direct effect during the migrant crisis in 2015 (Mudde, 2012:19).

When it comes to strategies for addressing nativism, there is a growing consensus on the broad categories that could help decipher the problem of the rise of extremist ideologies. William Downs was a precursor in defining the different strategies, based on his work in Belgian and Norwegian parties (Downs, 2001: 23-42). One should keep in mind that the following strategies have to be adapted to legal systems and parliamentary systems. The four broad categories for dealing with nativist politicians or demands are: collaboration;

co-optation; condemnation or diversion. Collaboration consists in bringing nativist politicians into government or legislative work, either to advance the governing party's own agenda, or because of the belief that governing actors will be able to moderate nativist's most extreme ideas and normalise their behaviour (Kleinfeld and Dickas, 2020: 8). Co-optation consists in mainstream parties capturing nativist votes by adopting some of their policy preferences and rhetoric. It is seen as a way of undermining the most extreme fringe of nativist parties. Condemnation consists in isolating and blocking nativist politicians from entering government or exercising power. It is particularly often used in Western Europe, especially in countries like France, Austria and Germany, where legal restrictions, like the laws to banish racist or hate speech, banning parties or prosecuting politicians, are a tool to restrict the spread of nativist ideologies and violence. However, these legal tools are not transferable in other countries like the USA, because of the infringement and conflict with American free speech protections. Diversion consists in shifting the focus on other policy issues, while ignoring nativist demands. It is often used in an attempt to unite voters by economic interests. Other authors, like Bonnie Meguid (2008), follow the same pattern but distinguishes three strategies: accommodative, adversarial and dismissive, conflating the collaboration and co-optation approaches (Meguid, 2008: 58).

Even though research on the public effect of nativism are still scarce, some researchers have conducted promising case studies about the consequences of nativist rhetoric on urban policies, for example Loren Landau and the study of South African urban segregation in the early 21st century. According to him, 'assumptions of non-nationals' inherent criminality and growing discourses of autochthony or nativism often serve to legitimise extra-legal xenophobic violence and discrimination by both state agents and others' (Landau, 2005: 1115). These actions have two main consequences. Firstly, they marginalise foreigners, which is the primary objective of nativist groups; and secondly, they have broader implications for public security, administrative justice and urban livelihoods. Even if South Africa has celebrated in 2014 its 20 years of democracy and its cosmopolitanism, the struggle over urban space and services is reflected in global responses to immigration. Nativism has been used as a

strategy to answer the double challenge of migration and urbanisation, which led to the generation of ‘zones of exception’ in which South Africa’s legal provisions are suspended or circumvented in an effort to regulate and alienate the country’s non-national population (Landau, 2005: 1116). The key component of the nativist discourse is the logic of exclusion of African from elsewhere on the continent, built on the image that they are an economic and physical threats. On the contrary, the exclusion of white population does not appear to be a priority, nor a concern in general (*ibid*). Most of nativist’ themes discussed in the above section are present in South African nativism, with urban South-African linking the presence of non-nationals with social ills, crime, unemployment, overcrowding and undermining social service delivery. Another characteristic, that is less observable in European countries, is the belief that foreigners are bringing diseases, especially HIV/AIDS in the country. The essential finding of this study is that it shows how anti-immigrant sentiments and practices, often justified through nativist ideology and discourse, are behind ‘a set of discriminatory, often extra-legal practices that threaten efforts to achieve administrative justice, to institutionalise the rule of law, and to build the cosmopolitan society publicly envisaged by its elected leaders’ (Landau, 2005: 1120). This example of case study is a primordial demonstration of the violent potential of nativist rhetoric, which is still an under-researched topic. However, the next part will look into the state of the field regarding nativist violence, and more specifically about the relation between nativism and terrorism.

b. Nativism, the next terrorism wave?

When it comes to the public effect of nativism, Mudde (2012) notes two important alleged phenomena that have received most of the scholar attention: the increase in anti-immigrant violence, along as the increase in anti-immigrant sentiment. This part will focus on the studies related to the potentiality of violence of nativist groups, outside of the main radical-right political parties. Even though numerous studies have looked into extreme-right violence, there are two main shortcomings in the field: the lack of research on the relation between nativism and violence, and the general lack of data on racist violence. As Mudde

notes, the latter suffers from the diverging legislations regarding this type of violence. Sometimes, it is the victim that labels his/her attack as racist, but in other countries it is a police or judge decision (Mudde, 2012: 22). On the question of correlation between electoral success and anti-immigration violence, there are strong debates about whether xenophobic violence is a causal effect of the rise of radical-right parties. Overall, many studies show a rise of nativist violence since the 2000's decade. Many agencies and NGOs are pointing out the terrorist' potential of some extreme-right group, in which nativism is, if not a direct driver, at least a core component of the group's ideology (European Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2010; Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right, Centre for Research on Extremism, etc.).

The various extreme-right terrorist attacks that have happened recently in Norway in 2011 (more than 200 victims), in Germany in 2016 (more than 40 victims), in the UK in 2017 (more than 10 victims), in the USA the same year (30 victims) and in New Zealand in 2019 (more than 100 victims) are the tip of the iceberg of extreme-right violence, the one that received the most coverage. However, the global trend is to an augmentation of right-wing terrorism (Jones, 2018, CSIS report). The question of right-wing terrorism and violence has been debated among scholars for decades (see Caiani et al. 2012; Mudde, 2004; Wilkinson, 1995 etc., in Ravndal, 2018). However, the causes of these violence are far from obvious, often due to the lack of comparable events data. Even though there are still few studies directly dealing with the relation between nativism and violence, some case studies, like Naoto Higuchi's (2018) study of the radical right in Japan enlighten the potential for future researches.

Bruce Hoffman characterises right-wing terrorists by their critics of the democratic state for its 'liberal social welfare policies and tolerance of diverse opinion—alongside its permitting of dark-skinned immigrants in the national labour force and of Jews and other minorities in positions of power or influence' (Hoffman, 2017: 249). Right-wing terrorism refers to the 'use or threat of violence by sub-national or non-state entities whose goals may include racial, ethnic or religious supremacy; opposition to government authority; and the end of practices like abortion' (Jones, 2018). Jacob Ravndal (2018), finds that a com-

mon denominator for these actors is that they fit Mudde's characteristics of authoritarianism, nativism and populism, so, they have strong authoritarian inclinations (for example in the USA they are strong defenders of the right to carry weapons in public), they promote nativism and/or anti-egalitarian agenda. Even though nativism is not used as a sole motivation for terrorist attacks, it is a recurrent variable in the attacks, that has to be taken into account. Indeed, it seems that factors like racism are more common, however nativism is commonly used by attackers to justify their actions. For example, Robert Bowers, who killed 11 people in a Synagogue in Pittsburgh in 2018 espoused anti-immigrant and anti-Jewish views (Jones, 2018). Before his attack, he posted a comment on a website supporting nativist rhetoric and conspiracy theories targeting Jews, and framing them as murderers of the 'American' people (Jones, 2018). As in other forms of terrorism, the internet and social media seem to be used as an opportunity to reach a broader audience, and to organise meetings or other events (Higuchi, 2018: 692). However, it would be interesting to study the nativist component in online propaganda and its national variations, in order to evaluate the potentiality for international movements. Moreover, as foreign connections provide Europeans and Americans based-groups with opportunity to improve their counter-intelligence techniques and their tactics, it becomes more and more crucial to hinder the crystallisation and universalisation of their extremist views and to prevent them from broadening their global network (Jones, 2018). If anything, the combination of a reinforcement of extremist views and of the particular threat posed by some individuals or groups is reinforced by the presence of stockpile of firearms and the development of capability to build improvised explosive device, given the paramilitary aspect of these organisations (*Le Monde*, 27 June 2018)¹.

Nativism must absolutely be considered in regard to extreme-right violence, for two main reasons. Firstly, nativism allows the perpetrators of violence to present themselves as the defender of a supposed invasion, therefore legitimising the gesture. The importance of nativism ideology in extremist discourse have been the object of case studies, and some successfully show the relation and logic between nativist ideas and violent actions. For example, the assassination of the CDU politician Walter Lübcke in June 2019 by two right-wing extremists was

justified by the latter by supporting the idea that the politicians, supporter of Merkel's refugee policy, was a 'traitor against the people' (*Volksverräter*). Key elements of extreme-right narratives are based on nativist ideas: firstly, that the state has befallen into the ends of the 'enemies' (here, the 'Others' targeted are refugees, Muslims, Turks etc); secondly that these 'enemies' are facilitating apocalyptic scenarios that will lead to the death and destruction of the people (*Volkstod*) by welcoming migrants into the country (Fielitz, 2020²).

Secondly, nativism plays an important role in historical revisionism or conspiracy theories that are widespread among far-right groups. In some countries, like Japan, who have a relatively low immigration rate compared to other nations, nativism reflects relations with its nearest neighbours. As Higuchi states 'The nativist movement primarily hates Koreans because they remind the Japanese of a disgraceful period in their history, which requires redress of rights lost in the process of decolonization. As the European radical right has been taking advantage of wars in the Middle East and the influx of refugees from there, Japan's nativism uses tensions with neighbouring countries for its own ends' (Higuchi, 2018: 695). Studies such as Ravndal's (2018) investigate the causes of right-wing terrorism and violence, with three causal conditions, 'the combination of which appears to fuel hostility, polarisation and violence', with elements of grievances and opportunities that are more complementary than exclusionary. However, it is difficult to extricate and weigh the importance of nativism in violent events, as nativism fits in various ideologies, like nationalism, racial supremacism, fascism or else.

c. 'Fortress Europe' and the question of pan-European nativist movements.

As nativism is an indispensable characteristic to determine the minimal definition of radical-right movements in Europe, in the sense that its combination of nationalism and xenophobia, it can be included in all the existing definitions of the party family. As Fagerhom notes, 'this minimal definition conforms with established definitions, is parsimonious and able to travel across Europe, allows

for some variation in the style of the core party message and is capable of separating a broad pan-European radical right family from other families' (Fagerholm, 2018: 541). If nativist ideology fits into various nativist movements and parties across Europe, it is interesting to question the potential for pan-European nativist movement, paradoxically nationalist with an international dimension.

The support for a pan-European approach is based on the shared common understanding in radical-right parties storytelling across Europe, even if the different parties have their own motives, agenda and differ when compared. RRPPs 'share a way of telling and selling their stories abroad, in a range not limited to their beloved nation, marking an unlikely intersection of supranational or 'civilizational' interests with parochial protectionism' (Akbaba, 2018: 201).

Even though there are few systematic studies on the actors and discourses favoured in transnational exchanges among radical-right groups, it appears that there are only few issues that garner transnational radical-right discourse on social media platforms like Twitter, and nativist ideology is one of them, along with anti-immigration. The 'common issue attention' brought by this form of transnationalisation provides a fertile ground for further mobilisation and organisational cooperation across countries (Froio and Ganesh, 2019: 514). In the narration of radical-right groups and supporters, there is an emergence of a confrontation between 'parochial and cosmopolitan views', where Europe is seen as a 'Fortress'. RRPPs position themselves as the defenders of European culture, values and way of life of a European civilisation. As a result, instead of drawing the social, political and cultural boundaries along member states' borders, they define the boundaries between the 'natives' European, and 'immigrants', who are, according to them 'Non-European', including Roma, Jews, Muslims, non-white people etc (Akbaba, 2018: 205). Of course, the idea of pan-European race is not new, especially among racist skinheads and Aryan ideology, and tend to continue as of today, with recurrent international meetings between different groups (Pollard, 2016: 415).

A good example of the potential of pan-European movement is the study of 'Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident', known under the acronym *Pegida*. The movement corresponds to nativist characteristics, basing its rhetoric on the struggle of European regarding immigration and the wider

effect of globalisation. Not only the movement emphasises concept such as ‘homeland’ and ‘culture’, but is also associated with renovative ultimate aims, which is ‘the goal of restoring an idealised version of a past state of affairs which is associated with ethnic and cultural realities’ (Murariu, 2017: 54). Based on a wide network of ‘citizen movements’, *Pegida* unifies its core supporters by emphasising their ‘Christian-Jewish heritage’. Founded in 2014 in Dresden, Germany by Lutz Bachmann, the movement changed its name from ‘Peaceful Europeans’ to ‘Patriotic Europeans’, which showed a more assertive and self-assured message, posing as the defenders of patriotism without further need for justification. In its beginning, the movement was exclusive to local supporters and did not seek publicization. However, the 2015 migrant crisis and terrorists' attacks gave the movement an important breakthrough and permitted to reach out to like-minded groups in other European countries. The movement is an example of attempt for pan-European nativist movement through the signature of the ‘Prague Declaration’ on 23rd January 2016, between *Pegida* and offshoots from other European countries, like Austria, Bulgaria and Netherlands, including the Czech movements *Blok proti islámu* (Block against Islam), and *Úsvit – Národní koalice* (Dawn, national Coalition). It shows the aggregation of grievances that are supported by Central European movements, against the globalisation and the ‘elites’ of the European Union. As Murariu concludes, the true importance of a movement like *Pegida* ‘lies less in its fortunes as a movement, but in the symbol it represents for the wider cause of European ultra-nativism as a whole. As the traditional parties throughout Europe are either splintering or facing dwindling grassroots support, renewed challenges to this consensus arise both from the right and the left’ (Murariu, 2017: 66).

Other authors like Crone (2012) and Young (2016) have opened the question of international nativist movements to other regions of the world, especially regarding Middle-East region, like Talibans or more recently Boko Haram. Young’s work on the organizational strength and institutionalised capacity for problem solving result on the hypothesis that weak states confront a threat to their existence with nativism, whereas stronger communities react with nationalism (Young, 2016: 566). He posits that nativism increased in the last decades because ‘the pace of global change has increased and so have the chances of

unmanageable threats to whole regions. That is fertile ground for nativism' (Young, 2016: 569). This capacity versus threat ratio would be interesting when studying the potential of international nativist movements.

d. The case of non-democratic states

An original look at nativism could come through the non-democratic state angle. Indeed, if nativism is regarded as a mix of xenophobia and nationalism, dictatorship such as China makes an interesting example to evaluate the relevance of the concept of nativism in a state's security and policy. The same rhetoric used by China to justify its action in Hong-Kong and in the Xinjiang region is used by nativist groups elsewhere to justify violence against the 'Others'. The *coup de force* of Beijing in Hong-Kong, outside if any juridical sphere, shows the authoritarian attempt to homogenise all of its territory, where any dissemblance appears to be suspicious at best, hostile to the government at worst. However, the response of Hong-Kongers can also be seen as an example of nativist defence, underlining their differences with mainland China, and displaying nativist messages in public spaces, supporting democracy and calling for the end of the Chinese ruling over the archipelago. (Lowe and Ortmann, 2020). The Chinese government has responded in June 2020 with a law on national security, extending the surveillance of media and restraining individual liberties (Le Monde, 1st July 2020).

In the same vein, the reaction of the Chinese government against the Uyghurs population can be seen as an attempt to unify the state by limiting or erasing cultural differences while displaying a moderate nativist discourse on the international level. Uyghurs who live in the autonomous region of Xinjiang occupy marginalised spaces, be they territorial, but also religious (they are mostly Sunni Muslims) and political. The central government justifies the population's surveillance and the colonisation of Uyghurs spaces by the majoritarian Han ethnicity by the real or perceived threat caused by the relations between some Uyghurs militants and Islamist movements that date back to the 1990's (Castets, 2003). After the attack on Kunming railway station in 2014, attributed to Uyghurs terrorists, a 're-education' process has been put into place to 'assimilate'

Uyghurs to Chinese culture. At the same time, the vocabulary to designate Uyghurs was more and more medical, as the Central government wanted to ‘eradicate the ideological disease’ (Zenz, 2020). According to 2018’s estimation, there are approximately two million Uyghurs who are imprisoned in closed ‘re-education’ camps. Moreover, alleged forced sterilisation of Uyghur women reveal a ‘vast strategy of ethno-racial domination’. All in all, modalities of a ‘Chinese nativism’ can be visible, and characterised by the will to reduce an ethnic minority to silence, while preventing it to stand out from the Chinese model, by erasing it and its culture, through the destruction of libraries, cemeteries, and the imprisonment of Uyghurs scholars and intellectuals. This example shows well the imbrication between nativist discourse and purely nationalism and repressive politic. This opens spaces for further debates about the field.

3. Debates, challenges and gaps in knowledge about nativism

Regarding the future on research about nativism, the identified subthemes are: the notable absence of strong debates in the field; the shortcomings and gaps that are most commonly found; the question of adaptability of nativism in non-democratic countries like China with Uyghurs or Hong-Kong; and finally the overall limitation of research on nativism due to the lack of empirical data.

a. A growing literature, with multiple approach but significant gaps.

As the concept of nativism was firstly studied by historians, the evolution of the concept from its origin to present days is the object of a rich literature, accompanied by reflective historiography (Anbinder, 2006), that is helpful to recontextualise an ancient phenomenon.

As the concept of nativism originates from the USA and has known a regain in popularity with the rise of radical-right movements in the last decades, it is understandable that most of the research available deals with North American or European nativism. The aforementioned studies allow us to draw the frame of nativism and to understand

its origins, implications, and potential consequences. However, it is essential to dig a bit more into the debates, shortcomings and gaps in knowledge of nativism, and to give few examples of how future studies could overcome these gaps.

Given the enormous amount of literature, one could expect a more important part of it being focused on theoretical approach and drawing typologies of recent nativist movements on an international scale, for example on the model of Huber et al.'s work, who theorised racist nativism (2008). The lack of general theorisation of nativism is hindering its definition's evolution, as well as potential approaches to study the phenomenon. The study of nativism and its related subthemes through quantitative variables of empirical studies, like the work of Fagerholm (2018) - mapping extreme-right and left ideologies in Europe - is promising and would allow more emphasis on the causality of nativism.

Studies, especially the one focusing on European countries, often circles around the same radical-right political parties, which is understandable given the large amount of data and topics to be studied. However, the study of non-political groups and their nativist components could be valuable to understand the influence of the most extreme ideologies on political parties, for example regarding white supremacist groups, and their role in the spread of nativist rhetoric. Moreover, there are more and more studies using original frames and approach, like the gendered approach of Lubbers and Zaslove (2017).

b. The difficulty to unentangle nativism from radical-right studies

Unlike populism, nativism is still a relatively under-researched concept per se, therefore few debates have emerged. The definition question, even though blurry, is quite commonly accepted around the main themes of Cas Mudde (2004, 2007, 2012), who emphasises on the importance of xenophobia and nationalism in nativist movements. There are different points of views regarding the importance of economic nativism and welfare chauvinism in comparison to anti-immigration sentiment, however, studies tend to show that the three themes (nativism, populism and authoritarianism) are more complementary than exclusionary. In my opinion, nativism would benefit from being studied outside the spectrum of populism, and adapted to mainstream politics, as it has become clear that nativist rhetoric is commonly used by mainstream political parties. An example could be the nativist component of the recent Indian laws restraining the access to Indian citizenship to Muslim migrants from neighbouring countries.

As mentioned in the conceptualisation part, the border between nativist ideology and nationalism can be porous. In the case of non-democratic countries, or in countries where the concept of nation-state is less relevant or applicable, the notion of nativism needs to be adapted.

Conclusion

Incoming presidential elections in the USA will doubtlessly be the stage for new nativist rhetoric from the Republican candidate. Nativism has been present on the American soil for centuries and is not likely to disappear anytime soon. The academic field is following the same tendency, with thousands of articles written since the 2000's and an exponential growth since 2015. In the absence of extensive theoretical framework or typology, the field seems anarchic at first glance. However, aided by the ground-breaking works of authors like Hans-Georg Betz or Cas Mudde, this dissertation aimed at painting the bigger picture of a seemingly endless topic.

Nativism emerged in the United States in the 1840's with the Know-Nothing movement, in response to a massive influx of immigrants, mainly European Catholics. The movement built an anti-Catholic and anti-immigration rhetoric, based on the idea that Catholic religion and its followers were incompatible with the American identity, based on Anglo-Saxon Protestantism. Few decades later, in the 1880's, large-scale structural changes in rural America provoked a new outburst of nativist movement, accompanied by protest against the ruling class, tying nativism with populism. At the same time in Europe, Boulangism in France appeared with similar features, this time based on anti-Semitism and the opposition to immigrants, accused of undermining the construction and identity of the young Third Republic. The evolution of nativism is closely linked to the social and economic contexts and accommodated with different features, however always with the same characteristics that are anti-immigration and the idea that a state should be inhabited solely by 'native' citizens fitting the ideal-type of the nation.

The inclusion of nativist ideas in Nazi and other fascists ideologies, associating nationalism and xenophobia to reject the 'Other', sparked the interest of academia, with authors like Hannah Arendt. Nativism has been primarily studied through the historical lens, and historians like John Higham have constructed the skeleton of the field on nativism and nativist ideology. However,

the continuation and evolution of extremists' ideologies in the end of the twentieth century moved the focus of the field from history to political science.

The third and fourth wave of extreme-right have had a significant impact on the development of nativist ideology in radical-right populist parties since the 1980's. They marked the emergence of the three core facets of nativism as it is today: economic nativism, racist nativism and symbolic-cultural nativism. The field of research has developed itself in parallel, studying nativism as a part of radical-right parties ideology, together with populism and authoritarianism. Virtually all the articles that have been used in this dissertation deal with the concept of nativism within the radical-right frame. This brings sometime significant confusion with populism, depending on how the latter is defined. Indeed, the construction of nativist and populist rhetoric are based on the same opposition of 'us' versus 'them', be they alleged corrupt leaders or immigrants.

If anything, one of the most striking characteristics of nativism is its adaptability. Radical-right parties makes it fit into their discourse to target specific segment of the population, who are accused of different wrongdoing over time. This showed two main results of the research on databases: on the one hand nativism seems to be a 'catch-all' concept, evolving in parallel to political, economic and social events. This is observable via the evolution from economic nativism, centred on the idea that immigrant are responsible for stealing natives jobs and lowering wages, to symbolic nativism, centred on the idea that some religion or cultures, mainly Islam since 9/11, are not compatible with 'Western values' based on the 'Christian-Jewish' heritage of Europe. On the other hand, the adaptability of nativism into radical-right ideology is promising for the field, as it allows a wide range of research on different issues, such as the internationalisation of nativist messages via social media (Froio and Ganesh, 2019), or the comparison of nativist discourse and consequences in different Europeans countries (Helly, 2009; Richardson and Wodak, 2009).

The state of the field on nativism is characterised by its preeminent focus on occidental countries, explained by the American origin. The concept has been successfully applied outside the Western European sphere, and is relevant to study Central and Eastern European parties and movements, such as *Jobbik*

in Hungary or the *Georgian March*. This interrogates the applicability of nativism outside the frame of nation-states given by the Westphalian point of view and globally outside of the Western democratic political system. Recent studies about China (Lowe and Ortmann, 2020) shows that nativism is relevant to study the securitisation approach of a country toward its minorities.

To answer the research question on the role of nativism, it appears that the primary function of the concept is as a tool in the hand of radical-right political parties to mobilise and unite voters and supporters around a common identity. Unlike populism, nativism is fundamentally exclusionist when it comes to migration questions (Betz, 2007). Moreover, nativist ideology allows radical-right parties to present themselves as protectionist in relation to their own culture, leading to defensive positions when tied with the idea that migration is a ‘foreign invasion’ leading to the disappearance of a culture or nation.

Regarding what causes nativism and nativist ideology, the field is still blurry. Some authors link it to the combination of economic hardship and important immigration (Higham, 1955; Anbinder, 2006). However, the question of the predominance of nativist socio-economic agenda in radical-right programs, identifiable by welfare chauvinism, is the object of debates (see Pirro, 2016). Other authors (Betz, 2019; Perez Huber, 2016) argue that the racist and symbolic dimension of nativism, based on perceived cultural differences, are playing a greater role in nativist ideology. Nevertheless, the field clearly states the prevalence and importance of discourses and narratives shaping the representations of ‘otherness’. The portrayal of migrants as a threat is based on perceived differences, often completed by conspiracy theories.

Consequences of nativist ideology are contrasted between political ineffectiveness and potential violence in the near future. Indeed, radical-right parties that have accessed to power and governance are not able to fully implement their nativist programs, either because they are impeach by other legislative counterparts, or because they choose compromising grounds. The extension of nativist ideology to mainstream parties could however extend the potential for nativist exclusionary policies. When it comes to non-political parties, especially extreme-right groups, it seems that minorities are the victims of an increasing violence. However, the place and importance of nativism in these groups are

still unclear, as there are often an addition of other ideas and ideologies, such as islamophobia, neo-nazism, nationalism etc...

Overall, one can conclude that nativism is a seemingly endless topic to discuss a wide range of social and political issues and would benefit from a more complete theorisation. The effort to explore this phenomenon should be pursued, inside and outside of the Western sphere. Our understanding of nativism is crucial to explain and anticipate social and political challenges of today.

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