



**Erasmus
Mundus**

**The puzzle in the Turkish Foreign Policy decision-making
process: Beyond the nexus of continuities and changes**

July 2020

2395241

18114199

23868276

Dimitra Kioussi

Presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the

Degree of

**International Master in Security, Intelligence, and Strategic
Studies**

Word Count: 21057

Supervisor: Dr. Kenneth McDonagh **Date of Submission:** 28/7/2020



CHARLES UNIVERSITY

ABSTRACT

The puzzle in the Turkish Foreign Policy decision-making process: Beyond the nexus of continuities and changes

July 2020

International Master in Security, Intelligence, and Strategic
Studies

This dissertation analyses the puzzle over the nexus of *continuity* and *change* in the Turkish foreign policy decision-making process. It aims to demonstrate that in Turkey's case what seems to best explain the changing patterns in the country's foreign orientations are the so-called *adjustment* changes in its foreign policy outlook. This study seeks to address two interrelated research questions. The first research question is highly related to the complexity behind the nexus of consistency and inconsistency and to what extent changes in the country's foreign policy direction are *radical* or a product of *adjustment changes*. The second research question is related to how an interplay of interrelated variables can provide an insightful explanation regarding Turkey's convergences and divergences with states in high and low political salience issues. This study uses two decision models, the prominent 'Two-Level Games' introduced by Putnam, and a more recent model, the very well-known Poliheuristic theory introduced by Mintz, to demonstrate how the interplay of the individual, domestic and international component acts as a vehicle in Turkey's foreign policy decisions. To address that question, this study applies the core premises of the above-mentioned models to three Turkish foreign policy decisions – Operation Peace Spring, S-400 deal, and the TurkStream Agreement whose analysis will delineate how the leader's cognitive traits, the interference of the domestic constituents and the international developments are the determinant components of Turkey's foreign policy decisions. This study suggests that a fusion of these three

components provides a more holistic overview when analysing what triggers the *adjustment changes* in Turkey's foreign outlook.

Keywords: Turkish foreign policy decision-making process, 'Two-Level-Games', Poliheuristic theory, adjustment changes, AKP, OPS, S-400 deal, Turkstream agreement

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Writing a dissertation is indeed a challenging task for almost all young researchers, especially given the unprecedented circumstances that we are experiencing due to the outbreak of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. Personally speaking, this six-month period was a difficult but pleasant journey which I will always reflect on fondly.

First and foremost, I would like to thank from the bottom of my heart my family, my two wonderful parents, Chris and Sissy and my little brother Panos for the true support and constant encouragement in this very demanding process.

I am also deeply thankful for the support of my supervisor Dr. Kenneth McDonagh whose insights, guidance, advice, and encouragement motivated me even more to develop an insightful understanding of the topic. There is no shadow of a doubt that his academic experience and knowledge enabled me to go one step further and think out of the box regarding the complex nature of the topic that I chose to delve into.

Finally, I am deeply grateful to the IMSISS Programme as a whole and to the wonderful professors I had at the University of Glasgow, Dublin City University and Charles University who highly contributed to my personal and professional development.

Table of Contents

ABSTRACT.....	2
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	4
Table of Contents.....	5
List of Abbreviations.....	7
Chapter 1.....	8
Introduction.....	8
Chapter 2.....	11
Literature Review.....	11
Conclusion.....	19
Chapter 3: Research Design and Theoretical Approach.....	21
3.1. Introduction.....	21
3.2. Research Strategy and Data Collection.....	21
3.3. Theoretical Frameworks.....	22
Untangling the core features of ‘The Logic of Two-Level Games’.....	23
3.3.1. The importance of exceeding the ‘single’ level of analysis.....	23
3.3.2. The Logic of Two-Level Games and its Core Premises.....	24
3.3.3. The Determinant Role of the Statesman.....	28
3.3.4. Two-Level Games’ Validity and its Limitations.....	29
3.3.5. Poliheuristic Theory and its Significance.....	30
3.3.6. Untangling the core features of the Poliheuristic Theory.....	31
3.3.7. A Thorough Analysis of the ‘Two-Stage Process’.....	34
3.3.8. Poliheuristic Theory: Validity and Limitations.....	37

3.3.9 Conclusion	38
Chapter 4: Delineation of distinct Turkish foreign policy decisions: Applying the two decision models	39
4.1 Introduction	39
4.2 Operation Peace Spring: Political and Historical Background	40
4.2.1 Application of Putnam's (1988) and Mintz's (2004) Models to OPS	42
4.2.2 Concluding Remarks	48
4.3 The Purchase of the S-400 missile system: A Looming Debate	49
4.3.1 Application of Putnam's (1988) and Mintz's (2004) Models to the S-400 deal	51
4.3.2 Concluding Remarks	55
4.4 The TurkStream Intergovernmental Agreement: Towards A Strengthened Economic Partnership	56
4.4.1 Application of Putnam's (1988) and Mintz's (2004) Models to the TurkStream Project	57
4.4.2 Concluding Remarks	61
Chapter 5: Discussion	62
Chapter 6: Conclusion.....	66
Bibliography	69

List of Abbreviations

AK Party-AKP: Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)

CHP-RPP: Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)

HDP-PDP: Peoples' Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi)

MHP-NMP: Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi)

OPS: Operation Peace Spring

PHT: Poliheuristic Theory

PKK: Kurdistan Workers' Party

PYD: Democratic Union Party

TAF: Turkish Armed Forces

TFP: Turkish Foreign Policy

Chapter 1

Introduction

Since the early 1990s, Turkey's foreign orientations have been marked by gradual changes that shed light on the nexus of *continuity* and *change* in its foreign policy decision-making process. To untangle the distinct dynamics behind Turkey's changing patterns in its foreign policy orientations is indeed a challenge. Within the existing literature, scholars tend to explain why decision-makers opt for one alternative or orientation over the other based on a separate set of elements or variables. Therefore, there is a marked paucity of research in the development of a unified framework that would explicitly incorporate in a single study all the key drivers that trigger changing patterns in the country's foreign direction.

To address that puzzle, this dissertation investigates two interrelated research questions. The first research question is related to the above-mentioned puzzle and is the following: 'to what extent are changes in Turkey's foreign policy outlook actually *radical changes* or just *adjustment changes* of a constantly changing political, economic and security landscape?'. The second research question addresses the entanglement of a set of interrelated variables as an explanation to the changing patterns and is the following: 'to what extent can an interplay of the leader's personal cognitive traits, the interference of domestic constituents and finally international developments provide a holistic explanation of Turkey's multidimensional foreign policy?', and by extension 'to what extent will the convergences and divergences in low and high political issues with other state-actors fuel further isolation for Turkey in the foreseeable future?'. To address the second research question, this dissertation will apply a fusion of two decision models – Putnam's (1988) 'two-level game' and Mintz's (2004) Poliheuristic theory in order to demonstrate what motivates Turkey to pursue a threefold of strategic objectives that would satisfy its domestic interactions, international aspirations and the leader's domestic viability.

To date, the long-term puzzle over the nexus of *continuity* and *change* in the Turkish foreign policy decision-making process reflects two schools of

thought. The first school of thought accounts for ‘traditional decision-making elites’ that were the predominant figures in the domestic political arena from the establishment of the Republic of Turkey till the advent of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - the AKP Party) (Han, 2010). These elites identify ‘foreign policy’ with ‘state policy’ leading to a first conclusion; that the boundaries between domestic and foreign policy are blurry (Han, 2010:86). The existence of elites, along with a significant number of scholars who leaned towards that close affinity between foreign and state policy seem to embrace the argument of a strong continuity in Turkey’s orientations. On the other side of the spectrum, a large body of literature adheres to the significant changes that the AKP applied to Turkish politics. This school of thought strongly opposes to the traditional political elites by arguing that the advent of the AKP administration implemented a series of policies that paved the way for many significant changes in Turkey’s domestic and foreign priorities.

This dissertation suggests that looking specifically at the terms *continuity* and *change* when analysing Turkey’s foreign policies is quite restrictive. Therefore, this study suggests that the nexus of *adaptation* and *adjustment changes* seems to be more applicable to the aims and objectives of this dissertation. The term *adaptation* refers to the interpretation of the imminent threats and challenges of the security, political and economic landscape, and how subsequently the Turkish government ought to adapt to the emerging circumstances and *adjust* its foreign policy objectives based on its national interest.

This study comprises four chapters. Chapter 2 provides a thorough literature review on the puzzle over the nexus of *continuity* and *change* and through a delineation of distinct interpretations on the matter that this study will seek to address in the first research question. Chapter 3 introduces the reader to the research design and the theoretical approach. Putnam’s (1988) model and Mintz’s (2004) Poliheuristic theory were selected to address the second research question and unfold the nature of *adjustment changes* in Turkey’s foreign direction. Therefore, rather than examining the models separately, this study

merges the core premises of the two and draws conclusions regarding the above-mentioned research questions.

Chapter 4 will introduce three Turkish foreign policy decisions which are the following: a) Operation Peace Spring; b) the S-400 deal; c) the TurkStream Intergovernmental Agreement. This chapter will also apply the two decision models to the respective cases. Chapter 5 will then discuss the main findings from the analysis. The general discussion of the findings will also elucidate how they are related to the literature review, enabling it to draw an insightful analysis on the puzzle. Finally, Chapter 6 will draw conclusions from the present study, discussing its limitations and providing insights for future research.

Chapter 2

Literature Review

This chapter will first unfold the nexus of *continuity* and *change* in the Turkish foreign policy decision-making process which has been at the forefront of the academic literature since the early 1990s. Within the existing literature, a wide spectrum of academic scholars has shed light on this puzzle over the consistencies and inconsistencies, the continuities, and ruptures in Turkey's foreign policy orientations over the years. However, there is a marked paucity of research in the development of a unified framework that would explicitly incorporate all the key drivers that trigger these changing patterns in the country's foreign outlook. This dissertation will attempt to illustrate that a fusion of two already existing decision models can explain in a holistic way how Turkey's foreign attitude is shaped by an interplay of domestic considerations, international aspirations, and the decision-makers' cognitive features. Therefore, rather than looking at the three above-mentioned variables separately as they have been studied within the academic scholarship, I suggest that there is an interrelation among the domestic, international and individual component that sheds light on Turkey's convergences and divergences with states in high and low political salience issues.

Within the existing literature, academic scholars tend to profoundly use the nexus of *continuity* and *change* when delineating Turkey's foreign orientations (Özcan and Usul, 2011; Kara and Sözen, 2016; Ülgül, 2017, Haugom, 2019). As a starting point, Ziya Önis's (2011:51) contribution on the elements of continuity and discontinuity in the Post-2007 era elucidates various aspects of the puzzle, ranging from Turkey's foreign policy style, the policy of Europeanization, regional and global concerns to the mediation style, the leadership's role in foreign policy decisions and finally the impact of the domestic policies on foreign policy matters. The first element – Turkey's foreign style; namely the gradual redefinition of the country's foreign agenda and the shift towards a multidimensional foreign policy where Turkey would be the epicentre, was indeed one of the cornerstones during the early years under the AKP administration (Yeşiltaş and Balcı, 2013:13). To fulfil that end, the

preference of soft power tools over hard-power tools came to the forefront as Turkish policymakers soon realized they needed to broaden and deepen the Republic's relations in order to achieve the long-term objective, a pivotal 'central state' (Davutoğlu, 2008:78). However, this turn to multidimensionality and the use of soft power means was soon succeeded by a more independent and assertive attitude that indicated the first sign of inconsistency in Turkey's foreign outlook (Önis, 2011). This reinforcement of a more security-focused policy is widely investigated by academic scholars and strengthens the argument for a nexus of unilateralism and multilateralism where Turkey seems to swing back and forth. Walker (2007:33) illustrates the blurry boundaries between unilateralism and multilateralism by making reference to Davutoğlu's standpoint on that matter where he stated that 'Turkey should not be dependent upon any one actor and should actively seek ways to balance its relationships and alliances so that it can maintain optimal independence and leverage on the global and regional stage'. Looking at the more recent developments, Lars Haugom (2019:215) advocates that the confluence of two domestic factors – the president's concentration of executive power after the constitutional changes in 2018, and a subsequent turn towards a more hard line rhetoric, 'have for their part reinforced these trends by promoting a more assertive and security-focused foreign policy'.

The second element of continuity and rupture that has received considerable attention is Turkey's Western orientation (Önis, 2011). According to Murat Ülgül (2017), Turkey's inclination towards the West remains immutable over the years, although during 2009 and 2013 Turkey in fact prioritised the broadening of its relations with the Middle Eastern countries. Nevertheless, as Önis would argue, to date, Turkey's commitment towards its Western counterparts is questionable, especially if one takes into consideration that the former disengages from the multilateral platforms and opts for unilateral decisions, principally in the security realm. The question of what direction Turkey is moving into is a debatable one and that explains why decision-makers often opt for a more unilateral stance, however the argument of multilateralism is intensively stressed, at least in the political discourse.

The third element that seems to generate certain confusion among scholars is the regional and global role that Turkey seeks to assert. Adherents of the continuity argument tend to support that Turkey strives for ensuring stability, while acting at the same time as a mediator in regional and international conflicts (Yeşiltaş and Balcı, 2013:23). However, a significant body of literature has stressed Turkey's mediating endeavors were primarily oriented towards the Middle Eastern countries compared to the Balkans or Central Asia where the level of involvement was more limited. On the one side of the spectrum, Yılmaz and Özdemir (2017) pinpointed that during the second tenure of the AKP administration, the government opted for a more assertive and active foreign policy in the Middle East which significantly differed from the non-interventionist policy that the former pursued in the early years of its administration. On the other side of the spectrum, Ilter Turan (2011) argues that the Turkish foreign orientation towards the Middle East should not be attributed to the AKP government, as previous administrations had implemented a series of policies towards the strengthening of the relations. However, as Turan (2011) stresses, the main difference between previous administrations and the AKP is that the latter pursues a distinct approach towards the existing conflicts and tensions – a turn to unilateralism as a way to ensure its role in the region.

In the literature, the intensification of the endeavors in the Middle East is interpreted as an element of rupture. Nonetheless, from a personal standpoint, the more intensified efforts in the region should not be linked to notions as rupture or discontinuity in the country's foreign attitudes. Inspired by Turan's argument – that Turkey's interest in the Middle East is not a new phenomenon – I perceive the increasing tendency to intervene in the Middle Eastern matters as part of *adjustment policies* that the Turkish government had to implement in order to fulfil its strategic objectives in the region. Therefore, rather than looking at the nexus of *continuity* and *change*, a nexus of *adaptation* and *adjustment* seems to be more applicable to the aims and objectives of this dissertation. The term *adaptation* refers to the interpretation of the imminent threats and challenges of the security, political and economic landscape, and how subsequently the Turkish government ought to adapt to the emerging

circumstances and adjust its foreign policy objectives and orientations based on its national interest.

Highly linked to the above-mentioned argument is the ongoing debate among scholars in terms of what direction Turkey is moving into, and subsequently to what extent the changes under the AKP administration trigger a radical impact on Turkey's foreign orientations. Aras is one of the proponents of the non-radical aspect of the changes in Turkey's foreign orientations after the 2016 coup attempt, and as he explicitly argued 'presumed redirection or recalibration is unlikely to happen in TFP in the post-July 15 era' (Aras, 2019:3). In line with this argument, in their analysis on *Understanding the 'New' Turkish Foreign Policy*, Mesut Özcan and Resul Usul challenge the conventional wisdom among scholars with regard to a new Turkish foreign policy that signals a radical shift from the conventional roots of its foreign policy objectives (Özcan and Usul, 2011). A significant input from their research which also substantiates my argument on *adaptation* and *adjustment* is the fact that they do not prefer the use of 'radical changes' to pinpoint the changes that the AKP administration implemented, but 'changes within continuity' (Özcan and Usul, 2011:159). Therefore, one could argue that the intensification of Turkey's interest in the Middle East is not considered a radical shift, but an adaptation to the changing security landscape that urged Turkish policymakers and decision-makers to adjust their policies and orientations accordingly without that signifying a total turn to the Middle East but a rediscovery and redefinition of the relationship. Highly linked to the non-radical shifts in Turkey's orientations seem to be the underpinnings of Soli Özel and Serhat Güvenç (2012) and Ozan Örmeci (2011) who argued that the majority of the AKP proposals regarding the country's foreign agenda was previously introduced by Ismail Cem, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs till 2002 (Özel and Güvenç, 2012; Örmeci, 2011, cited in Sezal, 2015:6).

Contrary to this non-radical aspect of the state's foreign policy, there is also a representative group of academics who embrace the radical shift argument. Kürşad Turan (2012:75) reinforces the assumption by claiming that 'the new foreign policy will be active and guided by a vision in which the

Middle East occupies the center stage'. Delving into the argument on the transformation of the Turkish foreign policy, Kemal Kirişci, through his novel contribution, draws an extensive analysis on the matter by presenting the distinct factors that paved the way for this transformation and led to 'massive changes' in the course of the years (Kirişci, 2009:33). According to a significant body of literature, a possible explanation for these massive changes can be attributed to the advent of the AKP in the Turkish political chessboard where a total reshaping of the Turkish foreign agenda was pursued. According to Han (2010), scholars who embrace this narrative fall under the scope of the first school of thought that posits in the center of its study the unprecedented changes in foreign policy decisions that the AKP applied in 2002. As the author explicitly argues, 'the source and legitimacy of this new foreign policy rests on the increasing democratic expectations and standards in the country that carried the AKP to power' (Han, 2010:87). Consequently, a proponent of this thought would argue that the domestic developments were among the most crucial determinants for these changes, leading this research to the fourth component of continuity and *rupture* – interrelation of domestic and foreign politics

The fourth component of *continuity* and *rupture* that has been a bone of contention among scholars is the issue of entanglement between domestic politics and foreign policy. As Önis (2011) demonstrates, advocates of the continuity argument tend to explain the linkage between the domestic and foreign policy through the lens of the increasing involvement of the civil society and public opinion in the process of shaping foreign policy decisions. In line with the above-mentioned assumption is Larrabee's and Lesser's view, as according to them, 'public opinion has emerged as an increasingly important factor in Turkish foreign policy' (Larrabee, FS and Lesser, IO, 2003:33, cited in Hatipoglu and Palmer, 2016:239). Nonetheless, this gradual intensification of public's involvement in domestic politics is interpreted by Önis as a component of *rupture*, in a sense that the interrelation between domestic and foreign politics was significantly reinforced (Önis, 2011:51). However, there seems to be a pitfall in using the further linkage as a component of *rupture*. Even though scholars stress the use of foreign policy to further consolidate domestic viability, they do not seem to interpret it as an element of discontinuity in the

Turkish foreign policy orientations. To cite an instance, Bulent Aras (2017:4) argued that the increasing role of individuals rather than institutions blur the boundaries between domestic and foreign politics, paving the way for ‘the politicisation of foreign policy and erosion of the boundaries between domestic and foreign policy’. The issue of politicisation of the Turkish foreign policy is also stressed by Haugom who directly links the instrumentalization of the Turkish foreign policy to the president’s domestic expediency and viability (Haugom, 2019:214). The leader’s interference in the country’s foreign policy decisions, especially after the strengthening of executive power under the Constitutional amendments lays the foundations for further investigation in the following chapters, as it fits certainly under the scope of this dissertation.

Looking at the tightened linkage between domestic and foreign politics, it would be quite restrictive to presume it as a feature of discontinuity. The use of the term *adjustment* seems to provide a more comprehensive explanation to the above-mentioned argument. To expand more on this, one could argue that it was the gradual reinforcement of the role of the civil society and public opinion that led the AKP government to redefine the relationship due to increasing domestic pressures and subsequently to adjust its foreign policy initiatives to the requests of the domestic political base. Therefore, one should pay significant attention while using the terms *change*, *continuity*, *rupture* to portray Turkey’s foreign orientations. With regards to change, Hermann’s (1992) contribution is considered pioneering in the study of the distinct levels of changes as it provides an explanation regarding the puzzle around *continuity* and *change*.

Hermann, in his seminal study on ‘*Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy*’, outlines four distinct levels of change; a) adjustment change; b) program change; c) problem/goal change; d) international orientation game (Hermann, 1992:3, cited in Haugom, 2019:207). The core difference among the four levels is attributed to four factors; a) scope; b) means; c) purpose; d) orientation. In terms of the scope, Hermann pinpoints that a change is associated with the scope of a country’s foreign policy. In Turkey’s case, this feature can be seen in the prioritisation of domestic politics under Erdogan’s tenure, and more specifically a turn to

safeguard national security. The second factor – means – accounts for the selection of methods that the government opts for when confronting with crises or conflicts. Applying this factor to Turkey, one could claim that its inclination to ensure its assertiveness is intertwined with the use of force to achieve greater payoffs. The latest offensive campaign in North-eastern Syria serves as a representative instance where the use of force was chosen amid various alternatives, as it was perceived the optimal option for Turkey's national interests. The third factor – purpose – is intertwined with the objectives of the foreign policy agenda. As Haugom (2019) pinpoints, the purpose is directly linked to the notion of *strategic autonomy*. To achieve strategic autonomy and a greater leverage in the international political arena, the strengthening of partnerships with state-actors is imperative. However, as this dissertation will demonstrate, Turkey's convergences and divergences with regional and international actors primarily in high political salience issues act as an impediment towards the fulfilment of *strategic autonomy*. The fourth component – orientation – aligns with a holistic change of the entire foreign policy agenda towards regional and international affairs. Applying this factor to the Turkish case, Haugom argues that an international orientation change is less likely to occur in Turkey's foreign orientations as the extent to which these changes can be characterized as 'radical' or 'dramatic' remains highly contestable (Haugom, 2019:207). In the Western eyes, a Turkish disengagement from its Western affiliates would be tantamount to an international orientation change. For instance, Ankara's rapprochement with Russia and the former's decision to buy the S-400 missile system to advance its national missile system could be interpreted by the West as an indicator of international orientation change. On the other hand, Turkish policymakers and decision-makers perceive this rapprochement as part of their strategic autonomy policies which falls under the scope of the third factor – problem/goal change.

Regarding the distinct factors that trigger changes in Turkey's foreign policy, within the existing literature, scholars seem to diverge upon drawing a fixed set of variables that would provide a holistic explanation. The following section will shed light on this puzzle by drawing upon Mustafa Aydin's

contribution concerning the existence of *structural* and *conjunctural* variables that will subsequently serve as a transition to chapter 3 – theoretical approach.

Aydin (2004) argued that there is not a universal set of variables or factors that would portray the effects on the foreign policy decision-making process. However, in his novel study on the ‘*Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War*’, he illustrates a division between two broad axes of variables that could act as a starting point when untangling the foreign policy decision-making process. The first axis falls under the scope of the so-called *structural variables*. According to Aydin (2004:11), the core features of the structural variables are that they first tend to be immutable across time, and second, there is no direct link between the variables and the international developments. The country’s geographical location, its historical practices, the cultural components, along with its long-term economic needs would primarily fall under the spectrum of these variables. In Turkey’s case, the inspirer of the so-called ‘Strategic Depth’, Ahmet Davutoğlu, stressed the importance of the variables as key drivers of Turkey’s foreign policy objectives (Davutoğlu, 2008). Turkey’s pivotal geographical location, the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, the cultural affinity with the Arab world and finally the deepening of *economic interdependence* represent a sense of continuity in Turkish politics that lays the foundations for the *conjunctural variables*. Contrary to the structural ones, the character of the conjunctural variables tends to be dynamic, as they are a product of the entanglement between domestic and international developments (Aydin, 2014:11). Consequently, conjunctural variables do not present a course of continuity as they constantly change. This core difference between the two offers a first explanation of the nexus between *continuity* and *change*. Indeed, there is a body of literature that focuses on explaining Turkey’s foreign orientations through the lens of the structural variables which are directly linked to the *continuity* argument. However, this dissertation seeks to encourage further investigation by looking at an interplay of *conjunctural variables* that would potentially give a more holistic explanation on the puzzle over Turkey’s foreign behaviour, its alliances with regional and international actors, the divergences

in high and low political salience issues, and finally the blurry boundaries between multilateralism and unilateralism.

Conclusion

This chapter sought to introduce the reader to the general discussion concerning the peculiar features of the Turkish foreign policy orientations and the extent to which they are the product of *continuity or change* in the Turkish decision-making process. The nexus of *continuity and change* reflects a long-term puzzle on the Turkish political chessboard that reveals two schools of thinking. As Han (2010) denotes, the first school of thought accounts for ‘traditional decision-making elites’ that were the predominant figures in the domestic political arena from the establishment of the Republic of Turkey till the advent of the AKP. These elites identify ‘foreign policy’ with ‘state policy’ leading to a first conclusion that the boundaries between domestic and foreign policy were blurry (Han, 2010:86). The ‘traditional decision-making elites’ and a significant body of scholars seem to embrace the argument of a strong continuity in Turkey’s orientations. The three elements of continuity that have been omnipresent can be summarized as follows; a) a prioritisation of Turkey’s national security as a product of its pivotal geographical location; b) a Western orientation which is deeply rooted in the Kemalist ideology; c) an adoption of ‘reactive strategies’ in response to undesirable of foreign policy outcomes (Han, 2010:85). Nevertheless, there is a considerable body of literature that leans towards the element of change that the advent of the AKP government brought in the domestic political scene. This school of thought seems to question the traditional decision-making narrative and presumes that ‘the preferences of the traditional decision-making elites do not reflect the genuine desires of the population’ (Han, 2010:86). That explains why a proponent of this narrative would argue that the AKP brought a series of changes that aimed to reshape the country’s foreign and domestic priorities.

In this dissertation, the researcher does not exclude the one narrative over the other and seeks to elucidate that the nexus of *adaptation* and *adjustment* seems to be more applicable to the aims and objectives of this study. The following section will introduce the reader to the two theoretical frameworks –

Putnam's (1988) model and Mintz's (2004) Polyheuristic theory – that will attempt to unfold the nature of *adjustment changes* in Turkey's foreign behaviour and what motivates the country to pursue a threefold of strategic objectives that would satisfy its domestic considerations, its regional and international aspirations, and finally the leader's domestic viability. Therefore, rather than examining the two models separately, this study suggests an entanglement of the three variables that could potentially mirror the 'three-level of analysis' introduced by Kenneth Waltz (Waltz, 1959).

Chapter 3: Research Design and Theoretical Approach

3.1. Introduction

Chapter 2 – Literature Review – identified the puzzle over the nexus of *continuity* and *change* in the Turkish foreign policy decision-making process. There is a paucity in existing research in that there is an array of factors that signal a potential continuity and rupture in Turkey’s foreign policy orientations. However, four crucial points should be further scrutinized; a) to what extent are these changes actually *changes* or just *adjustment changes* of a constantly changing security, political and economic landscape?; b) to what extent can an interplay of domestic considerations, international developments, and the leader’s cognitive features can provide an insightful explanation of the country’s changing foreign policy directions?; c) to what extent are Turkey’s convergences and divergences with international and regional actors in high and low political salience issues a product of the above-mentioned interplay?. Chapter 3 – Research Design and Theoretical Approach – will delve into the distinct components of the research strategy; namely the means of collecting data, the use of two theoretical frameworks to address the research questions, finally limitations in the chosen strategies.

3.2. Research Strategy and Data Collection

The research strategy that best meets the aims and objectives of this dissertation is the case-study approach. As Roger Pierce (2008:3) illustrates, ‘Students of conflict studies are more likely to adopt an in-depth case study of a particular geographical area’. Pierce’s (2008:3) argument reflects the two components that help explain why I chose that research strategy; a) in-depth research and analysis; b) a determined geographical area. This study uses Turkey as its primary case-study and it explores three Turkish foreign policy decisions to illustrate its convergences and divergences with regional and international actors, especially when it comes to the country’s foreign policy orientations. Regarding the type of the case-study, the *explanatory* one meets the purpose of this dissertation. The reason why I presume that is because this study intends to demonstrate the reasons *why* Turkey opts for one alternative

over the other, *what* motivates the country to adopt or reject courses of actions and *how* domestic and international components influence the foreign policy decision-making process.

Regarding the methods of collecting data, this study utilizes an extensive series of secondary data ranging from books, journal articles, news articles to official government documents, and think tanks' reports. The initial idea regarding the research design was to combine primary in-depth interviews with secondary data. The conduct of elite interviews would include scholars from the University of Piraeus and think tank researchers. However, due to the outbreak of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic since early January, I had to adjust my research to desk-research analysis. That explains why I opted for an extensive study of the existing literature. The research questions identified above served as catalyst for the identification of the relevant secondary data. Distinguishing among the vast amount of academic and non-academic literature was indeed a challenge and certain limitations arose during the process. This study takes into consideration a set of criteria to enhance the validity and reliability of the research study. These are the following; a) the year of publication – the more recent publications were primarily selected, as this study dovetails with the current situation and the structure of the Turkish foreign policy decision-making process; b) the authors' contribution to the development and extension of thinking in the given research area – an array of authors were selected in order to present the twofold image regarding the consistencies and inconsistencies in the country's foreign orientations. During the selection process, several shortcomings arose which will be further analysed in the following sections where I introduce the two theoretical approaches and in Chapter 6, the conclusion.

3.3. Theoretical Frameworks

This section introduces the theoretical frameworks of this dissertation and serves as a transition towards chapter 4. This dissertation utilizes two decision-making models and suggests that a fusion of the two provides a more holistic explanation of the main argument – which variables indicate Turkey's convergences and divergences with high and low political salience issues and

consequently to what extent these divergences can be considered as products of the changing patterns in Turkey's foreign policy orientations. Therefore, this section is divided into two parts. The first part introduces Putnam's (1988) framework, its core assumptions, its applicability in foreign policy decisions and finally its limitations. The second part follows a similar structure as it introduces Mintz's (2004) Poliheuristic theory (PH), its main features, its applicability in foreign policy decisions and finally its limitations. After depicting the core components of each approach, in the following chapters the entanglement of the two models will serve as the baseline for explaining Turkey's inconsistencies in its foreign policy orientations.

Untangling the core features of 'The Logic of Two-Level Games'

3.3.1. The importance of exceeding the 'single' level of analysis

Within the existing literature, a significant body of theorists tends to explain interstate relations based on a single level of analysis (Moravcsik, 1993). As an illustration of this argument, David Singer states that 'one could not add these two types of statements [systemic and domestic causes] together to achieve a cumulative growth of empirical generalizations', as the two levels of analysis – state level and systemic are 'mutually exclusive' (Singer, 1961:29, cited in Moravcsik, 1993:6). Singer's ambiguity concerning a potential interplay between the domestic and the international political game sheds light on the so-called level-of-analysis problem. The roots of the level-of-analysis problem date back to the 1950s where Kenneth Waltz introduced a classification of three levels; the individual level that principally focuses on the personality and psychological features of statesmen as primary causes of war; the state level where domestic considerations initiate a driving force for governmental policies; and finally the systemic or international level and its anarchic nature as a key driver for state behaviour (Waltz, 1959). As Sampath Gunasena (2013: 218) pinpoints, the first image – a leader's human nature – along with state behaviour which is a domestic component constitute a 'bottom-up approach', in the sense that they lead unavoidably to the third constituent – the systemic level. However, as the main feature of the international system is anarchy, from a neorealist standpoint, states seek to maximize their gains in the international

arena while safeguarding their national interests. This direct impact of the international level on the state-behaviour is characterized as a 'top-down approach' and several studies have focused on indicating how the international political game influences the state's foreign behaviour (Moravcsik, 1993). Nevertheless, as this study suggests, focusing exclusively on a single level-of-analysis would be quite restrictive and that explains why Putnam's (1988) framework is one of the most prominent examples of how the two approaches – 'bottom-up and top-down approaches' – are able to offer a unified endeavor towards bridging the gaps between the domestic and the international political game.

3.3.2. The Logic of Two-Level Games and its Core Premises

In the existing debate over the linkage of domestic and international politics, Putnam's contribution lays the foundations for a closer investigation towards the level-of-analysis problem. As Putnam (1988) argued, the empirical findings of numerous studies mainly concentrated on distinguishing the domestic and the international constituent, and subsequently an insightful analysis on the potential entanglement between the two was highly underdeveloped. The bureaucratic model of foreign policy introduced by Graham Allison substantiates the missing link in the literature (Putnam, 1988:431). According to Allison, 'Applied to relations between nations, the bureaucratic politics model directs attention to intra-national games, the overlap of which constitutes international relations' (Allison, 1971:149, cited in Putnam, 1988:431). However, as Putnam illustrates, scholars did not make any significant effort to identify the overlap and to provide an insightful conceptualization of the link between domestic and international politics (Putnam, 1988:431). Therefore, in his novel study on '*Diplomacy and Domestic Politics*', Putnam sought to fill the gap in the academic scholarship by introducing the 'two-level game'. As Moravcsik (1993:23) argued, the peculiar characteristic of the 'two-level game' is its duality as either a metaphor or as a theory. As the author explicitly explains (1993), using it as a metaphor, it firstly provides a more general approach of explaining international negotiations. Untangling the core premises of the theory, the significant role of the decision-

makers attests the tight linkage between the domestic and the international political game (Putnam, 1988:434). The metaphor of the 'two-level game' serves to represent an instance of how decision-makers as the chief negotiators seek to obtain payoffs in both boards. To contextualize the components of the theory, one should first look at the two-level process during the negotiation phase. As Putnam (1988:434) pinpoints, decision-makers seek to maximize their gains both at the national and the international level. At the national level, the existence of domestic constituents urges the government to pursue favorable policies which they aim to fulfil. At the international level, the primary objective of the government is to satisfy the domestic considerations and ensure domestic viability minimizing in this way any potential loss that may occur during the negotiations (Putnam, 1988:434). This interplay of two levels, as Putnam depicts, is a two-stage process where the initial stage, known as Level I, entails a bargaining process among negotiators which may result in a conditional agreement. The reason why I used the term conditional to denote the nature of the agreement is because in the second stage, known as Level II, the 'separate discussions within each group of constituents about whether to ratify the agreement', and subsequently the emergence of several constraints on behalf of the domestic constituents can halt the negotiations at Level I (Putnam, 1988:436). At this point, it is crucial to pinpoint that at Level II, 'bureaucratic agencies, interest groups, social classes, or even public opinion' form part of the so-called domestic constituents (Putnam, 1988:436). The distinct level of interference that these constituents have on the domestic political scene can be determinant towards the ratification or not of the international agreement. However, untangling the nexus between Level I and Level II, one could argue that it is not only the domestic constituents in the second stage which can influence the final outcome of the agreement, but also any alterations at the initial stage could also potentially alter the expected outcomes in the second stage. According to Putnam (1988:448), the interlink between the two levels is tantamount to a 'synergic linkage', leading to the conclusion that a mutual dependence between the two levels is a necessary, if not imperative component of the successful processing and the ratification of the international agreement.

As a first point of reference, in the Turkish case, domestic constituents have a considerable effect on the foreign policy decision-making process. As Merve Özdemirkıran (2015:2) demonstrates, industrial interest groups in Turkey have gained significant role in the domestic political scene, as the state utilizes soft-power tools, and the policy of *economic interdependence* to pursue foreign policy objectives. In that sense, the increasing role of economic activity of businessmen in Turkey has a direct effect not only on foreign policy but also on domestic politics. Özdemirkıran verifies the latter argument by arguing that ‘Through their economic activities abroad, they have started a new relationship with the state and gained greater “legitimacy” in negotiations with the state while playing an intermediary role between Turkey and foreign countries’ (Özdemirkıran, 2015:5). The intermediary role that the interest groups seek to acquire and the subsequent pressure on the government to implement favorable policies that would satisfy the demands confirm Putnam’s premise on how domestic actors can actually be influential stakeholders in the international negotiations where domestic interests are at stake. Highly related to the economic activities and the role of businessmen in Turkey is the involvement of public opinion. To cite an instance, the increasing role of the business activities in the Middle East in 2005 and especially their contribution to providing economic assistance to the Kurds in the Middle East, provoked intense reactions amongst the public whose attitude had turned more ‘hostile’ towards the Kurdish minority (Özdemirkıran, 2015:13). However, the interference of public opinion is not evident only in the economy sector but also in the security realm. To cite an instance, public opinion endorsed the government’s policies in Northeastern Syria this October and strongly supported the conduct of the offensive campaign. A blurry point could be the extent to which Erdogan’s government has contributed to shaping the general public’s perception. Cagil Kasapoglu, in his recent article on how Turks embrace a nationalistic mood, elucidates how the Turkish government uses media quite efficiently as a soft-power tool to shape ideas, perceptions, and at the same time downplay any opposition voices towards a distinct array of issues (Kasapoglu, 2019). To support his argument, Kasapoglu (2019), states that ‘With voices opposing the military operation muted and intimidated, nationalist sentiment is all that remains, mainly driven by pro-government media’.

Therefore, two conclusions can be drawn from the above-mentioned instances. Firstly, public's attitude is not immutable but dynamic, as it changes depending on the issue and its degree of significance for national unity and security. Secondly, both interest groups and the public opinion seem to have a degree of interference in domestic politics and that is to scrutinize in the following chapters where Putnam's framework will shed light on Turkey's foreign policy decisions in specific sectors.

Among the most decisive components during the international negotiations based on Putnam's 'two-level game' is the 'win-set' principle. By definition, a 'win-set' constitutes a 'set of all possible Level I agreements that would 'win' – that is, gain the necessary majority among the constituents – when simply voted up or down' (Putnam, 1988:437). However, Mendez's delineation of a 'win-set' provides a more comprehensive explanation of what it represents. Influenced by Putnam's definition, Mendez (2017:7) further explains that 'a win by one does not imply a loss by the other(s); both or all sides can win, though usually not equally'. The premise that 'both or all sides can win, though usually not equally', is in line with the larger and smaller win-sets that Putnam extensively refers to in his analysis, and depending on the size, the processing of Level I agreement is considered either more or less likely to occur. In sequence, the existence of larger or smaller win-sets are interlinked with two other significant notions; that of 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' defection. As Putnam (1988:438) denotes, smaller win-sets may trigger involuntary defection where the primary agent is not able to successfully carry through with the promised demands because of a failed ratification. In turn, given the smaller size of a win-set, the risk for involuntary defection is higher and therefore, the issue of collective action raises, especially when state-actors may be more encouraged to act unilaterally, as a means to counterbalance the relative lower size of the win-set. Voluntary defection differs as it is the egoistic nature of the agent's personality that deepens the problem of collective action (Putnam, 1988:438). Even though the two notions significantly differ, one could argue that there is a point of convergence in relation to the role of the chief negotiator in the outcome. The chief negotiator's role constitutes another key element of Putnam's 'two-level game'.

3.3.3. The Determinant Role of the Statesman

In his analysis, Putnam initially likens the profile of the chief negotiator to that of a mediator, an ‘honest broker’, or even a representative of the domestic constituents’ interests (Putnam, 1988:456). On the face of it, looking at the role of the primary negotiator as merely secondary or complementary would be restrictive, as the simplistic assumption that the negotiator does not have individual preferences and acts only as part of the process does not hold true. According to Putnam (1988:442), preferences at Level II of the negotiations, along with the formation of coalitions, institutions and finally the negotiator’s personal strategies constitute the threefold that determine the size of a win-set. Therefore, within the ‘two-level game’ framework, what seems to account for the most fundamental restraint on the statesmen is the size of the win-set which is intertwined with the above-mentioned components; a) the influence of domestic constituents and the extent to which coalitions can actually affect the negotiator’s choices; b) the existence of distinct institutions; c) the statesmen preferences (Moravcsik, 1993:24). In terms of the first determinant – influence of coalitions – in various instances, divergences arise between the preferences of the domestic constituents and the negotiator’s priorities. Subsequently, as Putnam (1988:457) illustrates, when facing a confrontation between the domestic considerations and the individual preference, the chief negotiator, ‘will normally give primacy to his domestic calculus, if a choice must be made, not least because his own incumbency depends on his standing at Level II’. Even though this assumption holds true, there are some parameters that I would like to pinpoint. When referring to the influence of the domestic component on a leader’s choice, one should take into consideration that the regime type across countries differs, and subsequently the leader’s interference and power in the foreign policy decision-making process also varies. Turkey, especially after the Constitutional changes in 2018 and the transition to a strong presidential system, represents an instance of a country where the individual preference of the leader is one of the main determinant factors when it comes to the foreign policy decision-making process. As Haugom (2019:214) demonstrates, under the new amendments, ‘state institutions that used to be agenda setters in foreign policy – such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Security Council –

have mostly been sidelined in the decision-making process' as power has concentrated on 'the hands of the president himself and his close circle of advisers', an amendment that affects the foreign policy decision-making process as well. However, this more personalized system where the leader is the ultimate decision-maker does not mean that the influence of the coalition networks, interest groups and finally public opinion do not affect the former's decision regarding Turkey's foreign orientations. This dissertation will seek to demonstrate that the interplay of domestic factors and international developments urge the decision-maker to adopt policies, form alliances and ratify bilateral and international agreements based on domestic calculations and international aspirations. These policies range from the leader's domestic expediency, the incumbent government's viability, the actualization of the interest groups' demands to the fulfilment of regional and international aspirations.

3.3.4. Two-Level Games' Validity and its Limitations

The previous section sought to provide a comprehensive grasp of the first theoretical framework that this dissertation will utilize to untangle the research question. Putnam's two-level-game is considered pioneering in the academic scholarship as it projects an entanglement of the domestic and international factors that decision-makers consider during bilateral and international negotiations. From the already existing literature, the paradigm of classical realism constitutes its closest affiliate in terms of how decision-makers and leaders 'mobilize domestic society to achieve international objectives' (Moravcsik, 1993:16). Nevertheless, as Moravcsik demonstrates (1993), Putnam's approach differs in three aspects. Firstly, the two-level-game is a 'theory of international bargaining' where domestic considerations do not only act as constraints for chief negotiators, but also as a window of opportunity for the latter to strengthen their statecraft both at the national and the international level. Secondly, the framework emphasises the central role of the negotiator who appears to be entangled in both boards seeking simultaneous gains while minimizing any potential losses. According to Putnam, the central role of the negotiator can be analysed – from three interrelated perspectives; a) how the negotiator perceives the domestic constraints; b) how the negotiator acts as an

'agent' who seeks to attain public support; c) how the negotiator seeks to achieve personal gains from the international bargaining (Moravcsik, 1993). Therefore, looking at these interlinked strategies, one could argue that the statesman's policies 'reflect a simultaneous double-edged calculation of constraints and opportunities on both boards' that seems to explain why in certain cases the final outcome of the international bargaining differs in terms of expectations and actualization (Moravcsik, 1993:17). What seems to differentiate the two-level-game framework from others is that the chief negotiator is 'simultaneously' engaged in a dual process which contributes to bridging the gap within the separate analysis of how the systemic level influences state behaviour and adds value to the existing scholarship by interlinking the two-levels of analysis into one single framework. Nonetheless, a significant body of literature stresses the existence of shortcomings when analyzing the premises of the two-level approach. As Knopf (1993:604-605) argues, the main shortcoming of the framework is that it 'does not adequately distinguish among different types of domestic-international interaction or different bargaining contexts'. This signifies the subsequent shortcoming in the analysis regarding the distinct types of domestic or international interactions and the effects it would have on the foreign policy decision-making process. In addition to that, I would pinpoint that even though Putnam posits the center of analysis on the chief negotiator as the central strategic actor, he does not seem to incorporate the cognitive features of the chief negotiators that may be influenced by other factors rather than domestic constraints or international developments. To address these shortcomings in Putnam's analysis, this dissertation will utilize Mintz's Poliheuristic (PH) theory, a framework that has also received considerable attention among scholars as it incorporates two theoretical schools of thought in a single framework. The following section will examine the core premises of the PH theory, its application to foreign policy decisions, and its limitations.

3.3.5. Poliheuristic Theory and its Significance

The Poliheuristic Theory of decision-making has gained considerable attention within the existing academic literature even though it was first introduced in the scholarship during the 1990s. As Oppermann (2018) stresses,

the distinctive feature of the PH model is that it explicitly combines cognitive and rational approaches to analyse foreign policy decisions. It is also applied to a wide array of decisions ranging ‘from single decisions, group decisions, sequential decisions, and decisions on strategic settings’ to decisions related to ‘national security decisions, foreign policy decisions, foreign economic decisions, as well as to domestic decisions’ (Mintz, 2004:4-5 & Mintz, 2005:95). The wide spectrum of decisions that PH is able to explain, along with its distinctive features provides an initial explanation of the reasons why this dissertation seeks to explain Turkey’s behaviour in low and high political salience issues based on the core premises of the theory. At this point, it is crucial to pinpoint that Mintz added value to the study of the decision-making process as he illustrated that decisions by decision-makers or policymakers originate from a dual-stage process. The initial phase of the process aims to illustrate how and under what conditions decision-makers opt for a certain number of alternatives, whereas the second phase entails an analytical stage where decision-makers opt for the alternative that guarantees the highest possible payoff (Mintz, 2004). The following section will unfold the core premises of the PH theory that lay the foundations for the following chapter and the application of the theory to Turkey’s decisions.

3.3.6. Untangling the core features of the Poliheuristic Theory

As already discussed, the Poliheuristic theory presumes a ‘two-stage’ decision process where cognitive and rational approaches are entangled. In the initial stage of the process, what seems to determine decision-makers’ choices are the so-called ‘cognitive shortcuts’ – a process where individuals’ cognitive features determine the course of action (Mintz, 2004:3). As Mintz explicitly illustrates, decision-makers in the first stage opt for the most favorable policies amid an array of distinct alternatives, using ‘heuristics’ that presuppose the decision-makers’ personal interference in the process. The selection of the predominant alternatives paves the way for the second stage where decision-makers use the principle of maximizing the expected utility and finally opt for the alternative that ensures the highest payoffs and minimizes the potential losses (Mintz, 1993, cited in Mintz, 2004:4).

As the PH theory postulates, its distinctive feature compared to alternative theories or models of decision-making is the application of the ‘noncompensatory principle’ in the initial stage of the process. At this point it is crucial to clarify that the *noncompensatory* term is written in all academic papers without a dash. Therefore, that explains why this study adopts this approach as well. According to the premises of the PH theory, decision-makers prioritise the use of the noncompensatory principle in a sense that they do not make any compromises when it comes to the elimination of the less desirable options or alternatives. Highly intertwined with this principle is the use of heuristics, the so-called ‘cognitive shortcuts’ which refer to the leader’s, the negotiator’s, or the decision-maker’s personal intrusion in the process (Mintz, 2004:4). As Mintz also demonstrates, even the breakdown of the term poliheuristic attests the existence of mechanisms – ‘poly (many) and heuristics (shortcuts)’ that decision-makers apply to ‘simplify complex foreign policy decisions’ (Mintz et al. 1997:554, cited in Mintz, 2004:6). However, as Oppermann pinpoints, the term ‘poly’ refers ‘not only to the use of multiple heuristics in foreign policy decision making but also to the theory’s focus on domestic politics’ (Redd 2003:103–104; Stern 2004:108; Mintz and DeRouen 2010:79, cited in Oppermann, 2014:25). The focus on domestic politics in accordance with Mintz’s argument on how ‘political leaders measure gains and losses in political terms’ attests that the domestic political scene is the epicenter of decision (Mintz, 2004:7). Indeed, the reliance on domestic factors as part of the elimination of the less favorable alternatives is one of the most significant features of the Poliheuristic theory that needs further investigation.

As already demonstrated in Putnam’s ‘two-level game’, the role of domestic constituents – opposition groups, interest groups, public opinion – have a significant influence on the negotiator’s course of action. According to the Poliheuristic theory, Mintz stresses that domestic politics is the ‘essence of decision’, and subsequently domestic considerations, along with potential risks or losses shape the course of the decision-making process (Mintz, 2004:7).

Highly intertwined with the noncompensatory principle are also the various dimensions that decision-makers evaluate and take into consideration

when rejecting the less favorable alternatives. As James and Zhang (2004, cited in Mintz, 2005:96) illustrate, in most cases there are four dimensions that decision-makers use in order to evaluate the alternatives; a) political; b) military; c) economic; d) diplomatic. In terms of how decision-makers assess the array of options, Mintz's analysis sheds light on how the noncompensatory principle is entangled with the interrelated dimensions. According to Mintz, 'in a choice situation, if a certain alternative is unacceptable on a given dimension (e.g., it is unacceptable politically), then a high score on another dimension (e.g., the military) *cannot* compensate/counteract for it, and hence the alternative is eliminated' (Mintz, 1993:598). That helps explain why the first stage of the Poliheuristic theory entails a noncompensatory and nonholistic approach that is linked to the cognitive school of decision-making (Mintz, 2004:4). At this point it is crucial to pinpoint that the *nonholistic* term is also written in all academic papers without a dash and this study adopts this approach as well.

The second stage of the PH theory signals the transition from the noncompensatory principle to compensatory where decision-makers amid the remaining alternatives opt for the one that offers considerable payoffs (Oppermann, 2014:24). The distinctive feature of the second stage compared to the first one is that while the first phase entails the rejection of distinct options, the second stage focuses on the analytical process of selecting the most favorable amid the remaining alternatives. To demonstrate how decision-makers opt for one alternative over the other, Mintz provides an insightful analysis that focuses on the so-called Decision Matrix. As the author elucidates, the first stage of the Poliheuristic process incorporates three components regarding the leader's decision matrix; a) alternatives; b) dimensions; c) implications (Mintz, 2005:95). At the onset of the process a set of alternatives is identified that differs from regime to regime and from leader to leader. To evaluate the applicability of certain alternatives, certain criteria are employed. As already discussed, there are four dimensions that appear to be predominant when evaluating the alternatives; political, military, economic, and diplomatic (James and Zhang, 2004, cited in Mintz, 2005:96). This dissertation will seek to demonstrate the interrelation among the four dimensions and their influence on domestic determinants of foreign policy decisions. Highly intertwined with the

four dimensions is the rising of potential implications. As Mintz (2005) argues, the use of force as a preponderant alternative would influence the political, economic, military, and diplomatic landscape to an extent. However, Mintz does not seem to analyse in-depth the extent of the political repercussion for instance in the economy or in the military sector leading to an initial shortcoming of the theory regarding its generality which will be further scrutinized in the following sections.

3.3.7. A Thorough Analysis of the ‘Two-Stage Process’

The defining components of the Poliheuristic Theory can be summarized as follows; a) nonholistic; b) dimension-based; c) noncompensatory; d) satisficing; e) order sensitive (Geva and Mintz, 1997:84).

A nonholistic search: In the Poliheuristic model of decision-making, the use of heuristics – the leader’s cognitive shortcuts – indicates that in the initial stage decision-makers drift away from the conventional rational way of thinking. The main difference between a holistic and a nonholistic search is that the former evaluates all possible alternatives (Mintz and Geva, 1994:442). However, as Sage (1990:233, cited in Geva and Mintz, 1997: 84) states, ‘Nonholistic models, on the other hand, employ a simplified process whereby the decision-maker sequentially eliminates or adopts alternatives by comparing them to each other, or against a standard, either across dimensions or across alternatives’. This point stresses the close linkage between the alternative set and the dimension-based principle. To substantiate this argument, Mintz (1993:599) stated that ‘the decision-maker adopts heuristic decision rules that do not require detailed and complicated comparisons of relevant alternatives, and adopts or rejects undesirable alternatives on the basis of one or a few criteria’ (Mintz, 1993:599, cited in Geva and Mintz, 1997:85).

The fusion of the nonholistic, dimension-based and noncompensatory principle can be further explored in a hypothetical offensive campaign initiated by a state-actor. This case will be further investigated in the following chapters as the military campaign in North-eastern Syria conducted by Turkey will shed light on the main objectives of this dissertation. However, this section will use

a hypothetical instance to demonstrate how the PH model works. If we take as given that a state is conducting an offensive campaign against another state, then the starting point would be the classification of all the available alternatives that the decision-maker has. In this instance, the policymaker has three alternatives; a) maintain the status quo; b) impose sanctions; c) use of force. After outlining the three potential courses of action, according to the Poliheuristic model, a set of dimensions should also be indicated. In the given circumstances, I chose to include the political, economic, and military criteria. Therefore, combining the first two steps of the initial stage of the process, the following table reflects the above-mentioned data.

Alternative	Political Dimension	Military Dimension	Economic Dimension	Total Sum
Do nothing	2	3	3	2+3+3= 8
Sanctions	3	2	2	3+2+4= 7
Use of force	4	3	3	4+3+3= 10

Table 1.1

The Table serves as an insightful explanation of the core premises of the model. The numbers form part of the hypothetical scenario and represent both low and high scores – 2 to 4 – that each one of the three alternatives would get in each dimension. In the initial stage, one could argue that the political dimension is more likely to influence the leader’s *cognitive shortcuts*, as the noncompensatory principle is the key driver for the latter’s decisions. As Mintz (2005) illustrates, political considerations are determinant factors during the foreign policy decision-making process. If we look at the low score of alternative 2 (Sanctions) in the economic dimension, then based on the noncompensatory principle, ‘if an alternative has a low score in one dimension, then no other score along another dimension, or dimensions, can compensate’

(Mintz and DeRouen, 2010:34). Given that the political dimension is most likely to constitute the most critical dimension and even though in the second alternative – sanctions – , the political criterion outweighs the other two, a proponent of the PH theory would argue that the imposition of sanctions would most likely be rejected by the decision-maker. The narrative behind this assumption lies in the idea that both the military and the economic dimension will not compensate the higher score of the political dimension as the latter's significance signals the leader's course of action. On the contrary, during the second stage and the turn to a compensatory principle, an adherent of the PH model would interpret the alternatives differently. As already discussed, the second stage entails an analytical process where amid the remaining alternatives, the decision-maker selects the most favourable one using the maximization of expected utility principle. The turn to a compensatory model signifies that a potentially low score in the political dimension can be compensated by a higher in the economic or military dimension (Mintz and DeRouen, 2010:10). The different approach that a decision-maker could take during the two phases elucidates how the cognitive and the rational schools of thinking are entangled in a single framework, and subsequently how the cognitive model is associated with noncompensatory, heuristics processes, whereas the rational model is linked to compensatory searches. As Mintz and DeRouen (2010:34) illustrate, decision-makers influenced by rational way of thinking, tend to calculate the costs and benefits of the available alternatives, and select the one which maximizes gains and minimizes potential losses. Therefore, in the above-mentioned example, a rational decision-maker who aims to achieve the maximization of expected utility through the use of compensatory searches, he/she would opt for the use of force among the three alternatives, as it has the highest score amid the total sum of each alternative. The four dimensions are also intertwined with the third component of the decision matrix; the rising implications. As a decision-maker, when adopting or rejecting alternatives, he/she should bear in mind all the political, economic, military, and diplomatic implications that may emerge during the process. These implications are highly related to the dimensions that decision-makers set at the beginning of the process. To cite an instance, amid a hypothetical crisis the decision-maker is aware of the potential rise of implications whose value is rated

depending on the significance of each dimension. After the initial rejection of the less favorable alternatives, in the second stage, the process of selection differs as it is based on rational calculations and the leader's domestic and international calculations. As Mintz (2005) presumes, the decision-maker ultimately opts for the alternative that presents the highest gain across the interrelated dimensions. As the author explicitly illustrates through the PH theory, the final decision is 'a combination of discarding infeasible alternatives in the first phase of the decision and selecting the best alternative from the subset of acceptable alternatives in the second phase of the decision' (Mintz, 2005:97).

3.3.8. Poliheuristic Theory: Validity and Limitations

This section delineated the key features of the Poliheuristic theory, a recent theoretical framework that unifies the cognitive and rational school of thought in a single framework. Even though Putnam's (1988) 'two-level game' shares commonalities with Mintz's (2004) Poliheuristic theory, one could argue that the latter framework added further value in the existing literature. Taking the essence of domestic politics as a baseline in both approaches, Mintz goes one step further by linking the decision-maker's cognitive shortcuts to rational thinking and the calculation of costs and benefits amid the foreign policy decision-making process. The PH model postulates a dual stage where decision-makers in the first stage are heavily embedded in the domestic political game as they tend to reject the alternatives that seem to have a political cost in their domestic viability (Sandal et al, 2011:28). During the early process of choosing amid the most viable alternatives, decision-makers take four dimensions into consideration. However, the political dimension seems to represent the key determinant of the decision-maker's actions. The use of noncompensatory principle constitutes the epicentre of the initial stage and along with heuristics form part of the decision-maker's toolkit when rejecting the 'unacceptable options' that could potentially harm the leader's political expediency (Sandal et al, 2011:28). In the second stage of the PH process, the decision-maker turns to the compensatory principle where rationality bespeaks the decision-maker's incentives. In this analytical stage, the decision-maker opts for the alternative that reflects the highest payoffs and the minimum losses. Mintz's model has successfully gained considerable attention within the existing literature as it

represents an innovative proposal to unify the merits of two distinct types of decision-making models. However, a substantial body of literature stresses the rising of certain shortcomings towards the applicability and reliability of the model in various instances. According to Stern (2004:110), one of the pitfalls of the PH model is its generality in terms of how domestic politics influence the decision-maker. As the author stresses, the degree and the extent of the leader's autonomy differs given the various regimes across the globe and the distinct level of interference in domestic politics. Indeed, the PH model did not entail the existence of multiple variables that could affect the leader's course of action, a pitfall that raises questions over the issue of generality as mentioned above. The non-identification of an array of independent variables also signals the weakness of the model to provide an explanation how policymakers and decision-makers frame a crisis incident or a conflict (Stern, 2004:110). In line with this argument is Klotz's claim who states that 'examining decision-making processes through individual motivation and cognition alone ignores the commonality of shared norms underlying dominant ideas or knowledge' (Klotz,1995:32).Therefore, a sole focus on the leader's cognitive traits as key drivers for foreign policy decisions certainly posits limitations in the decision-making process.

3.3.9 Conclusion

The delineation of the two decision models demonstrated the merits but also the potential pitfalls that occur when untangling their core premises. The analysis of the two models demonstrates that a sole or exclusive focus on one factor, element, or angle – a leader's cognitive traits, influence of domestic constituents or international development – posit restrictions towards a holistic overview of Turkey's foreign policy orientations. The following section introduces the reader to three Turkish foreign policy decisions the two models will be applied to provide an insightful explanation on the reasons why Turkey seems to follow a more unilateral course of action compared to its regional and international counterparts.

Chapter 4: Delineation of distinct Turkish foreign policy decisions: Applying the two decision models

4.1 Introduction

The previous chapter – Research Design – delineated the method, structure, and the theoretical models that this dissertation will utilize to shed light on the interconnected research questions. This chapter aims to apply the premises of Putnam's (1988) and Mintz's (2004) models to three political decisions made by the Turkish government. The selected cases pertain to high and low political issues as discussed in the previous sections and they cover the security, energy, and economy spectrum. The first case will demonstrate the futile negotiations in the Syrian peace process between Turkey and its international counterparts and subsequently how Turkey opted for the unilateral decision to conduct its third military offensive campaign in North-eastern Syria in October 2019. The second case will cover the recent agreement on the purchase of the S-400 missile system between Turkey and Russia despite strong opposition from the US over the decision. The third case will cover the Turkstream Project, a relatively hybrid project signed by Turkey and the Russian Federation as a product of the gradual rapprochement of the two state-actors, especially in the energy and economy sector. I chose to include these three cases in this dissertation to demonstrate that Turkey does seek to form partnerships in the energy and economy sector where national interests converge, whereas in the security realm a more independent, assertive and more security-based narrative is pursued as national interests and political priorities diverge. In accordance with this argument, the following sections will also elucidate the distinct factors, namely the leader's personal cognition, domestic interference and the constantly changing international landscape that have caused adjustments in the Turkish foreign orientations and subsequently in the decision-making process. To provide a more holistic idea of the blurry boundaries between foreign and domestic politics, the premises of the two decision models analysed in the previous chapter will be applied selectively in the three cases.

4.2 Operation Peace Spring: Political and Historical Background

The decision to launch its third military offensive campaign in North-eastern Syria illustrates that for Turkey the Syrian crisis constitutes one of the cornerstones of its foreign policy. Since the outbreak of the crisis in 2011, Turkey has adjusted its foreign policy based on the prioritisation of its national interests. As Min Wei (2019) highlights, in the course of the years Turkish policymakers have opted for a fusion of both diplomatic and military means in order to fulfil domestic gains and to project the country as an exemplar in the Middle East, enhancing the argument of the ‘central role’ that Turkey deserves to have in the region. Muhittin Ataman and Çağatay Özdemir (2018) substantiate the latter argument by pinpointing that in the Syrian crisis political priorities have changed over time as Turkey shifted from a humanitarian approach to a more independent, assertive, power-based policy in the last few years. This shift is a representative instance of the *adjustments* that Turkish policymakers and decision-makers implement and are a product of domestic and international considerations. The latest operation, the so-called *Operation Peace Spring* is intertwined with Turkey’s political and historical background that will shed light on why Turkish decision-makers amid an array of alternative courses opted for the conduct of a military campaign and the use of force. Another point related to this argument is Turkey’s inclination to unilateralism when its national interests are at stake.

Regarding the political background behind the operation, Turkey’s decision to launch the offensive did not occur all at once. As Ataman and Özdemir (2018) argue, the establishment of a safe zone along its borders with Syria represents one of Turkey’s strategic objectives. The futile negotiations with the US on the size of a safe zone, continued US support for the YPG forces so as to exterminate ISIS in the region, and finally U.S announcement of its troops’ withdrawal led the way for Turkey to pursue a different course of action where the use of force was perceived as the optimal choice. The trigger to launch the campaign seems to be twofold. First, the unsuccessful concessions on the size of the safe zone between Turkey and the US urged Turkey to change its rhetoric, as depicted in Erdogan’s more aggressive narrative in the UN General Assembly

speech. To be more concrete, given the unprosperous outcomes of the negotiations between the two countries, Erdogan stated that ‘Turkey would be “forced” to take military action for its own security’ (DW, 2019). As Bathke (2019) illustrated, Erdogan’s harsh rhetoric on the matter was also evident by his declaration in the early stages of the operation. The president explicitly stated: ‘the Operation Peace Spring will neutralize terror threats against Turkey and lead to the establishment of a safe zone, facilitating the return of Syrian refugees to their homes. We will preserve Syria's territorial integrity and liberate local communities from terrorists’ (Bathke, 2019). This declaration sets the primary objectives of the campaign that can be summarized as follows; a) safeguard and preserve the Syrian national sovereignty and integrity; b) suppress the separatist sentiments that posit a danger to the Republic’s national security.

This suppression of the separatist sentiments illustrates the historical background of the operation which is also entwined with the above-mentioned political incentives. The Kurdish issue has been at the forefront of the domestic political chessboard and especially under the AKP administration the Kurds are labeled ‘terrorists’ that need to be ‘exterminated’ (Turkey, White Paper, 2007:6). In the Turkish political discourse, the Kurdish conflict serves as a vehicle for a wide array of domestic and foreign policy decisions. Even though from 2013-2015 the AKP sought to accelerate the peace process between the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and Turkey, a potential resolution of the conflict was led to a dead end (Hoffman, 2019). According to the Turkish side, one of the contributing factors to the futile negotiations between the two sides was the PKK’s close affinity to the Democratic Union Party (PYD) in Syria and in particular its military wing, the YPG, which the US provided with financial aid in order to combat ISIS in the region. A potential creation of a semi-autonomous Kurdish state in Northern Syria is perceived as an existential threat for Turkey as there is always the fear of a potential spillover of separatist sentiments within its territory (Lindenstrauss and Shavit, 2019). That helps explain why the AKP government and Erdogan took a more nationalist pivot towards the Kurdish issue and prioritised mainly the leader’s domestic viability, along with internal and external considerations. The gradual increase of the

Peoples' Democratic Party's (HDP) popularity after the 2015 elections and the constant gains of the YPG forces in Syria, as part of the U.S led anti-ISIS campaign, triggered further frustration in the Turkish leadership. This frustration subsequently led to a series of *adjustments* in its Kurdish policies in terms of the political rhetoric and the means to suppress the increasing popularity both within the country and abroad. The official statement in the Official Press Release on October 24th clearly underpins the adjustment changes. As stated by representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'this Operation accelerates the political process in Syria, prevents separatism, formation of a terror zone, and the efforts to create a demographic change in the border of Europe and NATO, protects the unity and territorial integrity of Syria, prevents further irregular migration and helps Syrians to return to their country safely and voluntarily' (Turkey, *MFA*, 2019). Delving into the analysis of the statement, I would stress its political and historical connotation, as first the military campaign served political incentives related to Turkey's national interests and secondarily to Syria's territorial integrity. The historical impetus was driven by the long-term perception regarding the Kurds which acts as a driving force in the country's domestic and foreign policy decisions. The following section will demonstrate the linkage between the two decision models and Operation Peace Spring (OPS).

4.2.1 Application of Putnam's (1988) and Mintz's (2004) Models to OPS

As I demonstrated in previous chapters, Putnam's analysis has gained considerable attention in the existing literature, as he was the first one to identify the missing link between the domestic and the international political game. Putnam (1988) stressed the importance of looking at a political decision, a foreign policy and a bilateral or international agreement through the lens of a fusion of domestic and international considerations. Therefore, the political decision to launch the military offensive in North-eastern Syria forms part of Turkey's adjusting foreign policy towards Syria and is a product of interrelated variables that will need to be scrutinized.

According to Aras (2019:8), 'the tipping point between domestic politics and foreign policy has been the Turkish government's Syria policy'. In the

Turkish case, the phenomenon of the blurry line among domestic political considerations, foreign policy priorities as well as regional and international aspirations have been at the forefront of the country's national agenda. As the 'two-level game' projects, decision-makers as the primary chief negotiators are entangled both at the national and international board, seeking domestic and international gains. At the internal political scene, domestic constituents such as opposition groups, interest groups and even public opinion act as driving forces in the Level II of the negotiations and the ratification, or not, of the agreement. Turkey's interference in the Syrian case seems to incorporate several of Putnam's premises. As a first point of reference, the initial approach of Turkey from 2011-2015 was the prioritisation of humanitarian norms and the resolution of the conflict through regime change (Ataman and Özdemir, 2018). Highly opposed to that initial approach was the stance of the opposition which perceived the Syrian policy 'as sectarian and expansionist' (Aras, 2019:8). Fueled by the opposition parties, the anti-government sentiments regarding AKP's policies towards the Syrian issue and the Kurdish conflict provide an initial explanation of why Erdogan and the AKP government changed the course of action in 2015. The futile negotiations towards a peace process plan with the Syrian Kurds and subsequently the failure towards a common ground of cooperation can be attributed to a confluence of factors. A potential softening of AKP's policy towards the Kurds would primarily affect the tight relationship with the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) which supported the AKP in various policies against the CHP opposition party (Hoffman, 2019). Furthermore, a potential internal dispute would also automatically influence the credibility of the AKP in the domestic political scene, and it would lead to a potential loss of voters in the elections that would even endanger AKP's viability. Another factor that could lead to rising tensions in the domestic affairs was the success of the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) in the 2015 elections (Hoffman, 2019). The relatively gradual increase of the HDP's voice in the Turkish parliament provoked the immediate reaction of the AKP government as the fear of the constantly growing Kurdish demands for autonomy within the Turkish territory, but also a potential spillover effect in the Syrian Kurdish region, would lead to domestic uncertainty for the incumbent government.

Furthermore, what seems to constitute a determining factor of the futile peace process with the Kurds was the leader's personal intrusion. The personal interference of the chief negotiator in the domestic and international political arena reflects one of the key features of Putnam's analysis. To achieve larger win-sets among the majority of domestic constituents, Putnam argues that a synergy of three factors is imperative; a) to what extent coalition networks influence the negotiator's alternative course; b) to what extent lobbying and industrial interest groups affect the course of actions; c) and the leader's own preferences (Putnam, 1988, cited in Moravcsik, 1993:24). In terms of the first determinant, the influence of the opposition parties on domestic and foreign policy matters is significant as the gradual shift towards a more assertive security-based policy in Syria underlines the impact of the domestic environment on Turkey's foreign policies. Haugom (2019: 215) highlights that, given a lack of majority in the Turkish National Assembly and the fear of the opposition voices, Erdogan has 'increasingly appealed to the nationalist right in Turkish politics and tapped into growing nationalist sentiments in the Turkish population' as a way to counter the potential rising of implications in the domestic political scene and strengthen at the same time his personal domestic gains. However, to date, the extent to which Erdogan adopts favorable policies that would primarily satisfy all the domestic constituents is relatively questionable. After the 2014 presidential elections, the domestic political scene experienced adjustments in the foreign policy decision-making process as the leader's role was significantly strengthened. Especially after the Constitutional changes in 2018, the executive jurisdictions of the president were extended, paving the way for a centralised system where the president is the ultimate decision-maker. In accordance with Putnam's argument on the chief negotiator's preference, Moravcsik (1993:17) pinpoints that statesman's preferences 'reflect a simultaneous double-edged calculation of constraints and opportunities on both boards' which can strongly determine the course of the final outcome of the negotiations. At this point, it is crucial to highlight the convergence of the above argument with the main assumption of the Poliheuristic theory; as the Poliheuristic theory presumes, decision-makers are influenced by cognitive traits in the initial stage of selecting the more favorable alternatives, followed by a mere calculation of the opportunities and losses

based on rational thinking. Putnam's analysis does not refer to the leader's cognition but to personal preferences. However, the calculation of constraints and opportunities to achieve greater payoffs remains a commonality between the two models that will be examined in the following sections.

Highly related to the importance of domestic constituents on the Turkish domestic political chessboard is public opinion. During the recent years, Erdogan has changed his political discourse and embraced a more conservative and nationalist narrative regarding the major domestic issues (Aras, 2017:5). Media has served as a major source of influence, a soft-power tool to shape peoples' mindset and even downplay opposition voices in distinct governmental policies (Kasapoglu, 2019). The influential role of media on peoples' attitude is evident in the latest poll conducted by the Istanbul Economics Research on November 1 as it demonstrated that 'there has not been significant change in support for either of the alliances or any particular party' towards the operation (Selçuki, 2019). Therefore, Operation Peace Spring represents an exemplar of how the Turkish government has taken into serious consideration all the above-mentioned parameters before opting for the use of force. In Turkey, as the author (2019) illustrates, there are two axes of support when it comes to public's endorsement for military operations. The first source of support is intertwined with the *flag* which can be interpreted as the protection of the statehood, its territorial integrity, and its prestige. The second source of support is entrenched around the *leader*. In the 'Operation Peace Spring', there was a fusion of the axes that had a tremendous impact on the peoples' approval regarding the conduct of the campaign. The political and historical background, the long-term strategic thinking on separatism within Turkey and abroad, the country's isolation from its international counterparts, specifically the lack of sustaining a robust relationship with the US since the Obama administration till now, signify the reasons why the offensive campaign was met with overwhelming domestic public support.

Indeed, the analysis of the 'two-level game' shed light on the interconnected elements and factors that led the way for the conduct of Operation Peace Spring. Mintz's (2004) Poliheuristic theory as a more recent theoretical approach adds

value in the scholarship, as it projects a fusion of cognition and rationality when it comes to the analysis of foreign policy decisions. As the theory presumes, decision-makers are involved in a dual stage when opting for the best course of action regarding single decisions, group decisions, sequential decisions, national security decisions, foreign policy decisions and foreign economic decisions (Mintz, 2004:4-5 & Mintz 2005:95).

In the initial stage of the selection process, and contrary to Putnam's model, decision-makers seem to be highly influenced by the so-called cognition shortcuts. Even though Putnam does refer to the issue of the statesmen preferences as a key driver of determining the extent of the win-set, he does not profoundly delve into the leader's personal cognition characteristics as a separate influential factor regarding foreign policy decisions. In other words, both models stress the leader's interference in the domestic and international affairs, but Mintz goes one step further by incorporating cognition, along with the use of the noncompensatory principle as the baselines for rejecting the unfavorable alternatives in the first stage. The reason why I stress that point is because Erdogan as the primary decision-maker in Turkish politics seems to be influenced by his own cognitive traits when opting for a decision, at least at the onset of the process. As Valerie Hudson (2005, cited in Görener and Ucal, 2011:360) elucidates, 'it is in the cognition and information processing of an actual human agent that all explanatory levels of foreign policy analysis are in reality integrated'. Therefore, this dissertation claims that Erdogan's motivations and cognitive traits constitute one of the cornerstones when opting for one alternative over the other. These cognitive traits are the product of both structural and conjunctural variables as defined by Aydin in the theoretical approach. The pivotal geographical location of Turkey, the historical legacy of the Ottoman past, the conservatist ideology of the AKP government, domestic considerations and international developments influence the leader's cognitive beliefs to a significant extent. Highly related to the leader's personal interference on the decisions is the domestic component that the Poliheuristic theory also pinpoints. According to Mintz (2004:7), 'domestic politics is the essence of decision', a premise that is profoundly stressed in Putnam's model. Nevertheless, Mintz does not delve into the distinct parameters that form part of

the domestic constituents and that explains why in the analysis of Operation Peace Spring I mainly used Putnam's model to substantiate my arguments.

Despite the lack of analysis in terms of the domestic constituents and their influence on the final outcome, Mintz does present in his theory a decision matrix that can provide an explanation of the extent to which certain dimensions affect the decision-maker's decisions. At this point, I need to clarify that this study will explain the three foreign policy decisions using the theoretical components of the decision matrix and the extensive series of secondary sources.

As PHT presumes, in the early stage of the selection of the most favorable options there are four dimensions that the decision-makers take into serious consideration; a) political dimension; b) military dimension; c) economic dimension; d) diplomatic dimension (James and Zhang, 2004, cited in Mintz, 2005:96). In the given political decision – conduct of OPS – the political and the military dimension seem to have played the most significant role when making the final decision, opting to use force over a diplomatic solution. As discussed above, the growing fear of the Kurdish demands for autonomy, the potential dissatisfaction of the MHP political party in case of the continuation of the peace process between Turkey and the Kurds, the U.S troops' withdrawal from the region constituted major political criteria that influenced Erdogan's decision to a great extent. Therefore, it was the political component embedded in domestic considerations that urged the decision-maker to opt for the more viable options with regards to the Kurdish issue and its Syria policy. In accordance with the political dimension is also the military dimension. After the attempt of coup back in 2016, the AKP administration under Erdogan took a series of measures to weaken the once predominant role of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) (Haugom, 2019:214). This adjustment adopted by the Turkish government facilitated them to choose the use of force to reassure its assertiveness, as the TAF were traditionally opposed to the conduct of military operations and the use of force. Both the political and the military dimensions are interrelated in the sense that their implications strongly influenced Erdogan's decision. A potential inclination towards a more modest attitude where the continuation of

the peace process would still be one of the cards on the negotiation table, surely fuels domestic uncertainty and a certain degree of polarisation in the public opinion. In addition to that, a rapprochement between the ruling government and the TAF would also raise military implications, as the use of force as an instrument to enhance national security and safeguard national interests, would be more difficult to project as the most viable solution to resolve the conflict. These political and military parameters shed light on the reasons why Erdogan opted for a certain set of alternatives in the early stage based on his cognitive traits. Looking at the second stage, the so-called *analytical* stage, the PHT presumes that the decision-maker uses the rational approach to opt for the best alternative that would guarantee higher payoffs and lesser risks. The second stage also witnesses the turn to a compensatory principle in a sense that a potential low score of the X dimension in the first stage could be compensated by a higher score in another dimension (Mintz and DeRouen, 2010:10). In the Turkish case and Operation Peace Spring, if we take into consideration the low score that the operation took in the diplomatic dimension in light of an international outcry for its actualization, one could argue that in the second stage the political dimension could act as a means to strengthen the AKP's position internally, while justifying at the same time its actions, using the claim of the 'unwillingness' of the international counterparts to collectively resolve the issue.

4.2.2 Concluding Remarks

The first case study – Operation Peace Spring – portrayed the complexity of the puzzle over the research questions that this dissertation aims to address. In terms of the first question – to what extent the so-called *changes* in Turkey's foreign policy orientations are actually *radical* changes or just *adjustment* changes, this study suggests that OPS is an adjustment change in Turkey's Syrian policy and will be further analysed in chapter 5. OPS is also a representative instance of how the AKP government leaned towards the use of force as an instrument to ensure its assertive role both within the country and abroad. The interplay of the leader's cognitive characteristics, the influence of the domestic constituents, and the external developments all provide an

insightful explanation into the reasons why Turkey adapted to the security landscape and adjusted its foreign policy accordingly. This nexus of *adaptability* and *adjustment* also elucidates how Turkey swings back and forth between multilateralism and unilateralism. In the given case, and especially in this high political salience issue, the Turkish government diverged from its international counterparts and opted for a unilateral decision proving the argument that as a rational state-actor Turkey's national interests will always determine its course of action both in the domestic and in the international political game.

4.3 The Purchase of the S-400 missile system: A Looming Debate

The previous section investigated Turkey's political decision to conduct the third military campaign in North-eastern Syria illustrating the factors that paved the way for its actualization. This section will analyse the Turkish decision to purchase the S-400 missile defence system from Russia, a quite recent decision that has sparked a looming debate over the real incentives of the Turkish side, and subsequently the fragile relationship with the US.

Indeed, the gradual rapprochement between Turkey and Russia during the last years has raised several questions over the unpredictability of Turkey's foreign policy orientations, especially when it comes to the security realm. In the existing literature, the nexus of *cooperation* and *competition* is widely used as a way to portray the fragile, and in many circumstances, turbulent relationship between the two-state actors (Svarin, 2015; Shlykov, 2018; Öniş and Yilmaz, 2015). A confluence of factors ranging from domestic considerations, internal and external threats to the constantly changing security and economic landscape explicate the multidimensional relationship of the two 'frenemies', a term that seems to best characterize the nexus between rivalry and cooperation (Dalay, 2019). The factors mentioned above provide a thorough explanation of the reasons why Turkey and Russia converge in low political salience issues related to deepening of economic partnership through the principle of *economic interdependence*, especially in the energy sector, while they highly diverge in high political salience issues where national interests, national sovereignty and territorial integrity are at stake. For instance, the Syrian crisis and the distinct

approaches towards its resolution, the frozen conflicts in the South Caucasus, namely the Nagorno-Karabakh and the Georgia-South Ossetia conflict, the conflicting interests in the Black Sea region and finally the deviating approaches regarding uprisings in the Middle East fuel further divergences that lead many scholars to the assumption that convergence in the security spectrum is uncertain and therefore, 'in the long-term perspective rivalry is much more likely than cooperation' (Balcer, 2009:78, Özdal et al, 2019:24).

To unfold the various angles of the S-400 deal, it is significant first to touch upon the structural and conjunctural variables identified by Aydin. The defining trait of the so-called *structural variables* is their immutability across time and in the given case both states share an array of characteristics that allow the deepening of their relationship. The historical legacy of the two countries, the pivotal geographical location between the West and the East and the long-term pursuit of an influential role as a regional and international power constitute structural variables that highlight their closer engagement, especially in the economy and energy sector (Öniş and Yilmaz, 2015:2). However, apart from the structural variables, I would like to stress that conjunctural variables that tend to be dynamic and adaptive to the given circumstances, seem to play a significant role in the Turkish-Russian bilateral relationship. The gradual deterioration of the relation with the Western counterparts for both countries as well as Turkey's domestic quest for enhancing its national security, the increased level of interference of both leaders in domestic affairs and in the foreign policy decision-making process constitute a window of opportunity for developing stronger bonds and strengthen their relationship more than the mere economic angle. The purchase of the S-400 missile system represents a valid case of the closer engagement in the security sector that serves Turkey's national interests and domestic calculus. The following section will further scrutinize the case based on the premises of Putnam and Mintz's decision theoretical frameworks.

4.3.1 Application of Putnam's (1988) and Mintz's (2004) Models to the S-400 deal

Turkey's decision to reach an agreement with the Russian Federation on the S-400 missile systems certainly raises questions over the real incentives of this 'alternative military partnership' (Has, 2019). Given the fragile relation between the two countries which were on the brink of war in 2015 following the incident with the Russian jet, this rapprochement in the security sector since 2016 can be attributed to an interplay of factors that seem to have influenced the reconciliation. While the future is quite unpredictable when it comes to an effective continuation of cooperation, especially in the security realm, the analysis of the case will elucidate the peculiar traits of this *asymmetric relationship* between Turkey and Russia that will determine the relationship in the years to come. The core premises of Putnam and Mintz's theoretical frameworks are applicable to the given decision and will seek to provide a holistic explanation to the research questions analysed in previous chapters.

The S-400 deal is a product of domestic and international considerations, a premise that is highly illustrated in Putnam's model. As Putnam's model also underpins, the chief negotiator is entangled in both boards, seeking both domestic and international gains. That explains why the model is applicable to the given political decision. According to official declarations by high-level Turkish officials, the main reason behind this decision is the protection of national sovereignty and as Turkey is a rational player that seeks to safeguard its national interests, the decision to proceed with the deal came as an imperative condition towards that end (Has, 2019). At the national level, the Turkish government opted to align with Russia in the delivery of four S-400 batteries as a way to suppress a series of domestic and international developments that endangered primarily Erdogan's personal reliability and secondarily the AKP's viability. The long-term Kurdish issue, U.S troops' withdrawal from Syria, along with Erdogan's persistence to link domestic issues to foreign policies contributed significantly to the country's shift from its traditional umbrella of protection under NATO to the option of a more independent policy that raises significant controversy. Contrary to the clear aims of the decision to launch Operation Peace Spring, the way that Erdogan and Turkish officials present the

incentives behind the S-400 deal, at least in the political discourse, raises several questions. On the one hand, Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu, in one of his official statements, clarifies that Turkey will not withdraw from the deal and as he explicitly stated that ‘We have told them I don’t know how many months ago or years ago that it’s a done deal, so we cannot cancel it’ (*Reuters*, 2019). On the other hand, the Turkish side did not seem to reject a possible cooperation with the US on the Raytheon Co Patriot defence systems if the American side did not pose any barriers to Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 system. As stated by Turkish official sources, a potential agreement between Turkey and the US would be reached under certain conditions that would primarily not pose any restrictions on the continuation of the S-400 deal (*Reuters*, 2019). This ambiguity on behalf of the Turkish side demonstrates significant features of Turkey’s strategic objectives; a) prioritisation of domestic calculations when opting for a particular course of action; b) adjustments in its foreign policy objectives based on the domestic needs and convergence with states in certain areas irrespective of the divergent interests in an array of issues; c) acquisition of larger win-sets by persuading the National Assembly and by extension public opinion that the S-400 deal was a viable solution for safeguarding national security; d) striving for regional and international recognition which explains why Turkey pursues a more balanced position between the USA and the Russian Federation. These four points depict some of the core premises of Putnam’s framework and one could argue that even if his analysis is heavily based on the USA, its application is also possible to other regimes or countries with distinct features.

Furthermore, it is crucial to note the role of the opposition parties and the coalition networks towards the ratification of the deal in the domestic political game. According to an official poll conducted by Kadir Has University in 2015, nearly 43.7 % of the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) supporters endorsed the government’s initiative to sign the deal with Russia (*Hurriyet Daily News*, 2019). The unanimity in the National Assembly highlights how political parties in Turkey converge to issues related to national security as the country’s sovereignty is top priority irrespective of political differences. In accordance with the wide support towards the deal, it is also

significant to pinpoint how public opinion perceives the overall rapprochement with the Russian Federation, its prospects for the future and finally the relationship with the USA. Based on the poll conducted by Kadir Has University as mentioned above, the vast majority of the Turkish public opinion sustained the decision of reaching an agreement with Russia and in particular almost 55% of the respondents perceived as a positive sign the closer engagement with Russia (*Hurriyet Daily News*, 2019). The extent to which this rapprochement can be evolved into a strategic partnership is quite questionable given the existing divergent interests, either in the Black Sea Region or in the Middle East. However, I would like to stress that the respondents were most likely driven by economic incentives, as *economic interdependence* with Russia is the defining feature in their relationship. Contrary to the optimistic signs regarding the overall perception about Russia, the American results significantly differed. Most of the respondents' answers were centred on the nexus of enemy and scepticism towards the USA, as only 2.2% of the respondents perceived the USA as a vital ally (*Hurriyet Daily News*, 2019). There are underlying factors that can provide an explanation of the reason why public opinion leaned towards this sense of mistrust against the Americans. Erdogan's ability to polarise politics and shape public opinion highly contributed to a gradual shift from a closer affinity with the West to a more deepened relation with Russia. U.S continuous support to the YPG forces in Syria, its refusal to make further concessions on the size of the proposed safe zone in the Syrian territory and Russia's support to Ankara in its fight against the Gulen movement demonstrate how Erdogan and the AKP government exploit this domestic political turmoil in order to facilitate the acceptance of foreign policy decisions. Since 2016, the S-400 deal serves as an instance where the Turkish government driven by both domestic and international considerations has opted for the course of action that best suited its vested interests.

The analysis of the S-400 deal based on the premises of Mintz's Poliheuristic theory also provides an insightful explanation of the factors that contributed to selecting that option amid other alternative courses of action. The decision matrix developed by Mintz entangles both cognitive and rational thinking when deciding for the best alternative, and therefore this section will

apply some of its core premises to the purchase of the S-400 missile defence system.

As profoundly analysed in the theoretical chapter, the defining traits of the Poliheuristic theory are its nonholistic nature, the significant role of the dimensions and the use of the noncompensatory principle. In the initial stage, the decision-maker, highly influenced by his/her cognitive beliefs, uses 'heuristics' known as 'cognitive shortcuts' to eliminate the options with the least favorable outcomes. A contributing factor to the rejection of the unfavorable alternatives is the domestic political background which constitutes a common denominator with Putnam's (1988) analysis. Domestic politics for Mintz is the epicentre of decision and as he explicitly stated 'political leaders measure gains and losses in political terms' (Mintz, 2004:7). The political component constitutes a vehicle for political decision and that explains its key role in the decision-maker's interference in the initial stage of the selection process. The nonholistic trait of the PHT is intertwined with the second component – that of the dimensions. As Mintz (2005:96) illustrates, there are four dimensions that affect the leader's decision in the first place; 'political, military, economic and diplomatic'. Three of these dimensions will provide a more holistic explanation of the factors that led to the signing of the S-400 deal. At this point, I would like to pinpoint that the application of the model to the given case along with the alternatives I intend to use, are not a product of open sources related to the official Turkish stance on the issue, and subsequently the analysis is based on secondary sources.

Provided that in the initial stage of the process Turkish policymakers and Erdogan as the decision-maker chose amid a wide range of alternatives, the four that were perceived as the most prevailing were; a) alignment with Russia and the signing of the S-400 deal; b) alignment with the USA on the U.S patriot system; c) participation in the Eurosam missile project consortium; d) preservation of the status quo. The second stage entails the analytical phase of the process where the four dimensions and the rising implications are evaluated based on the rational approach and the maximization of the expected utility. Regarding the S-400 deal, the decision to foster cooperation with Russia is

entwined with the political and economic dimension. The turbulent domestic political background in Turkey, the Idlib operation in Syria, the Kurdish issue and its ramifications both internally and externally, the TurkStream gas project and the Akkuyu nuclear plant illustrate that the political component strongly influences the outcome of the decision. Turkey seems to be highly dependent on energy needs and the partnership with Russia on the Turkstream project and the nuclear plant represent two of the reasons why the Turkish government seeks to guarantee Russia's support. The above-mentioned instances also elucidate how the political dimension is directly linked to the economic considerations and how these two can compensate for any implications in the diplomatic dimension. The fragile and when else turbulent diplomatic relationship with Russia could explain why in the decision matrix the diplomatic dimension would get a lower score than the political or the economic dimension. However, as the PHT presumes, in the second stage where there is a shift from the noncompensatory principle to the compensatory one, decision-makers would most likely use the argument of the political or economic gains in order to counter its negative value. Highly linked to the dimension-based component is also the rising political, economic, military, and diplomatic implications. If the Turkish government were to choose the alignment with the USA under conditions that were not the most preferable ones for Turkey, then unavoidably this decision would trigger political turmoil, either in the National Assembly and the opposition parties, or in the public opinion. As already pinpointed, during the last few years, there is a significant decline in peoples' positive image towards the USA, and therefore the option of aligning with America would most likely increase public polarisation against the AKP. Therefore, the political decision to align with Russia in these uncertain times came as a product of rational calculations based on the maximization of gains and the minimization of the potential losses and definitely provides insightful inputs to the research questions of this dissertation.

4.3.2 Concluding Remarks

The second case study – S-400 missile system – aimed to further unfold the puzzle over the research questions that this dissertation seeks to address. In terms of the research question regarding the *changes* or *adjustments* in Turkey's

foreign orientations, the S-400 deal is a product of the *adjustment change* policy and is closely related to the second research question – the interplay of interconnected considerations. In the S-400 deal, the leader's interference, the domestic political turmoil, and the international outlook strengthened the validity of the argument that there is a strong interrelation among the three variables when it comes to the Turkish foreign policy decision-making process. As already discussed in the theoretical section, Putnam does not analyse profoundly the leader's personal interference and that explains why Mintz's premises on the leader's 'cognitive traits' adds further value in the existing case. In relation to the prior argument, Putnam's assumption on the prioritisation of the domestic calculus over the individual preference is not applicable to the S-400 decision as Turkey had a strong personalised system where Erdogan's political expediency combined with domestic considerations acted as the primary incentives towards the completion of the deal. Mintz's theoretical input again complemented Putnam's demonstrating that the three components act as key drivers towards the pursuit of domestic, regional, or international gains.

4.4 The TurkStream Intergovernmental Agreement: Towards A Strengthened Economic Partnership

The previous section illustrated Turkey's decision to purchase the S-400 missile system from Russia, a political decision with a deep political and economic incentive. This final section of this chapter will shed light on the Intergovernmental Agreement on the TurkStream gas pipeline project in order to elucidate Turkey's multidimensional foreign orientations and the convergence in low political salience issues, as opposed to rising divergences in high political salience issues. The reason I chose to delve into the TurkStream project is because the energy sector is one of the cornerstones in Turkey's national agenda and decisions like this Intergovernmental Agreement illustrate how Turkey strives to develop strong partnerships in low political issues as part of its regional and international ambitions.

As Yunus Furuncu (2020:8) pinpoints, the recent inauguration of the TurkStream gas project marked a new era in the Turkish-Russian energy relationship where instead of an *asymmetric relationship*, a sense of

interdependence would best characterize their relationship. As already demonstrated, in certain cases when national sovereignty, national interests and territorial integrity are at stake, Turkey opts for a more assertive, unilateral approach to protect its national security. TurkStream is the proof of Turkey's assertiveness to fulfil its long-term regional and international ambitions in the energy sector. However, in this case, the Republic prioritises cooperation with Russia, leading to an initial conclusion that economic incentives outweigh their divergences in the security sector. The following section will apply the premises of the two decision models to the Intergovernmental Agreement and will shed light on the interplay of the three elements that highly influence Turkey's foreign policy decision-making process.

4.4.1 Application of Putnam's (1988) and Mintz's (2004) Models to the TurkStream Project

The decision to sign the Intergovernmental Agreement on the TurkStream gas pipeline project serves as a representative instance of the deepening energy partnership between Turkey and the Russian Federation. A large body of literature characterizes the relationship in the security sector as highly 'asymmetrical', whereas the more recent agreement on TurkStream drifts away from this narrative and gives prominence to the notion of 'interdependence' (Whitmore, 2020; Furuncu, 2020; Öniş and Yılmaz, 2015). Indeed, this dissertation embraces the notion of interdependence when examining the TurkStream project as it explains in a more comprehensive way the nature of the relationship which is based on mutual economic benefits.

Applying the core premises of Putnam's (1988) analysis on the given decision contributes to the further delineation of the distinct but interrelated elements that act as key drivers in Turkey's foreign orientations. As an initial point, the defining trait of Putnam's work is the interrelation of the domestic and international political game as sources of influence when it comes to the foreign policy decision-making process. In the given decision, the impact of the domestic constituents on the rapprochement with Russia and the ratification of the agreement is profound. The 'two-level game' holds that at the national level, the coalition networks, along with opposition parties highly influence the

government's courses of action in domestic and foreign affairs (Putnam, 1988:434). Regarding the signing of the TurkStream agreement, since the beginning, the conservative-nationalist (MHP) political party, AKP's coalition power in the National Assembly, strongly endorsed the initiative of aligning with Russia, as the party has expressed its criticism against the West openly (Aras, 2019). Within the Turkish Nationalist Assembly, the Eurasianist block seems to approve the strengthening of the partnership between the two countries which leads to an initial conclusion that the interference of domestic constituents in the given decision had a positive connotation and acted as an additional incentive in the AKP's course of action.

Along with this general acceptance in the domestic political scene, the role of public opinion is again a determinant factor. As Aras (2019) illustrates, the use of media as a soft means to shape public opinion highly contributed to a gradual shift towards a more positive Russian image in the Turkish public. Indeed, the economic benefits acted as the backbone towards the approval of the agreement. Based on the official poll conducted by StratejiCo, an independent consultancy firm, almost 75% of the Turkish public opinion leaned towards the ratification of the agreement and the closer engagement to Russia, as compared to 2015 where only 56% of the population supported a partnership with Russia (Sengul, 2017). The main reasons behind this general approval towards the rapprochement can be summarized as follows; a) enhance energy supply security; b) ensure and strengthen economic bonds, expand the use of natural gas as an energy source; d) fulfil regional and international aspirations as an 'energy hub' through participating in international projects (Guler and Bayar, 2020; Sengul, 2017). The final objective – fulfilment of its regional and international long-term ambitions – represents the second pillar of Putnam's 'two-level game'. As he argues (1988), at the international political chessboard, the chief negotiator uses the domestic constituents as a leverage to international gains. In this case, the TurkStream project serves as a unique opportunity for Erdogan and the AKP government to fulfil Turkey's long-term objectives, while serving domestic, regional, and international interests at the same time. In accordance with the international benefits that Turkey would reap from its participation in international projects, an emergence of personal political gains

for Erdogan and his government would also rise. As an instance, Erdogan could use the signing of this agreement as a further asset in the domestic political game not only to ensure his personal and the political party's domestic viability, but also as a defining move towards a closer engagement between Russia and the EU. A potential reconciliation between Russia and the EU could also portray the country's image as a 'mediator' in international affairs. The duty of being a 'mediator' demonstrates the linkage between the domestic and the international background and how the TurkStream signing enables the AKP government to guarantee both domestic and international benefits, allowing the chief negotiator to be entangled in both boards at the same time.

The analysis of the TurkStream Intergovernmental Agreement based on Mintz's theoretical framework will also shed light on the reasons why this course of action was perceived as the most optimal for the Turkish government. At this point, I would like to pinpoint that this dissertation will only focus on Turkey's foreign policy decision-making process regarding this decision and not Russia's. Through the application of Mintz's model to the agreement, a more thorough analysis will elucidate why Turkey opted for the one alternative over the other, the dimensions that influenced the course of action and finally the rising implications in Turkey's relationship with its international partners.

As thoroughly demonstrated in the theoretical discussion, Mintz (2004) adds value in the existing literature on decision-making by interlinking cognitive and rational school of thoughts. In the initial stage, the decision-maker uses heuristics, the so-called *cognitive shortcuts* to eliminate the alternatives that may posit a significant risk for his/her domestic viability and in the second stage the decision-makers opts for the alternative that maximises the expected utility. In particular, the first stage 'involves a non-exhaustive search where a selection of 'surviving' alternatives is typically being made across dimensions prior to the completion of the consideration of all alternatives along all dimensions', while the second stage 'involves a maximising or lexicographic decision rule for selecting an alternative from the subset of 'surviving' alternatives' (Mintz et al, 1997:553, cited in Liu, 2006:30). In the given decision, the domestic political background contributed to the rejection of options that presented a low score in

the political dimension. A potential rejection of the cooperation with the Russian Federation in the first stage of the decision-making process by Erdogan would first trigger domestic and political turmoil, ranging from coalition networks and opposition parties to public opinion. A further analysis of the Turkstream agreement based on the decision matrix implied by Mintz will further substantiate the above-mentioned argument.

Provided that in the initial stage of the process Turkish policymakers and Erdogan as the decision-maker chose amid a wide range of alternatives the following three as the most prevailing; a) preservation of the status quo in order not to risk the imposition of sanctions by the US; b) alignment with Russia and the signing of the agreement; c) alignment with the EU in alternative energy projects *bypassing* in a way Russia. The second stage involves the analytical phase where the four dimensions – political, economic, military, and diplomatic posit certain implications that decision-makers must take into serious consideration to maximize payoffs and minimize potential losses. Turkey's long-term ambitions to strengthen its position as a gateway to energy security while reaping the economic benefits from its alliance with Russia in gas pipeline projects, indeed played a significant role in the decision to foster their cooperation. The option of preserving the status quo in order not to risk the fragile relationship with the US, a NATO ally that Turkey relies on, would primarily trigger domestic political turmoil. The nationalistic-coalition political party (MHP), the opposition (CHP) would most likely oppose to that alternative as it would be interpreted as a loss of national prestige and therefore, all the narratives that Erdogan and Turkish officials often use in the political discourse regarding the regional and global role that Turkey seeks to pursue would fall in a vacuum. The public's dissatisfaction would also rise as during the last years and especially after the 2016 coup attempt, there seems to be a gradual disengagement from the West and the Western partners. The third alternative – alignment with the EU in alternative energy projects bypassing Russia – would also provoke significant political and economic implications for the Turkish government. Turkey's economic interdependence from Russia is the cornerstone in the continuation of their relationship and given the fact that there is a deepening partnership in the economic and energy field in the last years

with a potential widening of cooperation in the security sector Erdogan would not risk to bypass Russia as the losses would be greater than the gains. For these reasons, one could argue that the political and the economic dimensions strongly impacted the government's course of action. The alignment with Russia and the signing of the Intergovernmental Agreement was perceived in the second stage of the process as the most viable serving domestic, regional, and international considerations. TurkStream would strengthen the country's balancing position between the EU and Russia especially given the gradual deterioration of their relationship. Therefore, Turkey could act as a bridge of reconciliation when it comes to the EU's energy needs, enabling the AKP to strengthen its position internally.

4.4.2 Concluding Remarks

The third case study – the TurkStream natural gas pipeline project – is the last section of this chapter and it also shed light on the puzzle regarding the nexus of convergences and divergences in the Turkish foreign policy decision-making process in high and low political salience issues. In terms of the first research question – *changes* or *adjustments* in Turkey's foreign orientations – the TurkStream Intergovernmental Agreement demonstrates that it does not represent a radical change in its foreign policy but forms part of its *adjustment* change policy given an interplay of domestic and international considerations. The agreement also proves the argument that Turkey seeks to develop partnerships with other states in low political salience issues when its economic interests outweigh any potential divergences in the security sector. In this case, and contrary to the first case – Operation Peace Spring – the most viable outcome for the Turkish government was to align with Russia, and subsequently to embrace multilateralism to fulfil its domestic, regional, and international aspirations. The following chapter will discuss the findings of the three foreign policy decisions and relate them to the existing literature in order to provide a holistic overview of the research questions that this dissertation sought to address.

Chapter 5: Discussion

As already demonstrated in chapter I – Literature Review – the nexus of *continuity* and *change* in the Turkish foreign policy decision-making process has been at the forefront of the academic literature since the early 1990s. Among academic scholars the puzzle over consistencies and inconsistencies, continuities and ruptures in Turkey’s foreign policy orientations triggers further divergences as to what extent changing patterns in Turkey’s foreign outlook should be considered as radical or not. Influenced by Hermann’s analysis on ‘*Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy*’ where he pinpointed four distinct levels of changes, this dissertation claims that the changing patterns of Turkey’s foreign orientations are not part of an international change – fourth level of Herman’s analysis – but they can be explained through the lens of *adjustment changes*. As a starting point, Operation Peace Spring is a representative case of *adjustment changes* along with *program changes*. As Hermann (1992:5) argues, the defining feature of the first level of changes, the so-called *adjustments*, is to ensure national security. The safeguard of national interests represents a priority for the Turkish government and that explains why in certain cases decision-makers opt for the use of force as the most appropriate means to ensure national security. This shift towards the use of force applies to the second level of changes, the so-called *program changes* that is also apparent in Operation Peace Spring in North-eastern Syria. As Turkish officials declared soon thereafter the initiation of the Operation, the offensive aimed to fulfil two goals; a) to suppress any separatist sentiments within Turkey and abroad that could potentially risk the country’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity; b) to protect Syria’s territorial integrity and its people from ‘terrorist organizations’ as Turkey officially declares the PKK and its affiliate in Syria (Turkey, MFA, 2019). To fulfil that end, Erdogan under the AKP government opted for the use of force amid an array of alternative courses, embracing a more assertive, independent and security-based attitude that raises several questions over this nexus of unilateralism and multilateralism that the country swings.

The second and the third case studies – S-400 deal and the TurkStream Agreement – represent a fusion of the first and the third level of changes as demonstrated by Hermann. Both cases form part of the *adjustment changes* that the government implemented to secure its national security interests. However, the difference in these two cases lies in the methods the government opted to achieve its goals. *Problem/goal changes* account for changes as part of the *strategic autonomy* Turkey seeks to achieve. That series of changes allow the state to form partnerships, to foster cooperation with other states, to strengthen its domestic viability and fulfil its regional and international ambitions. Even though strategic autonomy is indeed difficult to achieve given the rising divergences among states especially in the security spectrum, the S-400 deal and the TurkStream agreement prove that Turkey seeks convergence with states, with Russia in the given cases, when she has to fulfil certain domestic and international considerations. The convergence with Russia, especially in low political issues, does not mean that divergences in high political issues do not threaten the future of the Turkish-Russian relationship. This fragility in the relationship substantiates the argument that Turkey as a rational player primarily seeks to ensure its own national interests and pursues partnerships depending on what national interests and policy goals the state seeks to fulfil.

Therefore, through the analysis of these three cases, this research demonstrates that what seems to best characterize the nature of the changing patterns in Turkey's foreign orientations is the fusion of *adjustment changes* and *program/problem changes* depending on the case. Highly related to the changing patterns was the delineation of the distinct factors that provided a more holistic interpretation of why Turkey finally opts for certain courses of action. The three cases demonstrated that an interplay of domestic and international considerations constitute the key vehicles that have shaped the country's foreign outlook to a significant extent. Along with the domestic constituents and international developments, the previous chapter also illustrated the determinant role of the decision-maker in the foreign policy decision-making process. The extent to which each of these three elements affects Turkish policymakers and Erdogan as the ultimate decision-maker may differ. However, there is no shadow of a doubt that the individual, the domestic, and the international

components all contribute to shaping Turkey's foreign direction. The decision to conduct Operation Peace Spring can be attributed to the domestic political turmoil fueled by the constant pressure from the nationalistic-coalition party towards a more assertive stance against the Kurds, and the growing fear of public's reaction in case the AKP administration embraced a stance that would endanger Turkey's national security. Subsequently, Turkey's Syrian policy gradually shifted towards a more assertive and independent posture. Regarding the international developments, U.S troops' withdrawal from the region, along with a more passive stance on behalf of the Western powers towards the conflict resolution in Syria, also contributed to this more independent course of action. Finally, the leader's personal interference in domestic politics, his strong imprint on society unavoidably led the way to conduct the military offensive despite international outcry. In the other two cases, the S-400 deal and the TurkStream agreement, the decision-maker was also entangled in both the domestic and international political game seeking domestic and international gains accordingly. Erdogan's personal intrusion and his aspirations to remain in office and to gain greater popularity among the Turkish nation acted as complementary features towards the rapprochement with Russia. In terms of the international developments, U.S strong opposition to the deal and public's frustration against the USA during the last years may serve as an additional factor that can explain why Turkey strengthened the alliance with Russia. In the TurkStream Intergovernmental Agreement, the domestic component and in particular the economic incentives, along with the regional aspiration of pursuing the role of an 'energy hub' in the region acted as the primary incentives towards the ratification of the agreement.

From the analysis of the three interrelated cases, I would like to pinpoint that the common denominator that acts as the primary driver in Turkey's changing patterns is the safeguard of national security. As already stated in this chapter, the study of these three Turkish foreign policy decisions individually shed light on Turkey's multidimensional features in its foreign policy decision-making process. The selection of the cases did serve the purpose of portraying the changing patterns in the country's foreign outlook looking at distinct but highly interrelated sectors. The analysis of the individual foreign policy

decisions demonstrated how the interplay of interrelated variables – leader’s interference, domestic constituents and international developments all urge Turkey to prioritise its domestic calculation and adjust its foreign policy objectives accordingly. This behaviour also elucidates why the Republic seeks partnerships in low political issues where cooperation is more feasible to emerge, whereas divergences in high political salience issues trigger the Turkish government to pursue a more independent posture, leading them towards a path of isolation.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

This dissertation argues that the delineation of the changing patterns in Turkey's foreign policy orientations is indeed a challenge. It is challenging, as within the existing literature, there is a paucity of developing a single framework that would unify the multiple but interrelated variables that act as vehicles for Turkish policymakers and decision-makers. This study aimed to provide a more holistic overview by linking the core premises of two prominent decision models, acknowledging at the same time their shortcomings. Putnam's (1988) 'Two-Level-Games' and Mintz (2004) Poliheuristic theory were applied to three individual but interlinked Turkish foreign policy decisions. Each foreign policy decision contributed significantly to the aims and objectives of this dissertation. The study of Operation Peace Spring illustrated why the AKP administration leans towards the use of force aiming to ensure its domestic viability, while seeking at the same time to ensure its assertive role. The second reason why I selected the given case is because it is a very recent political decision and could serve as an exemplar of how Turkey opts for the use of force when conducting military offensives. Several military campaigns of the past such as Operation Euphrates Shield, Operation Olive Branch and the most recent after Operation Peace Spring, the so-called Operation Spring Shield could incorporate the interplay of the three thoroughly discussed variables in order to compare and contrast the similarities, the objectives and the motives behind each military campaign. In this way, a more profound understanding of how and to what extent Turkey has adjusted its policy orientations based on domestic calculations, international developments, and finally the leader's own cognitive traits.

Highly related to Operation Peace Spring was also the study of the S-400 deal and the TurkStream agreement. The reason why I chose to incorporate these two cases in this dissertation is because they elucidated how Turkey could shift from a mere independent and assertive role in the security realm to a more cooperative and interdependent role when seeking to fulfil its economic, energy considerations and by extension the safeguard of its national security. The S-400 deal illustrated that the rapprochement with Russia is a product of domestic

calculations, along with the prioritisation of national security, while the TurkStream Agreement served as a gateway for Turkey to pursue its long-term energy aspirations. The study of these two cases may also serve as the baseline for future research as to how Turkey behaves when aiming to fulfil certain national interests leading her to seek partnerships with specific states that would guarantee the accomplishment of specific foreign goals.

Nevertheless, the analysis of the respective cases and the application of the two models in the given foreign policy decision is restrained by certain limitations that need to be acknowledged. Putnam's model, for instance, is heavily centered on the entanglement of domestic and international interaction leaving no room for the cognitive features of the chief negotiator. Even though Putnam stresses the importance of the negotiator's strategic preferences, he does not analyse in-depth how the personal intrusion affects the decision-making process. To fill this void, I chose to incorporate Mintz's model, as in his analysis he presents a fusion of cognitive and rational thinking combined in a single theoretical framework. However, there are some shortcomings in Mintz's analysis that I need to pinpoint as well. Mintz uses the decision matrix to provide an explanation of how foreign policy decisions are a product of a dual stage. In the initial stage the decision-makers eliminate the less favorable alternative courses of actions based on cognitive shortcuts. In this study, based on the given literature, a specific set of alternatives was identified. However, the list of the alternative courses of action in the three cases is not definite which means that the selection of different alternatives by another researcher would be treated differently, and subsequently the rising implications would also differ. In this study, I use the four dimensions developed by Mintz, and consequently the implications were highly related to these dimensions. However, this does not mean that they are not other dimensions that can be taken into consideration when untangling the puzzle over Turkey's changing patterns. A third limitation would entail the selection of primary data as an additional source of validity in the dissertation. Initially, the study was designed to entail both primary and secondary data, but due to the outbreak of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, I adjusted the study to a literature review search and the gathering of secondary data. To minimize the potential shortcomings of the research study and to

increase the validity of my arguments, I implied two criteria; a) selection of the more recent publications; b) various scholars' contribution to the existing literature in order to present a multi-faceted analysis. However, the initial plan was a fusion of primary and secondary data. The conduct of elite interviews with University scholars and think tank researchers would add further validity to the existing study and maybe new insights regarding the *continuity* and *change* puzzle.

Despite all the limitations mentioned above, this dissertation demonstrated the complex dynamics behind Turkey's foreign policy orientations in high and low political issues. To project towards what direction Turkey is moving into is indeed a challenging task, especially given the fragility of its partnerships with other states. The study of the three foreign policy decisions demonstrated that the term *adjustment* and not *radical* is more applicable to elucidate the changes in Turkey's foreign policy directions. This study also illustrated that the interplay of the individual, domestic and international component can provide significant inputs into Turkey's foreign policy decisions. The application of these interrelated components to future political decisions may be a useful engine towards a more holistic overview of the *adjustment changes* in the country's foreign policy decision-making process in the coming years.

Bibliography

- Altay, I. (2019) 'Turkey's S-400 deal national security decision, not an issue for third countries', Daily Sabah, available at <https://www.dailysabah.com/diplomacy/2019/04/10/turkeys-s-400-deal-national-security-decision-not-an-issue-for-third-countries>, accessed on 10th April 2019
- Aras, B. (2017) 'Turkish Foreign Policy after July 15', Conflict Resolution and Mediation Stream for Istanbul Policy Center, pp.1-14, available at https://www.academia.edu/32419387/TURKISH_FOREIGN_POLICY_AFTE_R_JULY_15
- Aras, B. (2019) 'The Crisis and Change in Turkish Foreign Policy After July 15', Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Volume 44, Issue 1, pp. 1-13, available at 10.1177/0304375419837415
- Assenova, M. (2020) 'Russia's Trouble with Turkstream', Center for European Policy Analysis, available at <https://www.cepa.org/russias-trouble-with-turkstream>, accessed on 18th March 2020
- Ataman, M and Özdemir, Ç (2018) 'Turkey's Syria Policy: Constant Objectives, Shifting Priorities', Turkish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Volume 5, Issue 2, pp.13-35, available at 10.26513/toed.466046
- Ayoob, M. (2013) 'Turkish Foreign Policy: Looking Beyond 2012', USAK Yearbook of Politics and International Politics, Issue 6, pp.205-207, available at
- Aydin, M. (2004). Turkish Foreign Policy Framework and Analysis, Ankara: Center for Strategic Research (SAM)
- Aydın, M, Açıkmeşe, S, Çelikpala, M, Özel, S, Dizdaroğlu, C and Kosen, M. (2019) 'Research on Public Perceptions on Turkish Foreign Policy', Center for Turkish Studies, pp. 2-91, available at 10.13140/RG.2.2.14535.24480
- Avundukluoğlu, E. (2019) 'Turkey: CHP leader criticizes response to Trump tweets', Anadolu Agency, available at <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/turkey-chp-leader-criticizes-response-to-trump-tweets/1614954>, accessed on 15th October 2019
- Babacan, M. (2012): 'The Nature of Lobbying and Regulation in Turkey', Afro Eurasian Studies, Volume 1, Issue 1, pp. 173-194, available at <https://mpira.ub.uni-muenchen.de/57830/>
- Baev, P and Kirişçi, K.(2017) 'An ambiguous partnership: The serpentine trajectory of Turkish-Russian relations in the era of Erdoğan and Putin',

Brookings Institution, available at <https://www.brookings.edu/research/an-ambiguous-partnership-the-serpentine-trajectory-of-turkish-russian-relations-in-the-era-of-erdogan-and-putin/>, accessed on September 2017

Bathke, B.(2019) 'What's behind Erdogan's proposed 'safe zone' for Syrian refugees?' InfoMigrants, available at <https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/20083/what-s-behind-erdogan-s-proposed-safe-zone-for-syrian-refugees>, accessed on 10th October 2019

BBC. (2019) 'Turkey's Syria offensive explained in four maps', BBC.com, available at <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-49973218>, accessed on 14th October 2019

Biggam, J. (2020) 'Succeeding with your master's dissertation', London: Open University Press

Bilgin, P.(2005) 'Turkey's changing security discourses: The challenge of globalisation', European Journal of Political Research, Volume 44, Issue 1, pp. 175–201, available at <http://pbilgin.bilkent.edu.tr/Bilgin-EJPR2005.pdf>

Bechev, D.(2011) 'What does Turkey think?', European Council on Foreign Relations, pp. 2-81, available at https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR35_TURKEY_AW.pdf

Bueno de Mesquita, B, and D. Lalman,D.(1992) War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press

Cebul, M.(2019) 'Operation Peace Spring and U.S Strategy in Syria', Foreign Policy Research Institute, available at <https://www.fpri.org/article/2019/10/operation-peace-spring-and-u-s-strategy-in-syria/>, accessed on 11th October 2019

Dacey, R and Carlson, L.(2004) 'Traditional Decision Analysis and the Poliheuristic Theory of Foreign Policy Decision Making', The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume 48, Issue 1, pp. 38-55, available at <http://www.jstor.com/stable/3176267>

Dalacoura, K. (2017) 'A New Phase in Turkish Foreign Policy: Expediency and AKP Survival', Middle East and North Africa Regional Architecture, Issue 4, pp. 1-6, available at <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/69619/>

Dalay, G. (2019) 'Turkey and Russia are Bitter Frenemies', Foreign Policy, available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/28/turkey-and-russia-are-bitter-frenemies/>, accessed on 29th May 2019

Daily Sabah. (2017) '75 percent of Turkish public supports TurkStream gas pipeline project, new polls say', Daily Sabah, available at

<https://www.dailysabah.com/energy/2017/06/09/75-percent-of-turkish-public-supports-turkstream-gas-pipeline-project-new-polls-say>, accessed on 9th June 2017

Daily Sabah.(2019) ‘Turkey to jointly produce S-500s with Russia after S-400 deal’, Daily Sabah, available at <https://www.dailysabah.com/defense/2019/05/20/turkey-to-jointly-produce-s-500s-with-russia-after-s-400-deal> , accessed on 20 May 2019

Danforth, N. (2008) ‘Ideology and Pragmatism in Turkish Foreign Policy: From Atatürk to the AKP’, Turkish Policy Quarterly, Volume 7, Issue 3, pp. 83-95

Danforth, N. (2020) ‘Turkey’s New Hard Power Foreign Policy’, Center for Global Policy, available at <https://cgpolicy.org/articles/turkeys-new-hard-power-foreign-policy/>, available at <https://cgpolicy.org/articles/turkeys-new-hard-power-foreign-policy/>accessed on 19th February 2020

Davutoğlu, A. (2008) ‘Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007’, Insight Turkey, Volume 10, Issue 1, pp. 77-96, available at <http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/ahmet-davutoglu-turkeys-foreign-policy-vision-an-assessment-of-2007.pdf>

Demir, I. (2017) Overconfidence and Risk Taking in Foreign Policy Decision Making, London: Palgrave Macmillan

Demirtas, S. (2019) ‘Turkey, Russia in intense negotiation over Syria’, Hürriyet Daily News, available at <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/opinion/serkan-demirtas/turkey-russia-in-intense-negotiation-over-syria-143604> , accessed on 22 May 2019

Duran, B. (2020) ‘The sole axis of Turkey’s foreign policy’, SETA , 11 February, available at <https://www.setav.org/en/the-sole-axis-of-turkeys-foreign-policy/>, accessed on 11th February 2020

Duran, H. (2019) ‘How foreign policy became a campaign issue in Turkey's local elections’, TRT World, available at <https://www.trtworld.com/opinion/how-foreign-policy-became-a-campaign-issue-in-turkey-s-local-elections-25236>, accessed on 25th March 2019

Dudovskiy, J. (2018) ‘The Ultimate Guide to Writing a Dissertation in Business Studies: A Step-by-Step Assistance’, available at <https://research-methodology.net/about-us/ebook/>

DW. (2019) ‘Erdogan: Turkey to launch military operation in northeastern Syria’, DW.com, available at <https://www.dw.com/en/erdogan-turkey-to-launch-military-operation-in-northeastern-syria/a-50709086>, accessed on 5th October 2019

Evans, D, Coskun, O and Perry, T. (2019) 'Power shift: Who gains in the battle for Syria's northeast?', Reuters.com, available at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-turkey-usa-power-analy/power-shift-who-gains-in-the-battle-for-syrias-northeast-idUSKBN1WU2K8>, accessed on 15th October 2019

Evans, D and Gumrukcu, T.(2019) 'Explainer: Turkish operation may redraw map of Syrian war once again', Reuters, available at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-turkey-explainer/explainer-turkish-operation-may-redraw-map-of-syrian-war-once-again-idUSKBN1WO1UV>, accessed on 9th October 2019

Fantappie, M.(2012) 'Turkey Eyes Syrian Crisis Through Lens of Kurdish Stability', Carnegie Middle East Center, Available at <https://carnegie-mec.org/2012/03/23/turkey-eyes-syrian-crisis-through-lens-of-kurdish-stability-pub-47626>, accessed on 23 March 2012

Furuncu, Y. (2020) 'Analysis: The New Dimension of the Turkey-Russia Energy Cooperation TurkStream', SETA, available at <https://www.setav.org/en/analysis-the-new-dimension-of-the-turkey-russia-energy-cooperation-turkstream/> , accessed on 15th January 2020

Görener, A.Ş and Ucal, M. (2011) 'The Personality and Leadership Style of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: Implications for Turkish Foreign Policy', Turkish Studies, Volume 12, Issue 3, pp.357-381, available at <https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2011.604216>

Gozen, P.(2017) 'The Role of Energy Security in Turkish Foreign Policy (2004-2016)' in Pinar Gozen Turkish Foreign Policy: International Relations, Legality and Global Reach, United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan

Guler, S and Bayar, G. (2020) 'Analysis- TurkStream to strengthen Turkey's energy hub position', Anadolu Agency, available at <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/energy/general/analysis-turkstream-to-strengthen-turkey-s-energy-hub-position/28000>, accessed on 8th January 2020

Gunasena, T.S. (2013) 'Neorealism verses Two Level Game Theory in explaining Sri Lanka's Foreign Policy Responses toward the external compulsions (1993 to 2005)', Humanities and Social Sciences Review, Volume 2, Issue 4, pp.217–233, available at <http://universitypublications.net/hssr/0204/html/T3N160.xml>

Gurcan, M. (2019) 'A post-mortem of Turkey's Operation Peace Spring', Al-Monitor, available at <https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/10/turkey-united-states-russia-syria-postmortem-of-operation.html>, accessed on 25th October 2019

Hagan, J and Hermann, M. (1998) 'International Decision Making: Leadership Matters', Foreign Policy, Issue 110, pp.124-137, available at <http://www.jstor.com/stable/1149281>

Han, A. (2010) 'From "Strategic Partnership to 'Model Partnership: AKP, Turkish-US Relations and the Prospects under Obama, UNISCI Discussion Papers, Issue 23, pp.77-112, available at <http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=76715004006>

Has, K. (2019) 'Turkey, Russia, and the Looming S-400 Crisis', Middle East Institute, available at <https://www.mei.edu/publications/turkey-russia-and-loomng-s-400-crisis> accessed on 10th July 2019

Hatipoglu, E and Palmer, G. (2016) 'Contextualizing change in Turkish foreign policy: the promise of the 'two-good' theory', Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Volume 29, Issue 1, pp. 231-250, available at <https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2014.888538>

Haugom, L. (2019) 'Turkish foreign policy under Erdogan: A change in international orientation?', Comparative Strategy, Volume 38, Issue 3, pp.206-223, available at <https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2019.1606662>

Heldt, E and Mello, P (2017) 'Two-Level Games in Foreign Policy Analysis' in Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.1-31

Hermann, C. (1992) 'Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy', International Studies Quarterly, Volume, 34, Issue 1 p. 1-20, available at <http://www.jstor.com/stable/2600403>

Hermann, M and Hagan, J. (1998). 'International Decision Making: Leadership Matters', Foreign Policy, Issue 110, pp.124-137, available at [10.2307/1149281](http://www.jstor.com/stable/10.2307/1149281)

Hermann, M. (2001) 'How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework', International Studies Review, Volume 3, Issue 2, pp.47-81, available at <http://www.jstor.com/stable/3186565>

Hill, F and Taspinar, O. (2006) 'Turkey and Russia: Axis of the excluded?', Global Politics and Strategy, Volume 48, Issue 1, pp.81-92, available at <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396330600594256>

Hindmoor, A. (2006) 'Rational Choice Explanation' in Hindmoor, A Rational choice, New York: Palgrave Macmillan

Hoffman, M. (2019) 'The State of the Turkish-Kurdish Conflict', Center for American Progress, available at <https://www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/foreign-policy/policy-report/2019/07/10/the-state-of-the-turkish-kurdish-conflict/>

<https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2019/08/12/473508/state-turkish-kurdish-conflict/>, accessed on 12th August 2019

Hudson, V.(2005) 'Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations', Foreign Policy Analysis, Volume 1, Issue, 1, pp.1-30 Available at 10.1111/j.1743-8594.2005.00001.x

Hurriyet Daily News. (2019) 'Main opposition CHP slams gov't operation plans in N. Syria', Hurriyet Daily News, available at <https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/main-opposition-chp-slams-govt-operation-in-n-syria-147232>, accessed on 7th October 2019

Hurriyet Daily News. (2019) 'Government caused world to take position against Turkey: Main opposition leader', Hurriyet Daily News, available at <https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/government-caused-world-to-take-position-against-turkey-main-opposition-leader-147539>, accessed on 15th October 2019

Hurriyet daily news.(2019) 'Russia says no delay in S-400 delivery to Turkey' Hurriyet daily news, available at <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/russia-says-no-delay-in-s-400-delivery-to-turkey-143804>, accessed on 29th May 2019

Jirušek, M. (2020) 'TurkStream is South Stream 2.0—has the EU done its homework this time?', Atlantic Council, available at <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/turkstream-is-south-stream-2-0-has-the-eu-done-its-homework-this-time/>, accessed on 19th February 2020

Kara, M and Sözen, A. (2016) 'Change and Continuity in Turkish Foreign Policy: Evaluating Pre-AKP and AKP Periods' National Role Conceptions', Uluslararası İlişkiler, Volume 13, Issue 52, pp. 47-66, available at <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26406827>

Kasapoglu, C. (2019) 'Turkey-Syria offensive: Turks embrace nationalist mood'. BBC.com, available at <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50053526>, accessed on 15th October 2019

Kirişçi, K. (2009) 'The transformation of Turkish foreign policy: The rise of the trading state', New Perspectives on Turkey, Volume 40, pp.29-57, available at <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0896634600005203>

Kirişçi, K. (2006) 'Turkey's foreign policy in turbulent times', Institute for Security Studies, Issue 92, pp. 5-87, available at <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/turkeys-foreign-policy-turbulent-times>

Kırıřcı, K and Toygür, I. (2019) 'Turkey's New Presidential System and a Changing West: New Presidential System and a changing West: Implications

- for Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkey-West Relations', Brookings Foreign Policy, pp.1-22. Available at https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/20190111_turkey_presidential_system.pdf
- Kitchen, M. (2011) 'LSE IDEAS Turkey's Global Strategy', LSE Ideas, pp.2-45, available at LSE IDEAS Turkey's Global Strategy', LSE Ideas, pp.2-45 , available at <http://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/reports/LSE-IDEAS-Turkeys-Global-Strategy.pdf>
- Koru, S.(2019) 'In Turkey, Erdogan Is Still Calling All the Shots', Foreign Policy, available at <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/29/in-turkey-erdogan-is-still-calling-all-the-shots-bahceli-mhp-akp/> accessed on 29th April 2019
- Köstem, S.(2016) 'When Can Idea Entrepreneurs Influence Foreign Policy? Explaining the Rise of the "Turkic World" in Turkish Foreign Policy', Foreign Policy Analysis, Volume 13, Issue 3, pp. 722–740, available at <https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orw016>
- Kürşad, T. (2012) 'Syrian Crisis as a Reversed Two-Level Game', Ortadoğu Etütleri, Volume 4, Issue 1, pp.53-78, available at https://orsam.org.tr/d_hbanaliz/KursadTURAN.pdf
- Klotz, A. (1998) Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid, USA: Cornell University Press, p.32
- Knopf, J. (1993) 'Beyond Two-Level Games: Domestic-International Interaction in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Negotiations', The MIT Press, Volume 47, Issue 4, pp. 599-628, available at <http://www.jstor.com/stable/2706940>
- Lindenstrauss, G and Shavit, E.(2019) 'Turkey's Offensive in Northeastern Syria: The Expected, the Surprising, and the Still Unknown', INSS Insight, available at <https://www.inss.org.il/publication/turkeys-offensive-in-northeastern-syria-the-expected-the-surprising-and-the-still-unknown/> , accessed on 13th October 2019
- Liu, X.(2006) Modeling Bilateral International Relations: The Case of U.S.-China Interactions, USA:Palgrave Macmillan US
- Mankoff, J.(2009) 'Eurasian Energy Security', Council on Foreign Relations, Issue 43, pp 3-40, available at <https://www.cfr.org/report/eurasian-energy-security>
- Martin, L. and Keridis, D.(2004) The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Cambridge: MA: MIT Press

- Marcus, J.(2019) ‘What Turkey's S-400 missile deal with Russia means for Nato’, BBC, available at <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-48620087>, accessed on 13th June 2019
- Masumova, N.(2018) ‘Russia and Turkey: Resetting Economic Partnership’, Perceptions, Volume 23, Issue 2, p.33-50, available at <http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/sf-33-50.pdf>
- Mills, C. (2019) ‘Operation Peace Spring: A Timeline’, Geopolitical Monitor. Available at <https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/operation-peace-spring-a-timeline/>, accessed on 18th October 2019
- Mintz, A. (1993) ‘The Decision to Attack Iraq: A Noncompensatory Theory of Decision Making’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume 37, Issue 4, pp. 595-618, available at <http://www.jstor.com/stable/174541>
- Mintz, A.(1995) ‘The "noncompensatory principle" of coalition formation’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Volume 7, Issue 3, pp. 335-349, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3512063
- Mintz, A. (2004) ‘How Do Leaders Make Decisions?: A Poliheuristic Perspective’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume 48, Issue 1, pp.3-13, available at <http://www.jstor.com/stable/3176265>
- Mintz, A. (2005) ‘Applied Decision Analysis: Utilizing Poliheuristic Theory to Explain and Predict Foreign Policy and National Security Decisions’, International Studies Perspectives Volume 6, pp. 94–98, available at <https://academic.oup.com/isp/article-abstract/6/1/94/1811314>
- Mintz, A and Geva, N (1997) Decisionmaking on War and Peace: The Cognitive-Rational Debate, Boulder,CO :Lynne Rienner, pp.81-101
- Mintz, A and DeRouen, K.(2010) Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Mendez, A. (2017) Colombian agency and the making of US foreign policy: Intervention by invitation, New York, NY: Routledge.
- Mesly, O. (2015) Creating models in psychological research, United States of America: Springer International Publishing
- Moravcsik, A. (1993) ‘Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining’ in Evans et al Double-Edged Diplomacy International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, USA: University of California Press, LTD
- Neset, S and Strand, A. (2019) ‘Turkish foreign policy: structures and decision-making processes. CHR. Michelsen Institute, Issue,3, available at

<https://www.cmi.no/publications/6854-turkish-foreign-policy-structures-and-decision-making-processes#author-details>

Öniş, Z. (2003) 'Domestic Politics, International Norms and Challenges to the State: Turkey-EU Relations in the post-Helsinki Era', Turkish Studies, Volume 4, Issue 1, pp.9-34, available at <https://doi.org/10.1080/714005718>

Öniş, Z. (2003) 'Turkey and the Middle East After September 11: The Importance of the EU Dimension', Turkish Policy Quarterly, Volume 2, Issue 4, pp.1-9, available at <http://turkishpolicy.com/article/72/turkey-and-the-middle-east-after-september-11-the-importance-of-the-eu-dimension-winter-2003>

Öniş, Z. (2009) 'The New Wave of Foreign Policy Activism in Turkey', Danish Institute for International Studies, Issue 5, pp. 5-40, available at <https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/59827/1/593490118.pdf>

Öniş, Z. (2011). 'Multiple Faces of the "New" Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and a Critique', Insight Turkey, Volume 13, Issue 1, pp.47-65, available at <https://www.insightturkey.com/articles/multiple-faces-of-the-new-turkish-foreign-policy-underlying-dynamics-and-a-critique>

Öniş, Z and Yilmaz, Ş.(2015) 'Turkey and Russia in a shifting global order: cooperation, conflict and asymmetric interdependence in a turbulent region', Third World Quarterly, Volume 37, Issue 1, pp.71-95, available at <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1086638>

Özcan, M and Usul, A.R (2011). 'Understanding The 'New' Turkish Foreign Policy: Changes Within Continuity, Is Turkey Departing From The West?', USAK Yearbook of Politics and International Relations, Volume 4, pp. 159-185, available at <https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/rinlp6&div=10&id=&page=>

Özdal, H, Selim, H.Ö Kerim, H and Demirtepe, T. (2013) 'Turkey-Russia Relations in the Post-Cold War Era: Current Dynamics, Future Prospects', USAK Center for Eurasian Studies, Issue 13-06, pp.7-67, available at https://www.academia.edu/29170629/Turkish-Russian_Relations_in_The_Post-Cold_War_Period_Current_Dynamics_Future_Prospects

Özdemirkıran, M (2015) 'Soft power and the challenges of private actors: Turkey - Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) relations and the rising role of businessmen in Turkish Foreign Policy', European Journal of Turkish Studies, Issue 21, pp. 1-21, available at <https://doi.org/10.4000/ejts.5268>

Oppermann, K.(2014) ‘Delineating the Scope Conditions of the Poliheuristic Theory of Foreign Policy Decision Making: The Noncompensatory Principle and the Domestic Salience of Foreign Policy’, Foreign Policy Analysis, Volume 10, Issue 1, pp. 23–41, available at <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1743-8594.2012.00182.x>

Oppermann, K. (2018) ‘Poliheuristic Theory of Decision-Making’, Oxford Bibliographies, available at <https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199743292/obo-9780199743292-0238.xml> accessed on 24th July 2018

Ozel, V.(2019), ‘Understanding the S-400 crisis’, Al Jazeera, available at <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/understanding-400-crisis-190801201222608.html>, accessed on 5th August 2019

Peterson, M. (2009) An introduction to decision theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pew Research Center.(2014) ‘Turks Divided on Erdogan and the Country’s Direction’, Pew Research Center, 30 July, available at <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2014/07/30/turks-divided-on-erdogan-and-the-countrys-direction/>, accessed on 30th July 2014

Pierce, R. (2008) ‘Collecting Data Sets: Case Studies, Experimental, Comparative, Longitudinal and Action Research Methods’, in R. Pierce (2008) (ed). Research Methods in Politics, London: SAGE Publications Ltd

Pierini, M.(2020) 'Emerging From the Pandemic, Turkey Rolls Out a More Assertive Foreign Policy', Carnegie Europe, available at <https://carnegieeurope.eu/2020/06/03/emerging-from-pandemic-turkey-rolls-out-more-assertive-foreign-policy-pub-81963>, accessed on 3rd June 2020

Putnam, R. (1988) ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, Volume 42, Issue 3, pp.427-460, available at <http://www.jstor.com/stable/2706785>

Reuters. (2019) ‘Turkey says S-400 purchase from Russia a 'done deal,' cannot be cancelled’, Reuters, available at <https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-turkey-security-usa/turkey-says-s-400-purchase-from-russia-a-done-deal-cannot-be-cancelled-idUKKCN1RG2MB?il=0> , accessed on 4th April 2019

Robins, P. (2013) 'Turkey's 'double gravity' predicament: the foreign policy of a newly activist power', International Affairs, Volume 89, Issue 2, pp. 381–397, available at <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12023>

Sandal, N.A, Zhang, E, James, C.C and James, P.(2011) 'Poliheuristic Theory and Crisis Decision Making: A Comparative Analysis of Turkey with China', Canadian Journal of Political Science, Volume 44, Issue 1, pp. 27-57, available at <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423910001083>

Selçuki, C. (2019) 'How has the operation in Syria affected domestic Turkish politics?', Duvar.English, 15 November, available at <https://www.duvarenglish.com/columns/2019/11/15/how-has-the-operation-in-syria-affected-domestic-turkish-politics/>

Şengül, E.(2017) 'Turkish public support for TurkStream rises to 75 pct', Anadolu Agency, available at <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/economy/turkish-public-support-for-turkstream-rises-to-75-pct/838074>, accessed on 9th June 2017

Sezal, M. (2015) 'Transformation of Turkey's Foreign Policy: Original Discourses or Religious Idealism?', available at https://www.psa.ac.uk/sites/default/files/conference/papers/2015/Sezal-PSA2015-Transformation%20of%20Turkey%E2%80%99s%20Foreign%20Policy_0.pdf

Seufert, G. (2020) 'Turkey Shifts the Focus of Its Foreign Policy', German Institute for International and Security Affairs, available at <https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2020C06/>, accessed on 6th February 2020

Schmitt, E, Haberman, M and Wong, E. (2019) 'President Endorses Turkish Military Operation in Syria, Shifting U.S. Policy', The New York Times, available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/07/us/politics/trump-turkey-syria.html>, accessed on 7th October. 2019

Shlykov, P. (2018) 'Russian-Turkish Relations in the Wider Black Sea Region: Cooperation and Competition', Perceptions, Volume 23, Issue 2, pp. 93-116, available at <http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/sf-93-116.pdf>

Smith, S.(2019) 'Turkey launches military operation in Northeastern Syria after U.S withdraws', NBC News, available at <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/turkey-launches-operation-syria-3-days-after-trump-announces-u-n1063576>, accessed on 9th October 2019

Stein, A.(2018) 'The new Turkey: Making sense of Turkish decision-making', Atlantic Council, available at <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth->

research-reports/issue-brief/the-new-turkey-making-sense-of-turkish-decision-making/, accessed on 18th April 2018

Stein, A. (2019) 'The Crisis is coming: Syria and the End of the U.S-Turkish alliance', War on the Rocks, available at <https://warontherocks.com/2019/08/the-crisis-is-coming-syria-and-the-end-of-the-u-s-turkish-alliance/> , accessed on 5th August 2019

Stern, E. (2004) 'Contextualizing and Critiquing the Poliheuristic Theory', The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume 48, Issue 1, pp.105-126, available at <http://www.jstor.com/stable/3176271>

Strong, J. (2017) 'Two-level games beyond the United States: international indexing in Britain during the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya', Global Society, Volume 31, Issue 2, pp. 293-313, available at <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/68576>

Svarin, D.(2015) 'Towards a Eurasian axis? Russia and Turkey between cooperation and competition', Global Affairs, Volume 1, Issue 4-5, pp.381-398, available at <https://doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2015.1117250>

Todman, W.(2019) 'The Implications of a Turkish Intervention in Northeastern Syria', Center for Strategic and International Studies, available at <https://www.csis.org/analysis/implications-turkish-intervention-northeastern-syria>, accessed on 7th October 2019

Turan, I. (2011) 'Turkish Foreign Policy: Interplay between the Domestic and External', Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, available at <https://carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/21/turkish-foreign-policy-interplay-between-domestic-and-external-pub-45584>, accessed on 21st September 2011

Turan, K. (2012). 'Changes in Turkish Foreign Policy: A Shift or a Passing Interest?', Akademik Bakış, Volume 65, Issue 6, pp.1-20, available at <https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/73896>

Turkey. (2007) 'Defense White Paper of Turkey for 2007', available at https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/154908/Turkey_makale%204.pdf

Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2019) 'Press Release Regarding The Resolution Adopted At The European Parliament On The Operation Peace Spring' 24 October, available at <http://helsinki.emb.mfa.gov.tr/Mission/ShowAnnouncement/363867>

Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2019) 'No: 309, 24 October 2019, Press Release Regarding the Resolution Adopted at the European Parliament on the Operation Peace Spring', available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_309_-ap-de-kabul-edilen-karar-hk.en.mfa

Ülgül, M. (2017) 'Continuity or Change in Turkish Foreign Policy? Analyzing the Policy Fluctuations during the Justice and Development Party Era', Journal of Global Analysis, Volume 7, Issue 1, pp.59-81, available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/337495364_Continuity_or_Change_in_Turkish_Foreign_Policy_Analyzing_the_Policy_Fluctuations_during_the_Justice_and_Development_Party_Era

Walker, J. (2007) 'Learning Strategic Depth: Implications of Turkey's New Foreign Policy Doctrine', Insight Turkey, Volume 9, Issue 3, pp.32-47, available at <http://www.jstor.com/stable/26328891>

Waltz, K. (1959). Man, the state and war: a theoretical analysis, New York: Columbia University Press.

Wei, M. (2019) 'Turkish Foreign Policy Towards the Syrian Crisis: Dynamics of Transformation', Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, Volume 13, Issue 3, pp.462-477, available at <https://doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2019.1630573>

Whitmore, B.(2020) 'A Limited Partnership:Four Things we need to understand about the Russian-Turkish Relationship', Center for European Policy Analysis, available at <https://www.cepa.org/a-limited-partnership>, available at on 11th March 2020

Wilks, A. (2019) 'Turkish public, politicians voice support for Syria military push.' Al Jazeera, available at <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/turkish-public-politicians-voice-support-syria-military-push-191010135034852.html>, accessed on 10 October 2019

Yılmaz, S and Özdemir, O. (2017) 'A More Active Foreign Policy : Domestic Factors of Turkey's Middle East Policy during Second Tenure of the Justice and Development Party, Journal of Management and Economics Research, Volume 15, Issue 3, pp. 1-25, available at <http://dx.doi.org/10.11611/yead.321472>

Yeşiltaş, M and Balcı, A. 'A Dictionary of Turkish Foreign Policy in the AK Party Era: A Conceptual Map', Center of Strategic Research, Issue 7, pp.12-24, available at <https://sam.gov.tr/a-dictionary-of-turkish-foreign-policy-in-the-ak-party-era-a-conceptual-map/>

Yeşiltaş, M, Merve, S and Aslan,M. (2017) 'Turkey's National Security Architecture post April 16 Referendum: Consolidating the Pillars', Issue 26, pp.1-5, available at <https://www.setav.org/en/turkeys-national-security-architecture-post-april-16-referendum-consolidating-the-pillars/>

