

ABSTRACT

The thesis criticizes the subjectivist-teleological principals of economics. Economics intended to work with the individual preferences without normative, or any other, bias. The neutrality is, however, distorted by deep assumption of the economic thought – the a priori causality between the preferences and action. The teleological perspective as it was introduced by Karel Engliš was sharply delimited with respect to causality. Neoclassical and Austrian school, however, do mix causality and finality in their conceptions of action and preferences. My thesis strives to describe this mistake. It is also possible to formulate the theme of the thesis as criticism of the assumption of certain a priori rationality of human action. I try to clear up the notion of rationality, show the possibilities of its meaning and point out at the radicalism of any assumed causality it may encompass. I use the critical conclusions to outline a preference framework that would not repeat the identified mistakes, which would, however, set out from the subjectivist-teleological perspective as well.