

Příloha č. 1

On the Brink of the Expressible.

Adolf Portmann meets Carl Gustav Jung at Eranos Ground¹

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Abstract: The article focuses on Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961) and Adolf Portmann (1897-1982), two prominent figures of an intellectual discussion club called Eranos. I will outline how the nature of the Eranos platform has broadened from humanistic and religious studies introduced by its “Spitirus Rector” Jung and incorporated also natural sciences and adopted more scientific approach in the process. This historical shift begun with an arrival of the aforementioned Portmann in 1946 and resulted in his appointment as a chairman of the group (1962-1977). Portmann and Jung has been prominent figures in their respective disciplines and their theories became subject of a mutual criticism on Eranos ground. The aim of my article is to describe the relation between Jung and Portmann from different perspectives, mainly thorough their discussion about the subject of archetype and its relation to the instinct. The article also indicates how the Eranos spirit shifted under the influence of Portmann.

On the Swiss border with Italy, around Lago Maggiore Lake, the Via Moscia runs from Ascona town. Right before one of its bends, where nobody expects anything but palms and pine-trees between the road and the river, a stone stairway descends deep to Casa Gabriella. This three storey villa belongs to Eranos, an organization that became a meeting point of some of the world’s most prominent thinkers. In this article we briefly overview the history of Eranos and demonstrate how its peculiar spirit reflected in the work of Adolf Portmann. We will see how Portmann’s appreciation of a larger context when studying the animal and human led to discussions with another notable Eranos member; Carl Gustav Jung.²The

¹ The text was created with support of The Czech Science Foundation (GA ČR) Adolf Portmann: a pioneer of the eidetic and semiotic approach in the philosophy of the life sciences, n. 19-11571S and GA UK n. 1160119.

² Although Portmann and Jung met for the first time on Eranos ground, as young men they both studied under the professor Heinrich Zschokke (1860-1936) at University of Basel. Both have been witnessing during the lectures very convincing demonstrations about layers of organism’s evolution and those inevitably influenced Jung’s own thoughts about possible nature of collective unconscious as a layered experience of human species “with remnants of phylogenetic functions of perception and adaptation” (Jung 1916 appendix). As Portmann

subject that became the centre of their intellectual exchange was archetypes and instincts, and we show how both scholars clashed in their approach. We also show how despite the confrontation, both thinkers shared fundamental similarities; in placing the particular knowledge into a more general, humanized context and reaching the very limits of their respective disciplines, and even language itself in the process.

The Evolution of Eranos

From its very beginning the Eranos gathering was conceived by its founders as a forum for the interchange between Eastern and Western religion and spirituality. Its general idea was to bridge cultures, epochs and disciplines not only by an intellectual understanding but also, as one of its participants puts it “a knowing through direct experience... the continuing juxtaposition of the primordial and the modern, the individual and the universal, the scientific and the mythological” (Progoff 1966, 312). Carl Gustav Jung, who shaped early Eranos dramatically, described it as “... the only place in Europe where scholars and interested lay participants could come together and exchange ideas, unrestricted by academic boundaries” (Hakl 2013, 7). It was also the place where Jung and Adolf Portmann engaged in an intense intellectual exchange.

The idea of Eranos originated in German city of Marburg in 1932 by patron, scholar and esotericist Olga Fröbe-Kapteyn³(1881-1962) and Rudolf Otto (1869-

recalls later in an article that he is convinced that these images of hidden reality in the context of human species must have fascinated Jung (Portmann 1976).

³Olga Frobe-Kapteyn (1881- 1962) Born in London of Dutch parents, her father Albert Kapteyn, was a photographer and her mother was a philosophical anarchist, a writer on social questions, and a friend of playwright George Bernard Shaw and anarchist Peter Kropotkin. Olga Frobe-Kapteyn studied applied art in Zurich, but her great interest was spiritual research. She had a lively interest in searching for and collecting artefacts which she used to illustrate the topics of each year's of Eranos meetings. In 1935, she systematically began to collect pictures that exemplified archetypal themes. She traveled around Europe trying to find and purchase photographs of ancient frescoes, paintings, sculptures, manuscripts illustrations and primitive folk art. She then classified them according archetypal themes in what became known as the “Eranos Archive”, After the war, in 1946, she started to send her photographs to London, and in 1956 the Warburg Institute accepted her entire collection. In 1960, the archive was

1937), the theologian, philosopher, and comparative religionist. It was Otto, who gave Eranos its name, “ἔρανος” meaning “a shared feast” in Greek, to which every attendant brings a small gift (Kerenyi 1955). For the Eranos gatherings, this gift took the shape of a lecture, the main goal of which was to bring together intellectuals from various areas contemplating the importance of spirituality in human culture and to establish a common ground on which the religious philosophies of the Orient and Western civilization could meet (Progoff 1966).

The very first symposium took place a year after Fröbe-Kapteyn and Otto met, in 1933 under the title *Yoga and Meditation in East and West*. Lectures included *Meditation and Contemplation in the Roman Catholic Church* by Ernesto Buonaiuti, *On the Meaning of Indian Tantra Yoga* by Heinrich Zimmer, *The Contemplation in Christian Mysticism* by Friedrich Heiler, and *A Study in the Process of Individuation* by Carl Gustav Jung.

This annual lecture program called “Eranos meetings” (*Eranos Tagungen*) continued with different topics for another 66 years. Jung himself gave 14 lectures between 1933 and 1951 (Vitolo 2015). Every conference usually lasted for a week during which an open discussion between participants took place. Lectures were later published in the Eranos Yearbook (*Eranos Jahrbuch*), published by Olga Fröbe-Kapteyn from 1933 to 1961 – the year before her death. Six volumes of selected Eranos lectures, translated into English and edited by Joseph Campbell, were published between 1954 and 1968 as part of the Bollingen series (Gronning et al. 2007, 248).

Jung and Portmann were not the only notable names among Eranos members. The circle was joined also by Gershom Scholem (Jewish mysticism), Gilles Quispel (Gnostic studies), Henry Corbin (Islamic religion), Mircea Eliade (history of religion), Erwin Schrödinger (physics), Heinrich Zimmer (Indian religious art), Max Knoll (physics), Herbert Read (art historian), Joseph Campbell (comparative mythology) or Erich Neumann (analytical psychology), to name a few.

But despite the abundant presence of prominent intellectuals, Eranos never gained wider recognition. As Thomas Hakl argued, esoteric motives discussed during these symposiums and their pronounced sympathy to esotericism and

renamed the Archive for Research in Archetypal Symbolism (ARAS) and consist of more than 25 000 representations (Gronning et al. 2007).

mysticism led the outside scientific community to accuse the meetings of irrationalism (Wasserstrom 1999; Noll 1994). Indeed it is hard to position Eranos on an intellectual map as it found itself in a certain border zone between esotericism and science (Miller 2006). Many of its participants were adventurous in their respective disciplines and were even labeled as “*an avantgarde in the field*” (Hillman & Shamdasani 2013, 146), but one facet of the Eranos spirit is particularity interesting to this day. This is the joint effort of different personalities to reach the limits of scientific knowledge and to respect the fact that what lies beyond our capacity of articulation is as equally real as any scientifically accessible actuality. Portmann expressed this in his speech dedicated to the 80th birthday of Fröbe-Kapteyn in October 1961:

“Our thoughts aim to explore the hidden origins from which all the greatness arises. All origins are hidden in obscurity. To conceive a mystery of living spirit with a vigilant mind, to express what is expressible and at the same time an awareness of the inexpressible is always present in the work of Eranos” (Portmann 1974, 226).

And it was in this spirit, through Eranos, that Portmann and Jung tried to formulate their complex biological and psychological theories with respect to the inscrutable background transcending any discipline.

The Change of the Guard

For two decades since its foundation, Jung had a major impact on the Eranos spirit. Jung’s approach was adopted by Fröbe-Kapteyn herself (Portmann 1974, 224). Jung was considered a “spiritus rector” as denoted by Eliade, and a “volcano, which brings to light a mysterious rock from the core of the Earth, an exceptional material, which can be treated only by a volcanologue” (Portmann 1974, 226–227). And although the symposiums were not “Jungian”, their core subjects were archetypes, the collective unconscious and its subsequent topics treated from various perspectives (Gronning et al. 2007, 248; Franz 1972, 156; Progoff 1966, 310).

For Jung the Eranos meetings were a testing ground for his individual thought processes, offering the opportunity for discussions with other creative

thinkers. He presented his concept of individuation at Eranos in 1933, and on the next Eranos symposium he outlined his concept of archetype.⁴

In 1946, 13 years after C. G. Jung's first Eranos appearance, the Eranos circle was joined by a Swiss biologist, Adolf Portmann, who greatly influenced the future direction of the meetings. Not only was Portmann an academic but he was also known as a public intellectual. He gained notoriety with his radio shows, newspaper articles and public lectures which he used as a tool to introduce science to the general public. It was for him also an opportunity to agitate against political materialism and social Darwinism (Rieppel 2016, 100).

Adolf Portmann was also occupied by the idea of the unity of living organisms in both a psycho-biological sense and in relation to its environment. His lectures caught Fröbe-Kapteyn's attention (Ritsema 1982) and she encouraged him to visit the Eranos meetings. On the one hand Portmann perceived the invitation as an opportunity to enrich discussion and perception of complex topics, appreciating Eranos ethos of not being limited to a particular science discipline, but on the other hand he also saw a need to introduce modern scientific approaches into the Eranos debates. That is why his introduction in 1946 signified a major turnaround in the spirit and content of Eranos. The title of Portmann's first Eranos meeting was *Spirit and Nature* (Geist und Natur) and it was for the first time that natural scientists were also invited.

The aim of the first Eranos symposium which Portmann attended was to inspect the boundaries between the natural sciences and humanities. Jung spoke about *The Spirit of Psychology* while a Nobel prize holder Erwin Schrödinger about *The Spirit of Science*. The field of biology was represented by Portmann whose first Eranos lecture held the title *Biology and the Phenomenon of the Spiritual* (Die Biologie und das Phänomen des Geistigen, 1946). From that moment, Portmann never missed a single meeting and held more than 30 lectures – more than any other speaker before him. His lectures are available in Eranos journals, most of them was also published by himself in the book *Biology and Spirit* (Biologie und Geist, 1956)

⁴ Jung's last lecture at Eranos, called *Man and time* (1951) was another example of his use of the meetings to test ideas. He called his lecture *On Synchronicity* (Über Synchronizität), and it was a frontier subject between psychology and physics. Jung was undecided whether to present it at all and had to be encouraged by Wolfgang Pauli who studied the phenomena from the perspective of quantum mechanics (Gieser 2005).

and *Outbreak of Life Science* (Aufbruch der Lebensforschung, 1965). Portmann's friendship with Fröbe-Kapteyn deepened and eventually she entrusted him with the Eranos chairmanship. Portmann maintained this role for 15 years (1962–1977), partially with help of Dutch sinologue Rudolf Ritsema and his wife Catherine. Ritsema also chaired Eranos after Portmann's death (Ritsema 1982).

“The Original World Experience”

With the accord of Fröbe-Kapteyn, Portmann and other scientists eventually shifted the original Eranos spirit established by Jung. A thin red line of East-West spirituality⁵ which ran through Eranos meetings for more than a decade was replaced by particular subjects of natural science, culture critique, sociology and theology. However, Portmann did not just negate the original conception of the symposium but displayed a candid interest in it. His aim, similarly to Jung and other Eranos members was to place the empiric knowledge into a wider frame. As he drew from a tradition of the idealist morphology, he transcended the boundaries of his discipline for the sake of multidisciplinary dialogue. He opposed the instrumentalization of the science in the attempt to dominate nature and to engineer life. His deep appreciation for art infused his approach to biology (Rieppel 2016), understanding biology as a research of life, a notion which he argued is ungraspable by purely scientific methods. He saw this was the case not only because of the obscurity of the concept of life and the currently insufficient level of knowledge, but also by its complexity:

“Life is more complex than science that pursue its exploration. Reality which encompasses us and which we are part of, is bigger than what is possible in a specific time to discover with a method of research. Boundaries which are given by these actualities, does not mean a barbed wire or less treacherous obstacle but a researcher knows about them.

And who senses the boundary, will try to determine what is scientifically expressible with greater vigilance – but also, he will understand, that human with power of his spirit strives for bigger picture about his being in the world. Who stands at frontier, is also looking across barriers to the different land” (Portmann by Illies 1981, 223).

For Portmann strict analytical reason should be enriched by other modes of thinking, thus making a researcher better suited to perceive highly complex

⁵ As once Portmann's biographer wrote ironically: “Portmann and Eastern mysticism, that is not a rational connection, that is at most karmic sympathy!” (Illies 1981, 232).

subjects. He explained that Eranos was a place where he could experience this way of thinking:

“My biological work has given me a strong sense of our original world experience. The Eranos meetings made the confrontation with archaic thinking particularly impressive, it was truly the central point of our work” (Portmann 1974, 225).

To grasp the atmosphere built around Eranos by its “spiritus rector” Carl Gustav Jung —something that Portmann explicitly appreciated— we might consider Jung’s *Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious* (1934/1959) where he analyses the difference between the mind of primitive and modern man. The former has an “irresistible urge” to assimilate outer experiences into inner psychic events, hence conceiving any natural happening as a mythological story, while the latter is able to detach itself to some extent from outer objects (Jung 1934, 6).

According to Jung, what really changed in human history was not the nature of unconscious — that would contradict Jung’s definition — but the rise of conscious. The unconscious will always require us to assimilate on-coming experiences, and by doing so we gradually discover our position in the world and establish a relative balance between our psychological components. This is the cornerstone of the individuation process, the ultimate goal of Jungian psychoanalysis. “The original state of unconsciousness” equates Jung in his *Symbols of Transformation* (1952) to “containment in the primal mother”, the containment which has been *sacrificed* (Jung’s own term) by becoming conscious (Jung CW 5, §652). From this perspective we can better understand Jung’s most general statement: “the collective unconscious is an image of the world,”⁶ or as I would rather reformulate for purposes of this article “a totality of our connections to the world” – a definition which, to my best knowledge, would “survive” all the Jung’s variations in his Collected Works.

Awareness of our connection into a larger whole which is continuous, potentially infinite and only very marginally illuminated by consciousness, that is the archaic mode of thinking rediscovered by modern humans and promoted by Jung during Eranos lectures and although Portmann was critical to some moments

⁶ The phrase continues: “the collective unconscious is an image of the world that has taken aeons to form. In this image certain features, the archetypes or dominants, have crystallized out in the course of time. They are the ruling powers” (Jung CW 7, § 151).

of Jung's thoughts, as we will see later, he himself recognized a role of archaic thinking in the work of a scientist:

“In the moment when our dreaming overcomes all possibility of reason, the imagination assumes its original role which is to *integrate us into a larger whole*, something larger than a world of elementary functions of survival. And in those moments the imagination prompts thinker to draw a big words like *Élan vital* and allows him to realize his deeds and creations... When reason is not fruitful anymore, where rational theories can not illuminate anything, in a dreaming we glimpse a big images of “Nature”, “Big Mother The Creator”, “Magna Mater”, an ancient image of maternal abyss, the uterus and origin of all things” (Portmann 1950b, 202).

Portmann's description of an integration into a larger whole was not just a momentary poetic vision but a serious philosophical question linked to various aspects of his biological work, most notably to his inquiry into biological epistemology and his concept of living forms. We encounter them across his rich lecture and publication activities; in his Eranos lectures and most densely formulated in his *New Paths in Biology* (1964). There he claims that all fundamental biological questions lead us beyond the limits of scientific statements. Life always means something more than what a given era with its scientific methods can testify, and if we want to explain the most characteristic processes of life we reach a paradox that “Life is older than a living matter⁷” (Portmann 1964, 8).

If we move our attention from the general notion of life to concrete living beings we encounter the problem of wholeness again. An individual, either animal or human, is indivisible and non-reducible to its parts⁸. It relates itself to the world and creates and preserves its own inner world. It is only in these ways that it is genuine and complete (Portmann 1964, 10). For Portmann, every life form is an immense reality which does not contradict a rational analysis, though it is not

⁷ Portmann refers here to John Desmond Bernal a pioneer in molecular biology who studied the formation of organic compounds from unorganic matter concluding that life appeared earlier than living organisms. The idea is formulated in his *The Origin of Life* (1967).

⁸ In the English preface of the book *Animal Forms and Patterns* (1967), the translator Hella Czech explains that the wholeness of an organism is better denoted by German term “Gestalt” than English “Form”: “The word *Gestaltung* implies both the process by which such form have been produced and its result; organic form production, production of animal form, have seemed to be the most suitable equivalents” (Portmann 1967, 7).

embraced by it (Portmann 1949). This leads him to the expression of the, “unsolvable unity of the organism” (Portmann 2000, 126).⁹

The term which Portmann propagated and which supposed to denote the complex connection between an organism and the environment was inwardness (*Innerlichkeit*). Portmann established the notion of inwardness (*Innerlichkeit*) as a heuristic instrument and at the same time as a task for future researchers to not ignore but concretise it:

“We have penetrated into two invisible zones - into the darkness which begins below the threshold of our optical instruments, and into the other darkness which hides our subjective experience... Nature comprises every aspect of life – subjective experience no less than structure. Biologists ignore this fact at their peril” (Portmann 1964, 34–37).

According to Portmann, if we try to perceive a living organism adequately, it is necessary to enrich the intellect by imaginative thinking. Both capacities are “important elements of the totality of a human.” Only when employed together can we understand not only the diversity of living things, but also the “kind of experience which integrates them into a new world of meanings” (Portmann 2000, 93-94).

The experiencing of fullness, appreciation greatness, and the encompassing of wholeness that Jung strived to cultivate during Eranos symposiums can be appreciated by a scientist but could not suffice when it comes to solving practical problems. Portmann touched this subject in his Eranos lecture *Mythology in Natural Research* (*Mythisches in Naturforschung*), first of two Eranos lectures dedicated to the reflection of “Jungian” subjects. Portmann made a kind of personal confession about the role of imaginative thinking in his biological work but also denoted its limits. When it comes to technical progress, the task of a scientist is opposite to what the archaic mind does. Science “disenchantes the World,” as Portmann demonstrates with the human desire to fly. Only after we get rid of the mythological images of flying souls and Icarus’ wings and started to construct unsightly but functional assemblages of wooden planes were we able to actually soar into the air. On the other hand it was the imaginative thinking that produced the desire to fly in the first place.

⁹ Portmann does not imply here any vitalistic principle. He himself was opponent of vitalism as he wrote in the foreword to Jakob von Uexküll’s *Bedeutungslehre*, that we can not suppose any secret agent of life which can enter as an all-explaining factor (Portmann 1956, 7).

The imagination is for Portmann a source of inspiration but not the solution. And yet it was the imagination that gave shape to many biological theories. According to Portmann it was especially the period between the 17th and 19th century when imagination and symbolical thinking obstructed a factually eager mind. Portmann was very well aware that during the period in question the theory of human unconscious and animal instincts started to develop, and that philosophers like Kant, Schopenhauer, Carus and Hartmann created a bedrock for Jung's theories. Also in 19th century a theory of Organic memory as a possible technical explanation for how instincts are transmitted between generations was born and Portmann knew that Jung's thoughts about the nature of unconscious were strongly influenced by it.¹⁰

Instincts and Archetypes

The question about the nature of instincts and archetypes and their mutual relation was crucial for Jung's inquiries about the human psyche, and inevitably caught the attention of biologists.¹¹

Jung himself did not elaborate on instincts as an isolated phenomena, mainly using it as a border notion whose main purpose was to define the psyche. According to him, the psyche is delimited, "from the bottom" by instincts and, "from above" by spirit. The psychic is an emancipation from the compulsiveness of instinct. A human consciousness and will function in the zone between the instinctive and spiritual spheres. This liberalisation from biological determinism makes the development of psychic quality possible. Jung occasionally names the

¹⁰ Theory of Organic memory promoted by Butler, Hering, Semon, Ribot, Lazarus, Steinhal or Wundt was based on two basic conceptions: Lamarck's theory of hereditary acquires characteristics and Haeckel's biogenetical law that ontogeny recapitulates phylogenesis (Otis 1994).

¹¹ In an article from 1937 called *The Effectiveness of Archetypes in the Instinctive Actions of Animals* (Die Wirksamkeit von Archetypen in den Instinkthandlungen der Tiere) Friedrich Alverdes described a biology without psychology incomplete. He also pointed out Jung's psychology as helpful in the research of animal mind. Alverdes adopted Jung's concept of collective unconscious in the sense of a latent disposition to certain identical reactions and behaviour. According him not only humans but also animals have unconscious. Adolf Portmann even uses term "psyche" while describing navigation ability of migrating birds (Portmann 1964, 28-29).

supposed characteristics of instincts as contrasting with the psychic sphere, mainly its compulsiveness and rigidity. When touching the necessity to define instinct itself he claims that, “it is uncommonly difficult not only to define the instincts conceptually, but even to establish their number and their limitations” (Jung 1947, §374).

As well as instincts setting bounds for our minds, “from the bottom” Jung describes archetypes as taking effect, “from above”, existing beyond the reach of our intellect. Although these two directions are in an apparent clash, somehow biological dynamism correlates with the spiritual. Jung even states that, “psychologically the archetype as an image of the instinct is a spiritual goal which the whole nature of man strives” and that, “Archetype is a formative principle of an instinctual power” (Jung 1947, §84). When Jung continues in this thought direction, he quickly encounters a question on whether archetypes are not simply the instincts of the human species:

“To the extent that the archetypes intervene in the shaping of conscious contents by regulating, modifying, and motivating them, they act like the instincts. It is therefore very natural to suppose that these factors are connected with the instincts and to inquire whether the typical situational patterns which these collective form-principles apparently represent are not in the end identical with the instinctual patterns, namely, with the patterns of behaviour. I must admit that up to the present I have not laid hold of any argument that would finally refute this possibility” (Jung 1947, §404).

Jung indeed tried to contextualize archetypes biologically. In his *Psychological types* (1921) he identifies collective unconscious with Semon’s phylogenetic mneme¹²:

“The psychic structure is the same as what Semon calls “mneme” and what I call the ‘collective unconscious’. The individual self is a portion or segment or representative of something present in all living creatures, an exponent of the specific mode of psychological behaviour, which varies from species to species and is inborn in each of its members. The inborn mode of acting has long been known as instinct, and for the inborn

¹² In his fundamental paper *Mneme* (Die Mneme) (1904) Richard Wolfgang Semon (1859-1918) came up with a mnemonic principle. It is based on presupposition that agitation leaves traces. Repetition of the same stimuli leads to renewal of those traces and the process becomes hereditary. All the organised matter has ability to retain the traces so they can be evoked later. Semon called this ability “mneme” and the trace “engram.” Among his notable friends was psychiatrist Auguste Forel (1848-1931), a leading figure of Burghölzli Asylum and Eugen Bleuler (1857-1939) whose student was C.G. Jung (Schacter 2001).

mode of psychic apprehension I have proposed the term archetype. I may assume that what is understood by instinct is familiar to everyone. It is another matter with the archetype” (Jung 1921, 376).

It must be said though, that Jung found Semon’s theory insufficient.¹³ Even in his time Semon was criticised that his theory was based on crypto-Lamarck’s theories of heredity of acquired characteristics.¹⁴ Jung distanced himself from the Lamarckian position already in 1918 when he claimed that there cannot be anything like inherited ideas, but we shall think about inherited possibilities of ideas, apriori conditions for “fantasy-production” which are in a way similar to Kantian categories. Nevertheless, the fact that Jung tried to look for parallels between unconscious and mneme, encouraged critique from Portmann who considered it as central point of outdated thinking and pure speculation.

Jung was curious about Portmann’s view on this matter and asked him to present it at Eranos. The resulting lecture *The Problem of the Primordial Image in Biological Perspective* (Das Problem der Urbilder in Biologischer Sicht) in 1950 was not only Portmann’s reflection of instincts and archetypes from a biological perspective but also played the part in Eranos meeting dedicated to Jung’s 75th birthday.

Early in the lecture Portmann joked a little when he said that biologists reached for the term instinct instinctively. For Portmann the manner in which the biology explained patterns of unconscious behaviors was unsatisfactory. While trying to find relation between archetypes and instincts, states Portmann, Jung worked on the biological presumptions from 19th century when Jean Henri Fabre established a concept of instinct as a rigid set of inborn automatically triggered reactions. That, according Portmann cannot fully explain the connection which

¹³ “We are forced to assume that the given structure of the brain does not owe its peculiar nature merely to the influence of surrounding conditions, but also and just as much to the peculiar and autonomous quality of living matter, i.e., to a law inherent in life itself” (Jung 1921, §748).

¹⁴ Theodule Ribot considered Semon’s book a metaphysical work (Ribot 1912, 267), it was also criticized by Hans Driesch (1908, 218-219) and Auguste Weismann whose 27-page critique of *Die Mneme* appeared as the lead paper in the 1906 volume of the *Archiv für Rassen und Gesellschaftsbiologie* (Schacter 2001, 130).

animals and humans have with their environment and proposed to rename such biological phenomena to taxis or tropism.¹⁵

Since Fabre the concept of instinct underwent dramatic changes, namely through the work of scientists such as the Austrian zoologist Konrad Lorenz (1903 - 1989) and Dutch biologist and ornithologist Nikolaas Tinbergen (1907- 1988), both Nobel Prize holders for physiology and medicine, started to influence the thinking of biologists. Lorenz found middle ground between the early 20th century behaviorist conception of instincts as mechanical inborn reactions to specific stimuli (reflex-theories) and a vitalist conception of instincts as an irreducible purpose which guides mental activity (Lorenz 1950, 232; Brigandt 2005). Of course, not everything is inherited, stated Lorenz. Some behavior is learned, and some is the product of insight (Lorenz 1970, 116). In the middle of the century it was already perceived by many as a central theory of the new ethology, also thanks to popularization acts of Lorenz.

Adolf Portmann absorbed all these new impulses from ethology. In *Animals as Social Beings* (Das Tier als soziales Wesen) Portmann builds on the research of bees made by Frisch, Roesch, Lindauer and others which indicate that even in the behaviour of such relatively “lower” animals, we can trace phenomena like invention, nonconformity, work towards purpose but also indolence (Portmann 1961, 99–104). For these inner states which we can only guess from the outside, Portmann chose a name “tuning” (“*Stimmung*”), taking from a musical sense, but in the contrast with physically clear basis of musical tones, the biological structures which underline these affective-cognitive states are largely unknown (Portmann 1960, 58). During his own research, Portmann witnessed an animal’s ability to orient itself in such complicated and variable situations that instead of naming this capacity “instinct” he inclined to Wolfgang Köhler’s term “isomorphy” which denotes a correlation between a structure of the world and a structure of an animal and which does not suggest strictly mechanical connection between inborn structure and behavior. Where in Portmann’s debate about instincts is there a place for Jung’s archetypes? Are archetypes a typical human feature or are they just instincts typical for the human species? The archetype, in the context of various Jungian descriptions of it, could be interpreted as a process of achieving a human

¹⁵Fabre considered instinct to be any behavior which did not require cognition or consciousness to perform (Portmann 1961, 98- 119).

meaning in accordance with biological processes¹⁶ and with the world in general or translated into Portmann's dictionary as a human isomorphy, the specific human experiencing of the world.

Although it is a hidden structure, for Portmann the human unconscious can be studied by means of biology. It is not a chaos inaccessible by reason. Compared to an animal's mind it might be even better accessible as Portmann suggests because with higher organisations of life the amount of hereditary structures grows. It is very probable that there are more such structures in humans than in any other species and so we must presuppose an "enormous pool of preexisting forms of experience" (Portman 2000, 113). This biological fundament, says Portmann, should be a starting point for complex psychology in its study of the structure of archetypes. It is also a task of biology to provide content to what Jung calls archetypal.

Rather than archetypes, Portmann chose in his lecture the term "archetypal structure" more suitable for a biologist, presumably avoiding possible ontological connotations. He suggested three types or groups of these structures specific for humankind. The first type is essentially hereditary. Such structures have a fixed character from the beginning, and correspond with "triggers" found in animals. An example might be a recognition of a human face by a baby. At the same time Portmann expresses his uncertainty to what extent the archetype of "woman", "man" or "father and mother" are hereditary.

The Second archetypal group are such structures where heredity partakes only in a vague and opened way. These structures allow our individual formation. Here Portmann places sexual preference but also a subjective experience of „home“ and a resulting special relation to this area as examples.

The Third group is formed by the practicing and adopting of customs, traditions and goods. Everything that Gaston Bachelard marked as, "Complexe de Culture" belong here according to Portmann. In this case, Portmann concedes a possible merit of Lamarckian conception of heredity but not on biological but cultural level.¹⁷

¹⁶ Jung also wrote: „We may say that the image represents the meaning of the instinct" (Jung 1947, §398).

¹⁷ Bachelard established the notion of Cultural Complex as a part of his literary theory. He defines it as an unreflected attitude which affects the very process of reflection and

Jung himself was very dissatisfied with the outcomes of Portmann's Eranos lectures and ever since his animosity towards Portmann grew. According to Jung it is hopeless to explain the nature of archetypes to people who do not have a direct experience with psychological material. He wished that natural scientists would not enter the field they knew nothing about (Shamdasani 2003). According to Jung, only the representations of archetypes in the form of symbols and myths, and not the archetypes themselves, could be empirically studied because by becoming conscious an archetype is always altered. For the same reason Jung would also object to Portmann's notion of "archetypal structure" as a clear reference to physiological structure of the brain and the senses. Jungian archetypes do not describe the capability of our mind, but that the mind is capable to represent them: "Archetype is an explanatory paraphrase of the Platonic εἶδος" (Jung 1934, 4–5). This emphasis on psychological and philosophical aspects of the archetype is probably main reason of discord between the two scholars. Nevertheless Portmann remained diplomatic and evaluated the whole situation as a partial success. After many years he wrote in his letter to Zwi Werblowsky:

"My treatment (of Jung's archetypes) was a part of C. G. Jung's birthday party and so naturally a polemic moment has dissolved and my respect to Jung's endeavour prevailed in my study. My opinion today is after all the same as before, that Jung's research contributed to the broadening of the discussion about the archetype. I discussed with Jung several times that his presentation implies a cultural meaning of the archetype stressed by Bachelard and not the inherited one"¹⁸

It must be said, that in their studies of archetypes Portmann and Jung did not share the same terminology. Portmann dedicated his Eranos lectures almost exclusively to examples of animal behaviour and animal morphology. When he decided to proceed to the question of archetypes as a human feature, he limited his inquiry to early stages of human life (up to 4–5 years), thus the period of apparent cultural formation of an individual but still very rudimentary in comparison with the fully

imagination. While we believe that we are individually evolving in fact we just cultivate a cultural complex. According Bachelard a "realist" just chooses his reality same as a historian choose his version of history. Both are connecting to a certain tradition. Bachelard's cultural complexes are dependent on historical, cultural, literary and personal contingencies but in the same time have inherent and shared fundament (Bachelard 1999).

¹⁸ July 11,1973, Portmann's archive

developed adult human¹⁹ and very briefly mentioned Bachelard's culture complexes.

Portmann was looking at the human behavior and its unconscious patterns in a similar fashion as an ethologist studies a behavior of animals, i.e. as a processes significant in themselves, without apparent transcendence to broader meaning, ethical dimension or personal development, the topics that met together in Jung's notion of the individuation - the lifelong path of a human along which the archetypes serve as a signposts. Compared to this Jungian picture of humans life drama, Portmann's ambition in archetypes department was relatively modest. He wanted to demonstrate how can biology contribute into the discussion, mostly in critical way as the biological findings prove many hereditary speculations unfounded, typically Lamarckianism, and that caution is needed we try to link archetypes with instincts.

Conclusion

Portmann was the most notable biologist of the 20th century, who evaluated Jung's study of Archetype. It was Eranos that made this intellectual exchange possible. While having a great respect for Jung, Portmann found it necessary to critically overview Jung's conception of archetypes and instincts, seeing both subjects as apparently related to each other. But similar to Jung, when he stepped on the edge of an obscure world where instincts and archetypes resided, Portmann refrained from making definitive statements: "We are reaching the edge of the zone where any certainty of scientific claims exists." The proper research of this field according Portmann belonged to natural scientists who are able to perceive the human

¹⁹ Portmann refers to the research of E. Kaila (1932) R. A. Spitz, and K. M. Wolf (1946). Smile as one of the earliest emotional and social patterns of infants behavior. Kaila observed 3 month old children reacting to other people faces. Children reaction or smiling response was reduced and anxiety increased when exposed to motionless face compared to a vivid one (Kaila 1932). Spitz (1887-1974) discovered during his observations of children from 3 to 6 month old that it is not a certain expression of the face that triggers smile of the child, but the general shape of the face: domed forehead, two symmetrical eyes, nose. Various experiments with defiguration of the face presented to a child proved the effect of this specific configuration (Spitz 1946). Right here, claims Portmann, we clearly encounter the phenomena described by C.G. Jung as the archetype, reflection of a hidden psychic structure, an inborn readiness for action which triggers when appropriate configuration is reached.

dimension to a much greater extent and can encompass the richness of human experience. It belonged also to the researchers of psyche who would inquire a biological structures more than before with emphasis on the early stages of human development (Portmann 1950).

Portmann's effort to conceptualize archetypes as a biological structure made Jung clearly irritated but despite all their differences we find fundamental similarities in both thinkers. Both of them reached the very limits of what is expressible not only by means of their disciplines but by human language itself. Both of them tried to formulate the most complex notions, be it unconscious or life, and to place the knowledge of their respective disciplines into a more general, humanized context.

From the values perspective, Portmann and Jung were humanists who stood on the same ground against reductionist and mechanistic tendencies in science. Instead of an approach that every being is rigidly formed by the pressure of its surroundings or innate drives, which are both conceived as something foreign to its own nature, they perceived the surrounding or world in general as an opportunity for development. To them, a being is not just formed by its surroundings, but forms itself and expresses itself. This revelation of possibilities is also one of the effects of the Jungian unconscious. More than anything Jung's archetype is a source of possibility and meaning. Similarly, Portmann conceives an organism as a peculiar opportunity of expression and experience of the world. It was only through the interdisciplinary meetings such as Eranos that such exchange could have taken place. In Portmann's words:

“Collaboration in the circle of Eranos had immense influence on widening of my spiritual World. Above all it provided a nutrition for my deep desire to cross borders of my specialisation and to put together results of my own work with results of other fields of knowledge – and in the same time to present those parts of biological research where I found deeper meaning to wider circle of participants... Eranos symposiums also allowed me to grasp more clearly many questions which a lay person would like to address to a biologist” (Portmann by Ritsema 1982, 12).

Jung and Portmann met on Eranos ground and did their best as psychologist and biologist to show a better approach to humans and the world. Although they collided in their opinions on the specific subject of archetypes, the encounter itself became a valuable contribution into discussion about life and unconscious. The fact, that both of these great minds of 20th century struggled to answer the most

fundamental questions of their respective disciplines and to translate them into framework of others, only proves how complex and inexhaustible the topics are.

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Příloha č. 2

Jung's psychological analysis of Imago Dei²⁰

Vajdová, R. I., *Jung's Psychological Analysis of Imago Dei*, in: *Spirituality Studies*, 2, 1, 2016, str. 49–64.

Abstract

One of the most intricate topics that are still open in connection to a Swiss psychologist Carl Gustav Jung is religion and related issues: What is the relation between religion and psychology? What is Jung's personal stance? Did Jung reject religion as a relict of primitive way of thinking or did he try to replace religion with psychology? Some speculations drawing primarily from Jung's imagery and symbolism revealed in *Liber Novus* put forward the claim that he even aspired to found a new religion. This paper will attempt to square Jung's attitude to religion, mainly Christianity. I will point out the main ideas of his psychology of religion. I will follow the evolution of particular ideas related to religion starting with his early works right through to his last.

Key words: C. G. Jung. Imago Dei. Religion. Self. Individuation. Psychology of Religion.

1. Introduction

Not only as a historical figure has C. G. Jung been riddled by controversies, but also during his life numerous myths arose. In 1916, Jung writes to his colleague Alphons Maeder:

As to what the rumours about my person concern, I can inform you that I have been married to a female Russian student for six years (Ref. Dr. Ulrich), dressed as Dr. Frank, I have recommended immediate divorce to a woman (Ref. Frau E-Hing), two years ago I broke up the Ruff–Franck marriage, recently I made Mrs. McCormick pregnant, got rid of the child and received 1 million for this (Ref. Dr. F. & Dr. M. In Z.), in the Club house I intern pretty young girls for homosexual use for Mrs. McCormick, I send their young men for mounting in the hotel, therefore great rewards, I am a baldheaded Jew (Ref. Dr. Stier in Rapperswyl), I am having an affair with Mrs. Oczaret, I have become crazy (Ref. Dr. M. In Z.), I am a con-man (Ref. Dr. St. in Z.), and last not east – Dr. Picht is my assistant. What is one to do? How should I behave to make such rumours impossible? I am thankful for your good advice. The auspices for analysis are bad, as you see! One must simply not do such an unattractive enterprise on one's own, if one is not to be damaged.

(Shamdasani 2003: 1-2)

Jung's attitude towards religion has not been interpreted any less. In his books and letters he frequently states that he is being portrayed as a prophet²¹, an atheist, a

²⁰This paper was supported by GAUK, grant No. 368313

²¹The term prophet is speculated on by Ronald Hayman in his biography *Life of Jung* (Hayman, 1999)

mystic, a gnostic²², a pagan, a theologian or a materialist. He, however, considered himself solely a psychologist. He rejects claims that his theory strives to affirm the existence of transcendent God or any claims about the nature of such being. (CW 14, 1954). According to Jung, religious experience as such is real, therefore it deserves the attention of psychologists. „The psychologist has to investigate religious symbols because his empirical material, of which the theologian usually knows nothing, compels him to do so.“ (CW 14, 1954: 326)

It was the prominent Jung scholar Sonu Shamdasani, author of *Cult Fictions. C.G. Jung and the Founding of Analytical Psychology* (Shamdasani 1998), who shed a new light on life and work of C.G. Jung.

One of the Jung's current critics focusing on religious contexts of his work is Richard Noll. In his books, *The Jung Cult: The Origins of a Charismatic Movement and The Aryan Christ: The Secret Life of Carl Jung*, the American psychologist and historian interprets Jung's psychological theories as “anti-orthodox Christian cult of redemption or a Nietzschean religion” or rather “pagan form of personal religion.” Jung was allegedly waging war against Christianity and its distant, absolute and unreachable God and whose disciples' purpose was to listen to the voice of the dead, to worship the sun and to become gods themselves. In the conclusion of his book Noll suggests that we could be witnessing a birth of new religious movement arising from the merger of Jungian movement and the New Age spirituality of the late 20th century based on the apotheosis of Jung as a God-man. (Noll 1994, 1997)

When reading *Liber Novus*, one is normally so consternated by the religious imagery that it is quite easy to succumb to opinion that the imagery is not “merely” active imagination of an individual but a specific religious message, a prophecy. Noll especially pays attention to the images that prove Jung's alleged conviction that he is the new Christ: a black serpent lying at his feet, Jung spreads his arms wide as he identifies with Christ. Salome approaches him, the serpent winds around Jung's body and his face transforms into lion's. Salome tells him that he is Christ.

Salome became very interested in me, and she assumed that I could cure her blindness. She began to worship me. I said, ‘Why do you worship me?’ She replied, ‘You are Christ’, In spite

²²He refuses the term gnostic and claims that his psychological interest in gnosticism does not make him a gnostic . Letters to Neumann 30.1.1954. (Jung-Neumann, 2015)

of my objections she maintained this. ... While the snake was pressing me, I felt that my face had taken on the face of an animal of prey, a lion or a tiger. (Jung 2010: 251)

In his seminars (1925), Jung later offers his interpretation and says that his worshipping by Salome symbolised that side of the inferior function which is surrounded by an aura of evil. This experience was for him a symbolic deification, he transformed into the Deus Leontocephalus of the Mithraic mysteries 1st - 4th century). (Jung 1989). Noll, however, insists that Jung believed he had literally become someone of a God, an Aryan Christ. Noll claims that the lion-headed god Aion became his secret image of God within, and Jung and his close followers realized this truth and concealed it from the world. (Noll 1997) Noll is too concrete and too literal in his criticism. Anthony Stevens notes and points out that Noll writes as if Jung believed that it was an actual transformation into God, rather than a symbolic experience. He deals with it in more detail in his book *On Jung* (Stevens 1999, 275-290). Similarly, Sonu Shamdasani, translator of *Liber Novus* and arguably the most renowned Jung scholar, states that there is no evidence that the above mentioned active imagination shaped Jung's self-understanding for the rest of his life or that he even took it literally. More in the book *Cult Fictions*. (Shamdasani 1998, 49-55)

Comprehensive study of Jung's works allowed me to examine his relationship to religion, or God in great detail. Jung publicly distanced himself from anything that could be called a Jungian movement or a school, for instance in his lecture *Is Analytical Psychology a Religion?*²³ from 1936. (Jung 1977). In the course of his life he started to appreciate a psychological importance of religion, such as Christianity, while he explicitly warned against the spiritual vacuum he observed in some countries during his lifetime.

Jung's literary remains consist of nineteen volumes of *Collected Works*, two volumes of letters, several seminars, the autobiography *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* and the collection of interviews and casual writings in *C. G. Jung Speaking*. The amount of unpublished material exceeds the amount of the published one by far. (Shamdasani 2003) Therefore, to create a tight theory out of it is somewhat risky. Jung himself did not make it easier with the unsystematic

²³In his lecture he claims that psychology can be referred to as religion only in *statu nascendi*, that means in the state of being born. (Jung 1977)

nature of his writing style. I will attempt to present Jung's principal concepts in relation to religion, God and psychological experience of religion in general. I will try to proceed in a chronological order.

2. Religious activity as psychiatric diagnosis

At the beginning of his career Jung did not show any interest in religion as an independent subject matter, but he did so almost exclusively in relation to mental disorders when examining religious hallucinations, visions of God, self-identification of patients with prophets or divine beings. Jung mentions God in his writings for the first time at the age of 34. In *The Significance of the Father in the Destiny of the Individual* (1909a) Jung puts forward more complex statement about religion and its function. Influenced by Freud's *Obsessive Acts and Religious Practices* (1907), Jung interprets religion as 'fantasy structure' created in order to resolve sexual problems. (Heising 1979) Freud's concept of sublime sexuality, at that time, was not only a significant piece of knowledge but oftentimes also the only explanatory framework for a vast array of phenomena. At that time, according to Heising, Jung even agreed with Freud in stating that the parent-child relationship is primarily sexual. If it is religion in which the most basic transformation of the child – parent relationship into the man – God relationship takes place, it is then a purpose of every religion to process, or, to be more precise, to tame the human sexuality with the difference that the Moses' relationship with God was lawful, while the Jesus' relationship was personal (CW 4, 1909a).

However subversive this notes might seem in relation to religion, Jung did not agree with Freud, not even in his most radical early period : Christianity cannot be simply opposed, because it might be useful in psychoanalysis. First explicit and general definition of relationship between religion and psychoanalysis can be found in *The Analysis of Dream* (1909b): psychoanalysis can heal and strengthen human spirit where the Church has only crushed it (CW4, 1909b).

Jung turned away from Freud and the whole psychoanalytical movement when he started to doubt a sexual sublimation theory²⁴ and he embarked on an intensive

²⁴In Septembri 1912, during his lecture at the Fordham University in New Yorku he names reasons for sthis plit, later published as *The Theory of Psychoanalysis*: (a) with reagrd to the fact that repression cannot be an explanation for every condition, (b) unconscious images have theological meaning, (c) libido, as psychic energy, is not purely sexual as assumed by Freud.

study of mythology and its potential for psychology. Findings of his studies on astrology and psychology were summed up in a book titled *Psychology of the Unconscious* (1916). There Jung went beyond purely functional understanding of religion. He poses a question of why religious desire and motivation occur in a man (final cause). He also offers an answer that it is a psychic response to unfulfilled wishes – religion is, therefore, a concept of ideas of what we miss. He adds yet another question: where does this desire and motivation originate from (material cause) and answers that it is a common receptacle of “archaic inclination” shared by all people. (Jung 1916) These reflections are Jung's first steps towards the formulation of theory of collective unconscious and archetypes. And thus religion is the field on which Jung created his most essential theory. Religion will remain an inseparable motif throughout Jung's research into human Psyche.

Rejection of Freud's reductionism also manifested itself in terms of partial psychic phenomenon, whose manner of understanding still determines interpretation of all human desires and motivations: libido. Instead of using it in a Freudian's spirit - as a sexual drive energy – he transformed the meaning of libido into ungraspable psychological energy. According to Jung, sexuality is only one of the manifestations of libido. (CW 5, 1911) By saying that, he unlocked absolutely different understanding of one's self-realization and added to it dignity, wholeness and versatility that have no place in Freud's psychological mechanics. Reformulation of libido means that there are deeper layers of psyche than only sexual.

It implies that even the causes of neuroses lie much deeper and there are not only sexual, as Freud assumed. It would correspond with urgency and fatal severity of many psychological problems that evidently have no sexual origin. On the other hand, such approach promotes sexuality itself as a manifestation of a broader psychic energy, a manifestation of richness of spiritual life. Libido asserts itself in many concrete human activities of which it is the most profound driving force. As energy force it is ungraspable and it can be, according to Jung, identified with the symbol of God: „If one honors God, the sun or the fire, then one honors one's own vital force, the libido (Jung 1916: 96, 227). In *The Psychology of the Unconscious*

(CW 4, 1913) He also publishes *Symbols of Transformation* (CW 5), where he deals with a term libido in more detail. He also claims that fantasies of incest have more likely a symbolic rather than a literal value.

he states: From the psychological point of view to worship God is to worship one's own libido:

„Mankind wishes to love in God only their own ideas, that is to say, the ideas which they project into God. By that they wish to love their unconscious, that is, that remnant of ancient humanity and the centuries-old past of all people.“ (Jung 1916: 200)

Jung's psychological interpretation of a symbol of God leads him to the notion that in monotheistic religions libido manifests itself in the most comfortable manner, inasmuch as one source is worshipped. Just as libido is full of contradictory desires, God²⁵ is such, too. He can be forgiving and cruel beyond human logic or ethics, as later seen in the book of Job. Here Jung seems to appear as an explicit atheist, he even speaks of God as of a kind of fantasy projection known to psychologists in cases of paranoia (Jung 1916). He deems religious myths as ever beneficial for the not enlightened masses. But then, when those myths are cleared of obsolete elements it means protection against 'monsters of the universe' similar to peace and security received in the childhood from parents. Only the enlightened elite can uncover religion for themselves in a form of crippling neurosis.

In the years when opus Liber Novus was being created, Jung underwent a period of inner turmoil during which he tested his theories on himself. In his lectures, however, especially in *The Theory of Psychoanalysis* (1913), he again emphasised a need to study parallelism between unconscious fantasies and mythical religious motifs and to search for common grounds between them. He identifies the mind of a child with that of the primitive, thus implying again ontogeny-phylogeny model (CW 4, 1913). It is precisely in that time when Jung uses the term Archetype²⁶ for the first time (1919-1920).

²⁵To express the ambivalence of God Jung uses Bleuler's term ambivalence: „One can assume the dualism of the human will for which Bleuler, from the psychiatric point of view, has coined the word "*ambivalence*" as something generally present, bearing in mind that even the most primitive motor impulse is in opposition“(Ibid. : 194).

²⁶Primarily, the concept of archetype resulted from his self-analysis and from a work with a psychotic patient in the Burgölzli Hospital. From 1912 he used the term primordial images, in spite of numerous changes and modifications in the theory. By 1917 he speaks of *dominants*, special nodal points around which imagery clustered. In 1919 Jung introduced the term *archetype*. (Samuels 1986)

Jung repeatedly stated that Christianity is strictly an ascetic response to uncontrolled instinctiveness, and so the fate of Christianity is to be absorbed by history as a consequence of the human spirit advancement. As long as it is done collectively, there is only a couple of individuals with the courage and insight to embed their values elsewhere. Some commentators, for instance James Heisig, see Nietzsche's²⁷ influence here, even if Jung did not reflect on that at the time. (Heisig 1979)

3. Religious activity as psychological fact

Jung's growing lenience towards God and deity as psychologically indisputable phenomenon can be seen in small modifications of his theory of symbols. Based on a comparison of dreams and fantasies of patients with mythological symbolism across cultures he establishes hypothesis of transpersonal level of unconscious within one's mind. This psychological layer common to all human species cannot be, according to Jung, exhausted by the theory of wish fulfilment that Jung previously fiddled with. In the letter to H. Schmid he writes:

„The core of the individual is a mystery of life, which is snuffed out when it is „grasped.“ That is why symbols want to be mysterious... they are not so merely because what is at the bottom of them cannot be clearly apprehended. The symbol wants to guard against Freudian interpretations, which are indeed such pseudo-truths that they never lack for effect...(Letters 1: 31)

Jung made here a subtle shift: Religion is not only allegorical wish fulfillment, or hundreds of years old refined management of believer's instincts, but in religion 'something' is being authentically expressed. Jung never shared Freud's theory of Sexual sublimation without reservations and he considered religious activity as a general human desire. Even though, the desire fulfilment had been a frame within which he partially operated, hence the interpretation of God as psychologically portrayed libido. Abandoning the theory of wish fulfilment as such also changed his view on a symbol of God. It is not a symbol of libido anymore, but transpersonal unconscious as such. (CW 7, 1912) Jung here refers to the unconscious as a union of opposites, both God and Devil at the same time.

²⁷Nietzsche's influence on Jung has been discussed by a lot of historians and philosophers, specially by Bishop, P.(1995) *The Dionysian Self: C.G.Jung's Reception of Nietzsche* or Liebscher, Martin (2012) *Libido und Wille zur Macht*.

He reshapes a symbol of God into something that arrives to man from the collective psyche, but at the same time it is a symbol for the collective psyche – the deepest, mysterious layer of mind. Symbol of God has become a true content, not sublimation of something else:

„The contents of the unconscious lay the same claim to reality on account of their obstinate persistence as do real things of the external world ... It must not be forgotten that there have always been many people for whom the contents of the unconscious possessed a greater reality than the things of the outside world. (CW 6: 168)“

Jung is not interested in “essence” of religion, but in its psychological effect. Therefore, when he writes about religious orientation being a psychological need, it does not mean a defence of irreplaceable role of a particular religion. It only means that one will always behave in a manner known to him from religion. Religious function is for him an essential component of the psyche and is found always and everywhere, however undifferentiated it may be (CW 6, 315).

It must be kept in mind that Jung uses a term “symbol of God” as a declaration of psychological effect, not a term “God” as a thing-in-itself, and he did so all of his life. He refused to speculate metaphysically as he mentioned many times. What Kant called thing-in-itself (*das Ding an sich*), Jung refers to as “merely negative borderline concept” (Jung 1932: 10) saying that „every statement about the transcendental is to be avoided because it is only a laughable presumption on the part of a human mind unconscious of its limitations.“ (CW 13, 1929: 54)

Psychology is to study not God in himself, but the human idea of God. It relates to the fact that, according to Jung, psychology is a science not metaphysics. For Jung the God-image is a symbol and therefore it cannot be reduced to completely subjective origin. Anyway, in his another work *The Relation Between the Ego and the Unconscious* (1928) Jung converts to a concept of God and the divine as an autonomous psychic content: „by affixing „divine“ to the workings of the autonomous contents, we are admitting their relatively superior force... It is a force as real as hunger and the fear of death.“ (CW 7 1928: 239) Jung explicitly discusses that although science cannot prove God's existence in any way, the experience with God as a psychic fact cannot be disproved.

Science has never discovered any "God," epistemological criticism proves the impossibility of knowing God, but the psyche comes forward with the assertion of the experience of God. God is a psychic fact of immediate experience, otherwise there would never have been any talk of

God. The fact is valid in itself, requiring no non-psychological proof and inaccessible to any form of non-psychological criticism. It can be the most immediate and hence the most real of experiences, which can be neither ridiculed nor disproved. (CW 8 1926: 328)

For better understanding of his theory, Jung introduces new terms, listed in a lexicon at the end of the book titled *Psychological Types* (1921). And so for man to be actually able to create symbols, one needs a mediator between the ego-consciousness and unconscious. The mediator, according to Jung, is an innate transcendent function. (Jung 1921, 115) Another important term introduced by Jung is individuation – a process of differentiation of human being from unconscious with the purpose of understanding the unconscious contents (Jung 1921, 448-50) The aim of individuation is a birth of the Self and in Jung's work we can find many comparisons of the image of Self and the symbol of Jesus. He represents a goal to which every man is summoned in one's own way : Self-realization. The beginnings of such comparison can be found in *Liber Novus*, as indicated in Introduction.

What in Christian theology is called *Imitatio Christi*, is for Jung a religious equivalent to a journey of psyche in the process of individualization. „The deification of Jesus, as also of the Buddha, is not surprising, for it affords a striking example of the enormous valuation that humanity places upon these hero figures and hence upon the ideal of personality.“ (Jung 1932: 181) However, Jung points out that individuation does not mean placing a burden on Jesus, but to undergo the same experiment with one's life as done by Jesus: realization of oneself.

The Christian subordinates himself to the superior divine person in expectation of his grace; but the Oriental knows that redemption depends on the work he does on himself. The Tao grows out of the individual. The *imitatio Christi* has this disadvantage: in the long run we worship as a divine example a man who embodied the deepest meaning of life, and then, out of sheer imitation, we forget to make real our own deepest meaning-self-realization. As a matter of fact, it is not altogether inconvenient to renounce one's own meaning. Had Jesus done so, he would probably have become a respectable carpenter and not a religious rebel to whom the same thing would naturally happen today as happened then. (CW 13, 1929: 52-54, Psychotherapists or the Clergy 1932: 340)

For Jung, the figure of Christ is, similarly to Buddha, the most highly developed and differentiated symbol of the Self (CW 12, 1943). The basic symbol the Self is

mandala, which means a „circle“²⁸. Based on hundreds of mandalas drawn by patients Jung later notes that in the centre of them there is not God but always something else and very concrete (a serpent, a dish, a man, the Sun, a star, a cross...) According to Jung, patients with psychological problems do not primarily yearn for deity, but they search wholeness of themselves. This wholeness is fulfilled in the Self and so the image of the Self „is not a substitute but a symbol for the deity. (CW 11, 1937) Jung thus identifies psychological effect of the image of the Self and the image of God: „anything a man postulates as being a greater totality than himself can become a symbol of the Self“. Jesus then represents suffering of ego that must persist on his journey to individuation. He addresses this matter in greater detail in his work *A Psychological Approach to Dogma of the Trinity* (1948).

As far as Christian terminology is concerned, Jung explains its psychological meaning. God and Father represent psychological image of collective unconscious, God and Trinity show birth of consciousness and unconscious, God as Quaternity represents a symbol for the aim of individuation process, the Self.

The Trinity is for Jung a symbol of perfection while the Quaternity is a symbol of totality or wholeness. Reaching Quaternity, however, means theoretical, for man unattainable reaching of wholeness. Jesus is then a psychological story of a struggle to reach the aim, a symbol for individuation process; the Holy Spirit is an ideal imitation Christi, an individual decision to fight towards the Self through earthly existence. For Jung himself, this is a fresh breath for Christianity that has become so remote from the ordinary people. (CW 11, 1948, 152 – 163)

In *Aion* (1950) Jung poses a question: Is the Self a symbol of Christ or is Christ a symbol of the Self? He responds: A psychologist does not have another option but to opt for the second one (CW 9 II 1950, 68) In the same work he also touches on issues of good and evil, where he, for the first time, attacks a concept of *privatio boni* as metaphysical definition of evil. For Jung the concept was not acceptable for two reasons. On one hand, the concept denies the evident reality of evil, which is a commonplace but painful part of all human life. On the other hand, *privatio boni* view of evil is not an adequate expression of the psychological reality of moral

²⁸Mandalas are found not only throughout the East but also among us. The early Middle Ages are especially rich in Christian mandalas. Most of them show Christ in the centre, with the four evangelists, or their symbols, at the cardinal points. (CW13, 1929: 22)

judgement. For him „good“ and „evil“ were evaluative categories, applied to given facts of experience. They are not themselves facts, but human responses to facts, which may differ from one person to another (CW 9 II, 1950) Figuratively speaking, Jung does not take it only as a metaphysical problem but also something that directly and continuously intervenes with our lives. Therefore, for Jung, the teaching of *privatio boni* means repression of evil which can lead to evil working from the depth of our unconscious, and thus become even more concealed, stronger and devious. Jung believes that Augustinus arrived at his perception of *privatio boni*, because he did not contemplate evil as an equal pole to good. He claims that evil, unlike God is not absolute.²⁹ Augustinus does not acknowledge eternal existence of evil, because he sees the world in the moment when no evil existed and in the moment when it once again will not exist. For Jung, on the other hand, the non-existence of evil is not possible. As long as there is a man, the evil cannot cease to exist, given it has already existed. As a matter of fact, there is no annihilation in psyche, only compensation. Therefore, even that what is fading from the light of consciousness is carried with us in the matrix of unconscious. And thus, what disrupts wholeness for Augustinus, makes wholeness possible for Jung.

It is, however, necessary to note that for Jung evil is not entirely evil. It becomes evil providing we banish it there. At the end of the *Archetype and Collective Unconscious* (1934) he adds:

“We do not know what good and evil are in themselves. It must therefore be supposed that they spring from a need of human consciousness and that for this reason they lose their validity outside the human sphere. That is to say, a hypostasis of good and evil as metaphysical entities is inadmissible because it would deprive these terms of meaning. If we call everything that God does or allows „good“, then evil is good too and „good“ becomes meaningless.“ (CW 9II 1950: 267)

Jung did not intend to relativise moral good and evil. On the contrary, he claims that the moral evil arises from the fact that we cannot, due to our own natural tendencies, come to terms with evil and instead of integrating it, we repress it and we pretend it does not belong to us. In unconscious, however, “death” does not stand for demise, but as if it inevitably implies the resurrection in renewed force.

²⁹In his reflections, Augustinus draws from the initial state of absolute good that was disrupted and will return towards the end of history (Evans 1982)

Despite the mutual fondness Jung came to a disagreement with Victor White³⁰ especially when the matter of *privatio boni* is concerned.

4. Psychological defence and criticism of religion

Jung's attitude towards religion changes with time. He accepts it practically – as a cultural convenience that enables people things that are impossible on biological level - progress, sacrifice of oneself, etc. He also acknowledges that religion can serve us in a way of connecting us with the realms of unconscious otherwise unreachable. Therefore, it would be short-sighted to try to replace it altogether with science. The realm of unconscious from which the images of God and the Self emerge are, according to Jung, unknown and uncontrollable (CW 10, 1918). As a psychologist, Jung takes into account healing capacities of religion that bring release to chaotic instincts by means of fantasy. Therefore, we cannot simply get rid of religion without putting our own psychic health in jeopardy. Jung proposes to distinguish religious functions from religious dogmas that serve in every religion to prevent believers from confronting their own unconscious (CW 6, 1921).

Dogmas act as a protective shield of a believer against his own first-hand experience with God and as such it has its pros and cons. The advantage is that man is not directly confronted with his unconscious. Jung himself experienced it and he thinks that not everybody is capable of handling it. A strong man, however, can break this shield of religion and individually “experience God”. In the light of this dichotomy between the “mass” and the strong and enlightened individuals Jung puts emphasis on “nobleness ” of more individually understood religion:

„The astonishing range of Catholic symbolism, for instance, has an emotional appeal which for many natures is absolutely satisfying ... It is perhaps only temporarily and for relatively few individuals that the existing collective religious have become inadequate.“ (CW8, 1928: 59)

The figure of Jesus or rather his interpretation is one of the Christian dogmas which, instead of developing its promising psychological potential, has become an obstacle in the authentic relationship to the unconscious: Jesus, the alleged saviour, conceals before his believers that his inner conflicts (“sins”) have psychological origin and thus oversimplifying the significance of the unconscious.

³⁰See Correspondence between C.G.Jung and Victor White in Lammers A.C., Cunningham(ed) *The Jung-White Letters* 2007.

God-Father as presented in Christianity does not fulfil his symbolic potential either, because his function is only to ensure that man did not need to sacrifice the security of a child dependence. While Jung understands the term God psychologically as a part of the mind unknown to us, the Western theology objectified God to such an extent that he became Totally Other and hence he cannot by any means, descend to our soul. Moreover, the result is that an imitation of Jesus also loses its power and claim for a following of ideal of man's life (CW 12, 1944). As “for it is not a question of an imitation that leaves a man unchanged and makes him into a mere artifact, but of realizing the ideal on one's own account - *Deo concedente* - in one's own individual life. (CW12, 1944: 7)

Psychological science must, according to Jung, battle the infantilization of believers. Only a barbarian man needs God who assigns tasks and is an external judge of good and evil. Jung asserts that God must be withdrawn from objects and brought to the Soul³¹ Unless the Church³² accommodates to this need arriving with the development of modern consciousness, they will no longer be able to grant refuge to a thinking man. Psychology picks up the baton where the Church after two millennia run out of steam. It helps man to cope with unconscious and its “spiritual” archetypal images. By doing so it does not accomplish destruction of religion, quite the opposite. It unties the hands of religion: „It opens people's eyes to the real meaning of dogmas, and far from destroying, it throws open an empty house to new inhabitants.“ (CW12, 1944: 12) Apparently, Jung deems psychology an essential complement to religion for every believer. The role of psychology is to shed light on a psychological origin of dogmas that claim absoluteness and by doing so to instigate a thinking man: „the archetypes of the unconscious can be shown empirically to be the equivalents of religious dogmas“ (CW 12, 1944: 17).

³¹Soul is a translation of the German word *Seele*, whose connotations are not easily rendered in English. In some context it has been translated as „psyche“ or „mind“. Consistency would betray Jung's meaning. For several years he wavered between describing the object of psychology as Seele and as Psyche, eventually settling for the latter after 1933. (Hull comment In: CW 8: 300)

³²Jung distinguishes between Protestantism and Catholicism. He deals with the differences especially in an essay *A Psychological Approach to Dogma of the Trinity* (CW 11, 1948: 192) and also in *The Psychology of the Transference* (CW 16, 1946: 194).

In spite of that psychology cannot fully substitute for religion, as well as functions of reason cannot fully psychologically suppress the function of religion:

„Every extension and intensification of rational consciousness, however, leads us further away from the sources of symbols and, by its ascendancy, prevents us from understanding them. ... But if we understand these things for what they are, as symbols, then we can only marvel at the unfathomable wisdom that is in them and be grateful to the institutions which has not only conserved them but developed them dogmatically.“ (CW 11, 1948: 199)

Jung relatively specifically diagnoses two fundamental hazards of faith: the first, mentioned above, is a projection of the God-archetype fully on external object, the second one, on the other hand, is a projection of the God-archetype on himself. Both of these extremes have concrete consequences: in the first case, the God-archetype does not have consciousness within his reach and remains in his primitive, unconscious state. In the second case, the God-archetype inflates consciousness to the extent that he loses contact with unconscious. Religious symbols needs to be therefore kept within these two extremes supposing they should help a man to get on well with his unconscious mind. (CW 11, 1948)

The Swiss psychologist warns not only against passive, thoughtless devotion to a symbol of God but also against a naïve form of atheism that ignores deeper function of faith and ends in self-divination. A man living in a despiritualized world where reality is measured purely materially, can easily fall a victim to his own archaic instincts „...the destruction of the God-image is followed by the annulment of the human personality.“ (CW 9II, 1950: 109, 23)

His book *Answer to Job* in 1951, written at the age of 76 has gained the greatest response. The book has earned him not only admiration, but a harsh criticism, too, especially in the theological circles. „Job is a direct continuation of Aion: it traces the growth of consciousness through a study of changing images of God, both within and without the limits of defined doctrine. (Heisig 1979: 79). Jung begins his *Answer to Job* with a declaration of spiritual truth where religious testimonies are also included. Jung again points out that he refuses to deal with transcendent realities. A testimony from the Bible is considered “expression of the Soul” that refers to archetypes growing from collective unconscious. The Biblical story of Job and Yahweh trying Job is well-known but Jung arrives at completely new interpretation. Job blames Yahweh for tormenting him and reveals his antinomic nature. Job then gets to a higher moral level because he sees that Yahweh only

projects own doubts about himself. „Yahweh is .. too unconscious to be moral. Morality presupposes consciousness.“ (CW11, 1952: 372) Yahweh sees that Job has something that surpasses him – the self-reflection and he strives to transform, to become a man. Only Christ with his death on the cross clears man of his guilt. God then lives out what he imposed on man. Christ here represents an archetype of the Self and the whole process from Yahweh to Christ is an individuation, from unconscious to fulfilment. (CW11, 1952) Jung starts his book *Answer to Job* with a motto from the Bible, the second book of Samuel: „I am distressed for thee, my brother...“, for Jung it means a higher degree of consciousness as well as higher morality. At the end of his life he often draws attention to the fact that at the age of nuclear and chemical weapons man has too much power to remain ignorant. „For his aim is to offer modern man, faced with the problem of evil, an alternative to atheism and pious submission.“ (Heisig 1979: 82) However, he did not want to say that Christianity as such should come to an end. „I am, on the contrary, convinced that it is not Christianity, but our conception and interpretation of it, that has become antiquated in the face of the present world situation. The Christian symbol is a living thing that carries in itself the seeds of further development “ (CW 10, 1957: 279; CW 10, 1958: 328)

5. Conclusion

Jung's attitude towards religion was always ambivalent. From the very beginning he criticises the inhibitory nature of religion, but over the course of his career he starts to appreciate potential healing capacities of religion: for a believer, religious symbolism can become a means of finding a balanced relationship with own unconscious. Christianity in particular, according to Jung, is quite effective in this intermediary function. At the same time, though, Christianity is also rather destructive in pursuing collectivism that swallows an individual up and hence degrades one's inner values. Until his death Jung stood firm on the idea of “helping” believers, that means partially placing competencies of religion to psychology. He does not consider a religious ritual a full expression of spiritual content but as something that is needed to analyse and explain further so that a man can be rid of shackles of ignorance. In one of the letters to Hans Schmid (6. Nov. 1915) he writes: „We must help people towards those hidden and unlockable symbols, where the germ lies hidden like the tender seed in the hard shell.“ (Letters 1: 32)

I demonstrated that Jung does never entirely give up an interpretation of God's image partially as an attempt to fulfil desire for parents and security, but he refuses to interpret the God's image in a Freudian way, purely as a symptom of personal neuroses. He states that as an archetypal symbol God is a source of inexhaustible intelligibility and a bearer of possible, unpredictable meanings, therefore, never to be fully explained.

Jung is not an unbiased commentator of the end of Christianity in Europe. He starts to see the danger in inability of a modern man to acknowledge deep roots that Christianity sent out into the Western culture. That then leads to filling the spiritual vacuum by theosophy, anthroposophy and Eastern religions. (CW 11: 531; CW 9: 14-15, 22; CW 8: 58-59, 336; CW 10: 83-91; CW6: 36; CW4: 326)

In the introduction I have already outlined the extent in which the speculations about Jung's personal opinion on religion fluctuate; the speculation about whether he had any particular religion, or whether he himself regarded as a prophet. The truth is that Jung analyses Christian dogmas in depth. He discusses the nature of God and he attempts to prove that the principle of Trinity “does not function” psychologically. Does it mean then that Jung sets out for own “remedial metaphysical expedition” or does he only state what symbols and principles do not correspond with his clinical practice? Jung himself never admitted the first option and he also explicitly resisted it many times. Yet he threaded a thin line his entire life teasing the imagination of his readers and commentators to the maximum.

Finally, let me present one more quotation from a letter to Robert Corti, dated 30 April 1929:

„God wants to be born in flame of man's consciousness, leaping even higher... One must be able to suffer God. That is the supreme task for the carrier of ideas. He must be the advocate of the earth... My inner principle is: Deus *et* homo. God needs man in order to become conscious, just as he needs limitation in time and space. Let us therefore be for him limitations in time and space, an earthly tabernacle.“(Letters 1: 65)

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