

The work compares Wittgenstein with Husserl and Heidegger (or more generally: analytical and continental philosophy), but its character is rather systematic, as it treats the question of the relation among language, intersubjectivity and individuality. Husserl and Wittgenstein show that our experience of the world (world as we know it) is always our experience of the world (“the world as it is for us”), that this experience is essentially intersubjective, and that intersubjectivity is essentially linguistic. The shape of the experience of the world is not arbitrary, but it cannot be based “realistically” on the “objective” world, at most it can be founded “from inside”, pragmatically. The primarily pragmatic nature of our experience allows its variation (a plausible form of relativism), and on the other hand it makes it problematic to try to set the purpose of the experience beyond its limits (an absolute teleology of history). It is also shown that Husserl’s conception, setting the non-linguistic life of the consciousness “before” language and individual subjectivity “before” intersubjectivity, faces certain problems, or that we cannot conceive phenomena of thought (psychic life) and individuality, as we usually understand them, this way. Heidegger agrees with Wittgenstein in the point that language is understood as unbreakable limit for our experience of the world – language is the medium in which the sense of the world, into which we were born, is given to us, and it transcends us in a normative sense. Any knowledge of the world unconceived (inconceivable) by language is accessible to us only indirectly, from inside of language, through limit phenomena, i.e. failing of its expressive ability. ...