

Abstract

The thesis criticizes the subjectivist-teleological principals of economics, more accurately the inability to fulfill them. Economics intended to work with the individual preferences without bias and without any their concretization. The neutrality is, however, distorted by the accepted assumptions among which is very serious the a priori causality between preferences and action. The teleological perspective as it was introduced by Karel Engliš was sharply delimited with respect causality. Neoclassical and Austrian school, however, emanate from mixing causality and teleology in their conceptions of action and preferences. It is also possible to formulate it as the assumption of certain a priori rationality of human action. I try to clear up the notion of rationality, show the possibilities of its meaning and point out at the radicalism of any assumed causality between preferences and action. I use these conclusions to outline the preference framework that would not repeat identified mistakes, which would, however, set out from the subjectivist-teleological perspective as well.