

TĚLUPIL, Vojtěch. *Vliv historické zkušenosti na současná politická rozhodnutí: rozdíl v českých a slovenských postojích k uznání Jeruzaléma jako hlavního města Izraele*. Praha, 2022. 50 s. Diplomová práce (Mgr.). Univerzita Karlova, Fakulta sociálních věd, Institut mezinárodních studií. Katedra německých a rakouských studií. Vedoucí diplomové práce doc. Mgr. Tomáš Weiss, M.A., Ph.D.

Abstract

The question of the different attitudes towards Jerusalem and the historical relationship with Israel between the Czech Republic and Slovakia seems to be primarily a question of stabilization and destabilization of power (and differently applied ideological control) of communist Czechoslovakia of 1948-1989, with the radical break with in 1989, resp. after its division in 1992 into two successor states. The main goal of this thesis was to compare these attitudes using methods and approaches of historical institutionalism.

The way in which the institutional environment for foreign policy-making was set up at the beginning of the 1990s in the form of a commitment to continuity with Czechoslovak foreign policy after 1992. Natural non-institutional factors such as the specific role of the presidency or the stability of the executive environment in the successor states naturally played another role, but from the point of view of historical institutionalism inertia.

While the main phase of shaping the Czech Republic's foreign policy orientation took place during Jiří Dienstbier's post as Minister of Foreign Affairs (1990-1992) and subsequently developed with admitted continuity, Slovakia was in significantly different conditions after the partition of Czechoslovakia, both in terms of finding its foreign policy orientation and foreign policy infrastructure, and the turning point is considered to be the elections in 1998, which definitively ended the swordfish.

Regarding the attitude towards Jerusalem, several main parameters play a role in Israel and the Middle East conflict. From the point of view of the Czech and Slovak Republics, these are mainly different historical traumas, different domestic political divisions (and the degree of anti-communism), different emphasis on the importance of transatlantic ties with the US (and human rights agenda), which of course is reflected in foreign policy priorities. Especially in the fact that, unlike Slovakia, the unconditional support of Israel is declared as part of subscribing to the legacy of the First Republic (and T. G. Masaryk) and especially as a definition of the foreign policy priorities of the pre-November regime and its anti-Zionism.

This antithesis of the First Republic turns out to be something permanently present in

the Czech historical memory, which the pre-November regime failed to completely erase, despite all efforts, including the historical cultural contribution of the Jews. Dissidents' registration of this legacy also played a role here, partly due to the need to come to terms with other topics from the Prague Spring 1968. In Slovakia, on the other hand, these historical reminiscences did not occur, which manifested itself even after 1989. In addition, the relationship to Judaism is largely burdened by the legacy of Catholic autonomism and resistance to Czechoslovakism.

The Czech Republic's unconditional support for Israel is in direct contrast to Slovakia's sober approach, which essentially mimics the European Union's foreign policy. In the Czech Republic, it gradually developed after 1989 to the level of a joint meeting of governments, not to mention the high frequency of mutual visits by top officials. Slovakia gets closer to Israel much later (creation of monuments, etc.) and its relations are based more on pure pragmatism and are within the limits of the mentioned EU foreign policy.

Moreover, the attitude towards Jerusalem following the existence of Israel fits much better into the scheme of the Czech concept of statehood, based on historical law, rather than Slovak, which is based on natural law (while denying continuity with either Czechoslovakia or Hungary). At the same time, different approaches to the fulfillment of statehood could not be fully developed until 1992, until then they were stifled in Slovakia by centralist tendencies, both (despite the federal arrangement) from Prague and until 1989 also by the Eastern Bloc framework as such.