CHARLES UNIVERSITY

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Institute of Political Studies

Department of Security Studies

Master thesis

2021   **Adil Safarli**

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Comparative Study between the 2016 Failed Military Coup and Previous Successful Coups in Turkey

Master thesis

Prague 2021

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Bibliographic note

Abstract

The 2016 Turkish failed coup attempt was a striking political event of the year. Although Turkey is a country with a long history of successful military intervention and deep-rooted coup culture, the coup organizers could not achieve the desired outcome in 2016. The coups of 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997 have resulted in the government's change where the military played an important role by influencing the political sphere. However, the result was different in the coup attempt carried out on 15 July 2016. As the President, a large segment of military, political parties and a significant part of the society had an anti-coup attitude and stood up against the military coup. For this reason, the thesis attempts to compare the 2016 Turkish failed coup with the previous successful coups of 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997's in Turkey. The comparison is based on the hypotheses built on four civil-military relation theories and concepts: Military Professionalism, Civilian Supremacy, Social Cohesion and Public Institutionalism. According to the analyses, the findings indicate that the theories of Civilian Supremacy and Public Institutionalism better explain the failure of 2016 and the success of the previous coups than other theories.

Keywords

Declaration of Authorship

1. The author hereby declares that he compiled this thesis independently, using only the listed resources and literature.

2. The author hereby declares that all the sources and literature used have been properly cited.

3. The author hereby declares that the thesis has not been used to obtain a different or the same degree.

Prague 19.07.2021   Adil Safarli

Acknowledgments

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my thesis supervisor Dr. Tomáš Kučera for his patience and matchless advice through the semester. I am also thankful to my family and friends who have motivated me and gave me strentgh to successfully complete my thesis.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Ataturkist Association……………………………………………………………. (AA)

Central Intelligence Agency……………………………………………………. (CIA)

Chief of General Staff... (CGS)

Constitutional Court.. (CC)

Democratic Party…………………………………………………….……… (DP)

Fetullah Gulen Movement... (FGM)

Five Civic Initiative……………………………………………………….. (FCI)

Grand National Assembly of Turkey.. (GNAT)

Higher Military Council .... (HMC)

Investigation Commission .... (IC)

Islamic State ………………………………………………….....…... (IS)

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria... (ISIS)

Justice Party……………………………………………………………... (JP)

Justice and Development Party... (JDP)

Kurdistan Worker's Party.. (KWP)

Medical Faculty Student Association... (MFSA)

National Security Council... (NSC)

North Atlantic Treaty Organization.. (NATO)

Republic of Turkey.. (RT)

Republican's People Party…………………………………………….. (RPP)

Revolutionary Workers Unions Confederation...................................... (RWUC)

Supreme Military Council... (SMC)

True Path Party... (TPP)

1. Introduction

The failed 2016 Turkish coup attempt has disapproved the perception in Turkey that the soldiers will never be able to attempt a coup again (Haugom, 2019, p. 2). It indicated that some soldiers still regard the changing of the government through undemocratic ways as usual. In the history of Turkey, the military has been considerably influential in politics and multiple times staged successful coups. This situation, primarily seen in underdeveloped or developing countries, occurred almost every ten years in Turkey. Turkey witnessed the change of the government in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997 through undemocratic means such as direct military intervention or forcing the government to resign. Although it adopted the values of Western societies such as democracy, secularism, the rule of law and followed a foreign policy in harmony with the Western political system, it was still subjected to coups that led to a change of the ruling regime. These developments mainly were related to the country's past. In the Ottoman era, the Sultanate was regarded as a symbol of sustainable stability and continuity. As the Sultanate was abolished with creating a new republic, people needed another alternative guard to trust in dealing with the political unrest and stability (Aydinli, 2009, p. 584). Subsequently, they found this trust in the TAF (Turkish Armed |Forces).

It must be underlined that after the JDP (Justice and Development Party) came to power in 2002, the involvement of the military in civilian affairs has dramatically decreased. However, there were still military officers who tried to intervene in politics by organizing a coup attempt to overthrow the JDP from power. The 2016 failed coup was another attempt to change the democratically elected government. On the night of the coup attempt, 250 people were killed, putschists bombed the GNAT (Grand National Assembly of Turkey), and caused severe trauma (Luttwak, 2016). It was allegedly staged by FGM (Fetullah Gulenist Movement) members who have infiltrated into the army and

were directly funded by Fetullah Gulen (Rabi, 2017, p. 27). Regardless of who was behind the coup attempt, the 15th July 2016 coup was prevented by the ruling authority. Many of the officers did not obey the orders of the putschists and Erdogan himself called the people to go to the streets to stand against soldiers who were attempting a coup (Jacoby, 2016, p. 131). This worked, and the putschists could not achieve their aims. Unlike the previous successful coups that occurred in Turkey, the 2016 coup attempt failed. The failure of the 2016 coup attempt and its difference with previous successful coups remains an interesting case to study. Therefore, this thesis aims to find the reasons for the failure of the 2016 coup attempt and its differences between previous successful coups.

The **relevance of the thesis** is that it brings different perspectives on explaining the coups in the history of Turkey by using other civil-military relation theories. These perspectives can help understand previous coups that occurred in Turkey and suggest solutions to prevent potential coups. The thesis can help explain the success of the coups in Turkey and other developing countries of the world.

This thesis aims to compare the 2016 failed military coup and previous successful coups in Turkey. For that reason, the study targets analytical, objective, and critical evaluation of the Turkish coup attempt in 2016 and compares it with the previous military coups in Turkey based on four different civil-military relation theories. Comparison will be done based on the two different periods; one period from 1960 until JDP's power in 2002, another one from 2002 till 2016. This evaluation will include the views of various state and non-state actors regardless of their political ideologies and attempt to provide a comprehensive answer to the research question. The research question raised in the study is: how the 2016-failed military coup differed from previous successful coups in Turkey and why it resulted in failure.

The **method** employed in this thesis will be the comparative case study of the Turkish coups in two different periods. This method is the most appropriate for this thesis. It will be possible to identify the differences between the Turkish coups and state concrete and specific factors missing in the 2016-failed military coup in Turkey. With the help of this method, it will be possible to have more precise insight into the issue and provide a more obvious standpoint, which may be eventually valuable to analyze the military coups around the world.

The primary **sources** for the thesis are the works that already exist in the literature about the 2016 Turkish coup attempt. However, it should be underlined that the 2016-failed military coup is a contentious issue and lacks reliable information. Nonetheless, I did my best to read the sources critically and identify and utilize the most trustworthy sources. The goal is not to use resources, which is hard to prove since it will affect the reliability of the thesis. In this study, both primary and secondary sources have been used. However, the primary focus is given to the existing data, which has been gathered from secondary sources, such as websites and articles of political writers and the reports of international security and armed conflict experts. Some of these secondary sources were the sources written in the Turkish language. Moreover, primary sources such as the announcement of the Turkish governments or governmental institutions and the speeches of Turkish officials were used in the thesis as well.

The central body part of the thesis is **structured** into three sections. The first section emphasizes the critical well-known civil-military theories that set the ground for completing the thesis. The hypotheses and arguments that these theories claim bring new perspectives on explaining the failure of the coups. The second section focuses on the empirical knowledge of the relevant information about Turkish coups and their history. In this section, the decisive events that lead to the emergence of the coups are highlighted briefly. Finally, the last section analyses Turkish coups of two different periods based on

the civil-military theories underlined in the first section. It is the most crucial section out of all three, as the analysis and comparison obtained from this section help find an answer to the research question.

The thesis argues four different **hypotheses** based on the four civil-military relation theories highlighted in the theoretical section. The first hypothesis is based on the theory of military professionalism by Samuel Huntington, which stipulates that the professional army does not intervene in politics and does not support the implementation of the coup. This theory argues that if the coup is successful, that's due to the unprofessional characteristic of the soldiers who have not understood the essence of its duties. Thus, the first hypothesis is that military professionalism in the Turkish Armed Forces in 2016 distinguishes it from previous successful coups in Turkey, and the reasons why the 2016 military coup failed are best explained by military professionalism theory. Secondly, another hypothesis concerned with the concept of civilian supremacy by Samuel Finer states that if the army is under civilian control, it is unlikely that the coup will be completed. Thus, the second hypothesis is that civilian supremacy in civil-military relations in 2016 is the factor differentiating it from previous successful Turkish coups, and the theory of civilian supremacy best explains the reasons for failure. The third hypothesis is inspired by Amos Perlmutter's idea of social cohesion, which underlines that successful military intervention will likely occur when there is a low degree of social cohesion in the country. Considering this theory, the third hypothesis is that the high degree of social cohesion was present in 2016 Turkey, unlike the periods of previous successful coups, and social cohesion theory has better explained the failure of the 2016 coup. Finally, the last hypothesis is built on the theory of public institutionalism by Amos Perlmutter. He claims that successful military intervention is likely to happen in a state with a low degree of public institutionalism. According to this theory, if a state has strong public institutions and a solid ruling party, the coup will most likely fail. Therefore, the

last hypothesis is that the high degree of political institutionalism was present in 2016 Turkey, whereas it lacked in the periods of previous successful coups, and the theory of political institutionalism best explains the reasons why the 2016 coup failed.

In the analytical part of the thesis, all these four hypotheses are tested on the case studies of the previous Turkish coups. The result of the tested hypotheses is provided, followed by the conclusion section of the thesis. The sources used for the thesis are indicated in the bibliography part.

2. Conceptual/Theoretical Framework

This part of the thesis will introduce theoretical grounds and explanations of coup attempts. Before dealing with theoretical explanations one by one, the concepts of **disposition to intervene** and **coup-proofing measures** should be underlined. Firstly, the disposition to intervene appears when a suitable environment and elements for the military intervention in politics (Powell, 2012, p. 1018). When this environment exists, the coup plotters attentively assess their chances of success and initiate a putsch when the anticipated benefits of the action and the likelihood of triumph are high to balance the terrible results of a failed coup. To get high benefits from a coup, putschists have to ensure that the expected utility of the coup will be increased, and they have also to believe that they have a high probability of success (Powell, 2012, p. 1018).

Furthermore, the anticipated damage from a coup's failure may spread to different levels. It may consist of unpleasant results such as execution, imprisonment, banishment, and group-level sanctions such as disbandment of the army, the liquidating of the soldiers involved, and the mass killing of certain ethnic groups who have a connection with the

putsch (Pilster, 2011, p. 335). Moreover, state-level costs may include a civil war as well. Therefore, putschists should avoid attempting a coup until the anticipated probability of success is considerably high to balance the associated risk (Powell, 2012, p. 1020).

Moreover, another important concept to understand the essence of the theoretical grounds of the thesis is **coup-proofing measures**. These measures include the actions taken by the government to counter the military and decrease their disposition to intervene through different means (Powell, 2012, p. 1023). It is believed that these measures will reduce the ability of the putschists to attempt a coup; therefore, decreasing the anticipated benefits of a coup and making them less probable (Pilster, 2011, p. 336). However, it should be noted that specific measures such as legal restrictions on the officers work to the extent that they are willing to obey the law. It can be ineffective when the disposition to intervene is considerably high. Despite these, many governments have tried to coup-proof through establishing structural and legal obstacles which the army finds challenging to coordinate (Nordlinger, 1977, p. 1119). Therefore, the thesis will give great importance to this concept. Understanding the essence of coup-proofing measures is very important to deeply figure out the thesis's theoretical grounds, which will be introduced in the following paragraphs.

2.1. Coup/Military coup

The word **"coup"** as a concept is defined as "the work of changing the regime, resigning the government or overthrowing the administration by using force or using democratic means" (Devran, 2016, p. 7). On the other hand, the concept of the military coup is defined as the intervention of the military personnel to the civilian personnel. Generally, it appears to overthrow the civilian administration by the military (Hale, 2018,

p. 10). It may involve the use of violence and threats to reach the goal. As a result of the military coup, the "civilian personnel" or political ruling class can be dismissed from power. The army can either take charge of the government directly or hand it over to their puppets if organized by a third party (Nordlinger, 1977, p. 1119). As long as they do not go back to the times as at the start of a revolution, military coups as a concept usually intend to restore the system rather than establish a new system. Moreover, Powell and Thyne define a **coup attempt** as "an attempt by the army or other elites within the state apparatus to overthrow the head of government through unconstitutional means" (Thompson, 1975, p. 17). **Successfu**l coups are the types of coups when the head of authority is removed from the power for at least one week" (Belkin, 2003, p. 596). In contrast, **unsuccessful coups** are defined as types of coups when coup plotters cannot remove the head of government due to the people's resistance or strong coup proofing measures by the government (Powell, 2012, p. 1021).

2.2. Memorandum

In the literature, **a memorandum** is defined as "an article written to remind or to warn something"; however, in political literature, it is in the way of a person or persons warning another person or persons on any political issue (George, 2011). The military leaders usually use the memorandum to warn the government. The most significant difference between the memorandum and the military coup is that by warning the government, the memorandum gives a chance to the government to fix the situation; whereas, a military coup is a direct seizure of power by the military and has much more severe consequences.

2.3. Military Professionalism by Samuel Huntington

One of the theories that we will use in this study to explain the failure of the coups is *Military Professionalism* by Samuel Huntington. In his book, The Soldier and the State, he discusses civil-military relations. Focusing on the military's role in the civilian political scene, Huntington puts forward the proposition of "civilian control", that is, the dominance of civilian power over the military elements to minimize military power. The main idea of his book is that the professionalization of the soldiers is the primary factor to guarantee efficient civilian control of the armed forces and sufficient national defence. In dealing with civilian control of the armed forces, Hungtinton differentiated two different types of civilian control: subjective and objective civilian control (Samuel, 1957).

In the first model, the military is not separated from the political and social system and closely engages. The military is only formed in the face of war threats; however, once the danger is gone, the officers go back to society and perform their political and social tasks (Samuel, 1957). In the subjective civilian control model, the soldiers are dominated by a particular section of civilians through civilianizing the army. This model denies an independent sphere to the army and assigns a role of adjusting national priorities. It has the same political doctrines as the civilian regime and acts as a mirror of the state. Huntington asserts that the army struggles and contests for influence in adjusting national priorities with other groups in this model. However, Hungtington himself is against the subjective civilian control model. According to him, guaranteeing the consistency in political ideology and doctrines of an army as wanted by subjective civilian control model is challenging, thereby raising questions about its probability. For example, changing the political principles of the military with the coming of every new government would be a complex task to implement. For this reason, he criticizes some liberal democratic values

for creating a subjective civilian control that brings horrible results and notes that "a political officer corps, rent with a faction, subordinated to ulterior ends would endanger the security of the state "(Samuel, 1957). Then, he added that "the power of the army in a liberal society is the most significant danger to their professionalism "(Samuel, 1957). According to Huntington, military professionalism is low in subjective civilian control.

Secondly, Huntington suggests another model with the name 'objective civilian control' in which professionalizing the army and prohibiting any kind of intervention in politics is essential. The model focuses on retaining military and civilian leadership separately, thus enabling the army to perform freely. Here, the military is separated from politics, and the officers concentrate their efforts only on the military sector (enhancing the weapon system, managing the violence, improving defence, etc.). In this model, civilian control is obtained by converting the army into a tool of the state. According to this model, the army must improve and apply the methods to fulfil aims and objectives determined by the civilian authority (Momayezi, 1998, p. 21). Regarding the objective civilian control model, the army is independent of the interference of civilian leadership. Instead, it is dominated by the principle of professionalism, which contains subordination of the military to the civilian leadership and politically neutral position against civilian authority (Momayezi, 1998, p. 13). According to Huntington, the most effective way to manage civil-military relations is to have an objective civilian control model, where the professionalism is high. He argues that unlike 'subjective civilian control', separation and autonomy of the military in an objective control model would guarantee maximum military effectiveness since its responsibilities will not be weakened as a consequence of its interests widening into non-military areas (Samuel, 1957). The effectiveness of the army will be improved since it will be able to pay full attention to its duties and have absolute control over its activities. Subsequently, this would guarantee efficient control and a powerful army that can provide national security. The second model of Hungtington

embraces the "Clausewitzian approach whereby "war is the continuation of policy by other means," with senior army professionals ensuring national security for the country and giving military advice to the civilians, who deal with their expertise in the sphere of politics " (Momayezi, 1998, p. 14). Professionalism in one sphere prevents authority in the other.

According to Huntington, military professionalism creates a reciprocal binding bond and connection between society and its professionals. Military professionalism wants military officers to do their tasks and serve the country by obeying the politicians and rulers in the state and government (Samuel, 1957). Huntington stresses that this professional approach by the military makes the military coup unlikely to succeed. In his book, The Soldier and the State, he described qualities of military professionalism and noted that the soldiers should comply with these qualities. According to him, the qualities are as follows: 1. Expertise, 2. Responsibility, and 3. Corporateness.

First of all, the expertise contains the control of violence, knowledge of combat, and administrative and organizational skills. This set of skills is obtained through comprehensive training and education, and they differentiate the officers from laymen (Samuel, 1957). Huntington argues that military education should not only improve practical skills but also seek to train soldiers intellectually and morally. According to him, this will refrain the military men from intervening in politics.

Secondly, he argues that military professionalism wants soldiers to implement their responsibilities to their country, including non-interference to the politics and compliance to the central authority (Samuel, 1957). The military man should not overrun the limits of his competence. It means the soldier should never provide service that is not under his responsibilities and not within the limits of his expertise. Also, the military man should not apply personal beliefs and biases while performing his occupation (Momayezi, 1998, p. 15). Each rank in the army hierarchy demands more responsibilities and

capabilities**,** as they can decide on more strategic issues. However, the responsibility of the military man is to ensure national security and defence as a tool of the state. In the case of the military man, they are entrusted with assessing the country's safety and ensuring professional advice to the politicians. Society should, in turn, respect their expertise and entities. Huntington notes that this 'professional ethic' distinguishes military men from amateur actors involved in violence and demotivates officers to support the implementation of the military coup (Samuel, 1957).

The last quality of the military professionalism described by Hungtington is "corporateness ", which he described as "a sense of organic unity and consciousness of themselves as a group apart "(Samuel, 1957). In his words, corporateness means the diverse and specific characteristics of a particular profession that differentiate it from the rest. In corporateness, soldiers must have a clear, strong, and in-depth understanding of the mission and the customs and policies supporting it. Also, an essential component of corporateness is to have professional self-identity. Here, the boundary between a soldier and a civilian is drawn through the insignia of rank and uniforms and maintains corporate features. Moreover, Huntington noted that the corporate design of the military profession contained the bureaucracy, communities, associations, cultures, traditions, schools, journals, and entry to the job have strict requirements (Samuel, 1957). Therefore, according to Huntington, considering this corporative structure of the military profession, the military should be given autonomy, and no civilian interference should be allowed.

For precise measurement of military professionalism, the qualities mentioned above by Hungtington need to be integrated into the categories in which the related facts will be more observable. Then, these categories will be used for the analysis and comparison:

1. The "expertise "quality will be integrated into a category named **military education**.
2. "Responsibility "quality will be analyzed under the category of **political neutrality**.

3. The final quality will be remained and be incorporated into the category called **corporateness**. In the light of these three categories, the comparison based on the military professionalism hypothesis seeks to find out professional qualities of the Turkish Armed Forces during 2016 and previous successful coups.

The results obtained through the comparison will allow stating if the hypothesis is supported or not.

Hypothesis 1: The existence of military professionalism in the Turkish Armed Forces in 2016 distinguishes it from previous successful coups in Turkey, and the reasons why the 2016 military coup failed are best explained by military professionalism theory.

2.4.   Civilian Supremacy by Samuel Finer

The second theory our study intends to use is *Civilian Supremacy* by Samuel Finer. This part should be discussed and understood in relation to the previous military professionalism hypothesis. Finer criticizes Huntington's objective control model and professionalism argument, not seeing it as a proper way to manage civil-military relations. According to Finer, the fundamental contradiction of Huntington's statement is that the greater a military's autonomy, the less control civilians can hold. In contrast, "objective" civilian control may minimize military involvement in politics; it can also reduce civilian rule in military matters (Finer, 1962).

Unlike Huntington, Finer asserts that the existence of military professionalism might make the officers intervene in the political sphere for three different reasons: the officers may see themselves as servants of the state rather than of the civilian authority; the power of military autonomy may encourage them to decide on security and the army

matters; the strong loyalty in implementing their duties may push them not to obey the civilian authority (Finer, 1962). He argues that if the officers think that they can intervene for the sake of the country's supreme interest when the civilians are neglecting the state's best interests, that's when they abandon obedience.

Therefore, Finer argues that; the safest method of preventing military interference in civilian politics is possible by establishing the fact that soldiers and civilians believe in the superiority of civilians in principle. And this should never underestimate the importance of military professionalism. It does not allow to be taken or belittled (Finer, 1962). According to his theory, the military that believes in civilian supremacy does not intervene in the political sphere. In the sense of control of the military by elected civil servants, civilian supremacy is essential in a democracy. According to this concept, the strategic issues are best guided by civilian authority rather than a group of military experts whose ultimate goal must be to defend society, not to define it. Civilian supremacy allows a nation to base its values and goals, institutions, and practices on the people's will, rather than the choices of military leaders, who are by definition focused on the need for internal order and external security (Finer, 1962). Thus, Finer believes that the best way to discourage the army to intervene in politics is "the adoption of the concept of civilian supremacy in the army, where only civilian political leadership will have the control over the strategic decision-making (Finer, 1962).

In theory and conceptually, civilian supremacy is simple. In war and peace, every government's decision, all national security-related choices, is taken and made or approved by officials other than the professional armed forces. In principle, civil supremacy is absolute and inclusive. In principle, the military has no decision-making and responsibility authority unless authorized directly or indirectly by civilian leaders (Nordlinger, 1977, p. 1119). Every matter, big and small such as to decide to go to war or to punish the soldiers who have fallen asleep in the line of duty is decided by civil authority or the rules defined

by them. The civilian authority also determines the command decisions such as strategy selection, which operations will be organized, when and which tactic will be used, and the structure of internal military administration in war and peace (Nordlinger, 1977, p. 1119).

Moreover, according to Finer, the constitutional regulations must be accepted by the military. In the constitutional arrangements to be made, it should be clearly stated that the sole representative of popular sovereignty is political power. Therefore the legitimate authority of the government stems from free elections (Finer, 1962). It should go one step further and clarify in the Constitution that the armed forces come only after political power. It is a provision contained in the French, German and Italian Constitutions. The Constitution of each of those States defines certain forms of bringing the military under constitutional control. Namely:

1. The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces is the Head of State,

2. Putting the Armed Forces under the control of a particular institution. This supervisory institution is the Supreme Council of National Defense in France. In Italy, the Supreme Defense Council (which includes senior politicians and military commanders).

3. It should be stated in the Constitution that the power to decide on war rests with the parliament.

But, as in the case of strategic thinking and the ethics of professional military service, constitutional arrangements may seem confounding of matter and its shadow (Nordlinger, 1977, p. 1119). However, as Hobbes stated long ago, "oaths are nothing but words of devotion "; it does not give any guarantee of the loyalty of soldiers to the civilian regime (Finer, 1962). Many historical events and examples are showing that the promise of loyalty to the rulers was broken. Therefore, to guarantee this loyalty to the civilians, specific constitutional and other arrangements must be made beforehand. These assurances must be institutionalized so that the oath of devotion to the authority also makes sense.

To qualitatively measure civilian supremacy in the empirical analysis section, two categories will be formed: obedience to civilian regime and jurisdiction of the government over the military. First of all, as discussed above, Finer criticized the Hungtinton military professionalism theory because it prevents the obedience of the army to civilian authority. Thus, according to Finer, soldiers needs to obey the civilian politicians to have effective civil-military relations where the military does not intervene in politics (Finer, 1962). Considering this approach, the first category to measure civilian supremacy is **obedience to the civilian regime**. Secondly, Finer argued that to ensure compliance of the soldiers to the civilian authority, specific arrangements must be implemented so that the soldier's loyalty to the regime cannot be broken. As written above, these arrangements should include constitutional and any other legislative change that guarantees civilian supremacy over the military. Therefore, another category under the name of **the jurisdiction of the government over the military** will be formed to observe the civilian supremacy in the Turkish Armed Forces.

Hypothesis 2: The presence of civilian supremacy in civil-military relations after 2016 is the factor differentiating it from previous successful Turkish coups and the reasons for failure are best explained by the theory of civilian supremacy

2.5. Social Cohesion by Amos Perlmutter

The third theory that will help us to explain why coups fail is *Social Cohesion* by Amos Perlmutter. This theory mainly argues that in a state with a low degree of social cohesion, the intervention by the military is likely successful. In these states, goals of different groups and personal interests often diverge; state organs do not operate

efficiently; there are few channels for communication, and its programs turn upside down, and development projects collapse (Perlmutter, 1969, p. 385). These states lack mutually valued models of action and are unable to have enough common symbols that can bring society together for social and political action. Therefore, it is hard for the government to receive support for its efforts in the states with a low degree of social cohesion.

This inability in obtaining support is due to the different values of groups and members of society. A stopover in the syndrome of economic and social disorganization is realized only by a group's activities that leave the military, a party, or society revolutionary group (Perlmutter, 1969, p. 38). According to this theory, if the government lacks experience and symbols of authority, officers may manipulate the symbols of their institution to lead and use their power to achieve certain consistency (Perlmutter, 1969, p. 385). Thus, Perlmutter underlines that social cohesiveness is essential for the survival of any authority in the face of military intervention.

Social cohesion is essential to have improved ideological and political articulateness. It is consolidated with socioeconomic power, creates the basis for the political influence of any class. Perlmutter argues that the influential middle class is usually absent in a state with a low degree of social cohesion. It is reflected through polarization between the few rich and the many poor in society (Perlmutter, 1969, p. 384). The middle class is not significant, robust, efficient, united, and politically fruitful in the states with a low degree of social cohesion. The preconditions for military intervention appear when a weak middle class and one class in society are considerably more vital than the other ones. Because of the middle class's search for political allies and the battle for power among various classes, a suitable environment is created for military intervention into civilian affairs. For instance, the middle class only is 6 % of the whole nation in some Middle Eastern countries, and they are usually the employees, not having their private business (Perlmutter, 1969, p. 387). Also, this percentage of the middle class is low in Latin

America, changing between 10 and 20% (Perlmutter, 1969, p. 387). Not surprisingly, these are the regions where military interventions are frequently observed.

In addition to the social polarization, in a state with a low degree of social cohesion, certain groups within the society found themselves in a conflict against each other. The distinct and non-mutual values and beliefs between these groups result in the absence of unified social consciousness (Pelmutter, 1969, p. 386). It might be argued that having a different political view, value, and belief system is normal and acceptable in democratic societies. This should not be an indicator of the lack of social cohesion in a society. However, according to this theory, in a state with a low degree of social cohesion, this fratricidal relations between the groups reflect itself with prolonged social unrest (protests, riots, dissatisfactions, etc.) According to Perlmutter, these states are vulnerable to military intervention, as they cannot control the violence and mobilize the unifying action (Perlmutter, 1969, p. 388). Society is usually divided between traditionalists and modernists, secularists and religious, and different ideologies beliefs, and these differences are generally followed by protests, riots, and fights on the streets. Consequently, the military using social unrest finds itself in the best position to intervene in politics and prevent fratricidal relations between groups (Perlmutter, 1969, p. 388).

To measure the social cohesion hypothesis in the thesis, two observable criteria will be constituted: social polarization and stability. First of all, as mentioned above, Perlmutter argues that one of the factors that lead to the military intervention into politics in a state with a low degree of social cohesion is the divergence of the gap between rich and poor. Thus, this measurement will be incorporated into a category called **"social polarization "**. Secondly, Perlmutter underlined that certain groups end up in a conflict in a state with a low degree of social cohesion, leading to a fratricidal relationship among the classes. This measurement will be applied in the different section under the category of **"stability "**.

Hypothesis 3: The high degree of social cohesion was present in 2016 Turkey, unlike the periods of previous successful coups, and social cohesion theory has better explained the failure of the 2016 coup.

2.6.   *Political Institutionalism* by Amos Perlmutter

The final theory that is aimed to use during the paper is *Political Institutionalism* by Amos Perlmutter. This second theory by Perlmutter should be understood in relation to the first theory called social cohesion because it is a political manifestation of the social cohesion theory. According to this theory, the intervention by the military officers is likely successful in states in which political institutionalization has not occurred. The theory argues that the power of political organizations differs with their level of support and political institutionalization, that is the degree to which political organizations develop their traditions and the extent to which these organizations act autonomously (Perlmutter, 1969, p. 389). In the states with a low degree of political institutionalization, the level of support for political organizations, which is the number and diversity of such organizations' members, lacks. The legitimacy of these organizations is frequently hindered, as their values comprehend small groups and do not belong to big groups of people. For this reason, in these states, the political parties tend to be divided, each supported by various social groups, which in themselves are not cohesive (Perlmutter, 1969, p. 389). The labour movement is divided similarly: each category of worker is associated with different unions, and these unions do not trust each other.

Moreover, Perlmutter states that the countries with a high degree of political institutionalization differ from other states with their organizational strength. Here the organizational strength means the material resources, nationwide organizational presence

of the political party, and ability to predict and control the risks (Perlmutter, 1969, p. 388). According to Perlmutter, only strong and effective political parties can provide this political institutionalism. He argues that it does not necessarily mean that this powerful political party has to be authoritarian; it can also be democratic and consists of pluralistic groups such as India's Congress Party (Perlmutter, 1969, p. 389). Therefore, Perlmutter highlights the importance of powerful political parties since they have been the most successful actors in political institutionalization, which helped remove factors that lead to successful military intervention (Perlmutter, 1969, p. 389).

Furthermore, Perlmutter highlights that another factor to be found in a state with a high degree of public institutionalism is the scope of support to a political party. The political party uses various means and tools to gain the support of the people. It includes using media facilities, propaganda, populist statements, and a particular way of behaviours favoured by the people. The supporters that the audience that the populist discourse aims or succeeds in gathering people around the perception of "us" usually consists of socio-economically disadvantaged groups in the society (Campbell, 1960, p. 142). This situation prepares a very successful ground for holding the elites accountable for their failure and disadvantaged life standards. The party with its "us" perception tends to influence its voters massively and gain more support. According to research, there is a tendency to follow the collective decisions of the group rather than the personal preferences of the individuals at the decision-making stage (Lazarsfeld, 1944, p. 194). In this way, the party manages to receive support from different segments of society.

To measure the political institutionalization theory by Amos Perlmutter, two categories will be formed: the organizational strength and the scope of support. First of all, as mentioned above, Perlmutter notes that in a state with a high degree of political institutionalism, the organizational strength is observable and differentiates it from other states. Therefore, the name of the first category to be formed and analyzed will

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be **"organizational strength "**. Secondly, he underlined that the scope of support for the political party is high when there is a high degree of political institutionalism in the country. For this reason, the second category to measure political institutionalism will be constituted under the name of **"the scope of support "**.

Hypothesis 4: The high degree of political institutionalism was present in 2016 Turkey, whereas it lacked in the periods of previous successful coups, and the theory of political institutionalism best explains the reasons why the 2016 coup failed.

3. Coup Attempts in Turkey

3.1. Military coup in 1960

The Democrat Party (DP), which came to power by the elections held in 1950, also won the 1954 and 1957 elections. Before DP came to power, the RPP (Republican's People Party) did not see the opposition as legitimate, and opposing attitudes and actions that emerged from time to time were heavily suppressed (Uyar, 2020, p. 84). However, after World War 2, the opposition was allowed to be expressed on a legitimate ground with the force of the conjuncture in the world (Roy, 2004, p. 13). With the influence of the international conjuncture, the RPP had to endure the opposition (Uyar, 2020, p. 84). Although DP constantly complained about the intolerance of the RPP during his opposition period, DP also displayed the same negative attitudes after he came to power. Although important steps for democratization were taken during their period, democratic institutions were not consolidated as necessary (Gunn, 2015, p. 104). This situation negatively affected

the institutionalization of the power-opposition relationship, brought the system into crisis, and eventually played a significant role in the emergence of the military coup (Devran, 2016, p. 8). DP has acted intolerant against RPP and against other opposition parties and groups of society that oppose it, even by trying to liquidate his opponents (Kucukozyigit, 2016, p. 317).

To put pressure on the press and RPP, an "Investigation Commission" (IC) consisting of 15 people was established in the parliament (Uyar, 2020, p. 85). The opposition, press, and universities reacted very harshly to this. As the new bans and repressions came every day, Inonu threatened the government (Uyar, 2020, p. 85). It can be said that the struggle in this period was between the bureaucratic centre and the democratic side. On the one hand, the centre (bureaucracy and intellectuals) struggled to preserve the socio-political order created by establishing the republic, and on the other, the edge demanding change (Roy, 2004, p. 17). The hardening of the struggle brought about polarization in the society and the tension level of the power-opposition relationship was reflected in every sphere of the society.

As a result of these developments, a political and social crisis occurred in the country. The events in Istanbul and Ankara gave the impression that a brother fight was taking place in the country (Devran, 2016, p. 9). With the effect of other reasons, a group of officers from the army carried out a military coup on May 27th, 1960. This coup was seen as a positive step to overcome the crisis by the social groups in favour of the coup. Even the bureaucratic-military elites, who have given up hope that the RPP will come to power through elections and shape the society, saw the military coup as a way of liberation (Gunn, 2015, p. 117).

3.2. Memorandum in 1971

After the 1960 coup, a new constitution was created, and a new coalition government came to power under the leadership of Ismet Inonu by promising to fulfil the reforms demanded by the army. This situation did not pose a problem in terms of continuing the order the soldier established in 1960. However, the coming to power of the Justice Party (JP) with a high rate of votes in 1965, which saw itself as the continuation of the Democratic Party, resulted in a tense atmosphere in the military-government relationship (Gunter, 1989, p. 63). Especially in the 1969 election, the second victory of the Justice Party under the leadership of Suleyman Demirel brought the relations into a more complex situation. The Justice Party (JP), which ruled the country alone in the period from 1965 until the memorandum, demanded that the 1961 Constitution be changed by stating that the country could not be governed because nearly half of the society did not have a single representative (Gunter, 1989, p. 66). On the other hand, the opposition RPP argued that there was no problem in the Constitution; problems arose because the government did not want to implement the Constitution (Devran, 2016, p. 10).

In 1969, young people took to the streets with leftist demands in Turkey and other parts of the world. The tension was increasing among different groups, opposition, and government day by day, and both the ruling party and the opposition were far from making the necessary effort for a compromise (Agir, 2017, p. 9). Therefore, the Turkish army, seeing itself as guardians of the republic, intervened in politics again. This time the process was carried out with a different method. The Chief of General Staff signed the "memorandum", and it was read on the radio. In this memorandum, the commanders demanded the government's resignation that came to power through democratic elections and the establishment of a strong government that could fulfil the regulations stipulated by the Constitution with a Kemalist understanding (Gunter, 1989, pp. 66). If these demands

were not fulfilled, there was a warning that the army would take over the administration entirely.

At first glance, the coup seemed to have been done against the JP government, but later it was revealed that this coup was made somewhat against the left (Devran, 2016, p. 10). The steps taken after the memorandum suppressed the leftist movements. Some liberal elements of the Constitution were restricted, and the power of the state was increased. The armed forces increased their privilege and autonomy even more, and the soldiers made exceptional gains for themselves.

3.4. Military Coup in 1980

With the anti-American Ecevit-Erbakan coalition at the head, Turkey was in a kind of unsolvable crisis at the end 1970s, such as the Cyprus issue and the US arms embargo. With the economic sanctions after the Cyprus invasion, the value of money in Turkey dropped excessively, while inflation exceeded 100% (Emmati, 2013, p. 61). Left-right conflict since the '70s, and the resulting environment of terror brought on by the war, mainly affected Turkey. It all resulted in the loss of trust in the government. Thus, the Ecevit government resigned, and the Justice Party under the presidency of Demirel won the new elections. Demirel, supported by other parties, established a minority government.

While the turmoil continues throughout the country, in the press conference of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT) held on July 7 1979, the President of the Assembly stated that the assembly does not work as intended, does not enact the laws that should be enacted and do not fulfil its duty fully (Emmati, 2013, p. 63). Forty-six days after the Demirel government was formed and 32 days after receiving the vote of confidence, the CGS (Chief of General Staff) Org. Evren and Force's Commanders gave

a "warning" letter to President Korutürk (Baran, 2010, pp. 173-184). The PM (Prime Minister) and the public were informed about the warning letter a week later. The President, who received the letter stating that there should be a solution to the anarchy, gave this letter to Prime Minister Demirel on January 2, 1980 (Baran, 2010, pp. 173-184).

Failure to elect a new president to replace Koruturk, whose term of office expired on April 6, 1980, further increased the political crisis (Emmati, 2013, p. 62). Increasing security problems, a deadlocked political structure, the President who could not be elected, the left-right conflict, and the economic crisis signalled a new military coup. The coup was carried out by the junta, called the National Security Council, consisting of the Chief of General Staff and four commanders of forces (Baran, 2010, pp. 173-184). By declaring martial law in the whole country, all political activities were stopped, the parliament and the government were abolished (George, 2011, pp. 203-213). After Evren was declared the head of state, a government was established under the presidency of retired Admiral Bulent Ulusu (George, 2011, pp. 203-213). All parties were closed; their assets were transferred to the treasury. According to the previously prepared list, thousands of people were arrested or sentenced, and the universities were taken under control. This military coup was another damage to Turkish democracy.

3.5. Postmodern Coup in 1997

In the general elections held on December 24 1995, the Welfare Party (WP), led by Necmettin Erbakan, entered the Parliament with 6 million 12 thousand 450 votes and 158 deputies; however, this was not enough to form a government (Baran, 2010, pp. 173-184). Therefore, Erbakan reached an agreement with Tansu Ciller, the leader of the True Path Party (TPP), who came out as the third party in the same elections. Eventually, Welfare Party-True Path Party Coalition Government was established. The government, which was

established on June 28, 1996, under the Prime Ministry of Necmettin Erbakan, took a vote of confidence from the Parliament on July 8, 1996 (Baran, 2010, pp. 173-184). The establishment of the "Welfare-Road "Government and the appointment of Necmettin Erbakan to the post of Prime Minister was the beginning of the February 28, 1997, military intervention process, also known as the "postmodern coup". Within the army and bureaucracy, "secular" cliques, who thought that there should be intervention, started their activities shortly after establishing the government (Kucukozyigit, 2016, p. 325). In this context, from the first days of the government, continuous warnings of "secularism" were made against the government from the command level of the army who regarded the government as Islamist, and even briefings were organized for bureaucrats and members of the media (Hale, 2018. p. 17).

February 28 coup, or with another name, "the postmodern coup, "proceeded quite differently from the previous coups. During this process, no direct use of weapons was used, soldiers remained less visible, and instead, grassroots support was provided by using the power of the media (Hale, 2018, p. 18). In addition, the coup did not have a precise date other than the memorandum published on February 28. For example, when it comes to September 12, it goes down in history when the military seized power, but on February 28, such a thing did not happen. Still, it set in motion a series of actions that would result in the change of the government. Therefore, those times took time to make sense of it or take it seriously, since at first, events were not even perceived or named as a coup attempt (Momayezi, 1998, p. 25).

As stated above, one of the actors that played an essential role in this pressure process against the elected government was the media. In the newspapers of the "mainstream media" organizations of the period, severe criticism and even attacks against the government took place (Kucukozyigit, 2016, p. 327). It was highly influential in creating perceptions and paving the way for the coup; therefore, these media outlets and

their headlines had an important place in the "postmodern" coup process. Under the pressure of these headlines, elected Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan had to resign, and the Welfare-Road Coalition Government dissolved (Kucukozyigit, 2016, p. 325). Moreover, this pressure did not end with the dissolution of the government but continued with the same harshness until the Welfare Party was closed. In this respect, on February 28, 1997, "postmodern" military intervention is the last successful coup carried out in Turkey.

3.6. Failed Military Coup in 2016

July 15, 2016, incidents were the latest attempt to overthrow Turkey's legitimate government and reverse its implemented changes. On July 15, 2016, a coup attempt was made allegedly by a group of officers from the Fetullah Gulen Organization (FETO) within the Turkish Armed Forces. The coup attempt, launched at the General Staff Headquarters, was brought under control in approximately 22 hours across the country (Luttwask, 2016). On Friday, July 15, at 22:00, the General Staff Headquarters and TRT (Turkish state television channel) General Directorate gathered in Ankara and were captured by the military (Jacoby, 2016, p. 131). In Istanbul, the Bosphorus and Fatih Sultan Mehmet Bridges were closed to the passage by the soldiers. During this time, the Chief of the General Staff, Hulusi Akar, was taken hostage by the putschist soldiers. Informing the public right after the coup attempt, Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım said, "The incident was an uprising by a group within the army, that this attempt would not be allowed and that those who did it will pay the heaviest price" (Luttwask, 2016). The putschists who occupied TRT at midnight forced the presenter to read the coup statement on the live program, and after that, the broadcast of TRT was stopped by TURKSAT (Turkish satellite) shortly after

(Gurcan, 2016). The harshest reaction against the coup attempt came from President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who addressed the Turkish nation through the television channels, reacted harshly to the military uprising, and invited the people to the streets to prevent the coup. Upon the call of President Erdogan, people across Turkey took to the streets for the first time in history to avoid a military coup attempt and stand up to the coup plotters.

During the coup attempt, FETO member soldiers targeted important buildings such as the Turkish Grand National Assembly, Presidential Complex, the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) campus in Ankara, Ankara Police Department and opened fire. Many people lost their lives because of the fire and clashes (Luttwask, 2016). The Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETO) members coordinated the coup attempt through the communication network they established among themselves (Jacoby, 2016, p. 130). Allegedly, they gave orders to open fire to scare the civilians; however, when they realized that the coup would fail, they made plans to flee. In the first hours of the morning of July 16, the putschist officers were detained and arrested with the strict measures taken by the state throughout the country (Gurcan, 2016). Consequently, the July 15 coup attempt failed. During the coup attempt, 250 Turkish citizens lost their lives, and 2,193 people were injured (Jacoby, 2016. p. 132). Within the scope of the investigation carried out against the coup plotters immediately after the incident, action was taken against 169,013 people, including governors, deputy governors, soldiers, police, teachers, and judiciary members 50,510 people were arrested. A judicial control decision was issued for 48,439 people; an arrest warrant was issued for 8,087 people (Jacoby, 2016, p. 133). It should be noted that the magnitude of the military coup attempt carried out by the Gulenist organization on July 15, 2016, is closely related to the nature of the organization's organizational structure. The Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) has been at the forefront of the structure carried out in a very professional and long-term manner. The July 15 coup attempt revealed that the organization has a much stronger organizational and operational power than expected,

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especially within the TAF, apart from the state institutions it has infiltrated, especially the police and the judiciary.

4. Comparative Analysis of Turkish Military Coups Based on Theoretical Basis

4.1. Application of Military Professionalism

In the previous sections, it was underlined that the theory of military professionalism would explain the outcomes of the Turkish coups based on the level of professionalism in the army that plays the leading role in the emergence of a coup. Before deciding whether this theory applies to Turkish coups, it is essential to separately analyze the two different periods (1960-2002; 2002-2016) according to three measurement categories of military professionalism. Therefore, the presence of these measurements and their potential influence on the emergence of the Turkish coups will be assessed in the next paragraphs.

1960-2002 period

First of all, the category of **military education** needs to be evaluated to see how professional the Turkish Armed Forces was during 1960-2002. The high quality and professional military education started with Turkey joining NATO by accepting the organization's certain standards and requirements. The NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) made a strong impact on the modernization and professionalization of the Turkish army. As allies and partners in the same organization, the US government

transferred modern military materials and sent specialists to train the Turkish armed forces (Gregory, 2000, p. 100). Military officers were educated in terms of Western military norms and values and were sincere supporters of westernization

However, the military's influence in politics grew in Turkey despite the western type of military education. As the perception of military education in the Turkish army was different than those in the Western countries, the military education in some cases showed its effects differently in the Turkish Armed Force (Gregory, 2000, p. 4). The soldiers were trained with the Kemalist ideology and had the guardianship role assigned to them traditionally. The mission of guardianship of the army believed that to protect Kemalist doctrine is an essential task of the TAF. According to their thinking, this is enough reason and without any doubt justifies the intervention into the political sphere. Huntington argued that military education as part of the military would keep the generals away from politics and focus on defence policies. However, this was not the case in Turkey during 1960-2001.

Secondly, the category of **political neutrality** will be assessed to find out how professional the Turkish army was between 1960 and 2002. Suppose we look at the frequency of military intervention during 1960 and 2002. In that case, it can be argued that the army officers during this period started to disengage themselves from their politically neutral positions. They strongly involved themselves in politics and supported or made alliances with the political groups in Turkey. For example, the military in 1960 built partnerships with the political parties and groups from "civil society" and hoped for support to implement the coup (Karpat, 2004, p. 94). Moreover, the military in 1980 built strong networks from civil society groups that promised to support its activities in implementing the military coup. The network included many senior public servants and academicians they considered strategic to cooperate with (Roy, 2004, p. 18). Also, they paid too much attention to cooperate with the employers, who hoped for the benefits after the change of

the government. Soldiers were not politically neutral because the professional Turkish military officers saw themselves as the guardians of Kemalist ideology and were devoted to protecting Kemalist principles against the threat of political Islam and Kurdish separatism as the guardians of secularism. The Turkish army officers base their justification of the guardianship mission on Article 35 of the Internal Service Law of 1961, stating that "the military must protect Turkey as designated by the constitution" (Birand, 1991, p. 25). Besides organizing a coup, the Turkish army has also twice changed the constitution in 1961 and 1980. The constitution, which was adopted in 1961, was reactionary against Menderes government and included more liberal provisions (Karpat, 2004, p. 95). According to the military officers, the main goal of this constitution was to create democratic order where the electoral systém, political parties, and secular nature of the Republic are protected (Birand, 1991, p. 25). As discussed above, the Turkish army has tried to intervene in politics many times through different means; therefore, it can be argued that the Turkish Armed Forces was not politically neutral in the period between 1960 and 2002.

Thirdly, the last category, called **corporateness,** will be discussed according to 1960-2002 in this paragraph. In this period, the Turkish Armed Forces were well-known for their high level of corporateness. However, the corporateness of the Turkish Armed Forces was politicized with the adoption of the guardianship mission. Considering that the corporateness in this period included democratization and military activism, it is not surprising to see why the military frequently intervened in politics. Keeping it in mind helps to understand the army's dedication to the Kemalist principles, which opposed the state to become authoritarian under one man's rule and urged the separation of the religion and state affairs from each other (Sarigil, 2015, p. 283). Due to its corporate values, the Turkish army supported democratization which was the driving factor in its implementations of the coups. Here, the Kemalist values can be regarded as the ideological

engine that pushed the machine of guardianship, and they usually appeared in support of democratization (Jenkins, 2009, p. 7). Thus, it can be stated that the corporateness was part of the Turkish Armed Forces between 1960 and 2002.

2002-2016

For the years between 2002 and 2016, the first category of „**military education**" will be initially analyzed. In each country, the militaries have their schools to train new soldiers, and those schools are the tools and the requirements to be professional army officers (Tartter, 1996, p. 330). During 2002 and 2016, the acceptance to Turkish military schools was considerably challenging and competitive. The education in the military academies was considered much better than civilian ones, and many parents wanted their children to study in these military academies (Sarigil, 2015, p. 295). The quality of the education in these schools was improved comparing to the period of 1960-2002. In terms of facilities and opportunities, military students received a much better education than those years between 1960 and 2002. However, certain things did not change that much. For instance, although indoctrination of Kemalist ideology decreased in this period, it was still an essential part of the school curriculums. In the Turkish military academies and even some high schools, the ideology of „Kemalism" was still being indoctrinated, and this was seen as a way of patriotism and professionalism (Sarigil, 2015, p. 294). For example, the course named „National Security Knowledge" was taught in Turkish high schools, emphasizing Kemalism ideology and potential dangers to the Turkish Republic (Altinay, 2004, p. 3). This course was mainly supervised by army officials and was accepted as the only high school forum where the students could talk about recent political events (Akkoyunlu, 2007, p. 36). Considering these, it can be noted that military education was provided in the Turkish army between 2002 and 2016; however, it still carried the elements of Kemalist ideology.

Secondly, the period between 2002 and 2016 will be evaluated based on the category of **political neutrality**. During this period, certain investigations were carried against many military men, accusing them of being involved in orchestrating the coup and being part of the Ergenekon organization. These investigations started in 2007 with the findings of many hand grenades in one area of İstanbul, and it has become one of the most significant investigations in the history of the Turkish Republic (Altinay, 2004, p. 2). As argued by the prosecutors dealing with the cases, the organization deeply offended Turkey, divided the public opinion in the country, and dedicated itself to knock down the JDP government. The investigation revealed the deep Turkish state for JDP supporters, which has more say in the political sphere. According to the opponents of the JDP, it was just the step taken by the ruling party to get rid of those secularists who were against the activities of the JDP (Jenkins, 2009, p. 7). After these severe investigations, many military men, including high-rank officers, chose to keep calm and not raise their voices often. They refrained from talking about the activities of JDP and, in general, about politics; they did not even share any statements concerning the modifications enabling high-ranking army officials to be tried in the civilian courts (Hale, 2018, p. 20). Another proof that the government becomes unwilling to deal with politics was its reticence regarding abolishing the prohibition on headscarves in educational facilities. Therefore, it can be said that except few occasions, the military officers were politically neutral between 2002 and 2016.

Finally, the last category of **corporateness** will be applied to the period between 2001 and 2016. In this period, the TAF was enough corporate in terms of the quality of the education and training of the new army officers. It had many published journals which benefited the corporateness of the Turkish army considerably (Ihsan, 1996, p. 126). Also, the army in this period struggled diligently to achieve democracy, modernization, and improvement harmonious with European organizations, but without a total loyalty to each Western democratic principle (Sakallioglu, 1997, p. 154). The involvement of the EU here indicates

how effective the political liberations and adopting democratic principles can be for the strong military corporateness. one that has not been observed in Arab countries (Ihsan, 1996, p. 127). The reason is that the EU chose an active part in the process by suggesting the harmonization criteria to Turkey for joining Europe. In return, these steps encouraged modernization, democratization, and democratic policies for Turkey. The possibility that external actors had a positive role in Turkey's democratization looks more convincing. Another attractive characteristic of the corporateness in the Turkish Armed Forces is its stability throughout the years. It is most probably the outcome of the army's corporate institutional strength, enabling it to be relatively resistant against societal pressures, corruption, politicization through civilian connections, and against different factors that weaken the military corporateness (Sakallioglu, 1997, p. 157). Essentially, the fundamental corporate weakness of the TAF is its dedication and great focus on its duties. That means that from the perspective of the mission exclusivity, the Turkish army is partly corporate, primarily as a consequence of its diligent loyalty to a guardianship role besides its professional exterior defence role. The military was still loyal to its guardianship role in this period; however, it must be noted that this has slightly changed with the development of military corporateness. Therefore, in the end, it can be stated that the corporateness was part of the Turkish military during 2002 and 2016.

Result: The first hypothesis that military professionalism in the Turkish Armed Forces in 2016 distinguishes it from previous successful coups in Turkey, and the reasons why the 2016 military coup failed are best explained by military professionalism **is not supported**. The hypothesis could explain the 2016 failed Turkish coup because the army was professional in 2016 and did not let the coup occur. However, it fails to explain 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997 coups that resulted in success. In both periods, the Turkish army was professional, despite missing the elements argued by Hungtington that must be in a professional army and not compatible with his measurements of a professional army.

4.2. Application of Civilian Supremacy

The first category used to measure civilian supremacy in the years between 1960 and 2002 will **be "obedience to the civilian regime ".** However, before analyzing the 1960-2002 period, the civil-military situation before 1960 needs to be understood. In the early days of the Republic, no effort was made to separate civil and military affairs; officers actively participated in the country's administration. Nevertheless, as soon as the military victory was secured, Ataturk began to enforce separation between the civilian and military sectors (Uyar, 2020, p. 83). Successful military leaders, Ataturk and his successor, Ismet Inonu, chose to rule the country as a civilian instead of military administrators, and they received support from the Republican People's Party (RPP), the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, and over time, the bureaucracy (Hale, 2018, p. 13).

However, in practice, the separation of military and civilian areas was never complete. After the shift to a multi-party system, military influence in politics started to be evident. Therefore, the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) could not be excluded entirely from politics. However, Ataturk wanted to ensure that they remain loyal to the Republic and his reforms by directly intervening only as a last resort to support his efforts (Uyar, 2020, p. 83). The military's influence was felt in the civilian arena as former officers came to important political positions in the ministries, parliament, and administration (Ihsan, 1996, p. 129). Therefore, this tradition continues even in the years between 1960 and 2001.

From 1960 to 2002, the military's influence in civilian affairs was always visible. The officers who saw themselves as the Republic and Kemalism ideology guardians frequently intervened in politics, tried to influence political ongoings, warned civilian régime, or staged coup attempts. For instance, the "warning letter" given to President Fahri

Koruturk on 27th December 1979 to be conveyed to the Prime Minister and other political party leaders by Chief of General Staff Kenan Evren, TLF (Turkish Land Forces), Commander Nurettin Ersin, TNF (Turkish Naval Forces) Commander Bulent Ulusu, TAF (Turkish Air Forces) Commander Tahsin Sahinkaya indicates the direct influence of the military in civilian affairs and their disobedience towards the civilian regime (Emmati, 2013, p. 60). Indeed, the warning letter is an open memorandum to the political regime. The warning was not only to the ruling party but to all political party leaders, the general political system, and the executive branch's presidential wing (George, 2011, pp. 203-213). By explicitly mentioning the 35th article of the Service Law (which is about protecting the Republic) in the warning letter, it can be said that it was an apparent coup warning by the military (Nye, 1977, p. 211). From a democratic point of view, the armed forces, which are tasked with fulfilling the duty of the homeland and its attitudes and behaviours, such as warning the political authority, indicate an extremely undemocratic situation. Based on the provision of Article 35, which the soldiers always present as the legal justification for coups, they almost attribute a transcendent meaning to the mission of ensuring the security of the country, protecting the Republic and evaluating this above the principles of the constitution and the democratic rule of law (Emmati, 2013, p. 65). In this respect, it is possible to say that active military involvement in politics during 1960 and 2001 radically put political life under military tutelage in the dimension of military-civilian relations. Therefore, considering the regular army intervention, it might be argued that the obedience of the military to the civilian regime was absent during the 1960 and 2002.

Another measurement category to analyze civilian supremacy during 1960 and 2001 is **"jurisdiction over the military ".** The military in 1960 brought about the execution of PM Adnan Menderes; however, as frequently mentioned by intellectuals, it resulted in adopting a liberal constitution. This constitution created the National Security Council (NSC, a gathering where the military and civilians frequently talked about security

issues). It cleared the way for the institutionalization of the military's political impact in Turkey (Gunter, 1989, p. 64). When the TAF came to power, they went against Ataturk's principle of non-intervenience in politics, even in the name of upholding Kemalist principles.

In the National Security Council, the politicians were supposed to follow officers' views on security matters. It created a suitable environment for the officers to intervene in politics, as the security matters covered external and internal security (Agir, 2017, p. 11). The generals made constitutional changes to weaken the civilian government and provide an influential role for the commanders in politics (Agir, 2017, p. 11). Moreover, one of the practices that turned into a custom in this period was to elect a president from among the military's retired high-rank officers (Gunter, 1989, p. 64). In this respect, the role of the Turkish Armed Forces in politics was evident before the 1971 coup. Higher army officers closely watched over the politicians regarding their performances and secularism, modernity, and obedience to the new constitution.

Moreover, according to the 1982 Constitution, the person outside the parliament could be nominated for the Presidency, and with this arrangement, it was desired to pave the way for the election of persons with military backgrounds (Baran, 2010, pp. 173-184). The autonomy of the military was further strengthened with the 1982 Constitution. The powers of martial law courts were increased, and no longer could a case be brought before the judicial or administrative courts against the decisions of martial law commanders (Baran, 2010, pp. 173-184). The military authority has ensured that soldiers are included in the autonomous boards established to keep the society under surveillance and control. Going further, military judges were included in the CC (Constitutional Court), through which the way for the military to be effective has been opened in the Constitutional Court (Agri, 2017, p. 12). Therefore, the jurisdiction of the civilian regime over the military was absent during 1960 and 2001.

In this paragraph, the first measurement category of **"obedience to the civilian regime "**will be analyzed during 2002 and 2006. Admittedly 2016 Turkish failed coup attempt is an interesting case that needs to be explained. Here, the transformation of civil-military relations and the civilian supremacy approach has been a decisive factor in the coup's failure. In the first place, the change started when the Council of Europe granted candidate country status to Turkey in the Helsinki meeting in 1999 (Ulusoy, 2008, p. 52). The obligations according to the Copenhagen criteria were the implementations of several harmonization packages during a given time. It included many legislative changes based on the Copenhagen criteria and focused on areas such as strengthening democracy, human rights, and the rule of Law (Momayezi, 1998). More specifically, democratic rights and freedoms such as freedom of expression and minority rights have also been included in the reforms. Some of the packages released in the 2000s changed the anti-terror law and recognized rights such as broadcasting and education in other languages, including Kurdish (Ulusoy, 2008, p. 61).

The 'seventh harmonization package', which came into force in August 2003, draws attention to the civilian control over the army (Ihsan, 1996, p. 125). Transparency in public spending and budgeting was one of the requirements in the package. It was followed by specific changes which lead to the compliance of the army with the civilian regime. With the provision added to the Law on the Court of Accounts, the use of extra-budgetary funds by the military was abolished, and the army, which used the most extra-budgetary funds, was included in the budget discipline. Under the reforms, the budgets of the military were included in the state budget, and performance budgeting was implemented (Commission of the European Communities, 2004). These were necessary steps towards democratization and maintaining the obedience of the military to the civilian regime. (Hale, 2009, p. 18).

Moreover, the Turkish army was involved in the fight against terrorist organizations such as PKK. To provide the military obedience to civilian régime in this process, the Turkish parliament in February 2010 adopted a law creating a new secretariat for Public Order and Security under the Ministry of the Interior and this sekretariát's task was to create new anti-terror plans with the support of people it hired from the military and police institutions (Aknur, 2013, p. 143). The same Law also created an Intelligence Assessment Center to consolidate intelligence procurement among security units (Heper, 2011, p. 248). The politicians have started to create the National Security Policy Document, which defines the state's national interest, specifies national threats, and prepares means and tools to cope with them (Heper, 2011, p. 248). This document, frequently referred to as the "red book", was usually designed by the department of the Chief of General Staff and the NSC (National Security Council) without discussing it with the parliament, and the government had to comply with its judgments without question (Aknur, 2013, p. 143). However, in this period, the civilians positively engage in defining the national threats to the state and the ways that should be chosen to react to these threats.

Furthermore, another important step in this period to make the military obey the civilian régime was taken in July 2013. The JDP government aimed to make changes in the Internal Service Law of the Turkish Republic. In Article 35 of this Law, it was determined the task of the TAF is "to defend the Turkish homeland, constitution, and the Republic "; however, it was frequently interpreted by the military men as "defending the homeland from internal and external threats (Aknur, 2013, p. 143). This tricky interpretation allowed the army to defend the homeland from internal threats by organizing the coups. Therefore, the JDP government changed the Law and determined it as "protecting Turkish homeland against external threats, empowering the military to guarantee deterrence, implementing the tasks abroad with the Turkish Grand National Assembly's authorization and helping to sustain international peace," and this certainly

decreased the army's ability to intervene into a political sphere (Aknur, 2013, p. 143) Thus, considering the changes by the JDP government, it can be highlighted that the obedience of the military to the civilian régime was observable in this period.

Moreover, when it comes to the **"jurisdiction over the military "**measurement, it might be argued that the power of the military was decreased and the civilian regime had much more control over the military during 2002 and 2016. Besides the EU reforms that resulted in the loss of the power of the army, it continued to get weakened afterwards by the government's amendments (Narli, 2009, p. 57). The most important of these amendments as the constitutional change to decrease the jurisdiction of military courts, allowing them to deal with military service and military tasks (Narli, 2009, p. 69). The jurisdiction of military courts regarding civilian persons was narrowed. Starting from 1999, with a series of amendments submitted to the referendum on 12th September 2010, the powers of military courts have been restricted so that they can only try TAF personnel for crimes against other soldiers and military duties (Devran, 2016, p. 11). Also, with the constitutional and NSC law amendments made between 2001 and 2004, the authority of the TAF ensuring internal security was blocked by making changes in the power, function, and structure of the NSC (Hale, 2018, p. 12).

In the same years, steps were taken in the field of military expenditures with the regulations made in the constitution and laws, and many of the obstacles to the inspection of the TAF by civilians were removed with the new Court of Accounts Law enacted in December 2010 (Dorronsoro, 2016, p. 84). In the military courts, the situations and procedures regarding search and seizure decisions related have been rearranged. Furthermore, the detention period in this area was reduced to a maximum of four days. In cases of arrest and detention, it was obligatory to immediately inform the relatives of the arrested or detained (Dorronsoro, 2016, p. 85). With all these reforms, the civil-military relations in Turkey have experienced a significant transformation and played a great role

in the failure of the 2016 coup. This allows us to argued that the jurisdiction of civilian authority over the military was present in this period.

Result: The second hypothesis that "the existence of civilian supremacy in civil-military relations in 2016 is the factor differentiating it from previous successful Turkish coups and the reasons of failure are best explained by the theory of civilian supremacy "**is supported**. Civilian supremacy lacked in all four previous coups; however, its criteria were present in 2016. Thus, the concept of civilian supremacy answers the research question the thesis posed.

4.3. Application of Social Cohesion

1960-2002

To measure the social cohesion during 1960 and 2002 in Turkey, the first observable category will be **"social polarization "**. When looking at the period of 1960-2001, it might be argued that there was a significant gap between classes of the society. For example, the economic slowdown, stagnation, and the symptoms of crisis that shook the DP government caused a serious problém for fixed-income workers (Demirel, 2005, pp. 245-271). With the decrease in real wages, fixed income occupational groups such as workers, civil servants, military officers, and university faculty members were negatively affected by this development. Industrialists also claimed that too many resources are transferred to agriculture, and they complained about the unplanned and unscheduled economy (Devran, 2016, p. 9). At the beginning of 1960, the social tension began to be increased considerably. The fact that ten people were injured in the fight of RPP and DP

members in Adana meant the intensification of the process that started with the injury of Inonu by throwing stones on his head in Usak in late 1959 (Uyar, 2020, p. 91).

Moreover, the left-right conflict since the 1970s and the environment of terror brought on by the conflict affected the whole of Turkey. After the escalating anarchy, the country has sacrificed many people to political terror. As the right-left conflict grew, education became unavailable, and there was an economic crisis caused by high inflation (Nye, 1977, p. 215). The government that Ecevit established could not stop the bad course, and Turkey was exposed to severe ideological polarization in Turkey in 1974 (George, 2011, pp. 203-213). On the one hand, the leftist organizations advocating the integration of Turkey with the Soviets; on the other hand, nationalists claiming not to allow such desires have clashed in armed conflicts (Emmati, 2013, p. 60). Also, the universities, high schools, trade unions, government offices, even the streets were divided among different groups. This increasing security problems, a deadlocked political structure, the president who could not be elected, and the economic crisis pointed to a new military coup (Nye, 1977, p. 216).

In the 1990s, people identified themselves with different identities such as Kurdish, Islamist, secular, and urbanized, and thus cultural identity demands became priority over economic needs. The emphasis on these new identities is that these previously excluded segments were getting stronger in terms of creating intellectuals, media, and resources (Baran, 2010, pp. 173-184). Another reason was the constantly globalizing world. Although globalization seems like a paradox, it has led to the rise of cultural identities in the local sense. Considering the situation back in the1990s, it is clear that there was a representation crisis (Agir, 2017, p. 12).

Moreover, the dominant identity that heads towards the centre during the February 28th process was Islamism, which threatened the public sphere (Baran, 2010, pp. 173-184). The definition and control of this public sphere belonging to the elite became a clash

between Islamists and secularists. Various developments emphasized or implied that the secular system is under threat (Devran, 2016, p. 13). For example, in August 1996, the prime minister's first foreign trip to Iran was criticized, and the newspapers made headlines that the 70-year-old Western image of the country was being destroyed (Baran, 2010, pp. 173-184). Furthermore, not only economic issues occurred, but the same development was also experienced in the ideological and cultural field (Momayezi, 1998, p. 10). It was inevitable that political consequences would arise from this. Consequently, the political structures, which could not respond to the changing demands, caused social crises and conflicts between different groups, leading to social polarization.

Secondly, another category called **"stability "**will be evaluated based on the period between 1960 and 2002. Turkey has experienced many long-term protests, riots, and clashes between different social groups in this period. The participation of the students in these protests showed that one of the essential sources of support for the coups was the universities (Uyar, 2020, p. 92). For example, upon the events in the MFSA (Medical Faculty Student Association) and the harsh intervention of the police, the students decide to hold a rally the next day to protest the government's attitude in 1960 (Demirel, 2005, pp. 245-271). For this purpose, the members of various associations-organizations went around the dormitories at night and made great efforts to make the rally planned to be held the next day (Demirel, 2005, pp. 245-271). On April 28, students begin to gather in front of the Faculty of Law in Beyazıt and faced the police intervention harshly, and even the Rector was subjected to police violence (Demirel, 2005, pp. 245-271). During the unnecessary intervention of the police, a student named Turan Emeksiz died as a result of a bullet (Demirel, 2005, pp. 245-271).

Another factor that shook the stability in the country during this period was the high-level disagreements between the parties and even within the ruling parties. For example, the radical disagreements with and within Justice Party itself are one of the factors

that predispose the army to intervene in politics in 1971. Especially the election victory of the Justice Party put the opposition parties in a difficult position and caused them to increase the dose of the opposition against the Justice Party (Agir, 2017, p. 19). In addition to this situation in which politics was in, other factors in the country also played an active role in the army's involvement in politics. In this respect, the increasing workers' actions against the government and the government's policy against them were escalating the tension in the country. Significantly, increasing street protests of the trade unions put the government in a difficult position in maintaining public order. Protests were started under the Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions (CRTU) leadership against the arrangements made in the parliament for labour unions in June 1970 (Agir, 2017, p. 19).

According to the assessment of the British embassy, Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel stated that the 1961 Constitution was too libertarian and prevented the government from effectively ruling the country (Gunter, 1989, p. 104). Political crises and actions taken by trade unions and other ongoings were challenging for the government to overcome. It was student events in universities where it was apparent that the left was kind of on the rise. This situation made the universities a sort of conflict centre because oppositional groups were confronted, and incidents occurred many times (Momayezi, 1998, p. 13). The British Embassy also drew attention to this situation that the situation of the universities prepared the ground for the intervention of the soldiers in the country. Considering the extent of the protests and the riots, the conclusion can be drawn that stability was not fully provided between 1960 and 2001.

In this part, the first category of **"social polarization "**will be applied to 2001-2016. Despite considerable democratic reforms and a comparatively inclusive political environment at the beginning of Erdogan's ruling period, he gave up his liberal politics and adopted repressive ones later (Roy, 2004, p. 20). He designed an image of himself as a leader defending the national will and chose an ideology focused on Turkish nationalism and Islam (Rabi, 2017, p. 32). Erdogan showed his opponents as traitors working for the foreign powers that aim to destabilize Turkey and prevent its development (Haugom, 2019). Considering the developments and effective reforms at the beginning of his power, this discourse was very welcomed by many Turkish people. However, this narrative divided the society by creating tension between secularist and Islamist portions of the society (Haugom, 2019, p. 5).

Moreover, the Syrian issue has been considerably damaging for Turkey, both internally and externally (Devran, 2016, p. 17). Erdogan's support to topple the Assad regime resulted in weak control of the borders that allowed easy coming of the foreign fighters, and it was strongly criticized by the Western powers (Luttwak, 2016). As the country was under threat of ISIS in its borders, the Turkish economy and tourism were highly damaged, leading to another social dissatisfaction among Turkish citizens (Rabi, 2017, p. 34).

Furthermore, the Kurdish issue in Syria influenced the internal politics of Turkey. The government's hesitance to support Kurds of Syria in their fight against the IS (Islamic State) damaged the relations with its Kurdish population (Luttwak, 2016). Lastly, the coming of approximately 3 million refugees from Syria put pressure on the governmental institutions, complicated the ability of municipalities to deal with new refugee settlements in the cities, and increased the tension among local people (Haugom, 2019, p. 6). The

government had difficulties providing the return of refugees to Syria. Some people, especially the secular part of society, were frustrated and evaluated it as the need for Erdogan to get votes from refugees. However, the Islamist part of the society welcomed the coming of Syrian refugees and supported Erdogan's decision. Although things were normal at the beginning of the period, all these recent developments caused social polarization afterwards.

Secondly, the period of 2002-2016 will be analyzed based on another category called **"stability".** The situation in this period in the country was stable compared to the previous period. However, as Erdogan gave up on democratic principles and became more authoritarian over time, the long-lasting protests and riots started to emerge in this period as well. For instance, one of the famous protests was the Gezi protests in 2013. The Gezi Protests began as a result of the government's desire to construct a shopping mall and mosque in the area of the Gezi Park locating in the centre of Istanbul. The Gezi Protests enabled Erdogan to marginalize the people who go against the policies of the JDP (Dorronsoro, 2016, p. 83). In his speech, he told the public that: "Are the people only those at Gezi Park? Aren't those who came to meet us at Istanbul airport people, too? Those who are gathered now in Ankara; aren't they people, too?" (Yilmaz, 2021, p. 13). He also challenged those people in the protest to meet in the local elections. "Instead of occupying Gezi Park or Kugulu Park [in Ankara], there are seven months [until the elections]. Be patient and let's face off at the ballot box." Using this opportunity, Erdogan tried to convince the people that these protests are being organized by external forces who want to destabilize Turkey. These peaceful protests were faced with police brutality, where more than ten people were killed. Erdogan marginalized the people attending there and sympathized with them, referring to their sympathy as "terrorism propaganda" or "insult" to the government (Yilmaz, 2021, p. 14). Moreover, Erdogan criticized the media for providing help to the protestors. In one of his speeches, he stated that "There is no

difference between a terrorist holding a gun or a bomb and those who use their pen and position to serve their aims" (Lowen, 2017). He managed to portrait the media and civil society as betrayers and "puppets "bring used by the "external forces "who did want Turkey to become great power (Rabasa, 2008, p. 54).

Furthermore, another destabilizing event in this period was the Syrian war. The civil war in Syria, the country with the longest land border with Turkey, affected Turkey directly and indirectly (Yildiz, 2008, pp. 144-151). Until 2011, relations were normal; however, after the outbreak of the civil war, the course of events changed. This change revealed border security. Turkey's buffer zone discourse in 2012 was also an attempt to ensure safe border security. But Turkey could not get enough support from foreign countries regarding Syria. This crisis affects Turkey the most in the Middle East. Turkey, which wants to protect its border security with the Euphrates Shield, cleared Jarablus from terrorist organizations with a cross-border operation and afterwards left the control of the place to the opposition Free Syrian Army (Yildiz, 2008, p. 144-151). Turkey's fight against terrorist groups, mainly against DAESH / ISIS, shed a lot of blood. The attacks on Turkey were mostly with suicide bombers and targeted civilians. Turkey is a neighbour to the civil war in Syria. The conflicts arising from the PYD / DAESH rivalry cross the Syrian border and spread to Turkey reveal how vital the country's turmoil is for the neighbouring countries (Yildiz, 2008, pp. 144-151).

Attacks targeting civilians and soldiers, such as missile attacks, attacks on border posts, and suicide attacks, have shaken Turkey. The settlements on the border are also full of people who witnessed these attacks. Considering the risks, Turkey started to implement two kinds of strategies. Turkey, which has entered into the formation of a national and international policy; while implementing a plan of certainty and stability in the fight against DAESH in the country, also participated in the military and political struggle against DAESH in the global arena (Rabasa, 2008, p. 68). Every step in the fight

against terrorist organizations is crucial for domestic stability. Moreover, more than 3 million Syrian refugees who resided in Turkey brought massive dissatisfaction to the public, who feared losing their jobs. Therefore, it can be stated that although the period between 2002 and 2016 was more stable than 1960 and 2002, the stability was not fully maintained between 2002 and 2016.

Result: The third hypothesis that the "high degree of social cohesion was present in 2016 Turkey unlike the periods of previous successful coups and social cohesion theory has better explained the failure of 2016 coup **is not supported**. The theory of social cohesion can explain all the previous four coups in which they lacked social cohesion. However, it fails to explain the 2016 coup attempt, where the coup still failed despite a lack of a high degree of social cohesion.

4.4. Application of Political Institutionalism

1960-2002

In this section, the first category to measure political institutionalism, called **"organizational strength "**, will be applied to 1960-2002. Looking at the coups in this period, it can be observed that the governments did not take enough preventive actions to avoid events and the activities that created the ground for military intervention. The conclusion can be drawn that these governments did not have the organizational strength to provide these preventive measures. For instance, the DP government in 1960 failed to develop counter-measures against the RPP party, which was doing everything possible to end the political régime of DP. The groups that left the social coalition of the DP, the provocations of the RPP (Republican People's Party), and Inonu gradually

prepared the ground for May 27th. Among the 13 million documents that the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has declassified, crucial information has been obtained regarding the May 27th military coup (Uyar, 2020, p. 90). In the CIA document dated May 30th 1960, it is stated that some senior executives in the Republican People's Party knew the process of the coup and knew some officers were preparing for the coup; however, they did not participate in the action and planning phase (Uyar, 2020, p. 85). The ruling DP is also responsible for the success of the May 27th coup. Because although they were aware of development within the army against the Government, they did not take any serious measures. Preparations for a coup within the military began to flourish from the mid-1950s, and the first junta called Ataturkist Association (AA) expanded over time (Demirel, 2005, pp. 245-271). In 1955, Faruk Guventurk and Captain Dundar Seyhan founded the Ataturkist Association, whose members participated in the 1960 military coup (Demirel, 2005, pp. 245-271). The group's coup attempts intensified after 1957, and the Government did not do anything to prevent this development and weaken them. Instead of providing public institutionalization to strengthen its power and win the hearts and minds of people, they allowed the emergence of a suitable environment for the officers to institutionalize against the Government and implement a military coup.

Similarly, the ruling authorities faced great difficulties in the new institutional structure in the late 1960s. One of the issues was the increase in the political activity and militancy of the workforce and the middle class (Gunter, 1989, p. 110). As time passed, economic growth spread to the ranks of these groups; however, their role in the country's politics was small, and their share in the economy was low (Agir, 2017, p. 15). In the late 1960s, these groups became more active and began to organize. Unionism proliferated, especially among workers, and they formed an independent national worker's organization called Revolutionary Workers Unions Confederation (RWUC) (Agir, 2017, p. 19). The activities of these organizations coincided with the mass movement of Turkish

workers to West Germany and contributed to the changing trend in real wages and employment (Gunter, 1989, p. 110). It has led to growing civil unrest, student militarism and violence, the continuing decline of traditional culture in Turkey, and the spread of armed leftist politics worldwide.

After 1965, the growing actions of students towards communism, the junta movements that started after the second half of the 1960s were envisaged to overthrow the parliamentary order in cooperation with the army and the intelligentsia and to establish a one-party, working-class led regime (Agir, 2017, p. 8). According to them, this order should have changed, and the life of multi-party democracy must come to an end, and the single-party order should have been established. To realize the coup, junta movements started in the late 1960s. The Government, on the other hand, was unable to take any measures to stop these events.

Furthermore, this trend continued in the late 70s and resulted in the overthrow of the Ecevit government in 1979. However, the subsequent establishment of a minority government by Suleyman Demirel did not reduce the tension but increased it day by day (Nye, 1977, p. 217). There has also been a presidential crisis since April 1980. After President Fahri Korutürk expired, the post of Presidency was empty; however, the parties in the parliament could not agree on any name (George, 2011, pp. 203-213). No name could get enough votes for the Presidency in the GNAT (Grand National Assembly of Turkey), where more than 300 tours were held until September (Emmati, 2013, p. 59). Between the years 1977-1980, when political instability was so intense, the conflict between right and left was increasing gradually in the streets of Turkey (George, 2011, pp. 203-213). The conservative parties opposed to the left ideology argued that the workers' movements were trying to weaken the regime in Turkey and that it was a Soviet-backed movement to construct socialism (George, 2011, pp. 203-213). Turkey witnessed many massacres and political assassinations with the bloody struggle of the

representatives of these two approaches in the streets and universities. These were the years when members of the workers' movements took to the streets (Nye, 1977, p. 212). Tens of people with right and left views were killed every day in the conflicts in which political parties' youth organizations, trade unions, and illegal organizations played an active role (Emmati, 2013, p. 66). In this period, when a social conflict started, and there was no safety of life, the parties in power could not prevent the clashes.

Moreover, the case of the 1997 coup was not different from the previous coups, where the governments failed to provide adequate measures to avoid military intervention into the political sphere. For instance, in the success of February 28th as an intervention, the workers' and employers' organizations formed the "FCI" (Five Civic Initiative), which is allegedly brought the big media, high judicial bodies, military officers, and some non-governmental organizations together (Baran, 2010, pp. 173-184). This alliance between the Turkish Armed Forces, the bureaucracy, and the so-called non-governmental organizations have succeeded in keeping the elected under pressure and ultimately making them incapable of doing business. They believed that the country was ruined by domestic and foreign policy actions of the Government. Civil politics was almost destroyed; members of the coalition partner party were forced to resign, and the national will was disregarded (Baran, 2010, pp. 173-184). In front of this alliance, the Government did not have enough organizational strength to restore its credibility and deal with the campaigns against it.

Another category to measure political institutionalization is **"scope of support"** and will be applied to 1960-2002. To begin with, it must be underlined that the governments in the period of 1960-2002 did not have the popular support as JDP has. Although the governments which used Islamic rhetoric could get support from a particular segment of the society, they were still not as convincing and populist as JDP was. In case of pressure, the governments failed to mobilize the support and repair its damaged images in this

period. For instance, when the alliance of the military and opposition groups in 1997 started psychological operation activities on the society to create a bad image of the Government in their minds, the Government could not deal with it and lost its support eventually (Devran, 2016, p. 14). Also. When the content of the briefings, their presentation style, and statements are evaluated together, it was observed that the military acknowledged the Welfare Party in 1997 as dangerous as KWP (Kurdistan Worker Party) for the country and wanted to create the same perception of it among the population (Devran, 2016, p. 14). By doing this, they tried to find justification for the intervention into politics. In the successful completion of these activities, the media played the most crucial role. Unlike the classical coup tradition, the role of the media, especially at the end of this period, was highlighted by the alliance, and the headlines made by the press became the preparation part of the 28th February post-modern coup process (Agir, 2017, p. 12). Hurriyet, Milliyet, and Sabah newspapers soon launched a multi-faceted smear campaign against the 54th Government, putting the concepts of "fundamentalism", "secularism" and "sharia" into the headlines almost every day and tried to direct the public opinion (Baran, 2010, pp. 173-184). In return, the Government failed to mobilize the support and repair its broken credibility. It allowed the military, the opposition groups, and NGOs to create an alliance to influence public opinion against it. It was the case with other coups of the period (1960, 1971, and 1997). In these coups, the military and the opposition first tried to damage the reputation of the governments through media and different tools and then look for an opportunity to intervene in politics. In most cases, the governments of this period could not get enough support from the population to maintain their regime. Thus, it can be stated that the scope of support to the Government was low in the years between 1960 and 2002 in Turkey.

Unlike the previous period, the findings of the category of **„organizational strength"** are positive for the period between 2002 and 2016. The JDP government has been the strongest party after Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's government. Although at the beginning of his power, Erdogan provided opportunities for Gulen to spread his influence, he started to change his position toward FGM when the movement increased its power considerably. It included firing or arresting people who directly or indirectly connected with the Fetullah Gulen. After some time, the rising economic and political wants of the FGM (Fetullah Gulen Movement) hit a specific limit when Erdogan started to hinder the recruitment of FGM members in the government (Devran, 2016, p. 17). After Erdogan became the winner in the presidential election without any difficulty in 2014, he started to pressure Gulen-related people and organizations. These followed by closing down FGM's private tutorial schools, seizing TV channels and newspapers, and creating tax problems for the FGM-connected organizations (Haugom, 2019, p. 7). The FGM could not anymore recruit its members into important positions; thus, losing its strength in the media, judicial and bureaucratical institutions (Rabi, 2017, p. 30). The coup attempt in 2016 came when various prosecutors took practical actions against FGM members and several weeks before the meeting of Higher Military Council (HMC), which the JDP government announced as a chance to eliminate Gulenist's influence in the military (Luttwak, 2016). By doing so, Erdogan's government strengthen its institutions to secure its power and decrease the impact of Fetullah Gulen. It can be argued that Erdogan could reduce the ability of the Gulenist within the military and government, which indicates the organizational strength of his government to avoid potential military intervention.

Similarly, the category named **„scope of support"** will be assessed to measure the political institutionalization between 2002 and 2016. The JDP, as a political party, is

sometimes regarded as the most populist government in the history of the Turkish Republic. It emerged after a period of economic and political crises and rose to power with a high level of support by Turkish society. In the 2002 elections, when the political actors, who were seen as the cause of the crisis in the eyes of the large masses, experienced a great collapse, and the JDP came to power by succeeding in portraying itself as a new actor (Sakallioglu, 1997, p. 159). It may be helpful to remind that the JDP was qualitatively different from the governments that preceded it. With cases such as Ergenekon, the liquidation of power groups opposing the AKP within and outside the state apparatus and the seizure of the state apparatus almost at the level of state-party identity, the realization of a new foreign policy vision under the notions of strategic depth and regional leadership, different ideological strategy received enormous support from the Turkish society (Abramowitz, 2009, p. 121).

Since JDP came to power, President Erdogan tried to portrait himself as a man of the people because of his difficult early life. It was the crucial element differentiating him from the military and the political "elite" (Lowen, 2017). The fact that the boy grew up in a poor neighbourhood became the president of Turkey encouraged some segments of Turkish society. Even some Erdogan voters saw him as the chosen caliph or sultan for the whole Islamic world. Although Erdogan came to power with more democratic political discourse, later, his commitment to democracy was replaced with populism, and he brought Islamism to the scene. In Erdogan's leadership, the conservative segment of the society which the Kemalists oppressed found themselves as loyal citizens of the homeland, who wanted the development of Turkey, unlike the Kemalists who were seen as „other" (Yilmaz, 2018, p. 12). Knowing this fact, JDP used this as an opportunity and played populist cards to otherize the Kemalists and convey to conservative Turks that every failure and difficulty of the Turkish Republic was caused by Kemalists and similar mind politicians (Abramowitz, 2009, p. 120). The people were convinced that they have finally found their

man, the politicians who were their voice and who can represent their interest in the desired way. For example, after coming to power, Erdogan abolished wearing headscarves in the school and official buildings. It even increased his popularity and made his supporters even more loyal (Abramowitz, 2009, p. 120). This segment of the society was large in Turkey, and their support for Erdogan is unmeasurable. It was no surprise that during the night of the 2016 failed coup, the supporters of Erdogan were ready to sacrifice their life to protect his régime after Erdogan called his supporters to the streets. Therefore, it can be argued that although the secular segment of the society did not like and support the JDP régime, the scope of support to JDP by the conservative part of the society was high, and this support was unmatched.

Result: The last hypothesis is that „the high degree of political institutionalism was present in 2016 Turkey, whereas it lacked in the periods of previous successful coups and the reasons why 2016 coup failed are best explained by the theory of political institutionalism „ **is supported**. In the period between 1960 and 2002, when strong political institutionalization was absent, the coups failed. Thus, the theory of public institutionalism can also explain the previous Turkish coups and answer the research question.

	Military Professionalism	Civilian Supremacy	Social Cohesion	Political Institutionalism
1960	-	+	+	+
1971	-	+	+	+
1980	-	+	+	+
1997	-	+	+	+
2016	+	+	-	+
	Hypothesis **not** verified	Hypothesis verified	Hypothesis **not** verified	Hypothesis verified

The theory explains the case (+)

The theory does not explain the case (-)

5. Conclusion

The thesis tried to emphasize the 2016 failed Turkish coup and its comparison with the previous successful coups in Turkey. Two different periods were chosen to conduct a better comparison, one from 1960 till JDP coming to power in 2002, another from 2002 till 2016. The coups of the period between 1960 and 2002 were highlighted compared to the 2016 failed military coup. The study aimed to answer why the 2016 military coup attempt failed and how it differs from the previous successful coups in Turkey. The method chosen to obtain answers for the research question was the analysis of 4 different hypotheses inspired by four civil-military relations theories: Military Professionalism, Civilian Supremacy, Social Cohesion, Public Institutionalism.

The first hypothesis based on military professionalism argued that the presence of military professionalism in the Turkish Armed Forces in 2016 is what distinguishes it from previous successful coups in Turkey and why the 2016 military coup failed are best explained by military professionalism. The second hypothesis inspired by civilian supremacy asserted that "the existence of civilian supremacy in civil-military relations in 2016 is the factor differentiating it from previous successful Turkish coups and the reasons of failure are best explained by the theory of civilian supremacy. The third hypothesis that was grounded on social cohesion highlighted that the "high degree of social cohesion was present in 2016 Turkey unlike the periods of previous successful coups and social cohesion theory has better explained the failure of 2016. The last hypothesis based on political institutionalism stated that "the high degree of political institutionalism was present in 2016 Turkey, whereas it lacked in the periods of previous successful coups and the reasons why 2016 coup failed are best explained by the theory of political institutionalism.

It should be noted that the thesis attempted to analyze and check all four hypotheses based on the two different periods (1960-2002, 2002-2016). According to the analysis of the first hypothesis, military professionalism can explain the failure of the 2016 coup on the ground that professional Turkish officers prevented the coup from happening. However, the military professionalism fails to explain the coups in the previous period, as they were still successful despite having a professional and adequately trained army. Thus, the first hypothesis has not been supported by the findings.

Furthermore, after analyzing the second hypothesis, it was found out that the theory of civilian supremacy can be applicable in both periods. The results provided that the 2016 coup attempt failed because the army was in the hands of civilians; however, civilians did not have supremacy over the army in the previous period between 1960 and

2002, leading to the success of putschists. Therefore, the findings supported the second hypothesis.

Moreover, the analysis of the third hypothesis revealed that the theory of social cohesion could explain the coups of the first period between 1960 and 2002, as the violent struggle between leftism-rightism, secularism-Islamism, and different social divisions played the leading role in the success of the coups. However, it fails to explain the 2016 coup attempt in the second period, where the coup failed despite a lack of social cohesion. For this reason, the third hypothesis has not been supported.

According to the analysis of the final hypothesis, public institutionalism is valid for explaining all the given cases. The findings indicated that a high degree of political institutionalism between 2002 and 2016 was the decisive factor in the coup's failure and this lacked in the previous period, which caused them to result in success. Therefore, the results supported the last hypothesis.

The findings of two supported hypotheses helped us to answer the research questions raised in the thesis. Concerning the first part of the research question, the results revealed that the civilian control of the army and a high degree of public institutionalism distinguishes the 2016 failed coup from previous successful coups in Turkey. The same findings also helped us to answer the second part of the research question. They asserted that civilian control of the army and a high degree of public institutionalism are the factors that made the 2016 coup attempt failed.

In conclusion, the findings of the thesis about the 2016 failed coup attempt can be a practical guide to prevent future coup attempts in Turkey. However, as has been argued before, the coup culture is deeply rooted in Turkish history and is hard to throw away. Although the country has integrated into the Western political sphere by joining NATO and by cooperating with the EU, the impossibility of attempting another coup in the future has not been guaranteed in Turkish politics. The 2016 coup attempt failed; however, it

may not always be the case in the future. Thus, Turkish decision-makers must think about alternative policies to prevent any factors capable of leading to successful coup attempts.

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Diploma thesis project

Comparative Study between the 2016 Failed Military Coup and Previous Successful Coups in Turkey

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Study programme: International Security Studies

Year of project submission: 2020

1. Introduction to the topic

The emergence of a military coup for the purpose of overthrowing the regime is not new for Turkish politics. Approximately every ten years there is an attempt by the military to change the government in the name of democratic transition. In most of the cases including in 1960 and March 12, 1971, and 1980 and on February 28, 1997, the legitimate governments were overthrown and new governments were created instead. However, the outcome of the military intervention was different when a certain group of people within the military attempted to carry out a coup on July 15, 2016. The coup differs from the previous coups as the coup perpetrators bombed the Turkish Grand National Assembly, opened fire on the people and killed 250 people, and damaged many[1]. Also, it happened allegedly in the most politically stable period of Turkey. In comparison with previous military coups in Turkey, the 2016 military coup was not carried out on grounds such as political instability, security problems, chaos, regime crisis, and the people were not supporting the military coup[2]. Therefore, the military coup perpetrators received serious reaction by the civilians who went on the streets to support the current government, as well as by the leaders of opposition parties.

The official argument about the failed military coup raised by the Turkish government is that a certain group of military officers who are Fetullah Gulen's supporters had information that they will be excluded from the next meeting of the High Council of the Military in August; therefore, they organized a military coup to save themselves and seize the state power[3]. However, some argue that it was just a game played by Erdogan to strengthen its power by bringing his

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[1] AĞIR, O. (2017, September 13). The Reactions of Politicians For Military Coups in Turkey. Retrieved from https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/506653
[2] Hale, W. (2018). The Turkish Military in Politics, and the Attempted Coup of 15-16 July 2016. *Contemporary Research in Economics and Social Sciences, 2*(1), 7-41.
[3] Shkurti, G., & Ataman, M. (2016). COUP D'ETAT RECORD OF THE WEST AND WESTERN REACTION TO JULY 15 COUP ATTEMPT. *Social Sciences Journal*.

people to military positions. Whatever the real story was, the incident shook the whole world and Turkish society on the night of 15th July, and there were massive reactions to it.

2. Research Target and Research Question

The ultimate aim of this study is to examine the failed military coup attempt in Turkey in 2016. The research targets analytical, objective, and critical evaluation of the Turkish coup attempt in 2016 and comparison of it with the previous military coups that took place in Turkey. This evaluation will include the views of various state and non-state actors regardless of political ideologies and attempt to provide a comprehensive answer to the research question.

The most important question which has to be raised in this study is: Why was the 2016 Turkish military coup unsuccessful and how it differed from previous successful military coup attempts? To examine the actual events of the 2016 Turkish coup, reliable and unbiased works on this matter that exist in the academic literature will be taken as the core of the thesis. With the help of academic literature, this study will underline the occurrences in the night of the 15th July military coup and compare it with previous successful military coups in Turkey. In this thesis, I will mention the theories from highly known scholars such as Samuel Huntington, Samuel Finer, and Amos Perlmutter on when and under which circumstances usually coups fail. The theories will first be confronted with the occurrences on the 15th July night and secondly with previous successful military coups in Turkey. Results can demonstrate what is needed for a successful military coup. I am of the view that the obtained standpoint can be a useful tool for the researchers to analyze the various coup attempts worldwide.

Literature Review

The literature used for the thesis can be divided into two different categories. The first category of literature focuses on the theories and seeks to find answers to the question when usually coups fail. The literature used for this part will be *The Soldier and the State* by Samuel P. Huntington[4], *The Man on Horseback, Role of the Military in Politics* by Samuel Finer[5], *The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army: Toward a Taxonomy of Civil-Military Relations in Developing Polities*[6] by Amos Perlmutter. On the other hand, the second category emphasizes the reasons why the 2016 Turkish military coup failed, how the social response to this coup was, and how it differed from previous military coups in Turkey. The article called *The Turkish Armed Forces and Civil-military Relations in Turkey after the 15 July 2016 Coup Attempt* by Lars Haugom[7], *Political Instability in Turkey during the 1970s* by Michael M. Gunter[8] and *Rethinking how the coup detat's occur: An Evaluation on the Coup Attemps of 15th July by* Eren Veysel[9] will be used for this part.

This study will be my contribution to the already existing literature, it will be slightly varied from the currently existing literature. The thesis will shed light on different arguments and theories in the literature and reflect them on the answer to the research questions investigated. The theories I will use are not in detail discussed; thus, it will bring a new standpoint for the case of the 2016 military coup attempt in Turkey.

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[4] Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 1981), originally published in 1957

[5] Finer, S. (1962). *MAN ON HORSEBACK: The Role of the Military in Politics*. London: Pall Mall Press Limited5.

[6] Perlmutter, A. (1969). The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army: Toward a Taxonomy of Civil-Military Relations in Developing Polities. *Comparative Politics, 1*(3), 382-404. doi:10.2307/421446

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[9] Eren, V., & Kahraman, O. F. (2017). RETHINKING HOW THE COUP DETAT'S OCCUR: AN EVALUATION ON THE COUP ATTEMPS OF 15TH JULY. *International Periodical for the Languages, Literature and History of Turkish or Turkic Volume, 12*(31), 103-124.

Conceptual and Theoretical Framework, Research Hypotheses

The word "coup" as a concept is defined as "the work of changing the regime, resigning the government or overthrowing the administration by using force or using democratic means[10]". On the other hand, the concept of the military coup is defined as the intervention of the military personnel to the civilian personnel and generally appears as the overthrow of the civilian administration by the military. It may involve the use of violence and threats to reach the goal. As a result of the military coup, the "civilian personnel" or political ruling class can be dismissed from power and the army can either take charge of the government directly or hand it over to their puppets if it is organized by a third party[11]. As long as they do not go back to the times as at the start of a revolution, military coups as a concept usually intend to restore the system rather than establish a new system.

The thesis aimed to underline certain theoretical frameworks to have a more clear vision of the failed Turkish military coup attempt. The theoretical frameworks used in this thesis will mostly help to discover the reasons for the failure of the 2016 military coup by confronting it with previous successful military coups. The first theoretical framework is military professionalism by Samuel Huntington. He argues that professionalism create a reciprocal binding bond and connection between society and its professionals, and the military professionalism wants military officers to do its tasks and serve the country by obeying the politicians and rulers in the state and government[12]"

The second theoretical framework is the norm of civilian supremacy from Samuel Finer. Unlike Huntington, he underlines that "professionalism makes the military officers look on their

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[10] Hale, W. (2018). The Turkish Military in Politics, and the Attempted Coup of 15-16 July 2016. *Contemporary Research in Economics and Social Sciences, 2*(1), 7-41.
[11] Hale, W. (2018). The Turkish Military in Politics, and the Attempted Coup of 15-16 July 2016. *Contemporary Research in Economics and Social Sciences, 2*(1), 7-41.

[12] Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 1981), originally published in 1957

duties from the eyes of the politicians, and it may make them swerve from the idea of intervention to the politics and organizing the military coup; however, it is not the best way to stop their intervention[13]". According to him, the best way to discourage army to intervene into the politics is „the adoption of the concept of civilian control in the army, where the civilian political leadership will have the control over the strategic decision-making[14]".

Another theoretical framework that will be used in this thesis is social cohesion by Amos Perlmutter. He argues that „personal desires and groups aims frequently diverge in a state with a low degree of social cohesion[15]". In this state, there is ineffective and social control and not enough channels for communication. There should be symbols that can connect society and bring them together. Perlmutter underlines that „in a case when ruling class lack fails to provide symbols of authority, military personnel may be to manipulate the symbols of their institutions to rule and introduce some coherence by force[16]".

Moreover, Perlmutter introduces another theory called „public institutionalism" which will be helpful for the thesis. He claims that „there is less probability of military intervention into the politics in a state with a high degree of public institutionalism[17]". Because institutionalization of power means the limitation of power within a country and the absence of the public institutions would create the state of near anarchy where the military would intervene and rule by default[18]. He underlines that this institutionalism are provided by the existence of the strong and effective

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[13] Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 1981), originally published in 1957
[14] Finer, S. (1962). *MAN ON HORSEBACK: The Role of the Military in Politics*. London: Pall Mall Press Limited5.
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[18] Perlmutter, A. (1969). The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army: Toward a Taxonomy of Civil-Military Relations in Developing Polities. *Comparative Politics, 1*(3), 382-404. doi:10.2307/421446

parties. According to him, the public institutions represent the interests of public, and that's what makes a coup fail if there is a military intervention to politics[19].

Empirical Data and Analytical Technique

The research will be carried out based on a comparative study, as it is most fitting to this thesis. The research is aimed at explaining the situation in the Turkish 2016 failed military coup attempt, how it differed from previous military coups, and analysing them according to the theoretical background.

The main sources for the thesis are the most objective and unbiased works in the existing literature about the 2016 Turkish coup attempt. The goal is not to use resources which is hard to prove, since it will affect the reliability of the thesis. In this study, the primary focus is given to the existing data which has been gathered from secondary sources, such as, websites and articles of political writers and the reports of international security and armed conflict experts. Since we chose this type of data analysis, the conclusions we make from this research can be later applied globally in similar cases.

The method that is intended to use in this thesis is a comparative study between the 2016 Turkish failed military coup and previous successful military coup attempts. This method is the most appropriate for this research as it will be possible to identify the differences of military coups and state concrete and specific factors that were missing in the 2016 failed military coup. With the

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[19] Perlmutter, A. (1969). The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army: Toward a Taxonomy of Civil-Military Relations in Developing Polities. *Comparative Politics, 1*(3), 382-404. doi:10.2307/421446

help of this method, it will be possible to have a more clear insight into the issue and give a more obvious standpoint which may be later useful to analyze the military coups around the world

The first part of the thesis will underline different theoretical approaches from different authors. The theoretical part will shed light on the possibilities where the coups can fail. Then, the concept of the coup and military coup will be clarified in detail. These two parts, the theoretical and concepts will help to formulate a comparative analysis between the 2016 failed Turkish coup and previous successful coups in Turkey.

In the second part of the research, the case of the 2016 Turkish military coup will be studied in detail. Initially, short information about the previous successful military coups in Turkey will be given to be familiar with the military coup culture that exists in Turkey. Later, the case of the 2016 military coup will be discussed with comprehensive information including what exactly happened on the night of the military coup attempt. By this, it will be more obvious to see the differences and will be easier to argue what exactly went wrong on the night of 15th July; so that the coup failed?

It will be followed by the analytical part of the thesis. This part will analyze the implications of theories in the case of 2016 and previous successful Turkish military coup. The analysis will attempt to indicate how much the theories reflect reality and can be applied in the case of Turkey in 2016.

3. Planned Thesis Outline

The thesis project will begin with an introduction containing the short information about the thesis, methodology, and the literature review about the 2016 failed Turkish coup attempt. Then, the conceptual and theoretical framework of the thesis will be indicated.

The structure of the thesis is expected to be:

- Introduction

  o Relevance of the thesis, methodology, literature review

- Conceptual/Theoretical Framework

  o The concepts of the coup and the military coup, theories of Huntington, Finer, Perlmutter and others.

- The case study of the Turkish military coups

  o detailed emphasis of Turkish 2016 military coup; involving the history and outcomes of previous successful military coups in Turkey

- Empirical – analytical section

  o The analysis of Turkish military coups based on the theoretical basis

- Conclusions

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