

Analyzované části textů strategických dokumentů

Contents

National Defense Strategy.....	1
National Defense Strategy 2008.....	1
National Defense Strategy 2018.....	2
Quadrennial Defense Review.....	3
Quadrennial Defense Review 2010.....	3
Quadrennial Defense Review 2014.....	4
National Security Strategy.....	5
National Security Strategy 2010.....	5
National Security Strategy 2015.....	6
National Security Strategy 2017.....	6
Department of Defense.....	8
Report to Congress on Strategy to Protect United States National Security Interests in the Arctic Region 2016.....	8
Assessment on U.S. Defense Implications of China's Expanding Global Access 2018 .	8
Indo-Pacific report 2019.....	9
Arctic Specific Documents.....	11
National Strategy for Arctic Region 2013.....	11
Arctic Strategy 2013 (Coast Guard).....	12
United States Coast Guard Arctic Strategy Implementation Plan 2015.....	13
Report to Congress Department of Defense Arctic Strategy 2019.....	13
Arctic Strategic Outlook 2019 (Coast Guard).....	14
Strategic Approach to Arctic Homeland Security 2021.....	15
A Blue Arctic (United States Navy).....	16
Regaining Arctic Dominance (United States Army).....	16

National Defense Strategy

National Defense Strategy 2008

<http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/08nationaldefensestrategy.pdf>

China is one ascendant state with the potential for competing with the United States. For the foreseeable future, we will need to hedge against China's growing military modernization and the impact of its strategic choices upon international security. It is likely that China will continue to expand its conventional military capabilities, emphasizing anti-access and area denial assets including developing a full range of long-range strike, space, and information warfare capabilities.

Our interaction with China will be long-term and multi-dimensional and will involve peacetime engagement between defense establishments as much as fielded combat capabilities.

The objective of this effort is to mitigate near term challenges while preserving and enhancing U.S. national advantages over time. (p. 3)

Russia has leveraged the revenue from, and access to, its energy sources; asserted claims in the Arctic; and has continued to bully its neighbors, all of which are causes for concern. (p. 4)

We wish to use the opportunity of an absence of fundamental conflict between great powers to shape the future, and to prevent the re-emergence of great power rivalry. The United States welcomes the rise of a peaceful and prosperous China, and it encourages China to participate as a responsible stakeholder by taking on a greater share of burden for the stability, resilience, and growth of the international system. However, much uncertainty surrounds the future course China's leaders will set for their country. Accordingly, the NSS states that "our strategy seeks to encourage China to make the right strategic choices for its people, while we hedge against other possibilities." A critical component of this strategy is the establishment and pursuit of continuous strategic dialogue with China to build understanding, improve communication, and to reduce the risk of miscalculation. P. 10

China continues to modernize and develop military capabilities primarily focused on a Taiwan Strait conflict, but which could have application in other contingencies. The Department will respond to China's expanding military power, and to the uncertainties over how it might be used, through shaping and hedging. This approach tailors investment of substantial, but not infinite, resources in ways that favor key enduring U.S. strategic advantages. At the same time, we will continue to improve and refine our capabilities to respond to China if necessary. P. 10

We will continue to press China to increase transparency in its defense budget expenditures, strategies, plans and intentions. We will work with other elements of the U.S. Government to develop a comprehensive strategy to shape China's choices. (p. 10)

Both China and Russia are important partners for the future and we seek to build collaborative and cooperative relationships with them. We will develop strategies across agencies, and internationally, to provide incentives for constructive behavior while also dissuading them from destabilizing actions. (p. 11)

We shall seek to anchor China and Russia as stakeholders in the system. (p. 14)

China is developing technologies to disrupt our traditional advantages. Examples include development of anti-satellite capabilities and cyber warfare. (p. 22)

National Defense Strategy 2018

<https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>

We are facing increased global disorder, characterized by decline in the long-standing rules-based international order—creating a security environment more complex and volatile than any we have experienced in recent memory. Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security. (p. 3)

China is a strategic competitor using predatory economics to intimidate its neighbors while militarizing features in the South China Sea. (p. 3)

The central challenge to U.S. prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition by what the National Security Strategy classifies as revisionist powers. It is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model—gaining veto authority over other nations' economic, diplomatic, and security decisions. (p. 4)

China is leveraging military modernization, influence operations, and predatory economics to coerce neighboring countries to reorder the Indo-Pacific region to their advantage. As China continues its economic and military ascendance, asserting power through an all-of-nation long-term strategy, it will continue to pursue a military

modernization program that seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the near-term and displacement of the United States to achieve global preeminence in the future. (p. 4)

Another change to the strategic environment is a resilient, but weakening, post-WWII international order. In the decades after fascism's defeat in World War II, the United States and its allies and partners constructed a free and open international order to better safeguard their liberty and people from aggression and coercion. Although this system has evolved since the end of the Cold War, our network of alliances and partnerships remain the backbone of global security. China and Russia are now undermining the international order from within the system by exploiting its benefits while simultaneously undercutting its principles and "rules of the road." (p. 4)

Long-term strategic competitions with China and Russia are the principal priorities for the Department, and require both increased and sustained investment, because of the magnitude of the threats they pose to U.S. security and prosperity today, and the potential for those threats to increase in the future. (p. 6)

Quadrennial Defense Review

Quadrennial Defense Review 2010

https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/quadrennial/QDR2010.pdf?ver=vVJYRVwNdnGb_00ixF0UfQ%3d%3d

The rise of China, the world's most populous country, and India, the world's largest democracy, will continue to shape an international system that is no longer easily defined—one in which the United States will remain the most powerful actor but must increasingly work with key allies and partners if it is to sustain stability and peace. (p. iii)

The rise of China, the world's most populous country, and India, the world's largest democracy, will continue to reshape the international system. (p. 7)

Special attention is required to develop domain awareness tools for the Arctic approaches as well. In coordination with domestic and international partners, DoD will explore technologies that have the potential to detect, track, and identify threats in these spheres to ensure that capabilities can be deployed to counter them in a timely fashion. (p. 19)

As part of its long-term, comprehensive military modernization, China is developing and fielding large numbers of advanced medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles, new attack submarines equipped with advanced weapons, increasingly capable long-range air defense systems, electronic warfare and computer network attack capabilities, advanced fighter aircraft, and counter-space systems. China has shared only limited information about the pace, scope, and ultimate aims of its military modernization programs, raising a number of legitimate questions regarding its long-term intentions. (p. 31)

We will continue to work with this community of like-minded nations, whether by engaging with allies still shaping their democracies after decades of living in the shadow of the Soviet Union, building on the benefits of French reintegration into NATO's military structure, or addressing new security issues such as those arising in the Arctic region. (p. 57)

We will seek out opportunities to work with Moscow on emerging issues, such as the future of the Arctic and the need for effective missile defense architectures designed to protect the region from external threats. At the same time, the United States will continue to engage with Russia's neighbors as fully independent and sovereign states. (p. 59)

China's growing presence and influence in regional and global economic and security affairs is one of the most consequential aspects of the evolving strategic landscape in the Asia-Pacific region and globally. In particular, China's military has begun to develop new roles, missions, and capabilities in support of its growing regional and global interests,

which could enable it to play a more substantial and constructive role in international affairs. The United States welcomes a strong, prosperous, and successful China that plays a greater global role. The United States welcomes the positive benefits that can accrue from greater cooperation. However, lack of transparency and the nature of China's military development and decision-making processes raise legitimate questions about its future conduct and intentions within Asia and beyond. Our relationship with China must therefore be multidimensional and undergirded by a process of enhancing confidence and reducing mistrust in a manner that reinforces mutual interests. The United States and China should sustain open channels of communication to discuss disagreements in order to manage and ultimately reduce the risks of conflict that are inherent in any relationship as broad and complex as that shared by these two nations. (p. 60)

The Department will also enhance defense relationships and continue to work with Canada in the context of regional security, increased interaction in the Arctic, and combat operations in Afghanistan. (p. 62)

The effect of changing climate on the Department's operating environment is evident in the maritime commons of the Arctic. The opening of the Arctic waters in the decades ahead which will permit seasonal commerce and transit presents a unique opportunity to work collaboratively in multilateral forums to promote a balanced approach to improving human and environmental security in the region. In that effort, DoD must work with the Coast Guard and the Department of Homeland Security to address gaps in Arctic communications, domain awareness, search and rescue, and environmental observation and forecasting capabilities to support both current and future planning and operations. To support cooperative engagement in the Arctic, DoD strongly supports accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. (p. 86)

Quadrennial Defense Review 2014

<https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/quadrennial/QDR2014.pdf?ver=tXH94SVvSQLVw-ENZ-a2pQ%3d%3d>

Powerful global forces are emerging. Shifting centers of gravity are empowering smaller countries and non-state actors on the international stage. Global connections are multiplying and deepening, resulting in greater interaction between states, non-state entities, and private citizens. In a fundamentally globalized world, economic growth in Asia; aging populations in the United States, Europe, China, and Japan; continued instability in the Middle East and Africa; and many other trends interact dynamically. (p. 3)

As nations in the region continue to develop their military and security capabilities, there is greater risk that tensions over long-standing sovereignty disputes or claims to natural resources will spur disruptive competition or erupt into conflict, reversing the trends of rising regional peace, stability, and prosperity. In particular, the rapid pace and comprehensive scope of China's military modernization continues, combined with a relative lack of transparency and openness from China's leaders regarding both military capabilities and intentions. (p. 4)

In the coming years, countries such as China will continue seeking to counter U.S. strengths using anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) approaches and by employing other new cyber and space control technologies. (p. 6)

These changes */Climate change/*, coupled with other global dynamics, including growing, urbanizing, more affluent populations, and substantial economic growth in India, China, Brazil, and other nations, will devastate homes, land, and infrastructure. (p. 8)

The ability to deter and defeat these kinds of threats protects the United States, reassures our allies and partners, and preserves strategic stability with Russia and China. (p. 14)

With China, the Department of Defense is building a sustained and substantive dialogue with the People's Liberation Army designed to improve our ability to cooperate in

concrete, practical areas such as counter-piracy, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. At the same time, we will manage the competitive aspects of the relationship in ways that improve regional peace and stability consistent with international norms and principles. (p. 17)

Faced with this threat, the United States is committed to maintaining peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and closely monitors the situation through military and diplomatic channels in coordination with the ROK, Japan, China, and Russia. (p. 20)

Climate change also creates both a need and an opportunity for nations to work together, which the Department will seize through a range of initiatives. We are developing new policies, strategies, and plans, including the Department's Arctic Strategy and our work in building humanitarian assistance and disaster response capabilities, both within the Department and with our allies and partners. (p. 25)

National Security Strategy

National Security Strategy 2010

<https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/NSS2010.pdf?ver=Zt7IeSPX2uNQt007wq6Hg%3d%3d>

We are working to build deeper and more effective partnerships with other key centers of influence—including China, India, and Russia, as well as increasingly influential nations such as Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia—so that we can cooperate on issues of bilateral and global concern, with the recognition that power, in an interconnected world, is no longer a zero sum game. (p.3)

China and India—the world's two most populous nations—are becoming more engaged globally. (p. 8)

We will continue to deepen our cooperation with other 21st century centers of influence—including China, India, and Russia—on the basis of mutual interests and mutual respect. (p. 11)

Certain bilateral relationships—such as U.S. relations with China, India, and Russia—will be critical to building broader cooperation on areas of mutual interest. (p. 43)

We will continue to pursue a positive, constructive, and comprehensive relationship with China. We welcome a China that takes on a responsible leadership role in working with the United States and the international community to advance priorities like economic recovery, confronting climate change, and nonproliferation. We will monitor China's military modernization program and prepare accordingly to ensure that U.S. interests and allies, regionally and globally, are not negatively affected. More broadly, we will encourage China to make choices that contribute to peace, security, and prosperity as its influence rises. We are using our newly established Strategic and Economic Dialogue to address a broader range of issues, and improve communication between our militaries in order to reduce mistrust. We will encourage continued reduction in tension between the People's Republic of China and Taiwan. We will not agree on every issue, and we will be candid on our human rights concerns and areas where we differ. But disagreements should not prevent cooperation on issues of mutual interest, because a pragmatic and effective relationship between the United States and China is essential to address the major challenges of the 21st century. (p. 43)

Arctic Interests: The United States is an Arctic Nation with broad and fundamental interests in the Arctic region, where we seek to meet our national security needs, protect the environment, responsibly manage resources, account for indigenous communities, support scientific research, and strengthen international cooperation on a wide range of issues. (p. 50)

National Security Strategy 2015

<https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/NSS2015.pdf?ver=TJJ2QfM0McCqL-pNtKhtVQ%3d%3d>

The scope of our cooperation with China is unprecedented, even as we remain alert to China's military modernization and reject any role for intimidation in resolving territorial disputes. ... We are building on our own energy security—and the ground-breaking commitment we made with China to reduce greenhouse gas emissions—to cement an international consensus on arresting climate change. (Foreword by Barack Obama)

In particular, India's potential, China's rise, and Russia's aggression all significantly impact the future of major power relations. (p. 4)

As the world's two largest emitters, the United States and China reached a landmark agreement to take significant action to reduce carbon pollution. (p. 12)

The present day effects of climate change are being felt from the Arctic to the Midwest. (p. 12)

We encourage open channels of dialogue to resolve disputes peacefully in accordance with international law. We also support the early conclusion of an effective code of conduct for the South China Sea between China and the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN). ... Finally, we seek to build on the unprecedented international cooperation of the last few years, especially in the Arctic as well as in combatting piracy off the Horn of Africa and drug-smuggling in the Caribbean Sea and across Southeast Asia. (p. 13)

We will also stay engaged with global suppliers and our partners to reduce the potential for energy-related conflict in places like the Arctic and Asia. (p. 16)

The United States welcomes the rise of a stable, peaceful, and prosperous China. We seek to develop a constructive relationship with China that delivers benefits for our two peoples and promotes security and prosperity in Asia and around the world. We seek cooperation on shared regional and global challenges such as climate change, public health, economic growth, and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. While there will be competition, we reject the inevitability of confrontation. At the same time, we will manage competition from a position of strength while insisting that China uphold international rules and norms on issues ranging from maritime security to trade and human rights. We will closely monitor China's military modernization and expanding presence in Asia, while seeking ways to reduce the risk of misunderstanding or miscalculation. On cybersecurity, we will take necessary actions to protect our businesses and defend our networks against cyber-theft of trade secrets for commercial gain whether by private actors or the Chinese government. (p. 24)

National Security Strategy 2017

<https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>

China and Russia challenge American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity. They are determined to make economies less free and less fair, to grow their militaries, and to control information and data to repress their societies and expand their influence. (p. 2)

These competitions require the United States to rethink the policies of the past two decades—policies based on the assumption that engagement with rivals and their inclusion in international institutions and global commerce would turn them into benign actors and trustworthy partners. For the most part, this premise turned out to be false. (p. 3)

Rival actors use propaganda and other means to try to discredit democracy. They advance anti-Western views and spread false information to create divisions among ourselves, our allies, and our partners. (p. 3)

China and Russia are developing advanced weapons and capabilities that could threaten our critical infrastructure and our command and control architecture. (p. 8)

Every year, competitors such as China steal U.S. intellectual property valued at hundreds of billions of dollars. Stealing proprietary technology and early-stage ideas allows competitors to unfairly tap into the innovation of free societies. (p. 21)

China and Russia want to shape a world antithetical to U.S. values and interests. China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model, and reorder the region in its favor. (p. 25)

For decades, U.S. policy was rooted in the belief that support for China's rise and for its integration into the post-war international order would liberalize China. Contrary to our hopes, China expanded its power at the expense of the sovereignty of others. China gathers and exploits data on an unrivaled scale and spreads features of its authoritarian system, including corruption and the use of surveillance. It is building the most capable and wellfunded military in the world, after our own. Its nuclear arsenal is growing and diversifying. Part of China's military modernization and economic expansion is due to its access to the U.S. innovation economy, including America's world-class universities. (p. 25)

In addition, after being dismissed as a phenomenon of an earlier century, great power competition returned. China and Russia began to reassert their influence regionally and globally. Today, they are fielding military capabilities designed to deny America access in times of crisis and to contest our ability to operate freely in critical commercial zones during peacetime. In short, they are contesting our geopolitical advantages and trying to change the international order in their favor. (p. 27)

China, Russia, and other state and non-state actors recognize that the United States often views the world in binary terms, with states being either "at peace" or "at war," when it is actually an arena of continuous competition. Our adversaries will not fight us on our terms. We will raise our competitive game to meet that challenge, to protect American interests, and to advance our values. (p. 28)

China, for example, combines data and the use of AI to rate the loyalty of its citizens to the state and uses these ratings to determine jobs and more. (p. 35)

Today, the United States must compete for positive relationships around the world. China and Russia target their investments in the developing world to expand influence and gain competitive advantages against the United States. China is investing billions of dollars in infrastructure across the globe. (p. 38)

A range of international institutions establishes the rules for how states, businesses, and individuals interact with each other, across land and sea, the Arctic, outer space, and the digital realm. (p. 40)

Although the United States seeks to continue to cooperate with China, China is using economic inducements and penalties, influence operations, and implied military threats to persuade other states to heed its political and security agenda. China's infrastructure investments and trade strategies reinforce its geopolitical aspirations. Its efforts to build and militarize out posts in the South China Sea endanger the free flow of trade, threaten the sovereignty of other nations, and undermine regional stability. China has mounted a rapid military modernization campaign designed to limit U.S. access to the region and provide China a freer hand there. China presents its ambitions as mutually beneficial, but Chinese dominance risks diminishing the sovereignty of many states in the Indo-Pacific. States throughout the region are calling for sustained U.S. leadership in a collective response that upholds a regional order respect-full of sovereignty and independence. (p. 46)

China is gaining a strategic foothold in Europe by expanding its unfair trade practices and investing in key industries, sensitive technologies, and infrastructure. (p. 47)

We will work with our partners to contest China's unfair trade and economic practices and restrict its acquisition of sensitive technologies. (p. 48)

We will help South Asian nations maintain their sovereignty as China increases its influence in the region. (p. 50)

China seeks to pull the region into its orbit through state-led investments and loans. Russia continues its failed politics of the Cold War by bolstering its radical Cuban allies as Cuba continues to repress its citizens. Both China and Russia support the dictatorship in Venezuela and are seeking to expand military linkages and arms sales across the region. The hemisphere's democratic states have a shared interest in confronting threats to their sovereignty. (p. 51)

We will offer American goods and services, both because it is profitable for us and because it serves as an alternative to China's often extractive economic footprint on the continent. (p. 53)

Department of Defense

Report to Congress on Strategy to Protect United States National Security Interests in the Arctic Region 2016

<https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016-Arctic-Strategy-UNCLAS-cleared-for-release.pdf>

Non-Arctic States, particularly those with robust maritime sectors, have sought to increase their influence in the region and safeguard their ability to access potential resources and transit routes. Arctic Council Observers include France, Germany, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, the United Kingdom, China, Italy, Japan, Korea, Singapore, and India. The EU released an Arctic Strategy in 2013, reiterating its commitment to playing a bigger role in facilitating research, promoting climate change policies, and fostering cooperation. (p. 9)

Assessment on U.S. Defense Implications of China's Expanding Global Access 2018

<https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jan/14/2002079292/-1/-1/1/EXPANDING-GLOBAL-ACCESS-REPORT-FINAL.PDF>

~ Securitisation of Belt and Road Initiative

The Chinese Communist Party's foreign policy reflects its strategic objectives. The U.S. National Security Strategy states that China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model, and reorder the region in its favor as the preeminent power. China's most substantial expansion of its military access in recent years has occurred in its near-abroad, where territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas persist, but China has also expanded its military operations further from the Chinese mainland. China seeks this presence based on its changing military focus and expanding international economic interests, which are increasing demands for the PLA to operate in more distant maritime environments to protect Chinese citizens, investments, and critical sea lines of communication. (p. executive summary)

In 2017, China's leaders said OBOR, which at first included economic initiatives in Asia, South Asia, Africa, and Europe, now encompasses all regions of the world, including the Arctic and Latin America, demonstrating the scope and reach of Beijing's ambition. (p. 4)

While many of China's generous investment financing offers benefit their host nations, they often come with strings attached. The report provides 17 examples of cases in which Chinese investment and project financing that bypasses regular market mechanisms has resulted in negative economic effects for the host country; in which economic deals have carried costs to host country sovereignty; or in which China has employed economic incentives or economic coercion to achieve specific political objectives. China's attempts to gain veto authority over other countries' decisions, and its coercion directed at U.S. allies and partners in particular, will likely threaten U.S. posture and access if not addressed. (p. 4)

The NDS identifies long-term strategic competitions with China and Russia as the principal priorities for the Department. (p. 4)

While some OBOR projects appear to be motivated by economic considerations, OBOR also serves a greater strategic purpose. (p. 12)

In 2017, China's leaders said OBOR, which at first included economic initiatives in Asia, South Asia, Africa, and Europe, now encompasses all regions of the world, including the Arctic and Latin America, demonstrating the scope and reach of Beijing's ambition. China also released a "Vision of Maritime Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative" in 2017, which lays out three maritime corridors and the importance of maritime security cooperation. One identified corridor is from China through the Indian Ocean to Africa and the Mediterranean Sea. Another corridor is designated from China to Oceania and the South Pacific, and the last corridor from China to Europe through the Arctic Ocean. (p. 12)

Indo-Pacific report 2019

<https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF>

~Alaska is also Pacific region by this report

Inter-state strategic competition, defined by geopolitical rivalry between free and repressive world order visions, is the primary concern for U.S. national security. In particular, the People's Republic of China, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, seeks to reorder the region to its advantage by leveraging military modernization, influence operations, and predatory economics to coerce other nations. (foreword)

America's annual two-way trade with the region is \$2.3 trillion, with U.S. foreign direct investment of \$1.3 trillion in the region - more than China's, Japan's, and South Korea's combined. (p. 2)

In 2017, President Trump announced our nation's vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific at the APEC Summit in Vietnam, and our commitment to a safe, secure, prosperous, and free region that benefits all nations. (p. 3)

China's economic, political, and military rise is one of the defining elements of the 21st century. Today, the Indo-Pacific increasingly is confronted with a more confident and assertive China that is willing to accept friction in the pursuit of a more expansive set of political, economic, and security interests. Perhaps no country has benefited more from the free and open regional and international system than China, which has witnessed the rise of hundreds of millions from poverty to growing prosperity and security. Yet while the Chinese people aspire to free markets, justice, and the rule of law, the People's Republic of China (PRC), under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), undermines the international system from within by exploiting its benefits while simultaneously eroding the values and principles of the rules-based order. (p. 7)

China's violation of international norms also extends abroad. Chinese nationals acting in association with the Chinese Ministry of State Security were recently indicted for conducting global campaigns of cyber theft that targeted intellectual property and confidential business and technological information at managed service providers. China has continued to militarize the South China Sea by placing anti-ship cruise missiles and long-range surface-to-air missiles on the disputed Spratly Islands and employing paramilitary forces in maritime disputes vis-à-vis other claimants. In the air, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has increased patrols around and near Taiwan using bomber, fighter, and surveillance aircraft to signal Taiwan. China additionally employs non-military tools coercively, including economic tools, during periods of political tensions with countries that China accuses of harming its national interests. (p. 8)

As China continues its economic and military ascendance, it seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the near-term and, ultimately global preeminence in the long-term. China is investing in a broad range of military programs and weapons, including those designed to improve power projection; modernize its nuclear forces; and conduct increasingly complex operations in domains such as cyberspace, space, and electronic warfare operations. China is also developing a wide array of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, which could be used to prevent countries from operating in areas near China's periphery, including the maritime and air domains that are open to use by all countries. In 2018, China's placement of anti-ship cruise missiles and long-range surface-to-air missiles on the disputed Spratly Islands violated a 2015 public pledge by the Chairman of the CCP Xi Jinping that "China does not intend to pursue militarization" of the Spratly Islands. China's use of military presence in an attempt to exert de facto control over disputed areas is not limited to the South China Sea. In the East China Sea, China patrols near the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands with maritime law enforcement ships and aircraft. These actions endanger the free flow of trade, threaten the sovereignty of other nations, and undermine regional stability. Such activities are inconsistent with the principles of a free and open Indo-Pacific. Simultaneously, China is engaged in a campaign of low-level coercion to assert control of disputed spaces in the region, particularly in the maritime domain. China is using a steady progression of small, incremental steps in the "gray zone" between peaceful relations and overt hostilities to secure its aims, while remaining below the threshold of armed conflict. Such activities can involve the coordination of multiple tools, including: political warfare, disinformation, use of A2/AD networks, subversion, and economic leverage. During the last decade, China continued to emphasize capabilities for Taiwan contingencies. China has never renounced the use of military force against Taiwan, and continues to develop and deploy advanced military capabilities needed for a potential military campaign. PLA modernization is also strengthening its ability to operate farther from China's borders. For example, the PLA is reorganizing to improve its capability to conduct complex joint operations, and is also improving its command and control, training, personnel, and logistics systems. Key weapon systems deployed or in development, include: cruise and ballistic missile systems, modern fighter and bomber aircraft, aircraft carriers, modern ships and submarines, amphibious assault ships, surface-to-air missile systems, electronic warfare systems, direct-ascent, hit-to-kill anti-satellite missiles, and autonomous systems. (p. 8-9)

"Beijing is leveraging its economic instrument of power in ways that can undermine the autonomy of countries across the region...easy money in the short term, but these funds come with strings attached: unsustainable debt, decreased transparency, restrictions on market economies, and the potential loss of control of natural

resources.”

- Admiral Philip S. Davidson, Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, posture testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 12, 2019 (p. 9)

China is using economic inducements and penalties, influence operations, and implied military threats to persuade other states to comply with its agenda. Although trade has benefitted both China and its trade partners, Chinese use of espionage and theft for economic advantage, as well as diversion of acquired technology to the military, remains a significant source of economic and national security risk to all of China’s trading partners. While investment often brings benefits for recipient countries, including the United States, some of China’s investments result in negative economic effects or costs to host country sovereignty. Chinese investment and project financing that bypasses regular market mechanisms results in lower standards and reduced opportunities for local companies and workers, and can result in significant debt accumulation. One-sided and opaque deals are inconsistent with the principles of a free and open Indo-Pacific, and are causing concern in the region. For example, in 2018, Bangladesh was forced to ban one of China’s major state firms for attempted bribery, and in the same year, Maldives’ finance minister stated that China was building infrastructure projects in the country at significantly inflated prices compared to what was previously agreed. Furthermore, a Chinese state-owned enterprise purchased operational control of Hambantota Port for 99 years, taking advantage of Sri Lanka’s need for cash when its government faced daunting external debt repayment obligations. The United States does not oppose China’s investment activities as long as they respect sovereignty and the rule of law, use responsible financing practices, and operate in a transparent and economically sustainable manner. The United States, however, has serious concerns with China’s potential to convert unsustainable debt burdens of recipient countries or sub-national groups into strategic and military access, including by taking possession of sovereign assets as collateral. China’s coercive behavior is playing out globally, from the Middle East and Africa to Latin America and Europe. (p. 9)

A lack of transparency also clouds China’s activities in the polar regions. In 2018, China announced the inclusion of the region in One Belt One Road as the “Polar Silk Road” and emphasized its self-declared status as a “Near-Arctic State.” China is also expanding its engagement and capabilities in the Antarctic, in particular by working to finalize a fifth research station, which will diversify its presence across the continent. (p. 10)

Broadly, they share a preference for a multipolar world order in which the United States is weaker and less influential. Russia has Arctic interests linked to its significant Arctic Ocean coastline and the extraction of natural resources. This is witnessed by Russia’s extended continental shelf claim, and an uptick in its military posture and investments to develop the region and the Northern Sea shipping route, including with Chinese involvement. However, an interest in reserving Arctic resources for littoral states may ultimately limit the extent and depth of Sino-Russian cooperation. (p. 12)

The core diagnosis of the National Defense Strategy is that DoD’s military advantage vis-à-vis China and Russia is eroding and, if inadequately addressed, it will undermine our ability to deter aggression and coercion. A negative shift in the regional balance of power could encourage competitors to challenge and subvert the free and open order that supports prosperity and security for the United States and its allies and partners. To address this challenge, DoD is developing a more lethal, resilient, and rapidly innovating Joint Force, and is increasing collaboration with a robust constellation of allies and partners. (p. 16)

Arctic Specific Documents

National Strategy for Arctic Region 2013

https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/nat_arctic_strategy.pdf

~ no direct quotation of China at all and Russia is mentioned one (footnote only),
Climate Change is the main problem

The Arctic region is peaceful, stable, and free of conflict. The United States and its Arctic allies and partners seek to sustain this spirit of trust, cooperation and collaboration, both internationally and domestically. (Foreword by Barack Obama)

U.S. security in the Arctic encompasses a broad spectrum of activities, ranging from those supporting safe commercial and scientific operations to national defense. (p. 2)

Seek to maintain and preserve the Arctic region as an area free of conflict, acting in concert with allies, partners, and other interested parties. Support and preserve: international legal principles of freedom of navigation and overflight and other uses of the sea and airspace related to these freedoms, unimpeded lawful commerce, and the peaceful resolution of disputes for all nations. (p. 2)

To achieve this vision, the United States is establishing an overarching national approach to advance national security interests, pursue responsible stewardship of this precious and unique region, and serve as a basis for cooperation with other Arctic states and the international community as a whole to advance common interests. (p. 4)

Through this National Strategy for the Arctic Region, we seek to guide, prioritize, and synchronize efforts to protect U.S. national and homeland security interests, promote responsible stewardship, and foster international cooperation. (p. 5)

Our highest priority is to protect the American people, our sovereign territory and rights, natural resources, and interests of the United States. (p. 6)

As many nations across the world aspire to expand their role in the Arctic, we encourage Arctic and non-Arctic states to work collaboratively through appropriate fora to address the emerging challenges and opportunities in the Arctic region, while we remain vigilant to protect the security interests of the United States and our allies. (p. 6)

Safeguard Peace and Stability by working to maintain and preserve the Arctic region as an area free of conflict, acting in concert with allies, partners, and other interested parties. This principle will include United States action, and the actions of other interested countries, in supporting and preserving international legal principles of freedom of navigation and overflight and other uses of the sea related to these freedoms, unimpeded lawful commerce, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. The United States will rely on existing international law, which provides a comprehensive set of rules governing the rights, freedoms, and uses of the world's oceans and airspace, including the Arctic. (p. 10)

Arctic Strategy 2013 (Coast Guard)

https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/Strategy/cg_arctic_strategy.pdf

The concept of governance involves institutions, structures of authority, and capabilities necessary to oversee maritime activities while safeguarding national interests. (p. 10)

national Security presidential directive 66/homeland Security presidential directive 25 (nSpd-66/hSpd-25) sets forth United States arctic policy guidance and directs actions of implementation.¹¹ The policy outlines the U.S. Government's priorities including: national Security and homeland Security interests in the arctic region, international Governance, extended Continental Shelf and Boundary issues, international Scientific Cooperation, Marine Transportation in the arctic region, economic issues (including

energy), environmental protection and Conservation of natural resources; and the involvement of indigenous Communities. (p. 15)

The president signed the national Strategy for the arctic region¹⁴ on May 10, 2013. That document identifies strategic priorities for the U.S. Government to advance U.S. security interests, promote responsible arctic stewardship, and strengthen international cooperation. (p. 15)

a number of non-arctic nations and non-state organizations maintain awareness and engage in arctic maritime activity. China is expanding polar research capabilities and is considering the consequences of diminishing sea ice. China is also interested in resource extraction, as well as the advantages of shorter sea routes to and from Siberia, Western Europe, and the eastern United States.

Icebreaking capability by Coast Guard cutters is limited: The January 2012 resupply effort to Nome, Alaska, which required breaking an ice channel and escorting a commercial tanker to port, would not have happened but for the availability of the Coast Guard icebreaker USCGC Healy (WMEB 20). Surface capability is vital to meeting statutory responsibilities. As such, the nation must plan for ice capable assets that can effectively carry out year-round search and rescue, environmental response, charting, scientific research, and other arctic operations. (p. 36)

The Coast Guard's legacy is defined uniquely, and proudly, by adaptation through adversity. However, responses to major catastrophes always highlight gaps in preparedness. Examples include the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and the 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Conversely, such disasters also affirm the Coast Guard's value proposition to the nation. This strategy is informed by such historic lessons and embraces adaptation as a vital enabler in the U.S. Arctic. This Arctic Strategy will guide the U.S. Coast Guard as it seeks to ensure safe, secure, and environmentally responsible maritime activity in the Arctic. (p. 37)

United States Coast Guard Arctic Strategy Implementation Plan 2015

<https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%20Documents/5pw/Arctic%20Policy/CGAS%20IPlan%20Final%20Signed.pdf?ver=2017-08-25-075935-927>

Technický text, k analýze nebyl využit.

Report to Congress Department of Defense Arctic Strategy 2019

<https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jun/06/2002141657/-1/-1/1/2019-DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY.PDF>

National Security Strategy and anchored in the priorities of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and its focus on competition with China and Russia as the principal challenge to long-term U.S. security and prosperity. This strategy supersedes the 2016 DoD Arctic strategy. (p. 2)

DoD must prioritize efforts to address the central problem the NDS identifies – i.e., the Joint Force's eroding competitive edge against China and Russia, and the NDS imperative to ensure favorable regional balances of power in the Indo-Pacific and Europe. (p. 2)

Increasing Military Activity: Russia views itself as a polar great power and is the largest Arctic nation by landmass, population, and military presence above the Arctic Circle. Russia's commercial investments in the Arctic region have been matched by continued defense investments and activities that strengthen both its territorial defense and its ability to control the NSR. Russia formed the Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command in

December 2014 to coordinate its renewed emphasis on the Arctic. Since then, Russia has gradually strengthened its presence by creating new Arctic units, refurbishing old airfields and infrastructure in the Arctic, and establishing new military bases along its Arctic coastline. There is also a concerted effort to establish a network of air defense and coastal missile systems, early warning radars, rescue centers, and a variety of sensors. China's operational presence in the Arctic is more limited. It includes China's icebreaking vessels, the Xuelong and newly-constructed Xuelong 2, and civilian research efforts, which could support a strengthened, future Chinese military presence in the Arctic Ocean, potentially including deployment of submarines to the region.

Attempts to Alter Arctic Governance through Economic Leverage: Despite having no territorial claims in the region, China is seeking a role in Arctic governance. As part of China's "One Belt, One Road" initiative, it has linked its economic activities in the Arctic to its broader strategic objectives, as articulated in its first Arctic policy white paper in January 2018. China's stated interests in the Arctic are primarily focused on access to natural resources and the opportunities offered by the Arctic sea routes for Chinese shipping. China does not currently have a permanent Arctic military presence, but is increasing its presence through economic outreach, investments in Arctic states' strategic sectors, and scientific activities. China maintains research stations in Iceland and Norway and has pursued energy development and infrastructure projects in Russia, such as the Yamal liquefied natural gas project. China also continues to seek opportunities to invest in dual-use infrastructure in the Arctic. Despite China's claim of being a "Near Arctic State," the United States does not recognize any such status. (p. 4-5)

U.S. interests include maintaining flexibility for global power projection, including by ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight; and limiting the ability of China and Russia to leverage the region as a corridor for competition that advances their strategic objectives through malign or coercive behavior.(p. 5)

Homeland: The Arctic is strategic terrain as a potential vector for an attack on the U.S. homeland. China and Russia pose discrete and different challenges in their respective theaters, but both are also pursuing activities and capabilities in the Arctic that may present risks to the homeland. (p. 6)

Shared Region: In different ways, Russia and China are challenging the rules-based order in the Arctic. (p. 6)

China is attempting to gain a role in the Arctic in ways that may undermine international rules and norms, and there is a risk that its predatory economic behavior globally may be repeated in the Arctic. (p. 6)

Potential Corridor for Strategic Competition: Developments in the Arctic have the potential to directly or indirectly constrain DoD's ability to flow forces globally, and more broadly to affect U.S. strategic objectives related to competition with China and Russia in the Indo-Pacific and Europe. The Arctic remains vulnerable to "strategic spillover" from tensions, competition, or conflict arising in these other regions. (p. 6)

The 2018 NDS provides the overarching strategic guidance for framing DoD's Arctic Strategy. The NDS establishes DoD's goals and priorities for defending the homeland and protecting U.S. and allied interests globally by regaining the Joint Force's competitive military edge against China and Russia (p. 6)

Arctic Strategic Outlook 2019 (Coast Guard)

[https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/Images/arctic/Arctic Strategic Outlook APR 2019.pdf](https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/Images/arctic/Arctic%20Strategic%20Outlook%20APR%202019.pdf)

Number of Chinese Arctic expeditions. While not an Arctic nation, China has made the Arctic a strategic priority, declaring themselves a "Near-Arctic State." (p. 3)

America's two nearest-peer powers, Russia and China, have both declared the region a national priority and made corresponding investments in capability and capacity to expand

their influence in the region. Russia and China's persistent challenges to the rules-based international order around the globe cause concern of similar infringement to the continued peaceful stability of the Arctic region (p. 4)

America's competitors have shown a willingness to work within established frameworks when advantageous to them, but they are just as willing to work outside these frameworks to further their ambitions or spoil the interests of others. China, a non-Arctic state, continues to expand its influence and seeks to gain strategic advantage around the world. China has challenged international law in the East and South China Seas, built islands, and claimed territorial status to suit its national interests. China's pattern of behavior in the Indo-Pacific region and its disregard for international law are cause for concern as its economic and scientific presence in the Arctic grows. In 2013, China gained observer status on the Arctic Council. In recent years, China has declared itself a "near-Arctic" state and is pursuing a Polar Silk Road plan with a range of Arctic infrastructure activities to include ports, undersea cables, and airports. These plans are supported by the construction of a second multi-mission ice-capable ship, the announcement that it will construct a nuclear-powered icebreaker, annual deployments of research vessels into the Arctic, and investments in vulnerable communities. China's attempts to expand its influence could impede U.S. access and freedom of navigation in the Arctic as similar attempts have been made to impede U.S. access to the South China Sea (p. 10)

Strategic Approach to Arctic Homeland Security 2021

<https://uaf.edu/caps/resources/policy-documents/us-dhs-strategic-approach-for-arctic-homeland-security-2021.pdf>

DHS must also contend with Great Power Competition posed by nation-states such as the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) and Russian Federation (RF), whose malign behavior is at its most acute point since the Department's creation. These actors increasingly deploy non-kinetic instruments of power and influence, including cyber-attacks, disinformation campaigns, and exploitation of our immigration and trade systems, to undermine the Homeland and our vital national security interests. (p4)

Integrating its unique authorities—law enforcement, fisheries protection, marine safety, and maritime security—with Navy and Marine Corps capabilities expands the options [the Coast Guard] provide[s] to joint force commanders for cooperation and competition. In this era of long-term strategic competition, the Naval Service must be prepared to defend our national interests, anywhere - anytime. China's and Russia's coercive actions, their attempts to undermine our alliances and partnerships, and their aggressive military modernization efforts pose an undeniable threat to global security and prosperity. (p.10)

China:

The PRC continues to use nefarious methods to undermine international norms and institutions governing the Arctic to elevate its standing as a dominant global power. In 2018, the PRC published a China Arctic Policy white paper titled, articulating the importance Beijing places on securing a dominant foothold in the region, despite being a non-Arctic State. To carry out its intentions, the PRC invested in foreign infrastructure to include air and sea ports, developed plans to extract natural resources, satisfied growing domestic food demands through Arctic fishery extraction, and desires to control Arctic trade routes to meet a growing demand for resources as well as their internal motivation to be a "great power".¹⁶ China also has two icebreakers with plans to construct more, to include a nuclear-powered vessel. With continued investment, China could outpace U.S. icebreaker capacity and polar access by 2024. (p.13)

Left unchallenged, Russia and China will continue malign activities in the region to further their insular agendas and desire for dominance in the Arctic Region. (p.13)

China will use coercion as well as economic and scientific inducements to expand physical presence and strategic influence in the region. Although a non-Arctic State, China has formally established its Polar Silk Road strategy in support of broader efforts to achieve global power status by 2050. p.14 (notes)

A Blue Arctic (United States Navy)

<https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jan/05/2002560338/-1/-1/0/ARCTIC%20BLUEPRINT%202021%20FINAL.PDF/ARCTIC%20BLUEPRINT%202021%20FINAL.PDF>

Without sustained American naval presence and partnerships in the Arctic Region, peace and prosperity will be increasingly challenged by Russia and China, whose interests and values differ dramatically from ours. p1

The regional challenges facing the United States in the Arctic Region—from the changing physical environment and greater access to sea routes and resources, to increased military activity by China and Russia, including attempts to alter Arctic governance – have grown more complex and more urgent, while the rapid advance of authoritarianism and revisionists approaches in the maritime environment undermine our ability to collectively meet them. Peace and prosperity in the Arctic requires enhanced naval presence and partnerships. p3-4

U.S. Naval forces must operate more assertively across the Arctic Region to prevail in day-to-day competition as we protect the homeland, keep Arctic seas free and open, and deter coercive behavior and conventional aggression. Our challenge is to apply naval power through day-to-day competition in a way that protects vital national interests and preserves regional security without undermining trust and triggering conflict. p.4

The People's Republic of China views the Arctic Region as a critical link in its One Belt One Road initiative. As witnessed in other regions, a combination of Chinese capital, technology, and experience has the potential to influence Arctic shipping routes and undermine the economic and social progress of peoples and nations along these routes. China is investing in ship building – polar-capable cargo vessels, liquefied natural gas tankers, and nuclear-powered icebreakers – as well as port infrastructure to improve access in the Arctic. China's investments, global fishing fleet, and scientific, economic, and academic linkages to the people and institutions of Arctic nations, including joint ventures with Russia, will likely continue to rise in the decades ahead. We also expect increased Chinese Navy deployments on, below, and above Arctic waters. China's growing economic, scientific, and military reach, along with its demonstrated intent to gain access and influence over Arctic States, control key maritime ports, and remake the international rules-based order presents a threat to people and nations, including those who call the Arctic Region home. p.8

Regaining Arctic Dominance (United States Army)

<https://api.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/2021/03/15/9944046e/regaining-arctic-dominance-us-army-in-the-arctic-19-january-2021-unclassified.pdf>

The Arctic has the potential to become a contested space where United States' great power rivals, Russia and China, seek to use military and economic power to gain and maintain access to the region at the expense of US interests. p15

The NDS identifies the erosion of the Joint Force's competitive edge against China and Russia as a central problem the Department must prioritize while maintaining a favorable balance of power between the two theaters. p.15

U.S. National Security Strategy highlights the Arctic as a corridor for expanded strategic great power competition between two regions – the Indo-Pacific and Europe. p15

America's great power competitors – Russia and China – have developed Arctic strategies with geopolitical goals contrary to U.S. interests. China aims to gain access to Arctic resources and sea routes to secure and bolster its military, economic, and scientific rise. p. 15-16

China has described the Arctic as a new strategic frontier (alongside space and the seabed) where there is “undetermined sovereignty,” suggesting a justification for access and presence in the high North. Sovereign ambiguity allows China to justify access to the region and potentially utilize military means to do so. p.16

while for China the Arctic will be a necessary source for energy and manufacturing, transportation, and food security diversification. P.17

These projects, however, are heavily reliant on outside capital, particularly from China. This is another element giving Beijing a stake in the region. P.18

Beijing’s interest in the Far North, accelerated over the last decade, is widely viewed as a preemptive bid for control of economic resources in the region. China began to normalize its presence in the Arctic almost two decades ago under the auspices of scientific exploration. p18

China opened its first scientific research station in 2004, the Arctic Yellow River Station on the island of Svalbard, Norway. P. 18-19

In order to lend credence to Beijing’s questionable claim to near-Arctic status, China launched the Polar Silk Road Initiative in 2018. P.19

China’s efforts in the Arctic will likely seek to preserve China’s unfettered access to the Northern Sea Route and the international waters of the central Arctic Ocean. China is making a case to preserve its sovereign rights to the region by means of discovery, continual presence, and influence. China has also expressed interest in building transcontinental and cross-border data cables to facilitate high-speed data transfer between Europe and Asia. (p. 19)

Moscow has turned to Beijing as a source of long-term financing and technology to aid the energy and infrastructure development in the High North. This has emboldened China’s pursuit of its Arctic economic ambitions under the auspices of its Polar Silk Road Fund at the exact moment when Beijing’s global economic ambitions under the banner of its Belt Road Initiative are gaining momentum. A confluence of economic and political interests led to accelerated Russian and Chinese cooperation in the Arctic, as highlighted by the Yamal Liquid Natural Gas Project, a \$27 billion joint venture between the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation and the Russian energy firm Novatek. P. 19-20

Russian Arctic energy is also only one of many energy sources necessary to satiate China’s long-term energy needs and desire for Supply-Side diversification. Increased production by Russia, increased requirements from China, and a dearth of other suppliers could position Moscow to provide for ~20% of China’s total energy consumption by 2050, emanating from both Arctic liquid natural gas (LNG) and energy piped across Russia. P. 20

China’s increased physical presence in the Arctic, combined with Russia’s growing economic and military ambitions in the region, highlight how both nations have long-term strategic designs for the Arctic. It is unclear, however, whether they can reconcile their Arctic ambitions to reshape the region to suit their individual strategic interests. P. 20