

Master's Thesis

**Gender equality and attitudes toward immigrants in Europe:
a cross-national analysis**

Student: Ludovica Maria Chieppa

u188719

Erasmus Mundus Joint Master Degree “European Politics and Society”

Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona

Supervisor: Tania Verge

June 2021

Abstract

Although previous research has revealed the impact of individual and contextual elements on attitudes toward immigrants across Europe, a gender-focused study of European anti-immigrant attitudes is still lacking. This study examines the role of individuals' gender and macro structures of gender equality in shaping attitudes toward immigrants through the diffusion of benevolent and universalist human values. Drawing on the European Social Survey 2018 and the 2020 Gender Equality Index for 24 European countries, more gender-equal countries are found to be more tolerant toward immigrants, due to their higher self-transcendent values and lower conservation values. Also, no gender differences in attitudes toward immigrants have been found. These findings open the debate on the relationship between gender, gender equality, basic human values, and attitudes toward immigrants, suggesting new avenues for future research.

Introduction

As the share of immigrants and asylum seekers in Europe peaked in 2015, and extremist attacks against places and people symbols of the western culture shook the continent, public concerns about the compatibility of immigrant minorities' cultural practices and the European way of life were raised. Attitudes toward immigrants (ATI) became a popular topic in academic literature. Anti-immigrant attitudes have been divided into 'economic' and 'cultural': the main drivers of prejudice across Europe have been found to be cultural rather than economic, with citizens, and especially women, being mostly concerned about the impact of foreign cultures and traditions rather than economic and employment considerations (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014; Malhotra et al., 2013).

Being the majority of immigrants and asylum seekers men (Connor, 2016), the gendered aspect of this 'cultural invasion' has been exploited by some nationalist parties to spread social panics against minorities depicted as sexist and dangerous for women's rights and freedoms, especially in highly gender-equal countries, where sexist incidents have been denounced (Fekete, 2006; Yilmaz, 2015). Feminist scholars also entered the debate on the compatibility of traditional/patriarchal minorities and the European egalitarian norms, concluding that illiberal cultural practices are always inadmissible when in contrast with basic human rights and freedoms for women and men, girls and boys (Kymlicka, 2010; Okin, 2005; Philips and Saharso, 2008). In this context of ideological and symbolic contraposition, gender equality became a separating concept between illiberal 'others', the immigrants, and liberal 'us', the Europeans (Ponce, 2017; Yilmaz, 2015). Yet, no study has considered the effect of national frameworks of gender equality on gendered, country-specific, anti-immigrant attitudes. This thesis aims at addressing the gap by answering the question: to what extent do gender equality structures shape women's and men's attitudes toward immigrants across European countries?

Most existing studies use gender as an individual variable to explain xenophobic attitudes. Generally, men are found to be more xenophobic than women due to their domineering and authoritarian personalities (Feather and McKee, 2012; Lippa and Arad, 1999). Women, on the other hand, have been found to be more concerned than men about the cultural threats posed by immigration, especially when their acquired rights and freedoms seem threatened by specific out-groups such as the Muslims (Ponce, 2017). Since there is no agreement among scholars on the correlation between womanhood and positive attitudes toward immigrants, the impact of individuals' gender on attitudes toward immigrants is worth more investigation.

In addition, several cross-national studies have documented the impact of different contextual factors on public attitudes toward immigrants: economic, social, normative, and cultural frameworks shape anti-immigrant attitudes with different outcomes across countries (Quillian, 1995; Schlueter et al., 2013; Visintin, Green and Sarrasin, 2018, among others). Particularly in the cultural dimension, ATI are influenced by a country's system of values: countries with a prevalence of 'feminine' values such as humanitarianism and egalitarianism have been found to be more tolerant and open to diversity than 'masculine' nations, where power and conservation values prevail (Leong and Ward, 2006).

Values and principles have relevance at the individual level too: they are nested into cultural climates and legal frameworks and transmitted to the population through education, media, and public narratives (Pampel, 2011; Visintin, Green and Sarrasin, 2018). As a consequence, European citizens in countries that promote universalistic and egalitarian values, for example through gender policies, have been found to be more benevolent, and less conservative and less power-oriented (Schwartz and Rubel-Lifschitz, 2009). On the one hand, more gender-equal European countries have a higher incidence of self-transcendent values associated with tolerance and lower incidence of conservation values associated with

xenophobia (Davidov et al., 2014; Davidov and Semyonov, 2017; Ponizovskiy, 2016). On the other hand, the individual incidence of self-transcendent values on women and power values on men is exacerbated by the level of gender equality: in more gender-equal countries, women and men feel free in pursuing the values they ‘inherently’ care more about: benevolence and universalism for women, power for men (Schwartz and Rubel-Lifschitz, 2009).

This master thesis investigates to what extent individuals’ gender and one particular country-level element, gender equality, frame attitudes toward immigrants through the enhancement of tolerant universalistic vs. conservation/power intolerant values. This work adopts Schwartz’s (1992) classification of basic human values - as reflected in the dedicated items of the European Social Survey - to account for the variation in attitudes toward immigrants across European countries, according to the level of gender equality. Schwartz’s framework is widely used in the literature on public attitudes and divides basic human values based on polarly opposite life motivations: self-transcendence vs. self-enhancement, conservation vs. openness to change.

To test my hypotheses, I use data from the 2018 European Social Survey (ESS9) and the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) 2020 Gender-Equality Index (GEI) for 24 Northern, Western, Southern, and Eastern European countries. The adoption of a cross-sectional approach serves to illustrate within countries and across countries differences in attitudes toward immigrants, explained by gender and gender equality. The corresponding individual and macro controls are included in the analyses. This methodologic approach allows showing, first, that women are more self-transcendent but also value security and tradition more than men, thus are not more tolerant than men; and that the gender difference in ATI is not enhanced by higher gender equality scores. Second, that national levels of gender equality do reinforce universalist and benevolent values, boosting favourable ATI in more gender-equal and gender-progressive countries. Thus, according to my findings, more gender-equal countries

have higher levels of self-transcendence and lower levels of conservation that translate into positive attitudes toward immigrants. These findings bring new evidence to the debate on the micro and macro gendered aspects of attitudes toward immigrants, mediated by basic human values.

In sum, the results display a positive relationship between gender equality/gender-progressiveness, benevolent/universalistic human values, and attitudes toward immigrants across the 24 European countries of interest. Despite this, findings fail to prove that women are more tolerant than men, and that gender equality widens the gender divide in attitudes toward immigrants. This study adds to previous knowledge on the complex relationships between gender, gender equality, human values, and public attitudes toward immigrants in Europe, linking gender policies to an increase in tolerance among men and women. Generating awareness in this regard will contribute to the investigation on the potential for gender policies not just to promote equal rights for men and women, but also to foster social change and cohesion for society in general.

After an overview of the debate about diversity and women's rights in Europe, I comment on the literature on attitudes toward immigrants, human values, gender, and gender equality. Next, the quantitative cross-sectional research is presented and the findings are discussed. The last sections conclude and pinpoint new avenues for further research.

Background: Women's rights and immigration in Europe

The year 2015 posed a critical challenge to European countries: accommodating almost 5 million new immigrants and refugees (Eurostat, 2018). Since then, inflows have been stable, with 2.7 million new arrivals from non-member countries in 2019, and 23 million non-EU citizens living in the European Union by January 2020 - 5.1% of the whole population (Eurostat,

2020). Without counting the informal stayings, every year hundreds of thousands of immigrants (706.4 thousand in 2019, according to Eurostat) acquire European citizenship¹.

In 2015, 1.3 million people applied for refugee status, the majority of whom young male individuals from the MENA region (mostly Morocco and Algeria); Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and Bangladesh; and Sub-Saharan African countries (Connor, 2016). To date, Eastern Europeans, Latin Americans, and Southern Asians score high in citizenship acquisitions too (Eurostat, 2020). These data let emerge a profile of foreign-born residents with a very varied cultural upbringing, different from the European, and predominantly male. The gendered dimension of the phenomenon of immigration is especially interesting since the great majority of new arrivals are young men, often unaccompanied, who dominate the labor and humanitarian migratory inflows (OECD, 2017). The arrival of hundreds of thousands of men from developing countries, perceived as more traditional and patriarchal than the European, puts politics and the public opinion under the challenge of accomodating different cultures and ways of life, and find a balance between minorities' rights recognition and defense of the host societies' systems of values.

In this context, xenophobic attitudes against immigrants are generally perceived to have worsened over the past decade. The large inflows of immigrants from developing countries raised public concerns about the possibility of their integration into the host societies, built on equal rights and freedoms for women and men (Philips and Saharso, 2008, p. 292). Attacks against women and homosexuals perpetrated by male immigrants exacerbated the situation and have been promptly instrumentalized by the extreme right to claim that third countries' minorities have no place within the European culture. Populist discourses have depicted immigrants as invaders, carriers of illiberal practices, especially harmful to women, clearly

¹ For more information visit the Eurostat webpage: <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/home> (Accessed: 14 June 2021)

incompatible with the liberal European values (Fekete, 2006, p. 13). Critically, the founding principles of European democracies such as sexual freedom and women's rights have been instrumentalized by the right-wing to create narratives of opposition between 'us', the liberal Europeans, and 'them', the illiberal minorities (Yilmaz, 2015, pp. 40-42).

In particular, gender equality and women's rights have been used by the right-wing as markers of European 'sameness' vs. (presumed) misogynist and sexist non-European cultures (Moss et al., 2019; Yilmaz, 2015). Notably, the stronger concerns for women's rights have been expressed by populist parties in Scandinavian countries with a long history of gender equalitarian policies. There, some feminists created unusual alliances with the right-wing, and the concept 'femonationalism', the ideological identification of gender equality with nationalism against immigrant out-groups, was coined (Akkerman and Hagelund, 2007; Bohman and Hjerm, 2016; Farris, 2017; Sager and Mulinari, 2018).

Besides the extreme right's instrumentalizations, scholars agree that male-dominated societies with rigid patriarchal hierarchies are more inclined to social conflict; and that individuals with more traditional attitudes toward gender roles and gender equality are less likely to adopt peaceful and open behaviors, being more inclined to violence and prevarication to achieve their goals (Wood and Ramirez, 2018, pp. 350-352). Feminist scholars, in particular, have raised concerns about the impact of male-dominated minorities' cultural practices on women's and girls' freedoms, arguing that 'multiculturalism is bad for women' (Okin et al., 1999, pp. 7-24). Concerns about traditional cultural practices undermining the rights and freedoms of weak individuals within the minorities alimented common concern and diffidence against the impact of immigrant minorities on the host western societies (Okin, 2005). In an attempt to solve the contrasts, several member states opted for the introduction of 'civic tests' for immigrants to access citizenship, which include elements of constitutional law and liberal-egalitarian values such as women's rights and gender equality (Kymlicka, 2010; Modood and

Meer, 2013). Moreover, civic assimilation measures themselves have been considered illiberal by some authors (Joppke, 2014, 2019), and a manifestation of western cultural supremacy by non-western feminists (Okin et al., 1999, pp. 41-114).

To date, the tensions between foreign-born residents and host European societies are unsolved, and academics and practitioners keep discussing the compatibility of the minorities' 'controversial' cultural practices with the European democratic-egalitarian principles, among them, gender equality. The risk that patriarchal or openly sexist traditions could breed into multicultural European societies to corrupt egalitarian norms, may just be the result of a collective paranoia (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014, pp. 5-11); but anti-immigrants narratives have consolidated, and do aliment prejudice toward immigrants across Europe (Drazanova et al., 2020, p. 36). Also, attitudes predict real-life behaviors and political preferences, so that intolerant opinions often result in discriminatory practices, social conflict, and electoral support for xenophobic parties (Dinesen and Hjorth, 2020; Pierson, 1993).

In this context, gender equality is a double-edged concept: on the one hand, as a marker of European identity, it can foster negative attitudes toward non-EU immigrants (Fekete, 2006); on the other hand, gender-egalitarian values reinforce inclusive climates that enhance tolerant attitudes among men and women (Visintin, Green and Sarrasin 2018, p. 21). This work investigates the potential of 'macro' structures of gender equality to improve women's and men's attitudes toward immigrants across European countries, with an emphasis on the mediating effect of universalistic-benevolent human values.

Literature review and hypothesis

Attitudes toward immigrants

A comprehensive review of literature on public attitudes toward immigrants (ATI) shows that anti-immigrant fears can be simplified into two categories: economic and cultural (Hainmueller

and Hopkins, 2014). Building on political economy, some scholars explain anti-immigrant attitudes in the light of the natives' self-interest, and competition against foreigners over employment opportunities and economic resources (Malhotra, Margalit and Mo, 2013, pp. 391-393). Other scholars draw on social psychology to explain anti-immigrant attitudes based on the hostility toward foreign cultures' symbols, practices, lifestyles, and values (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010, pp. 310-318; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014, p.232). Overall, cultural concerns have been found to prevail over pocket-money considerations in shaping attitudes toward immigrants, and often have a 'sociotropic' nature: cultural ATI are generally based on collective unreal panics, alimented by the media and public narratives rather than real facts (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). Since cultural concerns are the main drivers of anti-immigrant attitudes, they deserve more attention: the cultural formation of xenophobic attitudes should be further examined, using the power of cross-national approaches to explain contextual variations (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014, p. 240).

Several authors (for a review, see Ponce, 2017) pinpointed the necessity to consider gender as a key explainer of attitudes toward immigrants. The cultural dimension of ATI is more present among women, whilst men are generally more concerned about the economic threats posed by immigrants (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014; Malhotra et al., 2013). It should be noted that gender is a cultural construct too (Ortner and Whitehead, 1981), which is crucial to the explanation of cultural ATI: gender brings organizational, experiential, and behavioral elements to the analysis of public attitudes, especially under the cultural umbrella (Hawkesworth, 1994; Lovenduski, 1998). Considering the politicization of gender equality within the debate on attitudes toward immigrants, the inclusion of gendered elements in public opinion studies becomes essential to explain ATI (Ponce, 2017, p. 2). Gender has been mostly used together with other individual characteristics - such as age, education, and skills - in explaining cultural attitudes toward immigrants: younger, more educated, and skilled

individuals have been consistently found to be less racist (Borgonovi and Pokropek, 2019; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; Mayda, 2006).

A few studies have used gender as the main analytical factor to frame ATI, building on gendered perceptions, experiences, and personality traits, to find that men are more xenophobic than women because of their authoritarian personalities and inclination toward social dominance (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010; Feather and McKee, 2012; Lippa and Arad, 1999; Quillian, 1995). A few other works have found women to be more xenophobic than men, among them, Ponce (2017, p. 9) claims that, even if women are generally less likely to hold anti-immigrant attitudes, they are more diffident toward certain minorities perceived as misogynists, like the Muslim. This finding suggests that gendered anti-immigrants attitudes are increasingly shaped by a fear of patriarchal cultures, so gender equality becomes a significant prejudice-defining element (Moss et al., 2019; Yilmaz, 2015). In the remainder of this section, the impact of different individual and contextual elements on attitudes toward immigrants will be discussed, distinguishing between the macro and micro dimensions.

At the contextual level, different theories explain the interplay of country elements in framing attitudes toward immigrants. According to the ‘group threat’ theory, larger inflows of immigrants combined with worse economic conditions generate intergroup conflict that results in negative attitudes toward immigrants (Malhotra et al., 2013; Schlueter et al., 2013). The theory of ‘social identity’ focuses on the formation of prejudice against outgroups: building on Allport’s (1954) theory of contact, scholars claim that the presence of larger culturally distinct outgroups in a country generates more xenophobic attitudes (Quillian, 1995). Notwithstanding, scholars argue that public prejudice can be mitigated by integration policies and inclusive approaches to diversity management (Green and Brock, 2020; Visintin, Green and Sarrasin, 2018).

Less scholarly attention has been devoted to the impact of cultural climates on public attitudes toward immigrants, suggesting that European cultural values and norms have a positive impact on ATI (Datler, 2016; Visintin, Green and Sarrasin, 2018). The ‘openness’ associated with the concept of *Europe* is framed by national normative frameworks: public policies, especially social policies, are key to enhance (or hinder) egalitarian and universalistic narratives that are passed into citizens through socialization, education, media, and the public discourse, improving or weakening social cohesion and tolerance (Visintin, Green and Sarrasin, 2018, p. 21). So, what type of cultural values flourish under gender equality frameworks, that have a favourable effect on attitudes toward immigrants?

Basic human values

To explain the impact of national frameworks of gender equality on ATI, I adopt Schwartz’s (1992, 2006) frameworks of cultural and human values. Across European countries, gender equality is associated with higher levels of self-transcendent cultural values (benevolence and universalism) and self-direction; and lower conservation values (security and tradition/conformity) and power (Schwartz and Rubel-Lifschitz, 2009, p. 176). In addition, benevolence and universalism are associated with more tolerant ATI, whilst conservation predicts negative ATI (Davidov et al., 2014; Ponizovskiy, 2016). Female respondents are more self-transcendent, and men are more driven by power, a value that implies social dominance and conflict over resources (Schwartz and Rubel-Lifschitz, 2009). Further, in more gender-equal countries, women’s benevolence and men’s power exponentially increase, resulting in a wider gender difference in human values (Schwartz and Rubel-Lifschitz, 2009, pp. 172-174).

Furthermore, individuals that value self-direction tend to rely solely on their proper resources and feel ‘in control’ of their existences, thus have less fear of the threats posed by external factors such as immigration, especially in countries with higher economic, normative

and cultural assets for self-realization ('locus of control' theory in Harell, Soroka and Iyengar 2017, pp. 3-9). Interestingly, self-direction is higher in gender-egalitarian countries and is a gender-neutral value, equally present among women and men (Schwartz and Rubel-Lifschitz, 2009). Hedonism and stimulation do not predict attitudes toward immigrants nor correlate with gender (Davidov et al., 2014; Schwartz and Rubel-Lifschitz, 2009). In brief, benevolence and universalism, self-transcendent values associated with positive ATI, are higher in more gender-equal countries and typically 'feminine'; whereas conservation and power, negatively associated with ATI, are higher in less gender-equal countries, being conservatism gender-neutral and power prevalent among men.

It is important to appreciate that Schwartz's (1992) framework follows a circular structure where the dimension of 'openness to change' is the opposite of 'conservation', and 'self-transcendence' is the opposite of 'self-enhancement'. The separating borders between values are malleable, so that bordering values have similar underlying motivations and flow one into the other (Schwartz, 2012). For example, power feeds into conservation, suggesting dominance over people and resources to maintain the *status quo* against external threats (Leong and Ward, 2006; Lippa and Arad, 1999; Quillian, 1995); whereas self-direction suggests faith in personal and societal resources to achieve conflict-less welfare for all, natives and immigrants (Messing and Ságvári, 2019, p.11). All in all, basic human values provide motivational direction to people's attitudes: positive toward objects that will help them reach their treasured goals; negative toward whatever hinders their aims (Schwartz, 2006).

Gender equality

At the macro level, Schwartz's values systematization has been used by several authors to explain variations in ATI across European countries. The most recent cross-national works have shown that basic human values and national cultural climates do vary across countries,

depending on the normative and economic context (Davidov et al., 2014; Ponizovskiy, 2016, pp. 257-259), including gender policies (Schwartz and Rubel-Lifschitz, 2009). Building on Schwartz's (2006) and Hofstede's (2011) frameworks of national cultural values, cross-national works have proved that European countries with stronger 'masculine' systems of values are less tolerant toward immigrants: societies that value mastery, power distance, uncertainty avoidance show a weaker commitment to policies that promote social coexistence and more negative attitudes toward multiculturalism (Leong and Ward, 2006). Also, 'feminine' humanitarian-egalitarian cultural values have a positive impact on ATI, whereas more conservative countries are anti-immigrant (Leong and Ward, 2006; Schwartz, 2006). Interestingly, egalitarian-humanitarian societies have higher levels of gender equality compared to collectivist-conservative societies (Eriksson et al., 2020; Pampel, 2011; Wood and Ramirez, 2018) which suggests that more gender-equal countries have more inclusive cultural climates.

In addition, countries with higher levels of gender equality have a larger incidence of self-transcendent human values such as benevolence and universalism: increased wealth, education, and self-determination enhance benevolent 'feminine' values vs. 'masculine' values such as power, achievement, security, conformity, tradition, that are predominant in less gender-equal countries (Schwartz and Rubel-Lifschitz, 2009, pp.178-180). Empirically, these findings are confirmed by a report based on the 2017 European Social Survey's data that illustrates how values of security and universalism are strongly connected with attitudes toward immigrants. Those who value security have more negative attitudes toward immigrants, while those who give importance to equality and benevolence have more positive attitudes toward immigrants (Messing and Ságvári, 2019, pp. 26-37).

In addition, according to the theory of 'locus of control', citizens of societies with stronger economic and social policies feel more in control of their personal life and less threatened by external factors such as immigration. The feeling of being 'in control' of one's

own economic and social situation, in contrast with feelings of insecurity and unpredictability, causes lower fear of the unknown, and more openness to external challenges and change factors (Harell, Soroka and Iyengar, 2017; Messing and Ságvári, 2019). Consequently, women and men from countries that ensure equal rights should feel more secure about their acquired freedoms, and less concerned about real or imagined cultural invasions.

At the micro-level, the complex interaction between personal positions on gender equality, gender roles attitudes, and attitudes toward immigrants is not a widespread topic in academia. Still, some empirical studies find concerns about gender equality to be associated with higher prejudice, especially against Muslims, perceived as more fundamentalist/extremist (Pedersen and Hartley, 2012, p.21). Other works show differing mechanisms: supporters of gender equality can show either positive attitudes toward foreign cultural practices, or oppose those practices and support the enforcement of gender equality norms over minorities (Sarrasin, 2016, p. 157). Still, there is no agreement on the impact of individual attitudes toward gender equality and gender roles division on attitudes toward immigrants.

Another point is worth analyzing: the impact of gender equality on a country's gender difference in attitudes toward immigrants. Previous empirical studies (for a review, see Ponce, 2017) agree that women are in general more tolerant than men, whose authoritarian traits make more prejudiced against immigrants (Lippa and Arad, 1999). Gender role socialization theory helps to explain gender differences in ATI: women and men interiorize different personality traits that make the former more inclined toward benevolence and universalism, values associated with positive opinions on immigrants (Davidov et al., 2008, 2014), whereas men are more driven by power, a trait associated with social dominance and prejudice (Lippa and Arad, 1999; Quillian, 1995). Power borders with conservation under Schwartz's (1992) circular framework of values. In sum, women care more about social justice, tolerance, equality, and welfare for close people, strangers, outgroups, and humanity in general, while men inherently

pursue self-enhancement through control over resources and people (Schwartz and Rubel-Lifschitz, 2009).

Maybe for their internalized ‘altruistic’ values, women are also found to have higher levels of social trust (Hooghe et al., 2009), to hold more progressive and egalitarian opinions, including on gender equality, and to be more responsive to social change than men (Lizotte and Sidman, 2009; Pampel, 2011). Also, women tend to be more knowledgeable about social policies than economics and traditional politics; are more engaged in policies that have a direct effect on people’s lives such as gender policies and diversity management, especially in more gender-equal countries where they participate more in public life (Fraile and Gomez, 2017). All in all, women’s benevolent and universalistic nature, together with their push to transcend themselves, makes them more sensitive to social justice, cooperation, inclusiveness, factors that suggest lower xenophobia, especially in countries that recognize women’s participation and empowerment to a higher degree (Ponizovski, 2016; Schwartz and Rubel-Lifschitz, 2009).

Paradoxically, some authors claim that the gender difference in basic human values is larger in more gender-equal countries: the higher the level of gender equality, the more women are tolerant and benevolent, and the more men are power-oriented and domineering (Schwartz and Rubel-Lifschitz, 2009). According to this strand of literature, gender equality exacerbates feminine vs. masculine values and traits under a mechanism called Gender Equality Personality Paradox (GEPP). The paradox is illustrated in several empirical studies on personal values and personality traits that lead to speculate that gender equality makes women ‘more feminine’ and men ‘more masculine’ in values, attitudes, and opinions (Fors Connolly et al., 2020, pp. 102-103; Giolla and Kajonius, 2019; Schwartz and Rubel-Lifschitz, 2009, p. 180). The GEPP’s logic can be further justified as follows: favourable wealth, freedom, and equality conditions increase individuals’ control over their lives and self-determination (Harell, Soroka and Iyengar, 2017), so wealth and human development encourage men and women to enhance

values they ‘inherently’ care more about, for women, universalism/benevolence, for men, power/self-enhancement (Schwartz and Rubel-Lifschitz, 2009). In sum, the greater the social, economic, political empowerment for both genders, the larger the gender gap between masculine anti-immigrants attitudes, and feminine pro-immigrants tendencies (Davidov et al., 2014).

Hypothesis

First, scholars argue that women tend to be less xenophobic than men (Lippa and Arad, 1999; Ponce, 2017; Quillian, 1995), and that they identify with values such as universalism and benevolence more than men, who are ‘inherently’ power-directed (Schwartz and Rubel-Lifschitz, 2009, p. 173). Therefore, given their stronger benevolence and universalism, *women are expected to have more positive attitudes toward immigrants than men* (Hypothesis 1.a.). The gender divide in human values tied to attitudes toward immigrants is deemed to widen more gender-equal countries: here women and men have more control over their life and more freedom to pursue the values they ‘naturally’ care more about (Schwartz and Rubel-Lifschitz, 2009, pp. 178-180). Thus, given that the gender divide in human values broadens with higher gender equality, *gender differences in attitudes toward immigrants are expected to be larger in more gender-equal countries* (Hypothesis 1.b.).

Second, European countries with higher levels of gender equality show lower incidence of values weakly and strongly associated with xenophobia, such as power and conservatism; and more diffusion of tolerant values such as benevolence and universalism, and self-determination/control, strongly or weakly associated with a lower fear of external factors (Davidov et al., 2014; Messing and Ságvári, 2019; Ponizovskiy, 2016; Ramos et al., 2016; Schwartz and Rubel-Lifschitz, 2009). Given that in more gender-equal countries conservatism and power are lower and universalism, benevolence, and self-direction are

higher, *public attitudes toward immigrants are expected to be more positive, for both genders, in European countries with higher gender equality* (Hypothesis 2.a.).

Last, cultural and normative frameworks frame individuals' attitudes through socialization, education, and shared narratives (Visintin, Green and Sarrasin, 2018, p. 21). So, the support for gender-egalitarian and gender-roles progressive opinions descends from macro structures of gender equality into the individuals (Pampel, 2011), together with higher identification with values such as universalism and benevolence (Schwartz and Rubel-Lifschitz, 2009). Given that individual support for gender equality through progressive gender roles opinions is associated with self-transcendent human values, *more progressive attitudes toward gender roles are expected to be positively associated with positive attitudes toward immigrants* (Hypothesis 2.b.).

Data and methods

This study uses data from the ninth round of the European Social Survey (ESS9 2018), which includes responses from individuals of over 15 years of age, sampled randomly and interviewed through a face-to-face method on a variety of issues, spanning from individual attitudes in different areas, to basic human values. I select the responses of 38.538 European native-born women and men from 24 European countries, whose gender equality score is measured by the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE), including: Denmark (DK); Belgium (BE); Bulgaria (BG); Czechia (CZ); Germany (DE); Estonia (EE); Ireland (IE); Spain (ES); France (FR); Croatia (HR); Italy (IT); Cyprus (CY); Latvia (LV); Lithuania (LT); Hungary (HU); Netherlands (NL); Austria (AT); Poland (PL); Portugal (PT); Slovenia (SI); Slovakia (SK); Finland (FI); Sweden (SE); and the UK (GB).

Dependent variable

To measure attitudes toward immigrants among native Europeans, I select one item that represents *cultural attitudes toward immigration*: ‘The country's cultural life is undermined or enriched by immigrants’. Responses are coded on an 11-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (cultural life undermined) to 10 (cultural life enriched). Higher values correspond to more positive cultural ATI.

Independent variables

At the individual level, as previously discussed, women are generally more self-transcendent (benevolent and universalist) than men, thus less xenophobic. For this reason, *gender* (men=0, women=1) is used to highlight differences in human values and attitudes toward immigrants within each country and across countries.

At the contextual level, I claim that macro gender equality structures influence total and gendered attitudes toward immigrants. I use the 2020 *Gender Equality Index* (GEI), whose data are mostly from 2018, to measure the level of gender equality in each country. The index, created by the European Institute for Gender Equality, was acknowledged as a reliable measurement by the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (Papadimitriou et al., 2020). It combines six dimensions of gender equality using a punctuation system for the areas of work; money; knowledge; time; power; health. To address its complexity, I operationalize the six dimensions separately, to ascertain which dimension has the higher impact on ATI. The gender equality domains, due to their encompassing nature, contribute differently to the increase of self-transcendent values, more favourable to migration, and the achievement of the personal and social ‘locus of control’. As a consequence, each sphere of gender equality is associated with cultural attitudes toward immigrants according to different mechanisms.

In addition, to illustrate how principles of gender equality are absorbed by the individuals and reflected in their attitudes toward gender roles, I include a variable called *Gender roles attitudes*, derived from the split ballot item ‘Approve if a woman chooses to never have children’, scored on a 5-points Likert scale from 1 (strongly disapprove) to 5 (strongly approve). This selection is intended to measure progressive vs. traditional gender roles orientations as a projection of gender egalitarianism, after acknowledging the eventual conceptual discrepancies in using an element of gender traditionalism to measure gender egalitarianism (Braun, 2008). A higher level of agreement to the statement-item corresponds to more progressive gender roles attitudes and higher gender egalitarianism.

Mediators

The ESS9 provides 21 Human Values items, each one associated with a specific value and accompanied by a description of someone whose personal characteristics represent the value of interest, gender-matched with the respondent. On the one side, within the realm of *self-transcendence*, *benevolence* is indicated by the item ‘Important to help people and care for others’ well-being’; *universalism* by the item ‘Important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities’. Also, *openness-to-change/self-direction*, the opposite of conservation, suggests increased control over personal life, individualism, and unfear of external threats: I measure it through the item ‘Important to make own decisions and be free’. On the opposite dimension, under the domain of *conservation*, *security* is measured by the item ‘Important that government is strong and ensures safety’; *tradition/conformity* is represented by item ‘Important to follow traditions and customs’. Lastly, *self-enhancement/power* corresponds to the item ‘Important to get respect from others’ and is the polar opposite of self-transcendence. The respondents indicate how similar the described woman/man is to her/him on a 6-point scale from 1 (very much like me) to 6 (not like me at all). We reverse-coded these items so that higher values indicate greater value-matching.

As already discussed, on the one hand, self-transcendent values such as benevolence, and especially universalism, are the best predictors of positive ATI, and highly present in gender-equal countries, especially among women. The neighboring value of self-direction, which suggests openness to change and control, is higher in more gender-equal countries, among both men and women, and somehow related to more positive ATI too. On the opposite hand, conservative values such as security and tradition/conformity are strongly associated with negative ATI, and are higher in less gender-equal countries, but are gender-neutral. Power also suggests negative ATI and is lower in gender-equal countries, but more present among men than women, especially in countries with more gender equality, according to the Gender Equality Personality Paradox. Since the values of stimulation, hedonism, and achievement are irrelevant to the relationship between gender, gender equality and attitudes toward immigrants they are not considered in the analyses.

Controls

Relevant controls are added both at the individual and national levels. At the individual level, age (in full years) and education (years of full education completed) are consistently reported influencing attitudes toward immigrants (Chandler and Tsai, 2001; Mayda, 2006). Also, *egalitarianism* is included as a control variable through the item ‘Society is fair when income and wealth are equally distributed among all people’, reverse coded on a 5-point scale from 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree strongly). Higher values indicate higher egalitarian opinions.

At the macro-level, I control for the 2020 Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), an interesting reference indicator for migration and integration policies across Europe, widely employed to assess levels of anti-immigrant attitudes in cross-national studies that focus on normative and cultural macro-factors (Davidov and Semyonov, 2017; Green and Brock, 2020; Visintin, Green and Sarrasin, 2018, among others). Also, the share of the extra-EU immigrant

population in each country, elaborated from the UN/DESA immigrant stock datasets, is included. The number of resident immigrants in a country is a powerful predictor of ATI based on contact theories (Allport, 1954; Green and Brock, 2020). Also, Besides this being an essentially cultural/normative study, the GDP per capita measure (in current international \$) is included as an indicator of the economic situation. This choice is justified by the widespread use of the ‘group threat’ theory, which associates negative attitudes toward immigrants to worse economic conditions and higher immigrants share (Quillian, 1995; Schlueter et al., 2013). ‘Group threat’ theory has been used in studies about human values and support for immigration too (Davidov et al., 2008).

Methods

The research design includes descriptive statistics, correlation matrix; linear regression models; and margins analysis - processed through the Stata 15 package. Countries are the 24 main units of analysis in the regressions, which count three main models, plus two additional models with measures of interaction between gender and each macro independent variable. After ascertaining the presence of correlations between the dependent variable and other variables of interest, I proceed with testing the hypotheses through linear regressions, clustered by country. Hierarchical logistic regression allows testing different combinations of variables while checking results against non-hierarchical multinomial regression models.

I include human values in each regression model to test their mediating effect and I test the moderating effect of the interactions between gender and the macro independent variables separately. P-values are used for variables’ statistical significance and the r-squared values are included to highlight each model’s explanatory power. Based on the regression models’ results, I retain the statistically significant variables to display gender differences in ATI across levels of gender equality and gender roles attitudes, through marginal effects analyses. In parallel, I

run margins analyses for each human value of interest to display their impact on the gendered dimension of attitudes toward immigrants, across levels of gender equality.

Results

After summarizing the dependent and independent variables of interest - in total (Appendix 1a) and by gender (Appendix 1b) - I run the bivariate statistics displayed in Table 1 to investigate the correlation between the variables of interest and attitudes toward immigrants. The results anticipate a statistically significant ($p < 0.01$) positive effect of the GEI score on attitudes toward immigrants. Gender roles attitudes (GRA) also seem to have a positive and significant ($p < 0.01$) impact on ATI, but both should be checked against control variables. On the other hand, gender has a weak ($p < 0.1$) positive effect on ATI, most likely to be hampered when introducing individual controls. Finally, preliminary findings on the impact of human values on ATI confirm an overall positive effect of self-transcendence (benevolence and universalism) and self-direction, and a negative effect of conservatism (security and tradition/conservation) and power on ATI. All the human values correlation coefficients are statistically significant ($p < 0.01$).

Table 1. Correlation matrix

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. ATI	1.000									
2. GEI	0.280***	1.000								
3. GRA	0.213***	0.388***	1.000							
4. Gender	0.008*	-0.060***	-0.007	1.000						
5. Benevolence	0.114***	0.221***	0.103***	0.095***	1.000					
6. Universalism	0.161***	0.173***	0.115***	0.045***	0.368***	1.000				
7. Self-direction	0.072***	0.100***	0.129***	-0.017***	0.299***	0.236***	1.000			
8. Security	-0.105***	-0.100***	-0.085***	0.046***	0.261***	0.224***	0.180***	1.000		
9. Tradition	-0.151***	-0.127***	-0.178***	0.081***	0.206***	0.085***	0.030***	0.303***	1.000	
10. Power	-0.078***	-0.110***	-0.038***	-0.028***	0.109***	0.045***	0.149***	0.196***	0.221***	1.000

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Before proceeding to test the hypotheses, Appendix 2 displays the process of testing the effect on ATI of the total GEI score (model 1) and its six dimensions separately (model 2), with the corresponding macro controls (MIPEX, GDP per capita and immigrants share). According to the results, the total GEI does not have a statistically significant effect on ATI nor do the subdimensions of money, time, power, health. The *knowledge* dimension has a weak ($p < 0.1$) negative correlation with ATI; and the *work* dimension shows a positive association with ATI, with high statistical significance ($p < 0.01$). Thus, gender equality in work is used as the macro independent variable in the next analytical steps. The implications of this choice are discussed in the next section of this thesis.

To test the hypotheses, I run three main linear regression models, clustered by country. According to Model 1, gender has a positive but not statistically significant impact on ATI when controlled by age, education, and egalitarian opinions, even if the ‘feminine’ human values of benevolence, and especially universalism, have a positive, very significant ($p < 0.01$) effect on ATI. As expected, tradition/conformity, and especially security, do have a negative, significant ($p < 0.01$) effect on ATI. Interestingly, self-direction and power do not have a statistically significant impact on ATI, even if they show respectively positive and negative coefficients.

Even after adding the GEI *work* score (model 2) or gender roles attitudes (model 3) to the first regression, the coefficient for gender increases but does not reach statistical significance, which leads to infirm hypotheses 1a and 1b. In other words, being a woman does not conclusively predict more tolerant attitudes toward immigrants and there are no significant gender differences in ATI, even after considering the contextual gender equality levels and progressive gender roles attitudes. The individual-level background variables contributed significantly to the variations, as expected, with education being the stronger positive predictor

of ATI, and age predicting a weak decrease in ATI. Surprisingly, egalitarian opinions are negatively associated with ATI, although with a low statistical significance.

Model 2 confirms the positive effect of gender equality in work on ATI, although with a low coefficient and medium statistical significance ($p < 0.05$) - even if controlled by migration policies level (MIPEX), the share of immigrants, and GDP per capita. So, hypothesis 2a is confirmed with an important caveat: national-level gender equality has a positive effect on ATI, but only within the work dimension. Also, model 3 displays that progressive gender roles attitudes are the best predictors of positive ATI with a positive coefficient of high statistical significance ($p < 0.01$), confirming hypothesis 2b: progressive gender roles attitudes are positively associated with ATI. It is important to highlight that the three main regression models have a medium explanatory power between 13% and 15% (Cohen, 1992): variations in ATI are explained to a 13% by human values and individual variables (Model 1); to a 15% after adding GEI-work scores (Model 2); and, alternatively, to a 15% with the addition of progressive gender roles attitudes (Model 3). Among the contextual variables, gender roles attitudes and GEI-work are the best explainers for ATI, even after controlling by statistically significant MIPEX score. The lack of statistical significance for GDP and immigrants share variables suggests that the 'group threat' theory does not nullify the explanatory power of gender equality.

Lastly, Models 4a and 4b respectively display the impact of the interactions between gender and GEI-work score (gender*GEIwork), and gender and gender roles attitudes (gender*GRA) on ATI. The interactions models include the human values variables as mediators and the individual and contextual controls. The interactions are significant ($p < 0.05$ for gender*GEIwork and $p < 0.01$ for gender*GRA). The explanatory power at 15% remains medium (Cohen, 1992).

Table 2. Linear regressions

	Attitudes toward immigrants				
	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4a</i>	<i>Model 4b</i>
<i>Micro</i>					
Gender	0.045 (0.07)	0.065 (0.07)	0.053 (0.08)	-3.047** (0.87)	-0.709*** (0.18)
Egalitarianism	-0.080* (0.03)	-0.054 (0.04)	-0.077* (0.03)	-0.072* (0.03)	-0.083* (0.03)
Age of respondent	-0.005** (0.00)	-0.006** (0.00)	-0.004* (0.00)	-0.006** (0.00)	-0.005** (0.00)
Years of education	0.117*** (0.02)	0.116*** (0.01)	0.115*** (0.01)	0.118*** (0.01)	0.116*** (0.01)
<i>Human values</i>					
Benevolence	0.229*** (0.06)	0.162*** (0.04)	0.182** (0.06)	0.175** (0.05)	0.185** (0.06)
Universalism	0.441*** (0.03)	0.412*** (0.04)	0.415*** (0.03)	0.422*** (0.03)	0.421*** (0.03)
Self-direction	0.017 (0.03)	0.011 (0.03)	0.002 (0.03)	0.009 (0.03)	0.004 (0.03)
Security	-0.278*** (0.04)	-0.252*** (0.04)	-0.265*** (0.04)	-0.259*** (0.04)	-0.266*** (0.04)
Tradition	-0.213*** (0.02)	-0.184*** (0.02)	-0.180*** (0.02)	-0.193*** (0.01)	-0.189*** (0.02)
Power	-0.053 (0.03)	-0.018 (0.02)	-0.032 (0.03)	-0.028 (0.02)	-0.035 (0.03)
<i>Macro</i>					
GEI work		0.051** (0.02)			
MIPEX		0.024* (0.01)	0.025* (0.01)	0.026* (0.01)	0.026* (0.01)
Immigrant share		0.003 (0.01)	0.007 (0.01)	0.005 (0.01)	0.007 (0.01)
GDP per capita		-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
Gender attitudes			0.221*** (0.03)		
<i>Interactions</i>					
Gender*GEIwork				0.043** (0.01)	
Gender*GRA					0.229*** (0.04)
Constant	3.557*** (0.28)	-0.767 (1.55)	1.827 (1.00)	2.567* (1.05)	2.486* (1.04)
r2	0.134	0.148	0.149	0.145	0.146
N	34619.00	34619.000	34175.000	34619.000	34175.000

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Note: All models were estimated using weights provided in the ESS 2018. All models are clustered by country. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Next, the analysis of marginal effects is displayed in figures 1a and 1b: figure 1a predicts ATI by gender according to increasing levels of occupational gender equality (GEI work); figure 1b shows the gender difference in ATI with increasingly progressive mean gender roles attitudes. First, considering the confidence intervals, women and men do not differ in cultural attitudes toward immigrants, which restates that hypothesis 1a is rejected. Consequently, the gender divide in ATI is unsubstantial and does not increase with higher levels of gender equality/progressive gender roles opinions: hypothesis 1b is rejected too. Second, the figures show that attitudes toward immigrants are positively correlated with gender equality levels (in the work dimension) and progressive gender roles opinions, confirming hypotheses 2a and 2b. Mean ATI register an improvement of 3 points (from 4 to 7 on a 1 to 10-points scale) between least gender-equal and most gender-equal countries and an improvement of around 2 points between least progressive and most progressive mean gender roles attitudes.

To further explain the gender differences in ATI (or their lack thereof), Appendix 3 displays the gender divide in human values across levels of gender equality. Only the four statistically significant human values are considered. As anticipated, benevolence and universalism increase with gender equality levels, and security and tradition/conformity decrease with higher GEI-work score, by 1 to 1.5 points. As a consequence, gender-equal countries are more tolerant (H2a). Remarkably, women have a higher incidence in all these values, being them positively (benevolence, universalism) or negatively (security, tradition/conservatism) correlated with ATI. These findings justify the impossibility to prove a correlation between women and positive ATI, infirming hypotheses 1a and 1b. Perhaps the statistical insignificance of power, essentially masculine value, justifies the impossibility to trace gender differences in ATI along with gender equality scores.

Figure 1a.





Figure 1b.



Last, Figure 2 illustrates mean ATI in each EU country divided by gender, sorted by increasing levels of work gender equality. Three patterns can be distinguished: first, women have more positive ATI than men in 14 out of 24 countries; second, gender differences seem to be wider in more gender-equal countries, but numerous exceptions make this finding dubious;


third, mean ATI improve with higher levels of work gender equality. The first two observations have been discarded by the linear regressions and margins analyses, while the third has been confirmed. The presence of several outliers and exceptions, displayed in figure 2, makes it impossible to claim that gender explains ATI, and that gender differences in ATI are consistently wider in more gender-equal countries. Nevertheless, figure 2 offers interesting insights into the relationship between ATI and GEI-work score in each European country, highlighted in the next section.

Remarkably, if taking Castles and Obinger's (2008) country clustering scheme as a reference, it is possible to trace two trends: Northern and Western European countries are generally more gender-equal and more tolerant; Eastern and Southern European countries less gender-equal and less tolerant toward immigrants. Sweden has the higher levels of work gender equality and the most positive ATI. It also displays a wider gender divide in ATI. It is followed by other highly gender-equal Northern and Western-Eu countries with very different levels of anti-immigrant attitudes, including: Denmark, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom; Austria (with particularly negative ATI); Ireland; Finland (with more positive ATI and a considerable gender difference in ATI); and Belgium. On a lower level of work gender equality and lower acceptance of immigrants, there are four Eastern (Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Estonia), two Western (France, Germany), and two Southern-Eu countries (Spain, Portugal). Their mean ATI varies from exceptionally negative, in Slovenia, to quite positive, in Spain and Portugal.

The last countries on the list, with the lowest levels of gender equality and worse ATI are Southern (Italy and Cyprus) and mostly Eastern European (Croatia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia). In these countries, women's and men's attitudes seem to overlap to a greater extent. Among them, Czechia registers the worst attitudes toward immigrants, whilst Croatia and Poland have more positive ATI compared to other Eastern-Eu countries with similar levels of gender equality. Besides the suggestive geographical clustering,

these results remain inconclusive for the presence of several outliers. Also, single cases require specific contextual explanations provided in the next section.

Figure 2.



To sum up, the statistical results show that conservation values are associated with lower levels of approval of immigrants, whereas prioritizing benevolence and universalism is associated with higher levels of acceptance toward immigrants across 24 European countries. At the individual level, both conservation and self-transcendent values have more incidence among women, who cannot be considered more tolerant than men. Also, gender equality does not influence the gender differences in ATI. At the country level, more progressive mean gender roles attitudes and higher levels of gender equality in the work dimension are associated with more positive ATI, even if controlled by the quality of migrants' integration policies. Moreover, self-transcendence increases and conservation decreases with growing levels of gender equality. Power and self-transcendence do not correlate with ATI. Last, the 24 European

countries display interesting geographical clustering patterns, where northern and western European countries tend to be more tolerant and gender-equal, and southern and eastern-Eu countries less tolerant and less gender-equal, with several exceptions for further analysis.

Discussion

Theoretical contributions

The theoretical insights offered by this master dissertation are disclosed in the following lines: the gender differences in attitudes toward immigrants are commented on; the positive effect of macro structures of gender equality on attitudes toward immigrants is described; the moderating effect of the interaction between gender and gender equality is explained; the mediating role of human values on ATI is highlighted; last, some remarks on single country-cases is made. First, regardless of women being more tolerant than men in the majority of the 24 European countries of interest because more inclined toward self-transcendence, the correlation between gender and ATI does not pass the linear regression test, leading to reject hypothesis 1a. Interestingly, conservation has been found to prevail among women too, plus, even if power is a prevalently masculine value, it is unrelated to attitudes toward immigrants. These findings blur the gender differences in ATI.

In addition, the Gender Gap Personality Paradox (GEPP) hypothesis does not apply to human values correlated with ATI, so, hypothesis 1b is infirmed too. On the one hand, men and women react in a similar way to immigration, and higher levels of gender equality do not correspond to a steady increase in the gender divide in attitudes toward immigrants. On the other hand, even if several exceptions make it impossible to trace a pattern, more gender-equal countries seem to display larger gender gaps in ATI than low gender-equality countries. A case study approach would help to clarify these trends and exceptions.

Second, after testing hypotheses 2a and 2b, it emerges that the total GEI score, controlled by migrants' integration policies, the share of the immigrant population, and GDP per capita, has no statistically significant effect on ATI. To address the Gender Equality Index's complexity, each of its sub-dimension is tested separately, with interesting outcomes: gender equality in the *work* dimension is positively associated with ATI; while in the field of *knowledge*, there is a weak negative correlation. Besides confirming hypothesis 2a with the necessary adjustments, these findings offer new insights into the relationship between ATI and specific areas of gender equality that require further examination.

The GEI work domain measures equal access to employment in terms of participation (full-time employment, and duration of working life); gender segregation and work conditions (employment in the sectors of education, health and social work; quality of work, and career prospects). The knowledge domain measures gender inequalities in educational attainment (participation in formal and non-formal education, life-long training), and gender segregation in some educational areas (health, education, welfare, humanities, and arts). For the moment, results suggest that the more women gain access to fair employment, the less threatened they feel by immigrants; but the more they access education and skills, the more concerned are about immigration.

These findings suggest the necessity to move the focus from the cultural dimension to the economic dimension of public attitudes toward immigrants (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). Pocket money, employment, and vocational considerations seem to drive the European public opinion on attitudes toward immigrants. I suggest to re-design the research object, focusing on the economic threats posed by immigration to address a new question: to what extent equal access to employment shapes gender differences in attitudes toward immigrants? Future research should investigate how the growing participation of women in public and economic life explains positive ATI and gather on the literature about economic anti-immigrant

attitudes, ‘group threat’ theory, and the prevalence of economic explanations for attitudes toward immigrants (Malhotra et al., 2013; Schlueter et al., 2013).

Next, in line with hypothesis 2b, progressive gender roles orientations are found to be the best predictors of positive ATI, even if controlled for age, education and egalitarian opinions. Yet, the choice of a gender roles-related item to measure gender egalitarianism can be deemed to be inaccurate. There is no agreement in the literature on the use of gender roles opinions to measure gender-egalitarianism (Braun, 2008). Besides the conceptual and operational cavils, it would be interesting to expand more on the associations between personal gender-equalitarian attitudes and positive ATI, to ascertain to what extent individual progressive orientations are linked to inclusiveness, social cohesion, anti-racism. Surprisingly, egalitarianism results negatively correlated with ATI. More research is needed: egalitarian orientations in different domains can be included as independent variables, mediators, moderators, controls.

Third, the interactions between gender and macro structures of gender equality do not yield important moderating effects on the relationship between gender and attitudes toward immigrants. Again, not only women are not found to be more tolerant than men, and gender differences in ATI do not increase in more gender-equal countries, but the opposite claim can be true. Gender differences in human values and ATI could decrease with growing gender equality, leading to convergence, as suggested by the literature on women’s and men’s gender-egalitarian attitudes across levels of gender equality (McDaniel, 2008). Under this perspective, gender equality can generate allineation rather than division in women’s and men’s values and opinions.

Fourth, human values are very significant mediators in the relationship between gender and ATI, and gender equality and ATI. As expected, self-transcendent values predict positive attitudes toward immigrants, conservation values negative. Still, this study ignores the

interactions between gender and human values, and between gender equality and human values in framing ATI. Further research should observe how each human value interacts, at the individual level, with gender; and at the national level, with gender equality score, to shape ATI.

Also, it would be interesting to include other mediators in the correlation mechanism: economic, social, and political individual characteristics can be invested in the relationship between gender and ATI. For example, political opinions, left-right orientations; attitudes toward other discriminated categories (LGBT+, for example) can predict ATI. Plus, human and social capital, personality traits, psychological elements, and moral stances can be relevant to the study of the gender-ATI correlation. At the contextual level, moderating factors that may affect the normative/cultural environment should be taken into consideration too, for example, the portrayals of immigrants in public discourses and the media; the type of integration policies in place; the prevalence of populist parties in the political debate. In the broader sense, I invite scholars to investigate how micro and macro cultural, normative, and socio-economic elements play into the mechanisms between gender, gender equality, and ATI.

Last, the country-specific results display patterns of higher work gender equality and more positive ATI in Western and Northern-Eu countries vs. lower work gender equality and less positive ATI in Southern and Eastern-Eu countries. The numerous exceptions jeopardize these findings and suggest that other context-specific elements should be considered: the normative, political, socio-economic conjunctures affect ATI in each country. In particular, the quality of national integration policies measured by the MIPEX index explains some of the outliers. For example, Sweden has the most positive ATI, the higher levels of employment equality, and is in the world's top 5 for integration policies. Austria has less positive ATI compared with countries with similar gender equality scores, perhaps because of its 'halfway unfavourable' integration policies. Portugal and Finland have more favourable ATI compared

with similarly gender-equal countries, and they are in the world's top 5 positions for integration policies. Italy and Cyprus are two Southern-Eu countries severely hit by immigration and unfavourable toward immigrants. They score very low in occupational gender equality and their integration policies vary from mild integration to no integration at all. Clearly, there is no one-fits-all explanation for cross-countries differences in ATI: more economic, normative, social, and cultural factors should be taken into consideration.

To conclude, future research avenues could explore the effects of gender equality on other public opinion and policy domains. If gender equality weakens xenophobic attitudes, it would be interesting to discover if gender equality, for example, increases social trust; decreases public support for populist parties; decreases anti-LGBT+ tendencies. Anti-immigrant attitudes can be operationalized differently too, for example with a focus on Muslims, a minority that is perceived as more patriarchal. Moreover, this thesis exclusively focuses on EU natives' public opinion, so the question of gender equality improving immigrants' attitudes toward the hosting society remains unanswered. Different independent macro variables can be tested too, for example, questioning if LGBT+ policies lead to positive attitudes toward immigrants too, against contemporary 'homonationalist' tendencies (Puar, 2013).

Policy implications

This thesis's findings hope to encourage the debate among policymakers and practitioners about the relationship between gender equality and xenophobia. Gender mainstreaming and intersectional approaches in politics, policies, and political science, already recognize the interdependencies between race and gender in policy-making (Crenshaw, 2005; Lovenduski, 1998). In particular, instances for gender equality and women's rights vindication frequently engage with discourses of ethnic recognition and redistribution: the common ground for feminist and anti-racist institutional and non-institutional change is reclamation against the

patriarchal white state (Alcoff, 2007; Thompson, 2002). The association between gender equality policies, progressive gender roles, and tolerance toward out-groups feeds into the debate on institutional and societal change toward more inclusive and egalitarian societies (Mackay, 2014).

Precisely, the change brought by intersectionality and gender mainstreaming operates at least at three levels: institutional (meso); individual (micro); national and supranational (macro). At the institutional level, the adoption of gender mainstreaming and intersectionality triggers change toward universal rights recognition. Gender-sensitive and anti-discrimination measures are thoughtfully incorporated into formal and informal institutions (Waylen, 2014), generating a climate of recognition for disadvantaged categories of the population such as women, girls, and minorities. At the individual level, policies and politics that promote gender equality for all the citizens, including racial minorities, aliment inclusive societies where egalitarian principles invade the citizens' opinions: progressive attitudes toward gender equality gradually spread into the population (Pampel, 2011), together with beliefs of tolerance, inclusion, social justice, and ultimately anti-racism.

At the national level, gender equality is an indicator of positive attitudes toward immigrants, as this work demonstrates. Gender policies should be designed and implemented to aim at a general improvement in social cohesion, that goes beyond gender equality and women's empowerment. At the supranational level, gender equality can be considered as a positive marker of European identity. Europeanization, if driven by principles of gender equality (Forest and Lombardo, 2012), would result in the creation of a European identity based on tolerance, anti-racism, and inclusiveness, rather than securitization and cultural supremacism. All in all, the universalistic and egalitarian essence of gender policies should be emphasized and used by illuminated policy-makers to create narratives of inclusion and equal rights not just for women and men, but also across races and cultures.

Methodological notes

The ESS provides high-quality data to measure attitudes toward immigrants and human values. Future research could use data from other reliable sources such as the European Values Study and the World Values Survey, to check the robustness of my findings. To improve the explanatory power of the research method, *ad hoc* surveys can be created and customized to test the causal mechanisms of interest. This data collection method would allow using several items for better capturing the multidimensional phenomena of cultural attitudes toward immigrants, as well as add other relevant control variables to the study. Among the macro-variables, the EIGE's Index is a reliable measure of gender equality for Europe, but other instruments could be tested too, such as the UNDP Gender Inequality Index (GII) and the Gender Gap Report information compiled by the World Economic Forum. Future studies can benefit from these sources to extend the geographical focus to other areas of the developed and developing world.

Further, a comparative analysis between countries with the most different (or most similar) gender-equality structures can be useful to highlight cross-countries differences and similarities in attitudes toward immigrants, with a stronger emphasis on the contextual factors. A qualitative approach can be implemented to test this thesis's findings, involving in-depth interviews with both citizens and policy-makers as beneficiaries and developers of gender policies; and an analysis of policies' and discourses' contents. A qualitative approach would be useful to highlight the unfolding of the causal mechanisms and would allow a more precise national, regional or local focus.

Last, the chosen cross-sectional approach does not exclude endogeneity, which can be addressed only by panel studies. An approach that describes the unfolding of the correlation mechanisms over time allows acknowledging the economic, social, political changes. In this study, human values do precede public attitudes because are formed much earlier in the life

span of people (Stern et al., 1995). Also, gender precedes human values: the socialization of human values in an environment that promotes self-transcendence should strengthen benevolence and universalism through childhood and adulthood, especially among women. At the contextual level, the problem is more complex: the ‘feedback mechanism’ theories argue that public attitudes and policies have mutual causal effects (Pierson, 1993): gender equality frameworks promote positive attitudes toward immigrants, which provide feedback for egalitarian norms. To the ends of this work, the ambiguous direction of the gender equality-ATI causal mechanism does not invalidate the entire logical sequence since effectively mediated by basic human values.

Conclusions

This master dissertation was aimed at exploring the gendered dimension of attitudes toward immigrants in Europe, with a special focus on the impact of gender and macro structures of gender equality. Previous studies on gender and attitudes toward immigrants are not conclusive in associating women with positive attitudes toward immigrants. Moreover, several individual and contextual factors have already been tested, but the effect of macro gendered structures on attitudes toward immigrants has been ignored. This study uses high-quality data from the 2018 European Social Survey and the 2020 Gender Equality Index to determine to what extent gender equality shapes anti-immigrant attitudes. The clarity of the analytical steps based on clustered linear regression and margins analyses facilitates replicability and checks for robustness.

To start, I tested the relationship between gender and anti-immigrant attitudes, which resulted in the impossibility to prove that women have more positive attitudes toward immigrants than men: hypothesis 1a was rejected. Also, the gender difference in ATI does not change with varying levels of gender equality, as claimed in hypothesis 1b. These findings are justified by the distribution of human values associated with pro-immigrants and anti-

immigrants attitudes across genders: even if women are more benevolent and universalistic than men, they also care more about security and tradition, values that are associated with fear of out-groups.

However, macro structures of gender equality, especially equal access to occupation, have been found to have a positive impact on attitudes toward immigrants, in line with hypothesis 2a. Progressive gender roles attitudes are positively associated with tolerance too, as anticipated by hypothesis 2b. From the cross-countries examination emerged that more gender-equal countries have higher levels of self-transcendent values (benevolence and universalism), that justify more positive attitudes toward immigrants; and lower levels of conservation values (security and conservation/tradition), detrimental to attitudes toward immigrants. Power and self-direction do not explain attitudes toward immigrants, nor change across genders and levels of gender equality.

Probably the most interesting finding is that not all the dimensions of the Gender Equality Index influence public opinions on immigrants, but just the work dimension. This evidence pinpoints the necessity for future research to take an economic perspective and investigate to what extent equal access to fair employment reduces competition between natives and immigrants over economic resources, resulting in more social cohesion and less xenophobia for both genders. The explanatory power of other dimensions of gender equality, for example, knowledge, should be investigated too.

This research is relevant to the debate about the threats posed by foreign-born cultural minorities to women's freedoms and rights, especially in European countries with a long tradition of gender egalitarianism. This thesis demonstrates that, in opposition to the populist discourses that portray immigrants as dangerous for women, more gender-equal countries are less xenophobic. The ideological use of gender equality to justify hostility toward immigrants, especially in gender-egalitarian countries, does not result in negative attitudes toward

immigrants. On the opposite, findings suggest that gender equality can be the symbol of European tolerance, rather than a tool for ideological separation between Europeans and non-Europeans.

Notably, gender equality does not just promote women's empowerment, but is beneficial to xenophobia-reduction and ultimately improves social cohesion. National climates based on equal rights for men and women generate an increase in benevolent values that are transmitted into the citizens through socialization, education and the media. As a result, immigrants are thought to enrich, rather than spoil, a country's cultural life in egalitarian nations. This effect is different in each European member state, and future research should highlight each country's contextual circumstances. Also, it would be interesting to explore how Europe can become more cohesive and tolerant by promoting gender equality: gender policies can be tested in their potential to mitigate the populist derive and to foster humanitarian rather than securitizing approaches to migration and diversity management.

Another important finding is that, even if women are on average more benevolent, self-transcendent, and tolerant than men, gender is uncorrelated to attitudes toward immigrants. Due to gender roles socialization, women are generally more concerned about other human beings' welfare, being them close people or humanity in general. Despite this, findings show that tolerance is a gender-neutral concept: even if women are more egalitarian and open to change, both genders are equally involved in building an equalitarian and inclusive society. Still, women's inclination to benevolence; the feminine concern for equal rights and opportunities for everybody; their propensity to tolerance, cohesion, inclusiveness; together with their responsiveness to social change and egalitarianism make women carriers and spreaders of gender-egalitarianism (Pampel, 2011), but also inclusion and tolerance, in contrast with a patriarchal society that prefers competition and domination.

Women's full access to employment facilitates their empowerment and participation in public life, spreading “inherently feminine” benevolent values. According to the diffusion effect (McDaniel, 2008), altruistic values and tolerance tend to expand among population cohorts, from women to men, from more progressive to less progressive individuals. The result is a gradual allineation of values and attitudes between men and women. By and by, universalistic and egalitarian tendencies would reach immigrants and minorities too: more research is needed to investigate the evolution in immigrants’ attitudes from traditional to egalitarian, depending on the levels of gender equality. All in all, policy choices that increase womens’ work and public life provide the impetus to adopt benevolent values in other sectors of the population, including men, foreign-born citizens, and resident immigrants.

Methodologically, I invite prospective research to use longitudinal techniques, on the one side, to rule out endogeneity, on the other side, to investigate the effect of socio-economic and policy changes on the relationship between gender, gender equality and attitudes toward immigrants. For example, future research developments might test the correlation mechanisms before and after the 2015 refugees’ crisis in Europe. Other contextual factors to take into consideration may be the 2009 financial crisis and the contemporary Covid-19 crisis.

In conclusion, this work contributes to our understanding of how attitudes toward immigrants operate in the dimension of human values, and to what extent are framed by individuals’ gender and macro structures of gender equality. The results show how implementing strong gender equality frameworks in different dimensions is beneficial for women’s and men’s empowerment and control over their xenophobic impulses, and to mitigate ‘sociotropic’ panics with benevolent inclinations. Gender policies are found to reinforce cultural climates based on tolerance, equity, and universalism for all, men and women, natives and immigrants.

References

- Akkerman, T. and Hagelund, A. (2007) “‘Women and Children First!’ Anti-Immigration Parties and Gender in Norway and the Netherlands’, *Patterns of Prejudice*, 41(2), pp. 197–214. DOI: 10.1080/00313220701265569.
- Alcoff, L.M. (2007) ‘Fraser on Redistribution, Recognition, and Identity’, *European Journal of Political Theory*, 6(3), pp. 255–265. DOI: 10.1177/1474885107077305.
- Allport, G.W. (1954) *The Nature of Prejudice*. 25th edn. Oxford, England: Addison-Wesley.
- Bohman, A. and Hjerm, M. (2016) ‘In the Wake of Radical Right Electoral Success: A Cross-Country Comparative Study of Anti-Immigration Attitudes over Time’, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 42(11), pp. 1729–1747. DOI: 10.1080/1369183X.2015.1131607.
- Borgonovi, F. and Pokropek, A. (2019) ‘Education and Attitudes Toward Migration in a Cross Country Perspective’, *Frontiers in Psychology*, 10(2224), pp.1-17. DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02224.
- Braun, M. (2008) ‘Using Egalitarian Items to Measure Men’s and Women’s Family Roles’, *Sex Roles*, 59, pp. 644–656. DOI: 10.1007/s11199-008-9468-5.
- Castles, F.G. and Obinger, H. (2008) ‘Worlds, Families, Regimes: Country Clusters in European and OECD Area Public Policy’, *West European Politics*, 31(1–2), pp. 321–344. DOI: 10.1080/01402380701835140.
- Ceobanu, A.M. and Escandell, X. (2010) ‘Comparative Analyses of Public Attitudes Toward Immigrants and Immigration Using Multinational Survey Data: A Review of Theories and Research’, *Annual Review of Sociology*, 36(1), pp. 309–328. DOI: 10.1146/annurev.soc.012809.102651.

- Chandler, C.R. and Tsai, Y. (2001) 'Social Factors Influencing Immigration Attitudes: An Analysis of Data from the General Social Survey', *The Social Science Journal*, 38(2), pp. 177–188. DOI: 10.1016/S0362-3319(01)00106-9.
- Cohen, J. (1992) 'Statistical Power Analysis', *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 1(3), pp. 98–101. DOI: 10.1111/1467-8721.ep10768783.
- Connor, P. (2016) 'Record 1.3 Million Sought Asylum in Europe in 2015', *Pew Research Center*, 2 august, pp.1-35. Available at: <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2016/08/02/number-of-refugees-to-europe-surges-to-record-1-3-million-in-2015/> (Accessed: 10 May 2021).
- Crenshaw, K. (2005) 'Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color (1994)' in Bergen, R.K., Edleson, J.L. and Renzetti C.M. *Violence against Women: Classic Papers*. Auckland, New Zealand: Pearson Education New Zealand, pp. 282–313.
- Datler, G. (2016) *European Identity as a Safeguard against Xenophobia? A Differentiated View Based on Identity Content*. Abington: Routledge. DOI: 10.4324/9781315746111-12.
- Davidov, E., Meuleman, B., Schwartz, S.H. and Schmidt, P. (2014) 'Individual Values, Cultural Embeddedness, and Anti-Immigration Sentiments: Explaining Differences in the Effect of Values on Attitudes toward Immigration across Europe', *KZfSS Kölner Zeitschrift Für Soziologie Und Sozialpsychologie*, 66(1), pp. 263–285. DOI: 10.1007/s11577-014-0274-5.
- Davidov, E., Meuleman B., Billiet, J. and Schmidt, P. (2008) 'Values and Support for Immigration: A Cross-Country Comparison', *European Sociological Review*, 24(5), pp. 583–599. DOI: 10.1093/esr/jcn020.

- Davidov, E. and Semyonov, M. (2017) 'Attitudes toward Immigrants in European Societies', *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 58(5), pp. 359–366. DOI: 10.1177/0020715217732183.
- Dinesen, P.T. and Hjorth, F. (2020) 'Attitudes toward Immigration: Theories, Settings, and Approaches' in Mintz, A. and Terris, L. (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Behavioral Political Science*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190634131.013.26.
- Drazanova, L., Liebig, T., Migali, S., Scipioni, M. and Spielvogel G. (2020) 'What Are Europeans' Views on Migrant Integration? An in-Depth Analysis of 2017 Special Eurobarometer "Integration of Immigrants in the European Union"', *OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers*, 238, pp.1-61. DOI: 10.1787/f74bf2f5-en.
- Eriksson, K., Björnstjerna, M. and Vartanova, I. (2020) 'The Relation Between Gender Egalitarian Values and Gender Differences in Academic Achievement'. *Frontiers in Psychology*, 11, p. 236. DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.00236.
- Farris, S.R. (2017) *In the Name of Women's Rights: The Rise of Femonationalism*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Feather, N.T. and McKee, I.R. (2012) 'Values, Right-Wing Authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation, and Ambivalent Attitudes Toward Women', *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 42(10), pp. 2479–2504. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.2012.00950.x>.
- Fekete, L. (2006) 'Enlightened Fundamentalism? Immigration, Feminism and the Right', *Race & Class*, 48(2), pp. 1–22. DOI: 10.1177/0306396806069519.
- Forest, M. and Lombardo, E. (2012) 'The Europeanization of Gender Equality Policies: A Discursive-Sociological Approach' in Lombardo, E. and Forest, M. (eds.) *The Europeanization of Gender Equality Policies: A Discursive-Sociological Approach*.

- Gender and Politics Series*. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, pp. 1–27. DOI: 10.1057/9780230355378_1.
- Fors Connolly, F., Goossen, M. and Hjerm, M. (2020) ‘Does Gender Equality Cause Gender Differences in Values? Reassessing the Gender-Equality-Personality Paradox’, *Sex Roles*, 83(1–2), pp. 101–113. DOI: 10.1007/s11199-019-01097-x.
- Fraile, M. and Gomez, R. (2017) ‘Bridging the Enduring Gender Gap in Political Interest in Europe: The Relevance of Promoting Gender Equality’, *European Journal of Political Research*, 56(3), pp. 601–618. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12200>.
- Giolla, E.M. and Kajonius, P.J. (2019) ‘Sex Differences in Personality Are Larger in Gender Equal Countries: Replicating and Extending a Surprising Finding’, *International Journal of Psychology*, 54(6), pp. 705–711. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1002/ijop.12529>.
- Green, E.G.T. and Brock, T.C. (2020) ‘When Integration Policies Shape the Impact of Intergroup Contact on Threat Perceptions: A Multilevel Study across 20 European Countries’, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 46(3), pp. 631–648. DOI: 10.1080/1369183X.2018.1550159.
- Hainmueller, J. and Hiscox, M.J. (2007) ‘Educated Preferences: Explaining Attitudes toward Immigration in Europe’, *International Organization*, 61(2), pp. 399–442.
- Hainmueller, J. and Hopkins, D.J. (2014) ‘Public Attitudes Toward Immigration’, *Annual Review of Political Science*, 17(1), pp. 225–249. DOI: 10.1146/annurev-polisci-102512-194818.
- Harell, A., Soroka, S. and Iyengar, S. (2017) ‘Locus of Control and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment in Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom’, *Political Psychology*, 38(2), pp. 245–260. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12338>.
- Hawkesworth, M. (1994) ‘Policy Studies within a Feminist Frame’, *Policy Sciences*, 27(2/3), pp. 97–118.

- Hofstede, G. (2011) 'Dimensionalizing Cultures: The Hofstede Model in Context', *Online Readings in Psychology and Culture*, 2(1), pp. 2307-0919. DOI: 10.9707/2307-0919.1014.
- Hooghe, M., Reeskens, T., Stolle, D. and Trappers A. (2009) 'Ethnic Diversity and Generalized Trust in Europe a Cross-National Multilevel Study'. *Comparative Political Studies*, 42(2), pp. 198–223. DOI: 10.1177/0010414008325286.
- Joppke, C. (2014) 'Immigrants and Civic Integration in Western Europe', *Institute for Research on Public Policy*, 8, pp. 1-30. Available at: <http://irpp.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/joppke.pdf> (Accessed: 2 March 2021).
- Joppke, C. (2019) 'The Instrumental Turn of Citizenship', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 45(6), pp. 858–878. DOI: 10.1080/1369183X.2018.1440484.
- Kymlicka, W. (2010) 'The Rise and Fall of Multiculturalism? New Debates on Inclusion and Accommodation in Diverse Societies', *International Social Science Journal*, 61(199), pp. 97–112. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2451.2010.01750.x.
- Leong, C.H. and Ward, C. (2006) 'Cultural Values and Attitudes toward Immigrants and Multiculturalism: The Case of the Eurobarometer Survey on Racism and Xenophobia', *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 30(6), pp. 799–810. DOI: 10.1016/j.ijintrel.2006.07.001.
- Lippa, R. and Arad, S. (1999) 'Gender, Personality, and Prejudice: The Display of Authoritarianism and Social Dominance in Interviews with College Men and Women', *Journal of Research in Personality*, 33(4), pp. 463–493. DOI: 10.1006/jrpe.1999.2266.
- Lizotte, M.-K. and Sidman, A.H. (2009) 'Explaining the Gender Gap in Political Knowledge'. *Politics & Gender*, 5(2), pp. 127–151. DOI: 10.1017/S1743923X09000130.
- Lovenduski, J. (1998) 'Gendering Research in Political Science', *Annual Review of Political Science*, 1(1), pp. 333–356. DOI: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.1.1.333.

- Mackay, F. (2014) 'Nested Newness, Institutional Innovation, and the Gendered Limits of Change', *Politics & Gender*, 10(4), pp. 549-571. DOI:10.1017/S1743923X14000415.
- Malhotra, N., Margalit, Y. and Mo, C.H. (2013) 'Economic Explanations for Opposition to Immigration: Distinguishing between Prevalence and Conditional Impact', *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(2), pp. 391–410. Available at: www.jstor.org/stable/23496604 (Accessed: 14 June 2021)
- Mayda, A.M. (2006) 'Who Is Against Immigration? A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward Immigrants', *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 88(3), pp. 510–530. DOI: 10.1162/rest.88.3.510.
- McDaniel, A.E. (2008) 'Measuring Gender Egalitarianism: The Attitudinal Difference Between Men and Women', *International Journal of Sociology*, 38(1), pp. 58–80. DOI: 10.2753/IJS0020-7659380103.
- Messing, V. and Ságvári, B. (2019) 'Still Divided but More Open – Mapping European Attitudes towards Migration before and after the Migration Crisis', *Friedrich Ebert Stiftung*, pp. 1-41. Available at: <https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/librarydoc/still-divided-but-more-open-mapping-european-attitudes-towards-migration-before-and-after-the-migration-crisis> (Accessed: 19 January 2021).
- Modood, T. and Meer, N. (2013) 'Contemporary Citizenship and Diversity in Europe:: The Place of Multiculturalism' in Taras, R. (ed.) *Challenging Multiculturalism: European Models of Diversity*. Edinburgh University Press, pp. 25–51. Available at: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3366/j.ctt20q22fw.8> (Accessed: 7 January 2020).
- Moss, A.J., Blodorn, A., Van Camp, A.R., and O'Brien, L.T. (2019) 'Gender Equality, Value Violations, and Prejudice toward Muslims', *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, 22(2), pp. 288–301. DOI: 10.1177/1368430217716751.

- Okin, S., Cohen, J., Howard, M. and Nussbaum, M.C. (1999) *Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?* Princeton: Princeton University Press. Available at:
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7sxzs> (Accessed: 2 December 2020).
- Okin, S. (2005) 'Multiculturalism and Feminism: No Simple Question, No Simple Answers' in Eisenberg, A. and Spinner-Halev, J. (eds.) *Minorities within Minorities: Equality, Rights and Diversity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 67-89.
doi:10.1017/CBO9780511490224.004
- Ortner, S.B. and Whitehead, H. (1981) *Sexual Meanings: The Cultural Construction of Gender and Sexuality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pampel, F. (2011) 'Cohort Changes in the Socio-Demographic Determinants of Gender Egalitarianism', *Social Forces*, 89(3), pp. 961–982. DOI: 10.1353/sof.2011.0011.
- Papadimitriou, E., Norlen, H. and Del Sorbo, M. (2020) (EUR 30423) *JRC Statistical Audit of the 2020 Gender Equality Index*. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. Available at: <https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2760/39645> (Accessed: 14 May 2021).
- Pedersen, A. and Hartley, L.K. (2012) 'Prejudice Against Muslim Australians: The Role of Values, Gender and Consensus', *Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology*, 22(3), pp. 239–255. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1002/casp.1110>.
- Philips, A. and Saharso, S. (2008) 'Guest Editorial: The Rights of Women and the Crisis of Multiculturalism', *Ethnicities*, 8(3), pp. 291-301. DOI:
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1468796808092443>.
- Pierson, P. (1993) 'When Effect Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback and Political Change', *World Politics*, 45(4), pp. 595–628. DOI: 10.2307/2950710.
- Ponce, A. (2017) 'Gender and Anti-Immigrant Attitudes in Europe', *Socius*, 3, pp. 1-17. DOI: 10.1177/2378023117729970.

- Ponizovskiy, V.A. (2016) 'Values and Attitudes towards Immigrants: Cross-Cultural Differences across 25 Countries', *Психология. Журнал Высшей Школы Экономики*, 13(2), pp. 256–272. Available at:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/309121650_Values_and_attitudes_towards_immigrants_Cross-cultural_differences_across_25_countries (Accessed: 14 June 2021)
- Puar, J. (2013) 'Rethinking homonationalism', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 45(2), pp. 336-339. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S002074381300007X>
- Quillian, L. (1995) 'Prejudice as a Response to Perceived Group Threat: Population Composition and Anti-Immigrant and Racial Prejudice in Europe', *American Sociological Review*, 60(4), pp. 586-611. Available at:
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/2096296?seq=1> (Accessed: 19 January 2021).
- Ramos, A., Pereira, C.R. and Vala, J. (2016) 'Economic Crisis, Human Values and Attitudes towards Immigrants', *Values, economic crisis and democracy*, pp. 104-137. DOI: 10.4324/9781315660790-15.
- Sager, M. and Mulinari, D. (2018) 'Safety for Whom? Exploring Femonationalism and Care-Racism in Sweden', *Women's Studies International Forum*, 68, pp. 149–156. DOI: 10.1016/j.wsif.2017.12.002.
- Sarrasin, O. (2016) 'Attitudes Toward Gender Equality and Opposition to Muslim Full-Face Veils', *Swiss Journal of Psychology*, 75(4), pp. 153–160. DOI: 10.1024/1421-0185/a000181.
- Schlueter, E., Meuleman, B. and Davidov, E. (2013) 'Immigrant Integration Policies and Perceived Group Threat: A Multilevel Study of 27 Western and Eastern European Countries', *Social Science Research*, 42(3), pp. 670–682. DOI: 10.1016/j.ssresearch.2012.12.001.

- Schwartz, S. (2006) 'A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications', *Comparative Sociology*, 5(2–3), pp. 137–182. DOI: 10.1163/156913306778667357.
- Schwartz, S. and Rubel-Lifschitz, T. (2009) 'Cross-National Variation in the Size of Sex Differences in Values: Effects of Gender Equality', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 97, pp. 171–85. DOI: 10.1037/a0015546.
- Schwartz, S.H. (1992) 'Universals in the Content and Structure of Values: Theoretical Advances and Empirical Tests in 20 Countries', *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology Academic Press*, 25, pp. 1–65. DOI: 10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60281-6.
- Schwartz, S.H. (2012) 'An Overview of the Schwartz Theory of Basic Values', *Online Readings in Psychology and Culture*, 2(1), pp. 2307-0919. DOI: 10.9707/2307-0919.1116.
- Stern, P.C., Kalof, L., Dietz T. and Guagnano, G.A. (1995) 'Values, Beliefs, and Proenvironmental Action: Attitude Formation Toward Emergent Attitude Objects', *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 25(18), pp. 1611–1636. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.1995.tb02636.x>.
- Visintin, E.P., Green, E.G.T. and Sarrasin, O. (2018) 'Inclusive Normative Climates Strengthen the Relationship Between Identification With Europe and Tolerant Immigration Attitudes: Evidence From 22 Countries', *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 49(6), pp. 908–923. DOI: 10.1177/0022022117731092.
- Waylen, G. (2014) 'Informal Institutions, Institutional Change, and Gender Equality', *Political Research Quarterly*, 67(1), pp. 212–223. DOI: 10.1177/1065912913510360.
- Wood, R. and Ramirez, M.D. (2018) 'Exploring the Microfoundations of the Gender Equality Peace Hypothesis', *International Studies Review*, 20(3), pp. 345–367. DOI: 10.1093/isr/vix016.

Yilmaz, F. (2015) 'From Immigrant Worker to Muslim Immigrant: Challenges for Feminism',
European Journal of Women's Studies, 22(1), pp. 37-52. Available at:
<https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1350506814532803> (Accessed: 13
February 2021).

Appendix 1a. Descriptive statistics, total

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
ATI	36994	5.27	2.645	0	10
GEI Work	24	72.47	4.58	63.34	82.89
Gender roles attitudes	37740	3.212	1.17	1	5
Benevolence	37768	4.79	1.005	1	6
Universalism	37678	4.768	1.086	1	6
Self-direction	37771	4.754	1.117	1	6
Security	37548	4.674	1.183	1	6
Tradition	37844	4.311	1.352	1	6
Power	37572	3.764	1.368	1	6

Appendix 1b. Descriptive statistics, by gender

Female

	N	mean	sd	min	max
ATI	746	7.19	2.198	0	10
GRA	750	3.94	.957	1	5
Benevolence	753	5.106	.899	1	6
Universalism	753	5.121	.944	1	6
Self-direction	751	4.826	1.141	1	6
Security	738	4.152	1.258	1	6
Tradition	753	3.991	1.392	1	6
Power	749	3.489	1.31	1	6

Male

ATI	777	6.647	2.353	0	10
GRA	773	3.686	.938	1	5
Benevolence	763	4.75	.906	1	6
Universalism	760	4.966	.981	1	6
Self-direction	765	4.765	1.006	2	6
Security	758	4.231	1.289	1	6
Tradition	765	3.667	1.425	1	6
Power	762	3.598	1.237	1	6

Appendix 2. Linear regression

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>
	ATI	ATI
Gender Equality Index	0.047 (0.03)	
MIPEX	0.017 (0.02)	0.021** (0.01)
Immigrants share	0.012 (0.02)	0.001 (0.01)
GDP per capita	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
GEI WORK		0.117*** (0.02)
GEI MONEY		0.020 (0.04)
GEI KNOWLEDGE		-0.035** (0.01)
GEI TIME		-0.003 (0.01)
GEI POWER		0.004 (0.01)
GEI HEALTH		0.009 (0.04)
Constant	1.316 (1.90)	-3.775 (3.37)
r ²	0.031	0.049
N	36994.000	36994.000

Appendix 3. Linear predictions: benevolence, universalism, security, tradition/conformity

