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Erasmus Mundus Joint Master's Degree in European Politics and Society

**Construction and Linguistic Portrayal of Climate Change Phenomenon in Right-Wing
Populist Parties' Political Discourse**

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Abstract

The main goal of this paper is to examine the construction and linguistic portrayal of the climate change phenomenon in the right-wing populist parties' discourse. The literature has so far mainly assumed automatic relationship between right-wing ideology and climate-refusal and did not go beyond analysis of specific climate-skeptical parties. We aim to fill this gap in the literature by analyzing both climate-supportive and disengaged RWP parties, as well their communication strategies on the matter.

In order to disentangle inconsistencies, paradoxes and contradictions in text and discourse-internal structures, as well as to demystify the possible persuasive or manipulative tendencies of RWP parties, this paper employs a Discourse-Historical Approach in order to examine how these actors transform, translate and modify the meaning and role of a climate change in their texts. Moreover, the focus of our paper is on the three strategies within DHA – nomination, predication and argumentation.

The analysis included three RWP parties – Alternative for Germany; Hungarian Fidesz and French National Rally. We found that the three examined parties with different climate policy preferences tend to deploy markedly different manipulative or persuasive strategies, and utilize different rhetorical and linguistical means when appealing to their electorates proved to be correct. Likewise, the formation of in and out-groups in their discourse varies considerably, as well as attributes given to social actors, objects, phenomena and processes around them. Nevertheless, the biggest variation is found in the argumentation strategy, i.e. elaboration of topoi and fallacies.

Keywords: climate change, populism, right-wing populist parties, environment, populist discourse

Introduction

There is a widespread scientific consensus that human activities are the leading cause of climate change (Cook et al., 2016), making it one of the most severe challenges the world is facing today. The issue became salient and appeared highly on the global agenda after the signing of the Paris Agreement in 2015, a cornerstone of the global action against climate change. Subsequent withdrawal of the US from the Agreement and activities by environmental activists have additionally raised concerns for the future of our planet. However, the actions to mitigate climate change have been inefficient, inconsistent, and not ambitious enough.

On the other hand, it is a widely accepted fact that human-made actions in sectors such as industry, transport, agriculture or energy production have led to the significant accumulation of greenhouse gases (GHG) in the atmosphere. Nevertheless, calls for more profound global

actions have been opposed by many political actors, especially populist parties on the right side of the political spectrum. This disagreement on the matter has naturally not translated to unified action against climate change and, in many cases, has led to climate change denial and refusal of science regarding its different aspects (Vainio and Paloniemi, 2013; Sibley and Kurz, 2013).

At the same time, over the past two decades, right-wing populist parties have become one of the most enduring features of European countries' party systems, no longer operating on the margins, but instead having managed to successfully integrate into their respective national political arenas (Zulianello, 2020). Moreover, literature largely agrees that RWP actors, whose nationalistic preferences go directly against global solutions necessary for tackling climate change, are one of the most serious obstacles to reaching ambitious climate mitigation actions. (Bailey, 2017). In light of this, researchers argue that political parties are the most significant players in climate change policy, but they may also be a major roadblock to effective climate policy (Compston and Bailey, 2013).

Furthermore, parties, in general, are of great importance for climate change politics for several reasons: party competition in a given country can shape governmental policies, and both its outputs and outcomes (Jensen and Spoon, 2011); parties play an important role in shaping public behavior linking the political decisions to the public (Brulle, Carmichael and Jenkins, 2012; Sohlberg, 2017). Finally, by channeling the climate policies, parties play a unique role in determining country's willingness and capacity to respond to the climate change challenges adequately (Farstad, 2018). Curiously enough, we, therefore, find it urgent to ask how various European RWP parties have framed the climate change issue in their rhetoric and what strategies have they used when appealing to the electorate.

Additionally, it is noteworthy stressing that, even though the RWP parties are prone to be climate-skeptical, it appears problematic to assume the automatic connection between right-

wing ideology and opposition to climate-related policies. Some RWP parties are indeed expressing skepticism, but some remain disengaged, whereas the others accept the scientific consensus and are supportive of climate policies (Gemenis, Katsanidou and Vasilopoulou, 2012; Lockwood, 2018). However, even when it acknowledges the existing variations across RWP, the literature tends to disregard the *discursive* differences *within* the right-wing spectrum. We, therefore, ask the following question: **How is the climate change phenomenon constructed and linguistically portrayed in right-wing populist parties' political discourse?** Answering this question will contribute to the literature in several ways:

Firstly, the literature on the topic has mainly not differentiated between climate change and the environment as a whole. The two, however, should be distinguished given that climate change has different incentives for political actors and is believed to cause more structural and societal changes (Farstad, 2018). Moreover, it is considered a salience issue, as opposed to environment, which is more of a valence issue, even though this perception has started to change recently (Gemenis, Katsanidou and Vasilopoulou, 2012). Therefore, political actors might consider climate change as a different prism to that of the environment, through which they can reflect their political agendas. Thus, we aim to add value to the literature on climate change by separating it conceptually and methodologically from the environment.

Secondly, previous studies on RWP parties' discursive strategies have disregarded the variety of attitudes towards climate change among RWP parties. Instead, they have mainly examined the climate-skeptical parties and have considered different types of skepticism – evidence, process, or response, therefore, not disentangling discursive practices of disengaged and climate-supportive actors. Thus, a complete understanding of the vast array of RWP actors and their climate policy preferences is necessary.

Therefore, our research is both socially and theoretically relevant: On the one hand, it deals with highly salient real-world challenges, and by fully understanding political parties' climate

policies and rhetoric, paves the way for improved and more inclusive policymaking processes needed for more ambitious actions. On the other hand, it contributes to the broader literature on the variance among RWP parties as well as party politics on climate change. Lastly, it contributes to the better understanding of these parties' rhetorical devices as well as uncovering their contradicting, fallacious or inconsistent discursive practices.

To answer the research question, we comparatively analyze three case studies and employ a *diverse cases strategy* (Seawright and Gerring, 2008). We adopt this research design to tackle the variation in our independent variable and opt for three right-wing populist parties – Alternative for Germany (AfD), Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz) and National Rally (NR) – all sharing the essential populist features – anti-immigration, Eurosceptic and Islamophobic attitudes, hostility towards global elites, as well as nativist and authoritarian tendencies. However, these parties differ in several essential context-related conditions that are believed to influence climate policymaking.

Our paper utilizes the Critical Discourse Analysis, and particularly, Historical-Discourse Approach (Wodak & Reisigl, 2015). The main goal of DHA is to identify how the chosen actors transform, translate and modify the meaning and role of a specific phenomenon in their texts and discourses. Deploying this kind of analysis allows us to disentangle inconsistencies, paradoxes and contradictions in text and discourse-internal structures and demystify the possible persuasive or manipulative tendencies of discursive practices. The data corpus consists of manifestos, programmatic documents for national elections (and for EP elections when they include explicit references to climate change), parties' and major parties' officials' Facebook posts, as well as their public statements regarding climate change in media.

In the following sections, we first examine state of the art on RWP parties and their general discourse, as well as more specific literature on their discourse on environment and climate change, respectively. Secondly, we introduce the reader to the research design and

methodology used to answer the research question. Thirdly, we compare the chosen case studies and discuss the analysis results, thus, reflecting on what these findings imply for the political communication of RWP parties and how they can drive our understanding of their discourse. Finally, the concluding section briefly summarizes the findings, points to the study's limitations and provides the potential avenues for future research.

Right-Wing Populist Parties

Populism has been a widely contested and multifaceted phenomenon in literature. It has been considered as an ideology (Mudde, 2004); political communication style (Moffitt and Tormey, 2014), whereas others have perceived it as a political logic (Laclau, 2005), a strategy (Engesser, Fawzi and Larsson, 2017), a discursive style (Hawkins, 2009), or instead as a form of political mobilization (Weyland, 2001).

The most common denominator of all types of populisms is a dichotomy of society separated into two groups – the people and the elite. Mudde argues that populism is a ‘thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”,’ and that politics should be an expression of the “*volonté général*” of the people. (Mudde, 2004) The ideology is 'thin' for not constructing a coherent set of beliefs but “assembles contradictory ideologemes in an eclectic fashion” (Wodak, 2020). Moreover, it is 'thin' because it does not have a definite form and can substitute other ideologies (Mudde, 2007), or even be combined with them (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2011).

Populism, when combined with nativism, constitutes populist radical right (Rooduijn, 2014) while at the same time it can be constitutive of the populist radical left (social-populism) (March & Mudde, 2005). Right-wing populist parties have particularly been the subject of an

increasingly lively academic debate in recent years. Their heterogeneity, chameleonic nature and elusiveness have made it possible to adapt to various contexts and various political settings.

Furthermore, not only have there been numerous debates about the definition of populism as such but various terms have been interchangeably used when referring to the types of right-wing populist parties. However, among all these terms, the term 'far-right' subsumes best a variety of parties with different policy agendas. Various labels can be found within this spectrum – right-wing populists, radical-right, extreme-right, right-wing extremists, or even neo-fascist (Forchtner, Kroneder and Wetzels, 2018).

Moreover, it is essential to note that the term far-right differentiates between extreme and radical right. The former represents more violent, racist, and aggressive parties that reject procedural democracy and employs the ethnic, nationalistic narrative (Schellenberg, 2018). The latter group, on the contrary, is more moderate and uses legal and democratic means when criticizing a country's institutions but still participates in the party competition in the same way as any other party (Forchtner, Kroneder and Wetzels, 2018). Nevertheless, radical-right parties also need to be distinguished from populist radical right parties (Mudde, 2007), given that in the case of the former, populism is not the prevailing characteristic, but it is instead nationalism that determines their agendas (Schellenberg, 2018).

In order to make our case studies comparable to each other, it is important to stress at the beginning which definition and classification we follow in our research. Given that the term 'far-right' is too broad and encompasses parties that we are not interested in for our research, we opt for the term right-wing populist parties.

Seen through the lens of Wodak, populism has four dimensions that differentiate it from the other similar phenomena (Wodak, 2015) :

- Nationalism/Nativism/Anti-pluralism refers to the construction of a notion of homogenous ethnos or Volk. In the heart (Wodak, 2015) of this dimension is homeland or Heimat, which can be potentially threatened by both external and internal threats
- Anti-elitism reflected in anti-elitist and anti-intellectual sentiments, often coming together with Euroscepticism.
- Authoritarianism reflected through a charismatic leader, a hierarchically organized party, and authoritarian rules
- Conservatism/Historical Revisionism exercised through the defense of traditional values and maintenance of a status quo

Moreover, she argues that European RWP parties differ markedly in constructing their ‘political imaginaries’, in focusing on various identity narratives they build by evoking their nationalist pasts as well as their emphasis on different topics in day-to-day politics. Nevertheless, regardless of contextual differences, they all pursue a ‘politics of fear’ by creating a binary division between ‘us’ and ‘our nation’ on the one hand and the minority scapegoats on the other hand (Wodak, 2015).

According to Betz, even though RWP parties question the legitimacy of democracy in general, their main targets are socio-cultural and socio-political systems, while, at the same time, they tend to embrace a free market and less government interference (Betz, 1994, p. 4). Additionally, the important commonality of RWPs is their ‘unscrupulous use and instrumentalisation of diffuse public sentiments of anxiety and disenchantment and their appeal to the common man and his allegedly superior common sense’ (Betz, 1994, p. 4).

Mudde argues that populism can be best combined with nativism, which is manifested through nationalism with xenophobic nature (Mudde, 2004). Therefore, it is assumed that only people with citizenship ‘transmitted through blood’ can be part of the nation, thus, excluding all the

other non-native elements that can potentially harm homogenous nation-states. The nativist nature of citizenship assumes that national values, identity, lifestyles, culture, and habits have to be protected from these foreign elements (Cervi, Tejedor and Dornelles, 2020; Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2007)

Apart from ideational approach to populism, there has been an emerging body of literature that considers it as a discourse. For Brubaker, for instance, populism is a ‘discursive and stylistic repertoire’ and all the populist parties have certain discursive, rhetorical and stylistic commonalities (Brubaker, 2017). In a similar fashion, Wodak discusses that populism goes far beyond a rhetorical style or a communication tool and cannot be separated from its ideological content. Moreover, she stresses that it is precisely the mix of its content and form that makes it more than just a political style (Wodak, 2020). This understanding of populist rhetoric is essential for disclosing and deconstructing their messages, communication and eventually, electoral success (Wodak, 2015).

Wodak and Krzyżanowski have also employed the discursive-oriented approach to populism. In their work on communication strategies of RWP, they argue that the latter almost necessarily include deliberate provocation of scandals, conspiracy theories, denials, and lies, and sometimes, what they call ‘ambivalent apologies’ (Wodak and Krzyżanowski, 2017). Another essential feature of the RWP parties is the ‘fear-mongering strategy’ in their discourse, where the ‘others’ are responsible for threats, dangers, or miseries caused. These ‘others’ mainly refer to Muslims, Jews, Roma people, capitalists, bankers, socialists, communists, international organizations, the media, ruling parties, or similar (Wodak, 2015).

The populist rhetoric almost necessarily includes the narrative of a threat and betrayal. On the one hand, the crucial goal of the establishment is to realize their interest, while, on the other hand, people are left aside, betrayed, and their anxieties are being ignored (Wodak, 2020).

Likewise, *ad hominem arguments* and other fallacies, such as the *straw-man fallacy* or the *hasty generalization fallacy* (purposefully deceitful argument) are nearly always used in their communication techniques (Wodak, 2015).

This thesis follows Mudde's conceptualization of populism as a thin centered ideology, combined with Hawkin's discursive conceptualization, in which he considers populism to be an ideology discursively shaped by political actors. As a result, populism will be regarded in our instance as a discursive expression of a thin-centered ideology that is concerned not only with the underlying set of basic beliefs about the universe, but also with the language that unintentionally reflects them.

Right-Wing Populist Parties and the Environment

Natural environment has been in the heart of RWP parties' political discourse for a long time. Gemenis et al. argue that one of the most distinguishable features of the radical-right-wing parties is not only their anti-immigrant position but precisely their anti-environmentalism, which is present more than in any other party family (Gemenis, Katsanidou and Vasilopoulou, 2012).

What is, however, most striking about these parties is a gap between, on the one hand, the preservation of national landscape originality and its importance for the existence of *Volk* (the people) and the supposed 'sacredness' of the national landscape; and on the other hand, their hostility towards environmental policies (Forchtner, Kroneder and Wetzel, 2018). After all, according to Ignazi, this does not come as a surprise, given that anti-environmentalism of the radical right parties is nothing more than a materialist reaction against left-wing/green post-materialist thought (Ignazi, 1992).

Therefore, even when trying to 'defend' nature and the homeland from the "nefarious others, and to forsake pro-environmental activities and thus preserve the nature and the status quo, RWP parties pursue their agendas on the local/national or a regional level and are mainly against global actions aimed at protection of environment or climate change mitigation (Forchtner, 2019). Against this background, in his paper on (far) right parties, Lubarda, for example, introduces the concept of 'far-right-ecologism', which encompasses the eco-fascist premise that nature and nation are one and inseparable, and the premise that national ecosystems should have supremacy over globalist ones (Lubarda, 2020). However, he builds his definition further by arguing that FRE sits between the conservative notions of responsibility and 'love of home' and the eco-nationalist demand to safeguard what is "inside our borders" (Lubarda, 2019b).

Drawing from the literature on RWP environmental discourse, RWP parties have made usage of the environment in various ways: this usage ranged from the importance of the national landscape and the homeland to its significance for the reproduction of the people to the aesthetic dimension of the community's natural landscapes (Wodak, 2020). Likewise, themes that appear quite often in their discourse include law and order, immigration, nationalism, Euro-skepticism, welfare chauvinism as well as the trade-off between economic growth and environmental protection (Gemenis, Katsanidou and Vasilopoulou, 2012). Other authors have also argued that not all RWP parties focus on typical anti-elitist arguments but rather tend to employ nationalist views framed through romanticist language and calls for national independence.

It is noteworthy stressing that studies of parties' (predominantly right-wing parties) environmental discourse can serve as a starting point when examining climate change policy preferences. Nevertheless, they do not give a complete understanding of a problem. Climate

policies as such, although starting to gain scholars' attention, are still overlooked in the literature, with domestic climate politics being relatively underdeveloped.

Therefore, climate change needs to be distinguished from the environment as a whole for several reasons: First of all, climate change is a positional, partisan issue (Farstad, 2018), whereas the environment is a typical example of a valence issue, even though this perception has changed in recent years (Gemenis, Katsanidou and Vasilopoulou, 2012). Secondly, climate policies, with their emphasis on decarbonization of the global economy, necessitate profound market structural changes, as well as significant behavioral changes, and might have different effects than traditional environmental concerns (Farstad, 2018).

Right-Wing Populist Parties and Climate Change

The literature agrees that climate politics is driven by partisan sorting lines (McCright and Dunlap, 2011; McCright, Dunlap and Marquart-Pyatt, 2016). In a similar fashion, Farstad argues that even though various factors, such as economic and policy preferences, strategic motivations or incumbency constraints influence parties' position on climate change policies, it is the left-right ideology that drives these variations (Farstad, 2018). He bases his argumentation on two facts: Firstly, RWP parties disapprove of state intervention and extension of its functions. Secondly, the right-wing ideology is likely to be socially conservative, making it problematic for right-wing parties to accept global policies directed at mitigating climate change (Farstad, 2018).

Climate skepticism is probably the most salient topic in the literature on climate change preferences. It encompasses a wide array of positions, ranging from opposing or questioning the scientific consensus and, therefore, the existence of anthropogenic climate change, to those

having a ‘positive’ refusal towards the issue, thus being agnostic, ambiguous, or unconvinced on the matter (van Rensburg, 2015).

According to Rahmstorf, there are three types of climate skepticism: trend (related to the denial of the existence of global warming); attribution (questioning the human-made influence of climate change, or sharing belief that climate change is a logical consequence of natural processes); and impact skepticism (the idea that global warming can in some cases be even beneficial) (Rahmstorf, 2005).

Rensburg has further developed this classification. By putting the three aforementioned types of skepticism under the umbrella of evidence skepticism, he adds another two categories – process and response skepticism. The former refers to skeptics who dismiss the IPCC's attempts to address climate change by saying that they are not scientifically credible, as well as those who believe that climate change debates are exaggerated by researches and the media, or even, that they are result of some type of conspiracy (Smith and Leiserowitz, 2012). On the other hand, response skeptics question the effectiveness of climate change actions or share doubts about the individual and societal relevance of climate change (Capstick and Pidgeon, 2014).

Lockwood offers one of the first theoretical assessments of the link between right-wing populism and climate change skepticism. He provides structuralist and ideological explanations for populists’ tendency for climate skepticism. The former considers climate policy a prism through which people feel the harmful effects of globalization and technological modernization. Thus, RWP parties appeal to those who are “left behind” in society. The ideological explanation, on the other hand, posits that nationalism and authoritarianism, in combination with anti-elitism, create a situation in which the people are dominated by a corrupt, liberal, cosmopolitan elite. In the case of climate change, the ideological explanations prevail (Lockwood, 2018).

Regarding specific PRRPs' position on climate change, the literature is not very extensive to the author's best knowledge. However, several studies have examined a number of European RWP parties and concluded that the majority of these parties have clear anti-climate tendencies, although not to the same extent and with several exceptions. Some of them are highly skeptical, some are ambiguous on the issue, whereas only one accepts the scientific consensus (Gemenis, Katsanidou and Vasilopoulou, 2012).

These variations are also presented in Ruser and Machin's work who make a difference among RWPs, thus, ranging from explicit rejection to an affirmative attitude held by parties who support the scientific mainstream and to parties remain disengaged/cautious (Ruser and Machin, 2019). Apart from that, these authors introduce the new concept of 'climate nationalism', arguing that these parties are less concerned with climate change as a global phenomenon and are trying to reject policymaking processes on the supranational level, while at the same time believe that national borders should play the central role (Ruser and Machin, 2019).

In their work on far-right climate change communication in Germany, Forchtner et al. conclude that different RWP, ranging from anti-liberal radical-right-populist parties to extreme-right parties and anti-democratic ones, have all deployed a skeptical climate change narrative, even though their argumentation differs (Forchtner, Kroneder and Wetzel, 2018). The authors similarly argue that this climate skepticism is mainly (although not always) a product of populist elements in their ideology. As a result, the threat to the *Volk's* stability and survival posed by 'globalist forces' is prevalent in their speech. (Forchtner, Kroneder and Wetzel, 2018).

Another pioneering study on RWP and climate change is Forchtner and Kølvrå's work on the link between the land, the countryside, and climate-change skepticism. They formulate an analytical framework consisting of aesthetic, material, and symbolic dimensions, through

which RWP actors use the natural environment and the landscape in different ways. While the first one refers to nature as sacred, enjoyable, and appreciable, the second one points to the national community's right to sovereignty and primacy over some specific part of Earth's territory that is culturally different from any other. Lastly, the material dimension refers to the homeland with all of its resources that serve the people of that country, making it self-sufficient and not dependent on any other external actor (Forchtner & Kølvråa, 2015).

However, even though RWP share many ideological traits, which also translate to climate change policy preferences, there is a number of authors who warn that the policy preferences of these actors are far from being uniform. For example, in their paper on opposition to climate mitigation policies, Hess and Renner examine various far-right parties. They conclude that most of them show tendencies for the rejection of scientific consensus on climate change, disapprove of decarbonization processes, and renewable energy instead supports the use of coal and fossil fuels. However, the level of skepticism is not uniform across them, given that some far-parties are positively oriented towards certain types of policies, precisely energy efficiency policies. (Hess and Renner, 2019).

Likewise, in their highly influential and relatively recent study on RWP parties and their positions on climate change, as well as their voting behavior on the matter in the European Parliament, the authors acknowledge that there is a whole range of different stances on this issue within the right-wing populist spectrum. The authors introduce a framework in which they distinguish between three types of parties: those that take a denialist position or oppose scientific consensus on man-made climate change; disengaged/cautious parties, including those with inconsistent on the matter; and finally, parties that are entirely supportive of global climate policies (Schaller and Carius, 2019).

The same authors claim that RWP parties which disapprove of climate change policies frame the latter as costly, unjust, harmful for the environment, and not worthwhile. Moreover, common frames used in RWP communication regularly include ‘economic decline’, ‘homeland (Heimat) and nature’, ‘national independence’ and ‘scientific dissent’ (Schaller and Carius, 2019). However, in their research, the authors have conducted content analysis, and their main goal was to spot the main patterns and frames present in RWP discourse without trying to disentangle their rhetoric and discursive strategies and dive deeper into the topic.

After analyzing the rhetorical devices of Nordic populist parties, Vihma et al. introduced an innovative analytical framework of three ideal types of opposition to climate change policies. The three include *climate science denialism*, *climate policy nationalism*, and *climate policy conservatism*. (Vihma, et al., 2020) While the first perspective denies that climate change exists, the second admits that it is caused by humans but believes that national and even EU initiatives are ineffective since only major world’s economies can make a significant impact. Similar to the nationalist one, the conservative position assumes that climate change is real, and therefore, climate action is meaningful, but only as long as it carries minimal costs to the economy and consumers.

Finally, after having reviewed the relevant literature, even though the exploratory nature of our analysis does not necessarily require formulation of hypotheses, we are able to make some preliminary expectations. We, therefore, expect that RWP parties with varying perspectives on climate change (i.e. skeptical, antagonistic, vague or supportive), will deploy different manipulative or persuasive strategies, and utilize different rhetorical and linguistic means when appealing to their electorates. Moreover, we can as well expect that formation of out-groups in their discourse will vary markedly as well as attributes given to social actors, objects and processes around them. This will be highly dependent on the context they are coming from.

Research Design

Our paper adopts a diverse cases strategy (Seawright and Gerring, 2008) and chooses three populist parties from three EU member states. Since we are interested in maximum variation across RWP, we have decided to opt for different cases within the spectrum. According to this strategy, if the focus of the research is on either X or Y, as it is in our case, then the research itself should be exploratory (hypothesis seeking).

The corpora of analyzed texts consist of manifestos, programmatic documents for national elections (and for EP elections when they include explicit references to climate change), parties' and major parties' officials' Facebook posts as well as their public statements regarding climate change in media.

The cases that we selected for our research include Alternative for Germany (Germany), National Rally (France), and Fidesz (Hungary). The rationale for the selection of these parties came from the variance that exists among them, in terms of contextual, country-related factors that are believed to drive climate policy preferences, but as well in terms of party-related factors. Moreover, our time frame includes the post-2015 period, given that the signing of the Paris Agreement and especially Trump's withdrawal from it shortly after are believed to have influenced right-wing-populist parties in Europe and elsewhere, giving them an incentive to take rather hostile positions on climate change mitigation.

The determinants of national climate policy development have so far widely attracted scholars' attention. They have considered various contextual factors: the type of party system, the political opportunity structure in a country, the salience of the environmental issues, the configuration of environmental discourses, etc. (Ladrech and Little, 2019). Others have included ideological positioning, the EU membership, political constraints within governance

models, and the level of economic development (Tobin, 2017). However, climate politics can also be driven by economic and policy preferences, size, strategic motivations, or incumbency constraints (Farstad, 2018). In our paper, we also consider specific climate-related factors on a country level, such as commitment to reach Kyoto targets, dependency on fossil fuel, use of nuclear energy, etc.

Before considering the aforementioned contextual factors that might have caused the variation across RWP policy preferences, it is important to point to their commonalities. Both ideologically and programmatically, they belong to a RWP party family even though AfD and NR are sometimes considered populist radical right parties, whereas Fidesz is a national-conservative populist party (Zulianello, 2020). All three fit well into Mudde's conceptualization, therefore having a profound 'populism', 'authoritarianism', and 'nativism' in the heart of their policies.

Anti-immigration, anti-Islam and 'welfare chauvinist' attitudes appear as cornerstones of their respective political agendas, as well the preservation of traditional values is their well-known criticism of the European Union. All three parties base their communication strategies on a Manichean dichotomy of a society. Likewise, they all have seats in the European Parliament. However, their electoral success in the domestic political arenas varies. While Fidesz dominates the Hungarian political scene and has a decade long governmental experience, the same cannot be said for AfD and NR.

When it comes to their respective countries, all three are parliamentary democracies, although both electoral and party systems differ markedly. While Germany and France are coordinated market economies (Carney, 2006), the Hungarian economy can fit into the same category, however, with the socialist legacy still playing a role. The three also differ in terms of GDP per

capita, with Germany having the highest scores, France performing slightly worse, while Hungary is still lagging behind the former two (Eurostat, 2021).

In terms of the environmental political arena, Germany's Green Party has managed to influence the domestic political arena by making ecological issues more salient and bringing them to the German mainstream. They currently hold 9% of the seats in the German Parliament (Shanahan, 2021). France's Europe Ecology-Les Verts (EELV) had astonishing results in the 2019 EP elections. The party also performs well on the local level but has only one seat in the National Assembly, whereas the Ecologist party of France (PE) has three seats (Chadwick, 2020). Hungary's green party (LMP) has been in opposition since its foundation in 2008, securing only 8 out of 199 seats in the National Assembly in the last election in 2018 and gaining no seats in the EP.

The most recent CCPI report from 2021 on countries' climate mitigation efforts shows that overall, on the scale from very low to very high, Germany and France have medium scores, while the score is very low in the case of Hungary (CCPI, 2021). Moreover, public opinion regarding climate change varies considerably across the three countries. According to the Special Eurobarometer from 2020, climate change and environmental issues represent the main global challenge for the future of the EU for 60% German citizens, 50% French citizens, and 33% of Hungarian citizens (European Parliament; European Commission, 2020).

When it comes to nuclear energy, Germany has committed itself to phase out its nuclear power by 2022 and shift to a low-carbon economy, thus, focusing on renewables. (OECD, 2020). Hungary has pledged to close its last coal plant by 2025. Currently, nuclear plants produce half of their electricity and the country aims to make 90% of its electricity carbon-free within a decade (World Nuclear News, 2021). In order to decrease its dependency on fossil fuel imports,

including coal, oil and natural gas, France has shifted to the development of nuclear energy, with nuclear power accounting for $\frac{3}{4}$ of its electricity production in 2018. (OECD, 2020).

Since the 1990s, Germany has achieved significant progress in climate policies and has set a goal to be GHG neutral by 2050. In Hungary, substantial progress has been made to decrease GHG and CO₂ emissions. In 2017, its CO₂ per-capita emissions were well below the European average. The country wants to be climate-neutral by 2050 (Ministry for Innovation and Technology, 2019). France has also managed to decrease its GHG emissions by more than 10% over the whole period of 1990-2013. The country's primary goal is to cut emissions by 40% by 2030 and by 75% by 2050, compared to the 1990s amount.

However, the most significant difference among the three parties has to do with their climate policy preferences. While Germany's AfD has been recognized as one of the most radical climate-denialist parties, France's National Rally has adopted a rather vague position and has not made the climate change issue highly salient. Fidesz, on the contrary, has advocated for the necessity of global climate mitigation action and has supported almost all the EU's policy efforts on the matter (Hess and Renner, 2019)

Methodology

Given that the main aim of this paper is to elucidate the discursive practices of the three RWP parties, it uses Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), and more specifically, its sub-type, the Discourse- Historical Approach (DHA) (see Wodak and Reisigl, 2015). This specific method will help us examine how the chosen actors modify, transform or deform the meaning and the role of the climate change phenomenon in their rhetoric.

The DHA utilizes large and diverse empirical data and different approaches, which results in extensive interdisciplinary analysis. It does so by trying to grasp many layers of different socio-

political and historical contexts in order to theorize how discourses and texts transform due to changing socio-political contexts. (Wodak, 2009)

It is important to stress that the notion of critique is essential in the DHA since it follows the orientation of Critical Theory. Thus, the approach includes three types of critique (Reisigl and Wodak, 2005). Those include:

1. *Text or discourse immanent critique* which relates to contradictions, dilemmas and inconsistencies in internal text and discourse structures.
2. *Socio-diagnostic critique* aims to elucidate manipulation in the discursive practices and uncover “their ethically problematic features, serving as a sort of social control. It focuses on revealing the manifest or latent character of discourse.
3. *Prospective critique* has an application in practice and its focus is on reducing language barriers improvement of communication with public institutions by providing guidelines informed by extensive fieldwork.

In the DHA, discourse is considered to be: ‘related to a macro-topic’; ‘a cluster of context-dependent semiotic practices that are situated within specific fields of social action’; ‘socially constituted as well as socially constitutive’, and ‘linked to the argumentation about validity claims such as truth and normative validity involving several social actors who have different points of view’ (Wodak, 2009).

However, Wodak distinguishes between text and discourse, claiming that “*Discourse* implies patterns and commonalities of knowledge and structures, whereas a *text* is a specific and unique realization of a discourse” (Wodak, 2009). Texts are, then, parts of the discourse, and ‘they make speech acts durable over time’ (Wodak & Reisigl, 2015). Moreover, *intertextual* and *interdiscursive* relationships between texts, utterances and genres are present in the DHA.

Whereas “*intertextuality*” refers to the linkage of all texts to other texts, both in the past and in the present, “*interdiscursivity*” implies that topic-oriented discourses are linked to each other in various way and can be linked to topics or subtopics of other discourses (Wodak & Reisigl, 2015).

In order to examine the ways of production and reproduction of a ‘positive Self’ and ‘negative Other’ through various semiotic devices, DHA employs five discursive strategies: *nomination strategy* (how are persons, objects, phenomena/events, processes and actions named and referred to linguistically, for instance, by creation of in and out-groups); *predication strategy* (what characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to social actors, objects, phenomena/events and processes); *argumentation strategy* (what arguments are employed in the discourse in question); *perspectivization strategy* (from what perspective are these nominations, attributions and arguments expressed); and *mitigation and intensification strategy* (are the respective utterances articulated overtly; are they intensified or mitigated) (Wodak and Reisigl, 2015).

One of the most essential features of the DHA's triangulation principle is argumentation theory, the so-called theory of *topoi*. Reisigl and Wodak define *topoi* as ‘content-related warrants or “conclusion rules” that connect the argument or arguments with the conclusion, the claim’ (Reisigl and Wodak, 2005). *Topoi* are therefore helpful in disentangling sometimes presupposed fallacies that are widespread in day-to-day conversations about specific topics.

Wodak and Boukala, for instance, draw on Aristotelian tradition and define *topos* as a

rhetorical and dialectical scheme that offers the opportunity for a systematic in-depth analysis of different arguments and statements that represent the accepted knowledge – endoxon – and which are usually employed by orators or opponents to persuade their audience of the validity of their opinion (Wodak and Boukala, 2015)

Moreover, the argumentation schemes in DHA can be reasonable or fallacious. In the literature, the latter are known as fallacies. Even though it is not always easy to conclude if a particular argumentation is formed as reasonable topoi or a fallacy, certain rules exist for distinguishing between the two. (see Wodak and Reisigl, 2015).

Building upon Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1994) work, Reisigl and Wodak form a list of widely used common fallacies, such as *argumentum ad baculum*, i.e., ‘threatening with the stick’, *argumentum ad hominem*, i.e., verbal attacks on the antagonistic personality, without introducing the actual argument; the *argumentum ad populum* or *pathetic fallacy*, which also bypasses rational arguments (Reisigl and Wodak, 2005).

There are also several quite extensive lists of topoi that are generally used in the literature. Reisigl and Wodak make a list of topoi that are used whenever one tries to appeal to a specific audience and try to convince them of one's argumentation or point of view. It includes the following: *topos of usefulness, advantage; of uselessness, disadvantage; of definition; of danger and threat; of humanitarianism; of justice; of responsibility; of burdening, weighting; of finances; of reality; of numbers; of law and right, of history; of culture and of abuse* (Reisigl and Wodak, 2005). Additionally, on the figure below, the list of widely used Aristotelian topoi is shown.

Topos	Principle and <i>Example</i>
Topos of opposites	If the contrary of a predicate belongs to the contrary of a subject, then this predicate belongs to this subject. <i>'If the war causes us all this damage, then we should make peace.'</i>
Topos of definition	<i>'If someone believes that evil is related to the gods, then he believes in the existence of the gods.'</i>
Topos of syllogism that starts with something specific and concludes with something general	<i>'If some human beings do not trust their horses to people who do not protect the horses of other human beings, then they cannot trust their salvation to people who do not succeed in saving other human beings.'</i>
Topos of the consequential	If an act has both good and bad consequences, then on the basis of the good/bad consequences this act can be exhorted/blamed. <i>'If one is educated, then he can be wise. If one is educated, the others envy him.'</i>
Topos of cause	If the cause exists, then so does the effect. If the cause does not exist, then there is no effect.
Topos of the aftermath	<i>'If someone is exiled and can live as he wants, then he is considered to be a happy person.'</i>
Topos that accepts as a cause something that is not a cause	<i>'Dimadis considers that Demosthenes' politics was harmful because after his governance the war began.'</i>

Figure 1: The list of Aristotelian topoi (Rhetoric, 2014B 23–24)

Source: Wodak, 2015

Moreover, Krzyzanowski's list includes the following: *topos of national uniqueness; of definition of the national role; of national history; of East and West; of past and future; of modernization; of the EU as a national necessity; of the EU as a national test* etc. (Krzyzanowsky, 2009, p. 103). For more topoi, see also (Wodak & Reisigl, 2015).

However, the criticism of the analysis based on pre-existing list of topoi has been quite widespread. For instance, Žagar's key critique is that there is no reconstruction of argumentation schemes or conclusions, but merely allusions to certain topoi with no genuine

examination of their implications. Topoi, in this sense, serve solely to validate pre-existing discourses, without reflecting on them or providing new analysis (Žagar, 2010).

Drawing on Zagar's criticism, this paper's main contribution is to move beyond traditional approaches to topoi, which tend to ignore their reconstruction and so far, have failed to provide fresh analytical and theoretical insights into different topics. We do not, however, reject the existing, readymade topoi lists, but instead, utilize them as a source of background information, while trying to disentangle hidden meanings behind argumentation schemes and introduce new, emerging categories.

Analysis

This paper focuses on nomination, predication and argumentation strategies in the discourse of the three RWP parties from Germany, France and Hungary. The total number of analyzed sources amounts to 52, including manifestos, programmatic documents, officials' statements in the media, and posts from official parties' Facebook pages (the main source).

Due to the language barrier that the author faced, some sources were translated to English by using translation engines (Google Translate and DeepL). An extensive key word search was run (climate change, climate, European Green Deal, IPCC, climate science, global warming, emissions, emission trading, ETS, energy, CO₂, Paris Agreement, renewable, coal, energy, waste, emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG), COP, anthropogenic, fossil fuels, Kyoto Protocol, environmentalism, climate-skepticism, energy transition, nuclear, solar, wind, carbon tax) and content was manually coded after data collection. (Appendix for nomination and predication strategies). The analysis is offered in the following sections.

Alternative for Germany: Trojan Horse of ‘Climate Protection’

Among the three parties, Germany’s AfD has the most radical approach when it comes to its climate policy preferences as well as its discursive strategies. The AfD in general opposes climate protection policies, as well as EU’s activities on cutting CO₂ emissions and disregards anthropogenic impact on climate. The cornerstone of their agenda is support for energy mix, based mainly on the nuclear power, having at the same time a hostile approach towards renewables. They have also argued against the use of solar and wind energy, claiming that the latter function at the expense of consumers, and have supported the re-carbonization process with increased share of fossil fuels in the country’s energy mix. The party has also rejected the Paris Agreement.

The refusal of the climate change existence can be seen already in the first sentence of their manifesto. Except for claims that ‘climate changes have occurred as long as the Earth exists’, they state the following:

The IPCC attempts to prove a correlation between anthropogenic CO₂ emissions and global warming that will result in catastrophic consequences for mankind. This claim is based on computer models that, however, are not backed by quantitative data and measured observations (Alternative for Germany, 2017)

By saying that the climate change is part of the natural processes, the AfD even argues that nowadays’ temperatures are ‘not much different than those of the Middle Ages and the Roman Warm period’. The Government is, they, say, ‘misrepresenting a situation of rising CO₂ emissions’, thus, imposing restrictions on people’s liberties and decreasing the living standard.

Further analysis has shown that all the usual topoi stemming from the literature were employed in the AfD’ discourse. However, a number of emerging categories has appeared, thus, helping to tackle the specificity of the AfD’s radical rhetoric towards climate change issue.

AfD's rhetoric is a product of making a clear Manichean dichotomy in a society – 'the people' versus 'elites', as well as constructing boundaries by creating 'Otherness', and thus, artificially making in- and out-groups in its discourse. The prevailing topoi include those of *history, threat, nature, definition, comparison, pressure or compulsion, advantage and usefulness, disadvantage and uselessness, costs, abuse* and the others.

First of all, the AfD's narrative on climate is discursively shaped by the emerging dichotomy of 'self-appointed', 'totalitarian', 'pseudo-elitists' and left-wing radical socialists who want to rebuild the society based on socialist standards under the pretext of climate protection, and 'us', 'the people' who are to be enslaved and their freedom to be taken away (*topos of abuse*). Moreover, against the same background, the AfD builds the argumentation further by introducing the *topos of comparison* of environmentalism and socialism which is then substantiated with the *topos of history*. The latter appears when they claim that 'socialism' itself does not sound right anymore after having a dictatorship on a German soil, therefore, they now call themselves 'eco-socialists'.

Another example of the *topos of history* combined with the *topos of comparison* can be seen in the statement that the 'social struggle' has lasted for decades and was seen in 'the fight of freedom-conservative-civil forces against socialists, communists, Maoists and deep-leftist'.

Additionally, according to AfD, by imposing their regulations on a 'common man', restricting his freedom and telling him what (not) to do, 'eco-socialists' are putting a pressure on the people, while at the same time, are endangering their freedom, their future, their whole lives, as well as the environment. This argument is developed via *topos of pressure/compulsion* and is also exercised through the following statements:

The green cartel on the left, which, under the guise of the supposed climate crisis, wants to impose an ecosocialist model on us, while destroying our environment [...] must finally be stopped if we do not want to lose our freedom.

The narrative of ‘threat and betrayal’ is implicitly present, and is exercised through the realization of the interests of ‘eco-socialists’ and so-called left-green cartel, whereas the citizens are betrayed, left aside, ignored, their freedom is endangered (Wodak, 2020).

Moreover, the AfD discursively constructs the ‘Green and communist’ ideology as a danger to people’s prosperity, to the *Volk*’s stability, the way of living, human lives, freedom, the existing economic and social order, a process that has ‘irreversible’ consequences. The party elaborates this argument through the *topos of threat*. Targeting ‘others’ who are supposedly responsible for those threats, dangers and miseries is a part of common populists’ fear-mongering strategy.

In a similar fashion, *topos of costs/finance* combined with *topos of negative consequences to the economy* is employed and it can be seen in statements such as the following: ‘human lives are at risk because climate aspirations deny them access to affordable energy’ (AfD’s Facebook page, 2019) or: ‘That’s it! Time for the end of the left-wing green climate league, which makes us all poor!’ (AfD’s Facebook page , 2019)

Likewise, *topos of frightening* dominates the AfD’s discourse. The following sentence is an example of it: ‘We still have the choice! But if this continues, then our opportunity to choose could soon be gone’ (AfD’s Facebook page , 2021). The argumentation is further developed through the introduction of a metaphorical scenario in which the ‘climate hysteria’ and its opponents will allegedly abolish Germany as a nation as well as its remaining wealth. It can be concluded that Aristotelian *topos that accepts as a cause something that it is not a cause* is also employed in the argumentation that the abolishment of German nation is a cause of global climate policies.

The discursive construction of the in-group of ‘us/citizens/the people’ and the out-group of ‘them’/political elites, the media elites, intellectual elites, climate activists is prevalent in the AfD’s discourse. This is elaborated through the *topos of comparison of the elites to ordinary citizens*.

Furthermore, claiming that they don’t want any top-down imposition from Brussels, and that no climate protection should be prescribed, the AfD argues that the people/we should oppose ‘the army of EU bureaucrats’. Therefore, Brussels become the direct target for the AfD attacks, as well as the ‘eco-warrior’ von der Leyen, which is accused of having double standards for flying with private jets, which supposedly emit 20 times as much CO₂ as a usual flight. Additionally, high government officials are accused of destroying country’s economy and costing people billions of euros.

However, the most radical and *ad hominem* rhetoric is directed towards Greta Thunberg. In the AfD’s discourse, she is represented as being confused and in need of help, she is an environmental ‘fanatic’ etc. She is also demonized in the AfD narrative for announcing the alleged approaching apocalypse and a ‘mass death’ or ‘the end of the world’. Expectedly enough, another social actor that is targeted in the AfD rhetoric is intellectual elite, and more specifically, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), who is accused of not having a real scientific evidence, and therefore of basing its ambitious policies only on assumptions.

Against this background, *topos of disregard of democratic rule and topos of top-down imposition of the will* can be seen in argumentation that ‘self-proclaimed activists’ and elites, under the pretext of protecting citizens tend to impose their own will on the people, completely neglecting the rules of democratic will formation.

Moreover, one of the emerging topoi that is quite present in AfD's Facebook posts is *topos of pseudo-elitist thinking*, sometimes even appearing as *topos of 'pseudo-religious thinking'* or *topos of climate religion*, which suggests the comparison of climate activists with 'priests'. This 'pseudo-religious', irrational thinking is then juxtaposed to 'our' common sense (*topos of common sense*), which needs to end 'the left-green education' and agitation. This does not come as a surprise, given that it fits perfectly well in the populists' instrumentalization of public emotions and their appeal to 'common man' and his 'common sense' which should be prioritized over everything else (Betz, 1994). This argumentation is further elaborated by the premise that politics must finally listen to 'critical voices in climate policy', thus, opposing the uniformity of opinion of the climate actions advocates, the media and the scientific community.

Moreover, *topos of authority* combined with *topos of solidarity* is visible in AfD's references to Orban's 'reasonable policies' aimed at making Hungary at the same time climate and child-friendly, thus, preventing the much more serious problem of demographic change.

Finally, the obvious fallacies (such as *ad hominem arguments*, *straw-man fallacy* and *the hast-generalization fallacy*) are visible in the argumentation on disbelief towards human-made climate change and the lack of scientific evidence. More specifically, the *fallacy of uncertainty or lack of proof* can be seen in their references to 'so-called climate-protection', 'alleged climate crisis/emergency', climate conspiracy, the 'obvious falsehoods', 'nonsense of the climate emergency', 'alleged scientific consensus' etc. In this case, climate advocates are considered as 'charlatans who scare people', whereas the current climate models are considered as 'childish', 'unsuitable', 'cruel' and not based on facts. On the other hand, these social actors are juxtaposed to the 'real' scientists which clearly contradict the assumption that climate

change is caused by human actions, as well as to ‘us/critical voices’. Moreover, by employing another conceptual metaphor of the ‘Trojan horse of the climate protection’, the AfD emphasizes the uselessness and detrimental nature of the left-green-eco-socialist ideology, which fails to be an alternative to the ‘proven social system’.

Additionally, another specific fallacy employed is a *fallacy of nature*. The AfD, therefore shapes its rhetoric around the assumption that climate crisis simply doesn't exist and that there is rather a ‘steady change’ in the climate, the process which has been supposedly happening on our planet for millions of years now. Nevertheless, both types of fallacies can be outweighed by the *topos of numbers* referring to the high number of scientists who accept the existence of human-made climate change, and the scientific evidence they offer, even when they are accused of not having one.

National Rally: ‘Within the National Borders’

France’s National Rally has adopted rather vague position and has not made the climate change issue highly salient. It has however accepted the existence of climate change, but leaving it to the country to protect the environment and tackle climate change, instead of letting the supranational actors to interfere in France’s political arena. Same as AfD, it has criticized Paris Agreement for being ineffective and it has discarded the use of wind energy. Unlike AfD, it has promoted increased investment in renewables, and has called for phasing out of fossil fuels. It can be read from the NR’s 2017 Manifesto, that the renewable energy sector should be developed through the ‘intelligent protectionism, economic patriotism, public and private investment’ (Manifesto of National Front , 2017). Simultaneously, according to them, the nuclear energy sector should be improved and modernized, together with the hydrogen sector, which has a potential to decrease France’s dependence on oil.

However, even though Le Pen was known for her rather vague statements regarding existence of human-man climate change and had never clearly declared herself as a skeptic or a supporter, her position has changed before the 2019 European elections (Manifesto of National Rally , 2019). The party has, therefore, decided to go green and to adopt more of an environmentalist approach, even claiming that Europe should be ‘world’s first ecological civilization’.

Statements such as: ‘Borders are the environment’s greatest ally [...] and it is through them that we will save the planet’ (Manifesto of National Rally , 2019) are a proof of the country’s commitment to national and local policies instead of global ones. Therefore, the trade-off between right-wing-environmentalism and localism, has shaped NR’s ideas. This in line with Forchtner’s argument that RWP parties, even when pro-environmentally oriented, tend to pursue their agendas on the local and national level and disapprove of global actions (although NR’s position has meanwhile shifted towards support of global policies). Moreover, one can say that NR can fit well into Lubarda’s category of ‘far-right-ecologist’ parties, given their emphasis on supremacy of local and national framework, as well as the importance of ‘national borders’ combined with the ‘love of home’ and national landscape (Lubarda, 2019b, 2020).

The same ‘nationalistic’ pattern was spotted in the National Rally’s Facebook posts. The results are in line with the previous findings on the party’s climate policy preferences, which showed that the climate change did not appear highly on the National Rally’s agenda, especially not before the 2019 European elections. The rhetoric of this party on Facebook was mainly dominated by the environmental topics and the pragmatic proposals on introducing new policies that would prioritize local and national over global level.

First of all, in this case, the NR has discursively distanced itself from the other RWP parties, since the common populist communication strategies seem not to appear in its discourse to the same amount compared with the other RWP. The process of ‘Othering’, the opposition to

global elites, the process of targeting various social actors and employing *ad hominem* arguments is almost absent from their rhetoric, at least in an explicit way. Moreover, obvious fallacies, such as the ones in the AfD's discourse are not present in the NR's rhetoric.

Rather, the party embraces 'patriotism' and 'pragmatism' and gives concrete policy proposals in order to tackle the environmental issues. By employing the *topos of ineffectiveness* of wind turbines, it argues that this non-renewable energy is to be blamed for consuming public money and rising costs in electricity bills. It simultaneously relies on the usage of the *topos of costs/financial burden*, stressing that these turbines are an 'endless financial waste'.

This 'demonization' of the wind-turbines is juxtaposed to the embracement of nuclear technologies, exercised via *topos of advantage or usefulness* of investment into decarbonated nuclear energy. Moreover, the National Rally makes use of metaphorical means in their discourse, by expressing its concerns that the abandonment of the nuclear technology would allegedly be an economic, technological and ecological crime, thus, simultaneously employing the *topos of frightening*. This is further developed by the introduction of the *topos of threat* of anti-nuclear ideology which only makes French people suffer, thus slowing down the development of decarbonated energy, which is 'essential' for their country.

When discussing the necessity of France to be energy independent, it employs the *topos of comparison* of France and its territory with the countries abroad, thus emphasizing the importance of domestic production and opposing the energy imports from elsewhere. The countries abroad are discursively constructed as 'producing hydrocarbons in poor conditions' whereas the French technologies are cleaner, ecology-friendly and without the danger for the environment.

At the same time, the *topos of threat* to employment, to the national landscape as well as to the broader interests of the State and its citizens is employed. This is followed by the usage of the *topos of frightening*, which can be found in argumentation that these potential effects could be ‘dramatic’ and therefore, its consequences are ‘alarming’. Moreover, the *topos of threat* to the land pollution and destruction of ecosystems is present. However, all the above-mentioned topoi can be said to function under the *topos of supremacy of local/national* level over the global one. Here, the National Rally discursively constructs the ‘the Europeanists’ who tend to impose (*topos of imposition/pressure*) European and global free trade, as disastrous for the planet, harmful for the domestic production and consumptions as well as for fair competition. Hence, the ‘Europeanists’ are clearly contrasted to ‘us/economic patriots’, seeking to create wealth ‘on our own soil’ by exercising the economy of proximity. Thus, the global level is juxtaposed to the level of the nation, which is the first and the most important actor for tackling the environmental emergency.

Additionally, through the statements such as the following one:

In short, we are in favor of the international, literally “between nations” cooperation, where nations come together to reach agreements on specific points...we are opposed to ineffective and dangerous supranational mechanisms, where decisions and actions are imposed from above on nations and therefore on people

the *topos of comparison* of the supranational and international is employed and is combined with the *topos of imposition or pressure*. Therefore, NR’s narrative is shaped by the trade-off between the opposition to European and global elites and the nationalist, romanticist sentiments and calls for national supremacy.

Against this background, Le Pen states how much is it important to love France, its national landscapes, its language and local accents. She employs the *topos of definition*, by discursively constructing French citizens who are much more than just consumers and producers. Namely,

those who are rooted on their homeland, and those = who ‘want to live on their land and to pass it on to their children’ are called ecologists. Unlike them, those who are nomadic ‘do not care about the environment’. It can therefore be concluded that, in the case of NR, the importance of national landscapes, the homeland and the French soil is important for the reproduction of the people, as previously discussed by Wodak (2020). Moreover, the all three dimensions proposed by Forchtner and Kølvråa (aesthetic, material and symbolic) are as well present in the NR’s public discourse. The first one refers to the use of nature, as something being sacred, and pleasurable, whereas the second one implies the community’s right to primacy over its own territory. On the other hand, material dimension, in NR’s case is present in the discourses about resources that should be produced ‘within our borders’, for instance, making France energy independent on external actors.

Fidesz: A Christian-democratic Climate Policy

Hungary was to first European country to pass the legislation needed for the Paris Agreement to come into force. Fidesz has been a great advocate of the global climate mitigation actions and has called other world’s nations to follow its track. It has also supported almost all the EU’s policy efforts on the matter. The party shows support for nuclear energy and fossil fuels instead of investing into renewables and believes that complete phasing out of fossil fuels is not likely to happen in relatively close future.

However, it is noteworthy stressing that there has been a shift in Orban’s position towards climate change, given that Orban himself as well as his party’s highest officials had long been questioning the existence of anthropogenic climate change and human actions’ influence on global warming, arguing that it was just another ‘scam’ of the leftists and liberal elites to misguide the public. Greta Thunberg and climate activists were also the targets of the party’s hostile rhetoric towards climate policies.

Even though at one point Hungary even vetoed the EU's carbon neutrality goals, the country has later on supported the EU's Green Deal plan to be climate-neutral by 2050. Moreover, after Trump announced the withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement, Orban stated that he was 'in a state of shock' thus, once more calling for more ambitious climate policies (Hungarian Free Press, 2017). Some argued that this shift came due to the Orban's wish to secure stable means from EU funding, as well as to attract new parts of electorate, namely youth and urban voters and to counterbalance leftists in Hungary and Europe (Kafkadesk, 2020).

With regards to the Fidesz's discourse, the climate change issue remained even less salient topic on their agenda. However, the party's rhetoric was simultaneously shaped by the criticism of the EU elites and the calls for global climate actions. It was additionally dominated by the statements on the importance of nuclear energy, as well as the statements on who is to be responsible for bearing the costs of such global policies.

The EU has remained the main target for Fidesz's attacks, sometimes in a more neutral way, for instance, when it was called to provide the equal conditions and support of the distribution of nuclear energy. In those cases, the *topos of responsibility* was employed. More explicit criticism of the EU is invoked when he claims that 'we'/people/Hungarians, will not let the 'Brussels bureaucrats' dictate the costs of fighting the climate change.

Moreover, via the *topos of advantage of usefulness* of nuclear power plants, Fidesz argued that the electricity generated in this way would be safe, not dangerous, environmental-friendly and most importantly, cheap.

By constructing the climate change as something that is 'real' and 'dangerous', has global consequences and therefore requires global solutions to tackle it, *the topos of reality* is put into practice, combined with the *topos of definition*, by defining the climate change as a global

phenomenon. Against this background, he even claimed that those, who believe that climate change is a communist scam are ‘not sane’.

Furthermore, even when arguing that climate change is extremely important world’s challenge, Orban has discursively constructed it as a rather ‘expensive thing’, thus, introducing the *topos of costs/financial burdens* that are to be paid by the world’s biggest polluters, multinational corporations and large countries. In this sense, Fidesz can be considered as a climate-conservative force, being supportive of global climate actions, as long as the citizens and the national economy don’t have to bear the costs of it. Moreover, by creating the binary division between the aforementioned social actors on the one hand, and ‘the poor countries and the poor people’ on the one hand, he creates the discursive dichotomy of ‘us’ and ‘them’. He develops his argumentation further, by once more distinguishing between ‘climate destroyers’ and ‘us, Hungarian citizens/Hungarian families.

Lastly, the emerging *topos of religion-based climate policies* is employed by arguing that ‘the protection of the created environment and of nature on a biblical basis is especially a Christian democratic policy’ (Kafkadesk, 2020). Moreover, obvious fallacies do not dominate the Fidesz’s rhetoric.

Conclusion

The main aim of this paper was to examine how the climate change phenomenon is constructed and linguistically portrayed in the right-wing populist parties' political discourse. By employing the Discourse-Historical Approach, we tried to identify how the chosen actors transform, translate and modify the meaning and role of a climate change in their texts and discourses. We therefore focused our analysis on the three types of discursive strategies: nomination, predication and argumentation, in an attempt to uncover inconsistencies, dilemmas, paradoxes

and contradictions in text and discourse-internal structures and demystify the possible persuasive or manipulative tendencies of RWP discursive practices.

The selection of our cases studies was primarily driven by variation across right-wing populist parties, caused by country-related contextual determinants of climate policy preferences, as well as party-related factors that are believed to influence climate policymaking. Therefore, by utilizing *diverse cases* strategy, we decided to opt for the three RWP parties: Alternative for Germany, National Rally and Fidesz in order to analyze how and if this variation translates to the different discursive practices and narratives on climate change.

The key contribution of our study was to go beyond the commonly accepted assumption that right-wing ideology can be automatically linked with the anti-environmentalist practices and a hostility towards global climate mitigation policies. Given that the existing literature has so far neglected the variety of attitudes towards climate change among RWP parties and instead have considered almost solely the climate-skeptical parties, we tried to fill this gap in the literature by trying to compare both climate supportive and disengaged RWP parties with the climate denialist ones. In this way, we were able to understand how to they construct and reconstruct social actors, processes and phenomena around them in a different manner.

Moreover, our paper also gives an added value specifically to the argumentation theory, i.e. theory of *topoi*, by not only basing our analysis on the readymade lists of widely accepted *topoi*, but instead goes further than that and forms the new, emerging categories of *topoi*.

The analysis showed that, even though united in their nativist, authoritarian and populist tendencies, which translate to anti-elitist, anti-immigration and anti-EU sentiments, the discursive strategies of the three RWP parties are far from being uniform. Not only their official stance towards climate protection policies is absolutely different (denialists, disengaged,

supportive), but the way they frame the climate change issue, and the argumentation they use when appealing to ‘the people’ is everything but not the same.

First of all, among all three parties, the AfD makes it most salient and has the most radical approach towards climate change policies. It can be even said that the disproportion between the AfD’s available data and that of the NR and Fides, is a finding in itself: the climate change does not appear to be highly on these two parties’ political agenda.

Regarding the AfD, its typical hostile, radical, fear-mongering rhetoric dominates the party’s climate change discourse. Discursive construction of ‘others’ and making in and out-groups in the society is in the heart of this party’s narrative. Typical targets of the AfD are therefore political elites, the media elites, intellectual elites as well as climate activists who impose binding rules on citizens, and whose actions are detrimental to the ‘common man’, his freedom, his prosperity and future.

The prevailing topoi include those of *history, threat, nature, definition, comparison, pressure or compulsion, advantage and usefulness, disadvantage and uselessness, costs, abuse* and the others. Some of the emerging topoi include: *topos of frightening, topos of costs/financial burden, topos of disregard of democratic rule, topos of ‘pseudo-religious thinking’, topos of authority* combined with *topos of solidarity* and the others. On the other hand, the fallacies in the AfD’s discourse are easy to notice: they use different types of those including *ad hominem arguments, straw-man fallacy, the hast-generalization fallacy* and the others. More specifically, the *fallacy of uncertainty or lack of proof* and *fallacy of nature* are dominant and therefore refer to the lack of scientific consensus and a belief that the climate change is a natural consequence of the climatic processes.

With regards to the National Rally, the party has not used obvious fallacies nor did it employ easily spotted manipulation strategies. In the case of climate change, NF has not employed the usual fear-mongering tactics to the same extent as AfD, and it did not discursively form the typical Manichean dichotomy of ‘people’ and ‘the elite’, except for several implicit references. Instead, it focused its rhetoric on a more pragmatic and patriotic, ‘eco-friendly’ approach, realized through the ‘climate-nationalism’, and even ‘climate-localism’ as opposed to global frameworks, emphasizing the importance of ‘our national borders’. In a similar fashion, the supranational mechanisms, unlike international cooperation of nation states, are considered as harmful for both people and the economy. At the same time, the aesthetic, symbolic and material dimensions to national landscape dominated the NR’s discourse. Moreover, some of the emerging topoi encompass: *topos of inefficiency or uselessness of wind turbines*, *topos of threat to land destruction*, *topos of threat to employment*; *topos of uselessness of supranational mechanisms*; *topos of advantage of nation states’ voluntarism* etc.

Finally, similarly to NR, Fidesz did not forsake typical populist communication strategies, it did not employ hostile rhetoric nor did it demonize specific targets as much as AfD. The contradictions, dilemmas and paradoxes were not recognized in the party’s discourse. Moreover, Fidez did not make use of obvious fallacies and did not pursue *ad hominem* argumentation. Instead, it was raising supportive voices for the global climate actions, however, simultaneously putting a blame of the EU and its bureaucrats for making the ‘poor people’ from the ‘poor countries’ to pay the price of the climate policies. Fidesz can therefore be considered as a climate-conservative party: supportive of global climate solutions, but as long as they are not detrimental for the pockets of Hungarian consumers. Likewise, some of the newly formed topoi included *the topos of responsibility*; *topos of advantage of usefulness of nuclear energys*; *topos of religion-based climate policies* etc.

Therefore, our assumption that RWP parties with varying perspectives on climate change will deploy different manipulative or persuasive strategies, and utilize different rhetorical and linguistic means when appealing to their electorates proved to be correct. Likewise, as we assumed before, the formation of in and out-groups in their discourse varied considerably, as well as attributes given to social actors, objects, phenomena and processes around them. Nevertheless, the biggest variation is seen in the argumentation strategy, i.e. elaboration of topoi and fallacies.

Lastly, the limitations of this study are manifold: due to the lack of time and resources, the analysis could not include more RWP parties, but rather chose one the typical representatives from each category of denialist, supportive and disengaged parties. Future research should conduct go in this direction. Likewise, the lack of knowledge of languages might have influenced our bias and misguided our conclusions, even though some preventive measures were taken. Finally, given the importance of the context-related factors for climate preferences, the future research should not only focus on the strategic communication of PWP on climate change beyond climate scepticism, but should also try find a link between certain contexts and specific discursive realities formed by RWP parties accordingly.

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Appendix

- AfD
- NR
- Fidesz

Nomination Strategy	Predication Strategy
<p>Discursive construction of social actors</p> <p>Discursive construction of objects/phenomena/events</p> <p>Discursive construction of processes and actions</p>	<p>Discursive characterization/qualification of social actors, objects, phenomena, events processes and actions (more or less positively or negatively)</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • People-educators; they; pseudo-elitist group, left-wing socialists; citizens; the media; voters; us; we, citizens; eco-socialists; moral-preachers; we; zeitgeist; dictatorship • German soil; system; subjects; freedom • Climate protection • System • Subjects 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • People-educators/they: moralizing, self-appointed, totalitarian • Left-wing socialists: radical; Citizens: normal, self-determined • Pseudo-elites: enslaving, socialist • Moral-preachers: anti-freedom • Zeitgeist: left-green • Dictatorship: eco-socialist • System: paternalistic • Subjects: enslaved
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Minister of Economy – Altmaier • Merkel, Altmaier, von der Leyen and their eco-socialists • Climate-neutral society • Merkel • Eco-socialist camp • Leyen • EU Parliament • Greens and Communists • German automotive industry • All of us • Remaining prosperity • Political landscape • Change of direction • Consequences • Economic policy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Merkel, Altmaier, von der Leyen: eco-socialist • Political landscape: changed for decades and turned around • Remaining prosperity: destroyed, threatened • Consequences: irreversible • Economic policy: reasonable •
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The leftists/them • Michael Shellenberger/him/environmental activist • The green cartel on the left • Eco-socialists • Conspired climate sect • Market order • Eco-socialist system/model 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The leftists/them: destroying the market • Michael Shellenberger/him/environmental activist: courage to step out • The green cartel on the left: imposing • Eco-socialists: taking freedom • Conspired climate sect • Market order: can be destroyed • Our entire lives: changed

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Our entire lives • Freedom • Climate crisis • Environment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Our freedom: to be preserved • Climate crisis: Supposed, “so-called” • Environment: destroyed
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The EU • Citizens/us/we • Brussels • Army of EU bureaucrats • Climate protection • Opposition to the EU 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The EU: expensive • Citizens/us/we: paying prices • Brussels: imposing • Climate protection: prescribed by Brussels
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Climate activists • Citizens/us • Young people • Activists • Climate hysterics • The federal government • Will • Climate policy • Democratic rules 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Climate activists: young, left-wing green, self-proclaimed • Young people: terrorized • Climate hysterics: presumptuous • The federal government: terrorizing youth • Will: imposed to people • Democratic rules: disregarded
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hungary • Orban • Children • Hungarian citizens • Climate hysterics • Greta • Demographic change • Politics 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hungary: climate and child-friendly oriented • Children: more than welcome • Greta: over-excited • Politics: reasonable
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The climate “league” • The climate priests • Charlatans/they • The people • Rescuers • The CO2 disciples • Ordinary citizens/we • Climate rescue gangs • CO2 • Climate crisis • Climate • Critical questions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The climate “league”: exposed • The climate priests: exposed • Charlatans/they: scaring people • Rescuers: supposed, endowed with power and privilege • CO2 disciples: not-knowledgeable • Climate rescue gangs: drastic, extremely costly, freedom-restricting • Climate crisis: “imminent” • Climate: naturally changed • Critical questions: not allowed
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The citizens • Climate fertilizers • Green Chancellor Habeck • The Greens • Markus Söder • German people • The EU and the Greens • Promises • Business • Climate policies • Coal phase-out • Coal jobs • New jobs and gas power plants • Climate ideology 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The citizens: paying price • Climate fertilizers: self-righteous, miles behind their promises • Green Chancellor Habeck: destroying German economy • The Greens: creating additional problems • Markus Söder: speeding up the coal phase-out • German people: lacking perspective • The EU and the Greens: ruthless, irresponsible • Promises: failed • Businesses: destroyed • Climate policies: utopian • Coal jobs: urgently needed • New jobs and gas power plants: not created

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Climate ideology: taking no account of economic and social concerns
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ursula von der Leyen/the President of the Commission The EU The citizens of Europe/we Private jets The Green Deal C02 taxes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ursula von der Leyen/the President of the Commission: having double standards; eco-warrior The EU: C02 neutral The citizens of Europe/we: in a trap Private jets: emitting 20 times as much C02 as usual flights The Green Deal: sending citizens into a trap C02 taxes: burdening population
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The good citizens/we The eco-socialist Greens/they Germany Left-wing green nonsense Climate crisis Change in the climate The Greens' program Industrial activity of the country Left-green education and agitation Policy of a common sense 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The good citizens/we: being scared The eco-socialist Greens/they: scaring citizens Germany: to be abolished as a nation Climate crisis: supposed Change in the climate: steady The Greens' program: suicidal and detrimental for country's wealth Policy of a common sense: needed
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Eco-socialist world rescuers/they The climate believers, the media and science Climate deniers Left-wing green climate league Us Scientific consensus Criticism Man-made climate change Doubts in scientific knowledge Environmental protection Fear-mongering 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Eco-socialist world rescuers/they: invoking alleged consensus The climate believers, the media and science: being one, having uniform opinion Left-wing green climate league: making people poor Scientific consensus: alleged Criticism: no longer accessible Man-made climate change: cannot be doubted Doubts in scientific knowledge: not allowed Environmental protection: needed
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Man-made climate change 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Man-made climate change: so-called, "responsible for everything", "to be blamed for everything" (ironically)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Greens The green-pained socialists The citizens Anthropogenic climate change 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Greens: spreading fear to citizens Anthropogenic climate change: allegedly devastating
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 500 Scientists Greta Thunberg The scientists Climate emergency Apocalypse Anthropogenic climate change Climate emergency Climate models Climate hysteria The economic system, key industries and jobs Human lives Climate aspirations Climate models Pseudo-religious thinking Critical voices in climate policy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Greta Thunberg: dramatic Climate emergency: not existent, nonsense Apocalypse: approaching Anthropogenic climate change: contradicted by scientists Climate models: unsuitable, cruel, unwise, childish, costly, speculative, incorrect Climate hysteria: absurd The economic system, key industries and jobs: eroded Human lives: at risk Climate aspirations: denying people an access to affordable energy Critical voices in climate policy; must be heard

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Germany • The Union • Voters • SPD finance minister Olaf Scholz • We, the citizens • Man-made climate change 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Voters: not supportive of new plans • We, the citizens: not a self-service, having less and less available • Man-made climate change: supposed
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SPD • Environment Minister Schulze Finance Minister Scholz • People • Germany • The citizens • Consumers • Energy prices • Taxes • Political failure • Tax reliefs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SPD: demanding further tax increases • Germany: responsible for only 2% of the world's emissions, not being able to affect the world's climate alone • The citizens: financially responsible • Energy prices: the highest in Europe • Political failure: ongoing • Tax reliefs: beneficial for citizens
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Greens • Germany • Climate hysteria 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Greens: spreading climate hysteria • Germany: abnormal
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Germany • Us • Sweedish teenager/Greta • Gretinists • Left-wing circles • The media representatives • Fear-makers • The protagonists of the political-media complex • The left-leaning young people • The freedom-conservative-civil forces • Socialists, communists, Maoists and deep-leftists • Climate protectors • Eco-socialists • Freedom, prosperity, the way of living • The social and economic order • The market economy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sweedish teenager/Greta: dramatic, with a choked-voice • Gretinists: dramatic • Left-wing circles and the media representatives: realizing their radical plans • Fear-makers: perfidious, calling for socialist planned economy • The left-leaning young people: unaware, instrumentalized under the pretext of climate protection • Socialists, communists, Maoists and deep-leftists • Climate protectors: self-proclaimed, anti-freedom • Eco-socialists: left-red-green • Freedom, prosperity, the way of living: threatened • The social and economic order: fundamentally revamped • The market economy: to be replaced by social planned economy
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Us, citizens, we • Merkel • Monitoring • Targets for CO2 reduction • Measures • Climate hysteria • CO2 • Population growth • Financial burden 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Measures: expensive and idiotic • Climate hysteria: permanent • CO2: demonized • Population growth: the key problem for the environment • Financial burden: imposed on citizens
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Greta Thunberg • Fanaticism 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Greta Thunberg: confused, in a need of help, fanatic • Fanaticism: dangerous to health
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) • Scientific evidence • IPCC climate models 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC): lacking scientific evidence • Scientific evidence: non-existent

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economic and energy system • Expansion of renewable energies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IPCC climate models: showing only negligible effects of CO2 reductions • Economic and energy system: restructured • Expansion of renewable energies: costly, socially irresponsible
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Us • Wind turbines • Nuclear energy • Common sense 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Wind turbines: ineffective • Nuclear energy: necessary
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • French people • Our country • Anti-nuclear ideology • Abundant nuclear energy: 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • French people: suffering • Anti-nuclear ideology: slowing the development • Nuclear energy: essential
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Migration • Terrorism • Climate change 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Climate change: linking terrorism and migration
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • French people • Wind turbines • Local referendums for the installation of wind turbines 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • French people: concerned • Wind turbines: costly, detrimental for national landscape
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • We, French people • The abandonment of nuclear reactors • Nuclear energy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The abandonment of nuclear reactors: economic, technological and ecological crime • Nuclear energy: needs to be improved
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The State • Wind power: • Economic emergency • Financial waste 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The State: irrational • Wind power: detrimental for the land pollution and destruction of ecosystems • Financial waste: endless
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The local and national level • Nation States • The Europeanists • Ecologists and patriots • We • Environmental problems • Voluntarism • Global free trade • Prohibition of protectionism and economic patriotism • Competition in environmental matters • Fight against climate change • Environmental emergency • Wealth 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Europeanists: imposing free trade, setting up unfair competition • We: patriotic, pragmatic, constructive • Prohibition of protectionism and economic patriotism: imposed • Environmental emergency: aggravated by the free trade and Europeanist model
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nations • Environmental problems • Supranational mechanisms • Negotiations between nations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Supranational mechanisms: ineffective and dangerous • Decisions and actions: imposed on nations and peoples from above
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Governments • Local and national level • Climate mitigation actions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Local and national level: the only legitimate policy framework • Climate mitigation actions: decided at the national level

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Minister Nicola Hulot Hydraulic fracturing technologies Gas Renewable and nuclear energy Economic patriotism Wealth 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Minister Nicola Hulot: irresponsible Hydraulic fracturing technologies: extremely polluting Gas: to be produced in France Renewable and nuclear energy: a solution
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> France French people Love of France, its landscapes, language, local accents Nuclear power 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> France: a physical, carnal reality French people: to be guaranteed the environmental security and the right to healthy resources Nuclear power: preferable
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The US's withdrawal from the Paris Agreement Environmental actions Major international agreements International free trade treaties Economy of proximity and economic patriotism 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The US's withdrawal from the Paris Agreement: regrettable Environmental actions: necessary Major international agreements: not sufficient International free trade treaties: having disastrous economic consequences Economy of proximity and economic patriotism: a solution
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The State Our compatriots Nuclear power plants Employment/jobs Phase-out of nuclear energy Dependence on energy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Shutting down the nuclear power plants: alarming Employment/jobs: endangered Phase-out of nuclear energy: costly
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I (Le Pen) Climate change Human activity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> I: not a climate expert Climate change: not a religion Human activity: contributing to climate change
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> We Someone, ecologist Nomads Borders The land The environment The homeland 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> We: saving the planet Someone, ecologist: living on their land, passing it on to their children Nomads: having no homeland Borders: the environment's greatest ally
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The EU Nuclear energy Nuclear power plants 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Nuclear energy: needed Energy from nuclear power plants: cheap, safe, 'green'
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Hungarians, we Hungary Adaptation to climate change Climate protection 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Climate protection: important, expensive
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Every European person Climate summits Climate change 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Every European person: to have interest in fighting climate change Climate change: to be stopped

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Polluters, multinational companies, large countries 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Polluters, multinational companies, large countries: Bearing the burden
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The bureaucrats in Brussels • Poorer people and poorer countries • We (The Government) • The costs of fighting climate change 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Poorer people and poorer countries: not to pay for the price to fight climate change • We: successful in creating climate protection rules
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Everyone • The largest polluting companies and countries • The Hungarian people • The environment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The largest polluting companies and countries: to pay the price
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Climate protection 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Climate protection: more important than political battles
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Climate change • Global action 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Climate change: real, dangerous, global phenomenon • Global action: required
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Protection of nature and environment • Christian democratic policy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Protection of nature and environment: biblical
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Those believing that climate change is a communist scam 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Those believing that climate change is a communist scam: sane
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Climate destroyers • Hungarian families • Climate protection 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Climate protection: important