

## **Abstract**

The thesis philosophically examines what moral responsibility Germany has towards non-nationals outside of its borders, based on the country's commitment to human dignity. International institutions are excluded. The focus of this work lies on the concept of human dignity as the basis for global justice. As the foundation, a political and legal background is provided in the form of a discourse analysis. Using the criteria of Dworkin's method of the "moral reading" of the constitution, the Kantian notion of human dignity is identified as the moral philosophical basis of the German concept of dignity – thereby contributing to definitional clarification of human dignity and the related concepts constituting the foundation of the German hierarchy of values. On this basis, Germany has a moral duty to respect the human dignity of every individual. To examine whether a positive duty can also be established, the philosophical foundations identified – especially Kant's theory of justice – are applied to the global level. Lastly, the concept of negative and positive duties is utilised to explore the limitations of assigning responsibility to nation states in the globalised world. As a result, this thesis establishes, for Germany, a negative duty for non-nationals and a weak positive duty manifested in the imperfect duty of beneficence. However, Germany has a clear (moral) responsibility for its actions and their effects. In a globalised world, the scope of this responsibility is broad. Based on these findings, the German conception of human dignity could serve as a model for Western countries promoting global justice.