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Two Sides of the Same Coin? – A Comparative Analysis of Radicalization Pathways of Right-Wing Extremists and Jihadists

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Abstract

This study investigates the radicalization pathways of German jihadist Denis Cuspert and Norwegian right-wing extremist Anders Breivik. The aim is to identify causal factors that could have initiated, promoted, or accelerated the respective radicalization process and to compare the radicalization pathways with each other in this regard. The purpose of this study is to better understand the complexity of a radicalization process in terms of causes, reasons, effects, and correlations in order to be able to respond to it adequately. Right-wing extremism and jihadism are current security threats to Western democracies and their societies. A comparison of jihadist and right-wing extremist radicalization processes helps design and further develop preventive and deradicalization measures. Essential causal factors that contributed to the radicalization process of Cuspert and Breivik are personal crises, rejection, the search for meaning and belonging, the desire for attention and recognition, interaction with like-minded people, psychological group processes, perceptions and narratives of deprivation and threat to one's social group, and foreign policy events. The cases differ concerning personal experiences and perceptions due to background of origin and, in particular, regarding the importance of the Internet during the radicalization process.

Keywords

Radicalization, Comparative Study, Jihadism, Right-Wing Extremism, Cuspert, Breivik, Radicalization Root Cause Model.

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Declaration of Authorship

1. The author hereby declares that he compiled this thesis independently, using only the listed resources and literature.

2. The author hereby declares that all the sources and literature used have been properly cited.

3. The author hereby declares that the thesis has not been used to obtain a different or the same degree.

Prague, 27 July 2021 Tobias Herrmann

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I would like to express my gratitude to my family, especially my parents, for always supporting me and making this possible.

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I. Introduction

Terrorism and terrorist attacks are some of our contemporary times' most current and complex security threats and risks. The threat posed by this multifaceted phenomenon has grown in recent decades to become one of the most significant global challenges with enormous relevance for national and international security. Following the 9/11 Islamist attacks in the United States, an attempt was made to understand the process by which individuals and groups turn to terrorism. The terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005 prompted terrorism researchers to focus intensively on the new concepts of "home-grown terrorism" and "radicalization," as Islamist terror and jihadists were not only imported from abroad but were now also emerging under the roof of Western democracies. These terrorist incidents join a series of attacks that have shaken the West. Boston in 2013, Paris and San Bernardino in 2015, Brussels, Nice, Orlando, and Berlin in 2016, and Stockholm, Manchester, and Barcelona in 2017 have become symbols of the escalating threat of Islamist terror. However, the West is also exporting its own home-grown terrorism and jihadists. In particular, the Islamic State had an enormous influx of so-called "foreign fighters" from the West during its heyday, who contributed to spreading terror on its behalf, especially in Syria. These circumstances triggered a wave of research regarding the radicalization processes that led the perpetrators to commit their acts and confronted politicians, decision-makers, and scholars with questions about the causes of radicalization. While most of the research and public debate over the past twenty years has focused on radicalization processes related to an Islamist threat and jihadists, right-wing extremist terrorism and the radicalization process of right-wing extremists have gained more attention and significance since the 2011 right-wing extremist terrorist attack in Oslo and Utoya, Norway, and the worldwide increase in right-wing extremist terrorist attacks in recent years, but at the latest since the right-wing extremist attacks in Christchurch in New Zealand in 2019 and Halle in 2019 and Hanau in 2020 in Germany. Although right-wing extremist terrorism has always been present, it has never received the attention in the past that Islamist-motivated terrorism was given. However, after Islamist terrorist attacks, as with right-wing extremist terrorist attacks, the question of "Why" has been raised equally and requires to be answered.

The radicalization of people into Islamists/jihadists and right-wing extremists has undoubtedly been a threat to modern Western democracies and their societies, and it is currently widely and intensively discussed publicly and scientifically. The need to

grasp and understand radicalization in all its complexity is scientifically undisputed and necessary. The question of the causes and reasons for radicalization is the scientific focus of current research. For politics and society, it is crucial to understand the process of radicalization and to study developments in order to find an adequate way to cope with it and to be able to design prevention and deradicalization approaches. For radicalization research, it is essential to analyze causes and effects as well as backgrounds and contexts as profoundly as possible in order to develop theories, explanatory approaches, and assumptions continuously. Against this background, it is also necessary to compare different directions of radicalization.

This master thesis focuses on the concept of radicalization and the process of radicalization, both the radicalization processes of right-wing extremists and jihadists. The radicalization pathways of the German jihadist Denis Cuspert and the Norwegian right-wing extremist Anders Breivik serve as case studies. Of interest are the general root causes and, in particular, the biographically effective causal factors influencing the radicalization processes. The aim of this study is to examine the radicalization pathways of the jihadist and the right-wing extremist in this regard and compare both based on this.

The following research question (RQ) and sub-questions (SQ's) are examined in the thesis:

- RQ: How can the respective radicalization pathways be explained in each case?
- SQ's: What are the conducive factors in each case? Are the conductive factors the same or different? What differences or similarities can be identified?

In order to ensure an investigation appropriate and adequate to the research question, the following course of action was selected. The study is divided into a theoretical and an analytical section. In the first part of the theoretical section, terminologies essential to the study are explained. Next, the concept of radicalization is introduced, and a three-part literature review is provided. Following this, the theoretical framework of the study, the root cause model of radicalization according to Veldhuis and Staun (2009), and the methodology of the study are defined and presented. In the analytical section of the study, an analysis of Denis Cuspert's jihadist radicalization pathway and Anders Breivik's right-wing extremist radicalization pathway is conducted using the research design established in the theoretical section. Finally, a conclusion is

presented summarizing and comparing the results of the analysis and answering the research question.

II. Theoretical Section

This theoretical section of the study is the foundation for the analysis conducted in the second part. In the following, essential terms for further understanding are clarified. Furthermore, the concept of radicalization is explained, and a literature review is provided. After this, the theoretical framework is determined, and the model to be used for this study is presented. Moreover, the methodology of the analysis is explained.

A. Clarification of Terminologies

In order to better scientifically analyze radicalization processes and pathways of jihadists and right-wing extremists, a basic knowledge of relevant terms must be provided. For this reason, terms such as Islamism, Salafism, jihadism, and Salafi-jihadism, as well as right-wing extremism, are discussed in the following pages in order to provide a foundation in this respect. However, it should be noted that this can only be a very concise and possibly simplified overview that is appropriate for this work but does not claim to be a fully comprehensive definition of these terms, as this would fail to meet their complexity. Furthermore, the overview regarding jihadist radicalization will be more extended, as this process is ideologically as well as religiously charged and accordingly involves more terminologies and requires a more extensive explanation of these terms. Before proceeding with the clarification of terminologies that will be the focus of this part of the section, the term extremism will be explained very briefly as an introduction and as a kind of entrance to the understanding of the subsequent terms.

1. Extremism

The term extremism and all other terms to be explained in this section are highly contested and disputed and have already caused a multitude of debates and controversies among scholars so that no universally valid definition exists. Moreover, extremism is understood differently, depending on a country's political culture and historical experiences (Jesse, 2021). Extremism can be seen as a kind of melting pot for

different variants of extremism. These variants may differ in their organization, action, and intensity (Mannewitz et al., 2018). One commonality can be seen in the rejection or elimination of the components of the democratic constitutional state, for example, institutions and pluralism or constitutional democracy as a whole (Jesse, 2017; Jesse and Mannewitz, 2018; Jesse, 2021). Here is where extremism is distinguished from radicalism. While radicalism seeks to change the system and does not yet pose a threat to the basic democratic order of the constitutional state, extremism seeks to overcome the system (Dienstbühl, 2019; Abay Gaspar, 2020). Extremism is often characterized by high levels of dogmatism, a clear division of the world into friend and foe, missionary zeal, and conspiracy theories (Jesse, 2017; Bpb, 2021; Jesse, 2021). Extremism can be described as the endpoint and extreme point of a radicalization process. This endpoint is defined by goals, ideas, and behaviors that are outside of and contrary to the fundamental values, beliefs, and norms accepted by society and often, but not fundamentally, involves the perpetration of violence (Neumann, 2013; Mecklenburg and Anthony, 2020; Coleman and Bartoli, 2021). However, extremism can also refer to the methods used to achieve these goals (Neumann, 2013). In this regard, extremism can be divided into "'extremism' of thought and 'extremism' of method" (Richards, 2015: 371). What goals and methods are pursued depends entirely on the variant of extremism. A distinction can be made between politically motivated extremism (right-wing extremism and left-wing extremism) and religiously motivated extremism (Islamism).

2. Islamism, Salafism, Jihadism and Salafi-Jihadism

Islamism, Salafism, jihadism, and particularly Salafi-jihadism are transnational phenomena and have gained particular prominence after the Islamist-motivated attacks of 9/11, growing enormously and often being seen as an acute threat to Western societies regarding terrorism. Over time, these terms have often been discussed, reformulated, and often misused, politicized, and alienated from their true meaning by Western scholars, Muslim theologians, politicians, and the media, sometimes using them as synonyms or seeing them as different stages of a process. These terms overlap but, more importantly, differ and are often associated with fanaticism, extremism, and radicalization.

a) Islamism

Since the terrorist attacks in the U.S., Spain, and England in the early 2000s, Western societies have looked with skepticism, concern, and uncertainty at the world's second-largest religion, Islam. These attacks and acts of violence, which perpetrators attempt to justify by invoking Islam, have reignited the debate about the relationship between Islam and Islamism (Volk, 2015). For this reason, it is crucial to distinguish and differentiate Islam from the phenomenon of Islamism and not equate them, as the vast majority of Muslims practice a peaceful Islam and reject violence (Volk, 2015).

There is no universally valid and accepted definition of Islamism. The term Islamism is often associated with terrorism and terrorist groups and has increasingly degenerated into a political fighting term. However, Islamism simply describes a religious or political ideology or political extremism within Islam, often referred to as "political Islam" or "Islamic fundamentalism" (International Crisis Group 2005; Mozaffari, 2007; Gaub, 2014; Volk, 2015; Pfeifer/Schwab/Süß, 2020; Fouad and Said, 2020). Islamism was a reaction to European colonialism and imperialism in the Middle East and a perceived disappointment, humiliation, and betrayal in the early 20th century by the West (Meijer, 2014; Volk, 2015; Fouad and Said, 2020). This state of mind in the region resulted in the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, the premier Islamist movement of modern history (Gaub, 2014; Volk, 2015). Initially, Islamism was not focused on violence but a return to ancient values of Islam and an Islamic state with these values as its foundation (Volk, 2015). The ideology of Islamism spread enormously in the following decades and is still gaining ground today. Violence has also become legitimate and a standard method used by a few currents within Islamism to achieve its goals, but by no means are all Islamists violence-oriented or willing to engage in terrorist actions.

Contemporary Islamism is not a homogeneous phenomenon and includes a wide range of different currents, most of which fall under Islamist revivalism (Boubekeur 2007; Gaub, 2014; Hamid and Dar, 2016). The goal is re-Islamization; the liberation of Islamic states from non-Muslim influence, and the transformation of society, state, politics, and culture with a sociopolitical objective that can be seen as anti-Western and anti-democratic (Roy, 2004; Gaub, 2014; Seidensticker, 2014; Fouad and Said, 2020). This involves the establishment of a binding legal concept with universally applicable rules based entirely on Islamic commandments and norms (Gaub, 2014; Volk, 2015; Jenkins et al., 2020). Followers of Islamism view Islam as the ultimate religion and

strive for a state or caliphate built on Islamic values and laws of Sharia. Western values such as pluralism, equality, freedom of expression, freedom of the arts, freedom of the press, or freedom of religion, for example, are rejected by Islamists and have no place in their view of an Islamic state with an authoritarian form of rule (Volk, 2015; Fouad and Said, 2020).

Islamist extremist/terrorist movements and groups such as Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic State, Muslim Brotherhood, and al-Qaeda invoke what they believe to be "true Islam" to provide justification for their atrocities through the religion of Islam (Volk, 2015). In addition to those who believe differently or are unbelievers in their way of thinking, Muslims are also victims of Islamist-motivated extremism/terrorism if they are not followers of the "true Islam" and do not share the fundamentalist beliefs (Volk, 2015; Jenkins et al., 2020).

While followers of the various Islamist currents are relatively united on the broad objectives, there are differences in the means by which the goals are pursued (Fouad and Said, 2020). Islamism is not synonymous with the use of violence when it comes to achieving goals. A distinction is made between jihadist Islamism and institutional Islamism (Volk, 2015). While jihadist Islamism is a militant movement that uses violence and incites violence to pursue its own agenda, institutional Islamism seeks to spread Islam and Islamize society through more pacific means, for example, through political participation or education (Mozaffari 2007; Volk, 2015; Fouad and Said, 2020).

Since Islamism, like any ideology, is adaptable, there are numerous different Islamist movements within Islamism that change based on time and context and are influenced by the prevailing conditions (Fouad and Said, 2020).

b) Salafism

Salafism is a heterogeneous and complex current within Sunni Islam that claims to represent the only true Islam and consists of diverse manifestations (Wiktorowicz, 2006; Volk, 2015; Ranstorp, 2019). It refers to early Islam, the first generation of Muslims, as it is considered by followers to be the most authentic and pure Islam (Bokhari and Senzai, 2013; Hamid and Dar, 2016; Adraoui, 2019; Kelvington, 2019; Ranstorp, 2019; Wehrey and Boukhars, 2019). The goal is "the creation of a pure community and the exclusion and condemnation of anyone who is not pure" (Lohlker,

2017: 269). Salafists see themselves as true believers of the one true Islam and are often also referred to as ultraconservative among Islamists because they follow a literalist and dogmatic interpretation of the Quran, Sunnah, and Sharia, and other Islamic scriptures (Hamid and Dar, 2016; Lohlker, 2017; Adraoui, 2019; Ranstorp, 2019). They are known for following the habits and behavior of the first Muslims and reject modern interpretations and views (Hamid and Dar, 2016). Components of Salafism are "monotheism and God's absolute authority, the principle of sanctity with a clear binary distinction between "us" and "them" that rejects non-Muslims (in many cases everyone and everything that is non-Salafi)" and the rejection of "secular democracy as full-fledged tyranny" (Ranstorp, 2019: 6). Followers of Salafism see themselves as a kind of defense against Western values (Ranstorp, 2019). Although the vast majority of Salafists do not engage in politics or violence, extreme versions of Salafism emphasize the extermination of those they believe are not true believers (Lohlker, 2017; Ranstorp, 2019).

Within the Salafism movement, there are three different orientations: "the purists, the politicos, and the jihadis" (Wiktorowicz, 2006: 208). The large majority of Salafists tend to take a purist/quietist approach and stay out of politics and avoid political activism, confrontation, and violence and deal exclusively with the teachings of Islam and the religion itself (Wiktorowicz, 2006; Hamid and Dar, 2016; Wagemakers, 2016; Ranstorp, 2019). However, some Salafists also participate in politics and are politically active by participating in elections or even forming political parties (Hamid and Dar, 2016; Wagemakers, 2016; Wehrey and Boukhars, 2019). Politicos, though, reject democracy because they believe it is incompatible with Islam and also want to protect or, instead, separate Muslims from democratic processes (Ranstorp, 2019). Enemy images include Western regimes, but also Muslim regimes and rulers, whom they describe as godless because they do not follow Salafism (Ranstorp, 2019). A tiny minority of Salafists devote themselves to a militant approach to Salafism, jihadism (Hamid and Dar, 2016). This orientation of the Salafism movement is also referred to as Salafi-Jihadism, which views violence as a legitimate and necessary tool against states and the international order to defend and expand the Islamic community (Ranstorp, 2019; Wehrey and Boukhars, 2019). A detailed explanation of Salafi-Jihadism is of particular importance concerning Islamist extremist/Jihadist radicalization pathways and processes and will be provided under a separate point.

c) Jihadism

Definitions and meanings of jihadism are contested among scholars from various research disciplines and range between two extremes with several different positions that exist between them (Sedgwick, 2015). Jihadism describes a mindset and an individual commitment to belief and action within Islamism (Ashour, 2011; Fouad and Said, 2020). "In Islamic writing, a distinction is made between greater and lesser jihad" (Volk, 2015: 6). While greater jihad is more about spiritual actions and personal moral efforts to come closer to Islam and thus God, lesser jihad is focused on physical actions (Volk, 2015). Furthermore, jihad can be divided into offensive and defensive jihad (Fouad and Said, 2020). Defensive jihad is when there is a need to fight external aggressors who attack the Islamic community (Fouad and Said, 2020). Offensive jihad consists of actual Muslim conquest in the sense of Islamic expansion (Fouad and Said, 2020). Jihadism calls on each believing Muslim to commit or participate in jihad as a religious struggle when a regime is deemed un-Islamic or when the Islamic community needs to be defended against attack (Volk, 2015; Hamid and Dar, 2016; Fouad and Said, 2020).

In the ancient doctrine of jihadism, waging or engaging in jihad as a military struggle involving the use of force is a moral duty and is bound by specific provisions and circumstances determined by Islamic scholars (Cook, 2009; Hamid and Dar, 2016; Fouad and Said, 2020). Modern jihadists operate detached from this classical doctrine of jihadism and pursue inciting Muslims to fight the enemy anywhere and by any means (Hamid and Dar, 2016). They believe that "armed confrontation with political rivals is a theologically legitimate and instrumentally efficient method for socio-political change" (Ashour, 2011: 379).

Although most orthodox Muslims and Salafists reject the notion of militant and violent jihadism, there are individual Muslims who are willing to use violence and who see the West and everything associated with it as an existential threat, aggressor, and enemy attacking the Islamic community (Hamid and Dar, 2016). This enemy and its supporters and allies are fought by the jihadists in terms of jihad, or holy war, at the local, national, as well as international levels (Hamid and Dar, 2016). With this religious charge of fighting for Islam, jihadism gives jihadists, and by extension, jihad, a justification and existential sense of physical violence (Bokler-Völkel, 2018). Jihadism and a global jihad became visible on the international stage in terms of terrorism by groups such as al-Qaeda or the Islamic State.

d) Salafi-Jihadism

Although there is no clear definition of Salafi-Jihadism, the term already suggests that it involves a combination of Salafism, a strict and literal interpretation of Islam, with a commitment to militant/military and violent jihadism, the holy war (Denoeux, 2002; Hamid and Dar, 2016; Wagemakers, 2016). Salafi-jihadism adds jihadism to Salafism and sees the practice of violence in terms of armed jihad as a necessary means to achieve the goals of changing the prevailing international order and defending Islamic society from attack (Maher, 2016; Kelvington, 2019; Ranstorp, 2019). Salafi jihadists see jihad as a religious duty and a divine mission (Ranstorp, 2019). By committing and participating in jihad, martyrdom is particularly desirable among Salafi jihadists, as this ultimate sacrifice will be rewarded later in paradise (Ranstorp, 2019). However, as pointed out earlier, not all Salafis are jihadists, even though all jihadists can be considered Salafis (Ranstorp et al., 2017/2018). In addition, it should be noted that Salafi-Jihadism is a tiny minority within Salafism and Sunni Islam.

Followers of Salafi-Jihadism believe that the use of violence in the sense of jihad to defend or expand Islam should not only be against non-Muslims but may also be used against Muslims (Wagemakers, 2016). Salafi jihadists view Muslims who disagree with their fundamentalist view of Islam and follow laws other than those of Sharia as infidels and apostates from true Islam (Wagemakers, 2016). In their view, these no longer have any claim to be Muslims, and they deserve to be killed just as much as non-Muslims (Moghadam, 2008; Hamid and Dar, 2016; Wagemakers, 2016). Salafi jihadists thus perform a binary distinction of the world into believers and nonbelievers to be fought locally, nationally, and internationally as part of global jihad (Denoeux, 2002; Hamid and Dar, 2016; Wagemakers, 2016; Ranstorp, 2019). Global jihad thus targets the West and Western supporters as well as apostate Muslims. "Most jihadist groups today can be classified as Salafi-jihadists, including al-Qaeda and ISIS," and terrorist attacks in the last two decades against Western societies can also be seen in this context (Hamid and Dar, 2016: 4; Wagemakers, 2016).

In the last two decades, the number of Salafi jihadists in Europe and the Western Hemisphere has increased sharply. The same period has seen a rise in jihadist attacks and foreign fighters (Soufan Group, 2015; Hegghammer, 2016; Ranstorp et al., 2017/2018). Salafi-jihadism has tremendous appeal, especially for youth, due to its

ideology and is mainly responsible for contemporary jihadist radicalization processes leading to terrorism (Wagemakers, 2016; Ranstorp, 2019). The appeal of Salafism can be explained in terms of three frames, which consist of different narratives and reinforce each other: "diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing" (Ranstorp, 2019: 10). Diagnostic frames are meant to present an emotional picture of a threat to the Islamic community, consisting of narratives that portray Muslims as victims who are humiliated, oppressed, and treated unjustly by the West (Ranstorp, 2019). Prognostic frames offer religious violence as a means to combat the threat and are meant to serve narratives that portray jihad as an involuntary duty but righteous war and that everyone is needed or can contribute to it (Ranstorp, 2019). Motivational frames are meant to motivate and mobilize supporters to take action by spreading narratives that those who support and engage in jihad are the only defenders Islam has and that taking action in the sense of jihad brings redemption and belonging, as well as promises the fruition of a perfect society in the form of a caliphate (Ranstorp, 2019).

3. Right-Wing Extremism

The term right-wing extremism (also referred to as far-right extremism) is highly contested among scholars. There are a variety of different, competing definitions and different right-wing extremist actors, such as parties, militant groups, or individual perpetrators (Stevkovski, 2015; Ravndal, 2018). Right-wing extremism is often associated with lone-actor terrorism and concepts such as neo-Nazism and neo-fascism (Stevkovski, 2015; Koehler, 2017; Ravndal, 2018). Moreover, right-wing extremism is defined differently in each country and also in different temporal and historical contexts (Ali, 2021). However, academic discourse has been able to agree on two defining points that seem pretty plausible at first glance; right-wing extremism describes an ideology, and that ideology is right-wing (Mudde, 1995; Carter, 2018).

A general definition of the right is fraught with difficulty because right-wing extremism is not a homogenous ideology, and there are different modes of thinking within that ideology (Carter, 2018). Ethnicity, ethnic exclusion, violence against minorities because of their ethnicity, rejection of the principle of equality, anti-pluralism, ethnic culturalism, nativism, belief in white supremacy, as well as anti-Semitism, anti-Islamism, glorification of the Nazi regime, aversion to liberal democracy, conspiracy theories, and use of violence play a role in many right-wing

extremist mindsets (Pedazur and Canetto-Nisim, 2004; Stevkovski, 2015; Ravndal, 2018; Sterkenburg, 2019; Jupskas and Segers, 2020; Ali, 2021). Right-wing extremism has "anti-constitutional and anti-democratic features, namely a rejection of the fundamental values, procedures and institutions of the democratic constitutional state and a rejection of the principle of fundamental human equality" (Carter, 2018: 175/176). Existing literature regarding definitions of right-wing extremism identify characteristics such as exclusionary nationalism, hostility to democracy, authoritarianism, demand for a strong state, as well as racism, populism, and xenophobia, although not all characteristics need to be present (Carter, 2018; Sterkenburg, 2019; Ali, 2021). Within the ideology of right-wing extremism are right-wing movements that can comprise "extreme nationalism, racism and white supremacy, Christian religious radicalism and radical anti-government beliefs" (Piazza, 2017: 1).

Although not all right-wing extremist actors engage in violence, they spread fear, hatred, and hostility against minorities (Ali, 2021). Right-wing extremism feeds on people's emotions through deliberate manipulation, exploiting individuals' anger and helplessness (Stevkowski, 2015). Right-wing extremists often have a sense of a certain lack of freedom from ruling elites and a threat from an "enemy of the people" who must be subjugated, deported, or exterminated (Stevkovski, 2015, Ali, 2021: 122). Narratives to this effect include the threat of Islamization, conspiracy against the white race, or the great exchange of peoples (Sterkenburg, 2019; Ali, 2021). Furthermore, the phenomenon can be caused by social circumstances and insecurities such as unemployment, poverty, fear of the future, feelings of neglect, frustration, or corruption, as well as a sense of adventure, peer pressure, or a sense of belonging (Stevkovski, 2015; Ali, 2021).

Right-wing extremism increasingly takes place online, for example, in the gaming scene, and uses online technologies for transnational networking, which, for instance, has given rise to the U.S. "alt-right" movement (Sterkenburg, 2019; Ali, 2021). However, "far-right extremism can be a loose or disorganised network having no website, official ideology, social media presence and structured membership" (Ali, 2021: 125). Right-wing extremist actors who carry out violent acts tend to write manifestos and, more recently, live-stream their acts (Ali, 2021). These actors aim to spread their campaign among other right-wing extremists and achieve spectacularization, thereby inspiring and motivating others to emulate them (Brzuszkiewicz, 2020; Ali, 2021).

There are different categories of right-wing extremists in terms of motivational factors that drive these actors toward active right-wing extremism: Revolutionaries, Wanderers, Converts, Conformists, Loners (Linden and Klandermans 2007; Sterkenburg et al., 2019; Ali, 2021). Revolutionaries are driven by a sense of adventure and are often attracted to right-wing extremism at a young age (Linden and Klandermans 2007; Sterkenburg et al., 2019; Ali, 2021). Wanderers are drawn to right-wing extremism only over time because they are not getting anywhere on their previous path and therefore feel frustration and seek support (Linden and Klandermans 2007; Sterkenburg et al., 2019; Ali, 2021). Converts often come from disadvantaged backgrounds and feel left alone by politics and the government (Linden and Klandermans 2007; Sterkenburg et al., 2019; Ali, 2021). Conformists are less driven by right-wing extremist ideology but just want to belong and be liked by other people (Linden and Klandermans 2007; Sterkenburg et al., 2019; Ali, 2021). "Loners usually become radicalized online before meeting likeminded people offline. Their ideas are strengthened by alternative (online) media and interaction with likeminded people (online and offline)" (Sterkenburg et al., 2019: 4).

B. Radicalization and Literature Review

In the following pages, the concept of radicalization is presented, as it is the central concept in this study. Based on this, a literature review is provided in more detail explaining the concept of radicalization in three sections with different research directions tailored to this study and its analysis and research question

1. Radicalization: A Contested Concept

The term radicalization has entered common parlance long ago as a result of the terrorist attacks in recent years. Especially in the aftermath of attacks, the question of the perpetrator's radicalization is raised (Sold, 2020). Nevertheless, it is often unclear what is meant by this or what exactly this term describes. Also, in the academic discourse and among scholars and experts, the concept of radicalization and the identification of causes has generated many controversies due to different views and research directions among scholars. There is still no universal definition of radicalization, and there are many theories about radicalization (Vidino, 2010; Ahmed

and Obaidi, 2020). However, there is an agreement in radicalization research that radicalization is a process (Neumann, 2013).

Radicalization tends to be a gradual, nonlinear, and dynamic process with many stages that individuals or groups go through toward an extremist mode of thought and action (Marret et al., 2013; Ahmed and Obaidi, 2020; BKA, 2021). Scholars often illustrate the radicalization process by depicting it as phases, stages, a conveyor belt, a staircase, a spiral, or a pyramid (Baran, 2005; Moghaddam, 2005; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008; Borum, 2011b). The willingness to endorse or use illegitimate means to achieve goals grows during this gradual process and may culminate in the extremist belief system and eventual endorsement or even use of violence (Hafez and Mullins, 2015; BKA, 2021). During radicalization, the thoughts and actions of the individual or a collective change over a period of time. Borum (2011a) defines radicalization as a “process of developing extremist ideologies and beliefs” (p. 9). However, the radicalization process does not inevitably end in extremism or terrorism (Ahmed and Obaidi, 2020). Abay Gaspar et al. (2019) distinguish between radicalization without violence, radicalization into violence, and radicalization within violence. Self-radicalization and the role of the Internet on radicalization processes are important components in contemporary radicalization research.

Causes of radicalization often fall short in the public debate and are often explained with overly simplistic explanatory patterns such as a personal crisis, influence, or (religious) origin (Borum, 2011a; Beelmann and Lehmann, 2020). According to scientific radicalization research, radicalization is by no means that simple to explain, as this process is much more complex. The process of radicalization is unique to each case. It may consist of individual and personal factors, sociological and societal processes, and systemic and socio-structural dimensions such as political, economic, or cultural conditions, referring to the micro-level, meso-level, and macro-level. These can include, among others, "social oppression, identity crises, experiences of discrimination, (school/vocational) failures, lack of prospects, fear of competition, the search for one's own identity or protest against injustice [...] lack of roots and lack of appreciation" (Sold, 2020: 1).

In radicalization, a distinction must be made between "cognitive and behavioral dimensions of radicalization" (Ahmed and Obaidi, 2020: 1). Cognitive radicalization is the process during which an individual's mindset becomes radicalized; that is, the individual increasingly adopts a political or religious idea, beliefs, and values that are

contrary to constitutional and democratic values and norms (Ahmed and Obaidi, 2020). Cognitive radicalization is "the social and psychological process of incrementally experiencing commitment to extremist political or religious ideology" (Horgan and Braddock, 2010: 279). Behavioral radicalization, on the other hand, as the second part of radicalization, is the process during which the individual's behavior changes and he or she participates in extreme activities, which can be illegal and violent or non-violent and legal (Hafez and Mullins, 2015; Vergani et al., 2018; Ahmed and Obaidi, 2020). Thus, behavioral radicalization is "collectively defined, individually felt moral obligation to participate in direct action" or the "readiness to engage in illegal and violent political action" (Githens-Mazer, 2012: 563; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2009: 240).

There are a variety of definitions of radicalization used and proposed by scholars and security agencies. Radicalization is understood as a process during which extremist ideologies and beliefs are developed, and this process is seen as a precursor to terrorism (Borum, 2011). Although the radicalization process does not have to result in the use of violence, there is a widespread view, especially in the English-speaking world, that radicalization is a process that leads to the use of violence; to this effect, a distinction is made between violent and non-violent radicalization. For King and Taylor (2011), an individual who undergoes a radicalization process becomes an extremist, who may subsequently also be considered a potential terrorist. McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) see radicalization as an individual's increased willingness to engage in and contribute to group conflict, as well as changing behaviors, beliefs, and feelings as a result of the process that increasingly seeks to justify those conflicts. According to Ahmed and Obaidi (2020), "radicalization can be seen as a social and psychological transformation whereby an individual increasingly adopts an extremist belief system, regardless if it ultimately results in actual violence or not" (p. 3). For Neumann and Rogers (2011), radicalization is a sequence of different processes that change the individual's position and that eventually lead to participation in violence for a political purpose. According to Sageman (2004, 2008), radicalization is a bottom-up process and the desire of belonging and being part of something bigger that makes radicalization violent. Wictorowicz (2003; 2005) assumes that passive and active interactions of the individual result in radicalization through his participation in the extremist milieu and, consequently, his continuous adaptation to the customs, norms, and ideologies that prevail there. The Swedish Security Service defines radicalization as "a process that leads to ideological or

religious activism to introduce radical change to society" and a "process that leads to an individual or group using, promoting or advocating violence for political aims" (Ranstorp, 2009: 2; Schmid, 2013: 12; Dzhekova, 2016: 14). According to the German Federal Criminal Police Office, radicalization is "the increasing turn of individuals or groups toward an extremist mode of thought and action and the growing willingness to advocate, support, and/or use illegitimate means, up to and including the use of violence, to achieve their goals" (BKA, 2021: 1). The U.S. Department of Homeland Security describes radicalization as "the process of adopting an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence, as a method to effect social change" (Rabasa et al., 2010: 1; Schmid, 2013: 12; Dzhekova, 2016: 14). The Danish Security and Intelligence Service defines radicalization as "a process in which a person is increasingly accepting the use of undemocratic or violent means, including terrorism, in an attempt to achieve a specific political/ideological goal“ (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009: 5; Kühle and Lindekilde, 2010: 24; Schmid, 2013: 12; Dzhekova, 2016: 13).

2. Literature Review

There is widespread agreement in the literature that there is no single cause of terrorism or a standard route of radicalization into terrorism. There are various conceptual frameworks for analyzing the causes and factors of radicalization. Most theoretical models consider radicalization as a process (Borum, 2011a, 2011b, 2012). In order to give the reader a clearer and more precise overview and understanding of the literature, the following literature review is divided into three thematic groups. Firstly, literature on general radicalization models. Second, literature on radicalization according to levels of analysis. And third, literature on radicalization according to ideology type (right-wing extremists and Islamists/jihadists).

a) Literature on General Radicalization Models

There are numerous models of radicalization, but there is basically no model that can be applied to every individual and every group since every radicalization process is unique. Terrorism researcher Borum (2011) has tried to summarize the divergent models and assumptions regarding radicalization. Many radicalization models describe

the process of radicalization as linear in terms of stages or phases, and violent action is at the end of this process of emotional and cognitive change. However, the use of violence is only one option for action; the majority of the researchers admit that radicalization can also occur without violence. A sample of some of the most popular models and classics of radicalization research are presented in the following.

The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin published an article by Borum (2003) in which he presents a "four-stage model of the terrorist mindset." As the name suggests, this is a "four-stage conceptual model for the emergence of a 'terrorist mindset'"(Borum, 2011b: 38). Not originally developed by Borum as a formal social science theory, the model attempts to provide an explanation of how hatred for a specific target group emerges and how this hatred functions as a justification and motivation for aggression and violence (Borum, 2011b). According to Borum's model, a chain of transformation happens first from grievances and vulnerabilities to hate and second from hate to justification and motivation (Borum, 2011b). The four-stage model begins with a focus on a condition or event that is perceived and identified by the extremist person or collective as unsatisfactory or grievance ("It's not right"). These can be economic or social conditions or events, for example, "poverty, unemployment, poor living conditions" as well as "government-imposed restrictions on individual freedoms, lack of order or morality" (Borum, 2003: 7). Next, this undesirable and unsatisfactory condition or grievance is referred to and presented as injustice ("It's not fair") (Borum, 2003: 8; Borum, 2011b: 39). "For those who are deprived, this facilitates feelings of resentment and injustice" (Borum, 2003: 8). In the third stage of the process, the injustice is projected onto a specific target, the target attribution ("It's your fault"), for example, onto a nation, politics, or specific individuals (groups) (Borum, 2011b: 39). These are held responsible by the extremists for the injustice, and the blame is assigned to them (Borum, 2003). This is followed by distancing/devaluation ("You're evil") against the target, i.e., the responsible party, through demonization or denigration (Borum, 2011b: 39). Aggression and violence against "the evil" are easier to justify, and it is also easier to generate and maintain motivation in this direction (Borum, 2003; Borum, 2011b).

Moghaddam's (2005) 'staircase to terrorism' model is a multi-causal approach "for the process of violent radicalization" (Borum, 2011b: 39; Christmann, 2012). The model consists of a first floor and five other narrowing and successive floors and focuses on psychological explanations that include "three levels at the individual (dispositional factors), organizational (situational factors) and environmental (socio-

cultural, economic and political forces)" (Christmann, 2012: 16; Moghaddam, 2005). The basis for entering the first stage and the driver for climbing within the process toward terrorism are "feelings of discontent and perceived adversity (framed as perceived deprivation)" of the individual (Borum, 2011b: 39). At each floor, specific psychological processes take place that determine whether the individual will advance to the next stage (Moghaddam, 2005). When moving to the subsequent stage, the number of individuals decreases, and the circle of potential terrorists becomes increasingly smaller (Borum, 2011). Ultimately, only a very limited circle of individuals reaches the end of the staircase, at which they engage in terrorism (Borum, 2011b). Moghaddam's staircase model begins with the ground floor. There, "perceptions of fairness and feelings of relative deprivation" prevail (Moghaddam, 2005: 162). Those individuals who have perceptions and feelings of injustice and deprivation move up to the first floor (Moghaddam, 2005). On the first floor, individuals try to improve their situation by seeking ways to achieve improvement (Moghaddam, 2005). If ways and possibilities are blocked for some persons or cannot be influenced or are not available due to external influences and structures, they continue to ascend (Moghaddam, 2005). At the second stage, the perception of grave injustice continues to dominate, but it is further complemented by the feelings of anger and frustration that can be influenced by a leader, and aggression can be projected onto a particular enemy by that leader (Moghaddam, 2005). "Individuals who are more prone to physically displace aggression onto enemies climb further up the staircase" (Moghaddam, 2005: 162). At the third stage, individuals get in touch with terrorism and begin to see terrorism as a justifiable strategy to improve their situation (Moghaddam, 2005). Those who become more involved with terrorism move up to the fourth floor, where recruitment of the individuals for terrorism begins (Moghaddam, 2005). On the fourth floor, a process of categorizing the world into "us-versus-them" and accepting terrorism as a legitimate tool takes place (Moghaddam, 2005: 162)."On the last floor – the fifth – specific individuals are selected and trained to sidestep inhibitory mechanisms that could prevent them from injuring and killing both others and themselves, and those selected are equipped and sent to carry out terrorist acts" (Moghaddam, 2005: 162).

Silber and Bhatt (2007) developed a four-stage model in the context of a New York Police Department report. This model focuses on radicalization as a bottom-up process. They found that the adaptation of a Salafist-jihadist ideology by citizens of a Western homeland (home-grown radicalization) is at the heart of the radicalization

process and identify a linear process with four distinct stages: 1) pre-radicalization, 2) self-identification, 3) indoctrination, and 4) jihadization (Silber and Bhatt, 2007). The pre-radicalization phase is the period and life situation in which Salafist-jihadist ideology has not yet impacted the individual (Silber and Bhatt, 2007; Borum, 2011b). Self-identification starts a process during which the individual comes in contact with and explores Salafism, adopts the religious and ideological values and doctrines, identifies with the Salafist community, and thus gradually moves away from the old identity (Silber and Bhatt, 2007; Borum, 2011b). "The catalyst for this -religious seeking‖ is a cognitive opening, or crisis, which shakes one's certitude in previously held beliefs and opens an individual to be receptive to new worldviews" (Silber and Bhatt, 2007: 6). Trigger events that serve as catalysts for this phase can be economic, social, political, or personal in nature (Silber and Bhatt, 2007). Indoctrination describes a phase in which attachment to the beliefs, ideas, and actions of Salafi-jihadism is intensified, as well as affiliation with the Salafi community, is reinforced (Borum, 2011b). In this stage, the individual fully adopts the Salafi-jihadist ideology and "concludes, without question, that the conditions and circumstances exist where action is required to support and further the cause" (Silber and Bhatt, 2007: 7). n the final stage, the individual accepts his duty to participate in jihad as an individual obligation of each individual, which includes planning, preparing and carrying out jihad and terrorist attacks (Silber and Bhatt, 2007; Borum, 2011b). Unlike the other phases, the jihadization phase can happen very quickly within a few months or weeks (Silber and Bhatt, 2007). However, Silber and Bhatt note that the individual does not have to go through all the phases, and the radicalization process can stop or interrupt at different points (Silber and Bhatt, 2007).

Precht (2007) also divides the radicalization process into four phases, which are very similar to those of Silber and Bhatt: 1) Pre-radicalization, 2) Conversion and identification, 3) Conviction and indoctrination, and 4) Action. Precht notes "that small group dynamics and identification are often powerful accelerants of commitment to extremist ideology," and the path to extremism is influenced by a variety of motivational factors (Borum, 2011b: 42). He focuses less on the individual's identification with Salafist Islam and more on the much broader cause of extremism. Precht categorizes the motivational factors into "background factors," "trigger factors," and "opportunity factors" (Borum, 2011b: 42/43). According to Precht's model, the pre-radicalization phase describes a period before the process of radicalization begins,

which includes background factors that make the individual susceptible to extremism (Precht, 2007). During the second phase, a transformation process of the individual occurs that changes religious identity or behavior (Precht, 2007). This process often begins with frustration and is accompanied by a search for identity and a search for solutions in extremism (Precht, 2007). In the subsequent third phase, "potential extremists usually begin to isolate themselves from their former life (although not everyone) and identify even further with the cause of radical Islam" (Precht, 2007: 36). The action phase is characterized by a commitment to carry out a terrorist attack (Precht, 2007).

McCauley and Moskalenko's (2008) model identifies twelve mechanisms of political radicalization with a focus on inter-group conflict. In their pyramid model, terrorists are the completed product of radicalization at the top of the pyramid (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008). "The base of the pyramid is composed of all who sympathize with the goals the terrorists say they are fighting for" (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008: 417). Going through the levels of the pyramid from the base to the top is "associated with decreased numbers but increased radicalization of beliefs, feelings, and behaviors" (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008: 417). Twelve mechanisms operate at three levels: the individual, the group, and the mass level (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008). These mechanisms work at different levels and lead to political radicalization and the top of the pyramid, terrorism. However, McCauley and Moskalenko note "that there are multiple and diverse pathways leading individuals and groups to radicalization and terrorism" (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008: 429). At the level of individual radicalization are four mechanisms: 1) Personal victimization, 2) Political grievance, 3) Joining a radical group - the slippery slope, 4) Joining a radical group - the power of love (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008). At this level, personal grievance, political grievance, joining a radical group, whether gradually or through personal connections, play a role in the radicalization process and pathway (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008). At the level of group radicalization, other five mechanisms are: 5) Extremity shift in like-minded groups, 6) Extreme cohesion under isolation and threat, 7) Competition for the same base of support, 8) Competition with state power - condensation, 9) Within-group competition - fissioning (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008). At this level, increasing approval and acceptance of more extreme positions due to groups of like-minded individuals, group cohesion under isolation and threat, increase in radicalization due to competition to gain supporters, increased radicalization

and engagement in competition with state power, and within-group conflict are significant in terms of radicalization processes and pathways (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008). The last three mechanisms are at the level of mass radicalization: 10) Jujitsu politics, 11) Hate, and 12) Martyrdom (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008). At this level, group cohesion as a reaction, dehumanization of the enemy, and remembering martyrs play a role regarding radicalization processes and pathways (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008). Furthermore, they developed the 'two pyramids' model (2014, 2017), which separates radicalization of opinion from the radicalization of action into two pyramids to differentiate between them since they follow their own distinctive paths.

Additional models, among many others, related to the radicalization process can be mentioned, such as Sageman's (2004) model of the radicalization process consisting of four stages or four factors: 1) A sense of moral outrage, 2) A specific interpretation of the world, 3) Resonance with personal experiences, and 4) Mobilization through networks. In addition, Taarnby's (2005) eight-stage recruitment process, consisting of the eight stages: “1) Individual alienation and marginalisation, 2) A spiritual quest, 3) A process of radicalisation, 4) Meeting and associating with like-minded people, 5) Gradual seclusion and cell formation, 6) Acceptance of violence as legitimate political means, 7) Connection with a gatekeeper in the know, and 8) Going operational” (Dzhekova, 2016: 25). Furthermore, Helfstein's (2012) cyclic and dynamic four-stage model of radicalization, consisting of the four stages: 1) Awareness, 2) Interest, 3) Acceptance, and 3) Implementation and also Doosje’s et al. (2016) radicalization model with the three phases: 1) Sensitivity, 2) Group membership, and 3) Action.

b) Literature on Radicalization According to Levels of Analysis

This section of the literature review follows an approach widely used in radicalization research to divide the radicalization process into micro-, meso-, and macro-levels (Horgan, 2005, 2014; Bjørgo, 2013). The multitude of factors that promote radicalization is categorized into three levels of analysis in order to be able to systematically analyze them within the complex process of radicalization and thus specifically identify the main mechanisms of radicalization. This level model attempts to relate the individual, its environment, and the overarching circumstances. The

boundaries between the three levels are fluid (Bjørgo, 2013). Furthermore, all factors in interaction with each other can have the ability to trigger the radicalization process of the individual or to accelerate it.

(1) Micro-Level

The factors on the micro-level refer to the individual personality, mainly to psychological components regarding the perception and identity of the individual, its personal relationships as well as relationships to its environment. According to Berrissoun (2014), factors such as identity crisis, a crisis of meaning, traumatic events, exclusion, loneliness, as well as dependence on drugs, and imprisonment can be crucial in relation to the radicalization process of the individual. Concerning traumatic events, Doosje et al. (2016) cite confrontation with death as a driving factor. According to Wilner and Dubouloz (2010, 2011), irritating experiences transform and further radicalize an individual's viewpoints and interpretation. Furthermore, experiences, perceptions, and feelings of lack of prospects, marginalization, discrimination, humiliation, stigmatization, rejection, meaninglessness, and social inequality are counted as micro factors (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008; Schmid, 2013; Berrissoun, 2014; Dugas and Kruglanski, 2014; Kruglanski and Webber, 2014; Doosje et al., 2016). Discontent with the individual social, political, and economic situation and, in this regard, the relationship between expectations and reality due to experienced or perceived limitation or blockage in the realization of opportunities, leads to frustration and further to feelings of anger and disappointment, which can turn into hatred and aggression (Moghaddam, 2005; Wahl, 2009). Bögelein et al. (2017) review existing models of radicalization by factors and identify micro-level factors that the individual or a group passively suffers. These include experiences of discrimination and loss, personal crises, search for meaning, perceptions of injustice, or victimization (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008; Bögelein et al., 2017). Meier et al. (2020) conducted expert interviews and detect factors such as discontinuities in biographies, problematic and critical life phases, unstable family background and support, as well as lack of recognition, low or absent self-esteem, perceived feeling of being excluded, search for meaning, negative expectations for the future, fear of economic and social being left behind, and consequently loss of status. They additionally identify the need for community and belonging and the search for purpose, solutions, values, and a concept

of life (Meier et al., 2020; Schahbasi, 2009). According to Srowig et al. (2018), insecure identities do not have sufficient skills to cope with critical life events or adequately process external irritations. This highlights the fluid boundaries between micro- and macro-levels. Logvinov (2021) sees these sociobiographical and personality-psychological factors at the micro-level as a kind of resource for political action. However, he understands these factors more as enabling factors and uses the metaphor of an explosive that is not ready to be activated until there is a detonator or fuse to illustrate radicalization. According to Logvinov, everyone has a potential fuse; it is just that the length of this fuse is different for each individual; for example, it is shorter for individuals where problematic structural conditions are present. For Rahimullah et al. (2013), micro-level factors include feelings of marginalization and alienation from society, as well as a lack of meaning and purpose due to the absence of social values and norms. Other factors found in the radicalization research literature include the individual's need for significance, feelings of humiliation due to socioeconomic or political disadvantage, regaining one's dignity, feelings of powerlessness, and desire for fame and adventure (Stern, 2003; Richardson, 2006; Kruglanski et al., 2009; Kruglanski and Orehek, 2011).

(2) Meso-Level

The meso-level includes factors relating to interpersonal relationships, interaction with like-minded people, and group dynamics, for example, through group affiliations, friendships, organizations, and social networks, which have a promoting effect on the radicalization process (Daalgard-Nielsen, 2010). In this regard, Malthaner and Waldmann (2012) introduce "radical milieus" as a collective term for the social environment that shares core elements of the ideological perspective and provides political as well as moral support. For Sageman (2004), networks related to friends, family, or tribes and the interaction between them and the individual are crucial factors at the beginning of the radicalization process. These contacts transport the extremist ideas and thus influence the individual. At the meso-level, psychological group dynamics take place within these networks that promote radicalization, such as peer pressure, framing, indoctrination, socialization effects, and echo chamber effects (Daalgard-Nielsen, 2010; van San et al., 2013; Berrissoun, 2014; Bögelein et al., 2017). Van San et al. (2013) explain the meso-level and the importance of the extremist group

or organization for the individual's radicalization with the principle of supply and demand; the group or organization offers and gives the individual something that it seeks in order to satisfy its needs. Meier et al. (2020) see an attraction and appeal of the group to the individual through special actions and leisure activities. The individual is searching for an identity, meaning, recognition, community, friendship, and a sense of belonging, which it finds within or is offered by the group or organization (Bjørgo, 2016; Doosje et al., 2016). Furthermore, the group helps individuals reduce their own self-uncertainties (Srowig et al., 2018). Doosje et al. (2016) mention as a driving factor at the meso-level "fraternal relative deprivation, the feeling of injustice that people experience when they identify with their group and perceive that their group has been treated worse than another group" (p. 81; Crosby, 1976). In the group, the pooling of frustration and a friend-foe and good-evil division of the world can happen as well as a feeling of revenge against society can develop (van San et al., 2013; Bjørgo, 2016). These group dynamics influence the individual's worldview and values so that even the use of violence is seen as a legitimate means (van San et al., 2013). Bögelein et al. (2017) point out that in-group dynamics also foster the individual's moral commitment to the cause. Other meso-level factors that promote radicalization include isolation and the cutting of ties and bridges, as well as alternative offers to the prevailing opinion by the group (Doosje et al., 2016; Bögelein et al., 2017). For Logvinov (2021), ideologized groups also play a crucial role, as individual perceptions and feelings are channeled in a specific direction through frames of the group. Della Porta (2018) summarizes that "radical beliefs shape individual radicalization paths when they not only resonate with personal experiences but also combine with friendship or kinship networks" (p. 468). Through psychological group dynamics, individual identity is replaced by collective identity. Moreover, in terms of radicalization factors at the meso-level, the Internet and social media play a significant role, as in-group dynamics can emerge there as well. Bjørgo (2013) states that through the Internet and social media, individuals "find some kind of moral support in their radicalization process in these virtual communities" (p. 36).

(3) Macro-Level

Macro-level factors can be seen as overarching political, social, economic, cultural, and societal structures and conditions, as well as societal contexts and preconditions in which micro-level radicalization factors emerge and are embedded

(Schmid, 2013; Meier et al., 2020). Thus, actual or perceived grievances and problems such as inequality of opportunity, discrimination, marginalization, and lack of prospects as well as poverty and unemployment, but also globalization and modernization in the context of these prevailing structures or structural conditions to which the individual is exposed, promote or foster the radicalization process (Schmid, 2013; Logvinov, 2014; Meier et al., 2020). For those individuals who experience socioeconomic disadvantage, there is a higher risk of radicalization, according to Murshed and Pavan (2009). For the study of radicalization from the macro-level, relative deprivation is often used as an explanation. Experienced or perceived oppression, impairment, or prevention in terms of political, social, economic, or cultural participation leads to frustration and alienation, which can escalate into aggression (Logvinov, 2014; Meier et al., 2020). Meier et al. (2020) found through their expert interviews that a poor economic situation of certain groups, perceived growing social inequality, and the social climate, in general, are crucial macro-level factors as they lead to frustration and radicalization. Not only domestic but also foreign policy decisions and developments and international conflicts can foster the radicalization process by creating frustration and anger, for example, through the Islamist narrative that the Muslim community is threatened, oppressed, and Muslims are being killed and, consequently, the call for solidarity and appeal to fight (Meier et al., 2020). According to Bjørgo (2016), the Internet also plays an important role at the macro-level, acting as a kind of amplifier or multiplier through the possibility of constant and real-time media coverage of political developments "that make events taking place far-away places such as Iraq and Syria coming very close to individuals" (p. 29).

c) Literature on Radicalization According to Ideology Type

This section reviews the literature in which scholars identify differences and similarities in the radicalization process of different types of radicalization in terms of ideology; in this case, right-wing extremists versus jihadists (Islamists, Salafists, and Salafi-jihadists).

A comprehensive overview of the literature and state of research on Islamist radicalization and right-wing radicalization is provided by Dzhekova et al. (2016) in their 'review of literature'. Research and explanations on Islamist radicalization are divided into three analytical paradigms (Dzhekova et al., 2016). Researchers in the first

paradigm examine the factors that provide an explanation for radicalization (Dzhekova et al., 2016). Within this paradigm, there is a view that Islamist radicalization can be explained by the economic and cultural conditions in the Arab world and the associated grievances (colonialism, frustration, deprivation, corruption, social division) that often lead to anti-Western attitudes (Dzhekova et al., 2016). Other factors are socioeconomic, such as economic marginalization, lack of education, peer pressure, discrimination, and the search for identity, meaning, and community (Dzhekova et al., 2016). The authors identify that "with regard to the causes of radicalization a concept dominant at all levels of analysis is that of 'grievance'" (Dzhekova et al., 2016: 48). In the second paradigm, the focus of analysis is on the process of radicalization (Dzhekova et al., 2016). The authors emphasize the importance of group factors, the crucial part of socialization, the significance of networks and personal ties, or socioeconomic deprivation in order to comprehend the radicalization process (Dzhekova et al., 2016). The third paradigm is concerned with both the factors that explain radicalization and the process of radicalization, thus focusing on factors and mechanisms at the individual level such as "pathways and ways of involvement as well as personal histories and processes" (Dzhekova et al., 2016: 49). According to this approach, radicalization happens "among the first generation out of concern for development in the origin countries," and in the second and third generations "through indoctrination and by bringing conflicts home"; videos and images of the suffering Muslim community are interpreted as Western oppression (Dzhekova et al., 2016: 50). In addition, cultural tensions, experiences of discrimination and exclusion, and the identity and meaning-giving role of jihad can be elements of the radicalization process (Dzhekova et al., 2016). However, Dzhekova et al. summarize that there are no single or predominant motivations related to Islamist radicalization. According to the authors, research on the causes of right-wing extremist radicalization focuses on different levels of analysis (Dzhekova et al., 2016). At the macro-level, right-wing extremism is "a consequence of post-industrial restructuring in a highly globalised and competitive international market" (Dzhekova et al., 2016: 65). The causes of right-wing extremist radicalization due to social change, modernization and globalization, and dissolution of social ties are perceived personal alienation, a new search for identity, fear of the future, fear of unfair treatment as a result of immigration, fear of the foreign, perception of a threat to traditional values, and social insecurity (Dzhekova et al., 2016). At the meso-level, political factors such as political parties play a role with regard to right-wing extremist radicalization (Dzhekova et al., 2016). At the

micro-level, individual causes and factors such as "the feelings of deprivation, loss of social status and frustration," socialization, sense of belonging, "lack of social integration, perceived group discrimination, perceived illegitimacy" contribute to the process of right-wing extremist radicalization (Dzhekova et al., 2016: 66).

The article by Möller and Neuscheler (2019) deals with radicalization and extremism and, to that extent, radicalization processes of Islamism and right-wing extremism. After summarizing the relevant topic-related state of research on biographical radicalization processes, they also provide an overview of approaches and challenges that emerge. They identify commonalities and differences between the extremisms in the state of research and practice. Commonalities in Islamist and right-wing extremist radicalizations are significant fears of threat and loss of control and, as a result, a sense of restriction of freedoms (Möller and Neuscheler, 2019). Both extremisms offer integration opportunities, in which the feeling of not belonging is replaced by a sense of belonging to a community and appreciation (Möller and Neuscheler, 2019). Furthermore, right-wing extremism and Islamism generate attractiveness through the creation of meaning, in which offers of meaning are made as a reaction to meaning crises (Möller and Neuscheler, 2019). Affinity and attraction for both forms of extremism can be found in experience deficits, and right-wing extremism and Islamism are both able to compensate for perceived life deficiencies (Möller and Neuscheler, 2019). Other commonalities are that both extremisms operate in their own way with a specific political-social framing and that susceptibility to these extremisms is reinforced by underdeveloped personal and social competencies regarding the radicalization process (Möller and Neuscheler, 2019). According to Möller and Neuscheler, however, there are differences in right-wing extremist and Islamist radicalization processes. While in right-wing extremism, religious orientation is of no or secondary importance in terms of recruitment; religion plays a significant role in Islamism (Möller and Neuscheler, 2019). Also, Islamism specifically targets people who are not part of the majority society, whereas members of right-wing extremism see themselves precisely as part of a homogeneous national, ethnic, and cultural majority society (Möller and Neuscheler, 2019). There are other differences between the two extremisms in terms of perceptions of collectivity and gender. While in Islamist radicalization, the idea of collectivity in the form of a union of the Muslim world is an important component, this is less present in right-wing extremist radicalization processes due to the national worldview and is more characterized by a kind of

transnational cooperation (Möller and Neuscheler, 2019). Furthermore, both extremisms are shaped by different attributions to the masculine and feminine (Möller and Neuscheler, 2019).

Abbas (2017) also examines differences and similarities in the radicalization of right-wing extremist and Islamist individuals and groups and sees the radicalization of both extremisms as phenomena with common driving forces and effects, particularly with regard to social structure and identity formation (Abbas, 2017). According to Abbas, the characteristic of both radicalization processes is a conflict in identity formation and "the search for an alternative, 'purer' identity" (Abbas, 2017: 55; Pisoiu, 2015). Identity formation can be negatively affected by various problems of a structural, economic, or psychological nature, so dislocation and identity conflict can occur, making individuals more vulnerable to external influences (Abbas, 2017). In both extremisms, "coming to terms with hegemonic masculinity in the context of intergenerational disconnect, combined with economic insecurity" is a reason for radicalization (Abbas, 2017: 55; McDowell, 2000). Other commonalities of right-wing extremist and Islamist radicalization are the search for acceptance, recognition, and fulfillment of expectations, which poses a challenge to the individual and causes despair, anger, and fear (Abbas, 2017). Furthermore, "Islamist radicals are anti-globalization, while far right extremists are anti-localization but both are pro-totalitarian" (Abbas, 2017: 56). Further common features of both extremisms are "to instil a sense of purist identity politics," "both have a utopian vision of society," "a narrowly defined vision of the self, which is exclusive of the other," and "both groups are the structural and cultural outsiders of society and directly opposed to each other" (Abbas, 2017: 56/57). Furthermore, according to Abbas, a core narrative regarding belonging and the Internet plays an important role in right-wing extremists and Islamist radicalization (Abbas, 2017). Social division is also an aspect concerning the radicalization process of both extremisms. In the context of economic transformations, right-wing extremists and Islamists face each other as "'left behind' groups," as direct competitors, "one racialized and alienated and the other marginalized and alienated" (Abbas, 2017: 57). Moreover, both extremisms stick to the narrative of a sense of identity that portrays them as potentially under threat (Abbas, 2017). While Islamist radicalization is determined by a struggle for a global project, right-wing extremist radicalization is more determined by local and national aspects (Abbas, 2017). However, both radicalization processes have emotional states and factors in common,

such as fear, frustration, anger, disappointment, as well as marginalization, inequality, and perceived injustice, which right-wing extremists tend to project on a national level and Islamists on a global level (Abbas, 2017). In conclusion, Abbas states "that these kinds of extremism are two sides of the same coin, where limiting one will invariably reduce the other" and that "both extremisms feed off each other's rhetoric" (Abbas, 2017: 59).

Laaroussi (2019) also claims that right-wing extremism and Islamism are essential "two sides of the same coin" and that the difference between right-wing extremism and Islamist extremism is minimal (Laaroussi, 2019: 5). According to Laaroussi, both extremisms present and share the same narratives and common driving forces, as well as the same basic mechanisms in the radicalization process (Laaroussi, 2019). As examples, he mentions the sense of attachment to a community, the role, and importance of the Internet and social media, the belief that "resistance" is a personal duty, and that an existential threat exists to their community against which they must defend themselves (Laaroussi, 2019).

Close (2020) describes the motives of far-right and Islamist terrorists in their article as 'eerily similar'. She refers to the ASPI special report by the international terrorism specialist Boaz Ganor (2020), who examines the terrorist Brenton Tarrant, his manuscript, and the act of terrorism in Christchurch. He has found 'eerie similarity' between Tarrant and jihadist propaganda issued before and after Islamist terror attacks. Close writes that “Ganor outlines eight major points of similarity which highlight common justifications for violence and comparable mindsets of right-wing and Islamist extremists”: Altruism, defensive action, the target, modus operandi, revenge, restoring old glory, call for action, sense of urgency (Close 2020: 2).

Buckingham and Alali (2020) examine important psychological dimensions in the manifestos written by Brenton Tarrant and Anders Breivik and the ISIS propaganda magazine Rumiyah and attempt to determine the extent to which ideologically opposed extremist texts display similarities in terms of psychological and semantic content. All texts show similarities in the convergence of topics (identity politics), emotional language and strategies, and the use of violence.

C. Theoretical Framework: The “Root Cause Model of Radicalization”

The theoretical framework used in this study is the "root cause model of radicalization" developed by Veldhuis and Staun (2009). Like the overwhelming majority of scholars studying radicalization processes, Veldhuis and Staun believe that each radicalization process is unique in some way. They do not believe that the radicalization process can be explained by a single explanation alone but that an individual's radicalization is composed of multiple and numerous causes (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009). The root cause model of radicalization was designed by Veldhuis and Staun (2009) in the form of a causal model to "analyze the factors that are responsible for causing radicalization among Muslims in the Western world" (p. 21). However, this causal model can also be applied to the analysis of a right-wing extremist radicalization process, which will be shown in the course of the analysis.

The focus of the root cause model of radicalization, according to Veldhuis and Staun, is on the "embedded individual" (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009: 22). Veldhuis and Staun criticize other studies and phase models for often focusing "on groups with shared characteristics as the main unit of analysis" and for emphasizing "group-level characteristics as explanations for radicalization," whereas individual circumstances are hardly taken into account (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009: 22). The model of Veldhuis and Staun, however, understands radicalization as an individual process, which is in causality with the given social environment of the individual (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009). This approach allows an analysis from the perspective of the radicalizing individual and examines "how a combination of macro-level and micro-level factors influences the individual's behavior" (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009: 19/20).

In the model, the most frequently cited causal factors were categorized into different levels of measurement (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009). These levels of measurement differ in the extent and manner in which they contribute to the individual's radicalization (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009). "In the model, 'root causes' refer to causal factors without which the radicalization process would not have occurred" (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009: 21). However, this does not mean that every causal factor is a necessary condition for the radicalization of the individual because it is quite different which factors contribute to radicalization at which point in time; it depends entirely on the individual. "The root cause model provides a framework with which to analyze how causal variables at different levels relate to each other and how they shape the

circumstances under which radicalization is more - or less - likely to occur" (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009: 21).

The root cause model of radicalization by Veldhuis and Staun (2009) makes a distinction between causal factors on two levels: the "macro-level" and the "micro-level" (p. 22). The model "argues that macro-level factors are preconditions for radicalization, but that in order to explain why some people do radicalise, and other people do not do so, a scrutiny of micro-level variables is essential" (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009: 22). The micro-level factors are again subdivided into "social factors" and "individual factors" (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009: 22). "Social factors" "describe the individual's position in relation to others" (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009: 22). Individual factors "describe personal circumstances and processes that explain how people interpret situations they are in, give meaning to them, and respond to them" (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009: 22). Furthermore, the different levels distinguish between "root causes" that form the basis for radicalization and "catalysts" that accelerate the radicalization process abruptly (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009: 22).



Figure 1: Root Cause Model (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009: 24)

Macro-level factors refer to the prevailing societal climate and social structures that may promote an individual's potential radicalization (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009). These (contextual) factors, which can explain the emergence of emotional states such as frustration and discontent in radicalizing individuals, include "demographic changes, political, economic, and cultural alterations, educational attainment, and labor market participation" (named explicitly in the model as "poor integration, international relations, poverty, globalization, and modernization") (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009: 24, 29-36; see figure 1).

Veldhuis and Staun state, however, that looking at the micro-level is essential to draw conclusions about causal links between characteristics of society and macro-level social structures and radicalization (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009). The micro-level is divided into social and individual factors (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009). Social factors "define the individual's relation to relevant others" (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009: 25). The model lists “social identity, social interactions and group processes, and relative deprivation” as factors (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009: 39-48; see figure 1). At the individual micro-level, there are factors such as “personality characteristics, personal experiences, or radicalization as a strategic choice” (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009: 53-59;

see figure 1). However, Veldhuis and Staun emphasize that the levels and causal factors are largely overlapping and intertwined (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009).

Furthermore, the model distinguishes between "causes" and "catalysts" (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009: 26). According to Veldhuis and Staun, causes can contribute to and facilitate the radicalization of the individual, but causes do not necessarily always have a radicalizing effect on the individual, as they can also alter over time due to changing conditions (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009). Catalysts are often both "unpredictable and volatile," can occur at both the macro- and micro-levels, often permeate both levels, and vary from person to person (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009: 26). Catalysts can "accelerate or catapult" the radicalization process but cannot initiate it by themselves and must interact with other causal factors (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009: 26). The model distinguishes between "recruitment and trigger events" regarding catalysts (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009: 26).

A more detailed explanation and operationalization of the different levels and their causal factors of the analysis of the model will be provided prior to the analysis.

D. Methodology

This study aims to generate insights regarding the causes of the radicalization of jihadists and right-wing extremists and to identify commonalities and differences between these radicalization pathways. In order to generate insights, the type of analysis, methodological approach to conducting the analysis, data collection, and case selection must be determined, as well as the operationalization of the theoretical framework must be performed to ensure a systematic and controlled analysis.

1. Type of Analysis

Since the focus is on gaining insights regarding the causes of jihadist and right-wing extremist radicalization processes and identifying similarities and differences on these radicalization paths, a qualitative, comparative case study analysis is selected for this reason. Qualitative case studies will be conducted and, in terms of their radicalization process, criteria guided analyzed, contrasted, and compared with each other in regard to their similarities and differences.

"In a case study, we study social phenomena in their real context," and case studies "are oriented towards finding typical characteristics of a phenomenon" (Bukve, 2019: 115/117). For this reason, qualitative case studies are useful and appropriate for the analysis of radicalization processes, as they provide accurate knowledge about a case and thus can guarantee an in-depth analysis of this complex phenomenon (della Porta, 2008; Muno, 2009). Comparative case study analysis, which is case-oriented and theory-guided/informed to examine similarities and variations, is appropriate for this study and procedure because its strength lies in testing and generating hypotheses, identifying complex causal explanations and conditions to specific social mechanisms and their interaction to a specific outcome, and systematically comparing phenomena (della Porta, 2008; Pickel, 2016; Bukve, 2019). Important in this respect is a structured way of proceeding with the analysis by using clear comparison criteria, which can be guaranteed by applying the root cause model of radicalization and the causal factors it contains (Pickel, 2016).

However, generally valid results or even generalizations cannot be achieved through a comparative case study analysis consisting of few case studies (Pickel, 2016).

2. Methodological Approach

To conduct the qualitative, comparative case study analysis, process tracing is selected as the methodological approach due to its suitability to analyze processes in detail and to obtain empirical evidence of the causal mechanisms and factors that led to radicalization in the case studies.

To conduct case studies and analyze complex phenomena, such as the radicalization processes of individuals, as in this case, scholars usually refer to process tracing (George and Bennett 2005; Muno, 2009; Bennett and Checkel, 2012; Beach and Pedersen, 2013; Bennett and Checkel, 2015; Blatter et al., 2018). "Process tracing is a fundamental element of empirical case study research because it provides a way to learn and to evaluate empirically the preferences and perceptions of actors, their purposes, their goals, their values and their specification of the situations that face them" (Vennesson, 2008: 233). The aim of process tracing as a methodological approach of the analysis is to trace the outcome (radicalization) to possible causal processes or explanatory factors (causes) and to reveal this causal link (Gerring, 2007; Muno, 2016; Bukve, 2019). With the help of process tracing, this particular process can be followed

up, and potential causal pathways that led to the outcome can be identified (Trampusch and Palier, 2016; Blatter et al., 2018). The difficulty in conducting process tracing is correctly identifying these potential causalities within the radicalization process. A weakness and danger of process tracing in this regard is "storytelling," whereby correlations are found between potential explanatory factors and outcomes that did not actually exist in the process but are reinterpreted in retrospect (Wolf et al., 2015). During the analysis of the radicalization pathways, storytelling can be avoided by having a solid theoretical foundation (Wolf et al., 2015). Veldhuis and Staun's root cause model limits process tracing by the factors at the different levels and thus provides the guiding parameters to be examined for the analysis.

This study utilizes the effectiveness of this methodology in analyzing processes in terms of causal mechanisms. Although this research methodology allows the researcher to examine specific cases regarding radicalization as they occur in a real-world scenario, the deliberately limited scope of the analysis does not allow for generalization. Regardless of this limitation, the conclusions and insights gained from this research can contribute to a better understanding of jihadist and right-wing extremist radicalization pathways in terms of potential explanatory factors and causes. Process tracing is suitable as a methodological approach for a detailed analysis of individual radicalization pathways and the identification of causal relationships leading to radicalization. This approach also allows for an in-depth comparison of the analysis results of the case studies with regard to potential explanatory factors and causes and for identifying similarities as well as differences between jihadist and right-wing extremist radicalization pathways and developing hypotheses and explanatory patterns in this regard.

3. Data Collection and Data Analysis

The radicalization process of an individual is usually not a public event. Radicalization mostly happens in private and behind closed doors, making it very difficult for researchers to firsthand experience an individual's radicalization path and observe the process. Self-radicalization and so-called lone wolf actors play an increasingly important role in this regard. In order to fully describe the radicalization path of an individual, this person would have to be accompanied throughout the entire

process. Since such an approach is not feasible in reality, the methodology follows a framework based on the use of mainly secondary source materials.

Secondary sources are materials or data that the researcher did not collect him or herself (Kothari, 2004; Adams et al., 2014; Walliman, 2018). However, research projects always consist of a certain amount of secondary sources, as no research can emerge from an academic vacuum (Walliman, 2018). This study relies on data collected from secondary sources. It depends on the use of secondary source materials because it is impossible to scientifically observe the entire radicalization process and, moreover, the processes have already been completed. Also, qualitative interviews of the radicalized individuals and, consequently, the generation of primary data are not feasible in the context of this study, as there is no possibility to conduct them. An advantage of secondary sources and the use of secondary data that benefits this study is that sources and data from multiple and diverse studies can be used, generated through time-consuming and costly work by experienced scholars and researchers who may have more opportunities to collect primary data regarding the radicalization processes and pathways of the individuals (case studies) due to their professional relationships and reputations, geographic proximity or lack of language barrier (Walliman, 2018). The disadvantage of secondary source materials is that they have already been collected using a specific methodology and have undergone analysis with a specific research focus and interpretation from the researcher's perspective. Secondary source materials can therefore be compressed and subjective (Kothari, 2004; Walliman, 2018).

There are different types of secondary source materials, for example, written, non-written, or statistical materials (Walliman, 2018). The secondary source materials used for these studies are diverse and range from publications such as books, manifestos, academic articles, and media reports to official documents from authorities, videos, and song lyrics. These source materials regarding the radicalization processes of the case studies form the data foundation of the qualitative, comparative case study analysis to be conducted.

Veldhuis and Staun's root cause model as a theoretical framework and process tracing as a methodological approach provides guidance in analyzing the collected data from the case studies. The model functions as a sieve in analyzing the content of the source materials of the case studies. The case studies go through the complete model where the macro- and micro-level causal factors, causes, and catalysts are defined in advance and serve as parameters and decide which information is crucial for the

analysis and will be filtered out. Based on the model and the definition of these parameters, the case studies can be made comparable. Operationalization of macro- and micro-level causal factors, as well as causes and catalysts, occurs in a separate section just prior to the level to be analyzed in the analysis section of this study. By using process tracing as a methodological approach and Veldhuis and Staun's root cause model as a complex theoretical framework, which allows the cases to be analyzed very thoroughly and systematically, a very in-depth and profound qualitative, comparative case study analysis can be guaranteed that analyzes and compares the two radicalization pathways of the right-wing extremist and jihadists cases.

4. Case Selection

The selection of the case studies is performed with regard to the research question and the comparability of the selected cases. Although the outcome of the selected case studies differs in some respects, they also show similarities in terms of their initial and general conditions. Denis Cuspert as well as Anders Breivik have successfully gone through a radicalization process towards violent extremism and terrorism, even though the radicalization paths differ in terms of the type of extremism; in the case of Cuspert a radicalization path towards jihadism and becoming a jihadist and in the case of Breivik a radicalization path towards right-wing extremism and becoming a right-wing extremist, but both with the commonality of carrying out violent terrorist acts. In addition, there are fundamental similarities in terms of the initial and general conditions of radicalization in both case studies. Cuspert as well as Breivik are both men, born around the same time and accordingly almost the same age, both have experienced a Western socialization and both have successfully completed a radicalization process towards their respective extremism. These similar initial and general conditions make both cases more comparable.

III. Analysis

In the following qualitative, comparative analysis, the case studies are analyzed within the framework of the root cause model of radicalization according to Veldhuis and Staun (2009). The model is adapted to the analysis, which is reflected in the operationalization of the respective level. The radicalization pathways of the German

jihadist Denis Cuspert and the Norwegian right-wing extremist Anders Breivik are examined with regard to the three levels of analysis and the causal factors at each level are identified. Subsequently, the results of the analysis are compared and differences as well as commonalities of the radicalization pathways are pointed out. The implementation of the analysis is carried out with a focus on the respective level. This means that the causal factors are first operationalized at the respective level and then this level is analyzed in both of the case studies. This approach enables a more comprehensible comparison of the radicalization pathways with regard to the levels. Factors will only be included in the analysis if evidence for the existence of this factor can be found in the jihadist and right-wing extremist radicalization pathway. The operationalized factors of the model are orientation but are not intended to be a rigid structure of analysis. It should also be noted that even if a causal factor is present at a level and could be identified, it does not necessarily have to have contributed significantly to the radicalization, but rather that this factor could have contributed to the process, whether by initiating, promoting, or accelerating the radicalization process.

A. Causal Factors at the Micro-Level: Individual Factors

In this section of the analysis, individual factors are examined at the micro-level. Often, individual characteristics and psychopathological components of the individual are highlighted by psychologists for this purpose (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009). Even though the focus of radicalization research "shifts away from identifying presumed individual psychological characteristics or moral qualities and instead focus is put on process characteristics which are variable, such as the changing context, in which the individual lives and operates," Veldhuis and Staun (2009) provide "a few examples of how individual-level features can help us explain how people respond to their environment and how some individual characteristics make certain responses (e.g., radicalization) more likely than others" (p. 53). For example, personality types or personality traits such as an authoritarian personality or narcissism could increase the likelihood of radicalization (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009). Although this relationship is highly controversial in radicalization research and should not be overestimated, the personality type as well as personality traits of the individuals to be examined, insofar as described in the sources, will find their way into the analysis in order to be able to determine any commonalities in this regard.

More attention is paid to individual experiences in this study, because decisions, behavior and psyche are often based on or influenced by individual and personal experiences, events or perceptions (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009). Micro factors in this regard include factors that have also already been mentioned in the literature review regarding the micro-level, for example, trauma, discrimination, social and economic marginalization, exclusion and rejection, search for meaning, and perceived humiliation. The radicalization pathways of the German jihadist and the Norwegian right-wing extremist are examined with regard to these causal factors and evidence is sought for the presence of these. In addition, emotions such as frustration, anger, hatred, and urge for retaliation or revenge are checked for in the pathways, as "emotions are often seen as driving forces behind social behavior" (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009: 57).

Another micro-level factor, the existence of which is examined in the respective radicalization pathway, is "radicalization as a strategic choice" (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009: 58). This means that the individual consciously chooses the path towards extremism, as this action brings the greatest benefit to the individual among several behavioral alternatives (Velhuis and Staun, 2009). Benefit here can be interpreted in many directions and can include quite different motivations. On the one hand, this action may benefit the individual in the search for action and adventure and the desire for fame; on the other hand, it may help in the search for belonging, meaning, recognition, and identity.

Catalysts are "trigger events that accelerate radicalization" (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009: 59). According to Veldhuis and Staun, triger events can include "disruptive events like a frustrated attempt to find a job, the sudden death of a relative or friend, personal experiences with discrimination, or imprisonment" (p. 59). In addition, events occurring at the macro-level can spill over into the micro-level, transforming an individual perception into a trigger event (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009). Examples in this regard can be a perceived provocation by a caricature or article, a military intervention, or a political speech (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009).

1. Denis Cuspert

a) Personality Type and Personality Traits

In terms of personality traits, Cuspert is said to be narcissistic and that he only became an Islamist to escape from his unsuccessful music career ("being a loser") without loss of face because God intended him for something bigger (Manemann, 2015). He is reported to have had an aggressive, violent, and radical personality, so that he was also imprisoned mainly for committing crimes of violence (Palm, 2017). In an interview, an old friend of Cuspert's testifies that he was a person who quickly found reasons for violence (Spiegel, 2017). As a child, he was even sent to an institution for difficult and troubled children (Schmitt and Veit, 2018). Friends described him as always seeking excitement, recognition, and attention in his life, and as a teenager he expressed to a judge that he wanted to be famous (Krüger, 2013; Dantschke, 2012, 2014). Cuspert's mother told in an interview that he was always looking for love and never knew where he belonged (Korfmacher, 2019). Cuspert even reportedly hurt himself with a knife, had suicidal thoughts, and was even institutionalized in a psychiatric hospital (Ata, 2014, Palm, 2017). In the song "Willkommen in meiner Welt" ("welcome to my world"), he raps about how he desperately searches for paradise every day and wishes for death because his life is so lousy, which is evidence of a mentally unstable state (Deso Dogg, 2006).

b) Experiences, Events and Perceptions

(1) Identity Crisis, Rejection and Search for Belonging

In Cuspert's case, an identity crisis and a crisis of meaning, or the search for identity and meaning, can be assumed. His biological, Ghanaian father had left the family early in his life and was later deported from Germany (Dantschke, 2012; Palm, 2017; Schmitt and Veit, 2018). It can be assumed that Cuspert never really knew or wanted to know his father, as he raps that he erased his father from his life; he had a difficult relationship with his stepfather, probably because he raised him strictly and with violence (Berliner Verfassungsschutz, 2014; Hellmuth, 2016; Schmitt and Veit, 2018). He was also unable to establish an identity with his German half due to the color of his skin (Diringshoff, 2015). In addition, he could not develop his identity through his environment because

he grew up in districts of Berlin where Turks and Arabs dominated and he was also an outsider there (Palm, 2017). He wrote and rapped the lines "in the schoolyard I was just the little nigga boy" (Berliner Verfassungsschutz, 2014: 8). Cuspert is described by his friends as someone who was always looking to be part of something (Palm, 2017). For a while, Cuspert is said to have tried to adopt the identity of his Arab-Turkish and Muslim environment by using typical slang, but, according to a friend, made himself look ridiculous while doing so (Krüger, 2013). In a song titled "Wer hat Angst vorm schwarzen Mann" ("who is afraid of the black man"), he raps about having no identity (Berliner Verfassungsschutz, 2014). As rapper Deso Dogg, Cuspert had tried to create his own identity. This identity started to shatter when he suffered a severe head injury in a car accident and could no longer remember his song lyrics (Palm, 2017).

(2) Economic Crisis, Discontent, and Subjective Relative Deprivation

Cuspert was able to gain fame and notoriety in the German rap scene as a gangster rapper under his stage name Deso Dogg and even had contacts with popular American rappers such as DMX, with whom he even went on tour in 2006 (Palm, 2017). However, he never made a breakthrough as a rapper with his music, both musically and economically (Palm, 2017). When Cuspert's rap career was about to end in 2008, he made statements about his life characterized by discontent and mental instability (Palm, 2017). He says that "he was either going to emigrate, go to jail, or be dead" if his career continues to be this poor (Palm, 2017: 118). He describes tremendous stress, pressure, and uncertainty about his career and future, and tells about having a mental breakdown where he didn't care about anything and fantasized about just taking his gun and shooting people (Diringshoff, 2015).

Furthermore, Cuspert had the feeling of being marginalized by the German rap scene and being deprived compared to his rap colleagues (Diringshoff, 2015). He was especially bothered by the fact that other rappers who make music about life and experiences on the streets and glorify this lifestyle are not authentic and have never experienced what they rap about, whereas he writes and raps about his actual life and advises against living such a life (Palm, 2017). Cuspert, in a 2008 video interview, refers to his rap peers as "entertainer gangsters" whereas he sees himself as a "gangster entertainer" (Dailymotion, 2021: sec. 18-24). The fact that Cuspert, who made music

authentically about his life and experiences, was less successful than these inauthentic "entertainers" increased his discontent with his situation and he felt deprived compared to the rest of the rap scene because of it (Palm, 2017).

(3) Discrimination and Marginalization

Cuspert experienced discrimination and marginalization in his life. As the son of a Ghanaian father, he was considered an outsider because of his skin color in the Berlin neighborhoods and problem districts of Kreuzberg and Moabit, where he grew up and which were mainly populated by Turks and Arabs (Diringshoff, 2015: 194). In song lyrics, he describes experiences of discrimination and marginalization at school and by the police and that he feels trapped in his skin in a white world consisting of hatred and illusions and sees only violence as the last option to survive in it (Berliner Verfassungsschutz, 2014; Schmitt and Veit, 2018).

When Cuspert was already part of the German Salafist scene, he tells about discrimination in practicing his religion by the German state and its authorities, as the police invaded his apartment and police officers allegedly humiliated him by laughing at him and stomping on his prayer rug (Palm, 2017).

c) Strategic Choice

In a video, Cuspert provides information about the reason for turning to Salafism, explaining that he had grappled with death and decided "out of reverence for Allah to finish with his previous life and take a new path" (Palm, 2017: 121). By early 2010, he was already featured in videos with German Salafist preacher Pierre Vogel, and in the same year he ended his music career because it was incompatible with his religion (Berliner Verfassungsschutz, 2011; Palm, 2017). The fact that he gave up his rap career, which was once supposed to give him perspective in his life and was a pillar of his life, describes his actively pursued life change towards Salafism, which replaced music in terms of perspective and pillar, and could be seen as a self-made decision.

Furthermore, Cuspert is said to have been in search of excitement, recognition, and attention, and also desired to become famous (Krüger, 2013; Dantschke, 2014). This may have contributed to Cuspert joining the Salafist scene in Germany, founding

the Salafist-jihadist organization “Millatu Ibrahim”, and eventually leaving for Syria and joining the Islamic State.

d) Catalysts

Cuspert grew up in an environment characterized by gangs and crime in problem districts in Berlin (Palm, 2017). He became a gang member and criminal himself and went to prison several times for robbery and other crimes of violence (Dantschke, 2012; Hellmuth, 2016; Palm, 2017). Through his periods in prison, he turned increasingly to religion, which offered him support and stability during this time (Ata, 2014). While in prison, he also reportedly made the decision to become a rapper in order to have perspective in his life (Palm, 2017).

Furthermore, according to him, a car accident played an important role in turning to religion (Hellmuth, 2016; Palm, 2017). In 2008, Cuspert was involved in a serious car accident (Palm, 2017). As a result of the accident, he suffered a head injury and consequently lost his memory, making it difficult for him to continue to remember his song lyrics (Said, 2015; Palm, 2017). The pillar that was supposed to give him perspective was crumbling. According to a friend, Cuspert saw the accident as a sign from God (Ata, 2014). He himself described the incident as a near-death experience, due to which he did a lot of thinking and self-reflection on whether his rapping life and the content of his rap songs were even in line with his religion (Said, 2015).

According to Cuspert, the car accident and the associated self-reflection on his life, as well as the war in the Gaza Strip in 2008/2009, are said to have made him more open to religion, i.e. Salafism and, to that extent, Salafist movements (Said, 2015; Palm, 2017).

2. Anders Breivik

a) Personality Type and Personality Traits

While Breivik continued to maintain contact with his father after his parents' divorce and always visited him in the summer until he was 15 years old, the relationship between him and his mother, who was psychologically unstable, can be described as very problematic (Orange, 2012; Dafnos, 2013). She did not take good care of him,

venting her aggression on him, cursing at him, and wishing him dead (Dafnos, 2013). Moreover, "his mother sexualized Breivik when he was four years old" (Dafnos, 2013: 98; Orange, 2012). As his mother became increasingly overwhelmed with Breivik, she turned to social services, after which the entire family, consisting of the mother, a sister six years older, and Breivik himself, was sent to the Oslo Center for Child and Adolescent Psychiatry (Seierstad, 2015). A psychologist gave a diagnosis on Breivik at the same time, writing "Anders has become a contact adverse, somewhat anxious, passive child" (Al Jazeera, 2012: 3; Borchgrevink, 2013; Turrettini, 2015). The Center for Child and Adolescent Psychiatry in Norway even recommended that Breivik should be taken away from his mother for his well-being, but this did not happen (Borchgrevink, 2013; Seierstad, 2015). His upbringing produced an introverted, strange, and at times aggressive boy who could not feel joy or empathy (Borchgrevink, 2013; Seierstad, 2015). Breivik was known in the neighborhood as an animal abuser who tortured neighbors' pets (Seierstad, 2015).

Breivik is believed to have wanted to become rich, big, and famous (Borchgrevink, 2013; Seierstad, 2015). He is said to be narcissistic with regard to the self-portrayal in his manifesto, as he tries by all means "to preserve his 'grandiose' self-image" (Ranstorp, 2013: 88). He is also reported by friends to have suffered from very low self-esteem or even an inferiority complex, which is further evident from extreme embellishments of his life regarding academic education and professional career in his manifesto (Carbone, 2011; Ranstorp, 2013). He allegedly underwent plastic surgery "to improve his appearance" due to his low self-esteem, which underlines the assessment of his friends who describe Breivik as a perfectionist (Carbone, 2011: 1; Seierstad, 2015).

b) Experiences, Events and Perceptions

(1) Personal and Economic Crises

Breivik experienced his first personal crisis at the age of 16 when his best friend, a Pakistani Muslim, makes the decision to join the Pakistani community in Oslo (Dafnos, 2013). Breivik interprets this behavior as a betrayal of their friendship (Dafnos, 2013). In addition to losing a friend, this personal crisis is also marked by disappointment, as he held Muslim youth in high regard and elevated them to a kind of pedestal in aspects of adherence to moral principles and camaraderie (Dafnos, 2013).

Due to his best friend's behavior and decision, wherein Breivik saw a rejection of the Norwegian lifestyle, and the perception of betrayal and sense of disappointment it created, Breivik's opinion of the Muslim community shifted to the extreme opposite, such that he now saw them as perpetrators of violence and rapists of ethnic Norwegians (Dafnos, 2013; Turrettini, 2015). While he had a positive attitude toward Islam in the beginning, he now perceived Muslims, and Pakistanis in particular, as nothing but cruel (Dafnos, 2013). Breivik claimed to have suffered and experienced attacks and robberies by Muslims (Berwick, 2011; Guilherme, 2019). This personal crisis may have been an initiating effect on the radicalization process.

Breiviks also suffered a severe setback professionally. He wanted to become rich and started several businesses, but they all went bankrupt (Seierstad, 2015). Regarding his last business, his own programming services business, he had to declare bankruptcy in 2005-2006 due to the financial crisis and had to move back to his mother's house in 2006 due to his poor financial situation (Dafnos, 2013; Ranstorp, 2013; Seierstad, 2015). As a result, he tried to become successful and earn money through illegal methods. He sold about 5000 forgeries of educational diplomas through a self-founded company called "ECommerce Group," earning about 6 million Norwegian kroner (today the equivalent of almost 600,000 euros) (Borchgrevink, 2013; Ranstorp, 2013).

(2) Exclusion and Search for Belonging

Breivik was hardly noticed in his childhood (Seierstad, 2015). He always had the desire to belong somewhere, but he did not succeed (Seierstad, 2015). He reacted to this rejection with a kind of defiance, so that now he no longer just wanted to belong, but wanted to be the leader of a group (Seierstad, 2015). He reportedly tried frantically to appear cool during his school years, but was an uncool outsider, considered a loser that no one wanted anything to do with, and experienced bullying and intimidation from classmates (Carbone, 2011; Seierstad, 2015; Turrettini, 2015). According to friends, he started going to the gym and taking steroids "in an attempt to mitigate his inferiority complex" (Carbone, 2011: 1).

As a teenager, Breivik reportedly was "a member (or an acquaintance) of a number of street gangs, including Pakistani Muslim ones" and a member of a gang from the graffiti scene (Guilherme, 2019: 40; Berwick, 2011; Borchgrevink, 2013). The truth was rather that Breivik had some kind of alliance with a Pakistani gang whose strategy was

to get into richer neighborhoods and demand money from the young people; in case of non-payment, the consequence for the young people was that they were beaten up and robbed (Seierstad, 2015, Turrettini, 2015; Guilherme, 2019). Despite this alleged alliance, Breivik was rounded up by the Pakistani gang, which he thought his Muslim best friend was behind, whereupon he began carrying weapons for self-defense (Seierstad, 2015). He was eventually kicked out of the graffiti gang as well, but continued spraying on his own, which caused conflict with the gang as he sprayed over their graffiti (Seierstad, 2015).

(3) Rejection and Desire for Attention and Recognition

Breivik's parents separated before he was one year old, but he continued to have contact with his father and visited him regularly during the summer (Ravndal, 2013; Seierstad, 2015). However, his father broke off contact with Breivik when he was 15 years old (Seierstad, 2015). Breivik felt he belonged to the Oslo graffiti scene at this time and promised his father he would no longer spray graffiti in the neighborhood (Seierstad, 2015). This promise was broken by Breivik, however, so his father completely cut off contact with him; he stopped visiting, calling, and even writing birthday cards (Seierstad, 2015). Breivik told his stepmother that he wanted his father to be proud of him and hoped that he would eventually accomplish something big so that his father would give him attention (Seierstad, 2015).

Furthermore, he tried to pursue a political career in the right-wing populist Progress Party and wanted to run for a position as a member of the Oslo City Council in 2003 (Borchgrevink, 2013; Seierstad, 2015; Guilherme, 2019). However, he never made it onto the list of candidates, which he was very frustrated about and blamed on a lack of support in the party (Borchgrevink, 2013; Seierstad, 2015).

Since 2002, Breivik has been noticeable with right-wing extremist comments and posts on neutral, conservative, but also relevant right-wing extremist websites and forums (Ranstorp, 2013; Ravndal, 2013; Seierstad, 2015). He also consumed right-wing extremist, anti-immigrant, xenophobic, and Islamophobic content on the Internet (Ranstorp, 2013; Ravndal, 2013; Seierstad, 2015). However, at some point, Breivik was no longer satisfied with just reading texts written by others and wanted to actively participate and become part of the group (Seierstad, 2015). Norwegian hackers leaked private emails from Breivik to a Norwegian journalist shortly after Breivik's terrorist

attack (Ravndal, 2013). This correspondence reveals Breivik's desire to become a professional writer and publisher of a culturally conservative magazine (Ravndal, 2013). In order to realize this intention, he wrote to famous bloggers and authors already established in the Norwegian scene critical of Islam and multiculturalism and admired by him, trying to win them over to his idea (Ravndal, 2013). However, all of them had rejected, including Peder Are Nøstvold Jensen, known in the scene as Fjordman, whom Breivik particularly admired (Borchgrevink, 2013; Ravndal, 2013). Breivik was rejected by the people he idolized and would have most desired to receive attention and recognition from.

Overall, it can be argued that Breivik was unable to deal with rejection from those around him. This may have led to Breivik becoming more extreme and further radicalized into violent right-wing extremism, as he no longer wanted to be overlooked and rejected and tried to realize his desire for attention and recognition from his environment.

c) Strategic Choice

Whether Breivik's radicalization toward violent right-wing extremism was a strategic choice is difficult to say, but there is some evidence to support that assumption. Breivik was concerned about the policies and political decisions that he perceived supported and promoted immigration, multiculturalism, and Islamization (Dafnos, 2013). He saw this as a threat to white European majority society, and this perceived crisis motivated him to become active and involved in the right-wing populist Progress Party (Berwick, 2011; Dafnos, 2013). However, he soon felt that democratic means were not enough to combat the perceived threat. Breivik's radicalization toward violent right-wing extremism can be seen as a self-made strategic decision, as he viewed this path of radicalization as without any alternative and necessary to combat the perceived threat. Furthermore, Breivik may also have strategically chosen to radicalize toward violent right-wing extremism in search of attention and recognition. Unable to fulfill his desires for attention and recognition within his environment, and instead experiencing rejection and repudiation from friends, political party, and individuals from the right-wing extremist scene who he looked up to, Breivik believes that he might need to radicalize further toward violent right-wing extremism in order to satisfy the need for attention and recognition from these actors (Dafnos, 2013).

d) Catalysts

The loss of his best friend can be identified as a trigger event. For Breivik, this betrayal was a personal crisis that he interpreted as rejection and repudiation (Dafnos, 2013; Seierstad 2015). This resulted in a negative change regarding the way of thinking about Muslims and Pakistanis and may have had an influence in the form of a stimulus for the radicalization process.

Furthermore, the Balkan War and Serbia in particular and NATO's intervention against Serbia in 1999 is said to have had an impact on his political orientation (Berwick, 2011; Ranstorp, 2013). He saw this as NATO's support of Muslims against Christian Serbia, which he believed would lead to the Pakistanization or Islamization of Western Europe in the future (Berwick, 2011; Dafnos, 2013).

Moreover, it can be assumed that the 9/11 terrorist attacks as a trigger event shaped Breivik's ideological worldview in the form of a “moral shock”, so that he interpreted the world on the basis of this event and consequently promoted the radicalization process towards right-wing extremism (Ranstorp, 2013: 88). An indication of this is that shortly afterwards Breivik began to write Islamophobic and xenophobic posts and comments in neutral, conservative as well as right-wing extremist Internet forums (Ravndal, 2013).

B. Causal Factors at the Micro-Level: Social Factors

In this section of the analysis, the social factors are examined at the micro-level, focusing on interactions and interpersonal relationships of the individual and group dynamics. "If we thus aim to understand how - changes in - individual behavior come(s) into being, we need to examine how individuals are affected by their social context on the one hand, and, vice versa, how individuals can affect their social context on the other" (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009: 39/40).

A social factor on the micro-level is "social identity" (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009: 40). A factor to be analyzed is the individual's identification with a social group and the (perceived) group membership through which the individual identifies and generates self-esteem and explains its social action (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009). The individual sees the world through the eyes of the group, so that the more intense the identification

with the group, the more intense the grievances and perceived attacks and threats against the group also affect the individual (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009). In particular, circumstances such as an identity crisis, exclusion by society, and alienation through discrimination can cause a person to turn to an (extremist) group and have a radicalization-promoting effect on the individual. Emotions also play a role with respect to social factors and should also be considered at this micro level in radicalization pathways, as the individual may perceive not only its own emotions, but also emotions of the group and group members (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009). The intensity of the emotion depends on the degree of identification (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009).

Other social factors to look for in the radicalization pathways of the case studies are "social interactions and group processes," as these shape the attitudes, feelings and behavior of the individual (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009: 42). Social networks can also explain why individuals engage in certain (extremist) ideologies or religions and contribute to the radicalization process. A precondition for the individual to join a certain group is the agreement of their values, which can reinforce after joining the group or the adoption of other values can happen (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009). Another aspect is "factors such as social affection, friendship and love, which establishes bonds between members of a radical group and newcomers" (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009: 43). Within the group, psychological group dynamics can emerge and operate, such as "norm conformity" through "encouragement and punishment" or "behavioral confirmation" and "sacrifices on behalf of the group," as well as framing, indoctrination, peer pressure, and victimization (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009: 44; Coleman, 1990). Charismatic personalities or leaders of the group can further reinforce in-group dynamics and also have an accelerating effect on radicalization (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009). In terms of social networks and psychological group dynamics, the Internet plays a role in promoting radicalization as a causal factor at the social level, as the Internet "is a prominent facilitator of network formation and interpersonal or intergroup interaction, and can offer possibilities for mobilization and social involvement in collective action" without people ever having to physically meet (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009: 45; Postmes & Brunsting, 2002). In addition, prisons can provide an environment where belonging is crucial and in-group dynamics take place that contribute to radicalization (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009).

Furthermore, relative deprivation in relation to the group needs to be mentioned as a social factor and radicalization pathways are to be examined in this regard. This

means that the individual who feels that it belongs to or identifies with a particular group perceives a discrepancy between what it believes the group is rightfully entitled to and what the individual expects the group to receive (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009). This circumstance can cause frustration and trigger aggression and collective violence (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009).

Catalysts are recruitment and trigger events. Recruitment "is driven by social and individual forces, including identity-related matters, network dynamics and individual motivations" (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009: 48). According to Veldhuis and Staun (2009), recruitment is a process that requires the individual to have some interest in the ideology or religion and has a radicalization-accelerating effect (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009). Recruitment can occur by the group or by the individual itself through self-recruitment, for example, due to a search for an identity or identity crisis, with the assumption that interaction between recruit and group is essential (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009; Sageman, 2004; Coolsaet, 2005). Trigger events are "unexpectedly occurring events that can manifest themselves at institutional, social, and individual level" that can affect "networks and personal relationships," for example, "provocative events," "the arrest of a group member," or "failure of friends" (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009: 49).

1. Denis Cuspert

a) Social Interactions and Group Processes

(1) Personal Networks and Interaction with Like-Minded People

According to Cuspert's statements, he first made a profession of faith at the age of 11, converted to Islam, and became a devout Muslim over time (Berliner Verfassungsschutz, 2014; Said, 2015; Palm, 2017). According to a friend, he turned to religion with increasing intensity during his times in prison, so that in particular his time in prison promoted his turn to faith (Ata, 2014; Palm, 2017). Furthermore, while in prison, Cuspert came into contact with the Kaplan movement, an Islamist German organization (also known as the "Caliphate State") (Berliner Verfassungsschutz, 2011, 2014; Dantschke, 2012; Schmidt, 2012).

Cuspert began attending mosque regularly (Palm, 2017). He caught the attention of Abdul Adhim, a preacher in Berlin, who saw potential in him and wanted to support him in his search for meaning (Said, 2015; Palm, 2017). Through Cuspert, he also wanted to gain access to young people, whom the preacher hoped to attract to a life of pure, Islamic values (Said, 2015; Palm, 2017). It is believed that through Abdul Adhim, Cuspert made contact with Pierre Vogel, the most prominent and influential Salafist in Germany at the time (Said, 2015). Cuspert and Vogel first met at the Al-Nur mosque in Berlin's Neukölln district, which he regularly visited and which is known for radical Islamist preachers and sermons with Salafist and jihadist content, including in relation to the Gaza conflict (Berliner Verfassungsschutz, 2014; Palm, 2017). The Islamist Internet portal "Die Wahre Religion" ("the true religion") and the group "Hizb ut-Tahrir" ("Party of Liberation"), both of which have been banned, as well as his attendance at mosques that can be classified as extreme and his acquaintance with the German Islamist and later jihadist Reda Seyam are said to have influenced Cuspert to turn further to Salafism (Dantschke, 2012; Berliner Verfassungsschutz, 2014; Said, 2015; Palm, 2017). In addition, he reportedly had contact with other Islamist, Salafist, and jihadist groups and organizations (Berliner Verfassungsschutz, 2014). In 2010, Cuspert quit rap music for his religion, which was actually the center of his life. This could be an indication that he had become involved with his new environment and that its views and values now matched his and he felt a sense of belonging. Furthermore, he and the German Salafist scene became known to the German authorities because of the extreme religion, and official measures such as house searches and inspections followed (Palm, 2017). Cuspert portrayed himself and the German Salafist scene as victims who were forbidden to practice their faith and contextualized this with the global oppression of Muslims, which speaks to the psychological process of victimization within the group (Palm, 2017).

(2) Group Processes and Dynamics

Although Cuspert was already a devout Muslim before he met the Salafist preacher Pierre Vogel, he was still quite inexperienced when it came to Salafism (Berliner Verfassungsschutz, 2014). However, he quickly internalized Salafism and embraced the identity of the group and the Salafist movement. After his first meeting with Vogel in early 2010, he participated in a Germany-wide tour, a so-called German-

language Islam seminar, of the Salafist scene that same year and acted as its mouthpiece to spread Salafist messages (Berliner Verfassungsschutz, 2014; Palm, 2017). Although Cuspert had only recently become a part of the German Salafist scene and did not yet have sufficient knowledge of Salafism, he rose to become a key figure in the movement in the following months and assumed a leadership role (Berliner Verfassungsschutz, 2014). In the following year, a socialization process of Cuspert took place within the group; his language and appearance changed so that he now used a style typical of Salafism in terms of language use and appearance, as well as changing his name to Abou Maleeq (Berliner Verfassungsschutz, 2014; Said, 2015). By using so-called "Nashid" (plural Anashid), Islamist fight songs, he propagated Salafi jihadism and called for militant jihad (Berliner Verfassungsschutz, 2014; Palm, 2017). He was thus the first German Salafist in the German Salafist scene to publicly call for militant jiahd (Berliner Verfassungsschutz, 2014). In numerous other Anashid, he blames the West for the suffering of the Muslim community, divides the world into good and evil/believers and infidels, and repeatedly calls for jihad, the war against the West (Berliner Verfassungsschutz, 2011, 2014).

Cuspert reportedly became more religious with Salafist tendencies after each prison term and tried to convert his circle of friends to his faith, which is said to have annoyed them so that they distanced themselves from him (Ata, 2014; Hellmuth, 2016; Spiegel 2017). This rejection of his old life, presumably fostered a desire to connect and belong and drove him further into religion and to the Salafist scene.

In 2011, after Cuspert had become one of the leading figures among Salfists in Germany, he founded the organization "Millatu Ibrahim," meaning the Community of Abraham, together with Mohammed Mahmoud and Abu Ibrahim (Berliner Verfassungsschutz 2014; Palm, 2017). This organization was a Germany-wide network of Salafi jihadists (Berliner Verfassungsschutz, 2014). Millatu Ibrahim distinguished itself from the rest of the German Salafist scene by its more extreme Salafi-jihadist interpretation of Islam (Palm, 2017). The organization and its members distinguished and isolated themselves from the rest of the scene, seeing themselves as the only representatives of "true Islam" and the "true defenders of the Prophet" (Dantschke, 2014: 183-184; Said, 2015: 130). After Millatu Ibrahim was noticed for violence at a demonstration and a Salafist-jihadist supporter of the organization deliberately severely injured police officers with a knife, the organization was excluded from the rest of the Salafist scene in Germany, which further advanced the isolation of the Salafist-jihadist

group (Dantschke, 2012; Berliner Verfassungsschutz, 2014). Cuspert now interacted only with like-minded individuals in a kind of Salafist-jihadist bubble. Through the echo chamber effect, his Salafist-jihadist beliefs were confirmed, consolidated, and strengthened. This can be seen in the fact that Cuspert publicly called the perpetrator, who had seriously injured the policeman, a hero and role model, justified the act as a religious act, and threatened with further violence (Berliner Verfassungsschutz, 2014).

b) Social Identity

Even though Cuspert, according to his own statements, was already a devout Muslim as a youth, it can be assumed that he initially identified more with his Berlin environment and the rapper scene and felt that he belonged to this social group. Due to lack of success and lack of recognition and alienation by and from the scene, he presented himself as a devout Muslim already since 2007 (Berliner Verfassungsschutz, 2014). He increasingly felt that he belonged to the Muslim community and identified himself with this social group. Through the eyes of this social group, Cuspert felt that the Muslim community was suffering from grievances, attacks, and threats from the West and Israel, and was at war with them in general (Berliner Verfassungsschutz, 2011, 2014). In particular, the Gaza conflict of 2008/2009 triggered a "moral outrage" (Palm, 2017: 137). The Gaza conflict is said to have been a major reason for his turning away from his rapper life and completely turning to religion (Palm, 2017). In this context, he first found belonging, recognition, and a social identity in the German Salafist scene around Pierre Vogel, then in the self-founded organization Millatu Ibrahim, and finally in the Islamic State. As he changed milieus, he also changed his social identity, as evidenced by his name changes.

c) Relative Deprivation

Relative deprivation with respect to the group can be assumed at various levels. On the one hand, Cuspert identifies as a Muslim and feels that he belongs to the Muslim community. Due to the perceived discrimination, marginalization, and oppression of Muslims worldwide, it can be argued that he feels a discrepancy in terms of what he perceives and what he feels is rightfully entitled for his social group in terms of recognition and status in the world (Palm, 2017).

This relative deprivation can also be broken down in the same way to the level of Germany. Cuspert identifies with the German Salafist scene and feels a sense of belonging to it. However, it can be assumed that he also perceives a discrepancy at this level; the discrimination and marginalization and lack of recognition within Germany that he feels in this regard does not fit with his view of what this scene should actually be entitled to.

In his development into a Salafi-jihadist, a relative deprivation within the German Salafist scene can also be observed. With the founding of Millatu Ibrahim, Cuspert now identified and felt more a sense of belonging to this Salafi-jihadist organization than to the less extreme German Salafist scene (Berliner Verfassungsschutz, 2014). Here, too, a relative deprivation can be assumed, since this organization did not receive the recognition in the scene that Cuspert thought it should have.

d) Catalysts

It is questionable whether recruitment as a catalyst is applicable in Cuspert's case. Even before his radicalization into the Salafist-jihadist scene, Cuspert was religious and showed interest in Islam especially Islamism and also Salafism (Buschbom, 2015). Personalities such as Pierre Vogel, group processes within the German Salafist scene, and contact with Salafi-jihadist groups as well as the organization Millatu Ibrahim may have promoted his radicalization or influenced the process, but it can be assumed less of a recruitment from this side and more of a kind of self-recruitment, especially since Cuspert co-founded Millatu Ibrahim.

However, a trigger event can be identified that could have had a promoting effect on Cuspert's radicalization. In 2012, Millatu Ibrahim was banned in Germany (Berliner Verfassungsschutz, 2014). This ban on the organization, first caused Cuspert's companion and co-founder of Millatu Ibrahim Mahmoud to leave Germany for Egypt and via other stops later for Syria, joining terrorist organizations before Cuspert took the same path a short time later (Berliner Verfassungsschutz, 2014; Palm, 2017). Under his fighting name Abu Talha al-Almani, he first joined the al-Qaeda terrorist network and later pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, meaning that he now also physically participated in militant jihad (Berliner Verfassungsschutz, 2014, 2015). Whether Cuspert would have followed this path even without Mahmoud is questionable, but

Cuspert's following testifies to a strong bond with his companion and emphasizes the power of group dynamics in terms of sense of belonging and group loyalty (Palm, 2017).

2. Anders Breivik

a) Social Interactions and Group Processes

(1) Personal Networks and Interactions with Like-Minded People

Breivik was between 16 and 18 years old when he started to get actively involved in the youth organization of the Norwegian Progress Party, which is the party in Norway that is against immigration and multiculturalism (Dafnos, 2013; Seierstad, 2015; Turrettini, 2015). He is looking for like-minded people "who have negotiated a similar change in beliefs and have also foreseen the threat posed by multiculturalists" (Dafnos, 2013: 101). Breivik is in the political party in search of "group identification" (Dafnos, 2013: 101). In 2000, after being politically active in the party for about 4 years, he came to the frustrated realization that democracy cannot help change and improve the perceived situation and that it is not enough to fight the perceived threat of multiculturalism and Islamization only by democratic means (Dafnos, 2013). Moreover, he believed that his party, the Progress Party, was part of the problem and not capable of initiating and bringing radical change in this regard; however, he did not exit the party until 2006/2007 (Dafnos, 2013; Seierstad, 2015). This change may also have had to do with the fact that he tried unsuccessfully to make a political career in the party (Guilherme, 2019).

According to himself, he was unable to find a resistance movement that attracted him regarding his extreme right-wing ideology, so he contacted a Serbian group via the Internet, through which Breivik managed to get in touch with other people across Europe and later co-founded the political movement of Knights Templar (Berwick, 2011; Dafnos, 2013). It is believed that this movement made him feel more self-confident and that he then completely rejected democratic ways of achieving his objectives (Dafnos, 2013). Breivik was also in contact with other extreme right-wing

Islamophobic movements and joined the Norwegian Defence League, which "he was forced to leave due to his extreme views" (Dafnos, 2013: 106/107).

It can be argued that these personal networks and interactions with like-minded people confirmed and consolidated Breivik's right-wing extremist ideology and, in the corresponding phase of the radicalization process, also had a partially promoting effect. However, with regard to social interactions and group processes, Internet forums and online gaming can be attributed with a radicalization-promoting effect towards violent right-wing extremism.

(2) Internet Forums and Online Gaming

The Internet was a crucial factor in Breivik's "new personal creation" with regard to the reinforcement of "idiosyncratic psychological and personal traits and as 'an echo chamber', where his ideology was shaped with and by other likeminded" people (Ranstorp, 2013: 89). Already in 2002 in the discussion forum of the Norwegian Progress Party's Youth, Breivik voiced his fear of Muslims as well as Islam (Ravndal, 2013). Websites and forums such as Gates of Vienna and Document.no, for example, which spread anti-immigration, xenophobic, and Islamophobic content, provided Breivik with right-wing extremist arguments constantly from 2002 to 2011, which consolidated his right-wing extremist ideology and also gave him a platform to spread his ideology through comments and to connect with like-minded people (Ranstorp, 2013; Ravndal, 2013). Breivik is said to have regularly visited about 30 different right-wing extremist websites that spread right-wing conspiracy theories such as the Eurabia theory, incited against immigrants, and propagated white power, when he moved back in with his mother in 2006 (Seierstad, 2015). His friends noticed a change in behavior starting in 2006, that Breivik talked constantly about politics especially immigration, multiculturalism, and Norwegian politicians, whom he blamed for betraying their own people in this regard (Dafnos, 2013). He was also a member of relevant right-wing extremist forums (Ravndal, 2013). In 2008, Breivik was active in the online forum "Stormfront," a global forum for white nationalism, and in 2009 he was also registered with the right-wing extremist forum "Nordisk.nu," both of which belong to the so-called counterjihad movement, "a transnational political movement whose main objective is to reverse Muslim immigration and the introduction of Islamic culture to Western societies" (Ravndal, 2013: 175). He blamed socialism and socialist parties for the

perceived "Islamization" of the West (Ravndal, 2013). Through these websites and forums, Breivik consumed various strands of right-wing ideology, particularly extreme views from key figures in the counterjihad movement, such as the aforementioned Fjordman, "Robert Spencer, Bat Ye'Or (whose real name is Gisèle Litman) and Andrew Bostom," whom he considered "ideological authorities with strong credibility" (Ravndal, 2013: 176). Instead of real communities, Breivik operated in virtual communities that functioned like a right-wing ideological bubble in which group processes such as echo chamber effects and indoctrination toward right-wing extremism took place. He exchanged ideas with like-minded people, which confirmed and consolidated his right-wing extremist worldview, since there were no other views and opinions besides right-wing sentiment left in this bubble. Moreover, virtual trumping by increasingly radical and extreme views and opinions happened to get recognition and attention from the group in this bubble and to respond to rejection. For example, Breivik criticized one of his ideological role models Fjordman for only wanting “to ban all Muslim immigration”, whereas he would “deport all Muslims from Western countries” (Ravndal, 2013: 176).

Breivik was a very active and extremely dedicated online gamer (Ravndal, 2013). When he moved back to his mother's apartment in 2006, his life consisted mainly of nothing but computer games for the next three years (Ravndal, 2013). He spent 7 to 16 hours a day playing the computer role-play game "World of Warcraft" online (Schreier, 2012; Ranstorp, 2013). Playing computer games online dominated his daily life and isolated him from friends and relatives and other social contacts outside the online world (Ravndal, 2013). Within his online gaming world, Breivik was popular with his fellow players and had great prestige due to the high level of his game character; "an accomplishment that takes quite a lot of time and 'player- killing' to acquire (Ravndal, 2013: 178; Schreier, 2012). He fled to the virtual world because it allowed him to create an alternate reality where he had everything he could not achieve in the real world, but always sought; recognition, attention, and belonging.

b) Social Identity

Breivik feels that he belongs to the white European majority society and identifies himself with this social group. Within this social group, however, he makes a further distinction. Breivik describes himself as a "cultural conservative" and referred to

all others as enemies and "cultural Marxists" who, in his opinion, promote a multicultural society and immigration and suppress other opposing opinions, for example, the liberal media and journalists, political elites and parties with the exception of right-wing populist politicians and parties (Ranstorp, 2013). Based on events and experiences, he perceives a dichotomy between "us" and "them"; an in-group consisting of a conservative and traditionally white Europe and an out-group consisting of multiculturalists and cultural Marxists (Turrettini, 2015). Through the eyes of this in-group to which he feels he belongs and with which he identifies, he perceives a threat in the form of Islamization that is supported and promoted by the out-group. He thus calls all those who criticize and attack the right-wing populist Progress Party as traitors and hypocrites because, in his opinion, it is the only party that cares about Norway, and attacks media that would hide the truth about violent actions committed by Muslims (Dafnos, 2013).

c) Relative Deprivation

Because of prevailing policies and political decisions that Breivik sees as facilitating and promoting immigration, multiculturalism, and Islamization, he perceives a deprivation for white European majority society. In Breivik's perception, the livelihood, security, and common good of white Europeans, as well as Christian and Western values, are threatened by the invasion of violent Muslim invaders and those who allow them into Europe (Berwick, 2011; Ravndal, 2013; Seierstad, 2015; Guilherme, 2019). Breivik perceives this threat as a deprivation of his social group, to which he feels he belongs and with which he identifies. He feels that the white European majority society is deprived, but this circumstance does not fit with his view of what this group should actually be entitled to, namely everything in which it is threatened.

d) Catalysts

In Breivik's case, no recruitment from the outside can be identified as a catalyst for the radicalization process. Even before he came into contact with people with a similar right-wing mindset through the right-wing populist Progress Party, Breivik can be said to hold extreme right-wing views. This was merely confirmed and consolidated

within the party. Authors and bloggers on the Internet on websites and in forums, as well as other right-wing extremist groups with which he came into contact, may have influenced Breivik's radicalization process and also promoted it to some extent, but it was Breivik himself who became increasingly extreme due to rejection and repudiation and, in this regard, the search for attention and recognition, and who promoted his own radicalization toward right-wing extremism. For this reason, self-recruitment can be assumed.

A trigger event, particularly with regard to psychological group processes and social interactions, which could have had a radicalization-promoting effect, is the rejection Breivik experienced from parts of his virtual right-wing extremist community from which he actually sought attention and recognition. Breivik's hacked and published private email correspondence reveals that in 2009 he had invested time and effort in obtaining cooperation with the conservative blog Document.no and the Norwegian Progress Party to jointly produce a paper journal (Ravndal, 2013). Furthermore, he offered "to assist Document.no in improving their use of social media platforms, and help Fjordman distribute his book Defeating Eurabia to a wider audience" (Ravndal, 2013: 177). He also presented Fjordman his idea of a book project (Ravndal, 2013). However, Breivik faced rejection regarding his proposals and ideas, which he proposed and presented to those he admired the most (Ravndal, 2013). With regard to his search for attention and recognition, it can be assumed that this rejection as a trigger event promoted Breivik's radicalization process; he had to become increasingly extreme in order to get attention and recognition. He then criticized bloggers and authors of the scene for still trying to get their message across by democratic means (Berwick, 2011). Evidence of this may be that he began physical preparations for the terrorist attack in 2009, the same year of the rejection and repudiation (Ravndal, 2013; Seierstad, 2015; Turrettini, 2015).

C. Causal Factors at the Macro-Level

Veldhuis and Staun (2009) state that the source of a radicalization pathway is no longer "to be found in individual pathologies alone" (p. 29). Macro-level social and environmental structures can influence the individual embedded in them and contribute to radicalization (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009). The existence of macro-level factors can be structures, conditions, or circumstances that influence an individual's likelihood of

radicalization (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009: 30). These will be used to analyze the macro-level case studies and examine the presence of these factors in radicalization pathways so that "how macro conditions can shape an environment that is conducive to radicalism" can be examined (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009: 30).

A macro-level causal factor to be examined is "poor integration" (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009: 30).Veldhuis and Staun (2009) understand this factor in the context of immigration and demographic change and thus with the adjustment of the situation by creating new structures to offer economic and political participation and the discrimination and marginalization in this regard (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009). Since Denis Cuspert and Anders Breivik are not immigrants, this explanation does not fit. This macro-level analysis follows a different explanation when examining the causal factor of "poor integration." People with an immigrant background, or indeed anyone in a society, may be poorly integrated into it because of prevailing structures, circumstances or conditions. Poor cultural, social, political or economic integration can be due to (perceived) structural/institutional discrimination and marginalization based on origin or belonging to a certain social class. For this reason, the radicalization pathways are screened for such realities and perceptions, as they may threaten the integration of the individual and promote or facilitate radicalization.

Another factor to be examined is "international relations" and foreign policy (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009: 32). Relationships between states, positions of the West on certain conflicts, and Western (foreign) policy, as well as perceptions of the individual in this regard, can have an impact on an individual's radicalization (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009). An example of this is perceptions or feelings of Muslims worldwide that Islam and the Muslim community are threatened by the West (and its politics) (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009). Veldhuis and Staun (2009) note that it is "important to state that policy in itself does not radicalize people; whether and to what extent it contributes to radicalization depends on social and individual dynamics that are determinant for people's perception of and response to global political events" (p. 33).

The next causal factor on the macro-level is "globalization and modernization" (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009: 34). In the course of globalization and modernization, there are no barriers for people anymore and everyone is connected somehow (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009). People settle wherever it is most advantageous for them. This increases competition for resources, so that feelings of being left behind from certain classes and conflicts in this regard can arise (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009). Technological innovations

facilitate constant connections between people (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009). This enables the emergence and expansion, but also constant accessibility of transnational extremist movements, which facilitates their influence on individuals as well as recruitment (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009). Communities become virtual communities that provide belonging at the convenience of the individual (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009). Virtual communities are constantly accessible and have an attractive effect on the individual, especially when alienated or feeling excluded (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009). The radicalization paths of the jihadist and right-wing extremist case studies are to be examined for evidence regarding aspects of this causal factor.

Trigger events at the macro level can include „events that call for revenge or action, such as a lack of opportunity for political participation, violence against in-groups, police brutality, and contested elections, but also provoking acts committed by hostile out-groups or compromising speeches by public figures" (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009: 36).

1. Denis Cuspert

a) Integration

Cuspert grew up in districts of Berlin that could already be described as social hotspots and problem districts at that time. Life in this socially deprived milieu consisted of violence, crime and "excessive lifestyle" (Berliner Verfassungsschutz, 2014: 7). It is assumed that Cuspert's socioeconomic situation was poor, as he mainly attracted attention with criminality related to money and was also imprisoned several times because of this (Berliner Verfassungsschutz, 2014; Palm, 2017). Furthermore, in his rap songs he talks about discrimination and perceived structural racism and inequality of opportunity. In one passage of the song "Wer hat Angst vorm schwarzen Mann" ("who is afraid of the black man"), Cuspert describes how he always had to be "ten times better, ten times harder, and ten times faster" because of his skin color so that his achievements would be noticed at all (Berliner Verfassungsschutz, 2014: 8; Schmitt and Veit, 2018: 39).

b) International Relations and Foreign Policy

Cuspert had the opinion that the West was at war with the Islamic world (Berlin Constitutional Protection 2011, 2014; Palm, 2017). He believed that Western states and Israel were bombing Iraq and Palestine and waging war against Muslim community to crush the Islamic world (Berliner Verfassungsschutz, 2011; Larsen and Jensen, 2019). He identified economic and political motives and goals, such as oil and power, as the West's motivation in the song "Wacht doch auf" ("wake up!") (Palm, 2017; Schmitt and Veit, 2018).

c) Globalization and Modernization

Even though Cuspert belongs to the poorer social class and grew up in a West Berlin problem district and social hotspot with a socially deprived and socioeconomically disadvantaged environment, this is probably not due to globalization but rather to aspects of integration, so it can be assumed that in this context the causal factor of globalization did not influence Cuspert's radicalization process (Dantschke 2012; Berliner Verfassungsschutz, 2014; Said, 2015; Palm, 2017). Despite this, Cuspert may have perceived himself as economically and socially left behind, with perceived deprivation as well as marginalization more likely to be relevant. On the contrary, globalization and also modernization in particular could have helped regarding his music career as a rapper, even though these factors on the other hand also might have caused him to face increasing competition. However, globalization and modernization may have played a role in his turn to religion and his radicalization into Salafi-Jihadism. Due to a globalized and modern world, it was possible for Cuspert to come into contact with various Salafi-jihadist views, to experience the Gaza conflict firsthand and research it, and to come into and stay in contact with numerous extreme Salafi-jihadist groups and organizations (Dantschke 2012; Berliner Verfassungsschutz, 2014; Said, 2015; Palm, 2017). Although Cuspert mainly maintained personal contacts from a real community, his radical milieu in Germany, a minor influence on his radicalization process can be assumed in this regard.

d) Catalysts

Cuspert emphasizes several times that the war in the Gaza Strip was a defining event for him and as a result of it he participated in demonstrations, did research on it, and turned further to religion (Palm, 2017). The Gaza conflict reinforced his opinion that the West and Israel were waging war against the Islamic world and Muslim community (Berliner Verfassungsschutz, 2011, 2014). The fact that his Muslim brothers and sisters were dying in this conflict affected Cuspert deeply, leading to a "moral outrage" (Palm, 2017: 137). In subsequent Anashid published by Cuspert, "Wacht doch auf" ("wake up!"), he drew attention to the suffering and plight of Muslims, telling of Muslim women and children screaming, injured, and killed to convey a feeling of innocent victims and great injustice; he is glorifying martyrdom as a result of jihad and the need to defend the Muslim community (Berliner Verfassungsschutz, 2011; Dantschke, 2012; Schmitt and Veit, 2018; Larsen and Jensen, 2019).

2. Anders Breivik

a) Integration

Breivik grew up in an area of Oslo that is predominantly white and whose inhabitants belong to the upper middle and upper class and tend to be conservative (Seierstad, 2015). Therefore, it can be assumed that Breivik's socioeconomic conditions were sufficient, so it can be said that he was well integrated into society in this regard. However, despite good socioeconomic integration and political participation, he was socially rather poorly integrated into his environment and society. He was an loner and misfit, spent most of his time alone and was seen and treated as an outsider, probably also due to his personality (Seierstad, 2015).

b) International Relations and Foreign Policy

Breivik believes the narrative that Western political elites are pursuing policies that lead to the support and implementation of a Muslim takeover of the West (Ranstorp, 2013). The terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the Balkan War and NATO intervention against Christian Serbia in 1999 supported his view in this regard. He perceives cultural Marxism and Islamization as a mortal threat to Western values,

Christianity, and indigenous Europeans, and blames European and national policies and all those who, in his view, opened the gates to Europe for Muslims (Berwick, 2011; Seierstad, 2015; Guilherme, 2019). However, he later emphasizes that in his opinion the problem is not so much Muslims, who have no choice because their way of life is determined by Islam, but multiculturalists and cultural Marxists, for example, journalists, politicians, academics, scientists, and teachers who are not in favor of a white, Christian Europe, and calls them traitors (Dafnos, 2013; Seierstad, 2015).

c) Globalization and Modernization

Immigration can be seen as an aspect of globalization. Since there are effectively no more barriers in the world, people can settle anywhere they see a perspective for themselves. This can increase competition between groups and cause feelings of marginalization, deprivation or being left behind and lead to conflicts within society. Since the 1970s, mass immigration from non-Western countries to Norway and other European countries increased; immigrants from Pakistan represented the largest single group in Norway (Berntzen and Sandberg, 2014). Although Breivik admired Pakistani gangs as a teenager, his views in this regard changed due to negatively perceived experiences (Guilherme, 2019). He saw Muslim immigration and multiculturalism as a threat to white majority society in Europe and Norway in the form of Islamization (Dafnos, 2013; Seierstad, 2015). Breivik believed that white Europeans are deprived and threatened due to the pro-immigration and pro-Islam policies of the social democratic Labour Party, and that their livelihood, security, and common good, as well as Christian and Western values, are at risk (Berwick, 2011; Ravndal, 2013; Seierstad, 2015; Guilherme, 2019). He sees Muslims, particularly Pakistanis, as invaders who "hang out together and proceed to violent activities, such as beating and raping ethnic Norwegians" (Dafnos, 2013: 99). Breivik even researched and collected data of criminal incidents by Muslims, which he listed (Dafnos, 2013). The perceived threat and deprivation of the white majority society by policy-promoted immigration and Islam combined with multiculturalism and Islamization as a consequence and aspect of globalization, which is perceived as negative, might be a causal factor on the macro-level promoting the radicalization process of Breivik.

Due to globalization, but especially due to the technical innovations that emerged in the course of modernization, it was possible for Breivik to promote his

right-wing extremist ideology increasingly towards violent right-wing extremism. In particular, the Internet, which enables and facilitates constant connection and accessibility, and thus websites and Internet forums, play an essential and accelerating role in Breivik's radicalization process. With the use of the Internet, he was able to consume a wide variety of right-wing extremist content at any time and to come into contact and exchange ideas with like-minded people at all times (Ranstorp, 2013; Ravndal, 2013). The constant accessibility of this virtual community also meant constant influence. In search of belonging, attention, and recognition the virtual community functions as an echo chamber to Breivik regarding his right-wing extremist ideology (Ranstorp, 2013). In this echo chamber full of like-minded people and right-wing content, Breivik's extreme views are confirmed and reinforced so that they become consolidated. His right-wing extremist ideology is not challenged in this self-contained and isolated network, or bubble, and is repeated and confirmed over and over again because there is no other content left but the right-wing extremist content. Based on the intensity of the use of the Internet and the echo chamber effect, it can be assumed that modernization and technical innovations in the form of the Internet had a promoting or even accelerating influence on Breivik's radicalization process.

d) Catalysts

As trigger events on the macro-level, two foreign policy events could be identified that also overlap and have an impact on the micro-level as well and could influence the individual on both levels. First, the Balkan War and NATO intervention in 1999 against Serbia could be mentioned here (Ranstorp, 2013). Breivik was upset and saw the intervention as the West's support for Muslims against Christians, which he interpreted as the beginning of Islamization and shaped his political orientation (Dafnos, 2013; Ranstorp, 2013). Second, the 9/11 terrorist attacks are said to have caused a moral shock to him and shaped his worldview (Ranstorp, 2013). Another trigger event, although not an explicit event, could have been political decisions, especially by the ruling social democratic Labour Party, regarding immigration, as he expressed extreme concern about the prevailing policy in this regard and described it as a betrayal (Dafnos, 2013).

IV. Conclusion

This study aims to investigate and explain the radicalization pathways of jihadists and right-wing extremists and compare both. Using a qualitative, comparative case study analysis, the radicalization pathways of the German jihadist Denis Cuspert and the Norwegian right-wing extremist Anders Breivik were examined to identify causal factors that could have initiated, promoted, or accelerated the radicalization process. For this purpose, the root cause model of radicalisation by Veldhuis and Staun (2009) was applied to examine the radicalization pathways toward jihadism and right-wing extremism in terms of causal factors at three different levels. Individual and social causal factors on the micro-level and causal factors on the macro-level could be identified that might have influenced the radicalization process of Denis Cuspert and Anders Breivik. Furthermore, differences and similarities in Cuspert's jihadist radicalization process and Breivik's right-wing extremist radicalization process could be found with regard to these causal factors.

Cuspert and Breivik were said in terms of their personality and character to be narcissistic and have psychological problems and be aggressive; Cuspert, in particular, suffered from depression and suicidal thoughts. Even though Cuspert and Breivik have different socioeconomic backgrounds, their childhoods were troubled, and both lacked real family support that might have countered the radicalization process. While Cuspert came from a criminal milieu, Breivik grew up in a well-off neighborhood. However, both can be said to lack integration in different ways; in Breivik's case, it was more social, in Cuspert's more socioeconomic. Both also had to deal with personal and economic crises. For Cuspert, it was an identity crisis combined with experiences of discrimination and marginalization and a lack of success. For Breivik, these crises also manifested themselves in unsuccessfulness and rejection, but also repudiation and exclusion. Significant factors that equally fostered the radicalization process in both cases are the desire for meaning and belonging as well as for attention and recognition. Similarly, in Cuspert's and Breivik's radicalization, contact with like-minded people and psychological group processes such as indoctrination, isolation, and echo chamber effects played a significant role. Here, however, a difference can be observed. While Cuspert radicalized mainly in a real community, Breivik predominantly radicalized in a virtual space. However, another common feature is that a kind of self-recruitment can be seen in both cases, although it was more robust in the case of Breivik than in Cuspert's case. Likewise, both identify with a particular social group and, depending on

the direction of radicalization, believe relevant narratives and conspiracy theories that this group experiences deprivation or is threatened by the other group. Another similarity that has influenced both radicalization pathways is foreign policy events that have triggered some moral outrage in both.

Although this study does not qualify for any generalization, an overwhelming majority of similarities can still be identified based on the results of the study regarding the jihadist and right-wing extremist radicalization pathways of Denis Cuspert and Anders Breivik. For this reason, it can be argued that jihadist and right-wing radicalization are two sides of the same coin.

This study has helped to better understand radicalization pathways toward jihadism and right-wing extremism and gain insights into similarities and differences. Continued research on this phenomenon is necessary to better address the acute danger and threat that jihadist and right-wing extremist radicalization poses concerning national and international security and our societies. In particular, future research should pay attention to psychological group processes in the virtual world as well as narratives and conspiracy theories that promote radicalization.

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