

## **Abstract**

Both Kant as well as Husserl have, at the mature stage of their thought, arrived at and strongly advocated specific idealistic doctrines which bear a great resemblance and even the same name, namely *transcendental idealism*. Although, in reality, the two doctrines are substantially different, there is one point in which they entirely overlap: they were both being anxiously differentiated by their authors from the *material idealism* of Berkeley, that is, the controversial 18<sup>th</sup> century doctrine which denies the mind-independent existence of the material world. The objective of this thesis is to demonstrate that, despite their adamant claims to the contrary, both Kant as well as Husserl are, as regards their idealistic doctrines, unequivocally Berkeleyan or, in other words, material idealists, and that the arguments they present in defense against this interpretation are either untenable or irrelevant with regard to the ontological orientation of their idealism. In both cases, the demonstration of the positive thesis is based on the very core of the given form of idealism: thus, we shall see that, in the case of Kant, material idealism is fully contained within the doctrine of the transcendental aesthetic, and that, in the case of Husserl, the same applies to his principle of relativity.