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**Securitization Within the Frame of Republican Order: A
Case Study of Marseille's Banlieues**

Master's thesis

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Declaration

1. I hereby declare that I have compiled this thesis using the listed literature and resources only.
2. I hereby declare that my thesis has not been used to gain any other academic title.
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References

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Abstract

This case study explores the securitization of Marseille's banlieues during the era of the Frame of Republican order that in the last decade of the twentieth century and first years of the new millennium significantly influenced intensive securitization of French banlieues with a high concentration of ethnic minorities and countless overlapping social and economic problems. In 2005, in reaction to the era of intensive securitization, unprecedentedly violent riots and social unrest broke out in banlieues across France, yet banlieues in Marseille remained calm. This thesis, therefore, aims to describe the securitization process and at the same time expose causes that lowered the intensity of securitization, mitigated the influence of the Frame of Republican order and alleviated its adverse effects on the local population. For this purpose, the thesis builds on a combined theoretical framework of securitization theory and framing theory that enables to put the securitization process into the broader context and considers specific historical background. This thesis also interprets findings on the securitization process and offers a critical evaluation of recent development in Marseille that puts into danger Marseille's resistance to securitization and exposes the city to adverse consequences.

Abstrakt

Tato případová studie zkoumá sekuritizaci předměstí Marseille v době rámce Republikánského řádu, který v poslední dekádě dvacátého století a prvních letech nového tisíciletí významně přispěl k celostátní sekuritizaci okrajových čtvrtí vyznačujících se velkou koncentrací etnických menšin a řadou ekonomických a sociálních problémů. Zatímco v předměstích a vyloučených lokalitách po celé Francii vyvrcholila intenzivní sekuritizace v roce 2005 třemi týdny násilností a sociálních nepokojů, v Marseille se tato protesty nesetkaly s podporou. Cílem této práce je tak nejen popsat proces sekuritizace, ale zejména poukázat na důvody, které způsobily odlišný průběh sekuritizace, zmírnili vliv rámce Republikánského řádu a zabránily jeho negativním dopadům na místní populaci. Za tímto účelem práce staví na kombinovaném teoretickém rámci, kdy je teorie sekuritizace podpořena teorií rámcování, která nabízí možnost zasazení sekuritizačního procesu do širších souvislostí a historického kontextu. Tato práce zároveň získané poznatky interpretuje a zamýšlí se nad procesy jež v dlouhodobém hledisku snižují odolnost Marseille vůči sekuritizaci a jejím negativním dopadům.

Keywords

Marseille, Frame of Republican order, securitization, framing, banlieue, Quartiers Nord, resistance to securitization, frame resonance

Klíčová slova

Marseille, rámec Republikánského řádku, sekuritizace, rámcování, banlieue, Quartiers Nord, odolnost vůči sekuritizace, rezonance rámce

Název práce

Sekuritizace v rámci Republikánského řádu: případová studie Marseille

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Introduction

In 2005, unprecedentedly violent riots broke out in suburban districts around large French cities known as *banlieues*. For weeks, front-page headlines informed the public about numbers of burnt cars, ignited buildings and injuries resulting from clashes between police and “*banlieusards*” (Sedel, 2013, p. 34). However, neither striking headlines nor fear invoking images were able to answer a profound question: what were the causes for the uprisings which led to the declaration of a state of emergency and were treated as “*internal war*”? (Rigouste, 2008, p. 97)

While violence and war-like manoeuvres of security forces in the streets of French cities caused consternation and surprise among the majority of the French public, many rioters considered violence as the only way of communication with a society from which they were over recent decades excluded and segregated (Mucchielli & Goaziou, 2007). In this respect, it was notably intensive securitization connecting banlieues to countless urban and social problems and resulting in excessive repression and control that gradually contributed to isolation and alienation of those living in these peripheral housing estates from the rest of French society. In fact, the acceleration of the securitization process in the last decade of the 20th century and a sudden increase in government’s emphasis on the fight against insecurity was so significant that many authors suggested considering the existence of specific context that enabled such a dramatic change.

Even though the first significant signs of disorder and large-scale social crisis appeared throughout the 80s, it was not until a social uprising in the summer months of 1990 that multiple overlooking problems which were for decades accumulating in banlieues across France were brought to the attention of the public and political actors. While on the one hand, the first major social uprising forced responsible actors to act and deal with previously neglected problems, on the other, it served as a pretext for securitization of banlieues. Although the securitization process gained momentum and began gradually transforming suburban districts into places of insecurity and violence, it was not until the end of the decade and rapprochement of political actors that banlieues became almost unanimously identified as a direct threat to the existence of the French republic (Balibar, 2001). The securitization of banlieues reached its peak after the 2002 presidential and parliamentary elections, which brought actors of the political right to power. And it was precisely during the era of Jacques

Chirac's presidency and Nicolas Sarkozy's role as the Minister of the Interior when omnipresent repression, discrimination, and stigmatisation of banlieues and its inhabitants reached a tipping point and resulted in the 2005 riots.

As riots and violence were spreading through France, banlieues in Marseille remained calm, despite Marseille's reputation as the most dangerous city in France and despite having banlieues that are considered as being worst of the worst (Mucchielli, 2013). In other words, while in other banlieues, inhabitants were protesting adverse effects of securitization, these arguments were met with a lack of understanding and support. The research target of the thesis is thus to explore the securitization process in Marseille and identify reasons why it did not lead to the same outcome as in other French banlieues. This thesis chose the securitization process in Marseille for the unique character of securitization, intending to identify causes for local resistance. At the same time, however, the thesis is going to investigate the durability of local resistance and is going to identify processes that weaken this resistance threatening to cause the same social and urban problems that are characteristic of other banlieues.

In order to comprehend the securitization process in its complexity, it is necessary to consider the existence of the previously mentioned specific context in which the securitization of banlieues took place. In this respect, various schools proposed to take into account the influence of "*republican nationalism*" (van de Watering, 2020, p. 5), "*securitarian ideology*" (Dikeç, 2013), or "*republican order*" (Mucchielli, 2007, p. 133) that served as a leitmotif guiding approach to banlieues and treatment of its inhabitants. For this reason, the thesis is going to combine securitization and framing theory to overcome disadvantages of securitization theory, such as the insufficiency of discourse analysis (Rychnovská, 2014, p. 15), and gain the ability of a framing theory to consider better the external contexts (Watson, 2012, p. 287). Regarding the research target of the thesis and its theoretical framework, research questions are going to be formulated as follows:

What frame facilitated securitization, and what was its resonance?

How did the securitization process of banlieues in Marseille evolve?

Why did the securitization process fail in the case of Marseille?

What are the processes that weaken Marseille's resistance?

The outline of the thesis will be the following: the first part is going to introduce the theoretical framework. Starting with the Copenhagen School theory of securitization, the theoretical part will then cover further development and improvements of the original theory, focusing primarily on its updates by scholars emphasizing a sociological approach to securitization. The second half of the theoretical part is going to present the framing theory and especially the concept of the *master frame* and *regime of truth* that are relevant for the thesis. After a brief chapter dedicated to methodology will follow chapter focusing on the securitization of banlieues in France. In this respect, the chapter dedicated to securitization in France is not intended to provide new findings but instead allows to fit the securitization in Marseille into the broader context, notably by explaining the existence of the Frame of Republican Order. On the contrary, the following chapters explore the securitization process in Marseille and afterwards explain differences in the securitization process and causes of Marseille's resistance to the Frame of Republican order. The final chapter will approach these causes of resistance from a contemporary perspective and offer a critical perspective on recent development in Marseille by identifying processes that weaken Marseille's resistance to securitization.

1. Securitization theory

The end of the Cold War marked the end of the bipolar world with clearly defined and identifiable threats. As a result, the traditional state-centred conceptualization of security, where military and state-related threats are dominant, started to be questioned, and non-military issues gradually found their way to the security agenda. In this regard, changes brought by the end of the Cold War significantly accelerated the process of 'widening' of the security, which progressively incorporated non-military issues into security studies. While it was notably the move towards multipolarity which led to the incorporation of new sectors into a traditional understanding of security, it is possible to find roots of the security widening in the growing importance of economic and environmental agendas in international relations during the 70s and 80s (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998, p. 2).

Despite the lengthy process of widening, the security of states remained in the centre of interest of security studies until the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, the post-bipolar questioning of well-established categories and long-standing definitions gave rise to the new perception of non-military threats that enabled a non-traditional understanding of security to gain ground (Floyd, 2007, p. 328-334).

With a growing acceptance of the non-traditional understanding of security, a security agenda penetrated other non-military sectors and allowed the recognition of changing nature of threats, their complexity, and interdependence of security issues. In this respect, the questioning of tradition state-centred and military-oriented approach led to the growing importance of a complex understanding of security, allowing to recognize a variety of interdependent security issues and their effect on all levels of society, ranging from the international system to individuals (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998, p. 7; Floyd, 2007, p. 334).

Given these points, the end of the bipolar world considerably transformed the security agenda creating from security analysis a multi-sectoral approach emphasizing the need to consider the importance of non-military threats (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998, p. 207). And it was precisely the process of widening which inspired scholars of the Copenhagen School to create the securitization theory

1.1 The Copenhagen School

The Copenhagen School was a group of scholars established around the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute and represented notably by Ole Wæver, Jap de Wilde and Barry Buzan. The Copenhagen School approached the widening of security and a move to non-military sectors from the social-constructivist position refusing the objectivist understanding of security (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998, p. 192). The Copenhagen School's constructivist approach to security served as a primary building block for the securitization theory explaining the social construction of security threat through discourse, suitable rhetoric, and speech acts (Floyd, 2007, p. 329; Wæver, 1995).

According to the Copenhagen School, the intersubjective nature of security and its social construct enable transforming a selected object into a security issue (Wæver, 1995). The construction of a threat happens through the securitization process, specifically through "*security acts*" (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998, p. 26) that redefine the meaning of selected issue, convince the audience about the existence of a threat, and legitimize extraordinary measures and non-ordinary politics (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998, p. 28).

In the securitization theory introduced by scholars of the Copenhagen School, the *security act* relies on the use of grammar and linguistical structures, through which securitizing actors create the feeling of insecurity and constitute existential threats (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998, p. 26). In other words, the use of discourse constitutes the main instrument of the securitization process and an essential tool in the hands of the securitizing actor. In this regard, suitable language enables reframing of a given issue and gives it a new meaning (Wæver, 1995).

Because of the emphasis on discourse and language, the scholars of the Copenhagen School define a *security act* as a *speech act*, which actors use in order to transform a given object into a security threat using security discourse, a set of codes and social interactions (Wæver, 1995). Each speech act thus follows the same logic where securitizing actors use speech acts guided by specific rhetorical structures to identify referent objects of the securitization (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998, p. 36).

The specific rhetorical structure and arguments justifying exceptional measures and explaining why the securitized issue represents an existential threat are the main building

blocks of the speech acts (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998, p. 33). In other words, by using speech acts, the securitizing actor's needs to answer the question "*What will happen if we do not take 'security action' (the threat) and what will happen if we do.*" and convince the audience about the response (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998, p. 32). Nevertheless, as the Copenhagen School remarks, since securitization "*has to be understood as an essentially intersubjective process*" (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998, p. 30), it does not need to follow the logic of objective reality. In other words, securitizing actors can create a security threat regardless of the existing real problem and present any issue as an existential threat without the support of empirical evidence (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998, p. 25).

It emphasises security and the specific rhetorical structure of speech acts that transform the politicized issue into a securitized one. In other words, through speech act, a securitizing actor takes the issue out from the domain of ordinary politics into the security domain where limitations and rules of normal politics do no longer apply and attempts to legitimize extraordinary measures through presented existential threat (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998, p. 25). According to Buzan: "*security is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics*" (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998, p. 23).

The transformation of a politicized issue into a securitized one enables the securitizing actor to handle security-related issues with extraordinary measures and with the use of power unacceptable in other domains. The Copenhagen School explains a different approach to the securitized issue on the superiority of the security domain over other politics. In other words, once the issue is introduced to the security domain, it transcends ordinary political issues (Floyd, 2007, p. 343). In other words, the securitization process disturbs the normal political process and moves the issue above ordinary politics, separates the issue from political debate and thus limits the possibility to discuss, question or decide upon its aspects (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998, p. 29). It is notably for this reason why the Copenhagen School considers securitization as an "*extreme version of politicization*" (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998, p. 23), where claims about security threats and fear serve as a reason for the audience's acceptance of extraordinary measures and missing public and political debate (Wæver, 2000, p. 251).

The securitization of a given referent object leads to a distortion of regular political debate and weakening of rules of normal politics (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998, p. 21; Wæver, 1995). As a result, it strengthens the role of those having or claiming authority to deal with the security problem since the issue's urgency justifies a strict and unquestionable approach to the problem. Therefore, the securitization process disproportionately empowers certain actors and legitimizes extraordinary measures. On the other, the disruption of normal political debate may help identify problematic areas previously overlooked and ignored. This claim is especially valid when securitizing actors react to legitimate public demand and justifiable insecurity feelings. Under such conditions, securitization allows identifying issues that require to be resolved with urgency and without lengthy public debate (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998, p. 40).

Despite this positive aspect of the securitization process, the possibility to securitize a particular referent object without existing empirical evidence (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998, p. 25) significantly questions the ability of securitization to identify overlooked issues and identify legitimate referent object righteously. Furthermore, even when the demand for exceptional measures is supported by empirical evidence and securitization is thus considered as logical, *"majority consensus does not prevent the effective securitization of something that is morally/ethically wrong"* (Floyd, 2007, p. 348). Regarding problems with unjustifiable public demand, the unknown objectivity of securitizing actors and unknown motives behind securitising a particular referent object may prove problematic. Therefore, it is impossible to determine whether securitization leads to positive outcomes and any judgement about its appropriateness depends on each specific case (Floyd, 2007, p. 348).

1.1.1 Conditions of Successful Securitization

Considering the subjective nature of security, the success of a securitization always depends on the audience and on the ability of those who 'speak security' to convince the audience about the existence of existential threat (Pinto, 2014, p. 165). Regarding the acceptance from the audience, many factors impact the audience's final decision, which defines whether a securitizing move becomes successful. In this regard, claims about a security threat need to gain enough salience, resonate among the audience, and be relevant. In other words, it is essential to remember that identifying something as a security threat is not in itself a guarantee of success for those who want to transform the issue into an

existential threat and claims about a security threat and its urgency need to respect specific nature of referent object and characteristics of audience (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998, p. 23). In this respect, the Copenhagen School's theory emphasizes that every securitizing move must respect the audience's collective experience, such as the existence of paranoia and shared perception of reality, which affect the way how the audience reacts to the presented existential threat (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998, p. 57).

Given these points, it becomes evident that securitization is a highly complex process whose success depends on various factors. Therefore, even though the securitizing actor may perform many attempts to securitize a particular referent object, there is no guarantee that speech acts emphasizing the urgency of the security threat are accepted by the public and succeed in their objective to move the referent object into the security domain. What happens after the security move is rejected happens, explores the next chapter.

1.1.2 Desecuritization

Failure of a securitization act and the audience's refusal to accept claims about existential threat may have various motives. However, it is primarily securitising actor's noncompliance with the linguistical-grammatical rules of speech act, failure to provide sufficient empirical support legitimizing securitization, and insufficient authority over the audience (Wæver 2000, p. 252-253). Once these reasons disturb the securitization process, two possible scenarios may happen: first, desecuritization and therefore returning of the former referent object back into ordinary politics, and second, the depoliticization of the issue and its removal from the political debate. Regarding the latter, removing an unsuccessfully securitized object from the political debate is especially problematic when a given problem is based on empirical evidence, and its depoliticization leads to ignorance and neglect (Floyd, 2007, p. 347).

Contradictory to the complete depoliticization of an issue, the return of a given issue into a political debate after an unsuccessful securitization move should be seen as a desired outcome. Reintroducing the problem back into the normal political domain after the failure of a securitizing move helps to raise awareness about the problematic issue (Biba, 2016, p. 434) and allows the handling of an issue in normal political processes (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998, p. 29). In this regard, both Ole Wæver and Marc A. Levy highlight that

successful desecuritization of a given referent object is especially helpful when extraordinary measures and prioritization of securitized issues complicate problem-solving and do more harm than good. As an example of this may serve excessive securitization of environmental problems, which may lead to rising international competition, unsuitable approach to environmental problems (Levy, 1995, p. 62) and "*inappropriate social construction of the environment as a threat/defence problem*" (Wæver, 1995, p. 65).

1.1.3 Analytical Framework According to the Copenhagen School

According to the Copenhagen School, the most suitable method for the study of securitization is linguistic analysis, which corresponds with the claim that securitization happens through speech acts. In this respect, Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde (1998) recommend using classic discourse analysis to uncover the main dynamics and actors of the securitization process, notably because analysis of securitizing discourse and speech acts enables uncovering a complex system of interactions between actors. Moreover, performing a discourse analysis is less demanding than using complex analytical methods and yet highly effective since it uncovers securitisation discourse and other variables interfering or interacting with the securitization process (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998, p. 176). Nevertheless, even though the speech act analysis is of primary importance, scholars of the CS recognize the need to perform discourse analysis hand in hand with complementary analytical tools to gain a complete insight into the securitization processes (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998, p. 177).

In order to understand the securitization process in all its complexity, it is crucial to identify and closely analyse three separate units of securitization: referent object, securitizing actor, and functional actor (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998, p. 36). Regarding referent object, it is the object which is identified as being threatened and whose survival is presented as being in jeopardy. As a result of security widening, almost anything may be presented as a being threatened, ranging from individual units and small groups to humankind itself. Nevertheless, while securitizing actors may identify almost anything as a referent object, there exists a critical condition of "*security legitimacy*", which refers to the ability of the securitizing actor to prove and legitimize its claims about security threats (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998, p. 39).

Apart from referent objects, securitization would not be possible without actors who *speak security* and perform the speech act through which they present arguments justifying the need for emergency measures and identifying referent objects (Pinto, 2014, p. 165). As a securitizing actor may act governments, political leaders, pressure groups and those, who have enough authority to reach, and most importantly, persuade a targeted audience. The authority of a securitizing actor is an essential condition for successful securitization. As Wæver (1995) notes: "*Anyone can speak on behalf of society and claim that a security problem has appeared*", but "*something is a security problem when elites declare it to be so*". In other words, those who speak on behalf of security need to possess a certain amount of legitimacy and enough authority to make the audience listen and accept the message.

Regarding the identification of securitizing actors, two main problems arise. Even though their identification is crucial for the securitization analysis, it is a demanding and comprehensive task. Notably, because the security discourse and speech acts are not being transferred through one channel but rather through complex communication and multilevel interactions between actors and audience. In addition, there exists another problem relating to the legitimacy of securitizing actors. In this respect, an organizational structure of certain units, such as governments, bureaucracies or institutions, makes the recognition of discourses impossible and complicates the identification of the main securitizing actor since it hides the real sources of a securitizing discourse (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998, p. 40).

Finally, a securitization may be influenced by functional actors who in some way contribute to the securitization process and shape its form, for example, by their involvement in political decision making or by their influence on the audience (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998, p. 36). Therefore, functional actors may act not only as someone closely connected to a securitized issue that contributes to securitization but also those who oppose claims about the existence of the existential threat and question the legitimacy of extraordinary measures. Once more, it is crucial to consider the effect of the security widening, which greatly enlarged the spectrum of those who may act as functional actors. Moreover, within each security sector, differs power and influence of given functional actor. Therefore, while a non-governmental organization may have a say in the environmental agenda, its role may be limited in the military sector occupied with threats to state survival.

Even though the analytical framework proposed by the Copenhagen School recognizes the need to perform multi-level analysis of securitization process in order to understand the securitization process in its complexity, the emphasis on linguistic-grammatical aspects and prioritization of discourse analysis served as a pretext for its criticism and motives for further development.

1.2 Post-Copenhagen School development of the Securitization Theory

By securitization theory, the Copenhagen School made a significant constructivist contribution to security studies building on the socially constructed nature of security. Despite the significance of the securitization theory, it was not accepted uncritically, and many scholars have reacted with constructive criticism proposing its further development and improvements of weak points. In this regard, many scholars identified the overreliance on the speech act and discourse as the most problematic aspect of the original securitization theory, stressing notably the unsuitability of speech act analysis for inquiring into the securitization process in real-world situations settings (Stritzel, 2007, p. 362). The resulting academic debate between the Copenhagen School and post-Copenhagen School scholars contributed to the emergence of new analytical frameworks and the rise of critical works, resulting in the emergence of two approaches towards securitization: linguistic approach and sociological approach (Carrapico, 2014, p. 602). While the Copenhagen School represents the linguistic approach emphasizing the role of discourse and speech act, many second-generation securitization scholars proclaimed the sociological approach as more suitable for the study of securitization.

1.2.1 Sociological Approach

The sociological approach refuses to treat securitization as a linear process formed by speech acts and securitizing discourse. Instead, it regards securitization as a complex process formed by both visible and invisible elements that shape the process itself, but most importantly, affect the acceptance of securitization by the audience. In contrast to the linguistic approach, scholars promoting the sociological approach emphasize the importance of the non-discursive elements that have a decisive role in accepting securitization move (Carrapico, 2014, p. 610). According to Mark B. Salter, a relation between audience and speaker cannot be reduced to a simple speech act strictly delimited by linguistic rules, norms

and conventions of discourse because “*securitization is a sociological and political process – manifest in language, but a complex effect of power, interest, inter-subjectivity, bureaucratic position, and process*” (Salter, 2011, p. 117). Notably, by focusing on interactions between audience and securitization actors happening through discourse and language, the speech act analysis ignores factors that interact with and shape the whole process, such as collective memory, group identity, or bureaucratic politics (Salter, 2008, p. 322). Therefore, the sociological approach builds on the premise that “*Different securitizing moves have different effects in different settings, which provide different basic power dynamics, different linguistic rules, and different local knowledge structure*” (Salter, 2011, p. 117). For the same reason, Jef Huysmans proposes to return to the analysis of *security acts* and does not accept the linguistical approach’s emphasis on speech acts. By highlighting a *security act* analysis, Huysmans draws attention to everyday decision making, negligible political decisions, and routine work. According to Huysmans (2011, p. 378), these “*ordinary decisions*” and practices are crucial since they illustrate how life changes through small and seemingly unimportant actions¹. (Huysmans, 2011, p. 377).

Apart from the refusal of a speech act and overreliance on discourse, a crucial component of the sociological approach is emphasising the importance of context within which the securitization takes place. In this respect, social settings (Salter, 2011, p. 118) and socio-economic context (Balzacq, 2005, p. 173) are not regarded as static parts of the scenery but rather as elements shaping the interaction between actors and constituting the final form of the securitization process. In addition, in a diverse society with complex social relations, it is no longer possible to ignore different audience types and do not sufficiently consider the role of the audience (Salter, 2011, p. 122). This criticism is supported by Balzacq, who considers securitization as an audience-centred process, where it is the audience and its beliefs that set the tone of securitization (Balzacq, 2005, p. 184).

Given these points, it becomes evident that the sociological approach led to a considerable requalification of the importance of each entity in the securitization process,

¹ According to Huysmans (2011, p. 377), it is the myriad of banal activities, unimportant decisions, and routine practices rather than speech acts that securitize the referent object without the audience's notice.

allowing the recognition of minor details and at the same time emphasizing the need to analyse securitization in a wider context. Therefore, the post-CS development of the securitization theory made the original framework for analysis obsolete, and many scholars proposed improved frameworks for analysis.

1.2.2 New Analytical Frameworks

Considering many improvements and further developments of the theory, focusing primarily on speech and linguistic aspects became insufficient. As a result, various scholars proposed updated analytical frameworks that allow better comprehension of complex securitization processes. In this respect, a significant contribution was made by Holger Stritzel. Stritzel's updated analytical framework reflects weak points and contextual deficiencies in the original framework proposed by the Copenhagen School. For this reason, Stritzel's analysis highlights notably the influence of context and intertextual meanings on the communication between securitizing actors and the audience. It is, therefore, necessary to consider the role of many underlying and mostly invisible factors such as popular culture, which may have a decisive role in the acceptance and refusal of extraordinary measures. In this regard, the influence of cultural and social settings is decisive since it "*construct a principal background and plot structure of meaning that help(ed) legitimate speakers and convince audience*" (Stritzel, 2012, p. 563).

Another approach to analysis proposes Mark B. Salter, who addresses a speech act analysis problem and reliance on linguistic rules. In order to obtain a better understanding of the securitization move and dynamic character of the overall securitization process, Salter proposes to use "*dramaturgical analysis*", which reflects the need to focus on all variables influencing communication between all actors participating in the securitization. The emphasis is thus placed on shared images, or metaphors, which change meaning depending on the unique experience of a particular audience. (Salter, 2008, p. 329).

1.2.3 Securitization Theory According to Thierry Balzacq

Drawing on the Copenhagen School's securitization theory, Thierry Balzacq joined the ranks of authors promoting the sociological approach by contesting an overreliance on discursive elements of securitization (Balzacq, 2007, p. 78). In this regard, Thierry Balzacq critiques the Copenhagen School notably because it relies on speech acts and specific

rhetorical structures, which are causing that "*within the CS framework, the discursive action of security holds a high degree of formality*" (Balzacq 2005, p. 172). In order to answer this deficit, Balzacq refuses the centrality of a speech act and proposes a new definition of securitization. It should be understood as a "*strategic (pragmatic) practice that occurs within, and as part of, a configuration of circumstances, including the context, the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, and the power that both speaker and listener bring to the interaction*" (Balzacq, 2005, p. 172).

By defining securitization as a "*pragmatic practice*", Thierry Balzacq (2005, p. 174) draws attention to securitizing actors and their ability to reflect the changing context and reactions of the audience. In this regard, it emphasizes that securitization is a constantly evolving process that reacts to changes in context and external reality, which is actively shaped and formed by securitizing actors. Therefore, Balzacq's emphasis on securitizing actors allows recognizing the importance of variables ignored by the original theory, such as power struggles between actors, their motivations and relation to the audience (Balzacq, 2005, p. 173). The shift away from the speech act does not mean those language elements are no longer crucial. However, compared to other factors, the overall importance of linguistic aspects decreases since Balzacq considers language as one out of many elements constituting the final form of the securitization process (Balzacq, 2005, p. 176). In fact, without other factors shaping the securitization process, the discourse and speech act cannot securitize the issue, and securitizing actors cannot transform the referent object into a threat (Balzacq, 2005, p. 173).

Regarding the role of the audience, it is no surprise that Balzacq considers the role of the audience vis-à-vis securitization as crucial since it defines the outcome of an overall securitization process. For this reason, securitizing actors' claims and actions need to correspond to external reality as closely as possible and must be supported with substantial empirical evidence (Balzacq, 2005, p. 182). The securitizing actor thus needs to identify what is considered threatening, respect shared fears and beliefs, and consequently determine what issue is most likely to be regarded as an existential threat (Balzacq, 2005, p. 186). Nevertheless, two crucial variables considerably facilitate the work of securitizing actors and significantly affect the audience's threat perception and its acceptance of security claims: proclaimed knowledge and authority of securitizing actors.

Authority and knowledge grant securitizing actors the power to make claims about security threats without the need to support these claims with empirical evidence. The need for empirical evidence decreases because authority and knowledge lower distrust to a securitizing actor and grant legitimacy to security-related claims (Balzacq, 2005, p. 190). In this regard, the audience may be less tempted to contest securitization since it may assume that securitizing actors are more informed and know about security threats of which the audience is yet unknown. In this respect, Didier Bigo (2002, p. 74) support this claim by highlighting the strong role of security experts in the securitization process. The power of security experts stems from the fact that they do not have to prove their claims and provide substantial evidence since the audience believes that security experts have the necessary knowledge and therefore regards their claims as credible and legitimate. In summary, claims about threats made by state officials, security experts, and public figures lower the demand for empirical evidence and have a more significant potential to convince the audience. In addition, those experts in the "*management of unease*" (Bigo, 2002, p. 64) can increase the chance for successful securitization by using political decisions or policy instruments as "*securitization tools*" facilitating the transformation of any entity into a threat and its removal from normal political debate (Balzacq, 2007, p. 80).

Taken together, the post-Copenhagen School development of the securitization theory significantly upgraded the original theory and proposed an updated analytical framework by addressing its weak points. In this respect, it was notably the emphasis on context and the refusal to regard the securitization process as something strictly bounded by the rules of securitizing discourse that motivated further development of the theory.

2. Framing Theory

In order to properly introduce the framing theory and explain its connection to securitization, it is crucial to start with a short reflection of previous uses of the concept of a frame and explain the framing process. This chapter will then explain interplays between both theories to clarify what makes framing theory and securitization theory compatible and in what way is combined theoretical framework convenient.

To start with, the concept of framing has been used across multiple disciplines, ranging from positivist works to post-structuralism (Watson, 2012, p. 282), nevertheless it

was notably in cognitive psychology and sociology where it found its use. Regarding psychology, framing plays an important role in the works of Kahneman and Tversky (2003) on decision-making, which identify social frames and framing of external reality as crucial elements shaping an individual's understanding of the world and complex reality. Regarding sociology, the concept of the frame has an important role, notably in the study of social movements. In this respect, it was notably Erving Goffman, who introduced the concept of a frame to the study of social groups and defined frames as "*schemata of interpretation*" (Goffman, 1986, p. 21) that give "*reason to things which would otherwise be meaningless*" (Goffman, 1986, p. 25). Considering Goffman's definition, frames influence how everyone perceives reality.

The use of frames in the study of social groups was further developed by Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow (1988, p. 198), who used the concept of "*the collective action frame*" to explain how social movements mobilize its audience and how the use of proper frame affect the effectiveness of social mobilization. According to Benford and Snow, certain frames allow social movements to delimit the area where the audience centre its attention and provide the audience with a "*manual*" on how it should understand reality. Therefore, by using frames, social movements create "*sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement organization*" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 614).

Apart from the study of social movements, the concept of the frame has been used by sociologists to study the role of media in the process of the social construction of reality (Tuchman, 1980; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). In this respect, William A. Gamson et al. (1992, p. 384) use the term "*media frame*" to describe a subtle and largely unacknowledged media discourse that actively shape and transform the perception of reality. Similarly, Pippa Norris, Montague Kern and Marion Just (2003, p. 10) refer to '*news frames*' to define interpretative structures shaping the meaning of presented facts and events. In the same way, Robert M. Entman describes the creation of shared knowledge and manipulation of public opinion through appropriate media frames transferred to the audience through media content. Focusing on the question of how media shaped a public opinion after the September 11 attacks, Entman defines framing as a process of "*selecting and highlighting some facets of*

events or issues, and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution" (Entman, 2004, p. 5).

2.1 Framing Process

In the same way as securitization, framing processes rely in the first place on discourse and the use of speech acts which is used by framing actors to shape and amplify the message to persuade the audience about the framed issue (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 623). According to Entman (1993, p. 52), processes of creating a discourse, highlighting particular issues, selecting some aspects of reality and amplifying their meaning constitute a "*communication process*", where on one side stands the communicator who guides the frame formation by deciding what to say, and on the other side is the receiver, who decides whether to accept or ignore the given frame (Entman, 1993, p. 53). While at the beginning of a *communication process* the communicator establishes basic contours of the frame through language and discourse, its final shape depends on strategic and contested processes. Regarding strategic processes, these refer to actions of framing actors that shape an established frame in accordance with envisaged aims and goals by highlight certain elements and specificities, intending to promote a subjective interpretation of events. As for contested processes, these refer to a clash between framing actors and those who oppose the presented frame. These contestations over and debates about framed issues once again influence the frame's development and influence reactions of the audience (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 623).

Whether through strategic or contested processes, framing actors, such as political leaders, media, or anyone promoting their interpretation of reality, aim to promote their understanding of reality or framed issues (Norris, Kern & Just, 2003, p. 11). Such a variety of heterogeneous actors means that multiple frames often overlap, and a variety of framing actors may interpret the same issue in diverse ways (Entman, 1993, p. 55). Thus, it is the authority of framing actors and their ability to persuade the audience that define the capability of framing actors to establish the frame and shape the framing process. Regarding framing actors' authority and power position, it is necessary to note that even framing actors with relatively low authority and a small audience listening to them may play a crucial role in the final form of the frame. The importance of less important framing actors is emphasized notably in Entman's (2004, p. 9) model of "*cascading activation*" focusing on the way how

frames which are articulated at the highest political levels spread through the "*hierarchy of public administration and media organizational structure*" and how the message reaches the audience often through messages of those who are at the bottom of the hierarchical structure

Regarding the frame's acceptance and the possibility of evaluating the audience's position towards the frame, Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow (2000, p. 213) introduced the concept of "*frame resonance*", measuring the frame's mobilizing potential and effectiveness. The intensity of the frame resonance on itself depends on several variable features, notably on actors' credibility, available empirical evidence, and favourable social-cultural context. To sum up, to achieve the acceptance of frame, framing actors need not only reflect given context but also dynamically react to changing socio-cultural elements and consider the nature of the audience.

2.2 Narrowing the Gap Between Securitization and Framing

The post-CS development of securitization theory bridged the gap between framing and securitization. In this respect, both theories emphasize the importance of the audience, which has power over the final form and plays an active role in the securitization and framing process. In addition, both theories highlight the influence of context and external reality and the need of actors to take broader settings into account (Balzacq, 2005; Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 619-622). Furthermore, both theories overlap and show compatibility in their emphasis on discourse and linguistic-grammatical composition of language (Watson, 2012, p. 283). Finally, regarding the final acceptance of securitizing move and a frame, it depends heavily on the authority, knowledge, and credibility of actors (Balzacq, 2005; Watson, 2012, p. 284) whose interaction with the audience is strongly affected by embedded power relations (Watson, 2012, p. 286).

These similarities between securitization and framing make both theories compatible, and the framing theory can be interconnected with securitization theory to understand better the complex reality in which the securitizing processes occur (Watson, 2012, p. 288). In this respect, several scholars, including Lin Alexandra Mortensgaard, Carvalho Pinto, and Dagmar Rychnovská, recognized interconnections and complementary elements between both theories and the advantages of the combined theoretical framework. According to Rychnovská (2014, p. 15), the analysis of frames "*can help capture the*

dynamics of 'audience acceptance' in these very interactionist settings and the contextual embeddedness of security communication." Regarding communication, Mortensgaard (2010) emphasizes the possibility of identifying existing media frames through which the audience interprets reality and takes a stance towards securitization.

The emphasis of Morthensgaard on media frames is crucial because even though securitization theory acknowledges the role of media in the process and their ability to *speak security* by producing discourse, it often limits its attention to security-related messages. And it is precisely this narrow scope of analysis that may limit the possibility to comprehend the complex role of media in securitization processes. Therefore, only after the refusal of limited security-oriented analysis of media discourse one can fully understand media power over the result of securitization. In this respect, recognizing coexisting media frames allows identifying each frame constituting one piece in a "*mosaic of securitizing, desecuritizing and more neutral*" media frames through which the audience interprets real-world events and external reality (Mortensgaard, 2010, p. 141).

As an example of the combination of framing theory and securitization theory may serve Fred Vultee's (2011) work investigating the role of media in securitization processes by looking particularly at how media frame news and present issues to the audience. Based on the study's findings, Fred Vultee attributes to media a vital role in the securitization process. According to Vultee, media contribute to diffusion, amplification and preservation of the securitizing discourse by appropriate framing of news and acting as a securitizing actor. Similarly, Paul Bagguley and Yasmin Hussain (2012, p. 717) use the framing theory in their study of media's role in securitization. According to the study, media have a significant effect on securitization since they shape the audience's perception of reality and the way how media frame news affects actors' credibility, audience's perspective on securitized issues and therefore considerably influences public opinion (Bagguley & Hussain, 2012, p. 731). Because of this, Anthony M. Messina considers media frames as "*lenses*" (2014, p. 44) through which the audience obtain information about issues being securitized and through which securitizing actors transfer their messages.

Taken together, works on media frames illustrate how framing and securitization overlap and serve as an example of an area where the analytical framework combining elements from both theories finds its use. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this thesis, it is

mainly the concept of the *master frame* that is of particular importance. The following part of this chapter will thus introduce this concept and explain why the master frame is relevant for the study of securitization.

2.2.1 Master Frame

Attempts to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of complex reality led to the concept of “*master frame*” that emerges “*around issues which tend to be complex and transcend other issues*” (Carroll & Ratner, 1996, p. 411), and in addition is “*very broad in interpretative scope, inclusivity, flexibility and cultural resonance, and can incorporate a number of specific issue frames*” (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 619). Regarding this definition, it is possible to consider a master frame as a central interpretative framework that regroups various agendas, beliefs, and shared knowledge from various movements or groups (Watson, 2012, p. 288). In this respect, the use of the master frame concept allows locating and analysing “*heterogenous goals of various groups within a state or society in pursuit of a common cause*” (Watson, 2012, p. 291).

Considering securitization analysis, identifying the master frame may be essential since it allows recognising shared beliefs, ideas, identities, or historical experience of a given audience. Therefore, its recognition allows complex analysis of socio-cultural context and wide contextual settings in which securitization occurs (Balzacq, 2005, p. 183). Furthermore, incorporating the master frame concept into the study of securitization allows recognizing a dominant interpretation of reality and a variety of “*different discursive contexts in which the framing processes are embedded*” (Rychnovská, 2014, p. 16). In other words, the study of the master frame uncovers coexisting and overlapping frames with diverse discursive settings, which altogether constitute pieces of one predominant master frame. The recognition of multiple frames constituting a master frame thus enable the analysis of the securitization process in all its complexity, with overlapping discourses, different actors and diverse audiences.

2.2.2 Regime of Truth

Considering the proposed definitions of a master frame, it shares important similarities with Michel Foucault’s “*regime of truth*” (2007, p. 131) that affects what type of discourse is accepted by the society and how the society perceives the reality. Even though

Foucault did not use the concept of the master frame, the presented concept of *regime of truth* shares significant similarities not only with the concept of the master frame but significantly overlaps with framing and securitization theory since it forms the context in which framing and securitization take place. In this respect, it creates conditions that affect how the audience accepts the discourse and presents reality.

According to the proposed definition, the *regime of truth* is a generally accepted interpretation of reality composed of "*the types of discourse which [the society] accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements*" (Foucault, 2007, p. 131). In other words, the *regime of truth* forms the understanding of reality and can define what is true and false according to the influence of factors that form a particular regime. In this regard, it is necessary to consider that each *regime* is shaped by a multitude of actors and elements, among others by media, ideologies, beliefs, and political struggles defining the *true form* of an external world and complex reality (Foucault, 2007, p. 132).

Regarding a study of discourse and securitization, in the same way as the master frame, the recognition of the *regime of truth* allows a comprehensive understanding of various discourses, notably because of a possibility to locate all discourses on one level and thus identify these, which are in some way connected or whose elements are overlapping (Foucault, 2007, p. 114). The relation between the *regime of truth* and securitization was recognized notably by Salter (2008, p. 322), who uses the term to describe the audience's subjective perception of the broader socio-political context in which the securitization and all related processes take place. In addition, Didier Bigo (2002, p. 65-76) identifies the creation of the *regime of truth* as an integral part of securitization since securitizing actors claim to know the *truth* about the nature of security threats and thus impose their version of reality on the audience.

2.3 Combined Analytical Framework

In order to understand the securitization process in Marseille and gain the possibility to identify what made the whole process so different from the rest of French cities, this thesis uses a combined analytical framework. In this regard, it follows the example of scholars who

integrated the concept of framing into the securitization analysis to gain better insight into the broader context.

The analysis of the securitization process in Marseille reflects the post-Copenhagen School development of the securitization theory. In this respect, it draws attention to non-discursive elements of securitization and refuses the dependency on linguistics. In this respect, it places special attention to social context and a variety of factors that more or less intensely contribute to securitization and enable creating a shared intersubjective perception of reality that enables moving a given referent object into the security domain.

Furthermore, by incorporating framing into the securitization, the thesis draws attention to less security-oriented elements in the overall process of securitization. In addition, by recognizing the existence of a specific master frame that facilitated the securitization of banlieues in France, this thesis draws the attention to the non-discursive elements of securitization and refuses to approach the securitization process through speech-act analysis and other narrowly oriented approaches that limit the possibility to recognize underlying factors, such as particular historical experience, or ideology.

In addition, the concept of frame's resonance is of particular importance for this thesis since it enables the identification of factors and processes which motivate the audience to either accept or refuse securitization of the given referent object. In this regard, it is especially the dependence of frame's resonance on cultural specificities, beliefs, values, and shared experiences that are of particular importance for studying the securitization process in Marseille. Moreover, identifying a specific frame enables a determination of various types of discourses, speech acts and securitizing moves, and based on their acceptance or refusal by the audience in Marseille, identify causes of local resistance to securitization.

3. Methodology

Given the nature of research questions and the thesis's research target, the thesis chooses to follow a qualitative research methodology, emphasizing the study of a chosen topic in its complexity and focusing on understanding observed phenomena (Elliott & Timulak, 2005, p. 147). In this respect, the thesis follows a methodology of qualitative research that "*puts slices of reality together*" (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, p. 5) to obtain the complex picture of a given phenomenon.

In order to utilize advantages provided by qualitative research methodology, this work is conceptualized as a single case study. While certain limitations are connected to a case study approach that is "*far from being methodologically ideal*" (Kacowicz, 2002, p. 121), its advantages surpass possibly problematic aspects. Mainly because a single case study provides an in-depth analysis of a selected case and leads to a detailed and complex understanding of the given phenomenon (Kacowicz, 2004, p. 108) within "*its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident*" (Yin, 1994, p. 13).

Following the definition provided by John S. Odell (2001, p. 163), the thesis is conceptualized as the disciplined interpretive case study, which emphasizes understanding a selected case without the intention to draw generalizable conclusions out of the particular case. In this regard, the case study uses the theoretical framework to study a new case. In this regard, the aim is "*to explain and/or interpret a single historical episode rather than to generalize beyond the data*" (Levy, 2008, p. 4). Therefore, the theoretical framework helps to explain the observed case and gain valuable insight into the individual case, in this thesis, into the securitization of Marseille's banlieues and its resistance.

In order to answer research questions, it is necessary to put the era of the Frame into the broader context and take into account the roots of securitization and particular social and historical experience that contributed to the emergence of the Frame. For this reason, before moving to the analysis of securitization in Marseille, the thesis will provide insight into the nationwide securitization of banlieues before and during the era of the Frame of Republican order and identify processes that made the securitization possible.

4. Securitization of Banlieues in France

4.1 History of Social Housing in France

In the aftermath of the Second World War, it became apparent that the lack of housing had become a significant problem requiring complex and fast intervention from the government. The impact of the war was severe since approximately 500 000 buildings were destroyed during the war, with more than 2 million more or less damaged (Bonelli, 2008, p. 29). Nevertheless, not only had the war stripped many citizens of their homes, but a housing

shortage was further getting worse due to changes in demographics fuelled by post-war economic changes, social development, and starting the decolonisation process. In this context, finding affordable housing soon became a demanding task for immigrants, whose journey towards better life often ended in slums and shantytowns, and a considerable proportion of young adults as the urban population in the whole of France experienced rapid growth. The gravity of the situation illustrates the fact that it was nothing extraordinary to see slums in the streets of big French cities (Gonick, 2011, p. 30).

In order to resolve the housing shortage and poor living standards² in existing housing, the construction of housing projects became one of the priorities of post-war reconstruction in France (Bonelli, 2008, p. 34). Since the State emphasized the rapidity of construction and favoured projects which offered the best ratio between accommodation units and price, the priority was given to large-scale social housing projects which were being built within *urbanisation priority zones* defined by demographic factors and socio-economic context in the given locality (Kirkness, 2014, p. 1282). In these zones, which in 1969 included 5 million inhabitants (Sedel, 2013, p. 25), the State began incentivising the construction of public housing estates, known as *Habitation a Loyer Modéré* (HLMs) (Gonick, 2011, p. 30).

Unfortunately, because of the high demand for cost-effectiveness and low financial costs of construction, many social housing projects have been isolated from existing urban settlements since their location was depending on the price of land acquired for building purposes. In addition, due to the need to provide housing to a significant number of people in the shortest time possible, architectural and urbanistic qualities were not regarded as necessary and many newly constructed apartments buildings relied on prefabricated units and uniform architecture regardless of local particularities (Bonelli, 2008, p. 31).

² In addition to the insufficient accommodation space, another problem connected to the housing situation in France needed to be addressed. That was the poor quality of existing residences illustrated notably by inadequate access to washing and toilet facilities. In this regard, in 1954, more than half of the housing units lacked indoor toilets and bathrooms, and only a slight majority was connected to the public water supply (Fourcaut, 2007).

However, despite the lack of infrastructure, relative isolation, and limited attractiveness of newly constructed “*grand ensembles*” (Bonelli, 2008, p. 33), the demand for housing allocation exceeded the limited offer, notably because relocating to new areas considerably improved inhabitants’ quality of life and material capacities (Bonelli, 2008, p. 36). For this reason, demand for housing was high across various social groups, notably between non-French citizens and young French families who were experiencing the adverse effect of housing shortage the most. Nevertheless, due to racial prejudices and xenophobic approach, the first inhabitants of HLMs were mostly young families and residents of French origin who were often preferred by those in charge of housing allocation (Sedel, 2013, p. 26-29).

4.2 Growing Urban Problems

Even though spending life in social housing districts was not a long-term goal for a significant number of inhabitants, it was neither a place from which anyone wanted to escape and move out as soon as possible. While the lack of services and isolation from other urban areas served as prevailing sources of discomfort, higher living standards and, to some extent, social life between people with similar socio-economic backgrounds contributed to persisting popularity. Nevertheless, at the end of the 70s, the number of relocations, notably among inhabitants in better financial situations, started increasing as multiple factors contributed to changes in social housing districts (Sedel, 2013, p. 26).

The first important factor that negatively affected the life in social housing districts was the change of the State’s urban policy and the adoption of a new approach towards those in need of housing. In contrast to the previous approach privileging large apartment buildings and large urban settlements, the State began to support the construction of owner-occupied residences (Fourcaut, 2007). As a result, smaller districts and small housing complexes became a priority, especially since these projects fulfilled newly demanded urbanistic standards and met the criteria for better integration into existing urban structures. Because of that they became more attractive than large apartment complexes and therefore more demanded by applicants (Driant, 2012). In addition, the new urban policy facilitated mortgage allocation and implemented mechanisms providing financial support and loans for citizens. Therefore, it became easier to obtain individual housing even without substantial financial resources or privileged social background. As a result, many middle-class families

motivated by these financial incentives started leaving social housing districts leaving behind empty apartments for those who were previously refused (Bonelli, 2008, p. 36-38).

The second factor, which was closely linked to the previous one and more broadly to the general politics of housing allocation, was changing ethnic composition of inhabitants. Due to already mentioned changes in the State's urban policy, the social and ethnic composition progressively transformed. Notably, because many apartments vacated by middle-class families were offered to applicants with different ethnicity and different socio-economic background (Dikeç, 2007). In this regard, it is crucial to consider that in the second half of the twentieth century, immigration to France was on the rise, and immigrants from non-European countries constituted the majority of candidates requesting social housing. Changing ethnic composition in social housing districts led to two significantly different outcomes. While in certain areas, the more diverse ethnic composition did not affect the quality of life, in other districts appeared first signs of ghettoization and related problems (Desage, Journel & Sala Pala, 2014, p. 156). Behind these different outcomes were discriminatory allocation mechanisms based on the applicant's ethnicity and country of origin used by local authorities to determine who has the right to available apartments in a given locality. In this respect, each applicant fell into two ethno-racial categories. The first category included applicants from Europe and former North African French colonies, and the second category included mainly immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa (Desage, Journel & Sala Pala, 2014, p. 179). While those belonging to the first category reached better offers in better localities, those in the second category were regarded with suspicion and were allocated to areas with lower living standards, often located in the suburbs of large French cities (Desage, Journel & Sala Pala, 2014, p. 159).

Apart from the effect of the State's housing and urban policies, it is crucial to consider socio-economic factors that led to profound changes in social housing districts. In this respect, the energy crisis resulting from the oil embargo following the Yom Kippur War brought crucial changes to the industry and French economy since the economic crisis accelerated deindustrialisation and led to a dramatic increase in unemployment rate, especially among unskilled manual workers. These effects of the crisis on social housing districts were devastating since it was mainly in these districts where the unemployment rate skyrocketed as people lost their jobs and thus their only stable sources of income (Fourcaut,

2007). The worsening socio-economic situation and high unemployment rate negatively affected social housing districts in two main ways. First, the decrease in purchasing power and persisting financial problems of many inhabitants forced local businesses to close, decreasing availability and variability of services and the absence of basic amenities. Second, worsening living conditions and socio-economic deprivation gave rise to criminality, drug consumption and overall worsening of security (Bonelli, 2008, p. 42-45). Therefore, it is possible to consider the 1970s recession as an essential milestone in the evolution of social housing, determining its development for many years to come.

While the impact of the economic crisis was severe, it was the combination of all the factors indicated above which was progressively transforming social housing districts. In this respect, changes in ethnic composition, urban policies, and consequences of the economic crisis became the underlying sources of adverse development and gradual decline. However, it was not until the beginning of the new decade when subsequent problems fully concretised and started transforming the symbols of modernity and better life into symbols of despair and demise (Fourcaut, 2007).

4.3 Emergence of Banlieues

During the 80s, adverse effects of urban policies, economic crisis and changing ethnic composition fully emerged and in many social housing districts created tensions and animosity between residents making cohabitation between various social and ethnic groups difficult (Busquet, Hérouard & Saint-Macary, 2016, p. 58). Since families of immigrants who were replacing those leaving large apartment complexes were often numerous and involved a large number of children, many long-term residents decided to leave as they refused to live in the same neighbourhood with “*loud*”, “*non-integrated*”, and “*problematic families*” (Bonelli, 2008, p. 39). Refusal to share the same living space with immigrants coupled with the ongoing trend of suburbanisation resulted in a departure of more middle-class French families. In a sense, this departure created a vicious circle since leaving inhabitants were followed by many businesses, and their departure progressively reduced economic opportunities and both the quality and the availability of schools and educational facilities. These changes, in turn, motivated even more inhabitants to relocate (Donzelot, 2006, p. 51).

Simultaneously with changes among inhabitants came a degradation of apartment buildings and surrounding public space. Such visible degradation was, however, only one of many problems which gradually changed certain “*urban priority zones*” into “*places to avoid*” (Kirkness, 2014, p. 1283), since apart from visible deterioration of housing, many social housing districts became places where the drug market started to thrive, and criminality rates were increasing. It was especially the case for social housing districts located primarily in peripheral areas of large cities known as banlieues (Dikeç, 2006, p. 68). As a result, those who could afford to live elsewhere moved away, and those who stayed became “*captives*” of their neighbourhood (Bonelli, 2008, p. 39). Banlieues thus gradually became a refuge for immigrants, unqualified workers, unemployed, and generally to all kinds of people in distress and precarious situations (Bonelli, 2008, p. 43).

While problems in banlieues were nothing new, it was notably a series of events during the so-called “hot summer” in 1981 (Dikeç, 2006, p. 68), which brought violence and criminality in these areas to public attention. During this period, multiple uprisings and social riots erupted in peripheral social housing districts, often accompanied by vehicles' thefts and ignitions. An unprecedented number of these incidents caught the media's attention and led to an increasing medialisation of problems connected to these suburban localities (Sedel, 2013, p. 29). The early 80s may thus be considered as a moment when the public's perception of social housing district and notably of banlieues undergone a profound transformation since intensifying interest of media and perpetual reporting about negative aspects gradually formed the public discourse on insecurity, criminality, and delinquency coming from *banlieues* (Bonelli, 2001b, p. 97).

There is, however, one crucial difference regarding the public discourse and medialisation of problems during the 80s when compared with the following decades. Even though media and public figures emphasised problems such as criminality and delinquency, they were mostly presented as only one part of the overall problem connected to social housing districts. Therefore, the rise of criminality was often put into a broader perspective and discussed within the context of deep structural problems, such as increasing social and spatial segregation, bad living conditions, and various socio-economic issues (Tissot, 2007, p. 22-31).

Similarly, the government's response to problems focused mainly on housing and social problems rather than on problems with violence and delinquency. The priority was thus placed on urban and social policies rather than on repression, which will be characteristic for the government's response to the 2005 riots (Sedel, 2013, p. 29). Specifically, the French urban policies were promoting the reconstruction of housing and renovation of urban space. Apart from increasing investments into renovations, the State implemented various social policies aiming to mitigate social segregation and promote community building, for example, through employee assistance programmes aimed at the socialisation of youths and prevention of exclusion (Foultier, 2015, p. 81).

Nevertheless, despite these efforts to address problems in certain social housing districts, these policies failed to address deep structural problems and notably underlying causes of a worsening situation in banlieues. It was precisely in these suburban, low-income housing districts mainly located on the periphery of large cities where multiple overlapping problems started accumulating and disproportionately affected life of local communities.

4.4 Banlieues as Sources of Insecurity

Regarding the accumulation of problems, life in banlieues at the end of the 80s was far from ideal. Overall neglect of problems, social and spatial segregation of inhabitants and unfavourable socio-economic context progressively contributed to rising social tensions and frustration of inhabitants. While it is undoubtedly true that the number of problems and their nature varied with each locality, growing dissatisfaction and frustration of inhabitants transformed most banlieues into a fertile ground for social unrest and, in a sense, into a ticking time bomb ready to explode.

Eventually, it was a traffic accident that served as a trigger. On October 6, 1990, a young man died in a road accident during the police chase in Vaulx-en-Velin, one of Lyon's peripheral social housing districts (Foultier, 2015, p. 82). As a result, violence broke out in Lyon's banlieues and across France, where accumulated tensions and neglected problems fuelled the hate against police, public officials and institutions. Consequently, rioting, looting, destruction of housing, and clashes with police become an everyday reality for inhabitants of banlieues and the rest of the French public since media transmitted the violence into every household and offered detailed coverage of these events (Mucchielli &

Goaziou, 2007). The unprecedented intensity of protests in Vaulx-en-Velin and detailed media coverage of violence profoundly changed an image of banlieues and an approach towards these urban localities and their inhabitants.

Indeed, many episodes of violence and protests took place in banlieues during previous decades, yet the uprising in Vaulx-en-Velin stood out notably for its violent nature and its impact on other urban areas. Instead of isolated cases of unrest, there were suddenly violent clashes with police happening in cities across France, and the issue of violence and insecurity in banlieues started resonating on all levels of French society and in public discourse. The insecurity thus emerged as the most critical topic for voters and politicians, leading to the politicisation of violence and exploiting its political potential. As a result, dealing with insecurity became a priority for politicians regardless of their political affiliation (Roché, 2004, p. 156-157). Furthermore, since the priority was given to the fight against insecurity, it was possible to recognize the growing neglect of other problems and the simplification of complex social and urban problems. In other words, what was previously regarded as a social problem became a problem of security. As a result, banlieues were transformed from “*neighbourhoods in danger*” into “*dangerous neighbourhoods*” (Bonelli, 2001a).

An exceptional level of violence accompanying protests in Vaulx-en-Velin and other banlieues provoked yet another significant change in an approach to urban problems since the insecurity in the urban and the problem with banlieues emerged as issues of national importance. While in previous decades, urban problems were regarded as problems of individual municipalities and were dealt with on municipal level, with the insecurity becoming the issue of national importance, the role of municipalities declined. This shift between municipal and national levels was crucial because, before this shift, dealing with urban problems was tightly bounded to local settings and specific contexts. And it was precisely this local and contextualized approach that was gradually replaced by a uniform repressive response from the government and its institutions (Bonelli, 2008, p. 89; Oblet, 2008, p. 38). The early 1990s thus represent an important turning point in an approach to banlieues. A problem with banlieues started emerging as an issue of national importance, and in addition to that, the medio-political discourse started framing most urban problems in banlieues as security-related issues. In other words, during a very brief period, multiple

social problems connected to banlieues and their inhabitants were set aside, and a priority was given to problems with violence, criminality and delinquency. Given these points, it is possible to situate the beginning of a nationwide securitisation of banlieues into the aftermath of protest in Vaulx-en-Velin.

4.5 The Frame of Republican Order

In order to understand why the French State adopted a strong authoritarian approach to banlieues and why the Vaulx-en-Velin riots led to an era of intensive securitisation, various authors, among others to Laurent Mucchielli (2008), Sophie Gonick (2011), Jean Beaman (2010), or Mustafa Dikeç, suggests considering the influence by the “*French republican tradition*” (Dikeç, 2006, p. 68). And it is precisely this republican tradition that served as the main building block of the emerging Frame of Republican order.

4.5.1 French Republican Tradition

While it is possible to broadly define the republican tradition as an “*established political tradition that emphasised social duties and obligations of the state for well-being of its citizens*” (Dikeç, 2007, p. 31), such a definition does not sufficiently explain its influence on a change in the government’s approach to urban problems. For this reason, it is necessary to look more closely notably at two components of French republicanism: a strong state’s tradition and republican nationalism (Dikeç, 2007, p. 91).

Considering a strong state tradition in France, its effect on the acceptance of security-oriented policies was decisive. That is because the “*republican state*” (Dikeç, 2006, p. 60) is expected to have a central role in society since it has social obligations to its citizens, needs to care about their well-being at the same time needs to preserve its authority and the integrity of the Republic (Dikeç, 2007, p. 28-31). Therefore, a threat of insecurity and questioning of the State’s authority during the 1990s riots were seen as a grave danger for the existence of the Republic itself and as such required vigorous response (Dikeç, 2007, p. 28-31). The need to deal with a threat in the form of banlieues representing “*anti-Republican spaces that pose dangerous threats to the general polity*” thus explains a turn towards repression and to the emergence of what Sophie Gonick identifies as “*French penal state*” (Gonick, 2011, p. 32).

The second essential component of the republican tradition was an emphasis on national identity and French cultural values (Dikeç, 2006, p. 66-67). This part of the republican tradition may be called “*republican nationalism*” (Dikeç, 2007, p. 31), and it affected the rise of nationalism and xenophobic attitude towards those who questioned republican values and social cohesion. In other words, *republican nationalism* was one of the main reasons why different cultural backgrounds and ethnicity started being regarded as threats to the Republic and the French culture (Gonick, 2011, p. 32). In this respect, republican nationalism set a norm defining what should be considered normal in French society. At the same time, it identified threats and dangers to the Republic and the security of its citizens (van der Wetering, 2020, p. 2). Since *republican nationalism* stems from xenophobia and nationalism, the most critical elements separating normality from abnormality were ethnicity, race and religion. The Frame of Republican order was therefore emphasizing the need to protect the integrity of France and its values against communitarianism, most notably against the one based on religious identity. In this regard, it is essential to note that in the French context, the religious identity was closely connected to race and ethnicity (Fellag, 2014, p. 19-20).

Taken together, the republican tradition represented a central pillar of the Frame of Republican order that influenced both government’s reaction to urban problems and the public’s acceptance of intensifying repression and nationalist discourse. In this respect, the importance of republican tradition was so decisive that it created a specific *regime of truth* that framed “*everyday explanation of the political and social world*” of French citizens (Bigo, 2002, p. 69).

In addition to the republican tradition, the change in approach towards previously neglected urban areas mirrored the overall zeitgeist of politics in the late 1990s and early 2000s, where the neoliberal rationality and technocratic approach to governing gained ground (Dikeç, 2006, p. 65).

4.5.2 Neoliberal Approach to Politics

The neoliberal approach brought two significant changes to the management of urban space and changed preferred outcomes of urban policies. While in the first place, it was the emphasis on effective management, primarily visible on a new market-oriented approach,

the second characteristic of neoliberalist turn was the promise to restore order and security by adopting a more uncompromising approach against criminality.

Before going any further, it is essential to clarify that the turn towards neoliberalism was not unique for French politics and that it was a gradual process rather than a sudden policy change. However, especially concerning security and the fight against crime, it is possible to identify a tipping point after which the spread of neoliberalist policies accelerated. This tipping point was Rudy W. Giuliani's era in the office of mayor of New York. In this respect, it was mainly during the era of Giuliani, when was the (in)famous policy of "*zero tolerance*" introduced in New York, giving rise to excessive controls and police repressions. In particular, the police were instructed to focus on minor delicts and less severe offences to get undesired individuals out of sight. Therefore, those targeted by excessive police practices began to feel unwanted, segregated and framed as citizens of the second category (Maurin, 2004).

Despite serious repercussions, Giuliani's approach to the management of New York served as an important paradigm guiding the management of urban areas in the period. It was notably after the year 2000 when the emphasis on security characterised by stricter repressions, gradual enforcement of policing units and investments into surveillance technologies appeared in France (Dikeç, 2006, p. 63-65). Ultimately, the beginning of the new millennium marks the important turning point since when the spirit of zero tolerance approach transformed repression into the best tool of prevention (Mucchielli, 2018, p. 189).

Even though the neoliberal and technocratic approaches to governing made their appearance in France, there was one crucial difference concerning the government's role. While in the US, the renewed interest in security coupled with reforms promoting downsizing governmental agencies, programmes, and services seen as unnecessary and non-essential, in France, the opposite was true. Therefore, hand in hand with more restrictive and repressive policing was strengthened bureaucratic apparatus and government's control of society. Consequently, this gave rise to a new system allowing both close surveillance and strict repression, creating what Loïc Wacquant call "*social panopticism*" (Wacquant, 2001, p. 407).

An emphasis on rationality and science was mostly visible during the peak of Nicolas Sarkozy's political career. During his mandate as the Minister of the Interior, one may even

use the term “*obsession*” regarding rationality and science (Bonelli & Sainati, 2004, p. 252-255). Obsession with data, numbers, and statistics accompanied by a central position of security experts was characteristic for Sarkozy’s justification of securitisation (Data, 2009).

4.6 Discourses of the Frame

After the social unrest in Vaulx-en-Velin, a critical change considering discourse around banlieues started to unfold as a new “*Republican discourse*” gradually gained ground (Fassin, 2015, p. 66). The Republican discourse became a crucial component of securitisation, creating the atmosphere of fear and insecurity that justified extraordinary measures and special treatment of a given problem. In addition, it helped to form the omnipresent Frame by linking banlieues to all sorts of problems and stereotypes, among others to delinquency, Islamic fundamentalism, danger and violence. (Narang, 2019)

Nevertheless, regarding the securitization of banlieues in the aftermath of the Vaulx-en-Velin riots and their transformation into a catch-all term for problems, it is necessary to take into account the history of and development in banlieues before the 1990 riots because even before the Vaulx-en-Velin riots, multiple overlapping discourses were, to a greater or lesser degree, identifying banlieues as sources of urban and social problems. Therefore, already at the begging of the era of intensifying securitization following the Vaulx-en-Velin riots, it is possible to identify discourses that were for a long time creating the connection between banlieues and insecurity. Before going any further, it is necessary to look more closely into these discourses, which were later, to a large extent, incorporated into the dominant Republican discourse.

4.6.1 Immigration Discourse

The discourse around migrants and problems of immigration was one of the main building blocks of the securitisation process. While the fear from others and negative approach to migrants with different socio-cultural identities were always present in the society, mistrust and restrictive approach towards foreigners gradually intensified in the second half of the twentieth century as a new wave of an anti-immigration discourse emerged and gained ground within French society (Balibar, 2001, p. 72). In this regard, Étienne Balibar (2001, p. 81) highlights the importance of French mentality and historical experience, notably the influence of “*colonial heritage*” that refers to “*prejudices, myths*

about the superiority, imperial history” that strengthen refusal of foreigners and provoke attempts to discipline and control others (Balibar, 2001, p. 78).

The 70s economic crisis may be considered as an important milestone in an approach to Islam and Muslims. Hand in hand with a growing number of social problems resulting from adverse impacts of the oil crisis on social housing districts, integration problems were becoming more and more visible. As a result, many started identifying a growing number of immigrants living in segregated localities as a source of the problems, questioning compatibility between Islam and France.

This sentiment, mostly built on prejudices and a lack of solid evidence (Mucchielli, 2000, p. 367), manifested itself in the increasing popularity of political actors identifying immigration as a threat. In this respect, it was especially the far-right political party *Front national* that capitalized on the anti-immigration and anti-Muslim sentiments and whose popularity significantly increased during the 80s (Deltombe, 2007). Regarding the evolution of anti-immigration discourse, increasing support to the political party openly criticising immigration and integration of migrants was crucial since it forced other political parties to react and introduce these topics into a broader political debate (Balibar, 2001, p. 69). As a result, media started giving more space to those criticising immigration, and similar headlines to the one asking the question: “*Will we be even French in thirty years?*” started appearing on the front pages more often. (Haski, 2016).

At the beginning of the 90s, the discourse around migration and immigrants entered its most critical phase. Through discourse practices of politicians and media, immigration became a direct threat to republican values and France’s security. On both sides of the political spectrum, claims about uncontrolled migration and increasing criminality caused by immigrants fuelled the implementation of new security practices, whose adoption was being justified and adhered by media, highlighting the need for emergency measures to ensure the nation’s survival (Bourbeau, 2014). This emphasized the connection between Islamism, immigration and banlieues on one side, and terrorism, insecurity and criminality on the other, which became one of the main pillars of the republican discourse, which created the perception that the securitization of banlieues and increasing repression were parts of “*the war of civilised world against Arabs*” (Deltombe, 2007, p. 145).

4.6.2 Insecurity Discourse

A central element of securitisation, and the reason why it was so widely accepted, was the creation of insecurity feeling through securitizing discourse emphasising threats, dangers, and the rise of criminality. Indeed, the accent on threats and worsening security conditions constituted a vital part of every other discourse. Nevertheless, it is worth treating insecurity discourse as a separate entity since various elements allow its separation and individual treatment. Most importantly, the predominant position of insecurity discourse in public debate and the intensity with which was the security-dimension emphasised by media and political actors (Mucchielli, 2000).

The fact that the discourse on insecurity should be treated separately supports Laurent Mucchielli, who identified three factors allowing the emergence of individual debate on insecurity (Mucchielli, 2010, p. 6-7). In the first place, it was an easily identifiable and well visible source of delinquency. The second factor was the rapid politicisation of security since the issue concerned a significant proportion of the electorate. Finally, the third factor which complements the two previous ones was the extensive medialisation and intensive coverage of security issues by media during the second half of the twentieth century.

While real-world events, profound changes in French society, and global context played a crucial role in the emergence and formation of the discourse (for example, the increasing immigration and economic crisis in the 70s), a less visible transformation significantly contributed to the growth of fear and sentiment of insecurity (Mucchielli, 2010, p. 7). In particular, it was the gradual atomisation of society and lack of social connections which manoeuvred many individuals into believing that insecurity should have its place on the political agenda (Mucchielli, 2010, p. 9).

4.6.3 Youth Delinquency Discourse

Discourse on youth delinquency and, more generally, youths of banlieues combines many elements of both immigration and insecurity discourses, yet due to the frequency of references to “*jeunes des banlieues*”, it is worth treating this discourse separately. Approaching the discourse around youths in this way exposes the fact that “*the phrase ‘jeunes des banlieues’ (suburban youth) has become a whole concept in itself*” (Douzet & Robine, 2015, p 40). In this regard, the *youths of banlieues* were treated as a separate object

in public discourse already at the end of the 70s. The emergence of associations between youths and insecurity should not be surprising considering the history of social housing and, in particular, the effect of severe economic crises. Considering accumulating problems, missing opportunities and declining quality of life, many suburban youths resorted to delinquency, drug consumption and minor criminality, all of which contributed to an emergence of an image of youths “*without moral and social identity*” (Mucchielli, 2000, p. 360).

In the aftermath of the Vaulx-en-Velin, the discourse around *youths of banlieues* contributed to the propagation of fear and insecurity feeling while at the same time justified police repressive and punitive approaches towards those who were treated as “*savages*” living in the “*jungle*” (Fassin, 2015, p. 90). The use of terms such as “*savage*” and “*barbarian hordes*” (Mucchielli, 2007, p. 104) in relation to suburban youths illustrates that the stereotyped image of this particular social group was not built only around delinquency, criminality and multiple social problems (Mucchielli, 2000, p. 360), but it also incorporated racial connotations and prejudices towards minority ethnic groups and different cultures (Douzet & Robine, 2015, p. 51).

4.6.4 Republican Discourse

The Republican discourse was a direct result of unprecedentedly violent riots and clashes with police in Vaulx-en-Velin. After that experience, the government progressively adopted a more authoritarian approach to banlieues to re-establish order and protect not only French cultural values, but most importantly, the integrity, and therefore the very existence of the Republic itself (Dikeç 2006, p. 75-76). This new approach was supported by the new discourse, which considered banlieues for a “*threat to values of the Republic, French identity and the authority of the state*” (Dikeç, 2013, p. 28). The Republican discourse was therefore built around the idea that banlieues and their inhabitants are incompatible with the French Republic (Tissot., 2007, p. 35-38), and it emphasized the need to fight against insecurity and exclusion caused by “*Islamic fundamentalism*”, communitarianism, and predicted ghettoization (Dikeç 2006, p. 73). In this regard, it identified banlieue as the primary source of problems and transformed it into a catch-all term. As a result, the integrity of the Republic and French values started being threatened by insecurity and problems coming from “*neighbourhoods of exile*”, “*outlaw zones*”, and “*grey zones*” (Dikeç, 2002, p. 92), which

the discourse identified as a unique source of criminality, delinquency, “*urban violence*” or even “*urban guerrilla*” (Dikeç, 2007, p. 89).

It is essential to note that apart from this new topic of the Republic in danger, the Republican discourse gradually incorporated elements from other discourses emphasizing insecurity, delinquency of youth and immigration, and progressively connected everything to the Frame of Republican order (Sedel, 2013, p. 23).

4.7 Securitization Within the Frame of Republican Order

Regarding securitisation, the Republican discourse linked everything to national security and the protection of the Republic. Notably, because republican tradition considered banlieue and its inhabitants of mostly immigrant origin as a threat to “*principles of republicanism*” (Bigo, 2002, p. 70), while at the same time it emphasised the need to preserve the government’s authority over the whole territory, defend its integrity and “*maintain the republican order*” (Mucchielli, 2007, p. 133). And it was precisely the idea of Republican order which served as a frame for the securitisation process.

In this regard, the emergence of the Frame of Republican order marked the beginning of a period of “*the return of the state*” (Dikeç, 2002, p. 94). The term itself refers to an era when the government started to fight against insecurity using security-oriented laws and measures, military urbanism and surveillance. In other words, to an era in which the government switched to a more repressive and more authoritarian approach towards banlieues aiming to regain its authority and re-establish order, intending to protect the Republic and French identity (Dikeç, 2007, p. 75-77). Even though a turn to a more repressive approach, strengthening of repression and intensification of policing did not happen overnight, it is possible to identify the aftermath of the Vaulx-en-Velin riots as the moment when the objective “*to bring order and power of the state back to banlieues*” (Dikeç, 2007, p. 95) gained momentum and made it to the top of the political agenda.

Apart from security-oriented laws and legislation aiming to fight against feared ghettoization and exclusion of ethnic communities, security measures have been progressively introduced to banlieues, one example of this being an increasing police presence. Intending to curb urban violence and tackle insecurity problems, banlieues, and other localities regarded as insecure, experienced a steep increase in the presence of police

forces referred to as “*police de proximité*” (Roché, 2004, p. XXV). Not only was the aim to ensure more effectiveness, but more importantly, it made police more present and visible for both the inhabitants and voters (Dikeç, 2007, p. 107-108).

In addition to the intensification of its presence, the police also adopted a harsher approach against delinquency and criminality, which was illustrated by a sudden rise in the deployment of police forces from specially trained units from “*Brigade Anti-Criminalité*” (BAC) in banlieues (Bonelli, 2001a). Furthermore, the rising level of intensity with which law enforcement units pursued their goals was supported by the fact that the French intelligence service established a special section dedicated to urban violence. The special section named “*Cities and Suburbs*” (Dikeç, 2002, p. 94) was created in response to violent unrest in 1990 to provide detailed surveillance and analysis of problematic urban localities (Bui-Trong, 1998, p. 225). Considering the role of French intelligence, its importance significantly increased during the First Gulf War since inhabitants of banlieues were seen as possible sources of violent opposition to the conflict (Mucchielli & Goaziou, 2007).

4.7.1 The Emergence of Master Frame

Even though the Frame of the Republican order influenced the securitisation of banlieues since the Vaulx-en-Verin riot, its importance was progressively growing hand in hand with increasingly aggressive discourse and repressive approach of security apparatus. In this regard, one political event proved to be especially significant: the conference in Villepinte, which took place in 1997 and had for the main theme problems in the urban areas. This conference was crucial because, during the conference, leading figures on the French political left identified urban security as their national priority (Mucchielli, 2007, p. 31). In this sense, the Villepinte conference paved the way for an era in which insecurity became omnipresent in French politics and society.

Consequently, an issue that was for a long time reserved for actors on the political right for a long time became a priority for actors on both sides of the political spectrum. Therefore, the political left sided with opinions emphasizing a punitive and restrictive approach to urban problems, which led to the emergence of the “*republican left*” (Wacquant, 2001, p. 409), characterized by security prioritization and robust bureaucratic and social control of those considered for sources of insecurity. In other words, with the emergence of

“republican left” banlieues “were transformed in the eyes of the state into insecure areas in need of control, where poor immigrant families were subjected to the rule of law” (Gonick, 2011, p. 33).

According to many authors, among others Laurent Mucchielli (2008, p. 7) and Laurent Bonelli with Gilles Sainati (2004, p. 246), it was precisely the Villepinte conference which transformed the right to security into a republican value and a fundamental right of each citizen. As a result, a fight against insecurity was no longer an ordinary political issue but rather a leitmotif guiding other political decisions and actions. In addition, a fight against insecurity unified political actors on different sides of the political spectrum, and the same pattern also appeared among media where the opposition to securitisation and anti-delinquency measures was almost non-existent.

Although the conference in Villepinte represented an essential milestone in the securitisation process, the era of the most intensive securitisation unfolded after the 2002 presidential and parliamentary elections, which brought actors on the political right to power. It was not by accident that actors on the political right managed to gain power over the parliament and the presidency. Over the years, an omnipresent discourse on insecurity, images of criminality and violence, and other elements of emerging Frame led to a growth of fear and the internalisation of insecurity feeling among the voters. Even though the left reflected the growing importance of the insecurity issue, which illustrates notably the Villepinte conference, it was the political right that capitalised on the demand for security the most (Roché, 2014, p. 156).

Furthermore, the international context in the early 2000s played into the hands of those emphasizing the need to fight against insecurity. In this regard, it was notably a growing awareness about international terrorism and the September 11 attacks, which served as another motive for security-oriented measures and further securitization (Mucchielli, 2007, p. 150). Taken together, international context and extensive politicisation of insecurity and criminality by the actors on the political right fuelled the demand for security and brought those offering a hard-line approach and stern measures to power (Data, 2009, p. 147). Therefore, not only was the issue of insecurity extensively politicised during the political campaign preceding presidential and parliamentary elections, but in addition to that, it remained a number one priority for years to come.

In 2002 Jacques Chirac entered his second term in the presidential office, and Lionel Jospin's leftist government was replaced by Jean-Pierre Raffarin, in which Nicolas Sarkozy took office as Minister of the Interior. And it is precisely in this moment when the Frame of Republican order became omnipresent and emerged as a *master frame* that guided activities of government, state institutions and "*various groups within a state or society in pursuit of a common cause*" (Watson, 2012, p. 291). The era of the most intensive Frame was thus connected to Nicolas Sarkozy who, both during his mandate as Minister of the Interior and later as the President of the Republic, acted as the most emblematic figure of securitisation and the most significant upholder of the Frame of Republican order. In fact, Nicolas Sarkozy himself declared that his aim is to "*restore the Republican order*" (Sarkozy, 2002).

According to Mustafa Dikeç, the emphasis on security and its prioritisation well over other political issues during the era of Nicolas Sarkozy was so predominant that one can even speak about the emergence of a new ideology that guided political decisions, security practices and repressions. In this respect, Mustafa Dikeç uses the term "*Securitarian ideology*" (Dikeç, 2013, p. 25), which "*consists in the putting in place of sensible evidence that provides the conditions of possibility for the legitimate deployment of such measures and the normalisation of such practices*" (Dikeç, 2013, p. 39).

This "*sensible evidence*" became everything that preserved the insecurity feeling and persuaded the public about the need for further securitisation (Dikeç, 2013, p. 39). In this respect, anything at least partly connected to insecurity, banlieues, or social and urban problems was connected to the one dominant master frame and formed enormously favourable conditions for the securitization process. Therefore, as "*sensible evidence*" served, among other, extensive media coverage of problems in banlieues, and data presented to the public by police and other institutions. Furthermore, it was precisely the publication of data and statistics through which Nicolas Sarkozy intensively justified intensifying securitisation and legitimised his policies (Data, 2009, p. 147-149).

Data and statistics have thus become tools proving the efficiency of the new government and especially of the new Minister of the Interior, who, motivated and inspired by the idea of zero-policing and neoliberalism, needed to improve these tools for his own sake (Dikeç, 2007, p. 119-121). For example, right after he entered the office as Minister of

the Interior, the police switched from yearly publication of statistics about criminality to monthly publication to show the improving performance of police, justify a more repressive approach, and persuade the gain credibility for further securitization (Dikeç, 2013, p. 32; Mucchielli, 2007, p. 24-25).

However, the change in data publication was only part of the new “*religion du chiffre*” (Tourancheau, 2010). Most importantly, the police started focusing on less serious crimes and small delicts since it was both more profitable and way more manageable (Data, 2009, p. 159). Instead of more serious crimes, even highly trained units prioritised random traffic controls, baseless identity checks and disproportional targeting of drug users instead of their dealers (Tourancheau, 2010). In this regard, it is crucial to consider Sarkozy’s decision to dismantle the *police de proximité*, and to replace its units with more extensive use of national police, since a turn to more repression was more readily accepted by units lacking the connection to the local community (Mucchielli & Goaziou, 2007; Data, 2009, p. 154-156).

Apart from police reforms and reorganisation of their work, it is possible to illustrate continuing securitisation on the fact that between 2002-2007, Nicolas Sarkozy initiated 21 laws and 21 decrees on security (Dikeç, 2013, p. 33). Among these laws stood out notably “*Loi d’orientation et de programmation sur la sécurité intérieure*” and “*Loi sur la sécurité quotidienne*”, which not only gave more authority to police but most importantly enabled its empowerment both through the number of units and new military-like equipment (Mouhanna, 2007, p. 37-39). As a result, a new type of non-lethal pistol known as the Flesh Ball found its way to the equipment of police (Fassin, 2015, p. 63) in order to fight against “*new mafias*” (Mucchielli, 2007, p. 154) and “*reconquer*” “*lawless zones*” (Rigouste, 2008, p. 89).

The introduction of Flesh Ball guns previously used during military missions in foreign countries was a direct consequence of a turn towards a purely repressive approach towards banlieues and concrete illustration of urban militarization, which accelerated during Sarkozy’s era. Apart from Flesh Ball guns, it is worth mentioning that police units frequently received training in military techniques and methods to reflect urban settings better (Rigouste, 2008, p. 89-96). The militarisation of an approach to suburban districts was also illustrated by changes in discourse, where expressions such as “*war against delinquency*”,

“*all-out war against delinquency*”, or “*war against violent gangs*” connected insecurity and violence in banlieues to images of war and conflict in a foreign country. These images and associations in great part facilitated further repression and extreme securitisation (Fassin, 2015, p. 76).

The incorporation of war evoking terminology into securitisation discourse targeting banlieues was a direct result of intensifying Republican discourse. Even though the Republican discourse gradually strengthened and justified robust policing and repression since its emergence in the aftermath of the Vaulx-en-Velin riots, it was notably during Nicolas Sarkozy's era when this discourse emphasised threats to the Republic became omnipresent. The 2002 elections thus marked the beginning of a period characterised by unprecedentedly intensive securitisation discourse justifying increasing police presence and repression as parts of the fight against “*barbarism*” (Mouhanna, 2007, p. 39) and “*republican conquest on the menaced territory*” (Fassin, 2015, p. 99).

Such “*conquest*” was mainly relying on the use of new technologies and notably on the installation of CCTV cameras in given localities. Investments into surveillance technologies started growing after the September 11 terrorist attacks, a tendency which only accelerated with Sarkozy's technocratic approach to security management that perceived video surveillance technologies as “*all-purpose tool*” (Heilmann, 2008, 115).

Indeed, the use of surveillance technologies did not start after the turn of the millennium. Nevertheless, contrary to the post-September 11 attacks era, the installation of CCTV cameras in the 90s was regarded as a violation of privacy and an attack on individual freedom. As a result, attempts by municipalities to install these technologies were often met with opposition from inhabitants and refusal from higher authorities (i, 2011, p. 6-9). Nevertheless, this approach quickly changed with intensifying securitization as investments into video surveillance grew by 118 per cent between 1993 and 2003 (Heilmann, 2008, p. 114). However, the introduction of surveillance technologies into the public space was only one dimension of the securitization of urban space. Hand in hand with new technologies prevailed the view emphasizing the need to increase security through urban planning. This form of securitization aimed to create urban space more controllable and resulted in removing many public utilities and creating fences and barriers aiming to control better and limit those identified as being problematic (Oblet, 2008, p. 63-71; Gonick, 2001, p. 27).

Given these points, it becomes evident that intensive securitization, aggressive discourse and emphasis on the fight against insecurity had the same leitmotif. While this thesis operates with the concept of the Frame of Republican order, it is possible to regard the government's obsession with security as the specific *regime of truth* or a new kind of ideology. In this respect, it is necessary to consider an important role played by French media and security experts, who significantly contributed to the establishment of the Frame and mostly supported the securitization of banlieues.

4.7.2 Role of Media

A closer look at the work of media reveals the prevailing consensus about the prioritization of insecurity-related problems, which significantly contributed to the creation and strengthening of the Frame of Republican order and was gradually fuelling demand for an adequate political response to medialised problems (Bonelli, 2008, p. 244). However, it is crucial to consider that media interest in suburban localities and social problems did not appear overnight. Since the 70s, worsening living conditions in banlieues and the gradual accumulation of social problems draw media attention to banlieues. However, it was not until the 90s when media started placing less emphasis on these social problems and began focusing almost exclusively on issues of insecurity and violence. It was nothing else than the Vaulx-en-Velin riots, during which media transmitted pictures of burning cars, clashes with police and violence into every household in France, that triggered this change in media's approach to banlieues (Sedel, 2013, p. 287-299).

Hand in hand with a surge in media coverage was happening a vital change concerning a diversity of issues presented to the public. In contrast to previous decades, most regional and national media uniformly adopted leitmotif of insecurity regardless of ideological and political bias. That is not to say that the reporting about violence and insecurity reached the same frequency on pages of right-leaning regional paper and national television, but rather than any other banlieue-related problem was hardly covered and presented to the public. The beginning of the 90s thus marked the beginning of a period of decline for issues previously dominating in media discourse that were progressively replaced by reports on "*urban problems*", "*problems with banlieues*", and the "*rise of insecurity*" (Bonelli, 2008, p. 207). As a result, mainstream media started forging an image of violent and dangerous banlieues, which was significantly facilitating securitisation and

uncontestably fit in with strengthening Republican discourse. Furthermore, public and media pressure forced politicians and responsible actors to focus more on insecurity, but an intensive medialisation gradually incorporated tensions and animosity deeply into society (Sedel, 2013, p. 62-63).

The number of programmes, special reports, and news reportages dedicated to insecurity culminated during the presidential and the parliamentary elections in 2002. While it is almost impossible to estimate the full extent of media coverage of insecurity, delinquency, violence, and other problems related to banlieues, it is possible to illustrate the media frenzy over these issues on TV news data. More specifically, at least 18 766 segments on crimes were broadcasted solely between January 1 and May 5, 2002 (Bonelli, 2008, p. 207).

Nevertheless, it is hard to judge the media's obsession with insecurity and delinquency when these were the news that appealed to the public, and a prospect of popularity and financial gains was of great importance for media and journalists who presented each day new revelations, scandals and news about banlieues (Bonelli & Sainati, 2004, p. 287). In order to satisfy the demand, media adopted a selective approach to information and adjusted news according to the presented narrative, intending to attract and consequently preserve high numbers of viewers and readers (Mucchielli 2007, p. 18). An essential role in this strategy was played by all sorts of 'security experts' who gained privileged access to media and were allowed to present their vision of a grim future (Sedel, 2013, p. 33). The omnipresence of experts may be illustrated by the fact that security experts, police officers and public officials represented more than 75 per cent of guests in television programmes dedicated to delinquency, insecurity and urban violence, which were transmitted between 1995 to 2002 (Bonelli, 2008, p. 210). While security experts in media facilitated securitisation, it was not the only way a new type of expert knowledge dedicated to urban violence expressed itself. This new type of expertise was becoming more and more important and demanded hand in hand with rising insecurity feeling, and so were all sorts of security experts and specialised institutions.

4.7.3 Influence of Security Experts

Regarding the amplification of discourses and maintaining of the Frame, the role of specialised educational institutions and research institutes was vital since they provided expert knowledge to the police and politicians, which guided decision-making and justified steps adopted in order to fight against insecurity. Moreover, the presumed credibility of security experts and their work helped to facilitate securitisation moves and justify controversial decisions in the public's eyes.

The increasing demand for rationality and science knowledge led to a sudden increase of experts inside and outside academia. Their number steadily augmented as educational institutions reflected public demand and provided students with the possibility to obtain security expertise (Bonelli & Sainati, 2004, p. 260). In this respect, it is worth looking at the cooperation between police experts and Paris University, which led to creating a specialised educational programme dedicated to urban violence (Mucchielli, 2000, p. 355). Although it can be said that the education programme in itself did not have a significant impact on overall securitisation or discourses on its own, it facilitated the creation of police-security experts nexus.

Regarding the credibility of security experts, it is essential to note that among the most prominent institutions providing expert knowledge was the *Institut des Hautes Études sur la Sécurité Intérieure* funded by the Ministry of Interior. In other words, seemingly impartial expert knowledge on urban violence was provided by a research institute administered directly by the Ministry of Interior and closely connected to its personal and organisational structures. In this regard, it is possible to question its objectivity and the ability to make unbiased conclusions (Mucchielli, 2000, p. 352). Despite this biased position, the work of experts working for the *Institute des Hautes Études sur la Sécurité Intérieure* as well as other security experts helped to legitimise intensifying security measures and creeping securitisation.

4.8 Effect of Securitization of Banlieues

4.8.1 Social and Spatial Segregation

Intensive securitization influenced by the omnipresent Frame of Republican order had a severe effect on banlieues and their inhabitants, who were identified as sources of insecurity and threat to society. One of the most visible effects of repression, policing, and securitization was the growing segregation of banlieues and their inhabitants and their exclusion from majoritarian society (Dikeç, 2007, p. 119-121).

In this regard, it is crucial to note that most banlieues experienced adverse effects caused by spatial segregation for decades. Whether it was long-time neglect of social problems, lack of opportunities or increased demands for mobility, the spatial segregation had a severe effect on inhabitants of banlieues. At this point, it is essential to emphasise that it was not only the actual distance in space but rather a lack of connections and several artificially created barriers that defined the intensity of spatial segregation. An example of such a barrier may serve transport infrastructure or industrial zone, making movement even between neighbouring urban areas too difficult, if not impossible (Delarue, 1991, p. 26-33).

Nevertheless, hand in hand with intensifying securitization, growing social polarisation gradually widened the gap between different urban areas and their inhabitants (Maurin, 2004, p. 6-7). As a result, regardless of proximity in physical space, inhabitants of many social housing districts were excluded from the majoritarian society, whether through differences in ethnicity, socio-economic background or because of artificially created categories and spatial fragmentation.

4.8.2 Discrimination of Inhabitants

As a result of securitisation and media-political discourse, not only were whole urban districts excluded from the rest of the city, but the same was happening to its inhabitants. In this respect, discourses, prejudices and categorisation contributed, among other things, to the association of inhabitants of banlieues to almost every problem in society while at the same time marginalised their real needs and sources of distress (Dikeç, 2007, p. 74). Therefore, they get the sentiment of being second-category citizens, and everyday life's reality confirmed that assumption.

An important factor contributing to this sentiment was growing tension between inhabitants and police resulting from repressions and unfair treatment (Mouhanna, 2007, p. 38-39). In this regard, multiple factors have contributed to this system favouring police impunity. Most importantly, it was the punitive and repressive approach of police towards delinquency initiated by Sarkozy's police reforms and the emphasis on efficiency. Nevertheless, while it is possible to identify the police approach emphasising numbers and discourses portraying banlieues as places of criminality as sources of mutual animosity, the disinterest of the rest of society equally affected the overall negative experience. In addition, gradual empowerment of the police and the emphasis on its role in a fight against insecurity created a system that ignored police failures, questionable behaviour and even unlawful treatment of citizens. In this respect, the lack of proper legislation and the missing system of checks and balances controlling police work was the most crucial problems (Amnesty International, 2009, p. 6-13).

One social group was especially experiencing the most adverse effect of repressive police approach and unfair treatment: suburban youths and, most importantly, those of immigrant origin. This group of "*ever-younger delinquents*" (Mucchielli, 2007, p. 156) was extensively targeted by police and experienced the most harmful effects of securitisation. As a result, tensions and frustration increased, and in addition, any remaining trust in authorities gradually disappeared and was replaced by hostility and distrust (Fassin, 2015, p. 68). Securitisation and repressive approach to banlieues have therefore resulted in a paradoxical situation. On one side were proclamations of officials, politicians and responsible authorities, which emphasised a need to resolve problems of social segregation, while on the other, securitization, xenophobia and racism contributed to stigmatisation, discrimination and further segregation (Busquet, Hérouard & Saint-Macary, 2016, p. 63).

4.8.3 Stigmatisation

In addition, securitizing discourse and problems emphasised by media and public figures gradually stigmatised inhabitants of banlieues. As a result, those having the address in banlieues became excluded from the majoritarian society since the address itself became a stigma that determined future relationships with other social groups and their work opportunities (Delarue, 1991, p. 26) quality of life (Bourdieu, 1999, p. 125).

Regarding the effects of stigmatisation, it may be helpful to distinguish between two dimensions. While in the first place, stigma had been negatively affecting an approach of others to inhabitants of stigmatised areas, it also gradually transformed how those inhabitants perceived themselves and what they thought about their neighbourhood.

Firstly, the stigma further intensified the isolation of certain social groups and weakened social cohesion. As a result of securitization, many banlieues become no-entry zones for non-inhabitants, which further tore apart most existing social ties as others started avoiding stigmatised areas. In addition to that, negative connotations, prejudices and stigmatists connected to banlieues transferred to its inhabitants, accompanying them every time they went outside of their districts and their places of residence (Desage, Journal & Sala Pala, 2014, p. 130). Consequently, not only did things like finding decent employment become incredibly complicated, but those having the address in social housing districts had started encountering discrimination and prejudices in their everyday life. After all, banlieues and their inhabitants had been associated with criminality, insecurity, problems with drugs, and anything which was considered as a deviation from accepted behaviour (Delarue, 1991, p. 24-26).

Secondly, the stigmatisation had a profound impact on the mindset of inhabitants. In this respect, it is essential to consider what Pierre Bourdieu (1999, p. 129) describes as the “*effect of the quartier*”. According to his writing, stigmatised areas gradually degrade their inhabitants, who adopt a negative approach to their living area and act according to it. In addition, they internalise the idea that the stigma is based on truth, and thus there is no point in opposing it. Ultimately, their behaviour and actions are entirely in line with expectations and with given stigma.

The internalisation of stigma and adopting a negative identity in banlieue was especially easy since there were very few reasons to rebut negative prejudices and stigmas coming from the majoritarian society (Roché, 2014, p. 198). Besides, weak social liens, lack of social cohesion, degradation of housing, criminality and violence were parts of the everyday reality of inhabitants of “*ghettos*” (Maurin, 2004), which made resistance to the internalisation of stigma extremely difficult.

4.8.4 Neglect of Problems

Apart from the adverse effects of securitization, it is crucial to consider that during the era of the Frame of Republican order, investments into banlieues and ‘problematic’ urban districts focused mainly on insecurity. In other words, maintaining security and the integrity of the Republic became so important that it led to a refusal of complex problems and the lack of interest in more suitable solutions to pressing issues (Mouhanna, 2007, p. 41). For that reason, many deeply rooted structural problems remained unresolved and were intentionally overlooked and marginalised. As a result, structural problems connected to suburban localities and social housing districts, which already in the 90s resulted in violent riots following the incident in Vaulx-en-Velin, persisted, and in many ways, even worsened.

These structural problems and social inequalities were primarily visible in ZUSs. The category of *Zones Urbaines Sensibles* was created to identify urban districts where multiple overlapping problems contributed to rising social inequality and the city’s growing polarisation around socio-economic lines (Wacquant, 2007). This division can be nicely illustrated on some data regarding unemployment, which was in general two-times and even three-times bigger in ZUSs than was the national average. More precisely, the worst unemployment rate was among the young adults and adolescents, where it mainly varied between 30% and 40% (Mucchielli & Goaziou, 2007), and the probability of being without a job was disproportionately higher among those inhabitants of immigrant origin. Furthermore, the same pattern was visible on education data, which identified ZUSs as areas with the highest drop-out rate and lowest educational achievements (Brévan, 2004).

While the intention behind creating the new zone was to prioritise problems in the most disadvantaged urban districts, this goal was hard to achieve. Especially since attempts to address problems in ZUSs were taking place within the existing Frame and were therefore accompanied by penalisation, stigmatisation, and intensifying securitisation (Busquet, Hérouard & Saint-Macary, 2016, p. 63). Therefore, instead of complex solutions and amelioration of the situation, banlieues and their inhabitants became more and more segregated from the society and were treated as second-category citizens.

4.9 The 2005 Riots

In this context of overall neglect of problems, intense securitisation, unfair treatment, and discrimination, refusal of majoritarian society reached a breaking point, and many inhabitants of banlieues lost a sense of belonging to the national community (Douzet & Robine, 2015, p. 51-52). This was notably the case for youths, who were at the same time stigmatized by political and media discourse and economically and socially segregated from the rest of society. As a result, many accepted violence as the only way of communication (Mucchielli & Goaziou, 2007).

Fifteen years after the uprising in Vaulx-en-Velin, which marked the beginning of intensive securitisation and framing of banlieues, unprecedentedly violent riots broke out in banlieues around Paris. Frustration and anger of inhabitants degenerated into a conflict after two incidents in Clichy-sous-Bois sparked a flame of hate against the police and the State. The first event which triggered a wave of protests in the banlieue was the death of two adolescents who tragically died in an attempt to evade police control. While protests after this tragic accident remained confined to the same banlieue, this event ignited pre-existing tensions and animosity towards police reached its tipping point in localities across France.

Yet, it was mainly the second event that initiated riots in other banlieues. During a clash between police and inhabitants of banlieue in Clichy-sous-Bois, three days after the death of two youths, a tear gas grenade exploded in front of the mosque, which had to be consequently evacuated. Due to the high level of tensions, unclear details and rumours about intentions behind the use of the grenade, this particular event became a symbol of the government's repressive approach, intolerance and discrimination. Therefore, it was October 30, which marked the beginning of nationwide protests which paralysed France for roughly three weeks. In this regard, the scale of violence and intensity of riots may be illustrated by the fact that on November 8, the President declared a state of emergency in the metropolitan area and mobilised tens of thousands of police officers and gendarmes across France. Regarding the Paris banlieues where riots were the most violent, up to 11 500 policemen were mobilised per day, and for weeks banlieues resembled more closely places of war than suburbs of Paris (Mucchielli & Goaziou, 2007).

Comparing 2005 urban riots to war might seem exaggerated, but unlike the war in some faraway countries, these riots were happening in France's interior. Even though no

casualties and presumably no lethal weapons were used, damaged property, burnt cars, and destroyed buildings sufficiently illustrated the intensity of the ‘conflict’. According to the official sources, almost 10 000 cars and 30 000 trash cans and wheeled bins were set to fire. In this regard, almost 140 buses were demolished or burnt in the Paris metropolitan area only. Furthermore, many public buildings, seen as symbols of the State’s repression and control, were looted or ignited (Mucchielli & Goaziou, 2007).

At the same time, however, banlieues in Marseille remained calm, despite being considered as one of the most problematic and dangerous in France. Instead of burning cars, damaged public buildings, and violence against police that were omnipresent in banlieues across France, life in Marseille’s banlieues hardly differed (Dubreuil, 2007). The next chapter focuses on the securitization process in Marseille during the Frame of Republican order to identify reasons why were adverse effects of intensive securitization less visible and what made the reaction to the Frame different.

5. Securitization of Banlieues in Marseille

5.1 Emergence of Marseille’s Banlieues

5.1.1 History of Social Housing

The development of social housing in France in the aftermath of the Second World War was guided by the need to address pressing issues with insufficient housing qualities and its shortage. Not only were these issues identical for all densely populated urban areas and broadly speaking to the whole of France, but quite identical was also the way how cities approached the urban development and how they addressed the lack of housing.

Nevertheless, despite the gravity of the housing crisis, very few social housing projects had been constructed in Marseille during the first decade after the war. This development was actually in line with the pre-war situation, when contrary to other major cities and towns, Marseille constructed a relatively small number of social housing structures (Peraldi & Samson, 2006, p. 227). Subsequent lack of housing was reflected by the emergence of slums in the centre of the city. While these temporary structures started appearing already after the First World War, it was notably after the Second World War

when the number of slums and people living in the significantly increased and created a "*city within a city*", which in 1960 counted more than 10000 inhabitants.

A growing number of people without proper housing and the fact that many slums were located right in the centre of the city surrounding the central train station motivated authorities to act (Peraldi, Duport & Samson, 2015, p. 57). However, it was not until 1960 when, almost a decade later than in other large cities, the construction of big social housing estates became a priority for the urban development in Marseille. Even though the construction of large housing complexes was progressively put to an end already in 1976 when changes in the state's urban and social policies led to a different approach towards social housing, a significant number of these buildings was actually constructed³, and in this regard, Marseille's urban development was no different than in other large cities in France (Peraldi & Samson, 2006, p. 89).

On the contrary, there was an important difference concerning the locations of new social housing complexes compared to other large urban settlements. Contradictory to cities like Paris or Lyon, the entirety of new social housing was located not far from existing urban areas and was situated in relative proximity to existing services and facilities. The reason why new development took place within the existing urban area was simple. It took advantage of brownfields and non-residential areas situated next to railways, factories, warehouses and other localities of similar nature. This was especially true for housing projects built during fifteen years between 1960 and 1975, in the 13th, 14th and 15th districts of Marseille, giving rise to what will be later known under the name "*Quartiers Nord*" (Peraldi & Samson, 2006, p. 227).

Despite the geographical proximity, the previous industrial character of localities where new housing complexes were constructed paved the way for future problems. To illustrate, newly built residential areas often lacked adequate services and sufficient transport infrastructure, which would connect these districts to the rest of the city. Considering this division, it was especially the position of railway tracks, which separated most of the new

³ In the period of just fifteen years was built more than 70 per cent of social housing capacities disponible in Marseille in 2003 (Peraldi & Samson, 2006, p. 227).

districts from existing residential areas and created what may be considered a border wall between two communities. As a result, Quartiers Nord experienced similar turbulent development as other banlieues in France, such as gradual concentration of inhabitants of immigrant origin with bad socio-economic backgrounds, impoverishment and progressive degeneration of housing accompanied by the departure of businesses and middle-class families. Therefore, even though large social housing complexes in Marseille were right from the beginning less isolated and were not burdened by spatial segregation, it did not mean they were easily accessible and were spared of problems connected to other banlieues. While the accumulation of these problems in northern districts of Marseille stemmed directly from artificially created barriers and the fact that in these districts was constructed the majority of large apartment housing complexes, simultaneously running impoverishment and rise of problems in the centre of the city was unique for Marseille.

5.1.2 Impact of Economic Crisis

In the mid-80s, the economic and social crisis hit Marseille. Since the previous decade, the economic recession and decline of certain industries gradually transformed the city, leaving behind abandoned industrial buildings and closed factories. In this respect, parts of the city that were first hit by the economic decline were those located next to closing factories and their transport infrastructure. Notably impacted were thus districts of Belle de Mai, Kalliste, Saint-Mauront, and St. Lazare, located not far from the centre of Marseille, for which the beginning of the economic decrease in the late 70s marked the beginning of a steep decline (Peraldi, Duport & Samson, 2015, p. 20). With the closing businesses and economic regression, a loss of jobs became inevitable, and inhabitants of those areas were set to fall into poverty and became trapped in a difficult socio-economic situation.

Furthermore, despite being the most important port in Europe once (Peraldi, Duport & Samson, 2015, p. 20), the port of Marseille no longer occupied a strong position in international commerce and its demise illustrated overall decline. However, a final blow to Marseille economy and notably to its central districts came with changes in France's economic and political relations with former colonies and notably with the North African region (Peraldi & Samson, 2006, p. 9). For decades, Marseille was a crucial transitory point for people and goods between France and North African countries. This led to strong cultural and economic relations and the emergence of informal economic structures, which served as

the only source of revenue for those in the most precarious situation. The first severe blow to fruitful economic relations came with the economic crisis and the impoverishment of a significant part of Marseilles inhabitants. Nevertheless, dynamic relations between Marseille and the North African countries definitively ended with the Algerian civil war, which was the cause for the weakening of relations between France and its former North African colonies ending in the introduction of visa requirements (Borja et al., 2010, p. 22).

For a Mediterranean city with a significant proportion of inhabitants of North African origin and strong economic and social connections with these countries, a new form of relations between North African countries and France proved to be devastating. With the loss of connections with Algeria and Morocco, many merchants have left the city, leaving behind closed businesses, while others found themselves deprived of opportunities and sources of revenue (Peraldi & Samson, 2006, p. 183). As a result, the centre of the city experienced a significant increase in poverty rates and a wave of urban depopulation followed by degradation of housing, the rise of criminality and subsequent problems. While it is crucial to note that depopulation was already in place since the 70s global economic crises, the loss of connection with North African countries made the situation markedly worse (Borja et al., 2010, p. 33).

The loss of relations and subsequent dramatic socio-economic changes transformed Marseille's centre into a locality that shared many common characteristics with banlieues situated around other large French cities. Therefore, during the second half of the twentieth century, two areas in Marseille became known for accumulating social problems whose nature was similar to those linked to banlieues on the outskirts of other large French cities. The first area emerged in the north of Marseille and was constituted from parts of 13th, 14th, 15th and 16th urban districts forming so-called "*Quartiers Nord*". The second area sharing many characteristics with the previous one, was formed in three districts located right in the centre of Marseille (Raquet & Mucchielli, 2017, p. 11-12).

5.1.3 Differences of Marseille's Banlieues

One of the most crucial characteristics of these localities was the level of unemployment and omnipresent poverty of inhabitants⁴, who were mostly of immigrant origin (Geisser & Lorceri, 2011, p. 41-42). Not surprisingly, poverty and precarity of a significant number of inhabitants resulting from decreasing economic activity between Marseille and North African countries and overall economic decline of Marseille contributed to an increase of criminality. Regarding criminality, it was not a new phenomenon in this port city as an international port always attracted illicit and illegal activities, which influenced the rest of the city. In other words, delinquency and criminality were always part of life in the city, whether it was because of the drug trade, existing shadow market or trafficking (Mucchielli, 2013b, p. 3-4). Nevertheless, the declining importance of the international port and weakening relations with North African countries led to important changes on the map of criminality. Notably, in Quartiers Nord, these changes led to a growing drug trade, which in significant part compensated for lost economic relations but at the same time caused a severe increase in rates of drug-related violence and serious crimes⁵ (Peraldi, Duport & Samson, 2015, p. 79; Pujol, 2016).

5.2 Securitization within the Frame of Republican Order

5.2.1 Immigration Discourse

Regarding the securitization of Marseille's banlieues within the Frame of Republican order, it is necessary to consider that especially an anti-immigration sentiment and discourse connecting immigrants to insecurity and violence existed in Marseille for decades. Even though the port of Marseille and its industries attracted a significant number of foreigners, and the city was regarded as a cosmopolitan one, xenophobia and nationalism profoundly

⁴ In this respect, it is important to note that median income in Marseille is in the long-term already one of the lowest in France and in concerned localities, it may not even reach half of the median (Geisser & Lorceri, 2011, p. 41). Based on data from 2013, 25 per cent of adults are unemployed on average, and this rate is getting even worse among youths and young adults, where it reaches 38 per cent (Mucchielli, 2013a, p. 51).

⁵ In fact, the rate of violence and criminality connected to the drug market is one of a few factors which significantly differs in Quartiers Nord and the centre of Marseille, since it is notably in more remote areas of northern districts where drug-related violence takes place (Mucchielli, 2013a, p. 33-35).

affected the acceptance of each newly arriving group of migrants (Mourlane & Regnard, 2013, p. 21).

While at the beginning of the twentieth century, the Italian minority was identified as a source of violence and insecurity (Mourlane & Regnard, 2013, p. 21), this perception gradually changed in the second half of the twentieth century as growing economic and cultural exchange with North African countries, hand in hand with an increasing number of immigrants of African origin, formed an insecurity discourse around non-European migrants. The xenophobic attitude and refusal of immigration may be illustrated on examples obtained from the pages of the local press, such as from the local periodical *La Tribune* and *Le Meridional*, that identified Marseille as "*the city of immigrants*" who replace local population (Mourlane & Regnard, 2013, p. 52), and declared that the city has "*enough of luetic Algerians, enough of Algerian pimps, enough of Algerian lunatics, enough of Algerian murderers!*" (Domenech, 1973).

Therefore, despite the existence of the cosmopolitan image of the city, a significant part of inhabitants considered immigrants and their families as second-category citizens and drew direct lines between them and problems in the city. In this respect, the international context proved to be especially important since it often reinforced these sentiments and aggressive rhetoric (Geisser & Lorceri, 2011, p. 52). Given these points, regarding immigration, the Frame did not necessarily introduce new issues into the public debate but, among certain groups of inhabitants, amplified the anti-immigration sentiments and demands for a hard-line approach against those without French origin.

5.2.2 The Frame Reaches Marseille

The emergence of the Frame of Republican order had a significant effect on the securitization in Marseille, where the securitization process started following a similar logic as in other French cities. In this regard, an omnipresent Republican discourse and politicization of insecurity led to the same outcomes as in the whole of France, one of them being notably increasing support to right-wing parties. Before continuing, it is essential to note that even before the emergence of the Republican discourse, conservative parties and actors on the political right had decisive voters' support in the region. Nevertheless, it was predominantly conservative politician Jean-Claude Gaudin who capitalized on the

Republican discourse and strengthening Frame and became mayor in 1995, amplifying the issues connected to the Frame and introducing them into local political discourse (Peraldi & Samson, 2006, p. 29-30).

Gaudin's emphasis on law and order intensified notably during the election campaign for the second term, which took place in the context shaped by the September 11 attacks, and during the first months after Gaudin's victory when the emphasis on republican values, security and order became the backbone of his policies and discourse. As a result, streets in the centre of Marseille became suddenly "*too coloured*" and "*invaded by foreign population*" (Peraldi & Samson, 2006, p. 29). Furthermore, it was not only Jean-Claude Gaudin, but generally all right-wing political actors whose calls for more security and stricter approach against migrants and delinquents were positively accepted by a significant part of the public. This was especially true for the party Front National and its leader Jean-Marie Le Pen, who gained 22% of votes during the first round of the 2002 presidential elections (Peraldi & Samson, 2006, p. 93).

In addition, right-wing political actors did not own their political success only to the ongoing securitization and nationwide presence of the Frame, but also to the work of local media who sided with those promoting a hard-line approach against insecurity. While national media and political discourse on a national level contributed to creating a negative image of Marseille (Verges & Pruneau), it was notably the work of regional and local press which strengthened the sentiment of insecurity among inhabitants. Nevertheless, this convergence between local and national media gradually weakened, and especially after Gaudin's first re-election, local media started building a more positive image of Marseille.

5.3 Resistance to Securitisation

Despite the existing Frame and widely accepted nationwide securitization of suburban areas in French cities, which created perfect settings for the securitization process in Marseille, the opposite started to happen after Gaudin's second victory in municipal elections and paradoxically, Jean Claude Gaudin, a conservative right-wing politician, became the most important figure that prevented the Frame of Republican order from gaining enough resonance and accelerating the securitization process. In this respect, it is possible to consider Gaudin's populist approach to politics and his ambitions to gain as many votes as

possible for the main reason. This approach to politics may be illustrated by the fact that while he spoke about insecurity and reiterated anti-immigration discourse to gain support for his second-term re-election among conservative and right-wing voters, he openly supported the construction of the Great Mosque in Marseille (Peraldi & Samson, 2006, p. 282).

Jean Claude Gaudin's support for the Great Mosque project nicely illustrates his opportunistic and populist approach to politics. Considering the Great Mosque project, the intention to gain political points was especially striking because even though the project of the Great Mosque with fifty-meter minaret appeared for the first time in 1937, it took more than 60 years for local politicians to address the issue because even among the Muslim population, the project was considered controversial and irrelevant (Peraldi & Samson, 2006, p. 280-281). The use of this project by Gaudin nicely illustrates his intention to please as many voters as possible, which prevented intensive securitization from happening.

In addition to the double-faced politics, another characteristic sign of Gaudin's approach to politics weakened the influence of the nationwide Republican discourse and the effect of the Frame. That was a growing emphasis on the difference between Marseille and the rest of the country, which was artificially intensified by most local politicians who connected their identity and political careers to the uniqueness of Marseille and its difference from the metropole (Peraldi & Samson, 2006, p. 98-100). The proclaimed speciality of Marseille was not only defined by the opposition to everything "*national*" and "*Parisian*", but most importantly by the emphasis on the cosmopolitan nature of the city and its ethnic diversity. In this respect, local politicians' political identity and discourse predetermined their reserved approach to the Frame of Republican order.

5.3.1 Image of Cosmopolitan City

While it was notably during the era of Jean-Claude Gaudin when local politicians uncovered a full political potential of the discourse emphasizing the city's cosmopolitan nature, the image of "*Marseille cosmopolite*" started forming in the 80s when cultural and educational institutions started promoting tolerance and openness of the city to all communities and foreigners (Regnard, 2013). The emergence of such a cosmopolitan image stemmed notably from close historical, economic and cultural connections with French North Africa and several waves of immigration in the 20th century, which led to a city with

a heterogeneous population and multiple coexisting communities. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that these communities were, in fact, often smaller than in other French cities and much more connected to France through strong historical and cultural connections. In fact, three of the most numerous communities are Algerians, Tunisians, and Moroccans, therefore those who share the same language and part of history with France (Peraldi, Duport & Samson, 2015, p. 71-74). For this reason, it is possible to regard the politicization of Marseille's cosmopolitan image and the emphasis on multiculturalism as another strategy of local politicians used to appeal to their voters (Geisser & Lorceri, 2011, p. 55).

It was mainly during the era of Jen-Claude Gaudin when the "*cultural diversity of the city became the backbone of municipality's communication*" towards its inhabitants (Geisser & Lorceri, 2011, p. 55). And it is the emphasized "*cosmopolitan image*", which was in direct opposition to the message amplified by the Frame of Republican order denouncing different cultures and ethnics (Peraldi & Samson, 2006, p. 117). As a result, local politicians who linked their identity to the uniqueness of Marseille and its cosmopolitan nature found themselves in opposition to national politics. Considering this division, it is possible to ask why even local right-wing politicians insisted on this speciality and cosmopolitanism of Marseille in the era of omnipresent Frame and intensive securitization of banlieues in the rest of France. In this respect, Michel Peraldi with Michel Samson (2006, p. 39) and Philippe Pujol (2016, p. 212) offer a simple explanation. Identifying Marseille as special and unique allowed political actors to hide dysfunctional local governance and legitimize their ignorance of multiple problems simply by referring to differences between Marseille and other cities.

Despite this political calculation, the orientation of local politicians on cosmopolitan image and emphasis on Marseille's uniqueness significantly contributed to the sentiment that politicians were not ignoring its inhabitants' demands, particularly these of its religious and ethnic minorities. While this once again proved to be essential for local political elites who obtained support from various communities, it was equally as important for these social and ethnic groups that were regarded as second-category citizens in other French cities and were identified as sources of problems by the Frame (Charmes & Bacqué, 2016, p. 29).

5.3.2 Strong Municipal Identity

The emphasis on the image of a cosmopolitan city and the uniqueness of Marseille gradually led to the emergence of a strong community feeling and city-related identity mostly inexistent in other cities. Therefore, in contrast to other urban settlements, Marseille's inhabitants did not base their identity on religion, race, or ethnicity, but rather on the fact that they live in this Mediterranean city. In fact, the majority of Marseille's inhabitants felt a great attachment to Marseille, and notably, those living in banlieues identified themselves more as "*Marseillais*" than French.⁶ (Geisser & Lorceri, 2011, p. 270). While it is hard to name the main reason why Marseille's identity became widely accepted and interiorized by inhabitants with diverse socio-economic backgrounds (Verges & Pruneau), the politicization of a cosmopolitan image was among the most crucial ones. The politicization of Marseille's image is nicely illustrated in the discourse of local politicians who accompanied claims about the unique character of Marseille by the ostentatious use of Marseille's accents only to prove their Marseille-related identity (Peraldi & Samson, 2006, p. 98).

Another important factor that strengthened lines of inhabitants to the city and prevented the Republican frame from obtaining enough resonance was the creation of an institution promoting dialogue and understanding between communities. Such an institution was created under the name *Marseille Esperance* at the initiative of intellectuals and municipal politicians in reaction to the 1990 riots. Given the context of its creation, it is no surprise that its role was to reunite delegates of major religious groups and communities to strengthen the feeling of belonging into one big Marseille's community (Peraldi & Samson, 2006, p. 284-289).

While on the one hand, the existence of a strong municipal identity weakened other identities (Douzet & Robine, 2015, p. 41-52), such as the one connected to France. Nevertheless, on the other, it gave inhabitants of Marseille's banlieues and especially to those living in "*poor urban communities largely composed of immigrants*" a sense of belonging

⁶ The fact that Marseille's identity became more important than other identities is not only highlighted by those living in Marseille but also by the rest of the French citizens. This illustrates the fact that even in the rest of France, municipal identity often surpasses those based on ethnicity or religion (Beaman, 2010).

into the local community (Ferguson, 2012, p. 561). In addition, the existence of a single predominant identity did not only mitigate the feeling of exclusion and segregation, but it also enabled the creation of strong community feeling and social mixing among inhabitants with various religious and ethnic backgrounds. This was, in fact, another essential exception from other French cities which experienced violent riots in 2005. For example, in isolated and stigmatized banlieues situated in Nimes, many youths preferred to identify as "*non-Nimois*", which resulted in a feeling of exclusion and an adverse approach to the rest of the city and its inhabitants (Kirkness, 2014).

5.3.3 Lack of Spatial Isolation

In addition, the securitization of banlieues in Marseille took a different form because of the already mentioned spatial proximity. In this regard, contrary to most banlieues in France, which are mostly isolated and spatially segregated from existing urban structures, urban districts can be considered as Marseille's banlieues do not lack relative spatial proximity. That is not to say that they are not isolated by any means from the rest of the city. However, there is a significant difference between being one of the city's districts and not being even part of the metropolitan area, which is the case of several of Paris's banlieues. For this reason, it is not possible to speak about ghettoization and exclusion from society when referring to these districts (Peraldi, Dupont & Samson, 2015, p. 13-16).

On the contrary, the spatial proximity typical for Marseille's Quartiers Nord does not mean that they are well integrated into the city. As well as in other banlieues, there exists a unique ecosystem and distinctive way of life resulting from isolation through barriers such as railroads and motorways. Nevertheless, it is impossible to find two entirely different lifestyles coexisting next to each other as in other urban areas (Delarue, 1991, p. 63). The same is valid for the centre of the city, which, despite being poor, multi-ethnic, and burdened by various problems, did not lack integration and socialization with other inhabitants (Ascarides & Condro, 2001, p. 231). The lack of spatial segregation and relative interconnectedness between banlieues and other urban districts directly affected the Frame's resonance based on the fear of immigrants, different cultures, and deviation from the norm. This is especially because contrary to other cities with banlieues, "*where the concentration of immigrants in small areas that are socially and economically disadvantaged*" (Douzet & Robine, 2015, p. 40) help define securitizing and framing actors the difference between

normality and banlieues, clearly identify problems, and fuel the sentiment against immigration, Marseille does not offer this possibility.

Therefore, while in other French banlieues, exclusion and segregation led to a "*fracture social*" (Maurin, 2004, p. 6) refusal of society and consequently contributed to the eruption of violence in the 2005 riots, inhabitants of Marseille's banlieues were spared from these negative factors. As a result, proximity in the physical space allowed social proximity and prevented alienation of social groups (Bourdieu, 1999, p. 127).

5.3.4 Shared Poverty and Precarity

Apart from isolation, one of the main characteristics of banlieues is poverty and the bad economic situation of its inhabitants. This is illustrated by data from 2013, according to which almost 26 per cent of the overall population in Marseille lived in ZUSs defined by extreme poverty and multiple social problems (Mucchielli, 2013b, p. 14). However, contrary to other cities in France, poverty in Marseille is not a problem in a particular location or certain city districts, but instead of the large area of the city. In fact, the only part of the city that is not affected by poverty are Marseille's southern districts, which are reserved for those who can afford high living costs and housing prices (Mucchielli, 2013, p. 13).

The same socio-economic background proved to be an important factor preventing the segregation of certain groups of inhabitants. While in other banlieues, the socio-economic segregation led to a growing number of problems and insecurity that later facilitated securitization and acceptance of the Frame, in Marseille, the inexistence of socio-economic division and shared poverty strengthened social lines between people and reinforced the feeling of belonging to the city (Geisser & Lorceri, 2011, p. 267-269).

In addition, the omnipresent poverty prevented the emergence of a sentiment of insecurity and fear from a particular group of inhabitants since it was impossible to identify the source of insecurity and criminality. As a result, the Frame of Republican order lost an essential argument in its message and could not get enough resonance. In the same way, inhabitants' lack of fear and low interest in the fight against criminality did not motivate politicians and securitization actors to adopt security measures and restrictions at the same pace as in other cities with banlieues (Raquet & Mucchielli, 2017, p. 13-15).

Regarding concrete measures and changes in an approach towards insecurity, these mainly resulted from reforms and political decisions taken on the national level. Therefore, as in other French cities, Sarkozy's police reforms led to the disposal of the “*police de proximité*”, reorientation on smaller delicts, and gradual militarization of police forces (Pons, 2016, p. 46), since there was almost no difference between municipalities or regions regarding the implementation of these reforms resulting from single national policy. In addition, in 2003, new surveillance technologies found their way to the streets of Marseille after the municipality decided to install CCTV cameras in the Noailles urban district to fight against insecurity (Pujol, 2007). However, the effect of this pilot project and other security measures cannot be compared with the repressive and punitive approach adopted in other banlieues and the securitization of banlieues in Marseille did not result in tension or exclusion of certain social groups.

6. Weakening Marseille's Resistance to Securitization

The previous chapter introduced factors that prevented the Frame of Republican order from gaining enough resonance and mitigated adverse effects of intense securitization of banlieues. In this respect, they also illustrate why Marseille was spared from the 2005 riots. Nevertheless, despite the resistance of Marseille to securitization during the peak of the Frame's influence, certain factors put this resistance into danger and, in the long term, threaten to destroy this particular strength of Marseille.

6.1 Medialisation and Ongoing Securitization

Although Marseille remained calm during the 2005 riots and resisted the influence of the Frame, which in other cities contributed to the growing exclusion and segregation of those living in banlieues, medialization of problems and insecurity in Marseille has remained in place and in recent years even intensified. As a result, previously low public demand for securitization and strict approach towards banlieues and those identified as a source of delinquency has been steadily increasing, leading to the politicization of problems and security.

According to Laurent Mucchielli, the security situation and criminality in Marseille started receiving special attention in 2011 when notably national media started amplifying

the city's negative image and focusing almost exclusively on the news connected to insecurity, delinquency, and drugs. Therefore, Marseille has become regarded as a place full of criminality, and delinquent immigrants, about which are media are always prepared to inform the public (Mucchielli, 2013b, p. 2). Even though in comparison with Lyon and Paris, Marseille does not stand out in the crime statistics (Mucchielli, 2013b, p. 15-17), a closer look at the representation of Marseille in media illustrates how it gradually became a symbol of criminality in France (Pons, 2016, p. 4). While media present to the public results of special investigations, reportages with hidden cameras and broadcast countless shows showing police forces in their fight against criminality, viewers in cinema cannot escape the stereotyped negative image of Marseille built around immigration and organized crime (Mourlane & Regnard, 2013, p. 63-67).

The influence of strong medialisation may be illustrated on data from 2014 focusing on the perception of criminality among inhabitants. When asked about the evolution of crime, almost 49 per cent of inhabitants declared that criminality has dramatically increased, but at the same time, almost 43 per cent of respondents recognized that criminality is excessively medialized and disproportionally presented to the public (Racquet & Mucchielli, 2017, p. 15). As a result, even though Marseille resisted the nationwide securitization during the Frame era, the securitization discourses had been gradually intensifying and in 2014 resulted in an omnipresence of insecurity issue during municipal elections (Mucchielli, 2013a, p. 8).

As a result of medialization and dramatization of problems, dealing with crime and insecurity emerged as one of the priorities on political agendas. Not only have been local actors pressured by media and public demand, but in addition to that, criminality in Marseille emerged as an issue of national politics. An example of that was the decision of the Minister of the Interior, who in 2011 changed for the third time in two years Marseille's Prefect of Police or the Prime Minister's decision to create a special inter-ministerial commission dedicated to the issues of criminality in Marseille (Mucchielli, 2013, p. 1-2).

In addition to that, ongoing securitization has been progressively increasing the level of institutional discrimination and categorization from police forces, which notably in the centre of Marseille creates animosity towards state and municipal authorities (Racquet & Mucchielli, 2017, p. 12). This is illustrated by the growing importance of religious-based

identity among the youngest generations of Muslims living in Marseille. In other words, contradictory to the Frame era when the municipal membership and Marseille-related identity were among the majority of inhabitants more substantial than other identities, the new generation is becoming more critique towards the State and public institutions and consequently loses connection to Marseille and France (Geisser & Lorceri, 2011, p. 269-275).

Therefore, especially in recent years, negative aspects connected to securitization, previously avoiding Marseille and its inhabitants, have progressively found their way to the city. An example of this may serve the strengthening role of the national police, which almost entirely replaced municipal police units having at least certain relation to their districts and inhabitants (Geisser & Lorceri, 2011, p. 206). As a result, there is currently a risk that processes that created tensions in other large cities and contributed to the 2005 riots may have the same influence in Marseille. In this respect, it is notably the stigmatization of certain groups of inhabitants regarded as a threat to security and their internalization of this negative image that poses a problem (Mucchielli, 2013b, p. 18).

6.2 Growing Socio-Economic Polarisation

A strong community unified by omnipresent poverty was largely responsible for the resistance of Marseille's banlieues to securitization since it connected various groups of Marseille's inhabitants who faced the same problems and precarious financial situation (Ascarides & Condro, 2001, p. 231). Nevertheless, it has been possible to observe a growing socio-economic polarisation among Marseille's inhabitants over the recent years. Its adverse effects are especially visible in the central districts, where a previously strong community of socially mixed inhabitants unified by similar socio-economic backgrounds has been progressively weakening.

An important factor that significantly contributes to this process is the large-scale renovation of the centre, which is since 1995 one of the city's main priorities. That year, in cooperation with state and private actors, the municipality launched an extensive urban project under the name *Euroméditerranée* to make the centre more attractive for middle-class inhabitants and tourists (Peraldi, Duport & Samson, 2015, p. 102). In order to achieve these objectives, the *Euroméditerranée* project was following two main lines of action.

Considering the first axis of the Euroméditerranée project, its aim was the creation of a new image of Marseille built around culture and luxury (Mattina, 2014), which would allow to restart of the economy of the city and create a new identity of the city previously based on industry and international port (Pinson, 2009). For this reason, the municipality prioritized the construction of large urban projects such as the transformation of unused parts of the port into luxury shopping malls and housing and the construction of the new building for a museum dedicated to the Mediterranean. In addition to that, the second axis of the project aimed to improve the poor quality of housing in the central districts to attract middle-class inhabitants and achieve bigger socio-economic diversity (Peraldi, Duport & Samson, 2015, p. 102). In this respect, subventions and participation of the municipality motivated many owners to renovate buildings and public space, gradually bringing a vision of the new Marseille into reality (Pujol, 2016).

Regarding the intention to achieve bigger socio-economic diversity, the effect of reconstruction is highly questionable since according to findings in other cities, the reconstruction is often accompanied by selective practices and social diversification in certain districts goes hand in hand with the concentration of poor in others (Lelévrier, 2010). In addition, expensive reconstructions, increasing number of tourists and the arrival of wealthy inhabitants triggered an increase in rents and costs of living for local inhabitants. Furthermore, the changing clientele forced many local businesses to close down or reorientate on demands and expectations of the new clientele. In other words, the centre of Marseille started to gentrify, and increasing prices of rents and housing have been forcing many poor inhabitants to move out of central districts (Jourdan, 2013) threatening to destroy social capital and supportive social networks that prevent social segregation (Lees, 2461).

As a result of gentrification, those who have been unable to pay high rents have gradually become excluded from their communities and have become segregated from the rest of the city in more affordable districts (Geisser & Lorceri, 2011, p. 163). Therefore, despite weak racial and ethnic segregation, which contributed to Marseille's resistance to the Frame, wealth has been significantly weakening social connections and cohesion of Marseille's community, which is becoming more and more polarised by wealth. (Geisser & Lorceri, 2011, p. 275).

In addition, while the municipality prioritized large construction projects in the centre of Marseille, other parts of the city have been experiencing a lack of resources and funds. This is especially visible in social housing districts where the lack of investments accelerated the degradation of housing (Nicol, 2015) and contributed to the worsening quality of life of the most disadvantaged social groups (Geisser & Lorceri, 2011, p. 163-164). Apart from poor housing quality, the worsening quality of life is reflected in the underfinanced education, inadequate infrastructure, and refusal to deal with accumulating social problems (Pons, 2016, p. 31-67). In certain banlieues, the lack of investments resulted in the reduction of already insufficient public transport and even to electricity blackouts during winter (Pons, 2016, p. 31-67). In this respect, it is necessary to keep in mind that at the same time was the municipality investing in luxury hotels and megalomaniac projects oriented on everyone else, except actual inhabitants of Marseille.

6.3 Effect of Gated Communities

Another problem to the community feeling and cohesion of society is the growing number of gated communities and willing spatial segregation of middle-class inhabitants. While at the end of the 90s, mainly those who were part of the higher class chose to live in gated communities, years of securitization and medialization of insecurity created a demand for a life in closed communities shared by a significant number of middle-class inhabitants. The influence of securitization and nationwide Frame is evident since, especially from the early 2000s, most new housing projects in Marseille included artificial barriers and walls separating its inhabitants from the rest of the city (Dario & Dorier; Billard, Chevalier & Madoré, 2005).

Furthermore, not only newly built housing projects are enclosed by walls and fences, but also many of existing localities followed the same pattern. As a result, in 2013, gated communities occupied almost 13 per cent of urban surface and especially in the South of Marseille, these closed areas became omnipresent. And it is mainly in districts with a high concentration of gated communities where artificially created impermeable barriers make life more difficult. In this respect, it is notably the most vulnerable social group that suffers the most from the resulting decrease of mobility and is often forced to spend more money and time on transport (Dario & Dorier).

In addition, the growing number of gated communities and resulting spatial segregation increases the level of ignorance of other people's problems and the intensity of social segregation (Young, 1999, p. 242). As a result, society experiences the weakening of the community feeling and understanding between various social and cultural groups (Loudier-Malgouyres, 2013). Considering Marseille, where a strong community and shared municipal identity significantly reduced the resonance of the Frame of Republican order, the increasing number of gated communities should be regarded with caution.

6.4 Summary

Considering trends that influence development in Marseille closely resemble processes that contributed to the emergence of problems in banlieues in other large French cities and consequently resulted in the 2005 riots. With continuing polarisation of the city and exclusion of certain social groups, Marseille may lose its unique community and strong municipal membership unifying most of its inhabitants. In this respect, the city may transform Quartiers Nord and other localities, which serve as a refuge for those excluded from the rest of the city, into the ticking time bomb ready to explode during the future social unrest.

7. Conclusion

The thesis focused on the securitization of banlieues within the era of the Frame of Republican order, which dominated French politics since the late 90s and peaked after Jacques Chirac's re-election as the President of the French Republic. The thesis aimed to identify differences in the securitization of Marseille's banlieues and explain the causes of significantly distinctive outcomes of the securitization process in France and in Marseille.

The first part of the thesis provided the theoretical introduction to securitization and framing theory. While the first chapter summarized the development of the securitization theory after its creation by the Copenhagen School, the second chapter focused on framing and the use of the concept of the *frame* across disciplines. Finally, the chapter explained similarities between both theories and highlighted the advantages of a combined theoretical framework.

Chapter four was dedicated to the securitization of banlieues in France. Firstly, it provided an introduction into broader social and historical context and emphasized notably the existence of a specific frame that significantly influenced the form of securitization in France. In this respect, the thesis

Secondly, the chapter described the securitization process itself and highlighted its adverse effects on inhabitants of banlieues who were experiencing a dramatic increase in the level of repression, policing and control.

Regarding the securitization process in Marseille, its specificities and differences were explored in the fifth chapter. Apart from describing the securitization process and its differences, the chapter explained why preventing the omnipresent Frame of Republican order from gaining enough resonance and why neither local politicians nor Marseille's inhabitants accepted its message. By doing so, this chapter answered the research question asking about causes leading to the failure of securitization in Marseille.

Finally, chapter six provided a critical overview of the recent development in Marseille and processes that may weaken the resistance of the city to securitization in the long term. In this regard, it offered a new perspective on the socio-economic changes in Marseille, which on the one hand, make the city more attractive and well-ordered, but on the other, threaten to deepen social polarization and widen the gap between inhabitants.

In summary, in regard to the research target, the thesis achieved its goals and successfully provided answers to research questions. In this regard, the thesis provided further insight into the development of the city, and the results of the case study lead to the conclusion that while Marseille's resistance to securitization and refusal of the Frame of Republican order protected the city from adverse outcomes and social uprisings during the era of most severe repressions and most intensive securitization, multiple ongoing processes threaten to erase this advantage.

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Securitization within a frame of republican order: A case
study of Marseille's banlieues



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1. Introduction to the topic

Over the years, the term *banlieue* has become a catch-all term for violence, delinquency and countless urban and social problems. This linguistic transformation has been accompanied by an increase in security and restrictive measures aimed to pacify and control the public space. Both interlinked processes can be considered as results of intensive securitization process which emerged in the last decades of the 20th century and reached its peak during Jacques Chirac's second term in office. For this period, various terms have been used, such as the era of *securitarian ideology* (Dikec, 2013), the *return of republican state* (Dikec, 2006), or *republican order* (Mucchielli, 2007).

Securitization of banlieues characterized by aggressive discourse and implementation of repressive and security measures went hand in hand with increasing social and economic problems, stigmatisation, and negative categorization of inhabitants. Frustration stemming from securitization and underlying problems erupted in 2005, after the death of two teenagers of Maghrebian origin during the police chase and caused violent demonstrations in banlieues across whole France. These uprising and protests, which some media connoted with terms such as urban wars, lasted for weeks and affected especially banlieues in major French cities. At the same time, however, banlieues in the city of Marseille remained silent. (Beaman, 2010)

Marseille is often considered as the most dangerous city in France (Mucchielli, 2013), and its banlieues are treated as being the worst of the worst. Yet, while other banlieues revolted in reaction to increasing repression and negative discourse, inhabitants of segregated localities in Marseille were not joining in. The purpose of the thesis is to identify reasons why neither nationwide securitization nor negative framing of banlieues has been accepted in Marseille.

In order to do that, the thesis will try to uncover specificities of the securitization process in Marseille and decrypt reasons for its resistance against the nationwide frame of the republican order. At the same time, the thesis should not be limited to the mere analysis of securitization processes, but it will try to offer a profound understanding of causes of resistance and explain their applicability, or inapplicability in different settings.

In addition to that, the thesis will try to grasp the primary outcomes of the unsuccessful securitization process. Apart from direct consequences, it will look at processes and development which took place in the city of Marseille after the gradual receding of the frame of the republican order. This part will aim to understand processes which may weaken resistance to securitization and offer a sceptical view on some aspects of recent development.

2. Research target, research question

What frame facilitated securitization and what was its resonance?

How did the securitization process of banlieues in Marseille evolve?

Why did the securitization process fail in the case of Marseille?

What was the outcome of unsuccessful securitization?

What are the processes that weaken Marseille's further resistance?

3. Conceptual and theoretical framework

Securitization theory was for the first time formulated by the scholars of Copenhagen school who suggested to use discourse analysis as a tool for decrypting the process. According to the analytical framework proposed by Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998), the attention should have been centred on the analysis of speech act and linguistic aspects. The original approach was, however, criticized for ignoring other aspects of the process, such as the importance of context and the role of the audience. For that reason, various authors proposed updated form of the analytical framework, among others Salter (2008) with dramaturgical analysis or Thierry Balzacq (2005), who remodelled original securitization theory and instead of the speech act introduced the pragmatic act. For Balzacq, the securitization is not limited only on linguistic aspects, but rather it should be understood as a context-dependent and audience-centred process. Most of the criticism stressed the lack of attention given to the context and the inability of the theory to grasp the complexity of the securitization process. Among others D. Bigo (2002), T. Balzacq (2005), or H. Stritzel (2007) emphasized the need for a new approach towards securitization and proposed their own analytical frameworks that allow profound understanding of complex and context-dependent nature of securitization process.

At the same time, various authors such as Rychnovska (2014) and Watson (2012) proposed to combine securitization theory and framing theory and that way obtain an even better understanding of the context in which securitization takes place. Despite having its origin mainly in sociology (Goffman, 1986) and psychology (Kahneman, 2003), the framing theory has found its usage in various social sciences especially for its ability to provide an insight into ways how the reality and the understanding to the world depend on cultural, social, and contextual settings.

Moving on to the framing and securitization processes in France, various scholars have taken an interest in the nationwide process characterized by the emergence of penal state and republican nationalism using terms such as *securitarian ideology* (Dikec, 2013), *republican state* (Dikec, 2006), or *republican order* (Mucchielli, 2007). Other authors have focused on specific aspects of, what can be considered as, frame. In this regard, works of Deltombe (2007) who covered the media discourse around Islam, and Bonelli (2008) who proposed a profound analysis of the evolution of French penal system, can provide valuable insight.

Considering the gradual process of securitization of banlieues and urban space, a substantial body of literature focuses on the history of and problems in social housing districts. Both Narang (2019) and Delarue (1991) explain how complexes of social housing have become segregated localities and how their inhabitants found themselves excluded from society. On the other hand, profound analysis of securitization and framing of French banlieues offers, among others, Roché (2004) and Mucchielli (2007).

Moving on to the securitization process in Marseille and specifics of this Mediterranean city, works of Laurent Mucchielli on violence, crime and insecurity provide numerous insights into securitization processes. Closely related are in this regard works of Pons (2016) and Donzel (2006) both of whom have been interested in the role of media in the creation of negative discourse and the difference between reality and media coverage of life in disadvantaged localities and banlieues. In this regard, books by Phillippe Pujol provide the reader with everyday reality in Marseille's banlieues. Another valuable insight into the life in Marseille and possible explication of its differences and resistance is offered by purely sociological literature, for example, Peraldi and Samson (2005) described specificities of local political processes and daily life, while other authors have been focusing either on the existence (Beaman, 2010), or inexistence of strong community (Mattina, 2016).

4. Empirical data and analytical technique

In order to answer the research questions, the thesis will adapt a qualitative approach, identified by Elliott and Timulak (2005) as more suitable for explanatory research designs. Single case study approach was chosen to explain the specificity of securitization processes around Marseille's banlieues and uncover possible causes of lower resonance of the republican order frame. In this regard, explanatory case study as defined by Yin (1994) will be adopted to investigate a unique phenomenon and provide a better understanding of the case.

Considering both descriptive and interpretative nature of research questions (Elliot and Timulak, 2005), the empirical part of the thesis will be structured into two main parts. The first part of the empirical section will investigate the process of securitization in Marseille to answer interpretative elements of research questions. Both discourse and non-discursive actions of securitization actors will be analysed with the intention to depict the complex process and its changes over time. The analysis of the securitization process will diverge from the original discourse analysis preferred by scholars of the Copenhagen school. It will follow the nondiscursive approach proposed by Thierry Balzacq to identify securitization actors and moves and perform a profound analysis of the securitization process. In order to do that, data from both existing literature and primary sources will be used.

Given the complexity of the securitization process, the thesis will follow a mixed methodology approach where the framing theory will support Balzacq's analytical framework. Various scholars, among others, Watson (2012) and Rychnovska (2014) have proposed the combination of both theories, emphasizing the profound understanding of context made possible by separate frame analysis. For that reason, the thesis will try to grasp complex securitization process through the frame proposed by L. Mucchielli (2007) who uses the term republican order for a complex understanding of interlinked processes which increased the demand for security and repression.

The second part will then focus on research questions with descriptive nature and based on the existing literature on Marseille community and society it will try to uncover processes which lead to the failure of securitization and framing in Marseille. At the same time, it will focus on the outcomes of unsuccessful framing and securitization. Deriving from existing literature on the community resistance, gated communities and the importance of public

space the thesis will try to explore processes which weaken Marseille's previous resistance and specificity.

5. Thesis outline

Introduction

Chapter 1: Theoretical/Conceptual framework

- Securitization theory
- Framing theory
- Combination of securitization and framing theory

Chapter 2: Methodology

Chapter 3: Constitution of the frame of the republican order

- Towards the problem of banlieues
- Overlapping discourses around banlieues
- Theory of master frame

Chapter 4: Securitization of banlieues in Marseille

- Background
- Analysis of the securitization process
- Concluding remarks

Chapter 5: Reasons for unsuccessful securitization

Chapter 6: Weakening the resistance

Conclusion

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