

Univerzita Karlova

Filozofická fakulta

Ústav filosofie a religionistiky

Bakalářská práce

Nietzsche's Will to Power led by the Hands of Morality

Nietzscheho Vůle k Moci v Osidlech Morálky

Jan Krajc

Praha 2021/22

Vedoucí Práce: Daniele De Santis, Ph.D.

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Dále bych ještě rád vyslovil díky směrem k doc. Mgr. Jakubu Čapkovi, Ph.D., jehož kritické poznámky mě inspirovaly k volbě alternativního přístupu k této práci, který nyní máte před sebou.

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Abstrakt

Cílem této práce je vyobrazení určitého pohledu na Nietzscheho koncept „Vůle k Moci“. Ačkoli Nietzsche nikdy nepodává akademickou definici tohoto konceptu, což má dle mého názoru své odůvodnění, pokusíme se jej poodkrýt následujícím systematickým způsobem. Klíčem k této hádance bude představovat jeden z dalších pojmů, které Nietzsche ve svém myšlení rozvádí – Morálka. I když se tak nemusí na první pohled zdát, oba termíny jsou velice úzce provázány, někdo by mohl říci, že až na úroveň jejich neodlučitelnosti. Tento fakt je více než zřetelně přítomný ve dvou jeho dílech – *Genealogie morálky* a *Mimo Dobro a Zlo*; a právě jejich houštinami se bude prodírat i náš vlastní výzkum. Na základě těchto dvou děl si vybudujeme neochvějnou základnu, na níž budeme moci pevně stát a ukázat si na tento záhadný princip, jakým Vůle k Moci bez pochyb je. Důvod pro kombinaci těchto pojmů je naše přesvědčení, že důsledné uchopení Vůle k Moci je možné pouze z pohledu zakořeněném v genealogii morálních hodnot, především ve způsobu, jak Nietzsche nahlíží na vývoj lidstva od před-morálního období, skrze období morální, až po období extra-morální. Konkrétněji, jak Vůle k Moci najde možnost (nepřímo) vyjádřit se v našem systému morálních (hierarchizovaných) hodnot, tak právě průzkum těchto hodnot nás přivede k jedinému možnému a bezpečnému přístupu k samotné Vůli k moci.

Tato esej se bude skládat ze čtyř částí. V první si poukážeme na to, jak v Nietzscheho očích dociluje jakákoli emoce a jakýkoli koncept svého vzniku. Tato metodologická část je zásadní z následujících důvodů – jelikož Vůle k Moci je zodpovědná za to, jak si vytváříme naše koncepty, musí být vznesena otázka, jakým konkrétním způsobem jsou utvářeny naše morální koncepty a úsudky. Proto budeme ve druhé části následovat postup myšlení, který sám Nietzsche předpokládá, a prozkoumáme jak přesně je Vůle k Moci zodpovědná za onen vznik konceptů. Ve třetí části zkombinujeme vědomosti z předchozích dvou kapitol a použijeme je k vysvětlení Nietzscheho konceptu „asketického kněze“. Čtvrtá a poslední kapitola bude mít formu shrnutí, vymezení se vůči jiným interpretacím Nietzscheho, a kritiky Nietzscheho samotného.

Klíčová slova

Vůle k Moci, Morálka, Emoce, Pocit, Vnitřní Zkušenost, Překrývající se Mnoho, Hodnota, Prostředek

Abstract

This thesis aims to propose a certain way of conceiving what is usually taken to be one of the key concepts of Nietzsche's philosophy – the Will to Power. Although Nietzsche never defines such a concept, we will try to unpack it in the following systematic way. The key to the puzzle will be represented by another notion that Nietzsche thoroughly elaborates on – Morality. Even though it might not be apparent at first glance, these two concepts are closely related, and one might even claim that they are inseparable. This fact comes to full light throughout two of Nietzsche's latest books we will be focusing on: *On the Genealogy of Morals* and *Beyond Good and Evil*. These two texts will represent for us a solid ground to search after a mysterious notion that the Will to Power most definitely is. For, we believe that a firm grasp of what Nietzsche intends by the latter notion can be obtained only if we consider it from the standpoint of the genealogy of moral values and, in particular, of how Nietzsche considers the development of humanity from a pre-moral stage to the stage of morality and eventually up to that of extra-morality. More concretely, as the Will to Power finds (indirect) expression in our system of (hierarchical) values, then the assessment of the genesis of the latter will provide us with the only possible, secure access to the former.

The thesis will consist of four parts. The first part will focus on how Nietzsche conceives of the problem of emotion and concept-formation or creation. The assessment of this methodological issue will turn out to be crucial for the following reason: as the Will to Power is what is ultimately responsible for how we frame our concepts, then the question needs to be raised as to how our moral concepts and judgments are specifically formed. Accordingly, the second part of our thesis will follow up on such Nietzschean train of thoughts and thus study how exactly is the Will to Power responsible for the mentioned concept-formation. The third part will try to combine the knowledge from the previous two chapters and use the newfound information to explain Nietzsche's own concept of the "ascetic priest". The fourth, and last, part shall have a form of a summary, an opposition towards other interpretations of Nietzsche, and a critique of Nietzsche himself.

Keywords

Will to Power, Morality, Emotion, Sensation, Inner Experience, Overlapping Multitude, Value, Means

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1. Introduction

It is very hard to resist the philosopher's urge to understand what life is. One need not go far in the history of philosophy to see said urge in function – consider Plato's division of life into three parts or Aristotle's perspective that life is a form of, let us say, self-alteration. And since Friedrich Nietzsche is also one of the great thinkers of the history of philosophy, it would be a grieving error not to at least witness, because we might not be able to understand it, his answer to such a question.

‘... life *is* will to power.’¹

It is precisely due to this one exclamation that we will try to uncover, to a degree we are capable of, the notion of Will to Power. This particular term stands at the basis of Nietzsche's philosophy, although how its definition is articulated is not very satisfying to an academic ear. There might be a reason why this is the case and if this reason was not intended by Nietzsche, it might at the minimum put us on the same note of seeing how important this key-term is.

As I have noted, there is no crystal-clear definition of the Will to Power, even though there are many sentences as to what it “is”. One example might be seen above, another one states:

‘This world is the will to power—and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power—and nothing besides!’²

But what do these examples tell us? They signify an intrinsic value of the Will to Power and metaphorically show us how it functions within Nietzsche's philosophical system. Besides that, they do not bring about any explanation. To put it simply, Nietzsche gives us a clue to

¹ Nietzsche Friedrich Wilhelm, *Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future*, trans. Hollingdale Reginald John (Penguin, 2003), p. 194.

² Nietzsche Friedrich Wilhelm, *The Will to Power: Selections from the Notebooks of the 1880s*, trans. Hill R. Kevin and Scarpitti Michael A. (UK: Penguin, 2017), p. 586

solve the riddle of the Will to Power in the form of another riddle – life is the Will to Power, the world is the Will to Power, and we are the Will to Power.

What might be the reason for that? He could have understood the Will to Power to be a “living notion” so to say, that is a notion which loses its value as soon as there is a definition imposed upon it, as soon as it is taken out of its “natural habitat”. To illustrate this idea in a different light, let us borrow Wittgenstein’s take on something inexpressible, for we currently find the Will to Power to be something “inexpressible”:

‘Perhaps what is inexpressible. (what I find mysterious and am not able to express) is the background against which whatever I could express has its meaning’.³

Ultimately, we understand that the Will to Power is not easily subdued, hence it is plain that we are in desperate need of another concept that could help us tame it. Taming, in our use of the word, means nothing else than introducing a sense of direction and limitation to the problem at hand. Similarly to leading an animal into an enclosure so that the study environment becomes less general, thus making its analysis easier. Accordingly, we must reduce the environment within which the Will to Power operates – we must view life, which is the Will to Power, only in certain conditions. Such conditions are provided by Nietzsche himself:

‘By morality I understand a system of value judgments which touches on the conditions of a creature’s life.’⁴

Therefore, we will inquire into morality, and its origin to find out how exactly it touches life and why. These questions are going to lead us into a deep-seated moral sense of human beings whose manifestation will take two forms in this thesis: *first in Section 2.2.*, will be the more general form, that of a society (i.e., how does this “moral sense” affect individuals

³ Wittgenstein Ludwig, Georg Henrik von Wright, Heikki Nymab a Peter Winch, *Culture and Value* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 16e

⁴ Nietzsche, *Will to Power*, p. 161

when they are members of a congregation?); and then *second in Section 4.*, the specific form of the manifestation, that of a highly “moral” (said word will gain a peculiar meaning, hence quotation marks) individual, namely the *ascetic priest* (i.e., what drives the individual, the priest into being moral at all?). In both cases, we shall uncover the harsh truth that it is the Will to Power which plants the deep-seated seed of morality into human beings: *first*, ‘as the theory of the relations of dominance under which the phenomenon ‘life’ arises.’⁵. And *second*, as ‘a *will to nothingness*, an aversion to life, a rebellion against the most fundamental pre-conditions of life, but which is and remains none the less a *will!*’⁶

In summary, our search for the Will to Power will *begin* (Section 2.1.) in the embrace of morality, concretely in its deep-seatedness in human emotions, sensations, and words. Said search will be rooted predominantly in *Beyond Good and Evil*, and *On the Genealogy of Morals* because it is in these two books that the connection of Morality and the Will to Power is the closest, one might say inseparable. Also, the fact that these books were written a year apart is going to make for a firm foundation on which we will be able to stand with ease. The deep-seatedness shall be shown on the example of an individual (for the purpose of clarity – it is easier to understand one example than many) which will, on top of seeing the roots of morality, uncover the individual’s unmatched value within Nietzsche’s philosophy. *Then* (Section 2.2.), we will present sensations, etc. in collaboration with each other on a larger scale i.e., in a society, which will make us assume a certain power dynamic within them. Hence, we will need to return to the deep-seatedness itself (Sections 3.1. and 3.2.) and try to articulate the origin of such power dynamic (the initial appearance of the Will to Power). *Followingly* (Section 4.), we will use our articulation for the interpretation of Nietzsche’s concept of the *ascetic priest*, thus rendering morality as the source of ‘the will to the *denial* of life’⁷. And *lastly* (Section 5.), we will pose an informative, or perhaps even critical question: What is the nature of Nietzsche’s discovery of the essential characteristic of the Will to Power (which we are aiming to justify in this thesis), that is:

⁵ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 49

⁶ Nietzsche Friedrich Wilhelm, *On the Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic*, trans. Smith Douglas (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 136

⁷ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 194

‘Its intention in all this is the incorporation of new ‘experiences’, the arrangement of new things within old divisions – growth, that is to say; more precisely, the *feeling* of growth, the feeling of increased power’⁸?

⁸ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 160

2. Morality

Let us start the inquiry by taking Nietzsche's assertion that 'moralities too are only a *sign-language of the emotions*'⁹ for granted. It provides us with two pieces of information, namely that the birthplace of morality can be found in the emotions, and that emotions express themselves in morality. These pieces of information we will use *systematically* as a point of departure for our claim that "it is the Will to Power which plants the deep-seated seed of morality into human beings" and *structurally*. We have taken the first piece as given, but we are still missing its justification, nonetheless if we can factually support the second piece (i.e., trace emotions back to morality) the first one will become undeniable. In other words, taking the assertion for granted will render our goal (i.e., the deep-seatedness of morality) more accessible: just like seeing a drawing of a pearl before diving into the depths of the ocean for one. Furthermore, after we track down the goal's manifestations, they will vindicate our initial "structural leap": like bringing the pearl back to the surface to prove that the drawing was not just a work of imagination.

Hence, it is the emotions we must first understand, and as we have pointed out, one example is easier to understand than many, therefore we will focus on their nature within the individual.

2.1. Emotions, Sensations, Words

The title of this section suggests that we shall be developing a connection between emotions, sensations and words. For terminological purposes let us note that what we talk about as "emotions" stands for the German "*Affekt*", sensations for the German "*Empfindung*", and that the German term "*Gefuehl*" which is sometimes, in the version of *Beyond Good and Evil* that we are using, translated as "sensations", and other times as "feelings", we unify under the notion of "feelings". Now, the said connection can be concretized followingly: emotions and sensations are synonymous in terms of their content but differ when it comes to the content's

⁹ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 110

apprehension. In other words: emotions and sensations seem to be the two sides of the same coin¹⁰. Words, meanwhile are vocal descriptions of images whose content is supplied by sensations; that is, words are expressions of sensations, or rather sensations express themselves, although not exclusively, through words. Hence, we have a ladder of concepts whose first step are emotions which also means claiming that morality accompanies all the concepts that are present on that particular ladder because emotions share the content of sensations' while words express it. But let us not get ahead of ourselves. We must first unveil what the term "emotions" stands for.

"Granted that nothing is 'given' as real except our world of desires and passions, that we can rise or sink to no other 'reality' than the reality of our drives – for thinking is only the relationship of these drives to one another -: is it not permitted to make the experiment and ask the question whether this which is given does not *suffice* for an understanding even of the so-called mechanical (or 'material') world? I do not mean as a deception, an 'appearance', an 'idea' (in the Berkeleyan and Schopenhauerian sense), but as possessing the same degree of reality as our emotions [*Affekt*] themselves – as a more primitive form of the world of emotions [*Affekte*] in which everything still lies locked in mighty unity and then branches out and develops in the organic process (also, as is only fair, is made weaker and more sensitive), as a kind of instinctual life in which all organic functions, together with self-regulation, assimilation, nourishment, excretion, metabolism, are still synthetically bound together – as an *antecedent form* of life?'¹¹

This paragraph tells us that: *aal*) the primary source of experience lies in 'our world of desires and passions'¹²; *abl*) the 'mechanical world'¹³ stands in seeming opposition to the 'world of desires and passions'¹⁴; *acI*) once one gets rid of the seeming opposition, one arrives on the conclusion that both worlds are 'worlds of emotions'¹⁵ which differ in degree; *adI*) 'desires and passions'¹⁶ are closely related to emotions. Although all of these statements have many implications, we are presently concerned solely with *aal*) and *adI*) because they

¹⁰ It is worth to mention that this notion, although the terms' interconnection is undoubtedly present, is peculiarly represented in our primary sources: emotions and sensations never appear in the same paragraph, and it is not a surprise when one pays even a closer look to sensations [*Empfindungen*] themselves – the term is used only six times throughout our primary reading, four of these uses being in a single paragraph

¹¹ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 66

¹² Ibid

¹³ Ibid

¹⁴ Ibid

¹⁵ Ibid

¹⁶ Ibid

are important for mapping out what emotions subsume. One claim, based upon the two sentences equating both the terms ‘emotions’¹⁷ and ‘desires and passions’¹⁸ with reality of the highest degree, that the terms are used synonymically, or that they are equivalent as to their meaning. However, we will advocate for an alternative approach: we will see emotions to stand qualitatively “above” desires and passions i.e., to be a complex relationship of many desires and passions.

In light of the paragraph cited above and our assertion that emotions are the outcome of “a complex relationship of many desires”, it would seem as if ‘thinking’¹⁹ (which ‘is only the relationship of these drives to one another’²⁰) and emotions were the same phenomena. However, this is not the case. Thinking is the act of one drive “standing over another”, while emotion is the result of this “standing over another”. Let us examine this distinction and justify our previous assertion of emotions being “qualitatively above desires and passions” on the example of the command, concretely in Nietzsche’s description of the ingredients of the will²¹:

‘[...] in all willing there is, first of all, a plurality of sensations [*Gefuehlen*], namely the sensation [*Gefuehl*] of the condition we *leave*, the sensation [*Gefuehl*] of the condition towards which we *go*, the sensation [*Gefuehl*] of this ‘leaving’ and ‘going’ itself, and then also an accompanying muscular sensation [*Muskelgefuehl*] which, even without our putting ‘arms and legs’ in motion, comes into play through a kind of habit as soon as we ‘will’. As feelings, and indeed many varieties of feeling, can therefore be recognized as an ingredient of will, so, in the second place, can thinking: in every act of will there is a commanding thought – and do not imagine that this thought can be separated from the ‘willing’, as though will would then remain over! Thirdly, will is not only a complex of feeling and thinking, but above all an *affect* [*Affekt*]: and in fact the affect [*Affekt*] of command. What is called ‘freedom of will’ is essentially the affect of superiority [*Ueberlegenheits-Affekt*] over him who must obey: [...] But now observe the strangest thing of all about the will – about this so complex thing for which people have only *one* word: inasmuch as in the given circumstances we at the same time command *and* obey, and as the side which obeys know the sensations of

¹⁷ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 66

¹⁸ *Ibid*

¹⁹ *Ibid*

²⁰ *Ibid*

²¹ n.b., we are not in a position to inspect the will itself just yet – we will turn to this issue in chapter three – we are only concerned with its ingredients and their affiliations to each other

constraint, compulsion, pressure, resistance, motion which usually begin immediately after the act of will; inasmuch as, on the other hand, we are in the habit of disregarding and deceiving ourselves over this duality by means of the synthetic concept ‘I’;²²

Now, we are provided with the following information: *aa2*) there is a plurality of feelings (‘sensations’²³, *Gefuehlen*) that precedes an emotion (‘affect’²⁴, *Affekt*) taking place; *ab2*) when an individual is thinking his drives are in a specific kind of relation, namely in a relationship where one drive is dominating over the others i.e., commanding them; *ac2*) he ‘who must obey’²⁵, and he who commands is essentially the relation of the one drive that is commanding to the rest that is obeying i.e., the individual is the one commanding and the individual is the one obeying; *ad2*) an individual’s emotion (‘affect’²⁶, *Affekt*) is the result of many feelings (‘sensations’²⁷, *Gefuehlen*) taking effect, and the result of a new constitution of drives, whereas his ‘thinking’²⁸ is the act of one drive becoming stronger and “standing over the rest of them”. Hence, ‘emotions’²⁹ stand above ‘desires and passions’³⁰ because they are the effect of their interconnection and they also subsume ‘feelings’³¹ whose appearance within an individual is necessary for emotions to even take place. In addition to this, although both emotions and thinking stand for “a relation among many drives”, they are not the same phenomena.

In summary, we are granted the answer we have been seeking: the content of emotions are desires and passions or simply drives, and feelings. Since the content of sensations and words should be, according to what we have said afore, very much alike, it is time for us to turn our attention to these two notions:

‘Words are sounds designating concepts; concepts, however, are more or less definite images designating frequently recurring and associated sensations, groups of sensations. To understand one another it is not sufficient to employ the same words; we have also to employ the same words to designate the same species of inner experiences, we must ultimately have our experience *in common*. [...] The greater the danger, the greater is the need to reach an

²² Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 48

²³ Ibid

²⁴ Ibid

²⁵ Ibid

²⁶ Ibid

²⁷ Ibid

²⁸ Ibid, p. 66

²⁹ Ibid

³⁰ Ibid

³¹ Ibid, p. 48

agreement quickly and easily as to what has to be done; not to misunderstand one another in situations of danger is an absolute necessity in human relations. One makes this same test even in the case of friendships or love-affairs: nothing of that sort can last once it is discovered that when one party uses words he connects them with feelings, intentions, perceptions, desires, fears different from those the other party connects them with. [...] Exactly which groups of sensations are awakened, begin to speak, issue commands most quickly within a soul, is decisive for the whole order of rank of its values and ultimately determines its table of desiderata. A human being's evaluations betray [*verrathen*] something of the *structure* of his soul and where it sees its conditions of life, its real needs.³²

Let us now once again identify the main points of the citation, this time focusing on sensations: *aa3*) 'sensations'³³, or 'groups of sensations'³⁴ recall certain 'inner experiences'³⁵ while they themselves are recalled by 'words'³⁶; *ab3*) inner experiences consist of: 'feelings, intentions, perceptions, desires, and fears'³⁷ (it is quite possible that the list is not complete but these examples give us at least an outline of what Nietzsche considers to be an 'inner experience'³⁸); *ac3*) these inner experiences are designated by groups of sensations in a way that whenever a particular sensation emerges within a body it arranges feelings, intentions, etc., into a particular structure, that is it issues 'commands within a soul'³⁹; *ad3*) sensations (and words) influence individual's evaluations because they determine his, or her feelings, intentions, perceptions, desires, and fears (imagine the difference between evaluating an unknown person who you fear, and an unknown person who you desire); *ae3*) sensations betray [*verrathen*] 'something of the structure'⁴⁰ of the individual's soul⁴¹.

Accordingly, we can conclude that since inner experiences consist of feelings, intentions, etc., sensations, which are the structures of concrete inner experiences, possess also the content also that of feelings, intentions, perceptions, desires, and fears. We have then arrived at the idea that emotions and sensations truly do overlap in terms of their content; and yet the

³² Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, pp. 205-206

³³ Ibid

³⁴ Ibid

³⁵ Ibid

³⁶ Ibid

³⁷ Ibid

³⁸ Ibid

³⁹ Ibid

⁴⁰ Ibid

⁴¹ Let us make another etymological remark, the German "*verrathen*" can be translated as either "betray" – as it is used in the citation – or as "to show"/"to tell": "to show something of the structure..."⁴¹. Which one of the terms it actually stands for naturally makes a huge difference in the interpretation, hence we will try to arrive at the right decision as our interpretation of sensations unravels.

overlap seems to include only desires and feelings. Let us then explore more thoroughly their distinct features and whether sensations are truly as broad in terms of their content as it appears.

As we have seen before, emotions are the results of the structure of their content. Sensations, on the other hand, seem to be not only the results of their content but to also dictate the structure of their content – they ‘issue commands within a soul’⁴². Similarly to memory, one first memorizes the steps for solving an equation, then whenever one sees an equation one is capable of recalling those steps from memory and solving it. The afore mentioned statement naturally begs the question: what is a soul?

‘But the road to new forms and refinements of the soul-hypothesis stands open: and such conceptions as ‘mortal soul’ and ‘soul as multiplicity of the subject’ and ‘soul as social structure of the drives and emotions’ want henceforth to possess civic rights in science.’⁴³

Accordingly, the soul is like a state where there is no single leader it is only the citizens (emotions) that inhabit it. The way they inhabit it, and thus the way their customary laws are set is determined by whatever they have gone through in their lives – wars, epidemics, revolutions, etc. (feelings, intentions, etc.). Then, however, there are bodies of power that they form called “political parties” (sensations) that are either opposed to each other’s, support each other’s, or are completely indifferent toward each other’s political doctrines. These bodies overarch the citizens, are at the same time composed of citizens, and are also founded to improve the state with regard to: what the citizens find wrong with it.

Hence, there arises the first hint at to how sensations and emotions apprehend their content differently: emotions seem to be their extension – the direct result of the relationship of all the possible events within a state. Sensation their flexion – the change in such relationship.

We can finally approach the last notion of this section which will also aid us in making sense of *ae3*) and as a result, getting hold of the second and last hint as to how sensations differ from emotions when it comes to apprehending their content. Let us return to §268 (footnote 32) and summarize what it tells us about words: their main applicability is that of means of communication, namely that of the communication of feelings, intentions, etc. In sum: when an individual uses words he is first and foremost trying to establish a connection between his

⁴² Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, pp. 205-206

⁴³ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 44

and others' inner experiences which is precisely what, according to Nietzsche, enables mutual understanding. Thus, if we turn the tables around, we are left with a theory that says: languages are based upon words whose origin can only be traced to a multitude of overlapping inner experiences. This, however, also means that there are inner experiences unique to individuals that are not represented by words perfectly i.e., words are still being used but they miss-designate a feeling, for instance. In other words:

'[...] ultimately the experiencing of only average and *common* experiences, must have been the most powerful of all the powerful forces which have disposed of mankind hitherto. The more similar, more ordinary human beings have had and still have the advantage, the more select, subtle, rare and harder to understand are liable to remain alone, succumb to accidents in their isolation and seldom propagate themselves.'⁴⁴

Thus, it follows that an individual whose experiences i.e., feelings, intentions, etc. in a certain structure, are "un-common" are either represented imperfectly, and there arises a misunderstanding between him and those whose structures are 'common'⁴⁵, or are not represented at all – he 'succumbs to accidents in his isolation'⁴⁶. Now, observe the most curious thing about words and sensations: It is clear from what has been said that whenever words are spoken, individual's feelings, intentions, etc. are structured into particular sensations, and these sensations vary. For example, when somebody in a village yells "fire", all the bystanders get a rush of feelings so as to be ready to act e.g., help or run: their decision depends on the concrete structuring of the feeling (etc.), that is on the concrete sensation that is connected with the word. This feature of words however carries a consequence, namely that words awake sensations to make the unique individual feel, albeit imperfectly, whatever the "spokesman" feels, that is to say whatever the "multitude of overlapping inner experiences" feels, instead of letting him respond in a way he would deem proper, in a way that the feelings, intentions, etc. were to structure themselves. See again *ae3*) (in the quoted version with "betray", in other words, the unravelling as we have called it seems to point us in the direction of "*verrathen* = betray")

To summarize this section, we have arrived at an understanding that emotions are the apprehension of their content (drives, feelings), and that emotions themselves form organizations that were unified under one name – "the soul". Sensations were explained to be

⁴⁴ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 206

⁴⁵ Ibid

⁴⁶ Ibid

deeply connected with personal ‘inner experiences’⁴⁷ (feelings, intentions, etc.). They organize individual’s feelings, intentions, etc. into structures as if to bring the once felt inner response from the past into the present, however, sensations were also shown to be highly influenced by the multitude (community); moreover, this influence seems to ‘betray the structure of the soul’⁴⁸. In other words, to go against the individual’s structure of feelings, intentions, etc., and the resulting emotion. Hence, it appears that we have come to an impasse because sensations, on the one hand, seem to be the extensions of emotions because they: originate within the individual, partly share emotions’ content, are also the content’s result, add upon the variety of the content, and are capable of intruding into it and adjusting it (therefore, extension). On the other hand, sensations seem to be determined and controlled from the “outside” due to the selection via words, and go, once again, directly against, or at least askew the individual’s soul. And what is even more important, this claim on its own would not push the moral value that we are following further on our imaginary ladder. It would only state that sensations are an obstacle in expressing our morality because they make individuals feel what they might not want to feel in a given moment. To climb up the ladder, we must add other individuals into the spectrum because there are individuals (the ordinary) whose emotions mirror the sensations awoken by the words as they are commonly spoken. It is only thence, when the moral value shifts forward, for it is a certain kind of morality, a certain kind of emotions that is put forth as adequate, as “right”. What hence arises is the value of an individual because it is him/her who is capable of bringing about new emotional responses to events (according to his/her inner experiences), new interpretations of phenomena. However, it is the common, the prevailing morality (= emotional response) that does not let him do so. To overcome our previous impasse we must bring in the dimension of “historicity”, for it will be the image of a historically characterized individual which only can help us comprehend the issue at stake.

Fortunately, we don’t need to divide these problems into two because they go hand in hand in the subject of society. Society adds others while allowing us to take into consideration its beliefs, customs, etc. Hence, let us move forward and look at that issue specifically – let us look at society as a moral restriction.

⁴⁷ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 206

⁴⁸ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, pp. 205-206

2.2. Society as a Moral Restriction

Our inquiry into morality within the bounds of society (society i.e., an organized community or group of people with shared beliefs) will schematically follow Nietzsche's thesis that elaborates on the moral development of history. He thinks that there are three periods of such development: the *pre-moral* period, the *moral* period, and the *extra-moral* period. The reason for such an approach is that we will be able to track morality (using what we have learned about the sensation-emotion relationship) according to its three different stages back to the individual and his emotions. In other words, only in so doing we will be able to justify our initial claim to the effect that 'moralities too are only a *sign-language of the emotions*'⁴⁹, and also bring to light the power dynamic mentioned in the beginning visible. First, however, we must explain how society springs from mere commonality, for we have claimed that the main source of commonality among individuals is words: they make individuals expect (react to) a certain thing (fire) and consequently wake up sensations that structure their feelings, intentions, etc. varyingly (help, run) while preferring the multitude that overlaps in the structure. In addition, words are the furthest point to which we have carried the scepter of morality. Therefore, it is only logical to show what happens when this selection via the right structures of feelings, intentions, etc. carries on for a long period:

'A *species* arises, a type becomes fixed and strong, through protracted struggle against essentially constant *unfavourable* conditions. Conversely, one knows from experience of breeders that species which receive plentiful nourishment and excess of care and protection soon tend very strongly to produce variations of their type and are rich in marvels and monstrosities (also in monstrous vices). Now look for once at an aristocratic community, Venice, say, or an ancient Greek *polis*, as a voluntary or involuntary contrivance for the purpose of *breeding*: there there are human beings living together and thrown on their own resources who want their species to prevail usually because they *have* to prevail or run the terrible risk of being exterminated. Here those favourable conditions, that excess, that protection which favours variations, is lacking; the species needs itself as species, as something that can prevail and purchase durability in its continual struggle against its neighbours or against the oppressed revolt or threatening revolt precisely by virtue of its

⁴⁹ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 110

hardness, uniformity, simplicity of form. The most manifold experience teaches it which qualities it has principally to thank that, in spite of all gods and men, it still exists and has always been victorious: these qualities it calls virtues, these virtues alone does it breed and cultivate. [...] A type with few but very marked traits, a species of stern, warlike, prudently silent, determined and taciturn men (and, as such, men of the finest feeling for the charm and *nuances* of society), is in this way firmly fixed beyond the changes of generations; continual struggle against ever-constant *unfavourable* conditions is, as aforesaid, that which fixes and hardens a type.’⁵⁰

The paragraph adds the following information to our thesis: *aa4*) with prolonged periods of ‘unfavourable conditions’⁵¹ the pre-discussed commonality becomes even more powerful among individuals because the need for better communication (for overlapping feelings behind words) just as well rises due to the seemingly un-ending danger of those ‘unfavourable conditions’⁵²; *ab4*) the overlapping structures of feelings, etc. cease to be merely preferable but become valuable; *ac4*) sensations that possess the ability to designate such structures will not be represented by “simple” words but by words with the status of ‘virtues’⁵³; *ad4*) individuals with those sensations (structure of feelings, etc.) will be viewed as virtuous, they will turn into the ‘species’⁵⁴, into the ‘type’⁵⁵ of the community.

What emerges is the simplest form of a society, a society of two casts – those who embody virtues (commons), and those who do not (un-commons). In other words, a society where those whose structures of feelings, etc. are dominant – not those who are more pragmatical, nor virtuous, nor knowledgeable – suddenly appear on top while the rest falls to the bottom. The leaders, however, do not simply rise to the occasion and do not fall with it once the danger subsides (it must be kept in mind that for they are nonetheless “better” than the ones being led) they necessarily remain on top because the composition of their feelings, etc. has been immortalized in words. They had embodied words, and now words embody them. This issue is quite beautifully described by Nietzsche in his *Genealogy*:

‘–What pointed me in the right direction was actually the question of what the designations of ‘good’ coined in various languages meant from an etymological perspective. I found that they

⁵⁰ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 200

⁵¹ Ibid

⁵² Ibid

⁵³ Ibid

⁵⁴ Ibid

⁵⁵ Ibid

all led back to the *same transformation of concepts* – that ‘refined’ or ‘noble’ in the sense of social standing is everywhere the fundamental concept, from which ‘good’ in the sense of ‘having a refined soul’, ‘noble’ in the sense of ‘superior in soul’, ‘privileged in soul’ necessarily developed. This development always ran parallel with that other one by means of which ‘common’ or ‘plebeian’ or ‘low’ ultimately slide over into the concept ‘bad’. The most eloquent example of this latter process is the German word *schlecht* [bad] itself – it is identical with *schlicht* [simple] (compare *schlechtweg*, *schlechterdings* [simply]), and originally designated the simple common man in straightforward contrast to the noble man, without at that time implying a suspicious sideward glance on the part of the speaker.’⁵⁶

Although the terminology in the quoted paragraph might be misleading, we have to keep in mind that Nietzsche is describing the ‘transformation of concepts’⁵⁷ from the perspective of the ‘speaker’⁵⁸ i.e., of the “leader” in our terminology. We are not only seeing the origin of the leaders being embodied by words but also the inception of the shift within the society’s inner experiences. Henceforth, the sensations stemming from the words ‘noble’⁵⁹ or ‘good’⁶⁰, and the words ‘common, plebeian, or low’⁶¹ shall be the new ordinary inner experiences, and the ordinary inner experiences shall not be based upon the events that the dangers of the world had presented the society with but based upon the events resulting from those events. To put it simply, the new selection of the commons will not be done on the world’s dangers but the values of the current society. Now, if we move the clock of history forward, and look at an individual that goes through the development of his/her inner experiences (that is collecting experiences) in “a community with a type” i.e., a simple society, we will see that they are pre-maturely limited, for the content of these inner experiences is already determined by the “values” of the society, they match with the inner experiences of the previous commons. The only thing that these inner experiences have not is the structure.

Our previously recognized impasse is bridged: sensations are truly built upon “personal experiences”. However, these experiences are determined by the values of the past society or societies (in extension, they are presumably heavily influenced by one’s family, level of education, etc.). Now, if we elaborate on this fuller version of sensations and then compare it

⁵⁶ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, pp. 14 – 15

⁵⁷ Ibid

⁵⁸ Ibid

⁵⁹ Ibid

⁶⁰ Ibid

⁶¹ Ibid

to emotions we will get to a peculiar conclusion: the “historical individual” (rather than the individual we had been describing in *Section 2.1*. which was taken out of the flow of time, so to say, for clarity) was seen to a large extent as sharing the content of his/her inner experiences with his/her fellow citizens (‘members of *one* people understand one another better’⁶²), thus raising the question of “how are his/her unique sensations (structures of those inner experiences) composed?”. The answer to that question stood right in front of us at the very beginning of our intellectual journey through sensations, for they do not “betray” [*verrathen*] the structure of the individual’s soul. They “show” [*verrathen*] the structure of the individual’s soul. In other words, it is the difference in our emotions (which also means in our morality) that renders the difference in sensations composed of the same inner experiences possible. Otherwise, it would be difficult to account for the following motto by Nietzsche: ‘With one’s principles one seeks to tyrannize over one’s habits or to justify or honour or scold or conceal them – two people with the same principles probably seek something fundamentally different with them’⁶³.⁶⁴

Nevertheless, let us not hinder. Since we have already established how society emerges from a mere community, we can now move on to inquire into the three moral periods. It is now clear that our sensations, and therefore also our words, are the expressions of our morality, hence the society established on the “overlapping multitude of sensations” is just as well an expression of a certain morality – we are pushing the “moral scepter” further. But, as we have said before, we are now seeking the justification for emotions being the true origin of morality. We shall start our search in a period where morality is simpler, or perhaps “non-existent”, namely in the *pre-moral* period because whatever will determine the values of this period consequently cannot be considered to be of moral origin.

‘Throughout the longest part of human history – it is called prehistoric times – the value or non-value of an action was derived from its consequences: the action itself came as little into consideration as did its origin, but, in much the same way as today in China a distinction or disgrace reflects back from the child onto its parents, so it was the retroactive force of success

⁶² Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 205

⁶³ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 92

⁶⁴ Nietzsche is quite often compared to Sigmund Freud, thus let us take advantage of this known fact, and make a comparison to help with comprehending the sensations-emotions relationship: emotions in our interpretation seem to mirror Freud’s id, while sensations the unity of his ego and superego. Id is, let us simplify, formed from the raw aspects of our being (animalistic urges, desires) while ego and superego are their “sweetened”, more socially acceptable manifestation”. In comparison, emotions do hold up the notion of “being raw aspects of our being”, however, sensations’ initiative seems not to be a “more socially acceptable manifestation” but something completely different – to skip ahead, their initiative is to express the Will to Power.

or failure which led men to think well or ill of an action. Let us call this period the *pre-moral* period of mankind: the imperative ‘know thyself!’ was then still unknown.’⁶⁵

Here the ‘value or non-value’⁶⁶ is being traced back to an ‘action’⁶⁷. What is more, the evaluation is done on pragmatical bases – success, failure (from the standpoint of the well-being of the community, its survival against “world’s dangers”). Accordingly, this period is characterized by not having “a type”; in fact, if the value or non-value is not being traced back to its origin, (which we previously took for granted) the aforementioned “immortalization in words” cannot take place. Thus in this period the members of a community do not look at themselves as being qualitatively different from one another. Since there is no clear definition of who is more or less likely to perform the deed with success without the imperative ‘know thyself!’⁶⁸, the only hierarchical factor within such community is the success or failure of any deed. This is why the hierarchy of its members is accidental. It is the need to secure a better chance for survival of the community that makes for the transition from the *pre-moral* period to the *moral* one. Nietzsche continues:

‘Over the past ten thousand years, on the other hand, one has in a few large tracts of the earth come step by step to the point at which it is no longer the consequences but the origin of the action which determines its value: a great event, taken as a whole, a considerable refinement of vision and standard, the unconscious after-effect of the sovereignty of aristocratic values and belief in ‘origins’, the sign of a period which may be called the *moral* in the narrower sense: the first attempt at self-knowledge has been made. Instead of the consequences, the origin: what an inversion of perspectives! And certainly, one achieved only after protracted struggles and vacillations! To be sure, a fateful new superstition, a peculiar narrowness of interpretation therewith became dominant: men interpreted the origin of action in the most definite sense as origin in an *intention*; men became *unanimous* in the belief that the value of an action resided in the value of the intention behind it. The intention as the whole origin and prehistory of action: it is under the sway of this prejudice that one has morally praised, blamed, judged and philosophized on earth almost to the present day.’⁶⁹

⁶⁵ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, pp. 62-63

⁶⁶ Ibid

⁶⁷ Ibid

⁶⁸ Ibid

⁶⁹ Ibid

Let us approach this paragraph from two perspectives: *First*, the shift in ‘perspectives’⁷⁰ allows for the “qualitative difference” among members of this period’s communities – they intend to do things for separate reasons, which leads to what we have seen in *footnote 50*. Consequently, this period is characterized by individuals being within the spectrum of the “overlapping multitude” – good, or outside of it – bad. In other words, characterized by individuals being judged through terms with a “moral background”, hence *moral* period. *Second*, since we know that communities are tightly connected to “overlapping” (i.e., splitting the community into one group that has in common sensations, and another that does not) we need to explain the shift in ‘perspectives’⁷¹ through it. Accordingly, there has to be a deciding factor hidden inside the individual’s tendency to organize his/her inner experiences exactly the way he/she does, for there is no other way to explain the shift in ‘perspectives’⁷² than by having an individual from the group that “does not” put forth his unique sensation which, to put it crudely, prefers to look at the origin of an action rather than its consequence. The community “permits him/her” to promote his/her sensation precisely because in the *pre-moral* period the “overlapping multitude” is not yet “immortalized in words”, that is they do not yet embody any values, thus he is not “going against them”. Furthermore, as we have said, “it is the difference in our emotions (which also means in our morality) that renders the difference in sensations composed of the same inner experiences possible”. Hence, it is within or rather behind the emotions where the aforementioned power dynamic lies because it is clear that it is the result of the power dynamic that determines whether we are in a *pre-moral*, *moral*, or, naturally, *extra-moral* period. As Nietzsche concludes:

‘But ought we not today to have arrived at the necessity of once again determining upon an inversion and shift of values, thanks to another self-examination and deepening on the part of man – ought we not to stand on the threshold of a period which should be called, negatively at first, the *extra-moral*: today, when among us immoralists at least the suspicion has arisen that the decisive value of an action resides in precisely that which is *not intentional* in it, and that all that in it which is intentional, all of it that can be seen, known, ‘conscious’, still belongs to its surface and skin – which, like every skin, betrays something but *conceals* still more? In brief, we believe that the intention is only a sign and symptom that needs interpreting, and a sign, moreover, that signifies too many things and which thus taken by

⁷⁰ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 63

⁷¹ Ibid

⁷² Ibid

itself signifies practically nothing – that morality in the sense in which it had been understood hitherto, that is to say the morality of intentions, has been a prejudice, a precipitancy, perhaps something provisional and precursory, perhaps something of the order of astronomy and alchemy, but in any event something that must be overcome.’⁷³

Here Nietzsche is proposing another ‘perspective’⁷⁴, one where the “qualitative difference” among individuals would not be seen starting from the intention (we cannot assume the true motivation of an individual’s actions from his intentions), rather from the factors that determine it: the structures of inner experiences, emotions. This Nietzschean shift in perspective would, however, once again make the “immortalization in words” impossible because for that to happen one needs to be able to find value (quality) within an individual’s structures (sensations) and then “overlap” the structures with the majority of others. In this period, on the contrary, the value is found in the determining factor of the structures (emotions), thus proclaiming the previous “immortalization of words” i.e., words like ‘noble’⁷⁵, ‘good’⁷⁶, ‘common’⁷⁷, ‘low’⁷⁸, invaluable, that is annihilating the words “moral background”. Hence, *extra-moral* (extra = beyond, outside) period.

In summary, we see two ways in which Nietzsche uses the word “moral”: *primarily*, in association with emotions because they are the origin of any moral evolution in history and *secondarily*, in association with the *moral* period, for it is the “immortalization of words” of this period (and consequently of the philosophical terminology used by thinkers before him) that assumed the word “moral” to stand for the evaluation of intentions, hence the logic behind him titling it: ‘a period which may be called the *moral* in the narrower sense’⁷⁹. Thus stands our justification of ‘moralities being sign-language of the emotions’⁸⁰ complete. Furthermore, the deciding factor of how individuals’ emotions are created have been sketched out – we have called it a “power dynamic” for a simple reason: it has been shown that emotions have contents, and it must be the interconnection of those contents that result into differing types of emotions, hence power dynamic. Thus, we move onto the second chapter of this thesis – connecting this power dynamic to the notion of the Will to Power.

⁷³ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, pp. 63-64

⁷⁴ Ibid

⁷⁵ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, pp. 14-15

⁷⁶ Ibid

⁷⁷ Ibid

⁷⁸ Ibid

⁷⁹ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 63

⁸⁰ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 110

3. The Will to Power

For the second time in this thesis we find ourselves before Nietzsche's concept of "emotion". This time, however, we are not inquiring into its effects, nor accounting for its contents – all of that has been already done. We are trying to figure out what it is that selects the type of the emotion that occurs in the individual i.e., the determining factor of the emotion. The structure of the chapter is going to be the following: since we have understood a large portion of the nature of emotions against the background of "willing" (*footnote 22, §19*), it will be our task to show how Nietzsche looks at willing in *Section 3.1*. Why we have understood emotions against the background of willing should not come as a surprise, that is if we understand will as "a desire of something valuable", because it was shown that our inner experiences result in emotions. Emotions in turn create sensations that are the structures of these inner experiences. Then, from a selection of sensations arises the "overlapping multitude" that institutes, through words, what is going to be seen as valuable in the given community (keep in mind that "embodying values" – *moral period* – and "instituting values" are two separate things), thus making sensations the main instigator of values⁸¹, and consequently rendering emotions the force behind value-formation. We shall describe how Nietzsche looks at willing in three separate steps. *First*, we will consider whether the will is free or is not because the factor of "freedom" or "unfreedom" significantly influences not only the possible contents of the will but more importantly the who initiates the "willing" – is it the decision of the individual based upon his emotions, or is it solely determined by the emotions? *Secondly*, we will bring this information back where we started (§19) and try to explain what the will is itself. *Finally*, we shall interpret a curious maxim (or interlude) that directly relates will or willing to emotions and see that the purpose or the deciding factor of the typology of emotions is their essential need to manifest a certain feeling of power.

Then, in *Section 3.2* we will seek to derive the issue discussed in the previous chapter i.e., 'new superstition, a peculiar narrowness of interpretation therewith became dominant: men interpreted the origin of an action in the most definite sense as origin in an *intention*'⁸², from

⁸¹ Granted that this explanation was deliberately made on the "overlapping multitude", because the terminology surrounding it allowed for easier apprehension, and does not exclude the appearance of this feature within every single individual.

⁸² Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 63

the new-found deciding factor – the feeling of power, which shall lead us to assume four different kinds of the said typology, that is four different kinds of morality taken as *primarily*. This deed will, in turn, permit us to venture forth into *Chapter 4* where we shall interpret the image of the ascetic priest.

Thence, let us query, what is the will or willing? And are we free to “will”?

3.1. Physiology of the Restriction

According to *footnote 22*, the term “will” or “willing” stands for or rather literally is a plurality of inner events one of them being the ‘emotion [*Affekt*] of command’⁸³. In addition, the same *footnote* claims that the notion of ‘freedom of will’⁸⁴ essentially consists of the identification of the individual within which such willing occurs with only a section of the plurality willing consists of, namely the ‘emotion [*Affekt*] of command’⁸⁵. This unsurprisingly begs for the antithetical assumption – our willing is unfree. That, however, is false just as well:

‘Assuming it is possible in this way to get beyond the peasant simplicity of this celebrated concept ‘free will’ and banish it from one’s mind, I would then ask whoever does that to carry his ‘enlightenment’ a step further and also banish from his mind the contrary of that unnatural concept ‘free will’: I mean ‘unfree will’, which amounts to an abuse of cause and effect. One ought not to make ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ *into material things*, as natural scientists do (and those who, like them, naturalize in their thinking –), in accordance with the prevailing mechanistic stupidity which has the cause press and push until it ‘produces an effect’; one ought to employ ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ only as pure *concepts*, that is to say as conventional fictions for the purpose of designation, mutual understanding, *not* explanation. In the ‘in itself’ there is nothing of ‘causal connection’, of ‘necessity’, of ‘psychological unfreedom’; there ‘the effect’ *does not* ‘follow the cause’, there no ‘law’ rules. It is *we* alone who have fabricated causes, succession, reciprocity, relativity, compulsion, number, law,

⁸³ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 48

⁸⁴ *Ibid*

⁸⁵ *Ibid*

freedom, motive, purpose; and when we falsely introduce this world of symbols into things and mingle it with them as though this symbol-world were an ‘in itself’, we once more behave as we have always behaved, namely *mythologically*. ‘Unfree will’ is mythology: in real life it is only a question of *strong* and *weak* wills. – It is almost always a symptom of what is lacking in himself when a thinker detects in every ‘causal connection’ and ‘psychological necessity’ something of compulsion, exigency, constraint, pressure, unfreedom: such feelings are traitors, the person who has them gives himself away [*verraeth*].⁸⁶

Habitually, we shall state the pivotal matters: *ba1*) the ‘unfree will’⁸⁷ is the result of ‘cause and effect’⁸⁸ being used as an ‘explanation’⁸⁹, in other words, it is seen as a phenomenon of the world rather than an attempt by the “overlapping multitude” to institute a value in order to ensure ‘their species to prevail’⁹⁰; *bb1*) any causal connection ought to be viewed as ‘a question of *strong* and *weak* wills’⁹¹; *bc1*) individual’s judgment upon the freedom or unfreedom of the will ‘gives him away [*verraeth*]⁹² – here, we circle back to our discussion about “showing”, or “betraying” [*verraethen*] person’s soul –, that is to say, the individual uncovers his/her soul.

Accordingly, the “force behind value-formation” (emotions) does not answer to our freedom to choose nor to the ‘mechanistic stupidity’⁹³ of causality but to the “quality” of the particular will – its strength. Naturally, a question emerges: how does one measure the strength (or weakness) of the will? This question will become, perhaps not easier to answer, but at least answerable once we also understand what the “will” is. Therefore, let us continue to our *secondly*, and cite once again from §19 (our citation begins where the last one ended):

‘...synthetic concept ‘I’; so, a whole chain of erroneous conclusions and consequently of false evaluations of the will itself has become attached to the will as such – so that he who wills believes wholeheartedly that willing *suffices* for action. Because in the great majority of cases willing takes place only where the effect of the command, that is to say obedience, that is to say the action, was to be *expected*, the *appearance* has translated itself into the sensation

⁸⁶ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 51

⁸⁷ Ibid

⁸⁸ Ibid

⁸⁹ Ibid

⁹⁰ Ibid, p. 200

⁹¹ Ibid, p. 51

⁹² Ibid

⁹³ Ibid

[*Gefuehl*], as if there were here a *necessity of effect*. Enough: he who wills believes with a tolerable degree of certainty that will and action are somehow one – he attributes the success, the carrying out of the willing, to the will itself, and thereby enjoys an increase of that sensation of power [*Machtgefuehls*] which all success brings with it. ‘Freedom of will’ – is the expression for that complex condition of pleasure of the person who wills, who commands and at the same time identifies himself with the executor of the command – who as such also enjoys the triumph over resistances involved but who thinks it was his will itself which overcame these resistances. He who wills adds in this way the sensation of pleasure [*Lustgefuehle*] of the successful executive agents, the servicable ‘under-wills’ or under-souls – for our body is only a social structure composed of many souls – to his sensations of pleasure [*Lustgefuehle*] as commander.’⁹⁴

Let us summarize the key remarks of this passage: *ba2*) there is no ‘I’⁹⁵, no subject in Nietzsche’s theory of the will; *bb2*) the ‘emotion of command’⁹⁶ is always accompanied by a ‘sensation of power’⁹⁷; *bc2*) since this ‘emotion’⁹⁸ is a feature of the will, Nietzsche can say that: ‘false evaluations of the will itself has become attached to the will as such’⁹⁹; *bd2*) there appears to be a greater number of emotions or at least a great number of their content present within willing hidden under the term ‘under-wills, or under-souls’¹⁰⁰ that contribute to the willing (are ‘successful executive agents’¹⁰¹) and consequently intensify the ‘feeling of power’¹⁰² [*Machtgefuehls*].

We can explain *bb2*) the following way: the emotion of command strains from the relationship of the one side that is commanding and the other that is obeying (which is characteristic for willing). The sensation of power is the outcome of the success of the relationship of these two sides, that is of the relationship’s establishment (for clarification see *footnote 32*). As a result, both the emotion of command and the sensation of power are the sole causes of the wrong conclusion that there is a subject because they allow for the identification of ‘willing’¹⁰³ with ‘action’¹⁰⁴ i.e., they allow for the adherence to the side of us

⁹⁴ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 49

⁹⁵ Ibid

⁹⁶ Ibid, p. 48

⁹⁷ Ibid, p. 49

⁹⁸ Ibid, p. 48

⁹⁹ Ibid, p. 49

¹⁰⁰ Ibid

¹⁰¹ Ibid

¹⁰² Ibid

¹⁰³ Ibid

¹⁰⁴ Ibid

that commands and for the disregard of the side of us that obeys. This also means that the side of us that commands completely overlooks the inner struggle that decides whether the willing is even realizable and, if it is, what components of the inner struggle are going to be on which side. Hence, it is this “false identification” of willing with action which deems the command to be the only condition for the wanted action.

From the statements above we can argue that we are reckoning with two uses of the word “will” (as we did with the word “moral”): *one* that stands for the aligning of the “components of the inner struggle” into the side that is obeying and the side that is obeying i.e., for the expectation of the ‘effect of command’¹⁰⁵, and the *other* that incorporates the identification of the *one* with the action i.e., the ‘will itself which overcame the resistances’¹⁰⁶. In comparison, this word has an origin that is similar to the word “moral” of the *secondary* type, for that type characterizes the period of moral evolution called the *moral* period, in other words, it is determined by the emotions of the “overlapping multitude”. Here, there is no “overlapping multitude” able to determine such use – we are inquiring into a single individual – but there still are emotions, specifically the emotion of command that, as we have said, allows for false identification (this notion will become clearer in Section 3.2.). In conclusion, the correct understanding of the will, according to Nietzsche, seems to involve a multiplicity of feelings (*footnote 32*), an emotion of command and “two sides of us” made up at least of several other emotions, or their content (*bd2*).

Now, it is finally time to state the curious maxim and finalize the answer to our question as to “what is the determinant of the typology of emotions?”:

‘The will to overcome an emotion is ultimately only the will of another emotion or of several others.’¹⁰⁷

Let us re-construct the same maxim using what we have learned about the will and its “freedom”. ‘The will to overcome an emotion’¹⁰⁸ ultimately means to be experiencing a multiplicity of feelings and an emotion of command (resulting in another feeling, a feeling of power) that are the results of the relationship of a side of us consisting of the emotion to be overcome (commanded) and a side of us consisting of a bundle of emotions (or of their content). This bundle of emotions then produces an additional overarching sensation of

¹⁰⁵ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 49

¹⁰⁶ Ibid

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, p. 98

¹⁰⁸ Ibid

power (pleasure as a commander) while its contents are themselves in the same relationship as is the emotion that is to be overcome and that bundle. However, we have to realize that in this maxim the emotion that is to be overcome has been, as is obvious already condemned to obeying, thus let us re-imagine the relationship without that value already set: as we have seen the sensation of power causes the overlook of the inner struggle, and in extension, the identification of the commander with the executor of the command, additionally the will, at the minimum to overcome an emotion, is the will of ‘an emotion, or of several others’¹⁰⁹, therefore a single emotion is only a false identification of the emotion as the commander with other emotions or emotional contents, as components of the inner struggle, in other words, a bundle of emotions. Hence, ‘the will to overcome an emotion’¹¹⁰ ultimately is a correlation of two bundles of emotions which begs a question: what determines which one of them is going to be overcome? The answer to that is provided by our query into the freedom or unfreedom of the will – ‘it is only a question of *strong* and *weak* wills’¹¹¹. In short, it is the strength of the sensation of power straining from the inner relationship of the emotions, or of their content, within the bundle that determines which one of them is going to command and which one to obey.

Now, we shall apply this newfound notion to the issue of the “overlapping multitude”, for lack of less confusing terminology. An example of this might be seen in the brackets before we have quoted the “curious maxim”. It should show us the reason why we have mentioned morality in connection to restriction, particularly to social restriction.

3.2. Power as the core of the restriction

In retrospective to *Sections 2.2.* and *3.1.*, we have seen three concepts being approached as results of the *moral* period i.e., as values of the “overlapping multitude”, namely the concepts “moral”, “freedom of the will”, and “un-freedom of the will”. Additionally we have said that the *moral* period evolved from the *pre-moral* period due to the emergence of the idea (“shift

¹⁰⁹ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 98

¹¹⁰ *Ibid*

¹¹¹ *Ibid*, p. 51

in perspectives”) that “it is the ‘origin of the action which determines its value’¹¹²”. We have justified this emergence by claiming that there is no other way to explain the shift in perspectives than by having an individual from the group that “does not” put forth his unique sensation. The individual’s sensations prefer to look at the origin of action rather than its consequence. In addition, the deciding factor of this individual’s decision to “look at the origin” was posited to be the “the need to secure a better chance for survival of the community”, that is the individual’s need for self-preservation. Now, we are in a position to fully develop this issue. The first simplification we have made was that self-preservation is only a by-product of the individual’s need:

‘Physiologists should think again before postulating the drive to self-preservation as the cardinal drive in an organic being. A living thing desires above all to *vent* its strength – life as such is will to power – : self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent *consequences* of it.’¹¹³

This understanding permits us to explain why we could have put into comparison the false identification of “the *one* with the action” and the false identification of the word “moral” with “evaluations of intentions”, for it is presently clear that every individual with the morality (emotional typology) of the *moral* period is first and foremost aiming to vent his/her strength through yet another identification of his words (sensations) with values. Let us illustrate this laborious problem more extensively:

‘Perhaps what I have said here of a ‘fundamental will of the spirit’ may not be immediately comprehensible: allow me to explain. – That commanding something which the people calls ‘spirit’ wants to be master within itself and around itself and to feel itself master: out of multiplicity it has the will to simplicity, a will which binds together and tames, which is imperious and domineering. In this its needs and capacities are the same as those which physiologists posit for everything that lives, grows and multiplies. The power of the spirit to appropriate what is foreign to it is revealed in a strong inclination to assimilate the new to the old, to simplify the complex, to overlook or repel what is wholly contradictory: just as it arbitrarily emphasizes, extracts and falsifies to suit itself certain traits and lines in what is foreign to it, in every piece of ‘external world’. Its intention in all this is the incorporation of new ‘experiences’, the arrangement of new things within old divisions – growth, that is to

¹¹² Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 64

¹¹³ *Ibid*, p. 44

say; more precisely, the *feeling* of increased power. This same will is served by an apparently antithetical drive of the spirit, a sudden decision for ignorance, for arbitrary shutting-out, a closing of the windows, an inner denial of this or that thing, a refusal to let it approach, a kind of defensive posture against much that can be known, a contentment with the dark, with the closed horizon, an acceptance and approval of ignorance: all this being necessary according to the degree of its power to appropriate, its ‘digestive power’, to speak in a metaphor – and indeed ‘the spirit’ is more like a stomach than anything else. It is here that there also belongs the occasional will of the spirit to let itself be deceived, perhaps with a mischievous notion that such and such is *not* the case, that it is only being allowed to pass for the case, a joy in uncertainty and ambiguity, an exultant enjoyment of the capricious narrowness and secrecy of a nook-and-corner, of the all too close, of the foreground, of the exaggerated, diminished, displaced, beautified, an enjoyment of the capriciousness of all these expressions of power. Finally, there also belongs here that not altogether innocent readiness of the spirit to deceive other spirits and to dissemble before them, that continual pressing and pushing of a creative, formative, changeable force: in this the spirit enjoys the multiplicity and cunning of its masks, it enjoys too the sense of being safe that this brings – for it is precisely through its protean arts that it is best concealed and protected! *This* will to appearance, to simplification, to the mask, to the cloak, in short to the superficial – for every surface is a cloak – is *counteracted* by that sublime inclination in the man of knowledge which takes a profound, many-sided and thorough view of things and *will* take such a view: as a kind of cruelty of the intellectual conscience and taste which every brave thinker will recognize in himself, provided he has hardened and sharpened for long enough his own view of himself, as he should have, and is accustomed to stern discipline and stern language.’¹¹⁴

The main points are summarized as follows: *ba3*) the presence of the notion of “false identification” is the underlying constituent of all individual’s affairs with the world, for all new experiences necessarily venture through emotions, as we have witnessed, and they succumb to that notion; *bb3*) hence, all new experiences are ‘assimilated to the old’¹¹⁵, ‘simplified’¹¹⁶ and ‘arranged within the old’¹¹⁷, that is all-new emotions are always put into a relationship with the old; *bc3*) the result of that relation is singular – it must produce a

¹¹⁴ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, pp. 160-161

¹¹⁵ Ibid

¹¹⁶ Ibid

¹¹⁷ Ibid

‘feeling of power’¹¹⁸, the means of that relation are, according to the passage, plural, specifically “*ignorance*”, “*caprice*”, “*deception*”, and lastly “*knowledge*”.

To put it in the terminology used hitherto whenever an individual has new inner experiences resulting in an emotion, it is the will of either the “old emotion” that overcomes this newcomer or the will of the newcomer that overcomes the “old emotion”. In this case, the result is in ‘the feeling of increased power’¹¹⁹ which in extension means that the organization of the new inner experiences falls either under the same sensation (structure), thus under the same word, thus under the same value, or that there has to happen a new organization of inner experiences according to the newcomer into an altogether different sensation. If this is the premise of the said encounter how come, then, there are four different “means” of setting to acquire it? The answer to this question shall come from *On Genealogy of Morals*. The interconnection might not be transparent from the English translation, for it completely covers up the terminological overlap through the word “Kraft” which in the paragraph quoted above stands for “power”, while the word used in §7 of *Genealogy* is, as we shall see, “energy”. Apart from interpretative intentions, the reason why we are making the transition now is because we shall use *Genealogy* as our main source in the following Chapter – more about that, however, in that Chapter’s introduction.

‘All animals, including *la bête philosophe*, strive instinctively for an optimum combination of favourable conditions which allow them to expend all their energy [Kraft] and achieve their maximum feeling of power [Machgefuehl]; equally instinctively, and with a fine sense of smell which is ‘higher than any reason’, all animals loathe any kind of trouble-maker or obstacle which either actually obstructs their path to this optimum combination or has the potential to do so (– I am *not* talking here about their path to happiness, but their path to power, to action, to the most powerful action, which is in most cases actually the path to unhappiness).’¹²⁰

Accordingly, every individual possesses a means to generate power characteristic to the amount of power (‘energy’¹²¹, *Kraft*) they can ‘expend’¹²² (‘it is only a question of *strong* and *weak* wills’¹²³). *Ignorance* generates power through the old emotion overcoming the

¹¹⁸ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, pp. 160-161

¹¹⁹ *Ibid*

¹²⁰ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, p. 86

¹²¹ *Ibid*

¹²² *Ibid*

¹²³ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 51

newcomer but the amount of power spent is low because the individual with ignorant means spends only little power on “trying to know” (‘defensive posture against much that can be known’¹²⁴). *Caprice* generates power through the newcomer overcoming the old emotion but the amount of power spent is yet again low because the individual with caprice means spends little power on adhering to a single sensation (‘a joy in uncertainty and ambiguity’¹²⁵ (imagine one’s world view shifting with every new information)). *Knowledge* generates power through the old emotion overtaking the newcomer at certain occasions, and the newcomer overcoming the old emotion at other occasions, the amount of power spent is high because it takes a lot of it to consider the possible shifts in sensations (‘takes a profound, many-sided and thorough view of things’¹²⁶). Here, however, our explanatory attempts must cease, for the *deceptive* means seems to lack clarity, thus we shall use the opportunity to approach it distinctly in the following Chapter, that is we will try to justify the claim that it is the *deceptive* mean that is the defining characteristic of the *ascetic priest*. This will not only complete our interpretation but, if we succeed, also verify it.¹²⁷

To conclude this Section, let us summarize why “power [is] the core of the restriction”. It is its core precisely because the individual that is seeking ‘the feeling of increased power’¹²⁸ (through the deed of “false identification”) must act out one of the “means” to acquire it, and it is the means he acts out that allows for the emergence of sensations that become a characteristic for a certain “moral period” (i.e., *pre-moral*, *moral*, *extra-moral*). This is to say that the “overlapping multitude” of the *moral* period possesses means that must be able to benefit out of interpreting (this issue shall be elaborated on in *Chapter 4*, for it cannot be properly done without understanding the means to *deceive*) ‘the intention as the whole origin and prehistory of an action’¹²⁹. In addition, it is through the multitude’s grip over inner experiences (see *Section 2.2.*) that the multitude functions as the ‘trouble-maker or obstacle which either actually obstructs their path to this optimum combination or has the potential to do so’¹³⁰ – their as in, individuals with other means. (This argument expanded on the second simplification we have made in *Section 2.2.*).

¹²⁴ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, p. 86

¹²⁵ Ibid

¹²⁶ Ibid

¹²⁷ Let us not refrain from an interludatory remark: consider the similarity of – *ignorance* to Nietzsche’s notion of Apollo, *caprice* to his notion of “early Dionysus”, *knowledge* to his notion of “late Dionysus”, and, quite preludatorily, *deception* to his notion of “the Crucified”.

¹²⁸ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 160-161

¹²⁹ Ibid, p. 63

¹³⁰ Ibid, p. 160-161

4. The Will to Nothingness

The structure of this chapter will be rather peculiar in comparison to the previous ones. We shall try to justify our claim that it is the “*deceptive means*” to the feeling of power that stands at the basis of the so-called *ascetic priest* by positing his attributes, or “definitions” from *Genealogy*, where there is a whole chapter dedicated to them, and interpreting them via our understanding that strained from, with one exception, *Beyond Good and Evil*, and because these books are very closely connected (notice Nietzsche’s subtitle to *Genealogy: A Polemic* By way of clarification and supplement to my last book *Beyond Good and Evil*), this action ought to render our justification viable. Our comparison shall be at an end as soon as we connect the *deceptive means* to the “will to nothingness”, in other words as soon as we connect the individual’s need to seek the feeling of power to the “will to nothingness”.

Before we begin, however, let us note that we will not be able to explain “every corner” of the *ascetic priest*, for that would require a thorough examination of more notions which are connected to it (“bad conscience”, “guilt”, etc.) and we do not have the space nor the ambitions to do so.

4.1. The Ascetic Ideal

The problem of what an “ideal” is usually starts with a philosopher. We, too, shall begin our analysis of the *ascetic priest* by taking a philosopher because it is the philosopher that “follows” the *ascetic ideal* who consequently becomes the *ascetic priest*. Before we get into a discussion of the philosopher’s emotions, however, let us consider how Nietzsche himself defines the *ascetic ideal*. As already said, this Chapter will have a “derivative” character, which means that we will first present Nietzsche’s definition of the *ascetic ideal*, then we will derive it from our established understanding of the “need to seek power”. Here is the *ascetic ideal*:

‘The three splendid slogans of the ascetic ideal are well known: poverty, humility, chastity. Now take a close look at the life of all great, fruitful, inventive spirits – you will always find all three present to some extent. But absolutely *not*, as goes without saying, as if these were

‘virtues’ – what are virtues to this kind of man! –, rather as the most authentic and most natural conditions of their *optimum* existence, their *most beautiful* fruitfulness.’¹³¹

There is a ‘spirit’¹³² whose means to attain power produces sensations that are designated by the words ‘poverty, humility, and chastity’¹³³ (these words are viewed as virtues by the community).

Now, let us take a look on the philosopher’s definition:

‘Let us compress this whole state of affairs into a few brief phrases: in order for its existence to be *possible* at all, the philosophical spirit has at first always been obliged to disguise and mask itself in the types of the contemplative man *established in earlier times*, that is, as priest, magician, prophet, above all, as a religious man. For a long time, *the ascetic ideal* has served the philosopher as a form in which to manifest, as a pre-condition of existence – he was obliged to *represent* it in order to be a philosopher, and he was obliged to *believe* in it in order to be able to represent it. The particular remoteness of the philosophers – with its negation of the world, its hostility to life, its skepticism towards the senses, its freedom from sensuality – which has survived until very recently, and in the process almost gained currency as *the philosophers’ attitude* as such – this is above all a consequence of the critical situation in which philosophy first emerged and managed to endure: that is, in so far as throughout most of history philosophy would not have been *at all possible* on earth without the ascetic shell and disguise, without an ascetic self-misunderstanding.’¹³⁴

Let us expand on the argument above: There is a certain kind of a spirit, the ‘philosophical spirit’¹³⁵ whose means to attain power (concluded from the ‘*ascetic ideal*’¹³⁶ being a ‘pre-condition of existence’¹³⁷ of the said spirit) needs to be hidden under the sensations established by the previous “generation” of the community¹³⁸ because the spirit’s means are unbeknownst to it (since its hidden under the sensation) ‘hostile to life’¹³⁹. If this hostility showed, the spirit would not be able to realize its philosophy because it would then not only

¹³¹ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, p. 88

¹³² *Ibid*

¹³³ *Ibid*

¹³⁴ *Ibid*, p. 95

¹³⁵ *Ibid*

¹³⁶ *Ibid*, p. 88

¹³⁷ *Ibid*

¹³⁸ The phrase “sensations established by previous “generation”” is used here as a reference to the notion of ‘transformation of concepts’¹³⁸ from *footnote 56.*, that it to reference the actions, for lack of better words, characteristic for the “overlapping multitude”.

¹³⁹ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, p. 95

have to create new sensations which would ‘obstruct the path to optimum combination’¹⁴⁰ for the whole community but also render its own optimum combination suboptimal (hiding requires it to spend power).¹⁴¹ Hence, the philosophical spirit disguises itself under the values that were embodied by the ‘noble’¹⁴² of the previous generation – ‘types of contemplative man *established in earlier times*’¹⁴³.

The philosophical spirit’s capability to attain power is conditioned by the sensations established by the previous “generation”, and their unchangeability. In fact, if the values were to change the disguise would turn out to be worthless and the spirit’s own optimum combination to be in truth suboptimal. Now, why are its means hostile to life? Although the reason is already present in the citation above, an additional element is to be brought in:

‘The idea at issue in this struggle is the *value* which the ascetic priests ascribe to our life: they juxtapose this life (along with what belongs to it, ‘nature’, ‘world’, the whole sphere of becoming and the ephemeral) to a completely different form of existence, which it opposes and excludes, *unless* it somehow turns itself against itself, *denies itself*. In which case, the case of an ascetic life, life functions as a bridge to that other existence. The ascetic treats life as a wrong track along which one must retrace one’s steps to the point at which it begins; or as a mistake which one rectifies through action – indeed, which one *should* rectify: for he *demand*s that one should follow him, he imposes wherever he can his *own* evaluation of existence.’¹⁴⁴

There is a certain kind of spirit, the philosophical spirit whose means to attain power needs to be hidden under the sensations established by the previous “generation” of the community. This means that the sensations do not truly correspond to his emotions (‘ascetic self-misunderstanding’¹⁴⁵) – it is an “individual from the group that “does not””, hence it is an individual whose emotions strive towards a ‘plebeian’¹⁴⁶ while having the sensations of a ‘noble’¹⁴⁷ (*footnote 56*). In other words, it is ‘turning itself against itself, denying itself’¹⁴⁸. Such self-denial reflects upon its ‘evaluation of existence’¹⁴⁹ because, to put it crudely, it is

¹⁴⁰ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, p. 86

¹⁴¹ Notice that this hostility to life is not the definition of “philosophical attitude”.

¹⁴² Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, pp. 14-15

¹⁴³ *Ibid*, p. 95

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid*, p. 96

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid*, p. 95

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 14-15

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid*

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid*, p. 96

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid*

upholding values to which it is unknowingly not emotionally “connected to”, therefore it is trying to put these values (sensations) outside of life itself (morality, as *primarily*, ‘as the theory of the relations of dominance under which the phenomenon ‘life’ arises’¹⁵⁰) which also entails ‘that one should follow’¹⁵¹ it because he cannot change the nature of sensations without adjusting the “overlapping multitude”. In theory, this spirit can be viewed as a “supporter” of all the individuals who do not “overlap with the multitude” – it is taking away the community’s means to put them into a category of the lows, plebeians, etc. based upon what the community finds valuable i.e., individual’s means that allow for the “overlap” – by taking these values (sensations) and putting them outside of ‘life’¹⁵² while also being a figure of merit for the noble: it considers their values as something more praise-worthy than life itself. To put it simply, this spirit creates a way for both the noble and the low to feel more powerful by completely exterminating the difference that life has put between them i.e., their individual means to “seek power”. Such a deed on the part of the spirit, however, generates a contradiction, a contradiction not only within the life of a community but also within life itself. Thus, let us conclude our derivation of the ‘will to nothingness’¹⁵³ from the “need to seek power” recalling two statements by Nietzsche which deduce the will to nothingness from the two aspects of the contradiction just mentioned (in the same order – community, spirit). Let us also add that these two statements will re-connect our two sources (*Beyond Good and Evil* and *On the Genealogy of Morals*), thereby justifying our parallel use of them:

‘To refrain from mutual injury, mutual violence, mutual exploitation, to equate one’s own will with that of another: this may in a certain rough sense become good manners between individuals if the conditions for it are present (namely if their strength and value standards are in fact similar and they both belong to *one* body). As soon as there is a desire to take this principle further, however, and if possible even as the *fundamental principle of society*, it at once reveals itself for what it is: as the will to the *denial* of life, as the principle of dissolution and decay.’¹⁵⁴

And the contradiction of life within the spirit itself:

‘We can no longer conceal from ourselves *what* this willing directed by the ascetic ideal actually expresses in its entirety: this hatred of the human, and even more of the animal, of

¹⁵⁰ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 49

¹⁵¹ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, p. 96

¹⁵² Ibid

¹⁵³ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 136

¹⁵⁴ Ibid, pp. 193-194

the material, this revulsion from the senses, from reason itself, this fear of happiness and beauty, this yearning to pass beyond all appearance, change, becoming, death, desire, beyond yearning itself. All this represents – may we be bold enough to grasp this – a *will to nothingness*, an aversion to life, a rebellion against the most fundamental pre-conditions of life, but which is and remains none the less a *will!*¹⁵⁵

In conclusion, it can be said that based on the characteristics of the *ascetic priest* i.e., the philosopher whose ‘willing is directed by the ascetic ideal’¹⁵⁶, especially the characteristics of his attitude towards the community that he is the one who uses the *deceptive* means to attain the feeling of increased power (*Section 3.2.*): he deceives other spirits, and ‘in this the spirit enjoys the multiplicity and cunning of its masks, it enjoys too the sense of being safe that this brings’¹⁵⁷ (safety before crushing through the ‘self-misunderstanding’¹⁵⁸).

Having said this, the interpretative part of this thesis has come to a conclusion. The only thing that is left or, rather the several things that are still will have to be discussed in the next Chapter. There, we will review our trajectory, highlight certain things that were said, and bring forth other things that perhaps remained unsaid.

¹⁵⁵ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, p. 136

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid*

¹⁵⁷ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 160-161

¹⁵⁸ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, p. 95

5. Summary, Opposition, Critique

Here is how this last chapter will be divided: *First*, we will make a synopsis of all the things we claimed; *second*, we will look at a few authors from our *secondary literature* and oppose a limited number of their interpretations of Nietzsche's philosophy; *third and last*, we will outline a critique of a particular aspect of the Will to Power.

First, as an individual goes through life he encounters new inner experiences. These inner experiences result in an emotion which then stands in contrast to an old emotion until they are reconciled or, if we were trying to be more precise, to a plethora of already reconciled emotions. This whole process of reconciliation is guided by the feeling of power, that is the deciding factor of the nature of the reconciliation (i.e., which emotion prevails) is the resulting amount of power stemming from it. That amount is, however, limited by the strength of the individual, by the quality of the already reconciled plethora of emotions (this is represented in Nietzsche's metaphor of the stomach – Section 3.2. –: everyone can digest but some have an issue digesting this, some digesting that), hence the individual has defining means in order to gain as much power as possible via the reconciliation. The reason why he needs as much power as possible is because he can feel like an individual only through the feeling of increased power – through the multi-layered false identification. Consequently, we can assert that what we have been describing as “the feeling of increased power” is Nietzsche's Will to Power; for via this feeling of power we can perceive not only the emergence of an individual as a unity but also the emergence of everything else as a unity (we have provided the example of emotions for instance). In addition, the individual's means to attain the feeling of increased power, that is the means of the individual's Will to Power, necessarily exhibit a certain kind of morality as *primarily*, in other words, morality as *secondarily* is the expression of individuals for whose Will to Power is this moral period the most beneficial. Hence, we have led the Will to Power by the hands of Morality and we have uncovered that, in the end, Morality itself has been led by the hands of the Will to Power.

Second, although a proper discussion of other interpreters of Nietzsche's work would require a Chapter of its own, perhaps even a whole thesis, we shall attempt to do our best in a few lines, for our selection of citations gives us at least two opportunities to lay out both our and the concrete interpreter's positions without the need to pose any explanatory remarks as to what exactly we are opposing.

Let us start with *Gilles Deleuze*. In this case, the motive behind our opposition is that he is clearly falling prey to the ‘prejudice of philosophers’¹⁵⁹ in his attempt at avoiding explaining the Will to Power as a “want to seek power”. In fact, Deleuze explains it instead as a ‘differential element of force’¹⁶⁰:

‘Nietzsche's concept of force is therefore that of a force which is related to another force: in this form force is called will. The will (will to power) is the differential element of force. A new conception of the philosophy of the will follows from this. For the will is not exercised mysteriously on muscles or nerves, still less on "matter in general", but is necessarily exercised on another will. The real problem is not that of the relation of will to the involuntary but rather of the relation of a will that commands to a will that obeys - that obeys to a greater or lesser extent. " 'Will' can of course operate only on 'will' - and not on 'matter' (not on 'nerves' for example): enough, one must venture the hypothesis that wherever 'effects' are recognized, will is operating on will" (BGE 36 p. 49). The will is called a complex thing because insofar as it wills it wills obedience - but only a will can obey commands.’¹⁶¹

Deleuze seems to completely misunderstand what the will is and that there is a difference between the will and the will to power. He seems to think that the will is a relation between two forces that vary in strength while this variation then organizes that relation into a “command-obedience relation”. We know that the will is either the result of the false identification of the executor of the command and the action, or the feeling of increased power which enables the false identification. In short, we could never say that ‘the will wills obedience’ because it would either mean that the “false identification wills obedience” which is not the case because the false identification can will because there is obedience or that the “feeling of increased power wills obedience” which, again, cannot be because the feeling of increased power is the result of obedience. His misunderstanding springs from the fact that he sees willing as a “cause-effect” relationship – the stronger force causes the weaker to obey – but that is not the case, for the paragraph he is sourcing this understanding from (§36 of *Beyond Good and Evil*) merely runs an experiment to track down the origin of this relationship to willing because Nietzsche thinks that ‘the belief in causality is the belief in the causality of will’¹⁶². Once, however, Nietzsche manages to track down the origin, he defines

¹⁵⁹ Title of the first part of *Beyond Good and Evil* where we have seen Nietzsche develop his critical standpoint towards cause and effect, freedom of the will, and un-freedom of the will

¹⁶⁰ Deleuze Gilles, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans. Tomlinson Hugh (Columbia University Press, 2002), p. 7

¹⁶¹ Ibid

¹⁶² Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 67

all efficiency of the will as the Will to Power i.e., ‘it is only a question of *strong* and *weak* wills’, not a question of causality.

And let us conclude *second* with *Pavel Kouba* where our motive lies in the issue of what happens when one omits the tight connection between Morality and the Will to Power (which we have pointed out in the abstract). To put it simply, *Kouba* thinks that whenever a community forms a principle i.e., a value, it is the principle that “denies life”, however, according to our interpretation, it is not the principle that “denies life”, it is the deed of putting the principle outside of life that “denies life”. This occurrence is not present in *Kouba’s* interpretation because he does institute the qualitative difference in people’s moralities, i.e., their emotional typology:

‘The space of power cannot be ensured by any general principle. Both, direct confrontation with an enemy, and the pursuit of compromises and agreements, can extend and enstrengthen the space, or destroy it. The necessity to decide brings even into the most collective decision an element of violence that cannot be denied but has to be endured under the name of imperative preservation of power. “To refrain from mutual injury, mutual violence, mutual exploitation, to equate one’s own will with that of another: this may in a certain rough sense become good manners between individuals if the conditions for it are present [...]. As soon as there is a desire to take this principle further, however, and if possible even as the *fundamental principle of society* [i.e., political decision-making – P.K.], it at once reveals itself for what it is: as the will to the *denial* of life, as the principle of dissolution and decay.”¹⁶³ Power is therefore jeopardized, if the possibility of both friendship and enmity are excluded on any level; society remains the subject of power as long as it can keep its ability to demand or disclaim its own decisions.’¹⁶⁴

Kouba’s approach to a paragraph from *Beyond Good and Evil* (§259) that also plays a role in our thesis – *footnote 154*, is quite different from the one we have taken. He seems to look at it as if it were dictating two different attitudes that people must be able to hold within a society, or ‘space of power’¹⁶⁵ in his terms, otherwise the society crumbles (hence, ‘dissolution and

¹⁶³ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, pp. 193-194

¹⁶⁴ Kouba Pavel, *Nietzsche, Filosofická interpretace* (Praha: OIKOYMENH, 2006), p. 265 – translation mine, original text: Prostor moci nemůže být zajištěn žádným obecným principem. Přímá konfrontace s nepřitelem i snaha o kompromisy a dohodu, obojí jej může rozšířit a posílit, nebo zničit. Nutnost rozhodovat vnáší i do nejspolečnějšího možného rozhodnutí prvek násilí, který nesmí být zapřen, nýbrž unesen ve jménu nezbytného uchování moci. [...] Moc je tedy ohrožena, je-li na jakékoli rovině vyloučena možnost přátelství nebo možnost nepřátelství; společenství zůstává subjektem moci jen tak dlouho, dokud si uchovává schopnost na svých rozhodnutích trvat i netrvat.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid

decay'¹⁶⁶), that is the society crumbles whenever it is 'ensured by any general principle' that advocates for an attitude that is friendly because it excludes the 'possibility of enmity'¹⁶⁷ (and *vice versa*): consider, however, how we have explained community to work, how would Kouba interpret the 'transformation of concepts'¹⁶⁸ from footnote 56?. Nonetheless, let us not venture astray by posing questions: indeed, there cannot be a 'general principle'¹⁶⁹ within a society but not due to the fact that it would promote a certain attitude albeit friendly or hostile, for the whole notion of community is based upon promoting a certain attitude, the danger of a general principle lies in the fact that it is "outside of life" that it is achievable without any consideration to the individual's "nature" i.e., emotions. This aspect Kouba cannot see because to refrain from everything that we do not have in front of ourselves, he avoided the interpretation of the bracket that leads us to a fairly important hint: individuals within a society can in fact behave according to a single attitude only if, however, they have the same "nature", the same values, the same body (i.e., structure of their soul). It is only then when we ensure that they will not be taken "outside of life". And, in case you are not satisfied with this answer – is it not a general principle to say that "the possibility of both friendship and enmity cannot be excluded on any level"?

Third and last, let our last words in this thesis be a little critical towards Nietzsche himself or perhaps let them be imaginative, for Nietzsche says early on in *Beyond Good and Evil* that 'every great philosophy has hitherto been: a confession on the part of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir'¹⁷⁰. It should be clear why after what we have uncovered. Based upon the same "uncovering", however, it also seems that the term "power" (the feeling of power, sensations of power, Will to Power, etc.) could be easily replaced by any other, let us say, "feeling" because there is no reason to adhere to "power" other than its traditional connection to activity, or maybe its connection to the feeling of being oneself, for lack better words, as in "no one can oppose me". Outside of that there seems to be no theoretical explanation as to why "power". Hence, we might assume that its use is highly "artistic" because the term seems to serve only as a reference point to these intricate notions that lie on the basis of Nietzsche's philosophy – similarly to "passionate love" for instance: love already involves passion, but it also involves many other feelings, thus why choose

¹⁶⁶ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, pp. 193-194

¹⁶⁷ Kouba, *Nietzsche, Filosofická interpretace*, p. 265

¹⁶⁸ Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, p. 14-15

¹⁶⁹ Kouba, *Nietzsche, Filosofická interpretace*, p. 265

¹⁷⁰ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 37

passion to describe love to a person who, somehow, does not know what love is? To render long story short, why must the overarching feeling be “power”, and since there is no viable definition, as far as these two books are concerned, cannot this preferential frame of mind of Nietzsche be interpreted as his own ‘involuntary and unconscious memoir’¹⁷¹? Such a shift might not change elements of this theory like ‘strength and weakness of the will’¹⁷², ‘freedom of will’¹⁷³, etc., however, it might cause a significant development on the grounds of the means available for individuals, consequently on the grounds of sensations, words, values, perhaps it might go as far as defining a new moral period. Alas, at this point in time we cannot wander further than to the conclusion that life sincerely appears to be the Will to Power.

¹⁷¹ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 37

¹⁷² *Ibid*, p. 51

¹⁷³ *Ibid*, p. 48

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