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**Counter - Terrorism Measures in Nigeria
Case study of Boko Haram Insurgency**

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Declaration

1. I hereby declare that I have compiled this thesis using the listed literature and resources only.
2. I hereby declare that my thesis has not been used to gain any other academic title.
3. I fully agree to my work being used for study and scientific purposes.

In Prague on
25th July, 2021

Signed
King udeme simon

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Abstract

In recent times Countering Terrorism has been at the top of most governments' security agendas and policies. Since terrorism has become the single most lethal weapon used by anti – state agents to destabilized society and gain government attention, it has become a very lucrative venture. Even though the underlying factors of each terrorist organization or insurgence defer from place to place, the motives remain unchanged across the board : whether it is inciting recruits and sympathizers to pick up arms, or appealing to sponsors to finance political violence, terrorist sects aim at creating fear in society to achieve their objectives.

Also, terrorism has now metamorphosed into a transnational global network of affiliates and terror gangs of like minds. With structural fundings, state – like model of hierarchy, and in most cases a judiciary system. This undeniable advancement in terrorism methodology from what was once seen as - basic ideological aggrievances among state and rebels' groups - in the past, to a full fledge political structure has informed deligent studies about terrorism and indeed counterterrorism.

Counterterrorism measure is therefore defined as the tools, measures and policies that are adopted by government when combating or stabilizing terrorism in each society. This concept takes many forms and can either be defensive: pro activating implementing measures to avoid terrorism by providing the enabling environment for peacfull co-existence, or offensive : in the occasion of defending the state against terrorist via use of force and other legally accepted methods.

This thesis aims at exploring the Counterterrorism measures adopted by the Nigerian Government when tackling the insurgence Group “Boko Haram”. This work will attempt to among other things: list the counterterrorism measures implemented in Nigeria, identify the challenges of implementing these measures, and final profer recommendations for better tackling of counterterrorism.

This will be achieved by using a collectiong of data and findings in scholarly writing and publications on the subject to gain perspective and analyse the policies on counterterrorism, first on the global scence and then on the Nigerian scene with Boko Haram.

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

Recently, terrorism has evolved from a non-networked political or violent religious act into a more destructive global concern (Katona et al., 2006). Due to increased capabilities and access to weapons of mass destruction which has led to the development of different but complementary counterterrorism methods. It should not be surprising since the world is constantly finding and discovering new and innovative ways to improve human life. From science, technology, arts, industries, among other compelling aspects of human endeavor, efforts are constantly geared towards making life better. Surely, less should not be expected of the safety of human lives. For the safety of lives to be maintained, peace and justice are two things that must be taken strictly by individuals and society at large. Indeed, goal sixteen of the sustainable development goals emphasizes peace and justice strong institutions. In this light, constantly working against peace and justice is insurgency and terrorism, one of the world's nightmares and biggest problems.

. Similarly, (Jenkin, 1985) also defines terrorism as the application of force or endangering of lives to change the political scene. These definitions state how terrorism incorporates violence for creating fear while pursuing a particular interest (Wardlaw, 1982). Terrorism is violence against civilians. It is a means of destruction. (Adeyemo, 2012) opined that terrorism is the intentional and systematic or planned destruction in whole or in part of an ethnic, racial, religious, or national group.

Citing (Garrison, 2004), (Aderonke, 2004) opined that terrorism is a means by which some groups of people seek to actualize a goal or objective using coercive and violent approaches on a state or society, thus, causing fear and insecurity. From this, terrorism involves applying force, threats, and violence by a group of opposing law and order in the pursuit of achieving a set goal driven by a strange or extreme ideology. Aderonke (2004) explained that such action pursued to inflict anxiety and fear in a targeted group to achieve the perpetrators' political or religious demands.

Every nation and country in the world faced with terrorism; however, the frequency differs. Sadly, in the last few years, the intensity of terrorism has grown worse in Nigeria because of the inability of the government to maintain law and order in the state. Because of this, various scholars have published many studies on the issue of terrorism in Nigeria, giving birth to different views and perceptions about the current status quo in the fight against terrorists in the Nigerian scene, a major and dominant one being Boko Haram. Aderonke (2015) takes the stand that "...there are a plethora of poignant and longstanding issues that have paved the way for terrorist activities in Nigeria". She, therefore, concluded that until this issue gets combated with and a solution that will permanently resolve the matter surfaces, terrorism will continue unleashing its terror on the state. The meaning or purpose of Boko Haram comes to light after a Hausa definition of the word : Boko Haram translates thus: "Boko" means western or foreign, while "Haram" means abominable or forbidden. Therefore, it states clearly how the Boko Haram insurgents started their terror on the ideology and philosophy that western education or culture is terrible. (Wikipedia, 2013).

According to (Akpan et al., 2014), the United States of America and its' allies classified Boko Haram as an Islamic group and the first terrorist organization in Nigeria. (Perrson,2014) stated that although Boko Haram was already in operation in the 1990s, it was not a serious security threat until some key members of the group killed by Nigerian security forces in 2009. Among the members were the leader of the group at the time, who went by the name Mohammed Yusuf. Apart from the leader, many members of the group were eliminated during that time. The aftermath was a regrouping of the sect in 2010, which became a serious security threat in Nigeria. Boko Haram attack usually target civilians, and the attacks take the form of suicide bombings and gunmen attacks. Under the disguise of military officers, attacks are often launched on the military as well.

Terrorism has several consequences on a state; (Chuku et al., 2017) stated that terrorism has several economic and non-economic consequences. The economic consequences of terrorism in Nigeria are :

1. Terrorism negatively affects a country or state's economy because of the destruction of lives and physical capital. (Collier, 1999).

2. Terrorism induces counterterrorism measures that attract monetary costs and other expenditures. Leading to a diversion of expenditure from productive activities to security and counterterrorism measures. (Blomberg, Hess, and Orphanides, 2004; Gaibullov and Sandler, 2011).

3. Terrorism exposes the affected state to economy-wide risks.

4. Several sectors of the economy, especially tourism and financial markets, are also affected by terrorist activities. (Eldor and Melnick, 2004; Enders and Sandler, 1996).

This thesis shall focus on the counterterrorism measures used by the government through its security agencies in the last couple of years while drawing insights from the causes, consequences, and negative impacts of terrorism in Nigeria. Previous studies such as Omilusi (2016) studied some of the counterterrorism measures used by the government to involve the security institution and international dimension, socio-economic dimension, government and democratization dimension, and the rule of law and human dimension.

Statement of the Problem

(Knoechelmann, 2014), using a cause and effect relationship, stated that the Nigerian Counter-Terrorism policy toward Boko Haram has failed. According to (Brechenmacher, 2019), in 2019, the Boko Haram operations in northeastern Nigeria entered their eleventh year. (Brechenmacher, 2019) noted that since the inception of the Boko Haram operation, the insurgency and countermeasures in themselves have taken the lives of thousands of civilians and displaced millions across the Lake Chad region, (Brechenmacher, S, 2019, May 3). Despite the counterterrorism measures in place as Muhammadu Buhari assumed his second term as president, the conflict in the northeast caused by Boko Haram activities is still far from being resolved (Brechenmacher, 2019).

According to Brechenmacher (2019), "there is a requirement for a multidimensional approach that will focus on combating deeper service delivery issues, corrupt governance, and environmental degradation. Apart from defeating Boko Haram, another focus of counterterrorism

measures should also be stabilizing areas that have been largely affected by terrorist activities. Concerning Boko Haram activities in Nigeria, northeast Nigeria is a major region that has been affected by the Boko Haram insurgency. According to (Brechenmacher, 2019), efforts at stabilizing the north-east region have generally fallen into three main categories: initiatives directed at de-escalating local conflict, preventing them and mitigation methods, as well as programs aimed at restoring local governance and basic services, and programs aimed at

fostering social cohesion and ensuring the reintegration of former combatants. Currently, most of the stabilization programs in northeast Nigeria believe that the terrorist activities in the region are over. This belief has facilitated the return of displaced populations and the local government (Brechenmacher 2019). However, (Brechenmacher, 2019) noted that in practice, Nigeria's overstretched, under-resourced, and the corruption-plagued military has struggled to effectively defeat Boko Haram activities in the region and Nigeria at large.

Today, civilians in different areas in the northeast are still facing ongoing threats from insurgent attacks and counterterrorism operations. The fact that civilians suffer from even counterterrorism operations is an indication that the counterterrorism measures suffer from ineffective coordination and rampant corruption. Among counterterrorism measures suggested by international partners is the need for a regional response to the crisis. However, the region lacks an effective political infrastructure, and cooperation has been primarily externally driven (Brechenmacher 2019). On this note, (Brechenmacher, 2019) concludes that the Nigerian case thus exemplifies the difficulties of implementing effective local-level stabilization efforts while working with a host government that lacks political commitment, transparency, and coordination.

Research Questions

1. What is the major cause or trigger of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria?
2. What are the effective and ineffective measures directed towards fighting terrorist activities in Nigeria?

3. What are the challenges to the implementation of counter-terrorism policy in Nigeria?

Scope of the Study

This study examines Counter-Terrorism Measures in Nigeria with a focus on Boko-Haram. The research was limited to the Cycle of Security Agencies including the State Security Services (SSS), the Police, and the Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC).

The study will involve the causes and consequences of terrorism in Nigeria, and how the impact of corruption has been discovered to facilitate terrorism within a state. Therefore, this study will consider how the government is putting up a “zero tolerance” for corruption. In the light of this, the study hopes to bring to light how the security institutions of the Nigerian state have been fighting the current security challenges confronting the state. For instance, intelligence sharing amongst security agencies such as the state security services (SSS), the police, and civil defence corps (NSCDC), and others within and outside the country. The role of the international community will also be examined. Regarding the socio-economic dimension, studies such as (Omilusi, 2016) show that poverty and socioeconomic conditions are germane factors to be tracked in any counterterrorism strategy because they are very key conditions that can easily drive ‘good’ people to seek solace or refuge in radicalized groups, apart from the fact that such groups will enable them to survive, they also provide them with an identity. Another aspect that will be covered in the governance and democratisation dimension in which terrorism should be considered as constituting an affront to democratic praxis and is, therefore, a deliberate and calculated attempt to bring about change in society in an illegal, untoward and illegitimate fashion.

Significance of the Study

The goal of this dissertation is to examine the reasons behind the failing counter-terrorism measures in Nigeria and to provide valuable recommendations for improved counter-terrorism measures marketing strategy. These will be elaborated in due consideration of the causes, consequences, and the existing measures put in place in the fight against terrorism in Nigeria. The measures the government has put in place in the fight against Boko Haram insurgency need to be analysed to be able to improve these measures through targeted counter-terrorism measures.

Additionally, it is necessary to investigate how the current counter-terrorism measures in Nigeria can be optimized. The results of this academic paper should provide important information for the security institution and the government regarding how to counter terrorism in the state. The added value of this academic paper is to provide significant new knowledge regarding counter-terrorism measures in the fight against terrorism. Therefore, this research will contribute to the existing collection of information on terrorism plaguing the global society. It is explicitly intended to reveal the methodologies embraced for fighting terrorism and Boko Haram insurgency. The research work will also assist and augment scholars whose quests are on monitoring the activities of counterterrorism. The result of this study would serve as a reference for policymaking and much emphasis is on counter-terrorism policies and knowledge transfer among scholars in the security sector. The outcome of this study would also be helpful to policymakers, security agencies, and safety officers across areas of the public concerning overseeing terrorism activities for National Sustainable Development.

CHAPTER TWO

GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM MEASURES

This thesis centres on counterterrorism measures, but prior to discussing the ways to combat terrorism it is worth having an understanding on what terrorism is globally and how it has become the single most pressing challenge to Government and societies. To achieve this, we shall in few next paragraphs define global terrorism and counterterrorism.

“Terrorism is a unique form of political violence , and campaign backed by threat and acts of violence, it is usually systematic and seeks to influence a wide audience by generating fear... the primary target are usually civilians to gain political control of the public”. (Steven & Gunaratna, 2004).

Contemporary Counterterrorism efforts require acute and deliberate action in that human rights should be protected while deterring, repressing, or eliminating threats of Terrorism. Terrorism

does not emerge without purpose. The legitimate concerns of the groups, if any, should not be jettisoned. There is a blurred line between political correctness and excessive use of force by the State and its agencies. Counterterrorism has been around for a while but gained more attention after the 9/11 US incident and has since become more popular as Terrorism has become transnational. And unlike ages ago, more countries have seen the value in ratifying and endorse counterterrorism measures to dissuade terrorism activities in their territories. Most terrorists aim to provoke the government to overreact; they can then capitalize on this to secure sympathy, sponsorship, and appeal to the population to their cause. (Steven & Gunaratna, 2004).

Global Counterterrorism measures defer and depend on factors like the geographical regions, the hard-line and purpose of the terrorist group, the severity of the issues, etc.

Nonetheless, this thesis shall focus on various seasoned comprehensive works on effective counterterrorism measures to contain Terrorism.

Countering terror requires engaging with different perspectives: Legal, military, socio-economic measures, and Religious standards. In this chapter, these perspectives would be expounded upon (both Advantages and disadvantages) to profer which solution works, and if applying all is feasible.

(Steven & Gunaratna, 2004) defined "*Terrorism is a unique form of political violence, a campaign backed by threat and act of violence.... It is usually systematic and deliberate: it seeks to influence a broad audience by generating fear*".

The terrorist thus has one aim to incite fear and get the government to agree to their terms and objectives. They hope to achieve this via various tactics: Kidnapping, maiming, destruction of infrastructures, and bombarding military and civilian installments to make a profound statement and gain attention. The activity of studying engaging and response to stop terrorist objectives is counterterrorism measures. So, to put it simply, the methods government adopts to face the actions of Terrorism are counterterrorism measures.

Government and its agencies need to be both defensive and offensive, prepared to tackle terrorist heads- at any given moment using all the apparatus available at its disposal: Judicial, military, Diplomacy, social engagement, Economic improvements to discourage Terrorism.

The first measure we shall explore is the Political Measure. In the authors' words, State needs to ramp up its negotiation skills to address, engage with the sect to meet the legitimate grievances, and make policies that encapsulate these Legitimate aggrievances. States can adjust policy if not to create new ones directed at solving the problems or needs raised by the terrorist (legitimate needs).

According to laws, as argued by (Shaffer, 2020), defining what constitutes the Legitimate intent of any insurgence defers serious negotiations and dialogue around what policies can be redressed and adjusted. Although what legitimate is and the interpretation defers from State to State, according to (Shaffer, 2020), who argues that if the intent is beyond inflicting psychological stress and extreme violence, this constitutes legitimate.

In this case, State must be unbiased and objective to see that Genuine concerns that border around marginalization, inclusion, and equality are satisfied. Most terrorist groups create their propaganda around social inequality, Freedoms, and excessive government intrusion in daily activities and Human rights. In such cases, the government should be open to reconstructing its policy to include these concerns. On the other hand, the government must be careful when adopting these measures to not give the wrong signal to extreme groups who would capitalize on these concessions.

As (Steven & Gunaratna, 2004) noted, *"By addressing the terrorist concerns, the government would have acted in good fate. "*

Furthermore, suppose the concerns are boarding around social or economic preferences. In that case, the government should facilitate schemes that would ensure employment, social welfare, poverty reduction and land redistribution, and legal, economical alternatives.

Political measures, in summary, hopes to tackle Terrorism by listening and adjusting government schedules, policies, priorities, etc., to reflect the needs of these terrorists or groups of

insurgences. A good amount of Terrorism is politically centered. It will make a whole difference if the measures are handled along political lines by government readiness to change unhealthy policy and reduce the potential of Terrorism and terrorist sympathy in the populace. The political effort here falls in the category of the defensive method. If the State seeks to preserve its unity, compromise to the legitimate concerns of insurgence could mean restoration of Peace to the polity. The government adopts the "carrots and stick approach "to reward good behavior and integrate and carter to the aggrieved sect, including them in its socio, economic policies. Some insurgence groups always have needs, carefully addressing these needs presents a higher chance of repealing terror.

Another dimension that goes hand in hand with political measures is conflict resolution measure. Nowadays, Terrorist operations are diverse and span different sizes and levels. National, local, military and international; thus, the methods to combat terror should address all areas, including deliberate and genuine will and attempt to resolve conflict. Through channels like mediation, negotiation, and public dialogues. Government should adopt Conflict resolution measures to resolve underlying disputes – the reason for the insurgence in the first place. However, anarchist terrorists who aim to destabilize a state should not be accepted in the name of Negotiation (Shaffer, 2020). The State should set up skilled and seasoned members of society to preside over dialogues, public hearing sessions and grant a free hearing to the needs of the terrorist.

Punitive measures

Punitive Measures are another essential measure to be adopted in defensive counterterrorism. This measure promotes the blockade of funds flows to the coffers of terrorists. Terrorism requires money to exist and carry out their enterprises and usually resolve armed robbery, organised criminal activities like kidnapping, hostage-taking, and even appealing to sympathisers for funding. Right-wing terrorists have adopted illegal means to arrive at budget, including drug trafficking, arms sales, kidnapping, money laundering, and fund-raising platforms (Gomis, 2015). Given that Terrorism has become transnational in recent times, a need for global

cooperation in fishing out funders of Terrorism is imperative. Many blockades are currently in place to reduce key channels of funding terrorism - Restriction and watch - dog eye on suspicious funds to terrorist groups is key to the fight against Terrorism.

For example, countries like France have banned fundraising to suspected religious groups and transfers funds from potential fronts to terrorist groups. UN, sanctions and boycotting on state sponsors or supporters of terrorists: freezing of assets, banning trades, travel, arms sales. (Steven & Gunaratna, 2004). This move has largely deterred states from political Terrorism and provided enabling environment to checkmate the flow of funds to encourage Terrorism. State-sponsored Terrorism reduced significantly as a result of these measures. Many states, who don't want harsh UN sanctions and exclusion, have sat up and cooperated with the UN in this regard.

Aside from sanctions on funding to terrorists, funding to any relevant information leading to the arrest of terrorists is a Great measure to adopt under the punitive action umbrella.

Another incentive is the Informants' reward package - Designed for informants who assist the government with valid information telling on the whereabouts of the terrorist.

Similarly, adopting sanctions such as Economic, freezing of assets and diplomatic isolation land arms embargo like in cases of Iraq, Iran, or Cuba can be a productive deterrence to terrorist sponsor countries (Steven & Gunaratna, 2004)

To achieve the above mentioned objective requires more than just placing embargoes or diplomatic isolation – it requires cooperation from the international community. If the measure must be effective all nations must be willing to play their parts to expose sponsor countries or report terrorist suspect on their territory.

There have been situations where some states harbor terrorist e.g. Pakistan with the Taliban, or when state continue to trade with indicated and blacklisted terrorist for private gains. (Steven & Gunaratna, 2004).

To enforce and strengthen the efficacy of these measure state must eliminate selfishness and act as a global voice to expose and report terrorist plots when they occur. A shared intelligence

between nations would produce an easier methodology for international action and quicker response to terrorism.

Judicial measures

According to (Donnell, 2006), International legislation has been at the forefront, when considerations for approaches to counter terrorism is the case. And this is so because for a greater part of the 20th century, states have been rattled by a growing terrorism index and there was an urgent need to create a framework to counter this phenomenon.

A couple of legal treaties and protocols were laid out to oversee the rightful process of countering terrorism; thus, the rule of engagement, the repercussion / penalties for terrorism related offenses had to be documented.

The front-line body United Nations has over the years compiled and improved upon legal materials and codes that spelt out crimes and penalties related to terrorism.

These can be termed counter terrorism legal framework and codes

Among others the prominent protocols include:

“The Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, adopted in Tokyo in 1963, the 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, the 1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, the 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages and the 1979 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Three treaties were adopted in 1988: The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, a Protocol to that Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts”. (Donell, 2006)

These treaties and protocols were adopted to substantiate the most pressing counter measures available, and feasible. *“A body of fifty offences were covered in these treaties which formed the legal framework for countering terrorism, including; Laws against financing terrorism, The*

Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, adopted in Tokyo in 1963, the 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, the 1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, the 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages and the 1979 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Three treaties were adopted in 1988: The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, a Protocol to that Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts” (Donald, 2006).

Judiciary Measures is a vital measure to be implemented to counterterrorism war; this measure entails the cooperation of states in ratifying international conventions and protocols against Terrorism. A good example would be the UN ten Convention on Terrorism.

Judicial measures strengthen the position of cooperation of having a collective legislation, laws and document on Terrorism that reflect the penalties sanctions and responsibilities of Nations in regards terrorism.

So far, under judicial measures some documents including expansion of extradition of suspects of terrorism on state territories... efforts to enhance mutual legal assistance has been put in place within some states e.g US, UK, Canada and Australia with exchange of information for prosecution of terrorist in other countries. (Steven & Gunaratna, 2004).

Aside from the problem of a universally accepted level of judicial cooperation and respond, another disadvantage of this measure especially when considering extradition has been the Questions often arising on the whether to prosecute convicted terrorist domestically or internationally. (Steven & Gunaratna, 2004). States have different judicial procedures and interpretation of terrorism and even penalty for crimes. These creates a loophole that most terrorist and their legal team explore in order to secure freedom and walk out free.

“In many instances if terrorist is apprehended in one country, the authorities who hold him may not want to extradite him for fear that he might face death penalty. Also, they may not want to prosecute him for fear of retaliation from the terrorist organisation”. (Steven & Gunaratna, 2004).

This begs the need to enforce a more powerful international criminal court that has the powers to summarily prosecute terrorist and grant protection to states that support in the process of having these terrorist apprehended.

Prosecution process of terrorist is also a higher heated debate issues amongst the judiciary arm of most states. Judges have little to no knowledge on terrorism and terrorist prey on these gaps to walk free in most instance, proving the innocence or guilt of a terrorist or its accomplices is dicey. First, there is the issue of no common definition of terrorism across board, academics, governments and internationally, this creates difficulties to prosecute terrorist.

Most times prosecution processes are delayed by reluctance of person to testify in court to secure a conviction. Aside from this, most legislations on terrorism are formulated based on the situation, creating a slow and unorganized process in general (O’callaghan 1999: Mcgartland 2000).

Measures to rectify these could include efforts to speed up the judicial process against terrorists, e.g Setting up special terrorist courts and innugration and trial in absentia. (Pillar 2001, 84).

Finally, there is an issue of human rights, to secure the conviction of terrorist some authorities hastily abuse the rights of the terrorist and are barely accountable to ensure adherence to the due process to justify such convictions.

Military Measures

The Military Response to terrorism is one of the preventive strategies to countering Terrorism in modern Democracies today. It can be described as the approach taken by the state using its military capabilities to reduce the impact of terrorist activities, reduce recruitment and ultimately

halt terrorist enthusiast from interest in the venture by acts of military engagement and deployment.

Military measures as the name implies involves use of force/coercion to silence anti – state organisations, for example, terrorist organisations. The state believes that through the use of military might, culprits and intending rebellion enthusiast will become weary and refrain.

Prior studies indicate that these measures either hold temporal success or fail totally, with Governments creating more fire than quenching it.

As popular researcher Tore Bjørgo highlights in his work (Bjørgo, 2015), the Military Approach to countering terrorism has been the foremost consideration of most Government until the 9/11 Terrorist Attack. The 9/11 attack proved to be peculiar for numerous reasons chiefly because it served as the outlier that put perspective and introduced the holistic approach of Counter terrorism. The Military Counter terrorism approach entails deterrence rather than prevention, advocates restoration of Law and Order with little or no dialogues. Terrorist are seen as traitors and Villains and reasons for action/ intent is disregarded no matter how appealing and justifying it may appear / seem. The Military Approach is highlighted here as one of the most applied means to counter terrorism. Government usually flexes their military might in attempt to silence the violent terrorist sect. Since usually the terrorist acts are generally regarded as Crime against the state and humanity, to the state it would seem justifying and legitimate to engage the military as a keyway to quell insurgencies. However, as earlier indicated these methods have not been effective when long term security and Lasting peace is the objective. Every terrorist organization or network has an aim, goal and believe that their goals can ultimately be achieved - as Tore Bjørgo points out in his work – even at the cost of lives of followers etc.

In summation, if terrorism is a tactic to achieve these aim and goals, Counter terrorism measure could therefore be regarded as that measure taken to dissuade, disengage, dislodge, discourage and prevent this tactic and the tacticians involved. Thus, military measures have been a means to an end for Government to deter and punish terrorists.

On the effectiveness of this measure, (Satana, Nil, and, Tijen Demirel-Pegg, 2020) argued in their collection of work on the Counter terrorism (CT) military approach, Military measures are the key causal factor in the decadence to modern democracy when handling CT.

For Santana et al, *“Military CT measures are among the various strategies available to decision-makers, and they refer to the use of the military and non-military security providers, such as intelligence and law enforcement, to employ offensive and defensive measures to neutralize the terrorist organisation’s violence“* (Satana, Nil, and, Tijen Demirel-Pegg, 2020)

Military intervention is usually enforced for protection, prevention, and pursuing justice in Counter Terrorism. As the author highlights, this approach is only as effective as the regime in place where it is executed. Where in a procedural or Quasi – democratically setting e.g. Turkey - where Government exercises Executive rights to deploy Military with little to no resistance, Military intervention would be ready to quench insurgences or perceived terrorist threats without second thoughts, in contrast to a more liberal system e.g. The United states, the Government Executive may have to have a dialogue with congress or in some cases with the American people as regarding deployment of the Military for this reason. Whilst this is not the main focus of this thesis, (what procedures are deployed in various states towards the use of the Military,) it is important to dig deeper for a clearer understanding of where Military intervention sits on the scale of CT measures and effectiveness.

With that in mind, it is also important to state that Military intervention in CT, is usually backed by the believe that military is the only state institution capable of fighting and dealing with Insurgency, as (Satana, Nil, and, Tijen Demirel-Pegg, 2020) mentions that Military measures cannot be fully evaluated as most Governments especially procedural democracies (quasi – democracies) capitalise on the CT environments to develop propaganda that securitizes, manipulates the narrative that compels the citizens' cognition that the military approach is the best bet in Countering insurgence.

Additionally, in their work, (Steven & Gunaratna, 2004) ascribes best practices for Military measures in combating terrorism:

featuring two main functions of the military. For them, the military should always adopt an Aid or assistant position to the civil authorities. Since the military possess special skills and expertise that the police units have no experience or are not skilled enough to handle e.g Bomb disposal unit, surveillance, Hostage rescue units etc.

For example, in the US, the special Air Service (SAS) is often used for hostage rescue.

These are instances where the military can assist the civil system in counterterrorism activities.

Also, the military can act as peacekeepers, set up random and regular checks and roadblock to ensure effective security for the polity.

With these initiatives, the civil authorities can avoid excess spending, and duplicity of roles with other paramilitary outfits thus taking advantage of the expertise of the military, who are more skilled and coordinated in this area.

When considering measures of countering terrorism, the military measure has to be hailed as the most effective deterrence to terrorist. Military contributions in such ways as - their special

expertise and skills, specialized task, and their prowess in establishing links for cooperation domestically and internationally -

encompasses skill set that builds valuable counterterrorism capability. (Steven & Gunaratna, 2004).

A drawback of this measure would be overreacting and excessive use of force. (Steven & Gunaratna, 2004) suggest that in such extraordinary circumstance where the use of force is inevitable, authorities must ensure that there is proper adherence to principles of liberal democratic values and human rights must be protected in order not to exuberate the situation and cause more casualties. Use of force must be the last resort for the military in these exceptional cases. Evidence of high disruption should be presented and use of force adopted as last option. (Pillar 2001,11).

Additional Measures

Counter-Propaganda: Propaganda and publicity is the engine room and the wing on which terrorism thrives. For the government to be on top of these campaign by terrorist it must initiate counter propaganda and positive publicity. Government should emphasize countering terrorist propaganda by replacing Negative with positive.

By encouraging dialogue, negotiations, and seek positive mediation during and after the crisis. It will erase negative perspectives and dislodge wrong propaganda presented by terrorist to attract sympathizers and apologists.

Finally, suppose the government creates the right environment for public hearing free academic forums where aggrieved parties can have a round table to discuss matters affecting them. In that case, most terrorist concerns are social, stemming from inequalities and underrepresentation. If these group feel heard a great chance for a change can arrive.

Conclusion

This chapter ushers in measures adopted globally it also demonstrates the feasibility of these measures, and how these measures affect the outcome of combating terrorism.

The concerted framework made up of legal, military, social and other measures mentioned creates a backbone to a successful counter – terrorism design.

This chapter's timeline examines terrorism counterterrorism, global measures, terrorism, counterterrorism, and some Global counterterrorism measures. It also features the drawbacks of these measures and useful recommendations to resolve most of the hiccups that these measures produces. It is a great way to usher in the next chapter , reflecting the application of these counterterrorism measures and the findings on the Nigerian counterterrorism scene especially dealing with the lethal insurgence of BOKO HARAM. After a brief definition and origin of BOKO HARAM the subsequent chapter shall attempt to apply the findings from Global measures to countering terrorism and apply them in the Counterterrorism model of Nigeria.

Finally, more research is needed on Global measures of countering terrorism, especially as nowadays terrorism is becoming more transnational. The existing Counterterrorism measures may then not be sufficient to combat terrorism.

CHAPTER THREE

TERRORISM & COUNTERTERRORISM IN NIGERIA

To understand the counterterrorism measures adopted in Nigeria one must first and foremost review the origins of terrorism in Nigeria, its roots and causes. This chapter shall address the origin of terrorism in Nigeria and the causes and highlight the defensive and offensive measures and policies response to combat terrorism.

According to (Muhammed, 2013), Boko Haram was a name given by the people of Maiduguri due to the way the sect opposed western education. Although there is no agreement for actual month and year that the sect was founded, many think that the origin can be traced back to 2002 to 2004. The sect's founder goes by the alias Aminu Tashen-Ilimi, who is said to have founded the group around Kanamma village in Yobe State around 2004.. Later on, the leadership passed to Mohammed Yusuf.

(Muhammed, 2013) noted that Yusuf was a peasant who hailed from a very poor background around Jakusko, He started a local mosque and Islamic study centre for the group which attracted many poor residents of the town as well as other neighbouring regions like Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. Yusuf lived a very different lifestyle than his followers because he sponsored his twelve children to western schools. Besides, Yusufu also had professionals in law and medicine who attended to him and bought him expensive cars.

The sect recognized Yusuf as the spiritual and political leader. Boko Haram was called the Taliban at this time and they served as a place where migrants studied the Quran. For this reason, most of the recruits to the sect were refugees. Also, the sect had youths trained in physical

combat and other military training. Later on, in 2009, the Nigerian Police (NP) who had received intelligence of the sect arrested the sect leaders in a raid that led to the killing of 700 people. However, the group was not dissolved but became divided into the northern region while most sect members migrated to Maiduguri. (Muhammed, 2013) noted that the group quickly drew the attention of Nigerian youths who had completed their studies but were unable to get a job due to the unemployment challenges in the country. Likewise, the group used coercion in recruiting people while others accepted the group's ideology and burnt their certificates or sold their possessions to join the sect.

The group started communicating its messages and ideologies using violence through weapons, grenades, and other explosives against neighboring regions. By establishing connections with other terrorist organizations outside the country, they could smuggle dangerous weapons and ammunition which now became a major tool for violence in promoting their propaganda.

It is unclear how Boko Haram has managed to fund its terrorist activities and missions ; (Muhammed, 2013) noted that a primary source of the sect is through its rich members. For instance, a prominent member of the sect was once an appointee of the Borno State govt, named Buji Foj. Until Buji' died in 2009, in a police raid (that also took the lives of another 700 members) Foj was appointed as a minister for water resources and chieftaincy affairs. Also, (Muhammed, 2013) noted that..“other ways the group has managed to raise funds are by the following:

1. Intimidating politicians, people in business, and other wealthy people in society.
2. Robbery attacks during some of their missions on commercial banks and wealthy people. The stolen funds and goods are usually termed as “spoils of war” by the sect.
3. Studies show that the group gets funding from foreign terrorist funding organizations such as The Al-Muntada al-Islami, spearheaded by Dr. Adil ibn Mohammed al-Saleem, based in England and associated with Saudi Arabia charity and Da'awa institutions“.

The group thirst for violence did not ensue until the clash with security operatives in July 2009. (Muhammed, 2013) narrated the event as an altercation while the sect members conveyed their dead members for burial. The security officers who were on duty along Maiduguri road prevented the members from carrying out their rites on the ground of violation of traffic. The

consequence was the exchange of violence and gunfire which ended in the death of some of their members. From that day onwards, the sect swore vengeance and demanded an apology from the government who did not respond. This action resulted to the violent display of the group in 2009. An incident at the time was an attack that launched at a police station in Maiduguri. The group received a huge blow during the police and military raid in the same year which led to the arrest of their leader, Yusuf died in the hands of security operatives during interrogation.

In 2010, the group was able to emerge again. This time, the leadership mantle had fallen on Abubakar Shekau who was able to gather the sect together again after the demise of their former leader. Shekau was born in Yobe state also. He married one of Yusuf's wives after his demise and also adopted all of his children. A major feature of his leadership was the highly decentralized structure of the group unlike when the Yusuf led it. However, the new structure was not deliberate but a result of the group division when it split during the 2009 raid. The group, however, did maintain their ideology. Shekau is described as an Imam by his followers and goes by the nickname "Darul Tawheed" meaning (Specialist in the orthodox doctrine of the uniqueness and oneness of Allah)

(Okwuchi, 2017) points out that the Boko Haram insurgency that began in 2002 has attracted many scholarly articles, journals, and books, among others, over the years. Though the Boko Haram group has been operating since 2002, the sect became even more notorious around 2009 due to the killing of their leader, Mohammed Yusuf, and other important sect members in a police raid. For (Okwuchi, 2017) that the lack of effective counter-terrorism measure against this particular group over the years shows that the existing literature on the Boko Haram still does not address the group's ideologies, motivations, and causes. The application could be instrumental to find the best approach end the terrorist group. Okwuchi suspicion may be correct, we should also note here that (Onuoha, 2010) once pointed out that the Nigerian government have the habit of ignoring scholarly publications and intelligent findings or have taken very little action based on the reports.

In any case, several studies have attempted to explain the cause and reason behind the Boko Haram insurgent group. Some of these studies indicates the group's affiliation with other regional terrorists such as Al-Qaeda (Gournel, 2012; Connell, 2012; Zenn, 2014). For instance, (Adesoji, 2010) believes that one strong motivation for the group is the Islamic revivalism while

(Loimejer, 2012) believes the group motivation is to reform Islam in Northern Nigeria. Other studies show that the group is against western education and lifestyle, including western religion, i.e. Christianity, and by implication, Boko Haram is a religious conflict between Christians and Muslim fanatics (Onapajo & Usman, 2015). These studies reflect the different angles that scholars have viewed the Boko Haram insurgent group in the past.

According to (Alozieuwa, 2012), the existing literature on the root cause of Boko Haram can be divided into five different theories which include vengeance theory, need theory, political feud theory; Islamic revivalism; and conspiracy theories. In this study, the multi casual theory explains and assess counter-terrorism measures. Thus, disregarding the above mentioned theories as mutually exclusive but rather complementary. However, scholars usually give more weight to certain causes than others. For (Alozieuwa, 2012), the political feud theory carries more weight than the other causes, while scholars (Cook, 2011) take the religious theory more seriously. Others still give more significance to the human need theory (Nwankpa, 2014). Without a detailed explanation and description of all these different perspectives, the study of the causes of Boko Haram is not complete. Therefore, the remaining part of this thesis is going to be used to describe the theories.

Religion

Some studies reveal that Boko Haram is an anti-western movement, while Christianity is viewed as a western religion. In the past, Northern Nigeria has witnessed different religious conflicts and violence, including different Islamic sects. A notable example is the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (Izala, and Maitatsine) (Nwankpa, 2015).

According to (Adesoji, 2011), Boko Haram shares the same or similar ideology with these past northern religious movements although there may not be any operational alliance. (Gourley, 2012; Isa, 2010).

These past northern movements include the Jihad led by Usman Dan Fodio in the 19th century, the Tijaniyya Sufi order the Maitatsine uprising of the 1980s, among others.

Initially, Boko Haram attacks were on churches which made many people believe that the terrorist organisation is mainly anti-Christian. However, studies by (Higazi, 2013) show that attacks by Boko Haram have both affected Christians and Muslims alike while other studies like Chouin, Reinert & Aparad, (2014) indicate a possibility of more Muslims being affected than Christians.

Political Feud

This perspective holds that Boko Haram is a political conflict between the Fulani-Hausa and Kanuri people on the one hand and between the north and the south (Lubeck, 2012) points out that Boko Haram is a rebellion against the native authority in the north. It is believed that the fusion and partnership of the Fulani authority with the Hausa elites is one of the causes of Boko Haram. Citing (Sklar, 1963), (Okwuchi, 2017) noted that the Hausa partners in the Fulani aristocracy are used as propagandist instruments that must have motivated the attacks in some parts of the North against certain politicians and religious scholars.

Another view draws insight from the past Jihad in the 19th century by Usman Dan Fodio. He started the reformation to purify the religion from the practice of the Hausa rulers of the time. With the success of the movement, the Fulani group started to govern the Sokoto caliphate. After Nigeria's independence from being a British colony, the Fulani started their rulership with the Hausa to promote a 'one-north' ideology to gain political benefits. However, to allay the fears of minority groups in Nigeria, Nigeria became divided into smaller states, threatening the one north ideology. Concerning this, (Okwuchi, 2017) explained that the crash of oil prices, followed by lack of or inadequate welfare and general government responsibility to the masses, sparked the north's insurgency (Watts, 1987).

The Socio-Economic View

According to (Okwuchi, 2017), the socio-economic view is very significant in finding an effective counter-terrorism approach to putting an end to the terrorist group. Subsumed under the socio-economic view is the theory of greed and grievance. (Oyeniyi, 2014) opined that Boko

Haram is motivated by greed while (Adegbulu, 2013) maintains that both grief and greed are two factors behind the terrorist group.

Cook (2014) noted that there has been no mention of any factor related to poverty and inequality among Boko Haram publications. However, (Okwuchi, 2017) stated that there is evidence to show that the Boko Haram truly holds some of these factors into account. Besides, Okwuchi (2017) noted that Boko Haram has lost many of its territories to government forces. However, the group can re-awaken if the conditions noted under the socio-economic view, such as poverty, inequality, and unemployment, are not addressed. (Loimeier, 2012) According to (Katsina, 2012), Boko Haram is a socio-economic motivated insurgency where “...conditions of poverty, unemployment, and inequality in the country [...] lead to frustration, alienation, and ultimately social discontent that spark violence and insecurity” (p.107). In a similar vein, other studies such as (Forest,2012), also emphasize the need for the government to provide adequate social welfare programs and other socio-development programs.

Government Responses and Counter-Terrorism Measures in Nigeria

(Muhammed, 2013) opined that the government's intervention activities and counter-terrorism strategies have so far been ineffective. Mostly, the strategies used are harsh and brutal, and have yielded little or no productive results. The strategy is a symptom approach that trains the terrorists to develop more survival instincts thereby developing regenerative ability to survive despite the constant brutal attacks by military and security operatives. Boko Haram is designated a terrorist organization by the Nigerian government and their attacks met with violent responses from security operatives. The key driver of support for the Boko Haram terrorist group is killing members and innocent individuals who became war casualties between the two elephants. On the one hand, it has garnered support for Boko Haram while on the other hand, it has led to abuse of human rights by the military which has created challenges for the Nigerian government in getting support from outside countries and organization in the fight against Boko Haram(Amnesty International, 2014; Campbell, 2014). Other studies also show that the Nigerian government

approach has predominantly been an eye for an eye response that has worsened the situation than resolve it (Okwuchi, 2017).

According to (Adedire et al, 2016), different responses applied by the government in tackling Boko Haram. First, violence by the military in northern Nigeria which has resorted to more casualties. In using brute force, the government has also funded the acquisition of more sophisticated weapons and ammunition. The government has also joined forces with the African Union and neighboring countries such as Chad, Niger, and Cameroon to use operational presence on Nigerian soil (Adedire, et al. 2016).

(Meritone, 2018) emphasized that after the success of the amnesty program in 2009, thousands of troops have maintained an operational presence in the north to curb the activities and attack of Boko Haram. Furthermore, (Meritone, 2018) noted that many special units emerged. Since that time in the battle against Boko Haram. In 2014, Nigeria's government created the Nigerian Army Special Operations Command (NASOC) alongside the Nigerian Air Force Special Forces Regiment (NAF SFR). Also, In June 2015, the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF), made up of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Benin, was established. The MNJTF includes contingents from Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Benin. Concerning the MNJTF, (Meritone, 2018) emphasized that the EU supports and supplies funding for the troops with over 200 million euros meant to tackle the humanitarian crisis.

According to (Omale, 2019), a good counter-terrorism measure in Nigeria is the security inter-operability (SIO) which stresses the collaboration, cooperation, and unity of the military, immigration, customs, law enforcement, etc against terrorism. According to Omale, on one hand, the collaboration and inter-operation of the police and military can help to find out the culprits and the sponsors of the terrorist. On the other hand, the collective operation of the Customs, Immigration, and the NDLEA can help to fish out the source of mercenaries and deadly weapons used by terrorists in Nigeria.

Another important counter-terrorism measures in Nigeria is border security. The Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS) is mainly responsible for border security coupled with the roles and responsibilities of the police, the military, and the customs (Meritone, 2018). The major challenge in border security is a lack of technological equipment in data collection and analysis since most data gathering was done on a manual, word of mouth basis. Lack of technical and

experienced staff is another major challenge in the issue of Nigeria border security. Furthermore, (Meritone, 2018) noted that the current administration has made very little progress in fully implementing the (UN Security Council resolutions 2178, 2014):

"All States shall prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border controls and controls on issuance of identity papers and travel documents, and through measures for preventing counterfeiting, forgery, or fraudulent use of identity papers and travel documents".

Three pieces of literature are reviewed under this section to address how the Nigerian government has responded to Boko Haram in recent years. These include (Muhammed, 2013), (Campbell, 2014), and (Okwuchi, 2017).

Stability Operation

Many think that the brute attacks of the military on Boko HARAM are factors that turned the group into an uncontrollable menace due to the brutal killing of the sect members in 2009. (Cook, 2011; Johnson, 2011; Forest, 2012; Anonymous, 2012; Higazi, 2013). The fundamental ideology of Boko Haram as an extreme Islamism sect could have been part of the reason why the military has responded with brute force. However, the use of brutal attacks has done nothing to resolve the terrorism in the north. As mentioned above, the main approach adopted by the Nigerians is brute force which is regarded as the symptom approach:

According to (Muhammed, 2013) In 2010 when the violence of Boko Haram reached a new peak, (the commanding General, while responding to the bomb attack on December 25 immediately ordered the Police force as the major tool for enforcing law and order in the state. The military is only supposed to offer assistance when the problem has gone beyond the Police capacity). Also, the Department of State Security and the Nigerian Intelligence Agency was identified with the intelligence-gathering responsibility which made up the Military for

resolving the conflict in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa state. This operation is known as the stability operation because it ensures law and order, but not complemented with social reforms and other conflict resolution programs which could have been the main reason for its ineffectiveness in dealing with the situation. The stability operation generally involves roadblocks and surveillance, cordons, search and rescue operations, and armed patrols. Since Boko Haram has to go via road to reach their targets, security operatives usually erecting checkpoints where searching of vehicles and individuals applied. Passengers asked to come down and trek to screen them properly. (Muhammed, 2013) pointed out that the check point lacked effectiveness because of low workforce and lack of good equipment. In most cases, Boko Haram reaches their targets using minor roads that are not easily suspected by security operatives.

Cordon and search operations carried out after reports reach the Military of suspicious terrorist activity. (Muhammed, 2013) noted that these operations have led to the arrest of many terrorists and the recovery of ammunition, weapons, and equipment used to make dangerous explosives and provide it with useful information. Other activities involve the security of key institutions and places vulnerable to attack, mobile patrols of environments, or vulnerable or exposed places to attack in the past. However, some soldiers on patrol stood exposed to attack by Boko Haram on several occasions resulting in injuries and even death of some officers.

On the effort of the stability operations in recent years, (Okwuchi, 2017) points out that the group has been successfully contained but not decreased. Thus preventing the group from spreading to other parts of Nigeria but is most likely to remerge at some point. Additionally, (Okwuchi, 2017) in an interview with security parastatals noted that Boko Haram is more of an idea than a group of soldiers, which means that if the idea is not eliminated, more soldiers will eventually pick up the mantle from their fallen heroes.

Stability operations remain Nigeria's primary strategy. In 2015, Muhammed Buhari, the new Nigerian president, gave the MILITARY a timeline of 3 months to wipe out the Boko Haram group. However, these objectives were a utopian dream because Boko Haram is still a threat until now. The strength of Nigeria's counterterrorism Nwankpa (2016) noted that another big challenge in the fight against Boko Haram was the abuse of power by the military due to the disbandment of the Joint Task Force in 2013. Lack of proper division of labour and the problem

of rivalry between the security operatives led to the dissolution of the Joint Task Force leaving matters solely in the hands of the military. This has led to a lack of proper integration of other security agencies into the counter-terrorism framework. For this reason, the government has focused heavily on building the capacity of the military, those of other security agencies have been overlooked such as the Police who are saddled with the task of maintaining law and order. (Okwuchi, 2017) noted that the Boko Haram still controls some territories and still aims to seizing more states, and regions. The failure of the government to integrate the Nigerian police and release funding and engage them in capacity building programs is a major cause of failure of stability operations.

Almajiri Schools

Another strategy to combat terrorism was establishing Almajiri schools in the north was to take the children off the streets and give them a bright future. Many youths and children are used as a tool of violence by Boko Haram in several operations. To stop the employment of youth and children by Boko Haram, the government established the Almajiri school to deny the sect soldiers. (Muhammed, 2013) noted that the government planned to create a formal education to eradicate poor education in the north which is the main driver of terrorism. For this reason, Almajiri schools were established in all nineteen northern states to give Qur'anic and formal education to more than 9 million ‘Almajiris’ in the country.

It is noteworthy to mention, the Almajiri school was created as a result of several conferences and seminars held to address the issue of poor education in the north. The fusion of Islamic and contemporary education would go a long way in resolving terrorism in the north. A major challenge for the program is the low turnout of students and poor administration of the schools by local government authorities because of inadequate provision of basic amenities such as water, electricity, and meals.

Legislative and Executive Counterterrorism Measures: The national assembly enacted the Anti-Terrorism Bill (ATB) in a bid to combat Boko Haram. The ATB defined the act of terrorism and

addressed issues such as funding of terrorist organisations, investigation, and prosecution of suspected terrorists, extradition, proper dissemination of information regarding terrorism, among others. (Okwuchi, 2017) believes that the major challenge with the anti-terrorism bill is implementation due to Nigeria's weak criminal justice system. Another strategy adopted by the executive arm is the declaration of a state of emergency. A further counter-terrorism strategy used by the Nigerian government is a declaration of a state of emergency. An example, is the 18-month emergency declared in the northeastern parts involving Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa from May 2013-November 2014. This measure allowed the Military to crush Boko Haram because they lost the territories and retreated to the outskirts of Borno state. (Okwuchi, 2017) noted that from 2011-2012, Boko Haram had the upper hand and had gained control of most Nigerian northern states especially Borno State, and was already planning to extend its territory to other parts of the country such as the north-central and southern states. They were however unsuccessful due to the rapid action of the Military following the State of Emergency.

Multinational Joint Task Force: Nigeria started a new military approach to fighting Boko Haram in 2015, establishing the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNTJF), a coalition of military troops from Nigeria and other neighboring countries, specifically Benin, Cameroon, Chad and Niger. Since the coalition started, most territories under boko haram has been recovered. This approach further strengthened the stability operation strategy in the fight against Boko Haram. In 2015, the election and inauguration of Muhammed Buhari as the new Nigerian government also opened doors to new alliances with foreign and western countries. This brought security assistance from British and American partners such as "... the deployment of U.S. and British military advisers and the sale of light attack aircraft in 2017." (Okwuchi, 2017)

Justice System and Terrorism Prevention Act: The Terrorism Prevention Act (TPA) was enacted in 2011 and later amended in 2013. (Mentone, 2018) suggests The Terrorism Prevention Act passed on February 17, 2013, is the second major attempt and effort for finding a serious framework in the battle against terrorism. The first act was passed in 2011. The Act addresses the partnership between national and foreign agencies in Nigeria and specifies each agency's roles in the prevention, detainment, and prosecution efforts in counter-terrorism measures.

According to (NACTEST,2016), The act generally involved five areas which are:

- i. Forestallment: This involves the process of anticipating and preventing terrorist activities
- ii. Secure: This addresses the protection of the country against imminent threats in the face of terrorism
- iii. Identify: This area involves the ability to discover or detect the early signals or signs of terrorist activities and it also addresses the improvement of the judiciary
- iv. Prepare: This involves reducing the risk of terrorist activities or threats by improving the country's defense posture.
- v. Implement: Promoting the development of cooperation between different stakeholders, national and foreign partners in the prevention, and fight against terrorism.

One of the achievements of the bill was the empowerment of the Office of the National Security Adviser (Okwuchi, 2017) as the main Nigerian counter-terrorism coordinator. The office of the ONSA later established and spearheaded the National Counter-terrorism Strategy in 2014 which in-turn began a Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) program. (Okwuchi, 2017) noted that the CVE program is the main non-military approach used by the Nigerian government to fight Boko Haram and terrorism as a whole.

The CVE comprises four basic components which include:

1. The first component has to do with the re-programming of the mindset of convicted terrorists or suspects and repentant terrorists.
2. The second component has to do with the society at large by eradicating any form of thinking that promotes violence.
3. Capacity building of the military as well as other law enforcement agencies is the focus of the third component.
4. Lastly, the fourth component deals with the design of economic revitalization programs in the northeastern states to address the socio-economic grievances of terrorism. (Premium Times, 2014)

Regional and International CT Cooperation: According to (Adedire, et al., 2016), terrorist activities always attract international attention. Citing (Mishal & Sela, 2000), Adebayo et al. Noted that international partnership against terrorist organizations, especially Boko Haram, comes in funding, information, ammunition, workforce, intelligence, etc. (Baylis, 2006) emphasized that terrorism is usually countered by blocking off the source of supplies of the terrorist organizations and fishing out their sponsors. Specific measures include a good democratic government, effective control of weapons especially from getting in the wrong hands, and effective use and application of available tangible and intangible resources such as alliances, power, and funds.

According to (Frontex, 2018), Nigeria, Syria, and Ivory Coast are ranked as the top three countries with illegal border crossing cases at the EU's external borders – Syria 19,447, Nigeria 18,309 Ivory Coast 14,300. This, therefore, shows how terrorists can easily gain entry through weak border security. In a bid to strengthen this security issue, Nigeria with support of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) created Migration Monitoring Points mainly in the northwest region of the country to easily get data on unsolicited movements. (Meritone, 2018) The IOM has also helped to equip the NIS with the procurement and installation of ten 'IOM Migration Information and Data Analysis Systems (MIDAS)' which helps to identify fraudulent acts and connects the INTERPOL database.

Conclusion

The Nigerian government has made many efforts to prevent terrorism in recent years. According to (Meritone, 2018), the federal government established the National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE), which had the support of civil societies, and international bodies particularly the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The policy aims to 'build capacity, improve coordination, strengthen the justice system, and integrate strategic communication, provide alternative narratives to violent extremism' (PCVE, 2017, p.5).

The Terrorism Prevention Act is a legal act that specifies different ways to prevent and respond to terrorism. Section 1(3) of the TPA (as amended) defines an "act of terrorism" as an act "which is deliberately done with malice aforethought and which may seriously harm or damage a

country or an international organization.” One important lifeblood of terrorism is funding or sponsorship. In the effort to prevent terrorism, the Terrorism Prevention Act specifies the following about terrorist funding.

First, terrorist funding has to do with the direct or indirect provision of funds with the foreknowledge that it will be used for terrorism. Terrorists are usually sponsored financially and offered support. To put an end to funding of terrorism, the TPA stated that the financial institutions must report any transaction that is suspected to link to terrorism to the Financial Intelligent Unit, which was established in 2005. The TPA prescribes life imprisonment for anybody convicted of this offense.

CHAPTER FOUR

ASSESSMENT AND CRITIQUE OF GOVERNMENT RESPONSES

In the previous chapters, we see how government's effort towards the Boko Haram insurgency has only contained their activities rather than diminished them. Consequently, failure to tackle issues that give breeding space for terrorism means that Boko Haram will still be around for a long time. The fight is not just against the current humans behind the terrorism but the idea itself and the conditions that allow the group to continue operations in Nigeria. The goal of this chapter is to provide counter-terrorism measures to tackle Boko Haram and future terrorist groups and also to critically assess the efforts of the government in the fight against terrorism

What Is the Major Cause or Trigger of The Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria?

This research leans toward the belief that a mono-causal factor does not cause the Boko Haram insurgency. On the contrary, Boko Haram insurgence thrives on different factors centered around different theories. Reviewed in brief under the literature review, namely the greed theory, the grievance theory, exclusionism, and psychological aspects. However, this research gives more weight to the socio-economic view discussed under chapter three which involves the greed and

grievance theories. The Boko Haram sect seems to be mainly driven by grievance over certain unfavorable social and economic conditions. Likewise, the exclusion of certain areas from basic social amenities and infrastructure and the lack of jobs and opportunities for political participation by the youth due to unrealistic standards are the major cause of the Boko Haram insurgency.

The cause or trigger of Boko Haram can be divided into two groups namely grievances and conditions responsible for their growth.

In the early years of Boko Haram, the group was seriously antagonized by western education. Also, the sect has grievances on Muslims who are perceived to not be in terms of Islamic law. According to (Muhammed, 2013), the sect advocates for an Islamic state ruled by Shariah law and perceives the government as a tyrant that must be opposed by all means. (Okwuchi, 2017) also noted boko haram group is also grieved about the massacre of their members by the police raid in 2009, led to the demise of their leader, Muhammed Yusuf, and 700 other members.

Concerning the conditions that favor Boko Haram's growth, unfavorable socio-economic conditions such as poverty, lack of education, or high illiteracy, unemployment, and horizontal inequality, among others.

Effective and Ineffective Counterterrorism Measures in Nigeria.

Failure of Stability Operations: Since the beginning of Boko Haram's violent attacks in early 2010, the Nigerian government has taken the stability operation approach in maintaining law and order in unproductive conflict zones. Many scholars have argued that the use of force by the military is never the solution to insurgency. In the case of Boko Haram, the use of force only stops the sect temporarily rather than permanently. For this reason, the use of brute force is often termed as a symptom-based approach to resolving violence. Another fault in the Nigerian stability operation against Boko Haram is the civilian casualties in the process of the battle against insurgents. (Muhammed, 2013) cites as an example Borno attacks in 2013, resulting in the death of 55 civilians in the town of Bama, while 187 people were killed in Baga.

The failure of security operatives to properly distinguish the sect members from civilians can be attributed to a lack of support and cooperation with the local populace. (Muhammed, 2013) noted that military operations should always work with the local community to isolate the terrorists. In the case of Boko Haram, there is usually a lack of support from community members to the military officers. In most cases, the presence of military officers has only escalated the situation from bad to worse. Another challenge is that the Boko Haram develops new camps in other areas after being chased from their territories. New soldiers are recruited when old ones are lost in the process of military operations.

Much emphasis is placed on stability operations in Nigeria, which has been regarded as a symptom-based approach. Many scholars agree that the use of force cannot end terrorism without addressing the root causes and conditions favorable to the growth and spread of terrorism. The effect of stability operations is only temporary as evidence shows that Boko Haram is always able to regroup and reemerge after a while. More importantly, the Boko Haram sect, just like most other terrorism, is driven by radical ideologies that need to be wiped out rather than using an approach which involves dealing with human terrorists alone. It also needs to be mentioned how the military mainly conducts the stability operation without proper integration of law enforcement and other agencies including NGOs. This has led to too much attention on the military by the government while law enforcement agencies are being overlooked in capacity building. This, among many other reasons, shows why stability operations alone are ineffective in fighting terrorism.

Failure of the Almajiri School: The main aim of the Almajiri schools was to deprive the Boko Haram sect of foot soldiers. However, the Almajiri schools only benefit the areas that are outside the reach of Boko Haram. Many Boko Haram soldiers and recruits were products of the Almajiri tradition, which means that the correct teaching of Islam coupled with contemporary education can go a long way to reducing the chances of vulnerable children.

The first challenge is the bureaucratic issue (Muhammed, 2013). The processes and delays in establishing the schools allow the sect to find their way to the children faster before the government sets in. In the same vein, youth unemployment is still largely unresolved, and the growing youth population is outside the provision of the Almajiri which is more beneficial to children. These age

groups are still very much exposed to the Boko Haram sect and can be easily recruited after many frustrations.

One of the effective measures that was put in place was the Almajiri schools established with a whopping amount of 15 billion nairas by the former president, Goodluck Jonathan. Most studies and literature agree that one of the major causes of terrorism in developing countries is a lack of education. The Almajiri school was established to incorporate the teaching of Islam with contemporary studies to teach the children proper social conduct and stop the false radical teachings of the Boko Haram sect.

Additionally, most children and youths usually end up as recruits for Boko Haram when they get frustrated and desperate because of joblessness, and/or poverty. However, the main problem of Almajiri school is that most of them are no longer functioning while some are already in ruins. Some of the schools have been remodeled as conventional basic educational centers, while others are in ruins (Guardian, 2019). For this reason, many children are out of schools, and have returned to hawking and begging for alms. Citing the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), The (Guardian, 2019) noted that about nine million children are out of school in the North while Kano State alone has about 10 Almajiri schools. Many children from poor background are usually sent from different parts of the north to the Almajiri school but most of them end up begging for alms due to the crowded nature of these schools, although, the Kano state government has turned the Almajiri schools into boarding schools with free-food, and education. The problem of the limited capacity of the schools persists as it has left many children unattended to, who have then resorted to survival on the streets.

Failure of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE): The first component of CVE deals with de-radicalization. The major agency spearheading the project is the Centre for Peace Initiative Development (CEPID) which focuses on the regulation of Islam in the north. (Okwuchi, 2017) noted that the CEPID, in collaboration with the Assembly of Muslims in Nigeria (AMIN) regulates Islamic teachings and sermons in mosques. The second component of the CVE according to (Oshita, 2007), should use a communal approach in conflict resolution and de-escalation of situations as well as re-enforcing values that promote peace and orderliness rather than violence

in the country. The success of the second component was largely dependent on transparency on the part of the government. (Okwuchi, 2017) noted that corrupt practices, greed, and exclusion of the masses by the government are among the factors that encourage political apathy. Failure of the people to participate in large numbers and effectively in the second component was bad for CVE.

In the same vein, the first component witnessed the massacre of Islamic clerics by Boko Haram in the past when the government brought some Muslim scholars and preachers to prisons to re-program the minds of the convicted and suspected victims and members of the public as well through radio programs (Sampson, 2013; Okwuchi, 2017).

It, therefore, makes sense to conclude that using the CVE components in recent times can bring about re-offending or 'recidivism' (Horgan & Altier, 2012). (Okwuchi, 2017) also pointed out that the government has not properly recognized the difference between 'de-radicalized' and 'disengaged'. Additionally, the government has failed to properly integrate and recognize the role and importance of Civil Societies, and international Non-Government Organizations in the CVE program.

Addressing the Root Cause of Terrorism

Boko Haram is not a new sect that is born partly out of Islamic extremism. It is often the case that a scholar or spiritual leader rises intending to do a service to Allah by purifying the religion from impurities and filth or to extend the religion to those who don't practice it using coercive means. On the other hand, Nigeria's unfavorable political and socio-economic climate can also cause violence in Nigeria. The north is one of the most illiterate and poorest regions of Nigeria. Many children are not in school and lack many basic health amenities, among other social infrastructure.

According to the (Global campaign Education for All, 2017), more than ten million Nigerian children are out of the school, of which about seven million of them are from the northeast. Also, the poverty rate in the northeast region is very high. Therefore, it is the case that the north suffers from a lack of basic socio-economic rights caused by, for example, unemployment, poverty, lack of a proper justice system, horizontal inequality, bad government and corruption, among others

which are all breeding grounds for terrorism. According to (Rosand et al., 2008), certain conditions are conducive to terrorism which calls for the government to urgently de-escalate situations, conflicts, injustice, inequality, poverty, and other social vices that can easily be a cause or aid terrorism in the country.

The issues addressed in this section calls for a political and development approach to terrorism, particularly Boko Haram. This includes the Presidential commissioning of Committees or panels for creating employment opportunities, empowerment programs, and skill acquisition training for the unemployed youths, provision of basic social amenities, prosecution of bad and corrupt politicians, creation of free education in all the northern states, and effective implementations of the recommendations mentioned above. The challenges, which can cause a delay in the eradication of the conditions discussed thus far,

include bad government, ...

Bad Government: (Okwuchi, 2017) believes the Nigerian government is facing a legitimacy problem due to bad governance and uneven distribution of wealth and resources or the exclusion of certain areas from basic social amenities and infrastructure. In the literature review, the exclusionism view of terrorism was discussed, which shows how violence is caused by the exclusion of the masses who live in poor areas from basic social infrastructure and amenities by corrupt politicians. (Sommers, 2007, 9).

Even though the Nigerian government received funds and support to fight and defeat Boko Haram in the north, the crisis of Boko Haram still lingers until the present. According to (Okwuchi, 2017), in 2010, about \$625 million was allocated to Nigeria while 6.25 billion dollars was allocated in 2014. Lack of proper disbursement of funds due to the corrupt practices of government officials led to the prolongment of the Boko Haram insurgency to date.

Also, (Hausermann, 1998) opined that the Nigerian government cannot provide its full responsibility to its citizens. While supporting (Hausermann, 1998), (Okwuchi, 2017) narrated the incidence of the oil boom of the 1970s and the recession that followed in the 1980s, which have largely contributed to the government's failure to provide governance and good social welfare for its citizens. During the oil boom, the government had ventured into some big industrial projects,

which were replaced by the Structural Adjustment Program, which has affected the capacity of the government to fully perform its responsibilities (Watt, 1992).

The failure of the government to perform its responsibility is one of the underlying causes of Boko Haram in the north. One important factor is the failure of the government to provide a social

scheme for the growing unemployed youth in the country. For this reason, youths tend to be vulnerable to the idea of joining crime and other violent groups. The failure of the government to provide social schemes, employment opportunities, empowerment programs, and the chance for the youth to be a part of the political system, where they can showcase their potentials in leadership positions can go a long way in the fight against terrorism.

Several kinds of literature such as (Forest, 2012) and (Isa, 2010) believe that without addressing the underlying causes, it will be difficult to eradicate Boko Haram. These causes include inequality, lack of jobs, exclusion, abuse of power, and corruption (Crenshaw, 1981; Schmid, 2005).

Effective Counter-Terrorism Measures to End Boko Haram

An effective counter-terrorism measure needs to involve different sectors such as private sectors, civil societies and NGOs, religious institutions, education, job creation, employment, and empowerment sectors like agriculture, etc. As mentioned earlier, the military has, solely, been saddled with the task of defeating Boko Haram. The first step to effective counterterrorism is proper integration of security, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies. According to (Muhammed, 2013), some level of success was achieved by the security forces, but this resulted in many civilian casualties and only succeeded in stopping Boko Haram temporarily rather than permanently. Also, the lack of public trust in the government by the local communities limited the effectiveness of the military in resolving the conflict permanently.

Generally, the improvement of security efforts through proper integration of other security, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies can improve the effectiveness of stability operations. In like manner, (Muhammed, 2013) noted that the security agencies should work collaboratively to find and neutralize the sect leaders to destabilize and destroy the organizational structure. However, a similar approach, used in 2009 to kill the sect leader and most of their members, only infuriated the sect further. For this reason, stability operation cannot effectively stop terrorism permanently.

The core driver of Boko Haram is ideology. This, therefore, suggests that one of the ways to counter Boko Haram and terrorism at large is to fight the ideology using de-radicalization programs. As stated in the literature review, Islamic revivalism usually poisons conventional Islam by promoting hate, anger, violence, and religious intolerance among young people (Lammy, 2013). Partnership with NGOs, especially religious institutions, and clerics to promote positive and moderate views of the religion in affected communities are required. (Muhammed, 2013) points out that clerics can be employed from existing Islamic organizations such as the Jama'atul Nasri Islam (JNI), the Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, and various Muslim organizations with moderate beliefs who abhor violent fundamentalism.

More importantly, the root causes and conditions favoring the growth and spread of terrorism must be addressed, creating better socio-economic conditions, especially in communities where Boko Haram has developed.

These include:

Improvement and Establishment of more Almajiri Schools: As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the current state of some Almajiri schools is nothing to write home about. Also, most of the few good schools are congested and not enough to meet the large population of out of school children in the north, which UNICEF has estimated to be about 10 million in the north alone. The creation of

more schools that can incorporate Islamic studies with contemporary education is an effective way to deny Boko Haram foot soldiers as well as end terrorism in the long term.

Job Creation: The exclusionism and grievance theory reveal how important job creation is in peacekeeping and conflict resolution. Joblessness and unemployment are some of the excuses for violence, crime, and other social vices. Also, youths struggle with identity construction when confronted with unfavorable government policies and lack of political will in job creation and empowerment programs. According to (Okwuchi,2017), a terrorist organisation is mostly comprised of young people. (Omale, 2013) also stressed the importance of creating a counter-terrorism measure that centers heavily on the youth. Hence, job creation and empowerment programs are one of the measures to maintain peace in a state.

The present administration of Muhammed Buhari started an initiative known as N'power on June 8, 2016, for unemployed and non-graduates under the ages of 18-35, which is meant to train and empower the country's youths in a bid to eradicate unemployment in the country. According to the Punch in an article released in July 2020, about three million applicants applied for three hundred thousand N'power jobs. This shows the state of unemployment in the country and reveals a need for the government to develop more initiatives to eradicate unemployment in the country.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

This research project aims to determine how and to what extent the counter-terrorism measures in Nigeria have been productive. This was done by analysing and understanding the causes, responses, and measures used by the Nigerian state to fight against Boko Haram.

The study was conducted primarily using secondary data. Several pieces of literature were gathered online, which served as the data source. This research was based on the Nigerian state while Boko Haram was used as a case study.

Findings from the research revealed how ineffective the counter-terrorism measures by the Nigerian government have been in the past years. Some of these measures include mainly stability operations, which has only added salt to the wound. It was proved in the research that the use of force alone cannot end terrorism which therefore calls for other production methods, among which are building state capacity, eradicating conditions conducive for terrorism, prevention, among others.

Recommendation

An effective counter-terrorism measure should consider all the possible causes and factors that contribute to terrorism in Nigeria. Also, counterterrorism in Nigeria should involve different sectors rather than just fall on the government's shoulder alone. To defeat terrorism and particularly Boko Haram, measures should consider building community support, enhancing partnership, cooperation, and collaboration between the different agencies and law enforcement and empowering and improving the justice system (Omale, 2013).

According to (Omale, 2013), a good counterterrorism approach should involve the four Ds of countering terrorism as given by (Piombo, 2007) which involves:

1. 'Defeat terrorists and their organizations;
2. Deny sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists;
3. Diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit, and
4. Defend citizens and interests at home and abroad.

Partnership with Different Sectors through the Meghalaya Model

This has to do with cooperation between different sectors in the fight against terrorism. It involves law enforcement, the justice system, civil society organisations, and other relevant sectors. Additionally, (Kharbhih, 2010) noted that the model was applied successfully to fight trafficking

in North-East Asia in 1999, and it comprises five components, namely 'Prevention, Protection, Policing, Press, and Prosecution'. The Meghalaya model process is further divided into five 'Rs': Reporting, Rescue, Rehabilitation, Repatriation, and Re-education. (Omale, 2013) believes that the model can also be successfully applied to fighting terrorism in Nigeria. A key significance is how it incorporates different sectors that most counter-terrorism initiatives fail to realise. Also, most Boko Haram members could be trafficked victims from neighbouring regions. Moreover, the rate of human trafficking along Nigerian borders is very high. It is therefore attractive to say that the model can tackle conditions which are conducive to terrorism in the country because of the way it enhances cooperation between civil societies, media, security and intelligence agencies, law enforcement, and the justice system

Public-Private Partnerships

(Omale, 2013) believes that many benefits can be actualized when the government cooperates with the private sector, especially in areas where state resources are limited.

Although partnership with the private sector is not a new concept and has been gaining increasing attention in the world among different countries, it is the case that in the area of security, partnership with private sectors is not getting the attention it deserves. According to the (United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, 2012), due to a lack of incentives by the government in the area of security, most private organisations consider investing in security areas as a cost. Similarly, the role of the private sector is vital especially in the area of capacity building and information exchange which is crucial to counterterrorism.

In 2012, the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), while partnering with the private sector in the area of the internet in terrorism testified that the private sector provided the expertise needed in both the technical and legal aspects of counter-terrorism on the internet. Additionally, (Yudintsey, 2012) also cites the case study of Russia who also partnered with Moscow State University and the People's Friendship University of Russia in the area of information exchange.

In consideration of this, private-public partnership in security should be developed and enhanced to include counterterrorism. It should also extend to NGOs and civil society organisations,

religious communities, media, tourism, and hotels rather than the business community alone. (Yudintsey, 2012; Omale, 2013)

Empowering Youth as Peace-Entrepreneurs and Peace-Seeds

(Collier, 2003), opined that there is a relationship between unemployment and terrorism, and many organisations have taken steps in the past to end terrorism through job creation and empowerment programs (Omale, 2013). According to (Hilker and Fraser, 2009), exclusion of the youth from the social and political systems is a key factor in the cause of terrorism. In most states, the standards are set high to exclude the youth from social and political positions.

World Bank (2008) identifies youth joblessness as an underlying cause in crime, terrorism, and social and economic underdevelopment. (ILO, 2010; UN, 2009). Additionally, (Omale, 2013) noted that the advantage of employment and job creation to peacekeeping and conflict resolution has been affirmed by the UN Secretary General's approval of the 'UN Policy For PostConflict Employment Creation. Income Generation And Reintegration' in 2008 and more recently by the ILO's 2010 Guidelines on Local Economic Recovery in PostConflict (UN, 2009; ILO, 2010).

Many studies believe job creation is a major tool for ending violence. However, job creation should not be used to isolate other key factors because job creation alone is not effective enough to end violence or armed conflict. (Walton, 2010). For this reason, job creation should be a part of a more comprehensive approach in counterterrorism. As examples, citing Brazil and South Africa (Omale, 2013) opined that a youth Anti Violence Response (AVR) strategy should address concerns. Job creation and other factors such as ideology, belief systems, religious extremism, and political and ethnic issues.

De-radicalisation Programmes

Religion is one of the most common excuses for violence. Many young men and women are easily misled by false religious ideas and extreme beliefs, which are then used as a reason for violence with the belief that it is in the service of God. (Omale, 2013) noted that politicians can also easily exploit religion and cultural differences for selfish gain. (Omale, 2013) cites as an instance the Biblical verse of Mathew 11: 12 which states: “And from the days of John the Baptist until now, the kingdom of heaven suffered violence, and the violent take it by force” which is easily misinterpreted by Nigerian youths as an excuse for violence.

Similarly, according to (Lammy, 2013), Islamic revivalism usually poisons conventional Islam by promoting hate, anger, violence, and religious intolerance among young people. Furthermore, (Lammy, 2013) opined that young people are the easiest prey to these false and extremist ideas.

Nevertheless, (Omale, 2013) stated that religion can also tackle violence because it teaches peace, generosity, wisdom, values, and morals, which can create a sense of bonding between people of different cultural and ethnic backgrounds. In light of this, (Omale, 2013) stated that Counter Extremism and De-radicalization Programmes (CEDP) is an effective approach to resolving conflict and ending violence.

Security Inter-operability (SIO)

Security interoperability means cooperation, exchange of information, and joint efforts by intelligence agencies, security forces, and military in counterterrorism. (Omale, 2013) believes that the identity of the financial sponsors of Boko Haram could be easily revealed, provided security agencies work together. However, the issue of security inter-operability remains a huge challenge in Nigeria because of the competitive nature of the agencies

Other Methods:

(Omilusi, 2016) opined that poor countries usually have the highest number of violent conflicts. (OECD, 2005). Omilusi furthermore identified poverty has the main factor behind the Boko Haram insurgency. Because of this, Omilusi recommended the following:

- ***Creation of Welfare Programs:*** - that marginalized people should be catered through the creation of welfare programs. This will prevent these groups of people from being enticed with offers to join terrorist and violent groups.
- ***High-Risk Organisations:*** Prevention of High-Risk organizations from penetrating the society and community where terrorism is most likely to occur. (Okai, 2014) noted that
- some foreign and non-religious organizations promote violence through the promotion of radical ideologies.
- ***The Use of Reintegration Programs:*** Often terrorism is triggered by ideologies that draw its strength from exclusionism, underdevelopment, unemployment and marginalization, among others. In this case, a reintegration program can help to replace the passion for terrorism with a unifying theme (Akinlotan, 2015:72). About this, (Sodipo, 2013) gave as an instance the case of reintegration schemes used in Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and Indonesia, among other countries, which have helped to rehabilitate members of violent and terrorist organisations. Concerning this, (Omilusi, 2016) advised that better education and empowerment programs should be given to high-risk individuals. Also, child soldiers should be viewed as victims rather than criminals and be given adequate support and rehabilitation.

- *Good Governance and Rule of Law*: (Isa, 2010) noted that the government can prevent terrorism by improving the rule of law, and through the adequate distribution of resources and wealth to stop the trend of marginalisation and horizontal inequality.

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