Reflections of the Deleuzian ‘Time-Image’ in the Films of Andrei Tarkovsky and of Alain Resnais.

Diplomová práce

Vedoucí diplomové práce (supervisor): Erik Roraback, D.Phil.
Zpracovala (author): Evgeniya Konoreva
Obor (subject): Anglistika a Amerikanistika

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I have no objections to the diploma thesis being borrowed and used for study purposes.
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Introduction.

The chief purpose of this project is to reconsider the role of the cinematic image within the frames of the representational mode of postmodern audiovisual culture. The development of film studies since the end of the Second World War has been receiving increasing interest by academic circles in cinematographic studies; moreover, the history of film studies has undergone several major transformations, which actually conditioned the emergence of the interdisciplinary and indeed multifunctional theoretical and critical approach.

Here is a brief historical overview of film studies summed up from the sixth edition of *Film Theory and Criticism: Introductory Readings*, edited by Leo Braudy and Marshall Cohen. According to this book, the history of film theory can be divided into three phases, and I paraphrase at some length:

1. 1916 – mid 1930s: the silent period or the formalist period; Hugo Münsterberg, Rudolf Arnheim, and Sergei Eisenstein: attempted to demonstrate that film was indeed an art, not just a direct recording of nature. Later this approach was modified by Siegfried Kracauer and André Bazin, among others, who argued: film is not an art in contrast to nature, but an art of nature.

2. 1960s and 1970s: film theory started gaining independence from other humanitistic disciplines; new writers influenced by social and economic developments emerged, new interpretive approaches derived from other disciplines: linguistics (from Pierce, De Saussure, Jakobson, Chomsky), which explored the system of meaning allowing communication of all styles to exist. What was stressed is not just a formal
meaning of individual films or special nature of film as art, but its place among more
general systems of meaning and communication. The semiotic and structuralist models
deriving from Levi-Strauss; Roland Barthes; Michel Foucault; Marxist trends; Freudian
theories and later – Lacan revisionary view of Freud; feminist interpretation of the power
structures of vision; deconstructive approach invented by Derrida (pierce the surface of
the text and discover its contradictions, Marxist and psychoanalytic tools were often
employed) – all were controversial and polemical, but all contributed to such classical
issues of film theory as the relation of film to theory and how film may (or may not) be
considered a language, audience desires, social attitudes, ideologies and cultures.

3. from the mid 1980s to the end of the twenty first century: this period in film
theory is constructed from dispersive and controversial elements such as feminism,
neoformalism, cognitive psychology, empiricism and phenomenology. All these insights
merge into larger perspectives, showing the way the audience’s activity shape the film’s
meaning, the resistance of the performer to the meaning imposed by the film narrative;
the challenge of digitization and new forms of media; now an independent film-maker
constructs a personal statement despite the webs of politics and finances of film
production. These multifunctional insights help reveal the way that film shapes and
reflects cultural attitudes, reinforces or rejects the dominant modes of cultural thinking,
and stimulates or frustrates the needs and drives of the psyche; also there is now a
willingness to venture beyond disciplinary barriers.\(^1\)

It should be said that, in my opinion, one of the most challenging and provocative analysis
of cinema has been given by renowned French philosopher, Gilles Deleuze, who published
two volumes entitled *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image* and *Cinema 2: The Time-Image.*
The *Cinema* volumes are valuable for this project because they both theorize cinema itself
and deliver a much more profound and abstract message. Apparently, what Deleuze
stresses in the *Cinema* volumes is a necessity to find a new place for philosophy and

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perception in the age of spiritual fragmentation and alienation. In the introduction to the Russian translation of the *Cinema* volumes, Oleg Aronson analyzes Deleuzian philosophy and compares cinematography with the Nietzschean “will to power”:

a place where philosophy which is striving for meanings, disintegrates;
where the blurry images not yet fixed in the description, not yet loaded with any values, appear on the surface.\(^2\)

Later on, Aronson says that according to Deleuze, cinematography deals with a new type of image system, which cannot be reduced to the conventional systems of images virtualized by reality. It has long been the purpose of philosophy – to virtualize reality; that is why the cinematographic experience is so unique – it is capable of reviving philosophy in a moment when it is constantly reliving its own death.\(^3\) D.N. Rodowick says in his book *Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine*:

> For Deleuze’s larger objective in not to produce another theory of film, but to understand how aesthetic, philosophical, and scientific modes of understanding converge in producing cultural strategies for imagining and imaging the world.\(^4\)

Indeed, Deleuze is generally concerned with the progressive development of contemporary culture into a fundamentally audiovisual culture. Rodowick claims that Deleuze regarded the semiotic history of film as parallel with a century-long transformation that led us to represent and to understand ourselves socially by means of “spatial and temporal articulations founded in cinema, if now realized more clearly in the electronic and digital media”.\(^5\)

Integrating cinema studies into the larger-scale philosophical debate around the understanding of experience, representation and reflection, perception and affection,


\(^3\) Аронсон, 14.


\(^5\) Rodowick, preface, xiii.
provides us with a whole new range of tools difficult to find in other models of film theory. Apart from the elaborate system of signs and images that Deleuze incorporates into his analysis, the two Cinema volumes offer much innovative and inspiring material for the re-examination of the cinematic forms of expression; Deleuze discovers new strategies of critical analysis and manages to challenge conventional modes of thinking about cinema by introducing thinking-cinematically.

Deleuze proposes a new approach to the theoretical understanding of cinematography; he develops an elaborate system for the classification of cinema based on the philosophical principles of Henri Bergson and of Charles Sanders Pierce’s semiotics.

Proposing a radically new approach to film history, he sorts the cinematographic image into two major types: the “movement-image” and the “time-image”, whose characteristics are determined by the general social, economic, spiritual and aesthetic conditions. His major argument is that the period after the Second World War witnessed the emergence of the new type of cinematic image, the direct ‘time image’.

While the ‘movement-image’ was dominating the arena of the young Hollywood movie industry and it owes its existence to the four major trends of the pre-war cinema: the American organic school, Soviet dialectics, French naturalism and German expressionism, the ‘time-image’ emerged from the ruins of conventional modes of representation. The overall devastation and shock after the Second World War led most of the European countries to an inevitable re-evaluation of moral and of aesthetic values, which resulted in the total collapse of the existing schemata, all of which did not prove sufficient enough in the post-death, post-tragedy, post-concentration-camp world of a devastated Europe.

According to Deleuze, the break between the “movement-image” and the “time-image” happened in five major waves: with Orson Welles, with Yasujiro Ozu, with Italian neorealism, with the French New Wave, and with New German Cinema. “The collapse of
the sensory-motor situations [...] allow only pure optical and sound situations; the disappearance of line of action and causality principles; it questioned the habitual narrative strategies, challenged the verbal presentation and presented a whole set of characters whose actions were now modified into wonderings, into observations, and into non-acting.

Thus, this project’s ambition is to prove the appropriateness of Deleuze’s concepts in the critical discussion of postmodern cinema. Perhaps his philosophical approach is too sophisticated and categorized, though it is worth trying to negotiate with his terminology and classifications in order to produce a fresh look at the works of some good filmmakers.

For the purposes of this project I have chosen two film-makers whose bodies of work constitute, I believe, an unprecedented significance of stylistic, of semantic, of aesthetic and of spiritual values: Alain Resnais and Andrei Tarkovsky; though they both were working within two diverse national and aesthetic domains, both aimed their creative energies at the exploration of the temporal and the spatial possibilities of the cinema. Rather than shooting a film, they created a thinking organism where time and space alter the visionary and mental contact of a film and its audience.

Rodowick says that the cinema of Alain Resnais is so important for Deleuze because

Resnais evinces a constant fascination for replicating an image of thought, but in relation to time rather than movement. The time-image organizes a new geometry of the interval marked by the concept of ‘irrational’ divisions. This geometry derives from a heightened sensitivity to the flows of time modeled no less by the calculus of probability physics than by the time-image of modern cinema.

This ability to operate with the flow of time is also characteristic of the films of another film-maker, Andrei Tarkovsky. Tarkovsky, with his theory of “sculpting in time” (Tarkovsky, Sculpting in Time) and “internal rhythm” (Sculpting in Time), perfectly fits a

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6 Deleuze, The Time-Image, 12.  
7 Rodowick, 13.
Deleuzian schema; not only do his films reveal the cinematographic temporal fluidity and spatial giantism with unprecedented aesthetic complexity and spirituality, but also as a philosopher Tarkovsky masterfully articulates the social and psychological tensions of his time that echo main Deleuzian philosophical concepts. In his books Deleuze pays little attention to Tarkovsky’s art, having mentioned him only a few times. However, I believe Tarkovsky’s films in many respects share much with Deleuzian philosophy, which I discuss below.

In an interview from 1986, Deleuze says

> The brain is a unity. The brain is the screen. I don’t believe that linguistics and psychoanalysis offer a great deal to cinema. On the contrary, the biology of the brain – molecular biology – does. Thought is molecular. Molecular speeds make up the slow beings that we are. […] Cinema isn’t theatre; rather, it makes bodies out of grains. The linkages are often paradoxical and on all sides overflow simple associations of images. Cinema, precisely because it puts the image into motion, or rather endows the image with self-motion [auto-movement], never stops tracing the circuits of the brain. […] The screen, that is to say ourselves, can be the deficient brain of an idiot as easily as a creative brain [of a thinker].

In other words, in the new world cinema starts operating on the deepest levels of our perception; in the new world full of disconnected images, the characters could no longer function within the basic sensory-motor states of affairs, for they have turned into the meandering figures who find themselves as Rodowick claims “in a state of strolling, rambling or wandering aimlessly which defined pure optical and sound situations. The emergence of the postmodern mentality stimulated the birth of “the faltering belief in totality”.

I. Gilles Deleuze and the concept of the ‘time-image’

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9 Rodowick, 75.
The point of departure in this discussion can be the statement that the twentieth century has continuously altered modes of representation. Representation as the basic working principle of art (which is the human’s communication and perception of reality as we know it) – has been challenged in many ways, though for the sake of this project we will concentrate on the ideas of Deleuze.

In Simon O’Sullivan’s book *Art Encounter Deleuze and Guattari: Thought Beyond Representation* he explores this topic zone. What he is generally saying is that Western accounts of art stipulate representation within a system of binary oppositions – meaning vs. object, content vs. form, or in other words – the occidental representation mode. He claims that poststructuralism tried to criticize these binary logics, but obviously it was not enough to break through classical representationalism. Even such kind of critique as deconstruction is not sufficient because it itself takes place in the field of metaphysical kinds of representation. What we have to understand is that representation is in crisis, which means that subjectivity is in crisis as well.  

O’Sullivan also says that our living strategies are constructed in a representational model where ‘we’ is a subject and ‘world’ is an object of creation. This subject-object relationship causes us to alienate ourselves from the precondition of self-consciousness. Thus the possible transformation of how we think about art – transforms the topology of how we think about ourselves.  

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11 O’Sullivan, 25.
1.1. Reconceptualizing art

What Deleuze proposes is a rethinking of art not as transportation but as connectivity. As Sullivan puts it, art cannot be considered a mere object of our knowledge, where knowledge stands for the information we have about reality; art is first of all a part of this world but it is apart from it also; art produces “affects” (Делёз и Гваттари, Что такое философия? 208) experienced in time, in duration; through the process of producing ‘affects’, art allows us to experience eternity within duration\(^\text{12}\). Cinema as one of the most prominent art forms in the contemporary world offers an interesting background for investigation in this sphere.

Furthermore, O’Sullivan comments that every artist according to Deleuze is actually reaching degree zero: which can be understood here as precisely a state of what Deleuze calls “non-organic life” (Deleuze qtd. in O’Sullivan, 118); here every art project produces a different experience of the world, a new myth, and thus a different, altered consciousness. An art object, film in particular, demands that we enter its mythic temporality, its geological and inhuman duration.\(^\text{13}\) Thus, film as a form of art, functions on many levels of our perception of reality and is capable of displaying a great variety of experiences. By the accumulation of intensities art produces an alternative gateway of the universal knowledge. O’Sullivan claims that in the Deleuzian philosophy art is the different viewpoint and it allows us access to other worlds; there are thus many viewpoints – as many valid worlds as there are artists; the essence of art is its world-building character; this essence constitutes distinct artistic subjectivities and “essence is not only individual, it individuates”.\(^\text{14}\) The creative force of art is even intensified because of its ‘world-building character’; the various realities around us are not easily accessible, it is the

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\(^\text{12}\) O’Sullivan, 41-44.  
\(^\text{13}\) O’Sullivan, 118-19.  
\(^\text{14}\) O’Sullivan, 121.
creative force of art that discovers them and introduces us to the whole galaxy of the unknown.

1.2. Film as an event

The above notions map onto film: constructing another world within the existing totality of being, film resurrects the initial complexity and circularity of being, thus multiplying the number of entrances into what I would like to call 'the world-as-we-do-not-know-it'. The other worlds of this world are being revealed through the mechanical nature of cinematography. Each work of art, including film, is a universe in itself, and it is anti-systematic. Deleuze says that being is Univocal: the One is the Many and the Many is the One. Art, and film in particular, as the production of worlds in process, the production of different kinds of the fold is the most helpful tool to rethink our relations with reality. (Deleuze qtd. in O’Sullivan, 126-127).

Cinematography is important for Deleuze because no other art form is so capable of rendering us such a magical concentration of movement, space, time, memory, and image. Incorporating all these features into the algorithm of its essence, the cinematograph de facto becomes a perfect treasure box of our most private passions. Deleuzian aesthetics offers a rethinking of cinema in a new mode. First of all, the cinematograph deals with an image. The image as a mere reflection of reality ceases to exist in the post-representational, post-linguistic, audio-visionary world. Now it gains the power of accumulating forces, sensations and passions.

In the introductory chapter to the book *The Brain Is the Screen: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Cinema*, Gregory Flaxman analyses the philosophical work of Henri Bergson. He claims that in *Matter and Memory*, Bergson proposes that the universe
consists of images; it is a molecular chaos of light that does not have center, right or left, top or bottom. What exists is only images, where each is a “road by which we pass, in every direction, the modifications, propagated throughout the immensity of the universe” (Bergson, qtd. in Flaxman 28-29). Later, Flaxman continues, proposing that “in this agglomeration, images are matter and matter is movement; there is no central perception because the eye is diffused in the deliriums of light…”

For Deleuze the film image is not always ‘in’ the present, whatever we assume to be the present. Rather, any image can be called “a grouping of temporal relations”.

The image itself is the system of the relationship between its elements, that is, a set of relationship of time from which the variable present only flows…What is specific to the image…is to make perceptible, to make visible, relationships of time which cannot be seen in the represented object and do not allow themselves to be reduced to the present.

The foregoing explains that the image is not a mere constitution of reality. The power of the image consists in its ability to absorb and present the complexity of temporal relations. That is why the image is so important for Deleuze: it unfolds the capacity of the whole universe within one glimpse. Flaxman gives another interesting view, indicating that movement is not just a measure of space; it is an image of duration and of time, which, according to Bergson and to Deleuze, can be regarded as “the consciousness of a qualitative change or the ‘whole relations’”.

The understanding of the whole – or more precisely – the open whole – gives us a key to a new understanding of cinematography. Deleuze replaces the idea of structures with the idea of the open whole. This openness enables us

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16 Rodowick, 8.
18 Flaxman, 18.
to explain the cinematic as a ‘material capture’, not as a text with a meaning, but as a body which performs, as a machine, as an assemblage, as an abstract machine […] This will provide a neo-aesthetics of the film experience as an ‘event’: an aesthetics of force and of sensation, where ‘subjectivities’ are no longer purely contained in the image, or in the spectatorial physic spaces, but through a melding of matter, the material of film, force, and sensation as movement, the ‘in-between’ of those spaces. ¹⁹

In this regard, the open whole of film allows for the emergence of unfixed relations, developing individuals and constantly changing interconnections.

The importance of the event-like nature of film outlined by Deleuze is crucial; for emphasis on the event-ness of cinema stresses the insufficiency of the conventional modes of representation to deal with the contemporary conditions of universal disintegration. The narrative used to represent reality now focuses on a reflective observation of how the narration falsifies actuality itself; the action is brought to its dead point where it is stretched to reach an absurdity in an emptiness on the one end and is compressed to the level of almost utter invisibility on the other side of things; the individual is disconnected and we may even say de-subjectified; cinema is de-verbalized and compressed; the situation is disjointed; hence everything in our contemporaneity is androgynous and pulsating. To deal with such a world we need something that is bold enough to lose its own functional identity; something that does not panic when “the aesthetic experience involves a whole and total engagement with molecular forces of being in the world. A complete depersonalization is involved, where subjectivity is rendered subjectless.”²⁰ Film as an event, as a particular “time machine” (Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine), as “a brain” (Deleuze, “The Brain Is the Screen”) – functions as an affirmative experience that is not premised on a substantive notion of subjectivity, inherent within language and a gendered reading space,

²⁰ Kennedy, 31.
but an experience that is perceived as an event, as a processual, aesthetic event of sensation, articulated beyond subjectivity.\textsuperscript{21}

Cinema is thus an affirmative event for the Deleuzian understanding of the cultural form. In his essay, “The Imagination of Immanence: An Ethics of Cinema”, Peter Canning says that the question concerning the present time is a question of nonrelation, the belief in the world in its “becoming” (Делёз и Гваттари, \textit{Что такое философия?}, стр.28) before and after movement:

what matters is to affirm the movement of […] the force of the outside – against the sedentary-paranoid disposition of consensual community, not only because the community form […] is sick, but because its control superego tends to inhibit the possibility of thinking. The force of thinking is to become capable of the nonrelation that enables (forces) thought to come back from outside like a war machine.\textsuperscript{22}

This non-relation is the precise state of the contemporary cinema (according to Deleuzian classification: the post world war II film) which proves the most appropriate form of media for coping with the world where for Deleuze, “time is out of joint” (\textit{The Time-Image}, 41) and “when the symbolic function fails, the structure of psychosexual temporality breaks down – no social identity, no names, no structured reality, image without metaphor and mental vision – becomes hallucination, reality collapses but the real appears.”\textsuperscript{23} And the real is best embodied by cinema.

In its very impulse to articulate the real, cinematography thus becomes too an accumulator of our sensations. Cinema’s constructive function gains a particular importance in such kinds of reality, because what we need is not observing the reality by reflecting it, but rather suggesting an alternative world; rearranging the whole set of virtual (possible) variants of this world in order to achieve the true meaning.

\textsuperscript{21} Kennedy, 24.
\textsuperscript{23} Canning, 356.
Thus the cinematic experience is not limited by the exploration of subjectivity, of
desire, or of truth, but becomes the one “constructing the bodies of spectators/observers as
a collection of disparate, complex and decentered perceptions. An abstract machine does
not function to represent, but rather it constructs a ‘reality’ of a different order. A ‘reality’
premised on the material nature of experience.”

This is why the two film-makers brought into focus in this project fascinate me. Both manage to create a new reality in their films. They not only cope with the actual state of existence, but offer an alternative reality full of
tensions, worlds of feeling and worlds of sensation. By operating both with memory and
with time, and with space and with time, which are the integral constituents of all the
relations known to the human so far, Tarkovsky and Resnais transform film from a
reflection of the world or primitive language system into a mode of being. Both Tarkovsky
and Resnais, though using different tools, construct films that operate “in non-teleological
ways, as process, as movement, immanence, through which newly configured desires are
apparent that do not lock us into thinking of ‘identity’ or ‘subjectivity’.”

In its creativity, film becomes a whole new form of relations, a new way of thinking this world where by
desubjectivizing and in a “detterritorializing” (Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus,
299) reality, film “allows us to go back ‘towards the acentred state of things’, toward a
state of pure molecular vibrations, which now require transformation, and not translation”
(Deleuze qtd. in Alliez).

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24 Kennedy, 68.
25 Kennedy, 69.
1.3 The ‘time-image’

In *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, Deleuze formulates the basic principles for identifying the major cinematic techniques of the “time-image”. As mentioned above, his classification allows another perspective on the development of the cinematographic image. While claiming the death of the “action-image” (*Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*), and the dissipation of the sensory-motor schema in the period after the Second World War, Deleuze maps a dramatic twist in the aesthetics of cinema when he says:

> The soul of the cinema demands increasing thought, even if thought begins by undoing the system of actions, perceptions and affections on which the cinema has fed up to that point […] The first things to be comprised everywhere are the linkages of situation-action, action-relation, excitation-response, in short, the sensory-motor links which produced the action-image. Realism, despite all its violence – or rather with all its violence which remains sensory-motor – is oblivious to this new state of things […] A new kind of image is born that one can attempt to identify in the post-war American cinema, outside Hollywood.27

The arena that saw the major transformation of cinematography is the European creative scene, the countries destroyed by war: Italy, France, Germany – the crucial re-transformation of the temporal and spatial shapes in cinema was born. The ‘detterritorialization’ of thought, of time, of space, and of causality, brought a new dimension in our understanding of these fundamental concepts.

In his books, Deleuze both builds on the ideas of Henri Bergson and C.S. Pierce and reveals the new dimensions in each of these two thinkers. Deleuze founds his philosophy of film on the Bergsonian concept of *durée*, which means that what we commonly call space and time are merely extremes of the contraction and dilation of a single *durée*, or

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duration. In his book *Deleuze on Cinema* Ronald Bogue says that the universe for Bergson is an open ‘vibrating whole’, “a flow of matter-movement that contracts to form the fixed and discrete entities of the spatial world and dilates to form the temporal dimension of a universal past surging through the present and into the future”.  

Here it should be stressed that within the limits of the oscillating whole, such functions as matter, time and space, and movement – are inseparable from one another; and only when they are joined together do they present any measure of the variety of the universe. Furthermore, Bogue continues, saying that our tendency is to distinguish movement from its bearer; however, this is incorrect: movement instead and in truth is inseparable from what movement moves; only an object of movement and movement itself constitute a single moving entity – a part of the whole. For Deleuze, there exists a complex relationship between the open whole of *durée* and the basic cinematic elements where every cinematic image can be considered a tiny piece of the whole, “a slice or chunk carved out of the matter-movement of the open whole […] Frame, shot and montage, then, are three different manifestations of time, three different ways in which the open whole of *durée* unfolds itself in the movement-image.”

Thus, Deleuze establishes a strong connection between the cinematic form and the complexity of *durée*. The cinematographic image is capable of shaping the matter of time in its own singular way. All cinema “brings to light an intelligible matter” which “consists of movements and processes of thought (prelinguistic images) and of points of view taken of these movements and processed (presignifying signs)”. (Deleuze, qtd. in Bogue, 4) This intelligible matter is “a plastic mass, an a-signifying and a-syntactic matter, a non-linguistically formed matter, though it is not amorphous and is semiotically, aesthetically and pragmatically formed” (Deleuze, qtd. in Bogue, 44).

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29 Bogue, 3-19.  
30 Bogue, 3-4.
However, what is helpful for the purposes of this work is that on the basis of Bergon’s philosophy, Deleuze delivers three major statements: “1. not only are there instantaneous, snapshot images, that is, immobile cuts of movement; 2. there are also movement-images, which are mobile cuts of *durée*; 3. and finally there are time-images, that is *durée*-images, change-images, relation-images, volume-images, beyond movement itself” (Deleuze qtd in Bogue, 11). Thus the ‘time-image’ gains the power to overcome movement; in their films, Resnais and Tarkovsky push the structure of movement to its limits thereby creating a breathing whole; a set of relations capable of transforming the mechanical energy of the camera into cross-flowing alternative channels. The classic sensory-motor case of the ‘movement-image’ fails to summon the chaotic energy of the modern world as a consequence it is replaced by a “pure optical and sound situation” (Deleuze, *The Time-Image*, 4):

> In the first place, the image no longer refers to a situation which is globalizing or synthetic, but rather to one, which is dispersive. The characters are multiple, with weak interferences and become principal or revert to being secondary. … In the second place, the line or the fibre of the universe which prolonged events into one another, or brought about the connection of portions of space, has broken. […] Linkages, connections, or liaisons are deliberately weak. Chance becomes the sole guiding thread […] Sometimes the event delays and is lost in idle periods, sometimes it is there too quickly, but it does not belong to the one to whom it happens (even death…).³¹

In such a world, the narrative used in the ‘movement-image’ ceases to interpret any situation; it is replaced by the ‘time-image’. Modern cinema has given birth to a purely mental image, which is another way to gain access to the virtual world, that which constitutes our being. By unfolding the non-identifiable relations, by committing itself to the multiplicity of the existing modes of being, the mental image unleashes pure duration. The ‘pure optical and sound situations’ finally break through the uncompromising firmness

of representation allowing the audience to participate in creation, to become a justified unit of a resonating relational whole.

[P]ure optical and sound situations do imply beyond movement, but don’t stop it. Movement now is grasped in another type of image ‘that never stops growing in dimensions’. [...The] growing powers: indirect image of time (dependent of montage), the pure optical and sound image, its opsigns and sonsigns, are directly connected to a time-image which has subordinated movement. It is this reversal which means that time is no longer the measure of movement but movement is the perspective of time: it constitutes a whole cinema of time, with a new conception and new forms of montage (Welles, Resnais).  

This implies, that time is the ruling force of the universe; it is through the metamorphoses of time that we comprehend the universe, live the universe, and grasp our experience as a part of this universe.

Thus, after the Second World War, cinematography had to find a solution for the world loaded with the new temporal sensibility; although this world is ruined and full of doubts. In the book The Matrix of Visual Culture: Working with Deleuze in Film Theory, Patricia Pisters comments that in The Logic of Sense Deleuze defines two concepts of time: Chronos and Aion. The ‘movement-image’ with its linear, successive present can be identified with Chronos. However, the state of being where “time is out of joint” definitely belongs to Aion – which is now a ‘time-image’. Deleuze:

Chronos is sick: the present is constantly invaded and eclipsed by other layers of time, past or future. It is a time of ‘becoming’, which does not so much follow the empirical reality as have a profound connection with thought: the time-image forces one to think the unthinkable, the impossible, the illogical, and the irrational.

In this way, time has lost its significance as a mere chronometer of our experience, which is the quality of Chronos. Calculating experience – which is always fragmented by the

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arbitrary division of arbitrary units – produces a past, a present and a future. In Chronos these three categories have to exist together, but they represent three different aspects of time. With the emergence of the ‘time-image’ what happens is such a modification of time where the unidentifiable, desubjectivized consciousness ‘deterritorializes’ our existence and we start perceiving time as ‘becoming’, not counting time, measuring it by some abstract, artificial formula, but living in and with time.

Rodowick comments that actually there cannot exist any direct delineation of time, because the past and the present coexist together, merging into the same process of ‘becoming’. Any objective truth cannot be achieved by placing the events in their chronological order, because there exists no objectified version of experience lived. An absolute truth and true presentation of time are impossible; the only fact that provides maximum satisfaction in this question is the idea of a complete negation of any truthful understanding of time. The works of Resnais and of Tarkovsky support this idea in their own manner by creating their unique illusions and new perspectives of temporal experience. What is more, Deleuze says,

> Time consists of this split, and it is this, it is time that we see in the crystal […] We see in the crystal the perpetual foundation of time, non-chronological time […] The crystal always lives at the limit, it is itself the vanishing limit between the immediate past which is already no longer and the immediate future which is not yet…a mobile mirror which endlessly reflects perception in recollecting.

Such a vision of time dominates the aesthetics of cinema of Resnais and of Tarkovsky; the action in their films is an odd amalgam of the past and of the present, sometimes the future is involved; in most cases, their characters find themselves disconnected with the world, which no longer accepts stability and rationalism; their experience is exhausted by classical notions of action and their relations are beyond the limits of any empirical totality of

34 Rodowick, 82.
univocal beinghood. The exploration of temporality leads to the expanding of their experience to the level of ‘becoming’ rather than of being; here coming-to-be is a process of unbridling personal identification and of self-questioning.

Temporal sensations are based on the sensations of memory: be they personal, national, natural, etc.; thus, wandering in the labyrinths of memory leads to the revelation of time.

Memory is not in us; it is we who move in a Being-memory, a world-memory. … the present itself exists only as an infinitely contracted past which is constituted at the extreme point of the already-there. Thus memory is not an issue of the individual psyche but a living force that involves the whole spectrum of ever-moving relations between the individual and the universe. The ‘time-image’ as presented in Resnais and in Tarkovsky captures the work of the mind as a passing through the splitting of subjectivity and of personal memory via the chaos of disconnections and non-relations; this whole procedure also manifests the beauty of a simultaneous present-past-future in a “crystal-image” (Deleuze, The Time-Image, 69).

Memory functions as a pushing force towards the powers of the virtual, the construction of relations outside the totality of being towards the energy of pure ‘becoming’.

[...] in ‘becoming’, the earth has lost all center, not only in itself, but in that it no longer has a centre around which to turn. Bodies no longer have centers except that of their death when they are exhausted and return to the earth to dissolve there. Force no longer has a center precisely because it is inseparable from its relation to other forces…

This is precisely what the films I will discuss concern: all of life as one big ‘becoming’, an earth without a fulcrum, bodies who articulate their relations to life as ‘becoming’ per se and who thus do not seek for identity but for affirmative sensations. The following chapters will articulate basic Deleuzian ideas through the means of cinematic experience.

As for myself, the selection of films presented in this project prove that a true film can be a

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36 Deleuze, The Time-Image, 98.
37 Deleuze, The Time-Image, 142.
transporter of the molecular vibrations of the universe as Deleuze believed it possible in film.

2. Andrei Tarkovsky

Andrei Tarkovsky is the major figure in the post-Stalin era of Soviet film. The films chosen for this project are as follows: *Stalker* (1979, *Сталкер*), *Nostalghia* (1983, *Ностальгия*) and *The Sacrifice* (1986, *Offret*). Tarkovsky is not only an idiosyncratic film-maker, but also an intellectual, a philosopher who was trying to convey his ideas about the mission of art and the mission of man through the medium of filmic work. Working in the tradition of Soviet montage, he opposed the “montage of attractions” developed by Sergei Eisenstein by his own theory of “sculpting in time” (Tarkovsky, *Sculpting in Time*). Deleuze pays considerable attention to Eisenstein and his ‘montage of attractions’ in the *The Movement-Image*; discussing the importance of the method of dialectic opposition in the development of cinematography.

Eisenstein created a system where the semantic tension of film was achieved technically by the opposition of two shots following one after the other. The dialectic tension created by such montage was to work on both the ideological and on the aesthetic level. Nevertheless, the ‘montage of attractions’ proved insufficient in its attempt to deal with the post-war disordered consciousness whereby there had to be born another method resourceful enough to summon this modified post-war II subjectivity. Consequently, Tarkovsky found a new aesthetic solution: his main argument is that the fundamental value of any film is the “internal rhythm of a shot” (Tarkovsky, *Sculpting in Time*), not a mechanical rhythm resulting in a special arrangement of the shots as Eisenstein puts. As

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D.G. Menard claims, Tarkovsky’s time-sculpting involves editing techniques that allow for a spontaneous unification of the shot as a self-organizing structure. Menard emphasizes the movement within the frame of the shot, thus he places time as the dominant feature in his films:

for Tarkovsky, it is time that rules, dictating the editing techniques. Therefore, time within the frame expresses something significant and truthful that goes beyond the events on the screen and those in the frame; and so, the direct perception of time is like a pointer to infinity.

Tarkovsky’s stress on internal rhythm is explicitly presented in *Stalker*.

### 2.1 Stalker

The transition from the ‘movement-image’ to the ‘time-image’, according to Deleuze, involves the transformation of the characters. Now, “instead of performing actors, characters become more like seers and wanderers, confused by the experience of time.” (Deleuze qtd. in Pisters,37). This can be applied to all of Tarkovsky’s and Resnais’s films. The characters of Andrei Tarkovsky: Stalker, Andrei in *Nostalghia* (1983) and Alexander in *The Sacrifice* (1986) – are desperately looking for salvation; to find an adequate answer for their questions, they spend their lives rambling in the universe.

As already mentioned, Tarkovsky was preoccupied with the idea of the filmic presentation of time. His style and rhythm is sensitive in *Stalker*. The shots in this film are long and meditative, allowing the viewer to enter them and to circulate within them as if in water. Water, the favourite object of cinematic representation in Tarkovsky, is an embodiment of a flow of time. It is constantly moving, without repetitions, and leaving no

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40 D.G. Menard, *Deleuze Meets Tarkovsky: A Deleuzian Analysis of Tarkovsky’s Theory of “Time-Pressure”*. 
space for flashbacks. Kennedy says that, according to Deleuze, water is the best environment which helps to show how the movement can be separated from the moving thing:

[…] The liquidity of the perceived image is diffused in all directions, into vibrations, just like the ever-increasing circles on a pool into which a pebble is thrown […] An image on screen then can be said to become ‘liquid’ through the molecularised use of the shot. So in the Zone, water is everywhere: the characters take a rest on the islands in the stream of unknown origin, which keeps in its bottom objects lost from history. The symbols of past lives, already lived through and abandoned. The pieces of the historical narrative no longer belong to the present, they are left in the flow of time, which is changing and never repeating itself. This rhythm imperceptibly opens the boundaries of the visible reality to discover the essence of things, their inner potentiality. Vladimír Suchánek claims in *Topografie transcendentních souřadnic filmového obrazu: úvod do problematiky uměleckého obrazu jako duchovně - estetické skutečnosti*:

In the stream of time all the days lived by a man are forgotten as if dead, having no sense; time has rolled them away; water has carried them away. However, water here is not only the sign of oblivion and of the finitude of time, but also the constant reminder of the circular structure of the universe […] Nothing of what has been done by man will be forgotten, not any day, not any moment.42

As an endlessly moving substance, water for Tarkovsky is an embodiment of the omnipresent circulation of time and of universal memory. The experience of birth and of death is enclosed in a process of everlasting repetition. Any living entity possesses this sometimes hidden or oppressed knowledge of universal truth, but there is a need to

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41 Kennedy, 119.
discover the way towards this knowledge, which Tarkovsky does by the means of presenting water in his films. Deleuze says:

> duration by changing qualitatively, is divided up in objects, and objects by gaining depth, by losing their contours, are united in duration. We can therefore say that movement relates the objects of a closed system to open duration.

Thus, any object can be coalesced with the eternal energy of duration. Tarkovsky supports this idea by placing rain inside the houses; the meditative and at the same time spontaneous rains fill the living space of people who desperately need to bond, and to create a sense of meaning.

The physical rhythm created by rain blurs the artificial boundaries and endows the existence with the invisible sensation of reconciliation and serenity but still it is a rain of both change and of constant repetition. Kennedy states:

> Every individual moment, then is part of the movement of the Whole, but that Whole, Deleuze points out, is an open whole […] The universe is a vibrational whole – a virtual past, coextensive with all that has ever happened, continually contracted into a present always pushing forward into an open and unpredictable future.

This means, that each moment of the film is a part of a greater and bigger organism, and by combining two effects together: the empirical melody of the rain and the technical rhythm of every shot achieved by the elaborate camera work – Tarkovsky conducts the overall presentation of time in this particular, Tarkovskian, meditative mode. Arranging the internal temporality of his films in this way, he implies the inevitable force of ‘becoming’.

Value is thus extended to the smaller units of each individual existence in the Universe. In Tarkovsky, every man is a bearer of an infinite and integrated knowledge of the universe, be it any variation of the objective truth, or of the individual experience; his long shot is a tool to reveal the whole of the living being in its complexity, duration and formation.

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44 Kennedy, 25.
Tarkovsky forges a sophisticated concept of time. In his symbolism, time is an overwhelming substance, which creates existence and is fading into the real at all levels of our imaginary. The scene in which Stalker and his companions drive a small truck at the beginning of their voyage takes several minutes. The camera follows the truck, and we hear methodical knocking of the metal wheels on the rails. The moment is a hypnotizing one with the only action on the screen the truck moving the three worried men into the mystery of the unknown. The close-ups suggest faces rich in thought and in expectation; fear and alienation is making them uncomfortable, but the way to the Zone gives them enough time to stabilize their emotions. Everything we need to know about the heroes is now seen on their visages. The Professor is gazing around, as if fixing the objects of reality by scrutinizing them in his professional scientific manner. The Writer is half asleep, the melody of the metal knocking hypnotizes him, he opens his eyes several times to make sure he is on the way, and falls back into a dreamy meditation. Suchánek says that “Tarkovsky considers this voyage being the basic sensuous symbol of the film, and metaphorically speaking, from the moment when the track moves on it stops at the very heart of the Zone.”

It seems that the beginning of the voyage is the most dangerous part of the way; because they are full of fear: the fear of leaving their predictable, explicable world; the three of them enter the zone of pure hope and immateriality. Perhaps the final point of their destination is the heart of their own spiritual world. This could mean that they have to get ready to meet tête-à-tête the darkest and most enigmatic parts of their own selves. The illusion gradually disappears to be replaced by the physical manifestation of the illusion and dream, which is the Zone itself. The greatest enigma of Tarkovsky’s art is to make the viewer feel the ebb and flow of time in the film. The scene just described is highly

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45 Suchánek, 198.
persuasive – you no longer watch the picture but enter its temporal and sensual density. A viewer feels “the pressure of time in the shot” (Tarkovsky, Sculpting in Time); the value of each moment does not belong to the characters we see on the screen, but is rather a new space in which a viewer can circulate. In this long shot we can see three different men, whose worlds are just now being transformed; a viewer is encouraged to participate in their discoveries. Supplying the scene with the entrancing affect of the repetitious knocking of the wheels plays a leading role in the creation of this affect. Herein lies the hidden energy of the Tarkovskian ‘time-image’, which involves the viewer with a great but invisible force; this image teaches one to discover things, not just merely follow the sequence of scenes, but to look deep into them. As D.G. Menard says:

The distinctive time running through the shots makes the rhythm...rhythm is not determined by the length of the edited pieces, but by the pressure of the time that runs through them.  

Thus, the energy of time in Tarkovsky creates the essence of his films. His time materializes into some liquid, but dense substance; the fourth dimension, which we cannot touch or seen is now fully on our screens:

time materializes when there is a feeling of something significant and truthful that goes beyond the optical and sound situations on the screen. The audiovisual events depicted on the screen are merely material indicators of something stretching out beyond the infinity of the image – what Tarkovsky calls ‘pointers to life.’ Thus, a truly real film stretches beyond the boundaries of its sound-images, creating more thoughts, ideas, than consciously put there by the film-maker.

This means that the film is not just a sequence of moving images; Stalker is expanding its temporal boundaries beyond the limits of mere representation, thus generating a multiplicity of other realities.

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46 D.G. Menard.
47 D.G. Menard.
The dominant factor in Tarkovskian cinema, as seen by Menard, is a dual or two-way process in which a real film lives within time only if time lives within it. A ‘real’ film is like a living organism because it grows in form and in meaning after leaving the editing bench, detaching itself from authorial intent and allowing itself to be experienced and interpreted in individually personalized ways – not unlike important moments in everyday life.48

Thus, Tarkovsky also liberates film from the dominant pressure of the author. An author shapes the story’s form and organizes the contents by putting several shots together in a specific order. However, the real meaning is produced and then perceived by the viewers, in the process of moving within the boundaries of time in the film. The author functions only as a mediator between the inner system of perceptions and values of the viewers and the artistic realization of values – a film. He or she suggests a whole range of possibilities and angles to make the viewer comfortable in the space where anyone can employ their individual imagination to superb effect.

Furthermore, Stalker is not only a set of beautiful images, but also deeply saturated by lyrics. The poems recited in the film are written by Tarkovsky’s father, Arseny Tarkovsky, and Tjutchev – the famous Russian poet from the Golden age of Russian classical poetry; thus, the cultural density of the film invites the viewer to feel the rhythm and so perhaps to find an echo or resonance in each individual viewer’s interpretive heart.

What Tarkovsky wants to show us is the extraordinary opportunities of the spiritual world. Inner spirituality can be enriched through the exploration of the world. The Writer and the Professor discover the hidden potentials of the Zone in their own consciousness. They found the wonders and hope for which they have been searching.

48 D.G. Menard.
However, the development of Stalker himself can be regarded as a story of spiritual degradation for Tarkovsky himself when he says that

*Stalker* in its form of expression approaches tragedy. It is true that in tragedy the hero has to die but I said ‘approaches’ because this is not a tragedy caused by death but by the complete destruction of a ‘certain inner world’. This is after all a different thing than tragedy. There exists, however, the concept of catharsis, cleansing through suffering, cleansing which is possible only in art... yes, perhaps also in life but always in the spiritual sphere. Thus if we are talking of *Stalker* as a tragedy of a certain individual, we are referring here to the destruction of the inner world of the title character. It would be hard to say if he reaches a new spiritual level, it would be more appropriate to say this about Writer or Professor.49

What Tarkovsky stresses here is Stalker’s personal failure to persist in his belief; his mission is to guide people towards the ‘becoming’, but he was not potent enough to fight human ignorance and mercantilism any longer. Stalker surrendered himself to a sense of apathy and despair too soon.

Stalker is a very complex, incredibly anti-typical character; his name ‘stalker’ originates from the English noun, meaning ‘hunter’, ‘follower’ – and theoretically bears certain signs of masculinity and strength. However, he is the complete opposite. The initial scenes of the film show us Stalker who is trying to escape his half-demolished house without being seen by his wife and daughter. His bald head, with the signs of injuries or illness, provokes questions and compassion. When his wife is awake and tries to dissuade him from taking another trip to the Zone, he is almost mute; long, concentrated close-ups of Stalker throughout the whole film portray a weak and vulnerable creature, with a suffering smile and sad wet eyes.

Marc Le Fanu in the book *The Cinema of Andrei Tarkovsky* claims that in the tradition of Western culture we tend to measure the characters by their action; in other words, the will to act and to fight serves as the major criteria for the positive character.

But in late Tarkovsky we are met with something that can only be described as an elevation of powerlessness, a hostility to conventional action, a quietism. What is weak is good: hardness is closest to death [...] The word ‘weak’ appears to be deployed with a special meaning attached to it – the meaning, perhaps, that we find in Dostoevsky rather than in Chekhov [...] Weakness is strength is Dostoevsky – a contradiction, not after all, paradoxical to Christians.  

Furthermore, Tarkovsky’s camera looks at Kaidanovsky (Stalker) not as though he were an actor declaiming portentous lines, but as though he were a unique, weathered, sculpted creature. His shaven head suggests suffering, without composing that suffering into a gesture of pathos. Stalker’s vulnerability resists being pinned down. For Marc Le Fanu

[...] He is muscular, but at the same time ‘neurotic’; masculine, but with feminine characteristics. In sum, he is opaque and ungraspable. Weakness for Stalker is a virtue; he is almost girlish and scared all the time; he is disturbing our sensations, because we expect the guide to the Zone to be a brave and experienced pathfinder, a hero. Stalker instead is hiding behind the backs of his followers; he is almost hysterical when he warns them about the dangers of the Zone; it is evident that he is the one who is the most scared, almost terrified by what he has already experienced.

Such vulnerability and girlishness is a way of ‘becoming’. What is interesting about *Stalker* is that in this film Tarkovsky is exploring the question of de-subjectification. Subjectivity as a dominant concept of Western civilization was challenged by Deleuze, who suggested different alternative concepts. Barbara M. Kennedy concludes that fixed identity and teleological order are replaced by a flux of multiple ‘becomings’. To Deleuze, ‘becomings’ are the process of desire, and the term ‘becoming’ cannot be explained as a

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purely natural or biological thing. Deleuze suggests rather that ‘becomings’ are molecular. ‘becomings’ are seen as ‘affects’ and it is the subsuming of subjectivity through the notion of a material ‘affect’ that is central to a neo-aesthetics of the cinematic. \(^\text{52}\) Later, Kennedy quotes Deleuze and Guattari:

> All ‘becomings’ are molecular. That is because ‘becoming’ is not to imitate or identify with something or someone. […] ‘becoming’ is to extract particles between which one establishes the relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness that are closest to what one is ‘becoming’, and through which one becomes. This is the sense in which ‘becoming’ is the process of desire. (Deleuze and Guattari, qtd. in Kennedy, 88)

Likewise, Stalker should not be regarded as a person with certain goals and wishes; he is instead a ‘becoming’. Through the powers of Stalker’s body, other people establish relations with the powers of the Zone; he is a conductor of others’ desire to explore the unknown, to explore the Other, where certainly, the Other – or the Zone, is the zone of proximity. It is the closeness of one’s wishes and desires; by establishing the link between the two, Stalker is the ‘becoming’. He is not a fixed subjectivity, because as Kennedy states ‘becoming’ is a flow of intensity that operates outside subjectivity.\(^\text{53}\) She argues that ‘becoming’ “is a process of immanence, a description of a processual experience of the ‘affect’, as opposed to the subject”\(^\text{54}\), thus Stalker as a ‘becoming’, produces a key for other possible ‘becomings’. Through the process of ‘becoming’ he is capable of transforming his individual pursuit into the transportation of energies to other people. Stalker’s vulnerability is a manifestation of his susceptibility to the powers of the Other, which is the Zone and life itself, and he is the one to transfer the joys of life to other people. That is why a ‘becoming’ that “serves to define life’s ephemerality, life’s

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\(^\text{52}\) Kennedy, 87-89.
\(^\text{53}\) Kennedy, 99.
\(^\text{54}\) Kennedy, 99.
ineluctability and sheer vibrancy or rhythmic movement, force and dynamism)”\(^{55}\) is the right word to describe Stalker.

In *Stalker*, the Writer in his monologue says there is no longer anything particular in which to believe in this world; everything has its proper rational explanation and can be mathematically calculated; there are no goblins, and the Bermuda triangle does not exist. He goes to the Zone to get some proof that the Other exists and he can touch it physically. Stalker survives by the process of ‘becoming’, which “is perceived as a molecular process […] which break[s] down the binary aggregations.”\(^{56}\) The affirmation of life itself through the experience of intensities and ‘affects’ is Stalker’s form of gift; the shockwaves of the universe pass through his body. The super-rational capitalistic world in which the Writer lives is a world of very fixed identities; the Zone for him is an embodiment of the alternative world, and Stalker by ‘becoming’ leads the Writer to a certain destabilization and reformulation of his existence.

For Stalker, the ‘becoming’ is then the realm of not only ‘the pre-personal’ but also the affective, the transitivist and the fusional. People no longer believe in miracles. Writers and Professors live in the universe of fixed dialectical identities where everything is marked and classified. But Stalker is the one who still keeps the knowledge of the Other; he still resists standardization and ultra-rationalism; this makes his body full of life; the ‘affects’ and intensities which are capable of discovering the wonders of life. His mission is to oppose the limits of the surrounding world by revealing the Zone to other people. The mystery of the Room overcomes the boundaries of traditional kinds of rationality; by pointing it out Stalker goes beyond habitual organization and opens up multiple new connections.

\(^{55}\) Kennedy, 105.

\(^{56}\) Kennedy, 92.
Moreover, the mysterious Room in the Zone also needs some explanation. It actually functions as the Deleuzian “body without organs” (Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 150), which is explained by Pisters, as the following:

BwO is a body that challenges or resists single and fixed identities. Deleuze and Guattari define the full BwO as a body populated with intensities (life) and multiplicities. The BwO does not oppose the organs: it opposes the limits of the organism and makes multiple connections that go beyond the organism’s organization as it is traditionally defined.57

In other words, the Room is a nerve centre of life; its miraculous ability to grant wishes is nothing more than a capacity to achieve something beyond the limits of organic structures and the social establishment. By uncovering seemingly impossible forces to its visitors, the Room fuses their minds, stretches their individual powers beyond known boundaries.

Kennedy comments on Deleuze:

The concept of the ‘body without organs’ is an attempt to denaturalise the body. Rather than see the body as a corporeal element, Deleuze and Guattari describe the body as a set of variously informed ‘speeds’ and ‘intensities’. It is conceived in relation to other bodies, particles of other bodies and entities. […] This body without organs is not a place or a scene or an actual ‘body’. The body without organs is a field for the production of the process of desire. It is what Deleuze calls the ‘plane of consistency’ or ‘plane of immanence’ as opposed to the plane of organisation.58

The mysterious Room grants people who can reach it their innermost wishes. Is it not a ‘field for the production of the process of desire’? The story of Porcupine told in the film talks about one of the first stalkers to the Zone, Porcupine; in one of the voyages to the Zone, he lost his brother. Therefore, he went to the Room to make a wish to revive his brother; it did not as the Zone grants only the truest wishes. Whatever you ask – is of less importance; only your real dreams and passions can come true. So, when Porcupine came

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57 Kennedy, 110.
58 Kennedy, 97-99.
back, he found himself phenomenally rich. He could not bear this burden of not-knowing himself well enough; the realization of his deep moral alienation from real human values and general spiritual corruption lead him to suicide.

The intensities and ‘actual bodies’ cannot be fooled by the banalities of the surrounding world. This is the tale Tarkovsky wanted to tell. The Room is “a field for the production of the process of desire”, which means it can never be fooled by the ‘molar’ pseudo- and so only half-intensities. And “it is through the ‘body without organs’ that sensation is assessable, through the pre-subjective state of materiality. The essence of sensation is rhythm, and the three compounds of sensation are imbricated through rhythm.”

So, the Zone, the Room and Stalker himself radiate and consist of the sensations of rhythm, which they try to deliver to those fixed subjectivities who endure an inability to feel the waves of the universe.

What is more important is that Tarkovsky creates these new sensations with the cinematic body of his film itself. His unprecedented feel for rhythm and ‘of the internal rhythm of the shot’ serves the same function. The rhythmical assemblage of his shots and the technical harmony of his editing techniques create a new type of cinematic truth divorced from traditional modes of cinematic representation.

*Stalker* seems created beyond any customary system; the film avoids most typical representational rules, thus creating a set of images not rooted in one single representation, but available for transformations of every individual viewer participant of the film. Tarkovsky suggests a new concept where there is neither a god, nor is there any recognizable system of dominating values. All the values are just found in the film and constructed in the consciousness of the viewers. Stalker is promoting his belief in the magic of the Room; Writer and Professor are at a loss, and no present God is guiding any

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59 Kennedy, 113.
of the three character’s actions, and the viewers are just perfectly situated to give their own meanings to what they perceive on the screen. The only thing that pervades the film is the vulnerability and uniqueness of the inner world of any human being. The belief in your own sources, in the strength of individual effort and hope is the main idea of the film.

Thus, ‘sculpting in time’ can also be called an independent montage technique. Andrei Tarkovsky believed that each director has his or her own aesthetic and personal sense of time, which creates new sensations of seeing. The very happening of the ‘time-image’ on the screen is not restricted to the use of long shots. Hence the ‘time-image’ is not necessarily a cinema governed by long takes – though it can be – but a broader, philosophical separation from the ‘movement-image’.

2.2 Nostalghia

In many respects, Nostalghia (1983, Ностальгия), is a very autobiographical film where Tarkovsky starts discussing the themes that worried him when he found himself in exile, away from Russia. Nostalghia deals with the questions that are also explicit in his last film, The Sacrifice (1986), which I shall discuss later.

Nostalghia concerns a Soviet musicologist and poet Andrei Gorchakov (played by Oleg Yankovky) who is researching the life of the eighteenth-century Russian composer Pavel Sosnovsky. According to James Macgillivray, the story of Pavel Sosnovsky in the film serves as an example of a narrative device known as mise en abyme, a condition in a work of art where a fragment of the work replicates, in miniature, the entire composition of the work; but what is unique about this film, Macgillivray reports, is that Sosnovsky’s

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60 D.G. Menard.
story mirrors Gorchakov’s story and finally leads us back to the personal story of Tarkovsky himself.  

Pavel Sosnovsky was a distinguished composer who was a serf in eighteenth-century Tsarist Russia; he left Russia and gained international success as a musician away from his homeland. However, he could not overcome the feeling of nostalgia and despair, so he came back to his feudal master where his depression was reinforced by alcohol addiction. Finally, he committed suicide.

During his stay in Italy, Andrei is sick of the sights of the omnipresent, universally acknowledged beauty of the Renaissance; he is no longer gathering facts about Sosnovky’s life; what is bothering him most of all is the growing alienation from the present reality where he is divorced from his home, his wife, his black-and-white experiences of beauty. The scene in the church, where Andrei refuses to go, on the hills of Tuscany, Eugenia goes to the church alone in order to see Pierra della Francesca’s *Madonna of Childbirth*; the fresco is believed to grant miracles for those who ask. This scene in the church is shot with an extreme expressiveness of colours. The light from the candles lights the whole space as if from inside; this soft but saturated light fills the frame. Everything in the church is made of light; the shining beauty of the interiors, the bright light of the candles fills in the screen with its seductive attraction.

Eugenia is there, tall and almost vulgarly beautiful, with her wonderful naughty red hair, standing motionlessly and gazing inside. As Macgillivray suggests, Tarkovsky imagines the scene of the pilgrims, women, who come to ask the *Madonna of Childbirth* to give them a child.  

Eugenia remains indifferent to the procedure, she is not moved, and does not share their belief. The priest asks her to tame herself, so she makes an attempt to kneel down. But she fails; she just leaves the church. Eugenia’s persistence in her dis-

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belief and her spiritual ignorance is later juxtaposed to the searches of Domenico and Andrei, and Alexander in *The Sacrifice*. In Eugenia, Tarkovsky, creates a rather shallow character; she is deprived of intellectual depth and her existence seems absolutely meaningless. Even her womanhood is questioned by a superficial emphasis on her sensuality and seducing eroticism: in the Tarkovskian universe a true woman is closely connected with the family. True womanhood is achieved by a woman’s capability to maintain family ties. So, Eugenia lacks the power of womanhood and, even more, in her life without belief she does not strive for the restoration of belief, which is the only way to accomplish salvation for many a Tarkovsky character.

It must also be said that Andrei himself is confused by Eugenia’s passionate but uninteresting character. His mind is tired of her artificial shine; Eugenia is sexually attractive, she is seducing him, but her womanhood is for Andrei false and unconvincing. On the one hand, he is tortured by her physical magnetism, he is obviously attracted by her impressive surface look; but on the other hand his mind belongs somewhere else, to his black-and-white home and to his wife with the anxious big eyes. He longs for the reconciliation of the two women; in his imagination he unites them together. There is a vision where his wife and Eugenia are embracing each other; so he does not have to choose anymore. However, this can never happen, so he loses interest in the wonderful Italian interpreter, and more and more often has the visions of this wife.

Tarkovsky stresses the contrast between the voguish, expressive beauty of Italian architecture, women, nature and the melancholic, introvert, mute beauty of Russian life. For example, the scene in the church, described in the following passage is followed by the view of the Russian landscape. The preoccupation with light is lost in Russian melancholy. Andrei’s visions, in which he sees the episodes from his childhood intervened with the memories from his later life, are shot in black-and-white. Tarkovsky is obviously
contrasting these two sets of images to point out the straightforwardness and plainness of the Italian bright beauty, Eugenia, who is no longer interesting for Andrei.

What is impressive in the Tarkovskian creative world is his ability to break the narrative line by melding the reality and visionary pseudo-reality together. As Pisters says in her book

when the virtuality and possibility of time become part of the actual image, when the presented becomes at the same time past and future, it is more difficult to say what distinguishes the real from the imaginary or to tell the difference between true or false. Whereas the classic movement-image does everything possible to avoid fooling the spectator, this is not the case with the time-image: false cuts, aberrant movements, never-explained gaps in the narration, they all make an actual open up to the virtual (and the possible) and at the same time make truth impossible to grasp: we can only guess what happens between, before or after.  

The above applies to *Nostalghia*, where as in all Tarkovsky-films, a break with what is happening on the screen never occurs; what we see is the continuing, highly plastic flow of time (time as a manifestation of subjective/objective reality/presence) uninterrupted by the narrative limits.

There are more episodes in the film that illustrate Tarkovsky’s idea of ‘sculpting in time’. He believed that ‘the internal rhythm of the shot’ constructs the aesthetic and semantic tension of a film. His theory of montage is meant to give film what he believed is the most prominent feature of film as an art form. In one of his interviews, Tarkovsky said:

None of the art forms can be compared with the force, directness … with which cinematography delivers the sensation of fact and …. living and changing in time.

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63 Pisters, 84.
For Tarkovsky, cinema is the first and the most effective tool one can use in his constant attempt to understand what time is, to get closer to the solution: how time can be measured. This is what he says about film:

A new aesthetic principle was born. This principle is the fact that for the first time in the history of art, for the first time in the history of the humankind a man has found a way to … capture time. And simultaneously – a possibility to reproduce the flow of this time on the screen an unlimited number of times; repeat it, return to it. A man got into his hands a matrix of real time. Time, seen and fixed, can now be saved in the metal boxe for a long time (theoretically – forever).\textsuperscript{65}

This has much in common with Deleuzian ideas of the ‘time-image’ as a signifier of the arrival of a true cinematic image after the Second World War, or even more precisely, following Orson Welles’s 1941-film, \textit{Citizen Kane}.

Tarkovsky believed that the power of the cinematograph consists in that film time is taken in real and in indivisible connection with the matter of reality itself, which surrounds us every hour of our individual life:

Finally, the cinematic image is a manifestation of the life facts in time, which is organized according to the forms of life itself and its laws of temporality. The observations are subject to selection; because we leave on the celluloid only the information which is an eligible part of the image. Furthermore, the cinematic image cannot be divided and divide into parts contrary to its temporal nature, we cannot exclude the flowing time out of it. The image can become a purely cinematic one (out of all the others) only under the strict condition that it lives in time and that time lives in it, starting with every single shot.\textsuperscript{66}

\textsuperscript{65} Родился новый эстетический принцип. Принцип этот заключается в том, что впервые в истории искусства, впервые в истории культуры человек нашел способ непосредственно запечатлеть время. И одновременно – возможность сколько угодно раз воспроизвести протекание этого времени на экране, повторить его, вернуться к нему, человек получил в свои руки матрицу реального времени. Увиденное и зафиксированное, время смогло теперь быть сохраненным в металлических коробках надолго (теоретически – бесконечно). Transl. my own, Тарковский.

\textsuperscript{66} Итак, кинообраз в основе своей есть наблюдение жизненных фактов во времени, организованное в соответствии с формами самой жизни и с ее временными законами. Наблюдения подлежат отбору; ведь мы оставляем на пленке только то, что имеет право быть слагаемыми образа. При этом кинематографический образ нельзя делять и членить вразрез с его временной природой, нельзя изгонять из него текущее время. Образ становится подлинно кинематографическим при том ( среди
The impossibility to separate the image from the flow of time characterizes the Tarkovskian cinematic method. For those who share the spiritual autonomy of the Tarkovskian cinematic image, Nostalghia presents an indivisible whole. Its density is not interrupted even by editing from one scene to another. The internal energy and fluidity of each shot and each frame fall into the stream of meditation and identification with the main character. This effect is achieved mostly by the technique of gradual, non-narrative transformations of reality into the dreams and dreamy states of Andrei’s mind.

In the time-image, the duration of time, which implies change and ‘becoming’, provokes undecidable alternatives and inexplicable differences between true and false. Real and imaginary become undecidable alternatives, and difference between true and false become inexplicable. Falsifying the narration frees itself from the system of judgment.67 The Tarkovskian cinematic method provides a perfect ‘time-image’ where it is no longer possible to define the true and the false, to separate reality from imagination, to say what is right and what is wrong. For in his films there is no place for any comprehensive system of values, everything is subjected to constant re-evaluation and re-interpretation.

After Andrei and Eugenia visit the church with the fresco of Madonna, both of them arrive at the hotel. Andrei goes to his room, which reminds one of Stalker’s house: a bed in the center of the frame, a window on the left and a door to the bathroom to the right; there is a gloomy atmosphere, almost darkness, soft but saturated colours; there are two distinct paths of light coming from the bathroom and the window. The camera is still and perfectly silent, showing the room and Andrei’s figure on the bed; he is sitting motionless, almost paralyzed with an unspeakable inner drama; he is laying down on the bed. The sound of the dropping water is filling the room with its repetitive softness; a dog from Andrei’s memories comes out of the bathroom and sits near Andrei’s legs. There is nothing

67 Pisters, 84.
in the work of the camera or of the soundtrack that would imply the absolute impossibility of the dog’s presence in the room whose appearance is not regulated by logic or by common sense; it is dictated by Andrei’s deep melancholy; Andrei’s dog does not exist here in this world, but we see it on the screen as if it belongs to the captured filmic reality. Because reality for Tarkovsky is never an exact world of words and mathematics, its complex originality is made of man’s ability to create and to believe in its own time.

The ‘time-image’, to paraphrase Deleuze, always has two poles: the virtual and the actual. However, it is rather difficult to define the borderline between the two; so, as Rodowick says in his book, “The image-crystal is organized by relations of indiscernibility – between the actual and virtual, physical and mental, or real and imaginary”. Rodowick also insists that this point of unreadability is “a process that both deepens our understanding of objects and events and widens our access to circuits of remembered experience in a mutual interpenetration of memory and matter”.

Back to Nostalghia, the dog is now on the floor, motionless, sharing the melancholy of its master; Andrei’s head is in the frame, and we see a woman, a dark-haired woman; she is his wife and within the next few minutes she is embracing another woman who appeared just a few days ago in his life, Eugenia. Both of them are smiling, reconciled both with each other and with Andrei’s conscience. The Tarkovskian method is technically perfect in this sequence; he erases the factual borderline between the two different states of mind, two different realities represented on the screen. His object and his subject merge into the single flow of time. The vision of Andrei’s wife is never interrupted by the formal or technical cut, it is instead edited in a delicate way to create a feeling of an uninterrupted spiritual state of mind. It is important that Andrei has never stopped thinking about his family; his life in Italy was not divided into the stage of forgetfulness of what is left and

68 Deleuze, The Time-Image, 68.
69 Rodowick, 94.
70 Rodowick, 92.
also reminiscing about the past life. Andrei is in a constant disharmony with himself and with the surrounding world. The thoughts about his wife do not occur to him, neither does time in the shot, because they are living within him; they inhabit his soul. That is why the transition between reality and a visionary world is so invisible in Tarkovsky; he has to stress the absolute absorption of Andrei’s mind both by his past life and present unsatisfaction and sadness.

The image of his wife is alive for Andrei, which is why film as a medium must communicate this sensation to the audience. Tarkovsky achieves his goal. Later in the film, we see Andrei’s wife laying in his bed, she is pregnant, obviously as she was a few years ago; but now on the screen, which is in Andrei’s and in our minds, she is in his bed. In another scene, he is hallucinating about her hearing his voice, and then a moment later he hears her calling his name in his hotel room. This is a ‘crystal-image’ par excellence, for as Deleuze puts it,

> In fact the crystal constantly exchanges the two distinct images which constitute it, the actual image of the present which passes and the virtual image of the past which is preserved: distinct and yet indiscernible, and all the more indiscernible because distinct, because we do not know which is one and which is the other.\(^{71}\)

What could seem to an unexperienced viewer a total confusion of thoughts and memory is in fact a good example of the unity of our sensations in a living and ever-changing whole. Cinematic temporality becomes a means of expressing its essential omnipresence and liquidity.

Additional important themes raised in this film include the concepts of sacrifice and madness, which also constitute the dominant thematic features of Tarkovsky’s next film, *The Sacrifice* (1986).

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\(^{71}\) Deleuze, *The Time-Image*, 81.
In *Nostalghia*, Andrei and Eugenia visit the hot springs pool of St. Catherine in Bagno Vignoni, where Andrei meets an eccentric old man named Domenico (played by Erland Josephson, who also plays Alexander in *The Sacrifice*). Andrei learns that Domenico is considered a madman who imprisoned his own family for seven years in an apocalyptic delusion. Strangely, Domenico has the same dog as Andrei has, and they have a similar almost a-social outlook and behavior. First, when Andrei wants to arrange a meeting he asks Eugenia to talk to the old man, but Domenico refuses to talk to him. However, later when Andrei is alone, Domenico invites him to his house. The scene in this half abandoned house, which now reminds one of a shelter for the most desperate, is one of the most profound in the film; it gives the key to the understanding of the mutual resistance and affection between Andrei and Domenico.

Suchánek speaks about the importance of the deep religious and spiritual involvement in *Nostalghia*. Andrei meets Domenico and is finally illuminated by the spiritual truth about his own life and by the complexity of art; the house itself is full of Tarkovskian symbolism, which we have already encountered in other Tarkovsky’s films. As in *Stalker* and in *Solaris*, the rain is falling inside the house, through the roof. The place itself is abandoned and mysterious; just as all the other Tarkovskian interiors, this one is highly stylized. The ruined walls keep no signs of life except of the pair of lonely pictures on the walls, and a big mirror in the corner of the room. The scene is accompanied by classic music, the choir. Here, Domenico confesses of his attempt to spare his family from the dying world, and shares bread and wine with Andrei; at this moment, according to Suchánek, Domenico says one of the fundamental truths of the film: one drop and another drop do not make two drops, but one – a bigger one. There is also an inscription written on the wall: $1 + 1 = 1^{72}$.

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72 Suchánek, 227.
Andrey entered the temporal space, which is highly spiritual. He is here present with himself, and with everything which makes him an authentic reality of existence. The Eternity. You and me, bread and wine, sin and conciliation, body and spirit, death and life, everything is one, indivisible. Everything relates to everything, because everything originates from the single point of eternity.73

It seems a crucial moment in Andrei’s understanding of himself and of his own individual spiritual devastation. However, he will need some time to achieve a realization of these discoveries. Domenico asks him to perform a bizarre task: to cross the pool of St. Catherine with a lighted candle, which should be a part of a greater redemptive design. Other people living there consider him insane and would not allow him to do this. Andrei is skeptical about this idea, but takes the candle with him, and is obviously intrigued by such an odd task. The idea of crossing the pool with a lit candle seems absurd and meaningless; however, it possesses a special value, understood in Deleuzian terms again as “a pure optical and sound situation”:

Suppose a character finds himself in a situation, however ordinary or extraordinary, that’s beyond any possible action, or to which he can’t react. It’s too powerful, or too painful, or too beautiful. The sensory-motor link’s broken. He’s no longer in a sensory-motor situation but in a purely optical and aural situation.74

The absence of a usual cause-effect link and of any rational explanation in the idea of candle-carrying makes it a Deleuzian ‘pure optical and sound situation’.

When Domenico is talking to Andrei, Andrei is impressed: he is speechless and almost paralyzed with confusion and with enlightenment at the same time. To convey the depth of this emotional daze, Tarkovsky has to operate on another technical and semantic level of film-making. In Nostalghia, the characters follow an at times inexplicable but essential exploration of the self; in so doing, the experiment to discover true meaning is

73 Sucháněk, 240.
74 Deleuze, The Time-Image, 51.
conducted in an atmosphere of paralyzing inaction and of extreme forms of self-doubt. In this respect *Nostalghia* is a purely ‘time-image’ film, Flaxman says:

> Situations lose their objective assurance, hence the emergence of pure optical and sonic images that have been delinked from the chronological series of the present, cut off from motor extension, from action. Indeed, the characters of modern cinema are no longer those who act, but rather those who see. Modern cinema is populated by a ‘new race of characters’ who are compelled to witness the world, yet who are entirely unsure of what they witness, lost in the thrall of an ‘uncertainty principle’ […] These characters are ‘visionaries’ […] a film is wedded to a wandering movement in which anything or nothing can happen.\(^{75}\)

Domenico’s action when he imprisoned his family a few years ago, left him even more disillusioned and despairing; Andrei’s action to go to Italy led to his total nervous breakdown. Now, the abovementioned ‘crystalline narrative’ of their post-action lives places them outside of the subjective reality in the world of non-action.

Andrei leaves the village and is planning to leave Italy. However, just before entering the taxi cab he realizes that he has to fulfill his individual goal; he realizes the meaning of Domenico’s message. So he returns to the pool, lights up the candle, and tries to cross the pool with the lighted candle. The flame is every time blown by the wind, but he persists in this meaningless almost absurd action till at the end of the eighth minute of the scene he collapses on the stairs of the pool.

This candle-carrying is not an action; it is a mission of a Deleuzian ‘time-image’ character as a “wanderer” to find the resolution for which he has so long been searching. There is ‘anything and nothing’ happening on the screen at the same time; by carrying the candle, he commits the final act of redemption both for himself and for everyone else. It is an aesthetic and spiritual culmination of his personal and artistic life, which could never be fulfilled without this last redemptive act. Deleuze says:

\(^{75}\) Flaxman, 31.
The modern fact is that we no longer believe in this world. We do not believe in the events which happen to us, love, death [...] The link between the man and the world is broken. Henceforth, this link must become an object of belief: it is impossible which can only be restored within a faith [...] The cinema must film, not the world, but belief in this world, our only link. [...] Restoring our belief in the world – is the power of modern cinema (when it stops being bad). Whether we are Christians or atheists, in our universal schizophrenia, we need reasons to believe in this world.  

Certainly this is true about Andrei; in his destructive nihilism he was looking for belief, and Domenico was the one who experienced the same aloofness from life and finally was able to restore his belief. Moreover, he did not achieve this enlightenment by means of empirical knowledge, but by committing an act of extreme internal and immanent power. Andrei finally gains reconciliation with his inner person.

At the same time, Domenico goes to Rome where he decided to burn himself on the monument of Marcus Aurelius on the horse. People start gathering on the square just to observe indifferently a man burning himself to death. The way this crowd is placed on the steps of the monument, in the street, has much in common construction-wise with the way Alain Resnais places his people in Last Year at Marienbad. Their complete impersonal, abstract outlook reminds us of their total indifference and, to neologize a little bit, their observational-ism. Domenico commits an act utterly incomprehensible for others, but filled with deep inner energy. It has much in common with another character – Alexander in The Sacrifice, which I will examine below.

Marc Le Fanu asks whether this strange act of self-burning by Domenico that unites with a serious and delightful hope for humanity is in any sense good: “[Nostalghia] has its fair share of silence and contemplation. Here Tarkovsky’s camera, restlessly moving over nature and stone and human physiognomy, forges an inexpressible discourse

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76 Deleuze, The Time-Image, 171-72.
Tarkovsky manages to infuse objects, “[A]s they emerge on the screen, nature and landscape seem to take on a history, a meaning, a vibration [...] It is too mastered to be wholly unhappy.”

2.3 The Sacrifice

Another important leitmotif in Tarkovskian aesthetics is the idea of a borderless existence in the state of spiritual unity. His films are labyrinths of dreams where there are no entryways to any particular reality. Each reality is just a construction of multiple layers of dreams, of nightmares, of wishes and of partial glimpses of a real world. But, as a director, Tarkovsky tries to establish this vulnerable line of connection (or, even more precisely, disconnection) and to erase boundaries; his world is an amalgam of fantasies and reality.

In his last film, The Sacrifice (Offret), produced in Sweden, in 1986, the stylistic method of a dreamy reality certainly plays the major role in understanding the meaning of the film as a whole.

The Sacrifice is about an aging actor, Alexander, brilliantly played by Erland Josephson, who is in a personal crisis; he is disillusioned and pessimistic. Alexander is shown in the surroundings of his house; the house itself is given a special significance in the film. A highly stylized interior of the two-storied building, full of doorways, odd corners and open windows; wooden furniture and vases; the celluloid itself exhales the smell of his house. The rooms are spacious and half-empty; the curtains of the windows are flying in the wind – and the dresses worn by Alexander’s wife and his teenage daughter seem made of the same cloth. The camera gracefully moves around in the space of these
rooms, echoing the sound of the heels on the wooden parquet, capturing the baroque poses of the human shapes. Alexander’s wife and daughter are dressed in sophisticated, baroque-like garments; their postures seem copied from baroque paintings: full of the antagonism of sudden tension and constant conciliation. Their faces are shot in a bizarre repulsive angle—in contrast with other of Tarkovsky’s female characters, these two do not bear the habitual signs of Tarkovskian women. They share the shallowness of Eugenia. In his universe a woman is often a sacred creature; she is a mother, which means she is the one who holds the family together. In *The Sacrifice*, Tarkovsky is losing this faith in salvation through family ties; Alexander’s wife and his daughter – are light-minded and aloof; Alexander is obviously left tête-à-tête with his problems. He is suffering the break with his wife who is flirting with their family friend; perhaps *The Sacrifice* is a story of Alexander’s personal crisis as a husband and as a father.

*The Sacrifice* examines too many contemporary philosophical problems. Deleuze challenges existing concepts of representation and “immanence”; he presents a critique of Freud’s and of Jacques Lacan’s notion of desire, which is of course based on the idea of an absence; as Pisters claims, desire in the Freudian-Lacanian interpretation is a lack, an absence of the original wholeness, which is lost immediately when the subject enters society. However, she claims that the Deleuzian and Guattarian philosophy creates a new conceptual understanding of desire:

> desire is not based on lack and the absence of an original perfect but on an impossible whole or dangerous void-like negativity. Moreover, desire is never related to an object. Rather, desire is a fundamental wish to live and to preserve life by connecting with and relating those things and persona that give us joy, that is, that increase our power to act […] desire is not based on negativity and lack, but it is positive desire to make connections.\(^\text{79}\)

\(^\text{79}\) Pisters, 20-21.
Consider for instance how in *The Sacrifice* Alexander’s bargain with God is his desperate desire to “live and to preserve life” (Pisters, 20). After the announcement of a nuclear war, when suddenly it became clear that there could be no rescue of the planet covered by nuclear dust, Alexander addressed a supreme being. His prayer – a wish to preserve life for those who are near and dear to him – is the ruling force of the film; in order to save their lives he makes the sacrifice. Alexander offers God his life, his belongings, his reputation and his social life, to wake up in the world without the threat of nuclear war.

The ambiguity of his decision is that his sacrifice is not a personal deal; in his bargain, he is actually manipulating the lives of other people. By renouncing everything he has renounced, he involves other people without their will; this is the main question in which Tarkovsky is interested. God keeps his word, and when Alexander wakes up he finds himself in a normal world, where there are no signs of the previous terrifying night. Alexander has to keep his word as well – so he burns his house and as a consequence allows himself to be taken to the asylum.

His sanity and his social and personal life are the price of his sacrifice, but if we look at Deleuze and in so many ways also his key precursor, Benedictus de Spinoza:

> to be joyful is to desire connections that are related to affirmative powers, not to the negative ones. (Spinoza qtd. in Pisters, 20)

I think the foregoing is crucial for the understanding of Alexander’s decision: for him a return to normal life means to be back to the family that is breaking apart, to the life he belongs to no more. In his broken family, he was no longer able to accumulate affirmative powers; obviously, his professional life did not give him any satisfaction. To stop this suicidal machine, to break the lines of escape with all these negative powers in his life, he chooses life without himself, which is for me probably the greatest manifestation of ‘pure desire’.
Alexander’s sacrifice is made possible through a whole set of physical, body connections. After his prayer-vow, Otto, the postman, enters the room and tells Alexander that he can make his sacrifice by sleeping with a mysterious foreigner, an Icelandic woman, Maria. According to Kennedy, in his philosophy Deleuze suggests a creative and innovative perception of the body

the relational quality of the bodies, the linkages of the human body to other bodies, human and inhuman, animate and inanimate, machinic and non-machinic in a post-human trajectory.\(^{80}\)

This leads us to the idea that the sexual contact implied in the film is also important on the universal level. Maria’s body leads Alexander to the body of Christianity and to the body of the whole planet:

[the concept] Body […] has a new and fluid dimension which encompasses all individuated, social, cultural and affective spaces. This is a reformulation of life as ‘body’ – body as life. It is ‘intensity’ and ‘affect’ which molecularly constitute this Body of life.\(^{81}\)

Alexander is gaining life in his body experiment; the intensities of his flesh and blood promise him a new life on Earth. Kennedy says that bodies can also be defined as “complex forces and intensities that coagulate, oscillate and imbricate, as machinic assemblages of the molecular”\(^{82}\) – which is why this physical contact serves as a ritual of enlightenment for Alexander in his striving to find some superior energy, such as that which a God represents. Relatedly, Pisters says:

A body for Spinoza, consists of powers and affects and of movements and rest […] the affect of love in terms of joy: not the union with the loved object, but joy, accompanied by the idea of an external cause […] The virtual life does not demand isolation; rather, it involves engagement with the rest of the world, especially with other minds that are also intent on virtuous striving to persist.\(^{83}\)

\(^{80}\) Kennedy, 26.
\(^{81}\) Kennedy, 100.
\(^{82}\) Kennedy, 49.
\(^{83}\) Pisters, 57.
The crisis in Alexander’s family is the gradual alienation of all the members of the family from each other. They need something to get involved into the universal ‘becoming’ and thus to regain life in its natural fluidity.

Otto does not suggest bloodshed or murder; his way to the realization of the vow is sexual desire, in other words, as Pisters writes of Spinoza above, – “joy, accompanied by the idea of an external cause”; where the external cause is the idea of redemption for loved ones. It is the joy of a physical contact with a passionate, mysterious stranger, which gives Alexander the right words to speak to God; to be heard by God. There is no isolation here for Alexander: he is surrounded by people who possess the same knowledge of the world as he does. And what is even more important, the Icelandic woman is a witch; she is a pagan magician; so, she has this transportable mind that is “also intent on a virtuous striving to persist” (Pisters, 57). Maria possesses the knowledge about the ways to escape total spiritual freezing, and these ways would lead directly to the reconciliation with the life and with the true self. She is the guide to the discovery of this alternative way. Maria works as a crystal, which is reflecting, according to the Deleuzian model, the potency of the virtual. By the means of her supernatural forces and by connecting himself to Maria’s flesh, Alexander reveals the powers of his weakness (this can be the same weakness that characterizes Stalker). He breaks the habitual adequate schema to achieve the state of the virtual where he loses his subjectivity for the sake of his weakness.

Peter Canning notes:

an escape – a Spinozist voyage sur place, mental voyage through the destruction of the signifier, into memory, time and ‘becoming’. This is not a conscious choice; it is an effect of a prior transcendental-libidinal decision, made in eternity, for experience, experiment in affect and percept. It is easy to identify with masters (it is all we do, whether to
love or hate), but to become an exile initiates another order of experience.⁸⁴

Is this not Alexander’s schema par excellence? His escape to Maria, his escape from reality into insanity – is all a mental voyage into the realm of the unknown where he – as a signifier – no longer exists. By choosing this alternative way, he is turning into memory, into the substance of time and ‘becoming’. And the concept of experiment is very important for him as well. Indeed, he is experimenting and improvising all the time. There are no rules in this game, and no marked exits points, but he is brave enough to try; he is experimenting with the God he has never been courageous enough to accept before. To become an exile the experience itself is important. He stakes everything he has in this huge experiment to enter “another order of experience” (Canning, 360). Maria and her flesh help him to dis-identify himself; her body and her outsider language open a new domain of non-subjective reality for him. Pisters says that for Spinoza, body and mind are fundamentally connected; they are extensions determined in a certain way, so that there are no limits, and “the unconsciousness of the mind is strictly related to the unknown of the body. There is no transcendental preestablished framework of the human subject: it will change according to its relations with its environment and other beings.”⁸⁵

At the end of the film, whether we accept the idea of the sacrifice and redemption, or we tend to think that this was just Alexander’s insane imagination, we see Alexander who has overcome his subjectivity and reached a state of “pre-personal” in the Deleuzian sense of the term such as when Kennedy writes that the ‘pre-personal’ state of being exists before the social and cultural world of language structures, and before the emergent sense of physic self […] This pre-personal exists as a kind of field of different forces and intensities. […] But there pre-personals are not experiences or had by a Self, a subject or a person,

⁸⁴ Canning, 360.
⁸⁵ Pisters, 56.
but are instead constitutive of the self. The pre-personal remains an impersonal state.\textsuperscript{86} This break with the dominance of subjectivity allows Alexander to reevaluate his existence; what Tarkovsky is trying to say is that through self-oblivion, we can reach a spiritually higher, de-subjectified state of being. Once, in relation to \textit{The Sacrifice} he mentioned that a man cannot love anyone else in the world if he does not know why he is here, on Earth. In order to answer this question, Alexander had to overcome the layers of logical thought and discursive schemata, to reach those feelings and things, “which can only be felt at a deeper level of the proto-subjective.”\textsuperscript{87} Alexander’s only way to achieve the de-subjectified state of being is insanity. The film ends with a scene in which Alexander is taken to the asylum.

\textbf{3. Alain Resnais}

Another film director who takes an interest in time is Alain Resnais. All Resnais-films are sophisticated meditations on the problem of time and memory; and three acclaimed ones in this regard include \textit{Night and Fog} (1955), \textit{Hiroshima mon amour} (1960) and \textit{Last Year at Marienbad} (1961).

According to James Monaco, Resnais was iconized as a highly intellectual director because of his elaborate cinematic technique. His films were criticized for being too sophisticated technically thus lacking emotional and psychological drama. The release of Truffaut’s \textit{The 400 Blows} (1959), Godard’s \textit{A bout de souffle} (1960) and Resnais’s \textit{Hiroshima mon amour} (1960) mark the emergence of a cinema movement established in France as a certain counterpoint to the domineering Hollywood narrative and technical style. Most of the directors who are now associated with the New Wave spent much of

\textsuperscript{86} Kennedy, 89.  
\textsuperscript{87} Kennedy, 89-90.
their time in the 1950s developing the criticism and new ideology of film in the French magazine “Cahiers du Cinema”, under the tutelage of André Bazin. However, as Monaco states in his book, Resnais, being almost ten years older than Godard, Truffaut and Chabrol, took a somewhat different albeit related path in cinematographic work. Resnais’s approach was more practical than theoretical, and he also stressed the importance of collaborative work in filmmaking, which in some way opposed the notion of ‘auteurism’ developed by other New Wave film-makers. Monaco also stresses how the complexity in Resnais’s films is due to his elaborate editing style.

As Monaco reports, as a child, Resnais’s passion was comic books. He was a devoted collector and reader, and studied in detail, image by image, the actions from comic-book stories. What Resnais says about his affinity for the jump cut, the flashback, and ‘flashforward’ is cited in Monaco:

Maybe you will think this is a joke, but I don’t know if it is. It could come from the fact that when I was a kid I was fascinated by Milton Caniff’s cartoon ‘Terry and the Pirates’, but it was an impossible task to find that story in France because it would be published for two weeks and then disappear. Then I would find it in Italian, and then that would disappear too. And after that there was a war and so I had to read ‘Terry and the Pirates’ in complete discontinuity. Well, I discovered that it gave a story a lot of emotion to know Terry when he was fourteen, and then when he was, say, 24, after which I would make up myself what had happened to him when he was 22, or 17. (Resnais qtd. in Monaco, 10-11)

Resnais’ discontinuous editing, as Monaco argues, is more about imagination than about memory, as Resnais himself declared, and it is an attempt to reveal the way we comprehend the world.

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89 Monaco, 8-10.
90 Monaco, 10.
91 Monaco, 11.
Deleuze says that the classical Hollywood editing technique used the cut to unite two images together, and thus bring them into the conventional narrative line; while in the editing of the ‘time-image’, “the cut begins to have an importance in itself. […] it is the equivalent of an irrational cut, which determines the non-commensurable relations between images” (Deleuze qtd. in Flaxman, 44). Maybe this is the reason a film-maker such as Resnais always claimed that editing was of a much bigger interest for him than directing itself. Editing involves a certain drama of juxtaposition, and by breaking the linear narrative into the non-equal sequences of jump-cuts, Resnais actually tells the non-verbal, but genuinely cinematic, story of the time-image, the post-modern sensuality of contradiction and of disjunction. Explaining Deleuze, Flaxman writes:

> In modern cinema, in other words, images are delinked from any determining schematism, and so what was an enchainment of images becomes a series in which each image is de-framed in relation to the image that follows it, producing a kind of space between images wherein thought lingers, oscillates, hallucinates…  

This is precisely what happens in Resnais-films; his characters are stunned by the irrationality of the non-linear situations in which they find themselves; they circulate in a certain hallucinogenic state of half-dreams and of half-lies. This space where thought is given freedom to emerge is all important for Resnais. Monaco says that Resnais-films, “far from being the complicated and torturous intellectual puzzles they are reputed to be, are rather simple, elegant, easily understood – and felt – investigations of the pervasive process of imagination.” And then he cites Resnais, speaking about the imagination:

> It is imagination that has taught man the moral values of color, shape, sound and perfumes. At the beginning of the world, imagination created analogy and metaphor. Imagination dissolves all creation. Remassing and reordering her materials by principles which come out of the depths of the human soul, imagination makes a new world, even a new realm of sensory experience. And as imagination has created this  

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92 Flaxman, 39.
world (one may say this, I think, even in a religious sense), it is appropriate that the same faculty should govern it. (Resnais qtd. in Monaco, 14)

Working with the potential of the human imagination helped Resnais to investigate the questions of memory and past in the films discussed in this project.

### 3.1 *Night and Fog*

*Night and Fog* (1955, *Nuit et Brouillard*) is a thirty-minute documentary film about the Holocaust. It is an early-style documentary, which made Resnais famous and established him in the cinematographic world. The screenplay for this film was written by Jean Cayrol (he is also the narrator in the film), who himself experienced the horrors of the Holocaust, and is emotionally and artistically attached to the idea of the film. Monaco goes:

*Night and Fog* deals more with our memory of the camps, our mental images of them, than with the camps as they actually existed, for the memories are real and present, as are the physical remains through which his restless camera ceaselessly tracks.\(^{93}\)

Further, both the director and the screenplay writer tried to convey an idea that it is not enough to remember, because memory as such functions only in the present. Memory is helpless when it is necessary to expose such a level of pain as was caused by the Nazi power. In addition, it is not the camps that count but rather it is our ability to build them which, unfortunately, has not disappeared but is still painfully present. Cayrol concludes his narrative with this warning:

And there are those of us who look concernedly at these ruins as if the old Concentration monster were dead in the rubble, those of us who pretend to hope before this distant picture, as if the plague of the camps had been wiped out, those of us who pretend to believe that all this

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\(^{93}\) Monaco, 21.
happened long ago, and in another country, who never think to look around us, who never hear the cry that never ends. (Cayrol qtd. in Monaco, 21-22)

It seems to be the fundamental message of the film: the atrocities of the past can never be turned into a mere postcard image; the past can never be saved as a separate folder which can be easily deleted; those who prefer to pretend that the past has gone forever are mistaken.

The past belongs to the present because of the irresistible power of time. In Night and Fog, Resnais made the images of Nazism an active part of our contemporaneity. By combining the documentary footage with the fictitious narration both in Night and Fog and in Hiroshima mon amour, Resnais calls into question the reliability of our memories and our methods of preserving these memories. Flaxman says:

[Deleuze] regards the very categories of representation as the primary target of the cinematic war machine. The cinema realizes its potential when it begins to falsify, to engage with powers of the false and simulacra in order to reveal those categories as the purveyors of ideological beliefs.\(^{94}\)

It is Resnais’s Night and Fog and his first major success – Hiroshima mon amour, which falsify fake ideological beliefs by juxtaposing the actual shots of real pain, the falsified shots of pain, and finally the fictional story.

Another important aspect is the problematizing of the specific memories and of our ability to revive such memories. What is being asked? It is, namely: is it really the Holocaust horrors that matter? More questions: does it really challenge the viewers’ expectations? Or is what happens on the screen actually just a projection of film on the screen? Is the event presented to the viewer totally absorbed by the time of the film? And where is the border of the specific time stream between the time of the celluloid strip being screened and the time flow of the images being screened? All these points come into view.

\(^{94}\) Flaxman, 36.
while thinking about and with Night and Fog. Are we still open to the realization of the image of the Holocaust terror we see on the screen? Or: are we no longer sensitive to the particular time of the image, as we are being absorbed by the time of the celluloid itself? This is precisely what makes us feel that Nazism is not a concluded episode in our history, that it is not past and gone, and that there is no guarantee that the atrocities of Nazism will not be repeated in the future. Such involvement in the ambiguity and in the possibilities of reality makes us, the viewers, panic, for it unobtrusively suggests that there are probably neo-Nazis among us. We are probably in contact with a potential Nazi every minute of our life. The constant circulation of the human experience can lead us again to the same horrors, which we now passionately neglect as only remnants from the past. Merging the shadows of the past with the daylight of the present, Resnais suggests the circulation of memory. At this point, it finds a certain conceptual echo with the Tarkovskian philosophy. Both of them attract the viewers’ attention to the universality of experience; to the circulation of knowledge, which constitutes our past-present-future association. Involving the viewer into the visual circle of memory, Resnais and Tarkovsky make the viewer feel and react to the new sensation of the unity of time.

Monaco argues that in Resnais’s aesthetics the twin themes of time and memory are always treated dialectically:

it is not the poetry of memory no it is a characteristic dream quality that attracts Resnais (although those are two elements that have considerable cinematic value), but rather the astonishing contrast between our experience of the past and our memory of it.\(^{95}\)

And then later Monaco argues that this dialectical clash between memory and experience itself is overwhelmed by a third concept, which can be much closer to the organic reality than either of them individually. That third concept is imagination. Resnais himself complained that the idea of making a time-authentic film is impossible. As the shooting,

\(^{95}\) Monaco, 30.
editing and the release takes so much time to complete, by the time the film is ready to be seen it is “hopelessly out of date: a relic of a moment past that attempts to capture a pluperfect moment which is always receding beyond reach.”

_Night and Fog’s_ opening shot is an actual present image of Auschwitz, with the voice narrating:

> Even a tranquil landscape, even a field with crowns, a harvest and grass fires, even a road with passing cars, peasants, couples, even a holiday village, with a fair and a belltower, can quite simply lead to a concentration camp. (Cayrol qtd. in Wilson, 28)

Resnais starts by proposing immediately the impossibility of the geographical and special closeness of the concentration camp with ordinary lives. The vivid colours of the landscape describe with cruel attention the simplicity and banality of the space that is seen in the following black-and-white sequence as an embodiment of horror and death.

As Emma Wilson suggests, it seems that the opposition of color over black-and-white photography creates a narrative tension between the present and the past, but it is not in the end that obvious at all. Because, as she follows in citing Vincent Pinel, Resnais for Pinel mixes the actual documentary shots with the black-and-white footage Resnais filmed himself, which basically transforms the dichotomy ‘past-present’ into an opposition of the two modes of narration-representation, two different approaches of the experience of the camps. By blurring the borderline between the documents from the archives and the ones created for the film, Resnais questions the adequacy of our means of saving the memories and of presenting them. The semantic tension of the two modes of representation in _Night and Fog_ explores the metamorphosis and changeability of memory itself and of our inability of preserving collective experience by the means of subjective perception. Individual experience fails when it meets the scale of Auschwitz. Thus, we can no longer

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96 Monaco, 30.
97 Emma Wilson, _Alain Resnais_ (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006) 28.
identify ourselves as the distinct viewers of the past events or as the participants of those events. Memory is not dead, but its presence is questioned. The observations of memory and of the documents presented in the film are provocative because in some way for Leo Bersani and Ulysse Dutoit, it makes us circulate within the actuality of the Nazi past; they suggest that “wanting any documentary knowledge of Nazism may be a way of refusing to confront our implication in it,” a view I endorse.

What is more, Night and Fog is constantly disturbing our modes of perception; when the camera in the film is smoothly moving forward, as if inviting us to follow, it reveals to us the unprecedented power of time, which in the present makes us suffer, terrifies us and calms us down when we are only reminded of the past that perhaps repeats itself.

3.2 Last Year at Marienbad

Last Year at Marienbad (1961, L'année dernière à Marienbad) is a film of great spatial and temporal density. It is said that this is a film of pure style. Wilson in her book says that “the film dissolves a sense of space, so it dissolves other certainties of time, memory and identity”. What the film is trying to express is the ambiguity and the uncertainty of memory. Along with the intricate storyline, this film suggests a strong implication of the viewer into the solution to the main mystery of the film.

Last Year at Marienbad tells the story of two people, nameless characters, who meet at the Marienbad hotel. One of the characters, X (Giorgio Albertazzi), tries to persuade A (Delphine Seyrig) that a year ago they had an affair, and she promised that they would meet in a year and she would go with him. A was and still is with M (Sacha Pitoeff)

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98 Wilson, 75.
99 Wilson, 69.
who may be her husband. X follows A, offering her ever-new evidence and souvenirs from the time they last spent together. She seems to have forgotten everything that had happened, but from one shot to another the reality where the characters exist in the present begins to change. As Resnais explains himself:

> In an international place, a stranger meets a young woman and tells her the love story they lived the previous year. The woman denies this; the man confirms it and persists. Who is right? (Resnais qtd. in Wilson, 68)

A’s impressions from the past and from the present starts yielding under the pressure of X’s gifted and persistent conviction. Or possibly, the memory suppressed by the compunctions from the adultery starts reviving into the present.

It is evident that what happens on the screen is someone’s subjective interpretation of the events. However, it is actually never clear whose imaginative mind is being projected on the screen. X is telling A something, and we suddenly see her in a black dress, but there is no evidence proving which of them has this vision of her in this dress. As Resnais says:

> can one ever know, in fact, whether one projects one’s own fantasies onto the other or whether one ‘receives’ one’s partner’s property? (Resnais qtd. in Wilson, 69)

What the characters are basically doing is that they are constructing this fantasy for the two of them. Everything is juxtaposed and reunited.

Alain Robbe-Grillet, who wrote the screenplay for this film, himself directed several films, which never gained as much popularity as Resnais’s films; but he was concerned to show all the same that cinema does not have a past and does not have a future. Everything that happens on the screen belongs only to the present. That is why cinema is fascinating for Robbe-Grillet. As a writer of ciné-roman, the roman noveau, he, according to Monaco, shared the idea that our mind is constructed in a way similar to how
temporal relations are constituted. We never feel the past, nor can we feel the future, we
live only in the present, where all the temporal sensations melt into a single unique
realization of the present presence. This has much in common with Deleuze’s philosophy,
as I have already discussed. Deleuze says:

The second type of time-image in Robbe-Grillet: a simultaneity of a
present of past, a present of present and a present of future, which
make time frightening and inexplicable. The encounter in Last Year at
Marienbad...: this implicated present is constantly revived,
contradicted, obliterated, substituted, re-created, fork and return. ...
Thus narration will consist of the distribution of different presents to
different characters, so that each forms a combination that is plausible
and possible in itself, but where all of them together are
‘incompossible’, and where the inexplicable is thereby maintained and
created.

Last Year at Marienbad is in truth considered a film about memory and the past. But I
think that what Robbe-Grillet wanted to show is the density of the present moment, which
is not, however, less important for the present research. The characters of the films live
through an intricate labyrinth of thoughts and of personal feelings about someone’s
experience. As we cannot say for sure, whether what is happening on the screen has ever
taken place, or in whose mind all these metamorphoses happen, the very fact of what
actually happened ceases to be important. What shapes the meaning of the film is how the
characters are now in contact, whether imaginary or not; the strong emotional attachment
they show, the different way they react to the events. The truth of the past is almost
invisible now, because apparently there exists no past for them and more importantly –
there exists no past that can be the truthful one.

100 Monaco, 78.
Placing the characters into the circulation of the time where the temporal borders are no longer useful, Resnais and Robbe-Grillet create a world of pure mental sensitivity. Deleuze writes that

the image ‘tips over into a past and future of which the present is now only an extreme limit, which is never given’. … In Resnais too it is time that we plunge into, not at the mercy of psychological memory that would give us only an indirect representation, not at the mercy of a recollection-image that would refer us back to a former present, but following a deeper memory, a memory of the world directly exploring time, reaching in the past which conceals itself from memory."102

The delicacy of this approach allows for the creation of a dreamy world where everything is in some kind of relation to everything else, but at the same time these relations are so loose that the viewer loses solid ground for participation.

The Hollywood formula of the ‘movement-image’, or découpage classique, was put into crisis by the time-image of Resnais, and by the generation of the sixties. As Monaco argues, they were breaking the dependence of film on dialogue and on story telling. This is precisely the non-representational quality of Deleuzian and Bergsonian durée. The film is no longer a mere narration of the events filtered through an idea of objective representation, but a whole that consists of images where the brain itself is the image and the screen. Last Year at Marienbad is duration, as Cliff Stagoll defines it, in a sense that it does not transcend experience, and cannot be divided into elements and into individual shots. It is a lived experience; it brings together both unity and difference in a flow of inter-connections. The mental life of the character(s) shown in the film is a flowing experience, and duration/ the final body of the film – is the immediate awareness of this

102 Deleuze, 39.
flow. Duration in this film is, according to Stagoll’s definition, flowing: overtaking the ‘not yet’ and passing away into the ‘already’. Robbe-Grillet calls it “mental realism”.

As Flaxman reports, the failure of the Deleuzian ‘action-image’, the ‘movement-image’ that is to say “marks a point at which, as we will see, brains and bodies begin to be deterritorialized from rigid identities”, he calls this a “birth of a new European form or a formless form”. I think this corresponds to Last Year at Marienbad. The brains and bodies in this film do not act as active forces in an active reality. The notion of reality is obscured because it is impossible to specify whose thoughts we are actually witnessing. First of all, it seems obvious that we are being invited into the consciousness of X, but later in the film it becomes impossible to specify whose vision is now on the screen, and whose thoughts are being projected on the screen. For example, in the scene with the imaginary or actual rape, the scene when she seems to remember something from the past, as in Wilson’s comments on these phenomena, we become increasingly uncertain about the limits of subjectivity, and the desire of these lovers for each other. This effect is supported mainly by the distortion of the image and of the soundtrack. For example, when X starts recalling the memories of last year in Marienbad, the images that appear on the screen do not correspond exactly to the verbal recollection and thus do not offer any temporal continuity of memory:

we become aware that there is no layering of past and present, that the ‘memory’ images are perhaps conjured in the present. Resnais’s past and present images very soon merge so that the viewer can hardly categorize the temporal value of the images any more. This is how the memory images in Resnais yield to the ‘mental’ images —

104 Monaco, 56.
105 Flaxman, 29.
106 Wilson, 74.
107 Wilson, 75.
Deleuzian mental images par excellence: not representation of memory or past experience, but mental evaluation.

The brains of the characters become entangled as the film proceeds thus ‘deterritorializing’ the identities of the characters in the imaginary-actual realm of the unfolding events. The collapse of the mental orientation of the film results in the emergence of the bodies’ interconnection. The bodies in this film matter a lot. The viewers see the statuesque shapes of the bodies positioned geometrically in a Deleuze-like “any-space-whatever” (Deleuze, The Movement-Image, 103) of the hotel and of the gardens. The dehumanized geometricality of these human body-shapes ‘deterritorializes’ conventional personal identity. It is the formless form in a quintessential form; what is especially effective here is the frames of the bodies in the garden, surrounded by Greek classical statues, which are praised for the beauty of their ideal over-temporal form. Nothing happens in the scene except the estranged displacement of the bodies within the space of the frame. Reducing the meaning of the scene to the mere physicality of the bodies, the positionality of the bodies, Resnais discovers the total collapse of the ‘movement-image’.

Our characters find themselves captured in the purity of Deleuzian optical and sonic images “that have been delinked from the chronological series of the present, cut off from motor extension, from action. Indeed, the characters of modern cinema are no longer those who act, but rather those who see. Modern cinema is populated by a new race of unspeakable trauma (Marienbad).”

Perhaps we should ask: what is more exactly this ‘unspeakable trauma’ in Marienbad? It is something that haunts the mind of X, and violently intrudes on the life of A; however, has it ever been explicitly mentioned in the film that it is the mind of X with which we are dealing? Can the trauma be the impossibility of situating the logical

\[108\] Flaxman, 42.
coherence of the events between the two human mind-bodies, or even worse within a single consciousness? Or: perhaps the trauma lies rather in the impossibility of connecting the present to the past, the past experienced with the image of this past, and thus a complete distortion of subjectivity. These images are the aftermath of the trauma. As Flaxman notes:

In *Last Year at Marienbad* different characters assume different presents, ‘so that each forms a combination which is plausible and possible in itself, but where all of them together are ‘incompossible’, and where the inexplicable is thereby maintained and created. (Deleuze qtd. in Flaxman, 42)

So, it seems the story is about the ‘inexplicable’ between them rather than with each of them as individual human units; it is about the irrationality of their numbness in the world of broken sensory-motor configurations of relationship. They bodies no longer relate to one another; the only thing that exists between them is the illusion of relation realized on the level of pure physicality.

Monaco claims that *Last Year at Marienbad* and *Hiroshima mon amour* are respectively a “true fiction” [and a] “false documentary”. As Robbe-Grillet himself says about the film:

The whole film, as a matter of fact, is the story of a persuasion: it deals with a reality which the hero creates out of his own vision, out of his own words. And if his persistence, his secret conviction, finally prevail, they do so among a perfect labyrinth of false trails, variants, failures, and repetitions! (Robbe-Grillet qtd. in Monaco, 69)

As a narrative device – the story is false, there is no any reference point left in the film. Space and time cease to shape the idea and the action, yielding to the impotence of fiction and of imagination. Robbe-Grillet:

There is no last year, and Marienbad is no longer on any map. (Robbe-Grillet qtd. in Wilson, 98)

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109 Monaco, 59.
The absence of the facts, of the objects, of the events communicates the impossible force of the fragmented imagination at work. To build on this area further, as Emma Wilson suggests, Resnais composed the baroque, ornate location of Marienbad out of a series of locations; Marienbad is a pure fantasy, an enclosed and luxuriant world that is only one place among the other hotels and gardens where the characters might have stayed before. As a place, Marienbad is rather an “obsession in the spectator’s imagination”.

Everything is fictional in *Last Year at Marienbad*; the way Resnais frames his shots – producing picturesque avant-garde landscapes filled with geometrical patterns and almost statuesque people; shadows of the people overtake the foreground of the frame transforming the natural objects of the frame (trees and statues) into nameless geometrical patterns. The architectural value of his framings – literarily engaging the architectural designs of the baroque hotel, the Victorian garden, the highly stylized paintings on the walls of the hotel – disrupt the direct understanding of his representation, and thus breaks the representational quality as it is. As X’s voice describes, in one of the long tracking shots at the beginning of the film, he once more walked

> down these corridors, through these halls, these galleries […], silent, deserted corridors overloaded with a dim, cold ornamentation of woodwork, stucco, mouldings, marble, black mirrors, dark paintings, columns, heavy hangings – sculptured door frames, series of doorways…

This monologue provides the description of a place that is overloaded with elaborate detail; however, it gives no satisfaction to the meaning-seeking viewer. The basic principles of representation are ruined under the sheer heaviness of the architecture and of the landscape of the place.

This is a story of ‘becoming’ and in this case character A is ‘becoming’ a statue, a construction. Being resurrected by someone’s impulses of power; A is being filled in by

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110 Wilson, 68-69.
111 *Last Year at Marienbad* cited in Armes, 95.
X’s ‘affects’, she is being constructed throughout the film into a ‘becoming’ statue. Here is Robbe-Grillet,

We can imagine Marienbad is a documentary on a statue, with interpretative views of the gestures, with a return each time to gestures themselves, such as they remain, frozen in the sculpture. Imagine a documentary that succeeded, with the statue of two people, in uniting a series of shots taken from different angles and with the help of different camera angles and with the help of different camera movements, and in telling the whole story in this way. And at the end you notice that you have come back to where you started from, the statue itself. (Robbe-Grillet qtd. in Armes, 113)

As a theatrical actress, Delphine Seyrig supports this idea; she is, as David Thomson argues, “able to invest small gestures with an enormous imaginary train” (Thomson qtd. in Monaco, 66). Consider for example the way she is being framed by the doorways, the paintings, the receding space of the corridors; the angle of her head and so vision as full of both aloofness and perceptibility express her weightlessness in space as a subject and her progressive merger with the de-subjectified space. Her poses sitting on the bench in the garden in the shots with a highly stylized depth of field speak of her pre-constructed, however already shaped, geometrical self. Her body language transports the heaviness of the surrounding game of imagination into the tiniest details of her physical body, thus transforming her into a living “sphinx-like” statue of enormous aesthetical density: “A might well stand for anima, since the actress (Delphine Seyrig) projects so well the statuesque softness, mysterious and somehow timeless, that anima characteristically evokes” (Parkes, qtd. in Wilson, 74). In this respect, Monaco says about the film: “it is an ‘opera of statues’, where the people ‘are sculptural volumes, masses, to be manipulated like the statues which populate the endless gardens”.

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112 Wilson, 73.
113 Monaco, 64.
The question of memory is of vital importance for her; it is her ability to comprehend the linkages between the past and the present that dictate the rules of the game played at the Marienbad hotel. The numerous allusions to the past could be conveyed differently. Resnais uses a certain type of referring to the past, which differs from the conventional understanding of flashback. Deleuze comments that for Resnais all the forms of the imaginary gain much more importance than would an ordinary flashback. A flashback is just a conditional character, so it is replaced by the method of joining the layers of the past.114 This “layering” does not distinguish the past from the present, rather it blurs the boundaries between the two. As for the logic of the ‘time-image’, Deleuze writes that the

[c]amera subordinates description of a space to the functions of thought. This is not the simple distinction between the subjective and the objective, the real and the imaginary, it is on the contrary their indiscernibility which will endow the camera with a rich array of functions, and entail a new conception of the frame and reframings.115

In Last Year at Marienbad everything that happens on the screen is regulated by the density of the thought, the only problem is that it is perhaps impossible to define whose thought it is. As a consequence, this film produces another example of the ‘time-image’ by blurring the boundaries between reminiscences and actuality, and in so doing deforms the very notion of a fixed subjectivity.

Resnais furthermore chooses a foreign actor speaking French (Giorgio Albertazzi) with a slight accent to make the spectator realize that the thoughts do not happen in words.116 The stream of consciousness here is in the image that corresponds to what is in the character’s mind. It produces a setting where nothing is stable or certain. All the settings, the past and the present, the real and the imaginary, resemble each other. On the

114 Делез, Кино, 431.
115 Deleuze, The Time-Image, 23.
116 Armes, 102.
other hand, everything is each time different; the heroine’s bedroom is constantly changing. Armes claims that Resnais employs a number of logically impossible tracking movements in which each character finds him- or herself in sometimes two opposite positions; thus Resnais breaks one spirit of spatial and temporal logic. In his method of using the imaginary geography, which happens quite often in Resnais’s films, he employs the same cinematic technique with the three baroque castles (Nymphenburg, Schleissheim and Amalienburg) that served as locations for Marienbad, but his final editing is done in such a peculiar way that it provides a feeling that “the same doorway constantly gives access to a new room and the garden is constantly changing, sometimes with paths and hedges.” In this act of constructing, he creates a labyrinth and even a whole spatial sub-reality, which however bears no signs of connection with the world as we know it. Armes claims:

At the end of the film the two characters cannot leave the suffocating atmosphere of the hotel for the real world, since they have no existence outside it. So the film ends with a new labyrinth and the ‘disappearance’ of the characters. The intricate maze of the narrative line destroys the chronology, which provokes many questions; Armes suggests that it is no longer possible to distinguish the actual location of the action; we are not able to specify where the action takes place. Is it possible to identify what we see on the screen in its real duration as the ninety minutes that actually need to be shown? Perhaps the film as a whole is timeless, and as Armes argues this can throw into relief the one timeless element on which the story focuses, viz., the statue.

Deleuze says that through the direct ‘time-image’ we can access the “dimension where people and things occupy a place in time which is incommensurable with the one

117 Armes, 103.
118 Armes, 108-11.
119 Armes, 112.
they have in space.”¹²⁰ What happens to the characters in *Last Year at Marienbad* seems irrelevant for the scale of their inner disorientation and inability to act. Their physical activity in space is pressed by the intensities of their consciousness, and Resnais masterfully conveyed this idea through the cinematic medium.

### 3.3 *Hiroshima mon amour*

*Hiroshima mon amour* (1960) a film, which brought fame and success to Resnais, is an exclusive visionary experience. From the initial scenes the world, created on the screen, is presented to us in a completely innovative way. Being asked to shoot a documentary film about the atomic bomb by his producers, Resnais was struck how this documentary would no longer be anything more than *Night and Fog*. In the end, he proposed that he would be able to shoot something interesting only if someone like Margarethe Duras would work with him; he told her what the film might be about, and gave her several ideas, which later on, developed into one of the best films in film culture.

To shoot a film about the atomic bomb is impossible, especially after *Night and Fog*. Something else needs to be told to create the idea of the bomb. They chose a love-story. And it is still disputed whether *Hiroshima mon amour* is not just a love story. But in this viewer’s opinion, it is not.

*Hiroshima mon amour* is a story about the past, which is ever-haunting and yet never reaching its goal. The story of the characters – a French actress and a Japanese architect, who became, each in their own way, the victims of the war, is no longer important. What is probably more important, is the location of their story – which is Hiroshima. They met in Hiroshima: she is hired as an actress in a film about the peace

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movement in Hiroshima; he reminds her of her lover, who was lost in the war ten years ago – a war that is the mediator between the two of them: the war and the bomb is a constant background in the film. ‘You know nothing of Hiroshima’ \(^{121}\) – but she knew a lot about her German lover and her madness – so she discovered Hiroshima through the loss in her past.

One of the important moments of revelation in the 1960 Resnais-film occurs when she says to her German lover: “I have told our story, I have revealed our secret”. \(^{122}\) Is it not because of Hiroshima? About being equally wrong to the human being? She happened to meet someone who brings back her still painful memory, and she realizes that she had started to forget his face. But here in Hiroshima everything changes, because in Hiroshima people suffered as much as she did. However, the quantitative measurement is not kept save here – showing the documents of Hiroshima after the bombing and the fictional actress and her love-story – Resnais stresses the strange equilibrium between the grandiose and the intimate. Depicting Hiroshima through the banal love-story of a great albeit intimate personal tragedy – is not only the way to show the disability of measurement but also a tool to make people understand Hiroshima as did the heroine; at the end of the film, she says:

‘I know your name, your name Hiroshima. “Hi-ro-shi-ma. Hi-ro-shi-ma.
That’s your name’. \(^{123}\)

Her love for a German soldier then is no longer a personal grief – but an extended overall experience of the past, which is surrounding her in Hiroshima. The German soldier and Hiroshima as place is a “body without organs” (Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 150) for her. She is no longer capable of experiencing him as a man, but rather as a vessel that can be filled in with her memories and with her immediate sensations.

\(^{121}\) *Hiroshima mon amour*, prod. Argos Films, dir. Alain Resnais 1959, 90 min.

\(^{122}\) *Hiroshima mon amour*.

\(^{123}\) *Hiroshima mon amour*. 

Depriving him of a personal name, she crosses the boundaries of Freudian subjectivity: he is no longer a subject with an ego but rather a body that accepts the metamorphosis of her sensuality. Deleuze claims:

> As for the distinction between subjective and objective, it also tends to lose its importance, to the extent that the optical situation or visual description replace the motor action. We run in fact into a principle of indeterminability, or indiscernibility…

The destruction of subjectivity together with the emergence of Deleuzian “pure optical and sound situations” in *Hiroshima mon amour* conditions the appearance of new types of connections to be established between the characters and Hiroshima.

Monaco claims that *Hiroshima mon amour* is about the impossibility of making the film. He cites Duras, who describes the significance of the opening scenes when we see the characters:

> ‘[It] is allegorical. In short, an operatic exchange. Impossible to talk about Hiroshima. All one can do is talk about the impossibility of talking about Hiroshima. The knowledge of Hiroshima being stated a priori by an exemplary delusion of the mind.’ Another affect they want to see is ‘that the extraordinary contrast between the banality of the fiction and the outrage of the fact of Hiroshima will provide leverage to talk about talking about the subject’. They want the banality of the love story to dominate the enormity of Hiroshima’s symbolic history.

The paradoxical thing about *Hiroshima mon amour* is its reflective quality; from what is quoted above it is clear that the major difficulty in the interpretation of the film is its self-questioning, its ambiguous way of showing Hiroshima and at the same time hiding the inner core of the actual place. ‘To talk about talking about the subject’ – inevitably presupposes the elusive nature of the subject of Hiroshima and, perhaps, of the impossibility of any finality or conceptualization of the place or of the whole phenomenon.

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125 Monaco, 37-38.
In addition, to complicate things even more, Resnais uses the same technique he uses in *Night and Fog*, when he combines the real archive material, some pictures taken from news footage, some taken from other films about the tragedy, some from films taken in the museum in Hiroshima, with the fake documentary shots of Hiroshima. Wilson puts forward the following thesis:

Through the Japanese man’s words, through the self-consciously composite, ‘false’ documentary images, Resnais signals the inadequacy of images of this event, this city and its suffering. He opens out our perception of voyeurism, and the failure, which inhere in his enterprise.126

This has much in common with *Night and Fog*, where the intentional combination of true and fake documentary shots disturb the viewer’s expectations. In order to provoke the audience to re-think our attitudes to the most tragic events in human history, Resnais has to break through intellectual and aesthetic philistinism and expectations. There could be no image which is able to present the scale of evil caused by the atomic bomb, because no means can be appropriate enough to show the level of human pain:

To film Hiroshima … means to show in what way the event exceeds the possibility of fixing it within filmic representations. (Ropars-Wuilleumier qtd. in Wilson, 64)

Furthermore, Monaco argues that the documentary shots of Hiroshima

are clearly heightened and protected against any dismissal by the mundane background of the love story. The level of our response is conditioned by the banal saga of He and She, which leaves us naked and open to the historical drama of the city, which is greater by so many magnitudes that it is immeasurable.127

But conversely, the viewer still tends to see the love story as the domineering theme of the film, which was actually Duras’s experimental intention. However, as Wilson argues in her

126 Wilson, 50.
127 Monaco, 43.
book, this love narrative is an inadequate means of representing Hiroshima and its horrors, but it seems that there no longer exists any adequate means to represent "an event which annihilates its own witness".  

I want now to argue that the place Hiroshima itself functions as a ‘body without organs’ in the film. Hiroshima as a city is deprived of its historical and geographical identity. The allusions made in the film to connect the city to the experience of the Second World War are extremely unstable; from the beginning of the film, Hiroshima is presented as a discrepancy between the fictional subjective presentation, and the documentary footage. Resnais suggests the impossibility of Hiroshima as a historical event saved in the memory of the characters; as it is being disputed by the mixture of documentary footage and fiction; the foregoing resonates nicely with the notion of Hiroshima as a Deleuzian-Guattarian ‘body without organs’. Being gradually erased from personal memory, Hiroshima is rather an abstract notion, which lacks the stability of any objective identity and thus intensifies the potential of multiple interpretations and ‘affects’. By placing the documentaries at the beginning of the film in close juxtaposition with the images of the intimate and shapeless merger of the two bodies, Resnais misrepresents the historical fact itself, and creates a new kind of meaning.

The opening scenes of the film give the viewer two bodies, intervened, in extreme close-up; the bodies are so to say, ‘deterritorialized’ in that they have already lost their physical contours in this embrace, delivering pure fleshness and the dissolve of shape into the materiality of what Deleuze calls an “any-space-whatever”. Because it is not the body that is shown, but the shoulder or any other organ disconnected from the body itself; the disconnected parts of the body in tender embrace. The bodies in this scene are de-subjectified and deprived of individual identity. When these shots were followed by the

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128 Wilson, 46-47.
documentary shots of Hiroshima ruined by the atomic bomb – the narrative reaches its outer limit. It is this climax that the authors need to achieve in the film. As Deleuze says:

it is necessary to move towards a limit, to make the limit of before the film and after it pass into the film and to grasp in the character the limit that he himself steps over in order to enter the film and leave it, to enter the fiction as into a present which is inseparable from its before and after.\textsuperscript{129}

So then, Hiroshima no longer belongs to history as history itself and it no longer belongs to human memory; the subjective and objective qualities of history disappear. The city of Hiroshima is being transformed into a Deleuzian ‘any-space-whatever’, which accumulates the intensities of personal sensations and projects them on the characters themselves. Hiroshima in \textit{Hiroshima mon amour} is outside of time; it ceases to belong to any certain historical fragment, but develops into a series of empty spaces to be filled in. In the film, the French actress is engaging this ‘body without organs’ that is Hiroshima to create a sense of the affiliation of her personal memory with world memory. She needs to fill in the gap of her Nevers and post-Nevers experience, which she has hitherto forced into the strange oblivion and never-never-land of her fears and desires. The fear of the pain she had (presumably) in Nevers and the desire to love are insurmountable. All her life after Nevers is but a ceaseless wondering of memory in search of protection and explanation. However, presumably because as Wilson suggests Nevers itself is a doubtful event:

Nevers is a memory (or nightmare) by which the woman is possessed, but one which she does not consciously recall, or so we are led to believe, until this encounter in Hiroshima. Nevers is shown as an intrusive, unlocatable memory, at first for both the woman and the spectator.\textsuperscript{130}

And the French woman’s attraction to the Japanese architect is a masochistic attempt to revive the passion of her memory, or to localize the source of her pain and

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{129} Deleuze, \textit{The Time-Image}, 38.
\textsuperscript{130} Wilson, 52.
\end{flushright}
discover the greater pain in Hiroshima itself. The city of Hiroshima is precisely this ‘any-space-whatever’ where she finds herself secure because by filling it with her small personal pain she is still not able to overcome the scale of pain of Hiroshima. Placing her intimate story on the scale of the atomic explosion – she connects herself to the wholeness of massive pain.

Arguably, the woman finds her own history in Hiroshima; in an attempt to reinvent her love she wants to grasp Hiroshima as a city and so she collects the sights of the city; as Wilson says “she wants to hold its stones and its shadows in her memory, but she remains a tourist. She is a museum visitor, she is an actress in a film in Hiroshima, she is a quest at the Hotel New Hiroshima, she passes through the city”. The French woman is walking through the streets of Hiroshima, but she still ‘saw nothing of Hiroshima’ as the Japanese architect insists. Wilson argues that her night wanderings through the city are erotic encounters; they are “bodily, sensory, blindly corporeal.” Again she is confronting her flesh with the flesh body of the traumatic city; she is not capable of grasping Hiroshima mentally, but she still can display her body and make it touch the signs of history. By absorbing the space of the city, she integrates into its energies and thus creates a new channel of connection between her own body and that of Hiroshima. Wilson goes on to quote Marie-Claire Ropars-Wuilleumier,

\[\text{a deformed hand, a destroyed eye, hair torn out, a distraught woman breaking out of a cavernous dwelling, a twisted bicycle, legs of passers-by, river, anger, stone – long is the list of materials which the narrative of Nevers drags out of Hiroshima’s museum and reconstructs into appeased, if not acceptable forms. What happens is the merging of the two loose narrative lines – Nevers and Hiroshima, where both of them are mutually being shaped and de-shaped by the affects of forgetting and remembering, hallucination and pain. (Marie-Claire Ropars-Wuilleumier qtd. in Wilson, 54)}\]

131 Wilson, 60.
132 Wilson, 61.
Pain is key here. Through the pain of its human bodies, Hiroshima and its ‘becoming’ is revealed. In Nevers, the French actress witnessed the death of her lover; after he was shot she said she spent the whole day with his dead body, though she says: “I missed the moment of his death because…because even at that moment, and even afterwards, I can say that I could not find the least difference between this dead body and my own.”

Merging with her dead lover, with his motionless body, she moves towards the unknown. Face to face with death, she breaks the boundaries of any stable reality.

Every ‘becoming’ is a process and an attempt to think differently, to see or feel something new in experience by entering into a zone of proximity and indiscernibility, a no-man’s land, a nonlocalizable relation sweeping up the two distant or contiguous points, carrying one into the proximity of the other. (Deleuze and Guattari *Thousand Plateaus* qtd. in Pisters, 106)

While embracing her dead lover’s body – ‘becoming’ is what happens to the French actress: overwhelming ‘becoming’ with stepping out of the certainty of the subjectivity into the ‘no-man’s land’ and ‘the proximity of the other’ – which is her lover’s death and her pain. And what is more unreasonable – life after this death and pain in the realm of false subjectivities which have never been able to deform themselves to the state of a “nonlocalizable relation” (Deleuze and Guattari *Thousand Plateaus* qtd. in Pisters, 106).

Resnais once said:

> For Hiroshima too there was no question of raising the monument for the dead. There more than elsewhere living is what matters. Everywhere you feel the presence of death. As a reaction you feel a violent appetite for life, a desire for immediate sensations. That is a banal psychological reality, and may perhaps explain a certain need for sexual freedom. (Resnais qtd. in Armes, 85)

The French actress was denied this right to live and to desire for after the death of her lover she is put into a cellar by her parents as a punishment for having a love-affair with a mortal

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133 Wilson, 55-56.
enemy. Perhaps here her “becoming-animal” (Deleuze and Guattari notion from A Thousand Plateaus) has started. Her hair was cut and her bald head is a memento of a sinful past. Dressed and treated as a mad person, she is excluded from the surrounding world and what is left within her reach – is the square of the city. Every day and every minute the square is filled with the sounds of human steps, of continuous life, of the sound of the church clock measuring the banality of time. The cut off marching legs of the people of the city, who actually executed her lover, with natural persistence, enters within the preview of her tiny window. The church clock signals an interrupted continuity of life outside the cellar; every hour reminds her about the continuousness of the outside life with its causes and relations. Imprisoned and tortured, she succeeds in breaking through the objectives of the subjectivity and the actual present. Deleuze says:

The paradox of this pure ‘becoming’, with its capacity to elude the present, is the paradox of infinite identity (the infinite identity of both directions or senses at the same time – of future and past, of the day before and the day after, of more or less…). (Deleuze Logic of Sense qtd. in Pisters, 109)

The pure ‘becoming’ of the heroine is thus the forgetfulness of her bald-headed identity. To remind herself of her existing body, she scratches the walls of her prison and leaves her nails in the stone. Now flesh is important to her because she no longer identifies herself with reality. Pisters says that “a subject in the paradoxical situation of ‘becoming’ is a subject that questions its identity” 134. Since the moment of her lover’s death, the French actress is in search of herself.

Through the marking of her own flesh on the walls, she tries to keep alive the idea of her own subjectivity. What is left for her now is only flesh. Perhaps that is why her only actual companion is a black cat. Capable of unrestricted movement and non-domineering

134 Pisters, 109.
self-awareness the cat experiences space in a way that is still inaccessible to the bald-headed woman. Through her flesh on the wall – she is ‘becoming’.

Wilson says:

In *Hiroshima mon amour* forgetting is visceral. The French woman, registering forgetting in her body, says: ‘I tremble from having forgotten so much love’ (Duras). She seeks memory through bodily feeling and reaction, seeking to graze and mark her body, to deform it, to imprint it with love. Yet in the ecstasy and reminiscence she seems to find with her Japanese lover – his very body recalling that of the German soldier – she finds herself encountering again the forgetting of love, the inexorability of time and movement into the future.\(^{135}\)

This is the ‘becoming’ through the flesh of the failure of ‘becoming’, though the difference itself does not now seem to carry any semantic value. For both of the characters, the French and Japanese pairing, transform subjectivity into the domain of the unattainable and the unfixed vacuum of unknown.

I think this is what Resnais actually does by displacing his characters into the aimless wanderings around the city. As Monaco proposes, the love relationship between the two characters of the film is extremely masochistic. Perhaps so too is our own interest in Hiroshima. This is a love story and the memory of horror impossibly tied together to show how the personal story serves as an index of history: “We are prohibited from observing the thing itself, but the reduction gives us the scale of it.”\(^{136}\) The relationship is indeed masochistic, involving desire and pain, suffering and pleasure. As one of the opening speeches goes:

\[\begin{align*}
\text{I remember you.} \\
\text{Who are you?} \\
\text{You destroy me.} \\
\text{You’re so good for me.} \\
\text{How could I have known that this city was made to the size of love?}
\end{align*}\]

\(^{135}\) Wilson, 64. 
\(^{136}\) Monaco, 45-47.
How could I have known that you were made for the size of my body?
[…].
You destroy me.
You’re so good for me.
You destroy me.
You’re so good for me.
Plenty of time.
Please.
Take me.
Deform me, make me ugly. *(Hiroshima mon amour* qtd. in Monaco, 47-50)

‘Deform me, make me ugly’ – is she not saying in other words: make me feel my pain again, I cannot feel it any more. I do not remember how to feel that pain any more? The memory of the pain is dying out, but we need it to keep the memory of the event itself, otherwise neither Hiroshima nor Auschwitz will ever be able to preserve the authenticity of their horror within world history.

*Hiroshima mon amour* seduces and invites the viewer to identify the meaning of the film with the love-story; Resnais places the Hiroshima story as a background for an ordinary love-story. Monaco says that the viewer of *Hiroshima mon amour* is forced to comprehend the horror of the atomic explosion, in the context of the love scene, so that the horror of Hiroshima would be associated with the lovemaking. Nevertheless, Resnais chooses several devices to break this illusionary simplification, to make the viewer doubt the first perception of the film. Monaco notes, that operating with intense, quick tracking shots, which unfold into the atmosphere of accurately composed portraits and medium shots, which seem to distance the viewer from the plot, Resnais provided us with a

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137 Monaco, 48-49.
subtextual commentary: Hiroshima is what we should get into, the love story is that from which we should remove ourselves.\(^{138}\)

What is crucial in the understanding of the film is that despite the extreme scale of the events, both the love-story and the story of the nuclear explosion, by virtue of their very juxtaposition, communicate the accumulation of emotional and physical pain, which resist any possible representation. Composing a story line in terms of such seemingly unjustifiable dialectics results in the emergence of a film that develops its idea by denying its own cinematographic methods.

In addition, memory as a constructing force of our self-identification plays a crucial role in *Hiroshima mon amour*. Memory is a dramatic force, which moves the characters both to each other and away from each other by manipulating their emotions and their sensations. Monaco claims that the energies of both characters “are directed towards forgetting. Her aim at the end of the film is to force him into oblivion: “I’ll forget you!” she screams at the end. “I’m forgetting you already! Look how I’m forgetting you! Look at me!” Parting is such sweet sorrow.”\(^{139}\)

The war plays a crucial role in this film, and the way the movie deals with this political issue is highly experimental. The characters do not speak politically in the film. This sudden inability to verbalize the political implications of the narrative is also disturbing. Nonetheless, the film in this respect does not become a-political; rather, by ceasing to speak of politics, the characters create another alternative solution for their post-war subjectivities. Their individualities are shaped by their relationship with the war and with the post-war experience and their memories of these experiences. Turning it into a silent body language, Resnais breaks through established ideas of thought and expression; his characters now enter the post-modern Deleuzian world of non-representation where

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\(^{138}\) Monaco, 49.

\(^{139}\) *Hiroshima mon amour*, in Monaco, 45.
nothing can be articulated by the vocal power of words. It is instead the body language of
the characters and the editing techniques that attach the political meaning to the film.

Cinematic tools of temporality are indeed various and sometimes unpredictable.
Today, one of the basic elements of film – the sound has become a sophisticated and
powerful tool in the cinematic universe. In his films, Resnais explores the semantic tension
of the sound accompaniment of film. His experiments reveal the polysemic nature of
sound and its capacity to modify the overall meaning and emotional contents of the film.
Furthermore, deeply influencing the formalistic features of film, sound can construct new
structural ties in film. In the book *Mindscreen: Bergman, Godard and First-Person Film*,
Bruce F. Kawin claims that:

> Sound it not, as was first feared, a ‘third leg’, but a highly expressive
> aspect of the filmed world.” […] “The narrator does not have to “tell”
sounds orally, but can allow the audience to share his ears, just as he
does not have to construct the landscape in front of him.140

This produces an impression of disorientation in the narration; where the semantic stress is
not just displaced from visual to sound effect or vice versa but is confused – the film thus
tends to lose its authoritative position.

The sequence from *Hiroshima mon amour* when the actress is observing her
Japanese lover laying on the bed provides a straightforward example of the uses of
subjective sound. The sequence runs less than two minutes and includes thirteen shots, ten
of which average four seconds in length; indeed the cutting is so dynamic and revelatory
that one can hardly has time to pay attention to the sound, but the sound here is the
principle narrator of the reality. While the French actress is reacting to the objects from her
immediate present she sees specific images from her past. So the sound is changing in its
density and loudness according to the intensity of her reminiscence. And furthermore the

140 Bruce F. Kawin, *Mindscreen: Bergman, Godard, and First-Person Film* (Princeton: Princeton University
sound accompaniment changes from the natural sounds, such as street sounds, when she perceives reality, back to music again when she becomes embroiled in her past.

Kawin describes this scene, in which the natural sound and music are used one after another to fit the actress’s mood. When the sound of the street suddenly disappears it is a signal that she has returned to her reminiscence, became disorientated, so she does not hear the noise of the street. Thus music becomes an instrument indicating her state of mind, the direction of her thought, the object of her attention; and it also controls the audience’s expectations. The return of the natural sound always indicates that she is back to normal life and the audience back to the present. He says that “music functions both impersonally and in the service of point of view – registering the levels of tension in the story (and controlling those of the audience) on the one hand, and indicating how the woman feels on the other”.

As was already mentioned above, Resnais deconstructs the concept of flashback in his films. Deleuze claims that for each layer of the past, Resnais involves all mental functions at once: memory and oblivion, pseudo-memory, imagination, intentions, etc. However, he continues, all this is fraught with ‘affects’. Resnais’s characters belong to the present, but their ‘affects’ are sunk into the past; and these ‘affects’ become the central characters of his films. Thus, it is increasingly difficult for Resnais to offer the viewer memories as explanation of past events, rather he offers ‘affects’ as traumatic hallucination. This method of working with the past ceases to explain the narrative, but instead disturbs the viewer. In *Hiroshima mon amour* it is impossible to tell whether Nevers has ever taken place, or is just a game of imagination; there is a possibility that all the images of the girl in Nevers are merely imagined by the Japanese man. As Deleuze puts it:

141 Kawin, 19-22.
142 Делез, *Кино*, 430.
Is it not for each of them a way of forgetting their own memory, of making a memory for two, as if memory were now ‘becoming’ world and detaching itself from the individuals. (Deleuze qtd. in Wilson, 53)

Besides, the memory of two is also constructed by the events themselves. It is worth noting that the preceding clearly indicates Resnais’s ambition to draw the viewers’ attention to the subjective time-flow. The audience is not only drawn into the personal reminiscence of the French actress, but is also confronted with the subjective interplay of her time layers. The music and the natural sound sequence construct a realm where the borders between the past and the present are not only regulated by her consciousness, but also regulate the specific film temporality. Allowing the heroine to deliver her unique sense of time (which is a complex multisemantic combination of allusions, of dreams, of reminiscences and of perceptions), Resnais introduces the subjectivity of time to the audience. Temporality is affected by the numerous mental strings and thus achieves a state which critic Kawin claims is not neutral:

The question of voice becomes, finally, the question of mind, and both are inseparable from the question of meaning.  

Conclusion

During the twentieth century, cinematography matured into an independent and potent form of art. Film as a sequence of images caught in continuity presents a unique tool of capturing time; it allows the viewer to observe the manipulation of temporal and of spatial values, which before was not possible in the arts. Furthermore, the technical and aesthetic conceptualization of cinematography was evolutionarily developing during its short history and, according to Deleuze, saw a major break after *Citizen Kane* (1941).

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143 Kawin, 22.
144 Deleuze, *The Time-Image*, 105.
and most forcefully following the Second World War. This break resulted in the emergence of the so-called ‘time-image’, which in its essence reveals a radical alienation of the individual in contemporary society, but seeks to establish a new philosophy of space and time in a disorientated post-war world.

The present analyses of the films chosen in this project aimed at revealing the new realities created by our two chosen film-makers. These realities echo the complexity and ambiguity of the contemporary individuality; these are the realities of a post-war subjectivity, one that is at one stroke both questioned and fragmented. Both Alain Resnais and Andrei Tarkovsky, whose bodies of work were conditioned by the emergence of a new post-modern consciousness, created a new cinematic style and also contributed to the rethinking of established cinematic techniques. Furthermore, both managed to challenge the conventional modes of cinematic (and image) representation, thus, creating a new type of visual reality, which Deleuze coined as the ‘time-image’.

Deleuze’s philosophy proved helpful for this research because it provides a new range of concepts and ideas that help us to negotiate the complexity of post-modern consciousness. His philosophical approach to cinematography, though having a highly systematic and abstract character, allowed the present study to find new, inspiring readings of selected films. Additionally, an attempt to involve Deleuze’s philosophical concepts, such as ‘becoming’, ‘any-space-whatever’ and others, enabled the project to see beyond the conventional categories of cinematography. Interpreting films on the basis of Deleuze’s philosophy means the integration of the most unexpected but highly inspiring concepts into the process of understanding film culture.

Experimenting with technical and with symbolic cinematic features, Resnais and Tarkovsky create new dimensions in the world of cinematography; these distinguished film-makers create new images of the past and of the present, and engender ways these
abstract notions can correlate with each other within the frame of postmodern consciousness. Decomposing memory and time, Resnais and Tarkovsky find new ways for expressing temporality and subjectivity. Their films produce different manifestations of the ‘time-image’ and reflect the complexity and ambiguity of the times when these films were created. Moreover, by modifying the reality into a multifaceted and open oscillating whole, Resnais and Tarkovsky reflected the “relativity of the spatio-temporal relationships and the vicissitudes of mental processes” (Turim, 3).

To conclude, it should be stressed that the films of Resnais and of Tarkovsky assessed in this project explore the philosophical questions that are of crucial import for the late Gilles Deleuze (1925-95). These are as follows: the concept of postwar subjectivity, the disappearance of the centralized ego, and the emergence of fragmentary, often marginalized characters; the ideas of sanity and of self-sacrifice, of potential energies and of the development of energy in the process of ‘becoming’; the vanishing of the sensory-motor states, which is a conventional narrative mode, and its replacement by what we have already adduced from Deleuze as “pure optical and sound situations”, which is often reflected in the broken linearity of the narrative; and last not least, the metamorphoses of time and of memory in the world of “universal schizophrenia” (Deleuze, *Time-Image*, 172). Thus, the creative integration of Deleuzian philosophical concepts broadened the classic interpretation of our selected films and stressed the importance of cinema as a powerful and provocative form of art, fully capable of delineating the “time-image”.

In addition, I would like to suggest that such an academic department as English and American studies at Charles University should develop an Interdisciplinary study program within its academic body and strive to include the diversity of cultural and critical material into its study guide. As soon as we integrate the discussion of cinema, philosophy, art criticism and theory into the current study material, we will obtain a far more exhaustive survey of modern thoughts and society. What cinematography is able to give is a fully established tradition of the theoretical and critical thought together with an absolutely new perspective on the problems of narration, of modes of representation, of the history of art, of the goals of art, and of the meaning of art. Today, film studies constitute an integral part of the cultural, literary, and linguistic academic tradition and, without any doubt, the integration of cinematic analysis will profit the professional growth of everyone at the Department.
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Cílem této práce bylo rozebrat filmy vybraných režisérů (Andrej Tarkovský, Alain Resnais) na základě filozofických úvah francouzského filozofa – Gillesa Deleuze. Ve své knize „Film: Obraz-pohyb a Obraz-čas“ zmíněný filozof vypracoval komplikovaný systém klasifikace kinematografických dílů a obrazů. Deleuze udává, že vývoj kinematografie prošel dramatickou změnou v poválečné době, kdy došlo ke zhroucení klasického schématu obrazu-pohybu. V důsledku totálního kolapsu konvenčních narativních metod a kolapsu převážně individuality, poválečná kinematografická scéna, zejména v Evropě, zaznamenala vznik „obrazu-času“. Táto práce se zaměřuje na analýzu uměleckých dílů v rámci „obrazu-času“ a zkoumá způsoby, které umožnily vybraným režisérům realizovat netradiční a často kontroverzní pochopení světa.

V části „Introduction“ je uvedeno krátké shrnutí dějin filmové teorie a také stručný přehled knihy „Film: Obraz-pohyb a Obraz-čas“. Vysvětluji, proč táto kniha nabízí širší a zajímavější přístup ke zkoumání filmového díla.

V první kapitole rozebírám postavení filmu ve filozofii G. Deleuza, zapojení filmu do filozofického a estetického systému, ve kterém film je zbaven reprezentativní funkce a vystupuje jako událost – „event“. Nabízím přehled základních vlastností „obrazu-času“.

Druhá kapitola je věnována ruskému režiséru Andreji Tarkovskému a zkoumá jeho filmy: „Stalker“„, „Nostalgie“ a „Oběť“. Aplikuji různé koncepty filozofie G. Deleuza abych dokázala, jaké možnosti nabízí „obraz-čas“ pro alternativní pochopení světa a jakým způsobem, technicky a esteticky, Tarkovský ve svých filmech vytvořil „obraz-čas“.

Třetí kapitola rozebírá díla francouzského režiséra – Alaina Resnais, jehož tvorba je součástí francouzské „Nové Vlny“. Tři filmy Resnais „Noc a mlha“, „Loni

Shrnutí.
v Marienbadu“ a „Hirošima, má lásku“ nabízí nestandardní úvahy o roli paměti, minulosti a imaginace v poválečné společnosti, což jsou základní významové funkce „obrazu-času“.

V závěru uvádím, že filozofické koncepty G. Deleuze pomohli rozšířit pochopení vybraných filmů a předvěst odlišný přístup k otázce interpretace kinematografického díla.