Building Positive Peace: Investigating Institutional Approaches to Peacebuilding and the "Local Turn"

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Abstract

Despite efforts to better understand and address the root causes of conflict, violence continues to affect nations and communities around the world, displacing millions and avoiding resolution. Global institutions, developed to promulgate a more cooperative and peaceful world order, have failed to adequately resolve conflicts, with many spanning multiple decades, regionalising, and involving an increasing number of non-state actors. Through historically situating the roots of liberal peacebuilding and analysing recent UN and AU approaches to peace consolidation and conflict resolution, this dissertation seeks to better understand the ways in which these institutions' pasts have influenced their present approaches. By bringing together historicist and sociological approaches to peace research, and following in a constructivist IR tradition, this dissertation traces norm formation at these institutions and contextualises calls for more "locally-led" approaches. I use historical research to situate the roots of UN and AU approaches and conduct thematic analysis to investigate norm shifts related to state sovereignty, protection of civilians, conflict prevention, gender, development, democracy, peacebuilding, and bottom-up approaches to peace. I find that while norms have shifted significantly in both institutions since the 1990s, influenced by the rise of human security and non-indifference norms, these norms continue to clash with earlier sovereignty-focused norms. Though they have different historical roots, the UN and AU have embedded similar norms and face similar challenges in reconciling tensions between these norms. As global conflict continues to evolve and institutions grapple with their efficacy, newer norms focused on gender, peacebuilding, and bottom-up efforts may provide opportunities for new conceptions of security that centre new referent actors as vital to peace consolidation.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Despite efforts to better understand and address the root causes of conflict, violence continues to affect nations and communities around the world, displacing millions and avoiding resolution. Global institutions, developed to promulgate a more cooperative and peaceful world order, have failed to adequately resolve conflicts, with many spanning multiple decades, regionalising, and involving an increasing number of non-state actors. Through historically situating the roots of liberal peacebuilding and analysing recent UN and AU approaches to peace consolidation and conflict resolution, this dissertation seeks to better understand the ways in which these institutions' pasts have influenced their present approaches. By bringing together historicist and sociological approaches to peace research, and following in a constructivist IR tradition, this dissertation traces norm formation at these institutions and contextualises calls for more "locally-led" approaches. I find that while norms have shifted significantly in both institutions since the 1990s, influenced by the rise of human security and non-indifference norms, these norms continue to clash with earlier sovereignty-focused norms. Though they have different historical roots, the UN and AU have embedded similar norms and face similar challenges in reconciling tensions between these norms.

In historicising the origins of the UN and AU and their founding principles and comparing these with more recent norm development, I seek to uncover what is static and dynamic about each institution's approaches to peace. How do these institutions' approaches compare to one another? Where have they succeeded and failed? Might these successes and failures be a result of their enshrined values?

Political thought and theory are not an exclusive monopoly of the West, although Western political philosophy has deeply informed the founding of global institutions, as

summarised in chapter two.[1] Given literature that suggests institutions are resistant to structural change, and that power differentials are engrained in structures and processes, I hypothesise that whereas United Nations' approaches to peace and conflict may be stymied by its founding principles, that the African Union, given its more recent transition and differing founding story, may emphasise alternative approaches to peace consolidation. It should be noted, however, that because of persistent Western interference in African countries' governance, it is possible that AU approaches may have evolved to reflect African bourgeoise interests rather than the interests of the people, thus primarily modelling normative Western approaches.[2] Financial dependencies may also impact the ways in which the AU is able to resist liberal approaches to peace and conflict resolution.

Thus, the question remains: have institutional norms changed due to "lessons learned" from institutional failures? Is there hope for reform, or are structural barriers too high to overcome? I use semi-systematic literature review, document analysis, and select civil society interviews to address the following questions:

- How have UN and AU approaches since the 1990s been informed by their histories?

- Have approaches changed since the 1990s to address persistent and emerging challenges?

- Where are UN and AU approaches similar and where do they differ?

- Can locally-owned and bottom-up approaches succeed where other approaches have failed?

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[1] Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, "The Cognitive Empire, Politics of Knowledge and African Intellectual Productions: Reflections on Struggles for Epistemic Freedom and Resurgence of Decolonisation in the Twenty-First Century," *Third World Quarterly*, 2020, 1–20.
[2] Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, "Following the Path of Revolution, Fanon's Political Legacy for Africa," *The Black Scholar* 42, no. 3–4 (2015): 36–44.

In investigating these questions, my literature review delves into debates around what peace is, how to define it, and who has historically been allowed to define it. This leads to a look at the historical roots of liberal conceptions of peace, which overwhelmingly inform institutional approaches, relying on a Westphalian conception of states, borders, and governance as well as racialised imaginaries of who is capable of governance and development. Chapter Three explains my positionality, research design, and the methodology I employ to investigate these questions.

Chapter Four delves into the UN as an institution, describing its origins and comparing its founding charter to that of the League of Nations in order to illustrate the UN as a continuation of the League. After this, I shift to peace-focused documents from the 1990s to today, tracing themes that arise throughout the documents and situating their evolution within the academic literature. I conclude that the UN continues its legacy of liberal peace approaches, albeit with limited cosmetic changes. Without significant structural reform, there is little hope for more equitable global power relations that could pave the way to positive peace for the global majority.

Chapter Five explores the African Union as an institution and its roots in the Organisation of African Unity. As in the previous chapter, I describe the AU's institutional origins and compare the OAU and AU founding documents before delving more deeply into recent documents related to contemporary peace and security challenges. I trace themes arising throughout these documents, using existing research to analyse shifts, and weaving in interviews with two women civil society actors who have engaged with these institutions over time. The concluding chapter briefly summarises the research findings.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Critical literature in recent decades suggests that the "liberal peace" is, at best problematic, and at worst, a myth. While much of contemporary peace studies affirms this finding, policy and implementation continue to approach conflict resolution from a Western-centric model of statebuilding that is often at odds with peacebuilding aims and approaches.[3]

As Johan Galtung wrote in 1969, peace is often defined as the opposite of, or absence of violence. Galtung takes a broad view, considering peace "present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations."[4] This definition allows space for a discussion of structural violence that goes beyond direct, personal violence. A further typology describes "positive" and "negative" peace, wherein negative peace refers to the absence of direct violence, war, or conflict, and positive peace represents both negative peace and a more expansive view which includes, in the words of Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr, "the presence of justice."[5] While countries not currently experiencing war are often considered "at peace," this does not describe the quality of the peace for those living in the society. Those who understand peace as more expansive describe the uneven distribution of resources, which causes unnecessary suffering, to be a form of violence. The tensions between these definitions leads to differing approaches to conflict resolution and peacebuilding. A parallel discussion runs through security studies, wherein classical "realist" scholars focus solely on armed conflict, while critical scholars employ the more expansive concept of "human security."

The concept of liberal peace stems from European enlightenment theories positing that lasting societal peace is best achieved through liberal democracy, necessitating market-based economic reform (the "liberal") and institution- and statebuilding efforts based on a

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[3] Dominik Balthasar, "'Peace-Building as State-Building'? Rethinking Liberal Interventionism in Contexts of Emerging States," *Conflict, Security and Development* 17, no. 6 (2017): 473–491.

[4] Johan Galtung, "Peace, and Peace Research," *Journal of Peace Research* 6, no. 3 (1969): 167–91.

[5] Martin Luther King, Jr., "Letter From the Birmingham Jail, or The Negro Is Your Brother," *The Atlantic Monthly* (Washington, DC, August 1963).

social contract between a government and its citizens (the "peace"). Whereas state failure scholars believe in statebuilding to resolve conflict, critical and post-colonial scholars contest that building all states in the image of Western states is either possible or desirable, arguing instead for a model that "fuses diverse nationalities into a unified framework of the nation."[6] Colonial governance models based on Berlin Conference boundaries created new divisions between ethnic groups, building or reinforcing hierarchies by rewarding some groups over others. In many cases, this led to cosmetic democracy wherein ethnicity was politicised for political gain, with majority groups as the clear winners. As Nyambura Githaiga demonstrates through Kenya's experience, identity-based violence thus often surfaces during elections.[7] In countries such as Rwanda and Burundi, where minority ethnic groups became the preferred governors, genocide and mass atrocities resulted, in part, from colonially-supported structures and hierarchies that disrupted traditional societal relations.[8] In such cases, the promise of democracy is a far cry from the promise of peace.

Oliver Richmond's typology of liberal peace demonstrates tensions between the internal components of liberal peace, describing a spectrum along which most interventions move and demonstrating how different norms contradict and undermine each other.[9] The "victor's peace," hyper-conservative military interventions, often occur during very violent crises, like in Bosnia and Kosovo, or more recently, Afghanistan and Libya. Such coercive military interventions are often criticized as using humanitarian language to mask Great Power interests. "Institutional peace" relies on normative and legal frameworks through which states agree on acceptable behaviour and proper enforcement mechanisms to influence states' behaviour towards one another. "Constitutional peace" emphasises Kant's

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[6] Christopher Zambaraki, "Challenges of Liberal Peace and Statebuilding in Divided Societies," *African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes* 23 (2017): 1–10, https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/challenges-liberal-peace-statebuilding-divided-societies/.
[7] Nyambura Githaiga, "When Institutionalisation Threatens Peacebuilding: The Case of Kenya's Infrastructure for Peace," *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development* 15, no. 3 (2020): 316–330.
[8] Mahmood Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002).
[9] Oliver P. Richmond, "The Problem of Peace: Understanding the 'Liberal Peace,'" *Conflict, Security & Development* 6, no. 3 (2006): 291–314.

argument that peace requires guaranteed democracy, based on the value of individual political rights, and accompanied by free trade. "Civil peace" looks toward individuals as agents of peace, rather than states or institutions. As described by Richmond, civil peace "is derived from the phenomena of direct action, of citizen advocacy and mobilisation," includes a "defence of basic human rights and values," and is "derived from liberal thinking on individualism and rights."[10] These strands of thought each have distinct roots and contradict one another in some places, ultimately depending on "intervention, and a balance of consent, conditionality, and coercion" for their implementation.[11]

Part and parcel of the liberal peace are the communities that supplement core political actors, including NGOs and civil society actors who support the larger epistemic liberal peace project. Catherine Goetze's work explores who gets to define peace, and to what effect.[12] Power here is understood in a Foucauldian and Bordieusian sense—as discourse rather than as a property and demonstrated through norms, values, discourses, and other forms of culture. If the people who make up the field are largely from the Global North, of a particular economic and social class, and educated in elite Western universities, their conceptions of peace are likely to follow the well-trodden paths of the liberal peace. Such approaches are embedded in institutions and their gatekeepers, and are difficult to shift, even when problems are identified.

Richmond demonstrates the continued dominance of the victor's peace, underpinned by the constitutional and institutional peace and harkening back to early Western political theorists. These three components require dominant states who are "at peace" to lead conflict resolution efforts in conflict-affected states, often through international organisations, institutions, and NGOs. The most critical discourse within the liberal peace framework is the emancipatory model, emphasising consent and local ownership, and rejecting coercive

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[10] Ibid., 293-294.
[11] Ibid., 296.
[12] Catherine Goetze, *The Distinction of Peace: A Social Analysis of Peacebuilding*, *Distinction of Peace: A Social Analysis of Peacebuilding*, 2017.

and conditional activities that produce dependency. This discourse comes mainly from the bottom-up approach, emphasises social welfare and justice, and relies on private actors and social movements over state actors.[13] While the UN as the main implementor of the liberal peace tends to focus on all aspects, even when incompatible, the US focuses more on victor's and constitutional peace, while remaining the largest funder of all aspects. Other major donors, NGOs, and agencies focus on civil and institutional peace, emphasising multilateralism and norm diffusion as key to sustainable peace.[14] The still-nascent emancipatory model has thus far not been employed by institutional actors. That differing preferred approaches often clash, and that the UN manages many different interests as the largest implementer, is apparent in the haphazard nature of some of its endeavours, as well as its struggles with securing adequate funding to implement its strategies. In the end, it is the powerful who continue to define peace without asking disputants what their ideal end goals would be.

In the realm of the civil peace, critical peace scholars believe roadmap-style, top-down approaches should be replaced with more dynamic, locally-informed approaches. Seeking to propel this shift, Pamina Firchow and Roger Mac Ginty's work on the Everyday Peace Indicators project emphasises a bottom-up understanding of peace informed by local communities in order to complement top-down measurement mechanisms.[15] Such bottom-up efforts have been well-established in the development field, where "participatory" methods invite local actors to define the problems they face and decide for themselves what interventions should look like.[16] In the related, but distinct, peacebuilding field, such approaches are relatively new and not yet widespread.

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[13] Richmond, "The Problem of Peace," 301.
[14] Ibid., 305.
[15] Pamina Firchow and Roger Mac Ginty, "Measuring Peace: Comparability, Commensurability, and Complementarity Using Bottom-up Indicators," *International Studies Review* 19, no. 1 (2017): 6–27.
[16] Robert Chambers, "Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA): Analysis and Experience," *World Development* 22, no. 9 (1994): 1253–1268.

Recent UN, EU, and World Bank documents on peacebuilding policy and approach affirm a discursive shift toward the local. However, the "local turn" has its own issues and contradictions. Local actors are not monolithic, and peacebuilding is a dynamic, not a static, process, deeply entangled in shifting identities in any given context.[17] Bräuchler and Naucke outline the relative ambivalence of local populations as partners in peacebuilding—not that locals are not an important reference point, but that they are often unfairly and uncritically venerated, to the detriment of project or political goals.[18] While local populations should determine their own fates, a return to pre-colonial traditions, for example, is often uncritically suggested as a solution to violent post-colonial orders. Such a suggestion ignores the ways in which societies, and the various identities within them, change over time, both as a natural occurrence and in response to oppressive systems of power. Bringing in traditional justice mechanisms then, like Rwanda's adaptation of pre-colonial *gacaca* courts for genocide trials, may have unintended consequences when it comes to long term peace formation. With this in mind, the "local turn" in peacebuilding broadly refers to attempts to refocus conflict resolution onto bottom-up, sometimes traditional cultural practices and approaches that emphasise the agency of local actors, particularly those affected by violence.

In this dissertation, I refer to "peace consolidation" as an inclusive blanket term encompassing peace enforcement, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. Peacekeeping occurs in cases of ongoing conflict and involves deploying armed actors to "support the implementation of a ceasefire or peace agreement."[19] Peace enforcement is a type of peacekeeping encompassing externally-imposed military approaches. Peacemaking occurs at high, usually interstate, levels to address cases of ongoing conflict, focusing on diplomatic tools and engagement to bring conflicting parties into negotiated settlement.

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[17] Pol Bargués, "Peacebuilding without Peace? On How Pragmatism Complicates the Practice of International Intervention," *International Psychogeriatrics* 36, no. 2 (2020): 237–255.

[18] Birgit Bräuchler and Philipp Naucke, "Peacebuilding and Conceptualisations of the Local," *Social Anthropology* 25, no. 4 (2017): 422–436.

[19] United Nations Peacekeeping, "Terminology," accessed March 23, 2021, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/terminology.

Peacebuilding measures aim to reduce the risk or recurrence of violence in a particular setting, with the end goal of building sustainable peace. It is the only part of the wider framework that emphasises both negative and positive peace and contributes to some of the tensions between the approaches. While these are simplified definitions, and the lines between each are often blurred, they encompass UN and other institutional approaches to ending conflict and supporting sustainable peace.

Post-colonial scholarship suggests that non-dominant states can make use of loopholes in international law to enact positive change, even in systems not intended for them. For example, the 1960 Bandung Conference, a gathering of newly independent Asian and African countries, ended in a declaration that centred UN Charter principles in demanding decolonisation. This conference helped transform the international order and led to the passage of the UN Declaration on Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples later that year.[20] This effort challenged both the post-War colonial order and the new postcolonial order wherein the Great Powers sought continued influence in post-colonial states during the Cold War. The Conference was preceded by a number of international solidarity conferences, including two women's conferences: one in 1949 in Beijing, and one in 1958 in Colombo, Sri Lanka. Armstrong delves deeply into the 1949 conference, showing the emergence of the international movement of women who had largely been side-lined in decolonial independence struggles. This movement pushed back against Europe and the U.S. as the "legitimate" sites of feminist thinking and rejected the Western-dominated feminist agenda. Quotes from delegates to these anti-imperial women's conferences echo women's voices at the San Francisco Conference that finalised the UN Charter, as well as pan-African women's movements: "The establishment of peace, freedom and democracy…is impossible of full realization so long as colonialism and oppression exist

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[20] Ahmad Rizky Mardhatillah Umar, "Rethinking the Legacies of Bandung Conference: Global Decolonization and the Making of Modern International Order," *Asian Politics and Policy* 11, no. 3 (2019): 461–478.

in any part of the world," said Taruna Bose, an Indian delegate to the 1949 Conference.[21] This oppression was largely the result of ongoing coercion by imperial powers, including the United States, that emphasised free-market capitalism and impacted states' ability to make meaningful economic reforms that might benefit their entire populations, including rural women who faced sweeping challenges, including unequal wages, inadequate healthcare, food insecurity, and gendered violence. [22] What, to these women, is "peace"?

In investigating the local as an emerging institutional focus, I am interested in civil society and their role in invoking political change that can lead to conflict resolution. As a population often left out of decisionmaking processes, women and girls are a key population to investigate within civil society and social movements. As I consider the UN and AU's peace formation practices, I investigate whether a more emancipatory "civil peace" framework is gaining ground in the liberal peace framework and disrupting the stronger conservative and orthodox branches.

[21] WIDF, "Second Women's International Congress Proceedings, Budapest, Hungary, December, 1948" (Northampton, MA, USA, 1949) in Armstrong, 308.
[22] Elisabeth Armstrong, "Before Bandung: The Anti-Imperialist Women's Movement in Asia and the Women's International Democratic Federation," *Signs* 41, no. 2 (2016): 305–331.

Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework, Design, and Methodology

Theoretical Framework

In this dissertation, I use historical sociology and historical institutionalism to explore the UN and AU as institutions and those people they intend to help. Whereas historians tend to emphasise the uniqueness of historical events and reject attempts at generalisation, sociology looks towards theoretical generalisations to understand social phenomena. Historical sociology brings the two together, understanding historical perspectives as germane to the study of social phenomena.[23] By applying a historical sociologist approach, I seek to better understand how the actors, politics, and theories of earlier times impacted the structures that were built and how and why these institutions approach peace and conflict as a result.

Inside of comparative politics, historical institutionalism explores the "role of temporal phenomena in influencing the origin and change in institutions that govern political and economic relations,"[24] emphasising how the timing and sequence of events generate institutions and how they implement policy. The focus of historical institutionalism is often on states rather than global institutions, though it holds analytical use for both global and non-state entities. Henry Farrell and Martha Finnemore suggest that by engaging with organisational sociology and IR constructivism, historical institutionalism can be usefully applied to global institutions.[25] Historical institutionalism understands states as autonomous organisational actors that persist and evolve well after the reasons for their initial formation have passed. Global and regional institutions can be understood in much the same way, though there are key conceptual differences, as the structures of member-based institutions

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[23] Jiří Subrt, *The Perspective of Historical Sociology: The Individual As Homo-Sociologicus Through Society and History* (Bingley, UK: Emerald Publishing Limited, 2017).
[24] Orfeo Fioretos, Tulia G. Falleti, and Adam Sheingate, "Historical Institutionalism in Political Science," in *The Oxford Handbook of Historical Institutionalism*, ed. Orfeo Fioretos, Tulia G. Falleti, and Adam Sheingate, First (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2016), 4–28.
[25] Henry Farrell and Martha Finnemore, "Global Institutions without a Global State," in *The Oxford Handbook of Historical Institutionalism*, ed. Orfeo Fioretos, Tulia G. Falleti, and Adam Sheingate (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2016), 572–589.

are different from state institutions. They also evolve in different ways, in response to crises, changing membership, and changing missions.[26] With no hierarchical state and no enforcement mechanisms, global institutions rely on norms and ideas to build power and make change, and promoting certain values is core to their mission. International organisations establish rules, hierarchies, and standards that must be met, in service of influencing actors to behave in a particular way. The methods used to coerce actors—usually states—to take on their recommendations, are different than those of states, and they thus must establish their authority in different ways, such as through expertise or legitimacy.

A norm is defined as a "standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity."[27] Political scientists speak of norms, whereas sociologists describe "institutions" as collections of behavioural practices and rules. Political scientists sometimes refer to institutions as norms, rather than collections of norms whose rules and practices have changed over time. In identifying norms, Finnemore and Sikkink demonstrate that it is only possible to view them through indirect evidence, such as a state's defence of a particular action or policy, as in U.S. land mine use on the Korean peninsula. They demonstrate "how agreement among a critical mass of actors on some emergent norm can create a tipping point" towards widespread agreement.[28] This dissertation investigates global institutions' norm development and shifts that seek to govern member-state behaviour, as well as civil society efforts to hasten norm development through influencing text in official institutional documents. As a more recent normative framework, the "women, peace, and security" (WPS) framework may provide important lessons for newer efforts toward locally-led peacebuilding as a set of norms.

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[26] Ibid., 575.
[27] Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998): 887–917.
[28] Ibid., 892.

As Mahmood Mamdani notes, "The management of difference is the holy cow of the modern study of society, just as it is central to modern statecraft."[29] Sociological theory assists in understanding interaction between and within groups, as group identity formation, integration, and fracture are core to understanding conflict cycles. Power is germane as well, as social stratification defines who in global or local society is able to act, to what degree, and under whose influence. Catherine Goetze's concept of exclusionary field thus assists in analysing those who shaped the institutions, and how their founding principles impact the norms they promulgate, and in whose interest.[30]

Research Design and Methodology

To evaluate the chosen institutions, their changing approaches, and their relationships with civil society, I chose to conduct a semi-structured literature review and thematic content analysis. The thematic content analysis is centred on document analysis and supplemented by interviews with civil society actors. I selected literature as methodology in order to collect and synthesise previous research from a number of disciplines. By combining historical research with political science and sociology, I aim to delve deeper into the institutions and the shifting politics and historical moments that shaped their approaches to conflict prevention and resolution.[31] Using a semi-systematic approach allowed me to explore my research question by developing a broad understanding of the core issues and actors, the state of knowledge production in related fields, and the major actors involved in norm promulgation at different levels. This helped me situate the core disagreements within each field and solidify my own understanding of the topics and theories under investigation.

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[29] Mahmood Mamdani, *Define and Rule: Native as Political Identity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2021).
[30] Goetze, *The Distinction of Peace: A Social Analysis of Peacebuilding*.
[31] Hannah Snyder, "Literature Review as a Research Methodology: An Overview and Guidelines," *Journal of Business Research* 104, no. July (2019): 333–339.

My thematic analysis was conducted through document analysis and interviews. These data sources allowed me to triangulate and corroborate my findings, as the documents selected came from official sources and my interviews opened a window into some of the ideas and perspectives of those affected by institutional interventions. As described by Sharan B Merriam, documents "can help the research uncover meaning, develop understanding, and discover insights relevant to the research problem."[32] As I interpreted the changing themes and ebbs and flows of official discourse and its interactions with civil society, combining document analysis with literature review helped me grapple with official discourse and how it interacted with current events and public perception. The selection of themes assisted in tracking change and development of ideas championed by the institutions and their subsidiaries. As I was reminded through my interviews, civil society is not a monolith, and there are a variety of ideas and perceptions within this grouping, as well as disagreements between different civil society groups and members within groups. The same is true of institutions, as signified by the differing approaches of development, political, and peacekeeping branches of the UN and AU. While both institutions are attempting to move towards an inclusive approach, there appears to be a disconnect between the different agencies involved in projects, as their goals and approaches may be based on different epistemological assumptions.

In each institutional assessment, I trace the founding of the institution, noting key actors who shaped its structure and approach and describing major norm shifts over time. This analysis largely relies on secondary historical research, and I have included a variety of sources to limit bias. Alongside this analysis, I used NVivo to conduct thematic analysis on seminal UN and AU documents that demonstrate their worldview and the approaches they utilise. I trace major themes throughout core peace-focused documents, drawing conclusions

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[32] Sharan B Merriam, *Case Study Research in Education: A Qualitative Approach*, The Jossey-Bass Education Series (San Francisco, CA, US: Jossey-Bass, 1988); in Glenn A. Bowen, "Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method," *Qualitative Research Journal* 9, no. 2 (2009): 27–40.

regarding the institutions' shifting approaches. I conclude with a comparison of the institutions' approaches, as well as some thoughts on the role of civil society in shaping these approaches over time.

While there is ample research on how outside actors influenced norm development at the League of Nations and UN, there is considerably less on the role of civil society in influencing the Organisation of African Unity and the African Union. In seeking to better understand these dynamics, I sought out conversations with African women advocates to better understand the relationship between civil society and African regional institutions in affecting norm diffusion.

Limitations and Ethics

This research is limited by the time allotted for research, access to interviewees and archives, and the word limit, all of which affect the depth of the analysis. The availability of institutional documents is a notable concern. For example, while some AU documents are publicly available online, others require physical presence at AU headquarters, or are limited to the public. For this reason, I selected public documents that show the development of policies and frameworks that aim to prevent and alleviate conflict-related suffering. Local-level analysis is limited by the necessity of reliance on second-hand research conducted by other analysts. Due to time and word limits, I was also unable to conduct a deep historical investigation into the predecessor organisations of the UN and AU—the League of Nations and Organisation of African Unity. A longer study should be conducted with a focus on these two institutions to trace shifts over a longer period.

While I had hoped to conduct three to five interviews, it was difficult to reach many of the actors I sought to interview. Contact information was inaccessible, and the short timeframe made it difficult to identify and build relationships with individuals who might have been able to facilitate introductions. This was likely exacerbated by the COVID-19

crisis, as well as differences in preferred communication styles. The time I had allocated for interviews was shortened by the amount of time it took to secure ethics approval. The two interviews I secured were with women I already knew from working on Burundi advocacy during the 2015 constitutional crisis. These women are Burundian and living outside of Burundi, which likely affects their perspectives. However, our familiarity with one another meant that there was trust already built into our interactions, and we could immediately delve deeply into the interview questions without needing to build rapport with one another. Both women, who are still deeply engaged in advocacy, have spent time influencing both the UN and the AU throughout their careers, and had very valuable perspectives about the approach of both organisations to addressing issues on the continent. These perspectives helped bridge some of the theoretical gaps between official discourse and practice.

A Note on Positionality

Before describing my research design and methodology, it is important to share a note on my positionality—that is, how my various identities and life experiences influence my research approach. As an aspirant feminist and postcolonial scholar, I am aware of my various identities and how they may affect my approach to, and understanding of, the issues at hand. As a white American, I benefit from my nationality, skin colour, and the material implications of colonialism and slavery. Outside of academia, my career is in human rights advocacy, and from an early age I was taught about the virtues of the liberal peace and its achievements.

As I conduct research on UN and AU approaches to peace, I carry the many teachings and contradictions of my experiences in international human rights advocacy with me. I seek to do as little harm as possible, and to approach my research with curiosity, openness, and humility. I hope to make a modest contribution to the issues that I care so deeply about and that I will continue to work towards professionally: better understanding dynamics of global

power, the drivers of policy and programmatic change, representation of neglected peoples in issues affecting their lives, and making academic concepts more accessible and relevant outside of academia. For a further explanation of my positionality, see Appendix II.

Chapter 4: From League of Nations to United Nations: Frozen Power Relations and Western Primacy

This chapter historically situates the establishment of the United Nations and analyses the evolution of its enshrined values over time. In seeking to understand how history and theory development affected the formation of core UN thinking on peace and conflict, I first trace the origins, philosophies, and dynamics of European states and empires. The first part of this chapter gives a snapshot of how European political philosophy embedded racism and justified empire prior to the founding of the League of Nations and the UN. Next, I provide a brief historical overview of the League of Nations as the predecessor to the UN and those involved in the formation of these institutions. Then, I analyse the major peace and conflict-related themes and concepts embedded into formative UN documents, first comparing the founding documents, and then turning to other major documents that have marked shifts in UN peace consolidation approaches since the 1990s. Finally, I make a few conclusions regarding the concepts that have endured and shifted over time and share some implications of this analysis. Through this analysis, I find that the UN continues to embed and champion norms based on liberal peace theories that justify Western approaches to conflict resolution. Though they have entered the lexicon, newer norms that emphasise the agency of non-state actors in peacebuilding have thus far been insufficiently funded and developed by the UN, while armed peacekeeping and statebuilding norms continue to be supported.

The Legacy of Empire and Racism in the West

From the mid-twentieth century, due to a drastic sociological turn in scholarly literature, social scientists have largely accepted that the concept of race is socially constructed. This understanding, however, does not make the reality of white domination over racialised others any less important or relevant. As critical race and post-colonial scholars remind us, it is exactly the socially constructed conceptions of race that have had

violent implications for Black, Indigenous, and other non-white people around the world for hundreds of years. As Neil MacMaster notes, the "widespread belief in such categorization […] has had enormous implications for the way in which 'white' Europeans have historically set out to dominate, exploit and kill 'inferior' peoples."[33] The belief in, and justification of, racial hierarchies has led to vast global racial inequalities, as well as national-level racial inequalities that persist today. Both anti-Black and antisemitic racism, used as justification for colonialism and empire, have had significant consequences for global power relations and remain crucial to understanding contemporary challenges to peace consolidation.

In *The New Age of Empire*, Kehinde Andrews demonstrates the history and underlying logic of racism baked into the Western world order, tracing its origins from erasure of non-Western modes of knowing into actively racist Enlightenment thought— origins that are often ignored or side-lined in mainstream political science and adjacent teaching and curricula.[34] The Enlightenment popularised racist thought, merging racial identity with capitalist thinking to justify racialised empire wherein Western states had a responsibility to rule over and expand into formerly-independent communities and nations. While critical scholars claim that racism cannot be disentangled from Enlightenment thinkers' other writings, traditionalists believe that Enlightenment-era theories on politics and peace are unaffected by the racist discourse that surrounds them. This debate, and the tensions within it, are relevant to this research, as knowledge production and political power are inextricably linked. In the case of the UN, policymakers and academics worked together to develop the institutions' structures and ways of operating, baking in Enlightenment theory in the process.

In tracing the origins of the UN, the literature often points to Immanuel Kant's theory of perpetual peace. As described by Carl Friedrich, Kant believed the goal of civilisation to be "the full development of the autonomous personality […] through the establishment of a

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[33] Neil MacMaster, *Racism in Europe : 1870-2000* (Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2001).
[34] Kehinde Andrews, *The New Age of Empire: How Racism and Colonialism Still Rule the World* (Penguin Books, 2021).

universal rule of law, that is to say, a scheme of organization which would guarantee universal and eternal peace."[35] As opposed to the Abbé Saint Pierre before him, who advocated a permanent international organisation made up of alliances of princes to uphold rule of law, Kant emphasised a union of autonomous states that could develop peace between nations. He rejected earlier notions of philosopher-rule, believing in the cause of the "common man," and thus supporting American and French republican rule. However, though Kant and many of his contemporaries emphasised freedom for the common man, he also saw "humanity in its greatest perfection in the race of the Whites," promoting a hierarchy that claimed, "the yellow [Asian] Indians do have a meagre talent," with "Negroes far below them and at the lowest point are a part of the American peoples."[36] Such arguments by well-regarded philosophers and statesmen upheld the white supremacist world order, even as these men made grandiose statements about freedom and democracy.

Histories of race theory formation, including "scientific racism" can situate the origins of white supremacy and the mythologies about whiteness that have persisted in the West up to today, including in the field of International Relations. While slavery as an institution was not originally a racialised phenomenon, it became so through capitalism. Enslaved Africans became known for their labour in Barbados in the 1600s. As prices for enslaved non-Africans rose, elites purchased enslaved Africans, leading to a huge demographic shift in enslaved peoples.[37] By the 1700s, as the European Enlightenment period began, philosophical figures such as David Hume, Immanuel Kant, and Georg Wilheim Friedrich Hegel began to publish work on human races, placing whites at the top of the scale.[38] Such "intellectual" justifications of racial hierarchies rationalised slavery and

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[35] Carl J. Friedrich, "The Ideology of the United Nations Charter and the Philosophy of Peace of Immanuel Kant 1795-1945," *The Journal of Politics* 9, no. 1 (1947): 10–30.
[36] Immanuel Kant, selections from "Physical Geography," in Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, *Race and the Enlightenment: A Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997); also quoted in Andrews, *The New Age of Empire: How Racism and Colonialism Still Rule the World,* 30.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Naomi Zack, "Introduction," in *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Race*, ed. Naomi Zack (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

colonial conquest, and these theories, though long criticised and debunked, still lie at the heart of many political theories and governance approaches.[39]

Jacques Derrida wrote in 1982 that "the white man takes his own mythology, Indo-European mythology, from his own *logos*, that is, the *mythos* of his idiom, for the universal form of that which he must still wish to call Reason."[40] Barnor Hesse elaborates on this, discussing the concept of race as central to conceptions of "modernity" used by such Enlightenment thinkers, conceptions embedded into both the League of Nations Covenant and the UN Charter. The concept of modernity relies on an understanding of "Europeanness" and "non-Europeanness" based largely on religion-based racialised imaginaries.[41] The language of modernity and "progress" used language of religion and morality to engrain a humanitarian lens into colonial encounters, justifying colonial conquest and slavery for the non-white global majority's "own good." Alongside racist biological and anthropological research that persisted well into the early 1900s,[42] such philosophical works set the foundations for hierarchical thinking about race that has deeply shaped global society.

As Mark Mazower painstakingly traces, the UN should be understood as a continuation of a history of world organisation highly informed by the issue of, particularly British, imperialism.[43] "A great deal is assumed about the UN's past by both supporters and critics on the basis of cursory readings of foundational texts, and there is very little acknowledgement of the mixed motives that accompanied their drafting."[44] While U.S. President Woodrow Wilson was one of the foremost champions of the League of Nations, the idea of a federation of nations, particularly of white-majority and white settler nations,

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[39] Errol A. Henderson, "Hidden in Plain Sight: Racism in International Relations Theory," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 26, no. 1 (2013): 71–92; Robbie Shilliam, "Race and Racism in International Relations: Retrieving a Scholarly Inheritance," *International Politics Reviews*, 2020.
[40] Jacques Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy* (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1982).
[41] Barnor Hesse, "Racialized Modernity: An Analytics of White Mythologies," *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 2007.
[42] John P. Jackson, "'In Ways Unacademical': The Reception of Carleton S. Coon's The Origin of Races," *Journal of the History of Biology*, 2001.
[43] Mark Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2009), 14.
[44] Ibid., 5.

was not new. At the Paris Peace Conference in 1849, Victor Hugo recommended the formation of a United States of Europe, and after World War I the idea of such a structure was again discussed throughout liberal internationalist circles in Europe as a potential war prevention measure. Mazower notes that there had been conversation amongst British commentators regarding a federalisation of white settler nations since the 1880s.[45]

Davis, Thakur, and Vale describe how British thinkers' work on consolidating racialised empire led to the creation of International Relations as a field—a field that, in turn, contributed to the rise of the liberal global order and its current institutions.[46] Brits in South Africa at the turn of the century gathered to support the intellectual development of a federated global Anglo empire with racial categorisations and hierarchies at its core. These men formed an epistemic community to develop unity within the empire, from the vantage point of Britain's colonies, rather than in London and Washington, DC, as had previously been done.[47] These men's British counterparts concurrently aimed to extend British influence while strengthening ties with the United States. Such efforts, they said, would usher in a peaceful world order—in the form of a global racialised hierarchy. Sceptics of such a framework included Winston Churchill, George Curzon, and Arthur Balfour, who, while sharing a vision of empire, preferred British primacy in international relations and did not want to negotiate with or defer to other powers.

In addition to political and intellectual norm entrepreneurs, there was a vibrant civil society landscape in Britain and Europe at the turn of the century that also believed global governance key to long-term peace. Peace activists contributed significantly to the public conversation on liberal internationalism and works by J.A. Hobson and others were widely circulated and read across Britain.[48] Concurrently, in mainland Europe, the conversation

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[45] Ibid., 33.

[46] Alexander E. Davis, Vineet Thakur, and Peter Vale, *The Imperial Discipline: Race and the Founding of International Relations* (London, UK: Pluto Press, 2020).

[47] Ibid., 6.

[48] Helen McCarthy, "The Respectable Face of Troublemaking," in *The British People and the League of Nations: Democracy, Citizenship and Internationalism, c. 1918-45* (Manchester, United Kingdom: Manchester University Press, 2011), 1–11.

evolved with help from pacifists. However, the largest internationalist movement in Britain, led by the League of Nations Union sought to bridge divides between political parties, and mainstream the idea of an international organisation with global membership.[49] As a result, conservative ideas of empire prevailed and merged with liberal ideas, forming a hybrid organisation that could be highly contradictory in its speech and approaches.

That IR's founding fathers advocated for empire and racial hierarchy is germane to understanding the development of the League of Nations, and later the UN. As Davis et al argue, "this history still shapes the way that we think even as the discipline largely fail(s) to remember it."[50] That it was the same epistemic community, and in many cases the same particular men, who advocated for colonial expansion who led the drafting on the League of Nations Covenant is telling. As Britain and the U.S., members of the UN Security Council, key donor states, and leaders in international financial institutions, continue to dominate global power structures, dictating policy and approaches for former colonies, it is unsurprising that many view their roles as little more than soft colonialism.

The Western world is a "changing and contested construct" and a "historical phenomenon transformed through colonial and imperial expansion, which created complex relations with long-lasting consequences."[51] The same is true other geographic regions. Conceptions of which countries and peoples are part of the "West," Europe, and Africa have changed over time and have been influenced by imperial relationships. Ann Stoler's conception of imperial formations helps explain the shift from a time of formal empires to the present era of organised liberal cooperation. She describes imperial formations as "processes of becoming" "defined by racialized relations of allocations and appropriations," developing the concept of "ruination," a process by which imperial power effects the present

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[49] McCarthy, 2.
[50] Ibid., 11.
[51] Karen Hagemann, "Introduction: Gender and the History of War—The Development of the Re-search," in *The Oxford Handbook of Gender, War, and the Western World since 1600*, ed. Karen Hagemann, Stefan Dudink, and Sonya O. Rose (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), xxvi–34.

through processes of "decimation, displacement, and reclamation."[52] Stoler borrows Derek Walcott's question, "What rot remains when the men are gone?"[53] This question is relevant to imperially-imposed political structures, including the hierarchies configured and reconfigured throughout the colonial period. Indeed, she claims that "The social terrain on which colonial processes of ruination leave their material and mental marks are patterned by the social kinds those political systems produced, by the racial ontologies they called into being, and by the deficiencies and threats associated with them."[54] This form of "ruination" is never "over," remaining "in bodies, in the poisoned soil, in water on a massive and enduring scale."[55] Stoler refutes former French President Nicolas Sarkozy's words to Dakar in 2007 that colonisation may be responsible for some ills, but not "all the present-day difficulties of Africa," including "the bloody wars that Africans wage among themselves," "corruption," and "waste and pollution."[56] Postcolonial scholars have for years traced the impacts of colonial state-building endeavours to protracted internal conflict, in Africa and elsewhere. While there is not one singular cause, the reordering of societies into colonially-imposed structures and hierarchies has had clear and long-lasting impacts on both the global order and post-colonial state governance.

Women activists played a role in internationalism, often merging pacifism with women's suffrage, and, at times, civil rights. Though women were sidelined in formal political processes, women's groups engaged with one another internationally well before the League of Nations was founded. The first International Congress of Women's Rights was held in Paris in 1878, and in 1915, 1,300 women from 12 countries gathered in the Hague as part of the Women's Peace Congress in opposition to World War I. Such events sowed the seeds of women-specific peace organising that continues today. Organisations

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[52] Ann Laura Stoler, "IMPERIAL DEBRIS: Reflections on Ruins and Ruination," *Cultural Anthropology* 23, no. 2 (2017): 191–219.
[53] Ibid., 200.
[54] Ibid., 204.
[55] Ibid., 207.
[56] Ibid., 211.

such as the International Alliance of Women, the International Council of Women, L'alliance national de sociétés feminines Suisses, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, and the World Young Women's Christian Association worked to influence the League of Nations and continued to influence the United Nations as it succeeded the former as the premier international organisation. Given this background, it is perhaps not surprising that the UN Charter was the first international agreement affirming gender equality as a fundamental human right.

Convened by the U.K., U.S., China, and the Soviet Union, the 1945 San Francisco Conference hosted 850 delegates from 50 countries, along with staff, advisors, and press. Of 850 delegates, 8 were women: Ellen Wilkinson and Florence Gertrude Horsbrugh of the United Kingdom, Minerva Bernardino of the Dominican Republic, Bertha Lutz of Brazil, Jessie Street of Australia, Wu Yi-fang of China, Virginia Gildersleeve of the United States, and Isabel Pinto de Vidal of Uruguay. Four of these women ultimately signed the UN Charter. The viewpoints of these delegates differed in their approaches to women's issues, and there is growing recognition of the particular role of Latin American women in ensuring women's rights were enshrined in the UN Charter. Bertha Lutz wrote in her memoirs that other women delegates from the U.S. and U.K. told her "not to ask for anything for women in the Charter since that would be a very vulgar thing to do."[57] It was an uphill battle to get women's rights highlighted in both the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and it was women from the Global South who secured this victory.

Hagemann, Dudink, and Rose ask "what happens when gender is integrated into histories of war and state formation, with their conventional assumption of clear-cut boundaries between state and society, military, and civilian spheres?"[58] They highlight five major historical processes to assist in analysing the intersections of gender, war, and the West: changes in the form and technology of warfare and types of war; state formation and

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[57] "Women and the UN Charter," SOAS Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy, 2021, https://www.soas.ac.uk/cisd/research/women-in-diplomacy/women-in-the-un-charter/.
[58] Hagemann, "Introduction: Gender and the History of War—The Development of the Research" 20.

nation-building; colonialism and imperialism; national liberation and anticolonialism; and the promulgation of war and violence and attempts to control and prevent them.[59] While it is impossible to draw boundaries around these themes, the last of these is important to this study: attempts to control and prevent conflict, and the role of international and regional institutions in this historical process. While I focus here on more recent developments, understanding this moment in relation to historical processes and how conceptions of gender, race, and power have shaped, and been shaped by them, is vital.

From League of Nations to United Nations: Founding Documents Analysis

While there are a few key differences between the Covenant of the League of Nations and the United Nations Charter, the differences lie largely in the framing of the documents, rather than their organisational structures. Here, I compare the two documents before analysing key documents that describe the UN's approaches to peace consolidation since the 1990s. Many of these documents relate specifically to UN peacekeeping efforts, though with the rise of the concepts of the "security-development nexus," and the "triple nexus" of aligned humanitarian, development, and peace activities, other aspects of peace consolidation are increasingly addressed by UN agencies alongside peacekeeping operations.

Both the League Covenant and the UN Charter frame the purpose of their respective organisation around international cooperation and international peace and security, aiming to develop institutional norms to keep states from going to war with one another through practice and law. Both give their associated institution the ability to act on global issues, not only issues in signatory states. War and armaments are thoroughly highlighted in the League Covenant, as is the norm of seeking judicial settlement for disputes by a permanent court. The League concentrated power in the League of Nations Council, the equivalent of today's

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[59] Ibid., 21.

UN Security Council. Its permanent members were Britain, France, Italy, and Japan, with elected, rotating members, whereas the UN's permanent Security Council members are the U.S., U.K., France, Soviet Union (now Russia), and China, also with elected, rotating members. Permanent members in both institutions were granted a veto on any issue, which, while an important short-term compromise intended to ensure superpower membership, has often hindered progress on various peace and security issues due to these members' political interests.

The most major thematic shift is the UN's focus on individual human rights, affirming the "dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small," as well as a focus on "social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom."[60] Such language, absent in the League Covenant, demonstrates a shift in norms from focusing solely on war and its prevention to a liberal understanding of individual rights and liberties. This is codified through the formal establishment of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in Article 7. The Charter recognises the principle of "equal rights and self-determination of peoples," specifically naming economic, social, cultural, educational, and health issues faced by the world's peoples as of interest to, and under the jurisdiction of, the UN. Here, we can see the beginnings of a shift towards positive peace.

In line with a more expansive view of international responsibility, Article 24 of the League Covenant sought to bring various international bureaux, commissions, and agencies under its jurisdiction. The League's Health Commission would become the World Health Organisation and the Refugees Committee would become the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Article 25 of the Covenant is the first to mention a formal relationship with non-governmental organisations—in this case, national Red Cross organisations for the purpose of humanitarian assistance. Such a commitment is likewise encapsulated in Article 71 of the

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[60] United Nations, "Charter of the United Nations" (1945), https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-full-text/.

UN Charter, which allows ECOSOC to consult with any NGO "concerned with matters within its competence."

Much of the UN Charter focuses on international conflict, prevention of war, and armaments. Chapter VII of the Charter specifically discusses actions that the UNSC can take when there is a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" in order to "maintain or restore international peace and security." This has allowed for changing approaches to peace consolidation throughout the existence of the organisation, as it can be interpreted to include violent and non-violent measures. The section further states that non-military responses can include "complete or partial interruption of economic relations," means of communication, and diplomatic relations. In terms of military responses, it is understood that member-states will undertake agreements with the UNSC regarding "armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage" to address threats to international peace and security. However, the politics of such contributions have always been complicated and ad-hoc, with recommendations for a standing force unable to find agreement amongst member-states.

There is little in either document that relates to the "local turn" and role of non-state actors in abolishing war and establishing peace. Colonised states and regions in both documents are considered only through the lens of empire, wherein people of occupied lands are "not able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world" based on their "stage of development" and thus "the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations." Only in selecting the region's League Mandatory are the "wishes of these communities" to be considered at all.[61] While Mandatories reported to a Mandates Commission annually, there was no formal appeals process for peoples living under Mandatory rule. Following the dissolution of the League, a significant part of the world was still administered by colonial rule, leading the UN to enshrine similar structures

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[61] League of Nations, "The Covenant of the League of Nations" (1919), Article 22.

and guarantees while recognising "the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories" and "respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political, economic, social, and educational advancement, their just treatment, and their protection against abuses."[62] Unlike the League Covenant, the UN Charter articulates the ideal of eventual self-government of these lands, the "political aspirations of the peoples," and the "development of their free political institutions."[63] It does, however, continue to use paternalistic language relating to the "stages of advancement" of certain peoples. Unlike in the League Covenant, however, the UN Trusteeship Council could accept and examine petitions and visit trust territories, providing some semblance of a check on administering authorities' power. The Charter's language on self-governance, equal treatment, and justice without prejudice was used in decolonisation movements to strengthen self-governance as an international norm and inspire global sympathy for their struggles.

While Article 7 in the League Covenant allowed League positions to be held by both men and women, there are only two additional mentions of women in the document: in Article 23, wherein humane labour conditions are guaranteed for men, women, and children, and human trafficking, particularly of women and children, were placed under League purview. Article 8 of the UN Charter similarly stipulates that no restrictions shall be placed "on the eligibility of men and women to participate in any capacity and under conditions of equality" in the organisation. Notably, though the UN Charter expanded protected categories to include race, sex, language, and religion, noting "the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible," Articles 97 and 110 use "he" when referring to the UN Secretary-General. Though both the Covenant and the Charter allowed positions to be held by both men and women, and women were employed in various positions by both organisations from their founding, no woman has ever held the position of Secretary-General

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[62] United Nations, "United Nations Charter" (1945), Article 73.
[63] Ibid.

for either organisation. All presidents of the League of Nations' General Assembly were likewise men, and only 3 of 75 UN General Assembly presidents have been women.

The final notable addition to the UN Charter is Chapter VIII on regional arrangements, wherein "pacific settlement of local disputes" should endeavour to be achieved through regional agencies prior to referral to the UNSC. Even in such cases, though, all enforcement action must be approved by the UNSC to be considered legal. I explore the African Union as such a regional arrangement in the next chapter.

Human Rights, Women's Rights, and Colonialism

As noted above, the most significant change between the League Covenant and the UN Charter was the development of ECOSOC and the emphasis on economic and social rights. The first two commissions established under ECOSOC's jurisdiction were the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) and the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), though legally nonbinding, enacted a significant normative shift, setting the stage for a host of rights-based conventions and treaties that would follow.

The preamble emphasises the universal nature of the rights of all human beings, and in particular individuals' freedom from fear and from want. This can be understood as an assurance of negative security focused on achieving bodily security for individuals, as well as a move towards a positive peace, or a broader conception of human security. At the end of the visionary preamble, however, is a reminder that self-determination of peoples is not a given, even in a document developed to ensure equality between all human beings. The clause reads, "both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction." The inclusion of these "peoples" is part of the shift towards individual rights, which in turn opens space for the concerns and well-being of local communities.

The drafting, however, was a contested process, and the issues of self-determination and women's rights were compromised on by the framers. Bodil Begtrup of Denmark, as the first Chairperson of the CSW, advocated for the CSW to be placed directly under ECOSOC's jurisdiction, rather than under the UNCHR. This shift happened early on and led to discussion in the UNCHR as to whether women's issues should be included in the UDHR at all. Upon the advocacy of delegates Tepliakov of the USSR, Romulo of the Philippines, and Mehta of India, it did continue to be included. However, a rift formed between the UNCHR and the CSW. According to Johannes Morsink, Begtrup and other CSW members aggressively lobbied the Commission to address the absence of sexism in the UDHR. Minerva Bernadino of the Dominican Republic, for example, called for sex to be explicitly recognized in the Declaration because "Certain countries did in fact recognize certain rights for 'everyone,' but experience had shown that women did not enjoy them, as, for instance, voting rights."[64]

The UDHR ended up including sex as a protected category in Article 2, the non-discrimination clause, stating that "no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty." Article 16 furthers gender protections, particularly around marriage rights. Articles 23 and 25 further establish labour rights, including favourable work conditions and equal pay, and specify motherhood and childhood as categories entitled to special care and assistance. Though it is not legally binding, because it is a universal document affirmed by nearly all states, the UDHR's normative framework provided women's rights advocates a strong base from which to justify their work.

It should be noted, however, that at the time only 58 countries were represented in UNGA, and of this only two African members: Ethiopia and South Africa. While Ethiopia

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[64] Johannes Morsink, "Women's Rights in the Universal Declaration," *Human Rights Quarterly* 13, no. 2 (1991): 229–56.

voted in favour of the Declaration, South Africa, then a self-administered dominion of the British Empire run by white Boers and British diaspora, abstained. All other abstentions, aside from Saudi Arabia, were countries under Soviet rule. However, language from the UDHR and the UN Charter was often cited in countries' independence struggles, showcasing the utility of the language in the documents for rights claims, even as a nonbinding document.

Contemporary UN Documents

Since its founding, armed peacekeeping has been the major UN tool for conflict prevention and mitigation. This follows in the liberal tradition of victor's peace, but with a twist, as the UN is traditionally not allowed to choose sides in conflict. As the UN toolkit has evolved, additional peacebuilding approaches have been added to the overall framework.[65] The legal basis for UN peacekeeping is provided by Article 1 of the Charter, which maintains that the UN may "take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace." Concurrently, the Charter emphasises the right to sovereignty, placing its enforcement duties potentially at odds with issues relating to internal member-state sovereignty. While UN peacekeeping is now considered core to UN activities, it is not explicitly mentioned in the Charter. Indeed, as Bellamy, Griffin, and Williams note, the core principles of UN peacekeeping—of consent, impartiality, and minimum use of force—have only been established through practice, rather than by law or treaty, leading to contested understandings and various interpretations.[66]

In its first 30 years, peacekeeping missions largely aimed to maintain peace in what are sometimes called "classical" or "first generation" missions. After the Cold War, there was a massive increase in demand for peacekeeping missions, increasing the number and scope of missions. In a span of five years, the UN went from running 5 peacekeeping

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[65] Ronald Hatto, "From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding: The Evolution of the Role of the United Nations in Peace Operations," *International Review of the Red Cross* 95, no. 891/892 (2013): 495–515.
[66] Alex Bellamy, Stuart Griffin, and Paul Williams, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, Second (Wiley, 2010).

missions with under 10,000 personnel to running 17 missions with over 75,000 personnel. The types of missions also became increasingly complex, due largely to failures to produce peace agreements and secure political compromise between parties. Expectations were high, leading the high-level peacekeeping failures of the 1990s to be all the more devastating.

Given the massive increase in peacekeeping operations since the end of the Cold War, as well as the increase in the number of functions expected of peacekeeping missions, it is largely this period that I investigate. Prior to Boutros Boutros-Ghali's 1992 report *An Agenda for Peace*, outside of individual mission posturing documents, there were few framing documents describing the role of peace operations in securing peace. It was not until this report that a formal definition of peacekeeping was even fully developed. Ronald Hatto suggests that it was the ad hoc nature of UN peacekeeping, as well as its omission in the UN Charter, that allowed for the nearly fifty-year delay in defining peacekeeping and its terms.[67] Because of the Cold War, he contends, the UN was unable to meet its collective security obligations, instead focusing on areas it could control—through peacekeeping operations.

Document Analysis

Year	Document Title
1992	An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping
1995	Supplement to An Agenda for Peace
2000	Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report)
2000	UN Millennium Declaration
2003	Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration
2005	In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all
2005	In larger freedom, Addendum
2009	Peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict
2010	Peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict, Progress Report
2010	Women's participation in peacebuilding
2012	Peacebuilding in the aftermath of conflict, Progress Report
2014	Peacebuilding in the aftermath of conflict, Progress Report
2015	Uniting our strengths for peace – politics, partnership and people (HIPPO Report)
2018	Peacebuilding and sustaining peace, Progress Report
2019	Peacebuilding and sustaining peace, Progress Report

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[67] Hatto, 497.

| 2020 | Peacebuilding and sustaining peace, Progress Report |

Table: List of Documents Analysed

The above documents were primarily collected from the UN Peacebuilding website's section on Secretary-General reports. I added two documents to these for analysis: the 1995 Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, which discusses the peacekeeping failures of the early 1990s, and the 2015 HIPPO Report on UN peace operations. These 16 documents provide a window into recent discussions around UN peace operations and demonstrate the types of discussions that have informed the direction of UN peace efforts over the past 30 years. Though I did not analyse development-specific documents such as the 1994 Human Development Report and An Agenda for Development, these documents are often referenced in the analysed documents, and peacebuilding has inherited many approaches from the field of development. This becomes apparent through the analysis.

An initial text-based content analysis revealed some interesting trends. A word frequency query with "exact matches only" revealed the top words between all documents as "nations" and "united," which was unsurprising given that these are documents primarily by and about the UN. The next most frequent words were "peace," "support," "security," "conflict," "operations," "peacebuilding," "development," "states" and "international." Further down the list, but still prominent, were "women" as 16th and "national" as 20th. An additional word frequency search including stemmed words, meaning words related to a particular root, revealed similar results. While an imperfect tool, since some words, like development for instance, also include verbs, it still revealed some overarching trends. The top twelve words included "nations," "units" (likely from "united"), "peaceful," "support," "operations," "developments," "missions," "conflicts," "security," "states," "country," and "peacebuilding." Further down, "capacity," "women," and "regions" are still prominently featured.

Using the above analysis as a starting point, I traced six major themes throughout the documents: (1) changing conceptions of security, including focal shifts from inter-state

conflict towards intra- and non-state conflict; (2) the role of democracy in peace consolidation; (3) the role of development in peace consolidation; (4) a focus on preventing conflict and protecting civilians in conflict; (5) the role of gender, especially women, in peace efforts; and (6) the rise of "localised" or "bottom-up" efforts to maintain and build peace. I later added additional secondary themes: arms control, including disarmament of armed actors; decolonisation; environment and climate change; liberal economics; the role of non-governmental organisations; cooperation with regional organisations; and states and sovereignty.

Theme	Average coverage
Peacebuilding	8.45%
Gender	5.06%
States and Sovereignty	4.49%
Prevention and Protection	4.14%
Development	4.05%
Liberal Economics	2.34%
Regional	2.23%
Democracy	2.11%
Local, Bottom-Up	1.56%

Table: Average coverage of themes covered in selected documents

The themes most commonly referenced in the selected documents were "peacebuilding," "states and sovereignty," "prevention and protection," "development" "gender," "regional," "democracy," and "local, bottom-up." In this section, I analyse the top themes from across the selected documents to identify trends in how these themes have evolved over time and what these changes mean for norm development, consolidation, and evolution.

Throughout the documents, there are distinct traces of the development of the "triple nexus" approach, the idea that humanitarian and development assistance are necessary to open conditions for sustainable peace. While the rationale behind the nexus is straightforward, the fields of humanitarianism and development developed distinctly, and

differences have proven difficult to reconcile.[68] Though in the lexicon prior, the nexus gained renewed attention in 2016 at the World Humanitarian Summit, which called for new approaches to conflict prevention, including by addressing the root causes of conflict; increasing emphasis on political diplomacy and conflict resolution; and merging humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding efforts. Lie argues that the expanding scope of humanitarian activity depletes both its core principles and its space for operation. By expanding humanitarianism into peacebuilding activities, which typically occur before and after, but not during conflict, it has become politicised, endangering the neutrality that it has historically required to engage in meaningful protection work.[69]

Theme: States and Sovereignty

Year	Report Name	References	Coverage
2014	Peacebuilding in the Aftermath of Conflict, Progress Report	54	12.13%
2012	Peacebuilding in the Aftermath of Conflict, Progress Report	40	7.92%
2020	Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace, Progress Report	37	7.89%
1992	An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping	76	6.14%
2018	Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace, Progress Report	29	5.75%
2019	Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace, Progress Report	15	4.89%
1995	An Agenda for Peace Supplement	36	4.37%
2015	Uniting our strengths for peace – politics, partnership and people (HIPPO Report)	105	3.56%
2010	Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict, Progress Report	29	3.43%
2009	Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict	53	3.32%
2005	In Larger Freedom, Report Addendum	9	3.04%
2000	UN Millennium Declaration	11	3.04%
2000	Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report)	51	1.79%

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[68] Jon Harald Sande Lie, "The Humanitarian-Development Nexus: Humanitarian Principles, Practice, and Pragmatics," *Journal of International Humanitarian Action* 5, no. 1 (2020): 1–13.
[69] Ibid., 3.

2005	In Larger Freedom	29	1.72%
2010	Women's Participation in Peacebuilding	18	1.67%
2003	Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration	15	1.17%

The data shows that UN approaches continue to be significantly state-centric, though norms under this umbrella theme continue to change. Focusing on the seven documents with over 4% coverage of the theme, there is a clear shift between the theme as it was discussed in the 1990s and more current conceptualisations from the 2010s to present. While earlier documents reference states and sovereignty in terms of the right to independent statehood and the responsibilities of UN member-states in supporting global order, later documents focus largely on building state capacity to help states ensure peace for their own peoples. This aligns closely with the evolution of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm, which will be discussed further in the next section.

The 1992 Report and its 1995 supplement include significant coverage of the state sovereignty theme. The first report is relatively lean, providing a positive view of UN opportunities to address conflict issues in a post-Cold War era. We can observe throughout this document a norm of individual security, as Ghali writes, "the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however has passed."[70] Throughout the document, he raises the need to supplement military-focused peacekeeping with civilian components, bringing in the emerging concept of human security. The 1995 document, coming after the massive peacekeeping failures in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda, also highlights individualised conceptions of security while addressing the limits of UN peacekeeping to address the "deep roots" of conflict.[71] In these documents, Ghali is grappling with the limitations of state sovereignty, particularly in the absence of a fully functioning state. Similarly, the core recommendations of the 2015 HIPPO report highlight the need for

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[70] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping," *International Relations* 11, no. 3 (1992): 201–218.
[71] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace," *United Nations [Online]*, 1995.

political solutions to resolve conflict; flexibility of peace operations to adapt to changing contexts; collaboration with regional organisations; and more field- and people-centred approaches.

The peacebuilding documents move toward a state responsibility framework wherein the UN assists states in "strengthening core capacity to lead peacebuilding efforts."[72] This reliance on the state aligns with the neoliberal statebuilding model wherein non-Western states are tutored into adopting Western governance models, thereby strengthening institutions to overcome chronic conflict. Christian Lotz describes this as "an extension of the good governance agenda of development."[73] The 2012 Peacebuilding report names UNDP as the core agency "develop[ing] system-wide principles and guidelines for the more effective use of development of national capacities to lead peacebuilding efforts."[74] The report notes five peacebuilding and statebuilding goals set by the G7+: inclusive politics, security, justice, economic foundations and revenues and services to guide country-specific processes. In the 2012 and 2014 reports, South Sudan is provided as an example of furthering good governance efforts, though by 2014 they acknowledged "infighting among the political elite, allegations of large-scale corruption and incidents of violent abuse of the national security forces" undermining popular trust of national leadership.[75] Finally, the 2020 report emphasised "cross-pillar" approaches resembling the earlier triple nexus, highlighting the need to align development, humanitarian, human rights, and peace and security approaches.[76] It uses several case studies related to "strengthening national capacities," including supporting non-governmental entities such as a national human rights defender network in Guinea-Bissau, water user associations in Yemen, and local women mediators in

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[72] United Nations Office of the Secretary-General, "Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Aftermath of Conflict," 2012.
[73] Christian Lotz, "International Norms in Statebuilding: Finding a Pragmatic Approach," *Global Governance* 16, no. 2 (2010): 219–36.
[74] United Nations Office of the Secretary-General, 2012.
[75] United Nations Office of the Secretary-General, "Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Aftermath of Conflict," 2014.
[76] United Nations Office of the Secretary-General, "Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace," 2020.

Niger. Though it is too early to draw full conclusions on lessons learned, it seems the failures

of the statebuilding norm may have paved the way for more recent efforts toward locally-

led peacebuilding.

Theme: Prevention and Protection

Year	Report Name	References	Coverage
2020	Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace, Progress Report	66	12.75%
2019	Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace, Progress Report	22	7.92%
2018	Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace, Progress Report	38	7.44%
2015	Uniting our strengths for peace – politics, partnership and people (HIPPO Report)	159	5.87%
2010	Women's Participation in Peacebuilding	25	4.79%
2000	UN Millennium Declaration	15	4.79%
2005	In Larger Freedom	49	3.89%
1995	An Agenda for Peace Supplement	31	3.47%
2003	Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration	18	3.32%
2014	Peacebuilding in the Aftermath of Conflict, Progress Report	15	3.08%
2000	Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report)	53	1.99%
2005	In Larger Freedom	3	1.93%
2009	Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict	27	1.73%
1992	An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping	32	1.56%
2010	Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict, Progress Report	15	1.00%
2012	Peacebuilding in the Aftermath of Conflict, Progress Report	6	0.71%

This theme encompasses two families of norms: civilian protection and conflict

prevention. The civilian protection norm stems from earlier humanitarian-focused norms

that codified civilian non-combatants as innocent in order to shame combatants for causing

harm to this category of individuals. Prevention, aiming to avoid conflict escalation in the

first place, is a broad categorisation encompassing various theories and norms, including

human rights, statebuilding, and democracy norms. Prevention and protection issues are

mentioned in all of the analysed documents, though the three reports from 2018, 2019, and

2020 include the highest coverage of the theme. After the failures of the 1990s, the UN doubled down on preventive diplomacy as a prevention measure, as highlighted in the Brahimi Report. Though the HIPPO report came 15 years later, its analysis and suggestions also centre the necessity of supporting political solutions to conflict while noting the "limits of prevention and mediation when strong united international resolve is absent and when regional interests are polarized," as in Libya, Syria, and Yemen.[77]

More recent peacebuilding reports emphasise addressing the root causes of conflict in order to address human suffering. The lack of resolve amongst the international community to invest in long-term solutions is highlighted, demonstrating that the UN continues to fall short in prevention, whereas humanitarian norms that centre individual well-being are significantly more developed and accepted. In service of prevention, the 2020 report highlights efforts towards "cross-pillar approaches," linking development, humanitarian, human rights, and peace and security workstreams in service of conflict prevention.[78]

The protection norm has been both helped and hindered by the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, which emphasises the responsibility of states to protect their people, the responsibility of the international community to assist them in doing so, and the international community's responsibility to intervene if the state is unable or unwilling to do so. R2P, which reinforces the "freedom from fear" pillar of human security, has been endorsed by all UN members to address genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.[79] The relation between sovereignty and responsibility remains tense, conflicting with the historical understanding of statehood, as R2P legitimises actions formerly

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[77] High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, "Uniting Our Strengths for Peace - Politics, Partnership and People," 2015.

[78] United Nations Office of the Secretary-General, "Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace," 2020.

[79] Samuel James Wyatt, "The Responsibility to Protect and Cosmopolitan Human Protection," in *The Responsibility to Protect and a Cosmopolitan Approach to Human Protection*, 2019.

understood as violations of sovereignty.[80] Critics of R2P trace the norm's evolution as a tool of paternalistic humanitarianism, or "emancipatory liberalism," by powerful "fortunate" states enacting interventions upon less fortunate, "unenlightened" peoples to "free individuals from the chains that bind them," often justifying violence as necessary.[81] Though protection norms are widely recognized by governments, for example through the signing of treaties and doctrines, protection continues to be a struggle.

Theme: Peacebuilding

Year	Report Name	References	Coverage
2019	Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace, Progress Report	67	26.38%
2020	Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace, Progress Report	99	23.10%
2005	In Larger Freedom, Report Addendum	23	19.26%
2018	Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace, Progress Report	87	19.14%
2014	Peacebuilding in the Aftermath of Conflict, Progress Report	60	11.27%
2012	Peacebuilding in the Aftermath of Conflict, Progress Report	58	10.46%
2010	Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict, Progress Report	50	7.06%
2010	Women's Participation in Peacebuilding	30	4.81%
2009	Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict	63	4.78%
1995	An Agenda for Peace Supplement	17	2.38%
2000	Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report)	44	1.75%
2005	In Larger Freedom	15	1.45%
2015	Uniting our strengths for peace – politics, partnership and people (HIPPO Report)	33	1.08%
2003	Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration	7	0.87%

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[80] Ramesh Thakur and William Maley, *Theorising the Responsibility to Protect*, *Theorising the Responsibility to Protect*, 2015.
[81] Dillon Stone Tatum, *Liberalism and Transformation: The Global Politics of Violence and Intervention* (Ann Arbor, MI: Michigan University Press, 2021).

1992	An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping	13	0.87%
2000	UN Millennium Declaration	3	0.54%

Peacebuilding was the most frequently found theme in these documents, particularly in newer documents that included "peacebuilding" in the report title. The first mention of "peacebuilding" is in *An Agenda for Peace*, which develops the concept as a key component of the UN's peace-related work and refers to it as one of four recommended areas for UN action. The aim of peacebuilding, as described in the report, is to prevent recurrence of conflict. As described above, prevention includes various theories that have often relied on a statebuilding approach. The emphasis on peacebuilding, however, recognises the shortcomings of state-centric approaches and leans into additional frameworks. Peacebuilding, as described in the 1992 report, includes non-military concepts and civilian-led mechanisms like democracy, human rights, and protection of minority groups as sources of long-term peace and stability, and asserts economic and social underdevelopment as conflict drivers.[82] This approach marks a shift away from more coercive peacekeeping approaches in favour of multisectoral engagement.

Following the publication of "lessons learned" reports after the tragedies in Srebrenica and Rwanda, Kofi Annan convened a high-level panel on UN Peace Operations, led by Lahkdar Brahimi, a well-respected UN diplomat from Algeria. Brahimi's panel conducted a comprehensive review of UN peace and security activities, making recommendations for improvement. As a core preventive activity, the report recommended the UN develop a stronger peacebuilding strategy, to be led by the Department of Political Affairs and UNDP, which already had programming expertise. In response to these and additional recommendations of the 2004 report *A More Secure World*, the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) was established in 2005 to advise UNGA and UNSC on peacebuilding

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[82] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping," *International Relations*, 1992.

strategy and to support national efforts to build peace. Inherent in this approach is a reliance on states as the core partner for peace. It also signified an investment in a broader strategy focused on holistic approaches to peace consolidation.

The mainstreaming of the "Women, Peace and Security" (WPS) discourse has led to deeper discussion of gender in conflict and ways to equalise gendered power relations through political and other processes. In the 2019 Peacebuilding Report, UNSG Antonio Guterres shared that "the number of outcome documents of [various UN agencies] that integrate the notion of 'sustaining peace' has continued to increase since 2016" and that "many Member States have embedded a sustaining peace approach in their national policies."[83] He additionally notes that there are 49 peace and development adviser positions in resident coordinator offices, suggesting that a technocratic approach relying on expert advice is still the norm for the UN. This approach in peacebuilding mirrors that of WPS national action plans, wherein countries make commitments to involving women in peace processes and protecting women and girls in conflict situations. This is still a top-down approach that names the state the ultimate arbiter of peace and assumes that the act of writing down a commitment will make the state feel beholden to follow it.

Theme: Development

Year	Report Name	References	Coverage
2018	Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace, Progress Report	46	11.80%
2019	Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace, Progress Report	30	10.46%
2020	Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace, Progress Report	48	10.27%
2000	Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report)	18	6.26%
2005	In Larger Freedom	76	5.87%
2003	Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration	32	5.08%
2012	Peacebuilding in the Aftermath of Conflict, Progress Report	18	3.35%

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[83] United Nations Office of the Secretary-General, "Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace," *English*, 2019.

2014	Peacebuilding in the Aftermath of Conflict, Progress Report	16	3.27%
2005	In Larger Freedom, Report Addendum	10	2.34%
2009	Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict	25	1.65%
2010	Women's Participation in Peacebuilding	9	1.44%
2010	Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict, Progress Report	11	1.01%
1995	An Agenda for Peace Supplement	13	0.73%
2015	Uniting our strengths for peace – politics, partnership and people (HIPPO Report)	17	0.62%
2000	Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report)	15	0.59%
1992	An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping	4	0.12%

In line with cross-pillar approaches, development has the highest amount of coverage in the three most recent reports from 2018, 2019, and 2020, with each referencing development in over 10% of the total text. This is quite a bit higher than many of the other themes, including the States and Sovereignty and Prevention and Protection themes. This suggests that the triple nexus approach, which places UNDP in an implementation role in peacebuilding has become the preferred approach. This is in strong contrast to earlier documents which reference development as core to long-term prevention but does not theorise this as part of peace operations. However, the roots of this approach are apparent in documents like the Brahimi Report, which supported collaborations between the Department of Political Affairs and UNDP in strengthening UN peacebuilding activities.[84]

That the UN has folded peace and conflict resolution goals into development documents has also hastened the merging of the peace and development agendas. Whereas the original eight Millennium Development Goals did not include peace and security, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development includes it as one of seventeen goals: "Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for

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[84] Brahimi Report, 8.

all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels."[85] That these goals were developed and passed though the General Assembly shows at least a cosmetic commitment by UN member-states to merge the peace and development agendas, emphasising state institutions as core to fulfilling this goal. Inside of this commitment are a number of norms, framed around the anti-poverty framework that the development industry is built around. Given massive economic inequality between the Global North and Global South, however, and limited efforts to redistribute wealth fairly between nations, efforts at addressing the economic drivers of conflict may have limited effect.

Since the 1990s, the development field has emphasised participatory methods in project planning, study and appraisal. While there is debate as to whether participatory development is liberatory or tyrannical, the participation of local peoples in the peacebuilding field follows in the footsteps of the participatory development model. Inherent in participatory development, however, is an emphasis on reform of existing approaches, rather than transformation or creation of new approaches. The underlying power structures remain the same, wherein donors dictate who is allocated funding and for what overarching purposes. Peacebuilding actors should familiarise themselves with debates in the participatory development field as they develop new norms towards locally-led approaches.[86] Since development, as with peacebuilding, relies on state cooperation, predatory states can enact policies that do the bare minimum for recipient populations, using funds to uplift populations that support their ability to maintain power—the opposite of emancipation.

Theme: Gender

Year	Report Name	References	Coverage

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[85] "Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development," 2016, https://sdgs.un.org/2030agenda.
[86] See, for example, Kevin Grove and Jonathan Pugh, "Assemblage Thinking and Participatory Development: Potentiality, Ethics, Biopolitics," *Geography Compass*, 2015; J. Ferguson and L. Lohmann, "The Anti-Politics Machine: 'development'' and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho,'" *Ecologist*, 1994.

2010	Women's Participation in Peacebuilding	92	39.57%
2012	Peacebuilding in the Aftermath of Conflict, Progress Report	36	11.25%
2020	Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace, Progress Report	37	6.96%
2018	Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace, Progress Report	20	5.57%
2019	Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace, Progress Report	19	5.33%
2014	Peacebuilding in the Aftermath of Conflict, Progress Report	16	5.23%
2015	Uniting our strengths for peace – politics, partnership and people (HIPPO Report)	73	4.14%
2003	Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration	8	2.43%
2010	Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict, Progress Report	9	2.15%
2000	UN Millennium Declaration	7	1.85%
2009	Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict	8	1.21%
2005	In Larger Freedom	13	0.43%
1992	An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping	4	0.17%
2000	Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report)	3	0.03%

Though two of the selected documents do not reference gender at all, this theme has the second-largest overall coverage of all of the selected themes. This is, in part, due to one document being fully dedicated to women's participation in peacebuilding, but recent peacebuilding reports also have significant coverage. The inclusion of gender as a core component in peacebuilding discourse has stemmed, in large part, from the passage of Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) in 2000, and the mainstreaming of gender into conflict analysis and recommendations for resolution. Critics claim that the UN-led WPS agenda is a product of global power relations that view women in the Global South as passive recipients of Western policymaking, and that the universalisation of the agenda fails to account for bottom-up and alternative understandings of security.[87] WPS comes from

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[87] Toni Haastrup and Jamie J Hagen, "Global Racial Hierarchies and the Limits of Localization via National Action Plans," in *New Directions in Women, Peace and Security*, ed. Soumita Basu, Paul Kirby, and Laura J Shepherd (Bristol: Bristol University Press, 2020), 133–52; Soumita Basu, Paul Kirby, and Laura J Shepherd, "Women, Peace and Security: A Critical Cartography," in *New Directions in Women, Peace and Security*, ed. Soumita Basu, Paul Kirby, and Laura J Shepherd (Bristol: Bristol University Press, 2020), 1–26.

the norm of gender equality that has become dominant in the liberal world order. Nicola Pratt and Sophie Richter-Devroe claim that "rather than transforming international security agendas, 1325 marginalizes anti-militarist feminism in advocating for peace and security."[88] Their research describes how women are treated when they speak against emancipatory liberalism, as with two Iraqi activists who condemned the U.S. and U.K. invasion of Iraq in speaking to the UN in 2003. "Despite 1325 calling for more women's participation in peacebuilding and conflict resolution initiatives, the 1325 advocates attending this meeting were embarrassed by the 'angry comments' made by the Iraqi women," they note.[89] Thus, even as norms are carried forward, it is difficult for women, and particularly women from the Global South, to have their voices and perspectives heard by those in power. This does not transform women's agency in a meaningful way, even as the UN pays more lip service to gender issues.

Theme: Local, Bottom-Up

Year	Report Name	References	Coverage
2020	Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace, Progress Report	30	7.08%
2012	Peacebuilding in the Aftermath of Conflict, Progress Report	16	3.42%
2018	Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace, Progress Report	11	3.14%
2015	Uniting our strengths for peace – politics, partnership and people (HIPPO Report)	70	2.56%
2014	Peacebuilding in the Aftermath of Conflict, Progress Report	13	2.54%
2019	Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace, Progress Report	5	1.61%
2010	Women's Participation in Peacebuilding	10	1.54%
2005	In Larger Freedom	16	0.90%
2000	UN Millennium Declaration	3	0.75%
2009	Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict	9	0.65%
2010	Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict, Progress Report	6	0.29%

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[88] Nicola Pratt and Sophie Richter-Devroe, "Critically Examining UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security," *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 13, no. 4 (2011): 489–503.
[89] Ibid., 494.

2003	Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration	5	0.26%
2000	Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report)	9	0.26%
1992	An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping	1	0.01%

In investigating this final theme, UN data is limited. Most reports do not significantly raise the issue of local engagement in peace processes, relying instead on elite and political actors in their conceptualisations of peace consolidation. Peacebuilding reports from 2018, 2012, and 2020 reveal that this norm is still nascent, and has not yet been significantly championed by the UN peacebuilding apparatus. In these documents, most language related to this theme emphasises that civil society organisations, women's groups, and youth organisations should be included in peacebuilding partnerships, but fails to explain how this engagement should occur, and why strengthening support for these groups specifically will lead to more sustainable peace. Without building out this language further, and providing justification to member-states, this theme will have trouble becoming part of the UN's normative frameworks and the UN will continue to fail at their stated goal of "inclusive" and "participatory" approaches.

The 2018 report notes a few cases of UN support to local actors, including community engagement work in the Central African Republic and support for youth and women peacebuilders in Malawi.[90] This report notes that the PBC is engaging in consultations with civil society organisations and bringing their views to the UNSC. The 2020 report, which has the highest theme coverage, uses case studies to demonstrate where participatory mechanisms were supported to bring local voices into peacebuilding processes and how this impacted social cohesion in communities.[91] Interestingly, the stories they share

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[90] United Nations Office of the Secretary-General, "Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace," 2018.
[91] United Nations Office of the Secretary-General, "Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace," 2020.

come largely from NGO reports rather than internal UN reporting, suggesting that there is outside advocacy working to solidify this norm in a similar way to feminist organisations championing 1325.

In the realm of the local, UN approaches seem to remain somewhat technocratic, as they emphasise "developing guidelines," and holding consultations. One significant shift is the recommendation that civil society organisations be direct recipients of peacebuilding funding, though such funds remain extremely limited, as demonstrated through OECD data on official development assistance.

Conclusion

The above analysis demonstrates that the concept of peacebuilding has become significantly elevated in UN approaches to addressing conflict in recent years, as well as its understanding that gender equality is a necessity for sustainable peace. It also demonstrates the merger of previously-distinct areas of practice—democracy promotion, development, humanitarianism, and peacebuilding. While themes like gender and prevention and protection have been mainstreamed in UN documents, due both to advocacy and "lessons learned," local and bottom-up approaches centring those affected by conflict have only recently begun to enter the formal lexicon. Meanwhile, states remain the core referent actor for the UN, and statebuilding approaches are core to the UN's understanding of conflict prevention and civilian protection. In the next chapter, I investigate the themes most commonly found in AU documents and compare my findings with the data presented in this chapter.

Chapter 5: African Approaches to Peace and Security

This chapter historically situates the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity and the African Union and analyses the evolution of their enshrined values over time. In order to understand these institutions' founding principles, I share a history of institutionalised pan-Africanism and the impacts of colonial encounters on state formation processes. I then turn to OAU and AU founding documents, analysing key similarities and differences, and analyse norm development in peace-related documents from the two institutions over time. I end with a few conclusions regarding the concepts that have endured and shifted over time and share some implications of this analysis.

In considering international norm development, defined as "collective expectations for appropriate behaviour," Kathryn Nash convincingly argues that the OAU and the AU "uniquely adapted existing international norms as well as created new peace and security norms within their regional sphere largely independent of international pressure."[92] Paul D. Williams outlines core African security norms as follows:

"(1) Sovereign equality of members (Article 4a).

(2) Non-Intervention by member-states (Article 4g).

(3) Anti-Imperialism/African solutions first.

(4) Uti possidetis (Article 4b).

(5) Non-use of force/peaceful settlement of disputes (Articles 4e, 4f, 4i).

(6) Condemnation of unconstitutional changes of government (Article 4p).

(7) The Union's right to intervene in a member state in grave circumstances (Article 4h)."[93]

I additionally add an emerging norm around women's equality, which has been shaped by both international norm formation and efforts by African civil society actors. By

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[92] Kathryn Nash, *African Peace: Regional Norms from the Organization of African Unity to the African Union* (Manchester, United Kingdom: Manchester University Press, 2021).
[93] Paul D. Williams, "From Non-Intervention to Non-Indifference: The Origins and Development of the African Union's Security Culture," *African Affairs* 106/423 (2007): 253–79.

comparing OAU and AU founding documents, and analysing peace and security documents drafted since 2000, I explore how these African institutions have developed and implemented various peace and security norms. Through this analysis, I find that while there are shared norms between the UN and AU, that the development of these norms has occurred differently, and that norm strength differs between the institutions. The development of newer norms offers opportunities to move beyond top-down approaches that emphasise liberal peace.

A Brief History of Institutionalised Pan-Africanism

The Organisation of African Unity (OAU), founded in 1963, and its successor organisation, the African Union, founded in 2002, find their roots in the anti-slavery, anti-colonialism and pan-African movements of the 19th and 20th centuries. Multiple pan-African Congresses were held in Europe and the United States in the early 1900s, largely attended by African diaspora members advocating for racial equality. Mohammed Bedjaoui notes that until 1945, attendees of these Congresses were largely "bourgeois intellectuals and reformers, mainly from the United States of America and Europe."[94] The sixth pan-African Congress,[95] held in Manchester in October 1945, was the most political of the seven held, and included participation by Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, W.E.B. DuBois of the United States, George Padmore of Trinidad and Tobago, and Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya. This Congress became a watershed moment in the fight against colonialism in Africa, leading to a marriage of pan-Africanism and nationalism.[96] The final declaration of the 1945 Congress stated, "We are determined to be free […] We demand for Black African autonomy and

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[94] Mohammed Bedjaoui, "Brief Historical Overview of Steps to African Unity," in *The African Union: Legal and Institutional Framework, A Manuel on the Pan-African Organization*, ed. Abdulqawi A. Yusuf and Fatsah Ouguergouz (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012), 9–23.
[95] This chapter cites the 1945 pan-African Congress as the sixth such Congress. Other sources reference this as the fifth pan-African Congress.
[96] Bedjaoui, 12.

independence so far and no further than it is possible in this 'One World' for groups and peoples to rule themselves subject to inevitable World Unity and Federation."[97]

Kwame Nkrumah, a revolutionary who had led the Gold Coast to independence from Britain in 1957, convened the first conference of independent states in 1958, and in 1961 declared, "Divided we are weak; united, Africa could become one of the greatest forces for good in the world… I believe strongly and sincerely that with the deep-rooted wisdom and dignity, the innate respect for human lives, the intense humanity that is our heritage, the African race, united under one federal government, will emerge […] as a Great Power […] directed to the good of all mankind."[98] While advocating for a "United States of Africa" Nkrumah and his contemporaries founded a number of sub-regional alliances that set the stage for a full continental organisation. Today, Africa has perhaps the densest grouping of sub-regional organisations in the world, and sub-regional organisations are a significant part of the African political landscape.

In progressing towards a cohesive African political structure, there were deep regional divides regarding the appropriate approach. The clearest of these divides was between the progressive "Casablanca group," African leaders from Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Mali, Morocco, and Egypt who believed that federation was an ideal solution and the moderate "Monrovia group," leaders from Liberia, Somalia, Togo, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Libya, and Tunisia who believed that such a union would limit individual countries' sovereignty. The "Brazzaville Group," the former French colonies of Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of the Congo, Dahomey, Gabon, Cote d'Ivoire, Niger, Mauritania, Madagascar, Senegal, and Upper Volta sought to maintain their relationship with France after the colonial period, and was also involved in these debates.[99] Given

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[97] W.E.B. Du Bois, "Fifth Pan-African Congress Final Resolution" (Manchester, United Kingdom, 1945), https://credo.library.umass.edu/view/full/mums312-b107-i461.

[98] Kwame Nkrumah, "I Speak of Freedom: A Statement of African Ideology" (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1961).

[99] Corinna Billmaier, "The Organisation of African Unity: A Symbol for Pan-Africanism?" (Leiden: Innovative Research Methods, 2020).

Africa's vast linguistic and cultural differences and varied experiences under colonialism, Africans had different conceptions of what a post-colonial relationship should look like, leading many leaders to scepticism around ceding autonomy to a powerful continental organisation.[100] What is most shared between countries and cultures is the experience of domination by the Global North. As such, the OAU's founding in 1963 occurred as a sort of compromise, centring independence and anti-colonialism as a shared value, but stopping short of developing tools for deeper integration. While the founding of the AU sought to improve the flawed structure of the OAU, similar divisions between African states remain today.

The Impacts of Colonialism on State Formation and Independence Politics: A Case Study

Any discussion of the current state of conflict and governance in Africa must note the impact of the colonial period on reconfiguring societal relations. One example is the former Ruanda-Urundi (now Rwanda and Burundi), a German- and then Belgian-held colony deeply impacted by the scientific racism employed by white colonisers. As others have painstakingly traced, Belgian colonisers preserved what they considered "traditional" structures of power, wherein Tutsi elites ruled over Hutu peasants.[101] This was based on false understandings of societal relations, however, and had far-reaching implications. While social hierarchies had, of course, existed prior to the colonial period, clan, lineage, and familial ties had been more important than ethnicity.

The colonial period radically restructured the social order, changing the nature of governance by expanding the reach of the state, altering forms of domination, and transforming the nature of political competition.[102] The systemic oppression of Hutu developed as a "dual colonisation" by Belgians and Tutsi elite and led to the Hutu revolution

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[100] Bedjaoui, 17, 22.
[101] Catharine Newbury, "Ethnicity and the Politics of History in Rwanda," *Africa Today* 45, no. 1 (1998): 7–24.
[102] Ibid., 11.

that overthrew the colonial order. Ethnicity became a fixed identity that determined individual life chances. Catharine Newbury emphasises that though Hutu demands were moderate, calling for equal opportunity, they also used racial terminologies that had developed through the "corporatising" of identity throughout the colonial period. As ethnicity became fixed, political elites exploited ethnic divisions for political gain. In the end, the development of state institutions and essentialisation of ethnicity had far-reaching implications that led to decades of pogroms culminating in the tragic 1972 genocide of mostly Hutu in Burundi, the 1993 genocide of mostly Tutsi in Burundi, and the 1994 genocide of mostly Tutsi in Rwanda.[103]

Even as African leaders were becoming politically independent from former colonisers, they were often themselves implicated in internal power struggles. The politics of the OAU developed with these local and national post-independence struggles as a constant backdrop, while newly independent countries struggled to manage the global economic inequalities perpetuated by former colonisers. As post-colonial scholars demonstrate, the struggle for independence is far from over for most post-colonial states. And yet national politics have often been successful in using this truth to consolidate single-party rule that denies true liberation for the vast majority of Africans.

From Organisation of African Unity to African Union: Founding Documents Analysis

In comparing the OAU Charter and the AU Constitutive Act, the visionary aims of both organisations are apparent. The preamble text of the OAU Charter emphasises the "inalienable right of all people to control their destiny," the necessity of "freedom, equality, justice and dignity," the "responsibility to harness natural/human resources for the total

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[103] For in-depth historical analysis, see Catharine Newbury, *The Cohesion of Oppression: Clientship and Ethnicity in Rwanda, 1860-1960* (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 1988); David Newbury and Jan Vansina, *The Land beyond the Mists : Essays on Identity and Authority in Precolonial Congo and Rwanda* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2009); Rene Lemarchand, *The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009); Mamdani, *Define and Rule: Native as Political Identity*.

advancement of our peoples," unity that transcends ethnic and national differences, the necessity for peace and security in order to advance human progress, and the importance of "safeguard[ing] and consolidat[ing] the hard-won independence as well as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our states, and to fight against neo-colonialism in all its forms." To realise these goals, the founders wrote, "all African States should henceforth unite" and "establish and strengthen common institutions."[104]

In comparison, the preamble to the AU Constitutive Act praises the "founding fathers" of the organisation "and generations of Pan-Africanists," recalls the "heroic struggles waged by our peoples and our countries for political independence, human dignity and economic emancipation," noting the role of the OAU in liberating the continent, affirming a common identity, and working towards continental unity. Unlike the OAU Charter, the AU Constitutive Act highlights socio-economic development and the challenges of globalisation and stresses the "need to build a partnership between governments and all segments of civil society, in particular women, youth and the private sector, in order to strengthen solidarity and cohesion among our peoples." Peace, security, and stability are necessary for the "development and integration agenda," as are the promotion and protection of "human and peoples' rights," "democratic institutions and culture," and "good governance and the rule of law."[105]

We can thus observe a significant linguistic shift away from emancipatory language and towards economic development. Core to conceptualising the "how" of development is language around security, democracy, and good governance, language seemingly inspired by liberalism. The inclusion of a sentence on the relationship between governments and civil society, with a particular focus on women and youth, demonstrates a significant normative shift that provides space for non-governmental actors within the organisation. This commitment is also emphasised in Article 4, which highlights the value of African peoples'

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[104] Organisation of African Unity, "Charter of the Organisation of African Unity," 1963, https://au.int/en/treaties/oau-charter-addis-ababa-25-may-1963.
[105] African Union, "Constitutive Act of the African Union" (2000).

participation in AU activities. Alongside principles of sovereignty, respect of borders, and assurances of peaceful relations between member-states are clauses on the AU's right "to intervene in grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity," the promotion of self-reliance and of gender equality, and the condemnation and rejection of "impunity and political assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive activities" and of "unconstitutional changes of governments." Aside from a shared condemnation of political assassination, these principles did not exist in the OAU Charter and suggest that AU norms followed from international norms championed by the UN.

The Charter's amendments cemented particular gender language and incorporated the right of the AU to intervene in internal affairs in situations of atrocity crimes. "Founding fathers" was changed to "founders," "Chairman" to "Chairperson," and, perhaps most importantly, particularly for civil society advocates, women's participation in AU decision-making was added to the Objectives section. These shifts show a strong normative shift towards gender equity as a shared value. Article 4(h) codified the right to intervene in "grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity as well as a serious threat to legitimate order to restore peace and stability" to any member-state, demonstrating a shift towards a civilian protection norm. Finally, the amendments emphasised equitable geographical representation in AU bodies, seeking to ensure the continent's more powerful states do not have more of a say than less powerful states, as they do at the UN.

Document Analysis

Year	Document Title
1981	African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Banjul Charter)
2000	Constitutive Act of the African Union
2002	Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union
2003	Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee (Part I)

2003	Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa
2006	Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD)
2007	African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance
2013	Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform
2015	African Peace and Security Architecture Roadmap 2016-2020
2015	Common African Position on the UN Review of Peace Operations
2016	Status of Implementation of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa

Table: List of Documents Analysed

The above documents were collected from the African Union website and their selection augmented by conversations and secondary research into some of the documents most pertinent to peace and security on the African continent. A word frequency query with exact matches only revealed the top words between all documents as "security," "African," "peace," "states," "member," "conflict," "RECs," "state," "article," "women," "support" and "regional." An additional word frequency search including stemmed words revealed similar results. The top words in this search included "state," "security," "peace," "African," "member," "conflict," "development," "rights," "RECs," "regions," "nations," and "support." The stemmed word "women" falls to the 14th place but is still prominently featured.

Theme	Average coverage
States and Sovereignty	10.37%
Regional	8.02%
Gender	7.91%
Prevention and Protection	7.29%
Democracy	3.77%
Peacebuilding	2.48%
Development	1.77%
Local, Bottom-Up	1.50%

Table: Average coverage of themes covered in selected documents

In comparing theme coverage in the selected AU and UN documents, a few things stand out. First, the themes of gender and prevention and protection are prominently featured in recent documents from both institutions. The similarities end there, however. The themes of democracy, peacebuilding, development, and local approaches are all quite low in coverage

in AU documents. States and sovereignty and regional themes are highly significant in AU documents, and to a much higher extent than in UN documents. In this section, I analyse the top themes from across the selected documents to identify trends in how themes have developed over time and implications for norm development, consolidation, and evolution. I briefly explore the less covered themes, drawing conclusions about AU norms and where they might be going.

Topic: States and Sovereignty

Year	Document Title	References	Coverage
2016	Status of Implementation of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa	45	32.49%
2007	African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance	35	19.80%
2013	Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform	63	14.43%
2003	Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa	37	9.81%
1981	African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Banjul Charter)	30	8.01%
2015	African Peace and Security Architecture Roadmap 2016-2020	92	7.11%
2006	Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD)	37	5.68%
2002	Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union	19	5.60%
2003	Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee (Part I)	54	5.25%
2000	Constitutive Act of the African Union	13	4.39%
2015	Common African Position on the UN Review of Peace Operations	5	1.50%

The theme of states and sovereignty has significantly more coverage in AU documents than in UN documents. This focus aligns with several key AU norms around state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and "African Solutions to African Problems." Due to colonial encounters as well as internal interests of national political elites, the AU and its member-states are wary of international engagement. While this has always been the case,

the UN's repeated failures to produce peace through external intervention, as with the peacekeeping failures of the 1990s, underscores the continued relevance of these norms to member-states. However, there are key differences between the AU states and states in the Global North informed by a Westphalian model. One key difference is AU states' ability to hold a monopoly on the use of force in large swaths of their territories.[106] However, even as states cannot maintain their own internal security, they tend to refuse external intervention.

The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, which was ratified in 1981, demonstrates the solidification of the norm of peoples' right to self-determination. The document stresses the need to support "liberation struggle(s) against foreign domination, be it political, economic or cultural," while assigning individuals the duty "to preserve and strengthen the national independence and territorial integrity of his country and to contribute to its defense."[107] Along with the OAU and AU, the Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights has also played a key role in embedding human rights norms in African states and regional bodies. More recently, the 2007 Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance aimed to codify state norms around democracy and governance to increase state legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens. This document raised the norm against unconstitutional changes of government on the continent, including punitive measures for non-compliance. However, the application of sanctions has been limited, as in the case of Burundi's 2015 constitutional crisis. Similarly, in our conversation, Carine Kaneza raised the contested DRC election of December 2018, wherein initially Martin Fayulu was declared the winner, with the AU initially acknowledging this win. Later, the AU walked back their statement after a DRC court named Felix Tshisekedi the winner. The lack of accountability or effective engagement suggest that the norm of accepting sovereignty above all is still more powerful than the more nascent norm against unconstitutional changes of power.

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[106] Hussein Solomon, "African Solutions to African Problems? African Approaches to Peace, Security and Stability," *Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies* 43, no. 1 (2015): 45–76; Williams 2007.

[107] Organisation of African Unity, "African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights" (1981), 6.

The 2013 Security Sector Reform (SSR) Framework notes that SSR frameworks for Africa have largely been externally developed, and do not "necessarily align with the realities and sources of insecurity of African peoples, states and societies." The document emphasises the need for AU engagement to support national SSR efforts, noting difficulties with non-state armed actors including mercenaries and private military companies, and addressing a norm against use of child soldiers. The 2016 Status Report on the Rights of Women considers state-led efforts to guarantee women's rights after the 2003 Maputo Protocol. The report notes the limits of sovereignty on women's rights, describing particular states' refusal to recognise certain women's rights as expressed in the protocol. Even so, many states have made progress in codifying gender-specific norms.

Topic: Regional

Year	Report Name	References	Coverage
2015	African Peace and Security Architecture Roadmap 2016-2020	199	22.00%
2015	Common African Position on the UN Review of Peace Operations	45	18.90%
2003	Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee (Part I)	91	11.63%
2013	Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform	41	9.44%
2002	Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union	26	7.88%
2007	African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance	10	6.00%
2006	Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD)	31	4.78%
2000	Constitutive Act of the African Union	13	4.06%
2003	Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa	5	1.69%
2016	Status of Implementation of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa	3	1.37%
1981	African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Banjul Charter)	2	0.49%

Regional cooperation is strongly emphasised throughout the documents. The above analysis on sovereignty and African states' mistrust of Western-led efforts on the continent

demonstrates why regional engagement is a popular alternative. The 2015 African Peace and Security Architecture Roadmap cites the increasing number of conflicts on the continent, including the Rwanda genocide as one of the core reasons for the genesis of the AU.[108] Ms. Kaneza concurred in her interview, noting the failure of African states to respond to atrocity crimes as a core driver of the organisational transition. She described several OAU failures, including failure to address severe human rights abuses by the Idi Amin regime in Uganda. In 1975, despite four Heads of State from Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia boycotting the OAU summit in Kampala, Amin served a full term as OAU Chairman. Such events, as well as the moment of renewal that came from the overthrow of the South African apartheid regime in 1994, led to the organisational transition and a stronger AU normative commitment to human rights.

Recent research suggests that while African third party mediators may have fewer coercive or material resources to bring to the table, due to the African Solutions to African Problems norm, they maintain a stronger level of legitimacy than non-African mediators.[109] Allard Duursma demonstrates African mediators' success, finding that "African third parties possess a social status that, in turn, provides them with a high degree of legitimacy when mediating armed conflict in Africa."[110] In her interview, Marie-Louise Baricako underlined the value of including mediators from the affected region, suggesting that when a mediator understands the culture, dynamics, and history of a region, that they can be a more effective mediator. "If you send to South Africa someone from Nigeria, I'm not very sure. But someone from Zambia, from Zimbabwe, from Malawi would do a better job. Because the way I speak is not necessarily the way people from Senegal and Mali speak. The way I think, the way I understand is not exactly the same […] it is easier to have someone from the

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[108] African Union, "African Peace and Security Architecture," 2015.
[109] Allard Duursma, "African Solutions to African Challenges: The Role of Legitimacy in Mediating Civil Wars in Africa," *International Organization* 74 (2020): 295–330.
[110] Ibid., 297.

region." This suggests that regional and sub-regional organisations, and those who take on leadership roles within them, can play an important role in embedding norms.

Topic: Gender

Year	Document Title	References	Coverage
2016	Status of Implementation of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa	43	33.35%
2003	Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa	93	33.31%
2006	Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD)	26	4.62%
2015	Common African Position on the UN Review of Peace Operations	5	4.16%
2013	Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform	14	4.10%
2007	African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance	6	2.51%
2015	African Peace and Security Architecture Roadmap 2016-2020	12	1.81%
1981	African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Banjul Charter)	4	1.79%
2000	Constitutive Act of the African Union	3	0.82%
2002	Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union	3	0.56%

The prominence of gender as a core theme aligns with normative shifts towards gender equity, and the UN Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. However, it is significant that the documents that fully cover this theme are dedicated to women and gender issues, and that otherwise gender has relatively low coverage throughout the documents.

While gender issues have a long way to go in both national and regional policymaking, as discussed in detail by Ms. Baricako, advocates were successful in driving the AU to revisit original Charter language, writing and passing the Maputo Protocol and establishing offices with significant power to work with civil society women and report

publicly on progress. While major challenges remain, the role played by civil society advocates in advancing gender equality norms cannot be understated. Though there was some work done at the OAU to ensure women's involvement in the organisation, it was limited. In 2006, the OAU Secretary-General established the African Women Committee on Peace and Development, which Baricako described as made up of "high calibre women who […] have been in high positions in their country," and "leaders of civil society organisations." Under that committee, women advocates were able to bring in highly influential stateswomen, including Ruth Sando Perry and Gertrude Mongella, to raise the profile of human rights abuses happening on the continent. The committee "allow[ed] us also to access the highest level of the leaders, like the Secretary-General at that time […] we could also seek for appointments with the heads of state and travel to this country or to that country to meet the head of state, to talk about our agenda."[111]

Aside from the OAU's African Women Committee, however, it was difficult to get women—and particularly civil society women—on the organisation's agenda. Women advocates worked to ensure women were not forgotten in discussions of structural changes as the OAU transitioned into the AU, including by lobbying for a quota of thirty percent of AU positions to be held by women. In the end, the AU decided on fifty percent—above advocates' initial request. Baricako, who helped lead this effort, described the ways in which advocates ensured their voices were heard, including by securing informal meetings with presidents to discuss gender inclusion. At the first AU Summit in Durban, South Africa in 2002, Baricako said:

> We did not have access to the room. Women were not allowed, […] we could not get accreditation. We were not accepted because I think […] African OAU staff members thought these women are coming to push us outside. I think that was their feeling. Because we were coming in good number, and we were strongly advocating. […] Even the day this parity was adopted, everybody else was in the room except women. Imagine. […] We would borrow badges from people who can go inside, enter the room, give to someone else, take out and give to someone else.

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[111] Ibid.

Baricako's description of advocacy in the hallways of hotels, often out of the limelight, corresponded with Kaneza's statement that "most of the work that women have done will not appear as structured […] for security reasons and cultural reasons."[112] Both women also described the impact of conflict on reordering society, a notion explored in depth by Marie Berry, who found that after the Rwandan genocide, "women took on new roles in their households, joined nascent community organizations, and soon began to emerge as leaders in their communities. Ten years later, thousands of women's organizations had emerged as vital and robust social institutions, and women were elected to the world's highest percentage of seats in Parliament."[113] Kaneza gave another example: the Mano River Women's Network in West Africa who worked together to pressure political actors during the Liberia war to secure a peace agreement.

The Maputo Protocol refers to other prominent documents and reports such as the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and UNSC Resolution 1325 to highlight women's rights as human rights and further develop African norms around gender equality. The document aims to mainstream gender into national constitutions and laws in order to codify equity norms. The 2016 status report demonstrates that women's rights norms are still limited, noting that as of October 2015, only 37 out of 54 AU member states had ratified the Maputo Protocol. Additionally, only 9 AU member states were up to date with biannual status reports required by the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, demonstrating a lack of political will to fulfil human rights obligations.

Topic: Prevention and Protection

Year	Document Title	References	Coverage

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[112] Kaneza, Carine. Interview with MacKenzie J. Hamilton. 6 July 2021. Recording and transcript available at the University of Glasgow Archive.

[113] Marie E. Berry, "From Violence to Mobilization: Women, War, and Threat in Rwanda," *Mobilization* 20, no. 2 (2015): 135–56.

2015	African Peace and Security Architecture Roadmap 2016-2020	117	16.67%
2002	Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union	46	12.74%
2015	Common African Position on the UN Review of Peace Operations	30	11.97%
2003	Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa	32	11.90%
2016	Status of Implementation of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa	20	11.48%
2006	Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD)	34	4.87%
1981	African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Banjul Charter)	16	3.53%
2013	Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform	15	3.14%
2003	Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee (Part I)	21	2.15%
2007	African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance	3	1.15%
2000	Constitutive Act of the African Union	2	0.59%

That coverage of this theme is over 10% for five documents from 2003 to present demonstrates that protection and prevention continue to be relevant to the AU. The prominence of this theme aligns with the shift towards R2P as an international norm. In the AU context, the shift was from non-interference, based on respect for state sovereignty, to non-indifference. Kathryn Nash explores this shift in detail, explaining it as a multi-stage process informed by the horrific wars and atrocity events of the 1960s and 1970s including in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, Uganda, and the Central African Republic. These events harmed Africa's reputation on the global stage and the continuation of such events led African leaders toward reforms that eventually led to the AU transition. By the time of the transition, human security was fully integrated into the international security lexicon, and R2P was emerging, in large part due to African atrocities in the 1990s.[114]

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[114] Nash, 7-9.

Even as R2P is sometimes decried as a Western imposition, the principle was developed in part by Algerian diplomat Mohamed Sahnoun, a former OAU Deputy Secretary-General and seasoned UN mediator, and the issue was discussed on the continent well before its international adoption. [115] Though the OAU created a mechanism for conflict prevention in 1993, it was ill-equipped to overcome the stronger sovereignty and non-interference norms. The 2002 Protocol that established the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) thus signified a shift in the AU's approach to peace and conflict issues. The document notes that "no single internal factor has contributed more to socio-economic decline on the Continent and the suffering of the civilian population than the scourge of conflicts within and between our States." The development of the AU's PSC and Peace and Security Architecture can thus be understood as a response to the OAU's failures and a desire to solidify the non-indifference norm.

Burundi is an interesting case study in the evolution of OAU/AU norms, because it was the first country that the OAU engaged in during the 1970s. While this engagement signified a primary concern for state, rather than civilian, security, engagement in the 1990s was different. Presidents Julius Nyerere and Nelson Mandela were instrumental in enabling the Arusha Peace Accords that ended the civil war and ushered in a new constitution. In 2003, the AU launched the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) as its first armed peace mission to prevent a relapse into conflict. This effort was lauded as an early AU success for the non-indifference principle, stabilising the situation enough that a UN peacekeeping operation could be deployed.[116] When a constitutional crisis escalated in 2015, there was engagement by the PSC, whose observers documented massive human rights violations. However, the limits of the non-indifference principle became apparent when the AU threatened to send peacekeepers to Burundi, and later decided not to do so because of a

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[115] Siphamandla Zondi, "African Union Approaches to Peacebuilding : Efforts at Shifting the Continent towards Decolonial Peace," *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, 2017.
[116] Tim Murithi, "The African Union's Transition from Non-Intervention to Non-Indifference: An Ad Hoc Approach to the Responsibility to Protect?," *Journal for International Relations and Global Trends* 1 (2009): 90–106.

lack of government consent.[117] Even given the failure to launch a peacekeeping force, the high-level attention paid to the issue by the AU over the years signifies that the norm has continued credence.

The non-indifference norm clearly has limits similar to the R2P norm. African-led principles continue to develop, as signified by the Kigali Principles on the Protection of Civilians that were launched in 2015. While these principles largely relate to peacekeeper preparedness, they also emphasise a norm towards using force when needed, regardless of the acceptance of the host government.

Remaining Themes: Democracy, Peacebuilding, and Bottom-Up Approaches

The remaining themes lacked significant coverage in AU documents, though the two 2015 documents made significant reference to peacebuilding, suggesting that the AU may follow the UN in further investing in and developing peacebuilding tools and approaches. Whereas peacebuilding has prominently emerged as a core theme in UN documents, likely aided by the creation of the PBC, at the AU it has thus far not emerged as a core internal theme. The relative success of the non-indifference principle, as well as the political challenges posed by armed peacekeeping approaches may provide an opening for unarmed peacebuilding approaches to further develop on the continent, but only if there are significant financial investments. A recent GPPI report suggests that the PSC's protocol provides space for AU-civil society collaboration that could assist in the further development of peacebuilding efforts on the continent, though to date such collaboration has been limited.[118]

As discussed earlier, there are significant challenges to democracy due to the limitations of statebuilding on the continent as well as the AU's hesitance to decry

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[117] Jide Martyns Okeke, "An Ambivalence to the Norm Cycle: The African Union's 'New' Approach to Continental Peace and Security," in *African Foreign Policies in International Institutions*, ed. Jason Warner and Timothy M. Shaw (New York, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2018), 19–32.
[118] Charles Nyuykonge and Mwachofi Singo, "Ten Years On: The African Union Peacebuilding Framework & the Role of Civil Society," 2017, https://www.gppi.net/media/APC_2017_The_AU_Peacebuilding_Framework_and_the_Role_of_Civil_Socie ty.pdf.

unconstitutional changes of power. Thus, we can see that democratic norms need stronger champions if they are to succeed on the continent. Addressing the tensions between the maintenance of colonial boundaries in African states, the tendency of politicians to mobilise votes based on ethnicity, and rhetoric around African peoples' self-determination are key to solving this challenge.

As with my UN analysis, the most underdeveloped theme within AU peace-related documents is local and bottom-up approaches to peace. Like in the UN documents, lip service is paid to the impacts of conflict on local peoples and the role of civil society actors in advancing societal peace. This suggests that, though there is significant discussion in academia and civil society regarding the role of local actors, a norm of local engagement is not yet integrated into either institution. In investigating the 2006 PCRD, which includes a 5% coverage of this theme, it appears that local actors are largely discussed as recipients of policy, rather than as partners in peace consolidation. While significant work is being done by local actors in addressing challenges, this work goes largely unsupported by institutional actors.

Ms. Baricako told me that women were some of the first civil society members to work on African issues and engage the African Union on human rights issues, largely due to the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights' engagement of civil society in their processes. She elaborated,

> [Civil society was] part and parcel of the activities of the Commission and most of the time the session of the Commission would always be preceded by three days consultation of the civil society organisations on the agenda of the African Commission, so that is what we wanted to get at the African Union. […] Whenever there is a summit, we gather for three days meeting to have views and feelings on the agenda of the summit in that session.[119]

These consultations are managed and run by civil society organisations, and Commissioners are invited to attend. Over time, more and more Commissioners have come to attend these

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[119] Baricako, 2021.

meetings, by invitation of the Special Envoy on WPS. This model could be used by the AU's PSC based on the stated PCRD principle of "national and local ownership." Without engagement and buy-in of local actors in long-term policy planning, the AU and UN will likely continue to struggle to address major challenges to their efforts at building sustainable and positive peace.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

Norms around state relations and conflict have shifted significantly in both the UN and the AU since the 1990s, influenced in large part by the rise of human security and emancipatory liberalism. AU norms have certainly been influenced by international norms such as state sovereignty, though they have also made these norms their own, interpreting them in different ways. For example, African states used international norms around state sovereignty and non-interference to advocate for independence from colonial powers but embedding these norms has limited norm development in other areas, including democracy and human rights. African states have continued to struggle to implement governance models that are inclusive of the diversity of the people within their colonially-imposed state boundaries. Given the continued focus on states as those responsible for peace and security, absent dramatic moves towards inclusive governance within these boundaries with significant local buy-in, it will be difficult to reconcile norms based on state sovereignty with newer human-centred norms. Even so, the relative success of engagement by regional and sub-regional actors in the conflict mediation field demonstrates the usefulness of these actors in conflict resolution and mitigation at elite levels.

Because norms can only reveal so much, I sought, throughout this dissertation, to historically situate the development of the UN and AU and their normative approaches to peace and security. Most normative approaches are based on a liberal model that originally aimed to uphold empire and a global racial hierarchy. The core themes explored through my thematic analysis show that both the UN and AU have, in recent years, increasingly emphasised state-centred approaches to resolving conflict and building peace, favouring preventive approaches that centre development and institution building as tools for prevention. Such an approach favours the Westphalian state model and colonially-imposed boundaries and risk recreating old problems. Basing policy on such norms will continue to marginalise non-elites, particularly those beyond state control.

Newer norms that emphasise actors beyond the state may provide opportunities for new conceptions of security. Peacebuilding efforts that centre local actors as agents of peace is one such opportunity. The UN has begun to institutionalise peacebuilding frameworks to prevent recurrence of conflict, and, though funding for these frameworks continues to be low, some important gains have been made. Yet these gains do not occur in a vacuum. As my interviewees emphasised, we live in an extremely unequal world, and local community members face violent repercussions for speaking truth to power. While "localisation is a good choice […] the country must be in peace. If it is not in peace, it is not possible."[120]

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[120] Ibid.

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<u>Appendix I: Abbreviation List</u>

AU – African Union

CSW – (UN) Commission on the Status of Women

EU – European Union

ECOSOC – (UN) Economic and Social Council

FAS – Femmes Africa Solidarite

OAU – Organisation of African Unity

OSCE – Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PBC – (UN) Peacebuilding Commission

PSC – (African Union) Peace and Security Council

R2P – Responsibility to Protect

SSR – Security Sector Reform

UDHR – UN Declaration of Human Rights

UN – United Nations

UNCHR – UN Commission on Human Rights

UNGA – UN General Assembly

UNSC – UN Security Council

UNSG – UN Secretary-General

WPS – Women, Peace and Security

Appendix II: Positionality

As a young activist concerned about the genocide in Darfur, Sudan in the mid-2000s, my approach to advocacy was inherently problematic and based on paternalistic liberalism, though I wouldn't have understood what that meant at the time. As with many engaged in this work, my activism was performative and self-congratulatory, centring myself and my fellow white activists who spent much more of our free time reading about UN peacekeeping and advocating for humanitarian intervention, and comparatively little speaking to people impacted by the conflict. Many of the scholars we read, the documentaries we watched, and the speakers at our rallies were white, Western, and well-meaning. But this approach was incredibly flawed, and the movement was little more than a fad. While we provided some space for wealth to be shifted to impacted communities, it was largely a charitable, rather than a liberatory, endeavour and did little to create the structural change necessary to bring peace to the Sudan.

One of the initial reasons I continued to work in the peace and conflict space was an overwhelming feeling of white guilt. As I got to meet, know, and befriend Darfuris, South Sudanese, Rwandese, Burmese, and others who had survived the horrors of genocide and mass atrocity events, I became more and more disturbed by white advocates who floated in and out of global justice work. I watched as white-led organisations focused on ending the genocide in Darfur closed their doors, leaving primarily diaspora and youth to continue the advocacy that had, for a time, become a relatively mainstream part of American political life. Funding dried up for the work that had rallied so many towards the cause of a relatively unknown part of the world, mobilised millions of dollars for peacekeeping and humanitarian aid and resettled hundreds of thousands of refugees to safer lands.

Prior to studying in Rwanda in 2011, I read Ivan Illich's 1968 speech, *To Hell With Good* Intentions, which problematises international volunteer work, imploring American volunteers to reject paternalism towards poor Latin Americans and instead look towards

improving the lives of the poor in their own country.[121] He considers the volunteers, who have no training to do the work they intend to do, self-congratulatory "vacationing salesmen for the middle-class 'American Way of Life'" who would be laughed at or spat upon by the poor in their own country should they seek to recreate their volunteer work abroad in their own country. His speech ends, "I am here to entreat you to use your money, your status and your education to travel in Latin America. Come to look, come to climb our mountains, to enjoy our flowers. Come to study. But do not come to help."[122]

I have sought to incorporate this advice into my own work and research, inspired, as well, by a professor who, knowing my usual temperament and militance towards particular viewpoints, advised me to do more listening than speaking while abroad. I was lucky to learn from individuals who were both concerned with ethics and invested in cross-cultural learning and collaboration. I benefited from the experiences of living with a host family, taking public transportation, and learning basic Kinyarwanda, and came to understand how limited my world and experiences were back in small town Massachusetts. When the "Kony 2012" craze proliferated after having spent time in Gulu, Uganda, I was irate at the portrayal of Ugandans as helpless and white Americans as saviours. I pushed back on this narrative while considering how I could work to improve people's lives, both in my own community and abroad.

There are no easy answers to these issues. For now, I've settled on the old theatre technique of "yes, and…" seeking to learn from and amplify the voices and demands of impacted peoples wherever I seek to advocate on an issue and acknowledging that there are contradictions in advocacy that cannot always be untangled. *Yes*, it is true that American-style democracy is not the only way, *and* it is equally true that democracy is not only a Western ideal, and that throughout human history people in global societies have demanded

[121] Ivan Illich, "To Hell with Good Intentions," *Conference on InterAmerican Student Projects*, 1968.
[122] Ibid.

a say in their own governance and the distribution of resources. *Yes*, it is true that American democracy is fundamentally flawed and that its benefits are not distributed equally, *and* it is also true that other governance systems are also fundamentally flawed and capable of enacting harm.

My academic training and approach can be credited, in large part, to studying both political science and history. Two of my formative teachers at Smith College were Catharine and David Newbury, scholars of the Great Lakes of Africa, the former a political scientist and the latter a historian. Their tutelage, combined with an interdisciplinary degree in African Studies, wherein I took courses on African philosophy, literature, and language, have shaped my approach to analysing societies and politics. I additionally developed a keen interest in political anthropology from studying under Susan Thomson, who at the time was studying peasant resistance to government reconciliations policies in Africa. She taught me to look deeply at the everyday lives of individuals to better understand the dynamics simmering under the surface. I am grateful to these formal teachers, and just as grateful to my fellow "genprev" activists who learned beside me, driven by a belief in the goodness of humanity. There is much work to be done in this broken world of ours, and we must never give up trying to understand and heal it wherever we can.