



Erasmus
Mundus

Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab Resiliency and Incumbent Governments' Ineffectiveness:
Rethinking Counterinsurgency against Salafist Islam-inspired insurgencies through
a Wicked Problem Analytical Approach

July 2021

University of Glasgow Student Number: 2479886E

Dublin City University Student Number: 19108613

Charles University Student Number: 12493403

Presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree

of

International Master in Security, Intelligence and Strategic Studies

Word Count: 23,247

Supervisor: Professor Emil Aslan Souleimanov

Date of Submission: 25 July 2021



CHARLES UNIVERSITY

Abstract

This study explores the relationship between Jihadist insurgency typified by Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab conflicts and wicked problems. Although a large number of research has been carried out on insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN), and the concept of the wicked problem has been applied to many studies in varying academic disciplines, there is no research on Salafism-inspired insurgency and the COIN efforts to resolve it using the concept of wicked problem.

The study adopted a qualitative research approach using a document analysis strategy to provide critical analysis of the “how” and “why” the two insurgencies are wicked problems, the failures of the incumbent states to defeat them, and a proposal of a wicked problem governance framework for managing the conflicts. The study concluded that the wicked problem concept has an explanatory utility that can illuminate the character of jihadist insurgencies and proposed taming as a governance solution to the insurgencies.

Acknowledgements

This research required a combination of hard work and perseverance in a difficult period of a global COVID 19 pandemic. I was only able to accomplish it with the support and assistance of some people. First, I am grateful to my supervisor, Professor Emil Aslan of Charles University, Prague, for his guidance throughout this research. His patience and understanding in providing the reviews, corrections and suggestions were invaluable to completing this work.

I also owe a debt of gratitude to my fellow students of IMSISS 2019-2021 Cohort for their friendship and support. Particularly, I thank Mr Makam Daim and Miss Olivia Dorak, the Course Leader, for their warmth and emotional support, especially in keeping in touch regularly to ensure I got on well.

Lastly, I am grateful to my wife, Eno-Obong and family in Nigeria for their support and understanding during the long period of the COVID 19-imposed isolation and absence, when airports were closed, and I could not get a flight back home for more than a year. Their prayers, regular calls and encouragement saw me through the difficult period.

Table of Contents

Cover page.....	i
Abstract.....	ii
Acknowledgements.....	iii
Contents.....	iv
List of tables.....	vii
List of figures.....	vii
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION	
1 Overview.....	1
1.1 Background.....	1
1.2 Salafist and Jihadist-motivated Insurgencies.....	2
1.3 Nigeria and Boko Haram, Somalia and Al-Shabaab: An Overview.....	3
1.4 Origin and Evolution of Boko Haram.....	4
1.5 Somalia : History of Clan Based Identities and Conflict	5
1.6 Origins and Evolution of Al-Shabaab.....	6
1.7 Jihadist Insurgencies of Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab as Wicked Problems...7	
1.8 Statement of the Problem.....	8
1.9 Aim of the Study.....	9
1.9.1 Research Questions.....	9-10
1.9.2 Research Justification.....	10
1.9.3 Significance of the Study.....	11
1.9.4 Theoretical Framework.....	11
1.9.5 Research Design.....	12
1.9.6 Thesis Structure.....	12
1.9.7 Limitations.....	13
1.9.8 Ethical Considerations.....	13
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW	
2.0 Introduction.....	14
2.1 The concept of Insurgency, Salafist thought and Salafist-Jihad Insurgency...14	

2.1.1	Salafism and the Salafist thought.....	15
2.1.2	Origin and Rise of Salafism.....	15
2.1.3.	Jihadist Insurgency Literature.....	16
2.1.4	Definition of Salafist Jihadist Insurgency.....	18
2.3	Differences between Traditional and Salafist Jihadist Insurgencies.....	18
2.4	Origin and Concept of Counterinsurgency.....	21
2.5	Critique of the theory of Counterinsurgency.....	22
2.2	Origins and the evolution of the concept of Wicked Problems.....	24
2.2.1	Wicked Problem in Counterinsurgency Literature.....	26
2.2.2	Critique of the Wicked Problem Concept.....	27
2.2.3	Jihadist Insurgency as Wicked Problem.....	30
2.3	Conclusion and Literature Gap.....	31
CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY		
3.0	Introduction.....	32
3.1	Justification for the use of the Qualitative Approach in this Case Study.....	32
3.2	Justification for Case Study Design and Case Selection.....	34
3.3	Data Collection using Qualitative Methodology.....	35
3.4	Data Analysis.....	36
3.5	Content Analysis of the Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab Insurgencies.....	37
3.6	Content Analysis of the Wicked Problem theory.....	38
3.7	Validity and Research Limitations.....	41
CHAPTER 4 CONCEPTUALISING BOKO HARAM AND AL-SHABAAB INSURGENCIES AS WICKED PROBLEMS		
4.0	Overview.....	43
4.1	Boko Haram and the Nigerian Enabling Environment.....	43
4.2	Al-Shabaab and the Enabling Environment of Somalia.....	44
4.3	Traditional Insurgency Conceptualisation and Analysis Framework.....	45
4.4	The Salafist Jihadist Insurgency Conceptualisation and Analysis Framework.....	48
4.5	Jihadist Insurgency Elements and Wicked Problem Conceptualisation.....	52
4.6	Jihadist Insurgency Characteristics as Correlates of Wicked Problems.....	53
4.7	Nigeria and Somalia : Environments Predisposed to Wicked Problems.....	57
4.8	Conclusion: Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab Insurgencies are Wicked Problems.....	59

CHAPTER 5 GOVERNING THE WICKED PROBLEMS OF THE BOKO HARAM AND AL-SHABAAB INSURGENCIES

5.0 Introduction.....60

5.1 Resolving Traditional Insurgencies.....60

5.2 The Classical/Traditional Insurgency Resolution (Counterinsurgency Model).....61

5.3 Incumbent State’s Weakness and the Unconquerability of the Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab Insurgencies.....62

5.4 Taming as a wicked Problem Governance Strategy of the Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab Insurgencies.....64

5.5 Governing Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab Insurgencies:The Wicked Taming Model..65

5.6 Chapter Summary.....67

CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION

6.0 Overview.....68

6.1 Future Research for COIN against Salafism-inspired insurgency and Wicked Problems..... 69

Bibliography.....71-82

Appendix A.....1-3

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

Tables

- 2-1 Differences between Traditional and Salafist Jihad Insurgencies
- 2-2 Framing Jihadist Insurgency as a Wicked Problem
- 3-1 Jihadist Insurgency Content Analysis Framework
- 3-2 Wicked Problems Content Analysis Framework
- 4-1 Jihadist Insurgency Characteristics as Correlates of Wicked Problems Properties

Figures

- 3-1 Research Design and Analysis Framework
- 4-1 Traditional Insurgencies Conceptualisation and Analysis Framework
- 4-2 The Salafist Jihad Insurgency Conceptualisation and Analysis Model
- 5-1 The wicked Problem Taming Model.

Chapter One

Introduction

1.0 Overview

An analysis of Jihadist insurgencies typified by Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab conflicts, counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in weak incumbent states' context, and the framing of the conflicts in wicked problem terms for necessary governance solution is the aim of this research. A background of statehood and the challenges it confronts especially from Violent Non-State Actors (VNSAs), as well as the Nigerian and Somalian environments (the conditions enabling the emergence of Boko Haram and Al Shabaab) are briefly highlighted to provide the context of the study. This is further underlined by the research questions, the statement of the problem, and the justification for the research. Thereafter, the research design, highlight of the research methodology are presented, concluding with the thesis structure, limitations of the study and ethical considerations.

1.1 Background

Unarguably, political territoriality and sovereignty, which the modern state defends jealously are some of the main features that distinguish it from its ancient kingdom and empire predecessors (Pierson, 2004). However, the logic and significance of the territorial and sovereign state have been challenged by a mosaic of issues that reveal its vulnerability and fragility. These issues range from globalisation, which manifests in various forms, to natural disasters and pandemics, over which the state has no control.

Apart from sovereign authority and control of territory, monopoly of the means of violence has been one of the main characteristics of the modern state. The sole authority and right to the use of the coercive instrument on behalf of its citizens are intrinsic to the state's existence. Historically, this logic gained locus from the decision of individuals to surrender their rights and desires of self-protection to the state, which exercises it on their behalf by discretionary measures (Anter, 2014).

Ironically, the coercive instrument of which the state is deemed to have the legitimate monopoly is also, in recent years, what it has been most vulnerable to when it lacks the capacity to use the same in fulfilment of the social contract with its citizens.

Therefore, of the contemporary threats to statehood, non-state actors with coercive capability have become the most pervasive and have posed the most significant challenge. (Shamir, 2021). In some cases, their ability to proliferate, splinter, merge, and fragment again seems to confound the state and constrain its coercive instrument capacity (Pearlman & Cunningham, 2012).

Since the end of the Cold War, while the number and frequency of interstate conflicts have sharply declined, intra-state conflicts initiated and funded by VNSAs have surged (Kaldor, 1999). For example, in Sub-Saharan Africa, insurgencies of various variants have created an opaque and criminality-fed political economy and hollowed out weak and failing states, rendering them unable to secure their citizens (Reno, 2012).

1.2 Salafist and Jihadist-motivated Insurgencies

While earlier typologies of insurgency like nationalist and anti-colonial variants were easily amenable to negotiated solutions, Jihadist insurgencies locate their grievances against political authorities in religious ideology. They are primarily affiliates of global, decentralised and networked groups such as Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. The emergence of these groups and their political role of leveraging jihadist ideology with the narratives of perceived or real grievances has enabled an articulate and cohesive pan Islamic propaganda. The narratives of the humiliation of Muslims and attack on Islam has produced good appeal for militant activities and changed the course and dynamics of contemporary insurgency. Specifically, the Salafist political ideas have helped to create awareness among its adherents and have stirred up sentiments of the supposedly waning, in religious, cultural, political, military, and economic terms, of Islam and the need to, by jihad (struggle), reclaim its once flourishing status (Moghadam, 2008). This radical ideology and the militancy it has produced have spread quickly from the Middle East to the Caucasus and Asia and have attracted vast followership of volunteer fighters. It soon gained root in Sub-Saharan Africa with a huge youth bulge without means of daily survival, where Boko Haram in Nigeria, and Al-Shabaab in Somalia, became ready franchises.

While scholarly work on insurgency and COIN have peaked in the last two decades (Spear, 2018), empirical work on Jihadist insurgency and COIN to overcome them are few. Suffice to say that COIN warfare against Jihadist insurgency is even more complex and intractable and appears insoluble to weak states against which they fight.

This is the case in Nigeria and Somalia, where Boko Haram and Al Shabaab groups with a very resilient and adaptive system of loose and well-nested organisational structures have challenged with some level of success, state sovereignty, and territoriality for over a decade.

1.3 Nigeria and Boko Haram, Somalia and Al-Shabaab: An Overview

A former British colony that became independent in 1960 but practising an unaffordable American-oriented democratic system, Nigeria is characterised by ethnic, religious, cultural, and linguistic diversity. With 36 states created by past military regimes under the contested basis of population, landmass, and availability of mineral resources, it is the most populous country and the largest economy in Africa with approximately 200 million people and a GDP of 443 billion US Dollars (World Bank, 2020). Although it has delineated geographic boundaries set at independence, the basis of nationhood is strongly challenged by the plurality of over 250 ethnic nationalities bearing distinct identities. There is a modicum of central political authority since much of the population accepts the tenuous notion of unity in diversity. Economically, it has woefully underperformed relative to its immense human and natural resources, with poor governance and debilitating culture of corruption, which has produced double-digit unemployment figures, at the heart of its development failures (USAID, 2010). Consequently, poverty is prevalent, and ethnic, inter-religious and intra-religious conflicts generate high level of insecurity in the country (Lewis, 2004).

Demographically, Nigeria is almost equally divided between Christians, who are predominant in the South, and Muslims, that constitute the majority in the North. A disparity in educational attainment and wealth exist between the North and the South due to differing beliefs systems and socio-cultural norms. While the South is generally pro-West with more investment in Western education and comparative advantage in a higher standard of living, the largely semi-arid and Muslim North prioritises Koranic education. It is educationally disadvantaged from a Western perspective and has a high level of poverty. Political Islamism, which is intolerant of moderate religious views and practices, is prevalent. Under this environment, where extremist religious beliefs and practices are the norms, Boko Haram owes its existence.

1.4 Origin and Evolution of Boko Haram

“Boko Haram” is a Hausa language (Widely spoken in West Africa and the Sahel) meaning, “Western education is forbidden by Islam.” The group accepts the nickname and insists that the phrase refers not just to education but also socio-political ills ascribable to the alleged domination of the Nigerian State by Western ideas and values (Thurston, 2016). The sect's politics, ideology and theological doctrines embody an exclusivist worldview. It pushes the victimhood narratives, claiming that its violent uprising against the State responds to the alleged history of persecution and marginalisation of Muslims and attack on Islam in Nigeria. Thus, Boko Haram has leveraged a mixture of exclusivism and grievances narrative grafted onto a framework of ideological beliefs to perpetrate violence against the Nigerian State and its citizens.

Largely Kanuri (a significant ethnic group in Nigeria’s Northeast) in composition and core membership, Boko Haram has historical antecedents from the 1804 Usman Dan Fodio jihad of the Northern Nigeria Sokoto caliphate and the 1980 Kano Maitasine sect riots, one of the most virulent religious crises in Nigeria’s history (Adesoji, 2011). It has a theological resemblance to other "Salafi-jihadi" sects worldwide, even though shaped by local dynamics of political Islam, identity, and intra-Islam rivalry for supremacy, especially between the Sufis and Shias and the radical Sunnis. Boko Haram has a murky origin traced to 2002, in a base near Kannama, Yobe, one of Nigeria's North Eastern States. Before his death in police custody in 2009, Mohammed Yusuf, its founding leader and charismatic preacher, had wax-and-wane relations with governors and the political establishment in the North East of Nigeria. Yusuf is known to have revered Salafist theologians, including Ahmad Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328 and the Palestinian-Jordanian Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (Thurston, 2016).

Following Yusuf’s extra-judicial killing by the police and the revolt by his followers, Boko Haram went underground, emerging later as a military organisation with Abubakar Shekau as an official successor. For strategic and ideological reasons, Shekau declared allegiance to the Islamic State in March 2015. Nonetheless, the group's uniqueness in tactics such as an attack on schools, cell phone towers, and power lines, mass kidnaps of young schoolgirls and women for ransom, appear indigenously created rather than externally directed (Thurston, 2016).

Boko Haram's official name is Ahl al-Sunna li-l-Da'wa wa-l-Jihad. Ahl al-Sunna, or "People of the Prophet's Model," is a synonym for only genuine representatives of Sunni Islam, with "the call" to its understanding of the duty to Islam, particularly the waging of jihad. Like other Salafi-jihadis, the sect lay claims to a sacred duty of declaring Muslim leaders apostates, organising a rebellion against infidel states, imposing the Salafi creed and its fundamentalist interpretation of Islamic law on civilians. It aspires to transform the countries in the region of Lake Chad (Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon) into a pure Islamic society. It views the United States, European states, and Israel as evil powers that seek the destruction of Islam (Thurston, 2016). The sect has been difficult to defeat due to its roots in the neighbouring states of Niger, Chad and Cameroon, and the Nigerian State's weakness. It has killed over 37,000 people since its inception (CFR, 2021).

1.5 Somalia: History of Clan-Based Identities and Conflict

The republic of Somalia emerged from a merger of British Somaliland, which gained independence from Britain on June 26 1960, and Italian Somaliland, which became independent from the Italian-administered UN trusteeship on July 1 1960 (FitzGerald, 2002). A deep historical sense of clan-based identity and conflictual relations has underwritten and shaped civil strife and rebellions in Somalia before and after independence.

The promise of a flourishing nation was soon truncated at independence by the assassination of the first Prime Minister, Abdirashid Ali Shermarke, by his bodyguard and the take over of power by a former army commander, General Siad Barre, in 1969. Barre's nepotism and misrule further widened the clan-based fault lines of Somalia, which post-independence constitution did nothing to strategically wean away from primordial loyalties. Nonetheless, political leaders have used Islam, the predominant religion as a rallying point for nationalist, and anti-foreigner sentiments (Vidino et al., 2010). Barre's misrule managed to last over two decades, but ended in 1991, when a combination of the forces of the northern and southern clans ousted him.

After the collapse of Siad Barre's government, opposition groups with clan-based support resorted to armed struggle to control the government and the country. Opposition by the former army commander, General Mahammad Faarah Aidid, to Ali Mahdi Mahammad's emergence as the head of provisional government further

polarised Somalia into irreconcilable Clan-based factions, ending in inter-ethnic war. Thus, the 1992 drought in central and southern Somalia, death and starvation resulting from food shortages, and activities of militias with loyalty to warlords led to a dire humanitarian situation (Vidino et al, 2010). With a poor economy and perpetually depending on aid, Somalia was bound to fail as a sovereign state. This humanitarian situation and the condition of anarchy prompted the UN response with the authorisation of a limited peacekeeping operation, United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I). Somalia's militia factions soon exploited UNOSOM's limited use of force for self-defence. Faced with the humanitarian catastrophe, the United States intervened in December 1992 with a Unified Task Force (UNITAF)-Operation Restore Hope. In May 1993, as the United States began to withdraw its troops, UNITAF was replaced by the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II). Seeing UNOSOM II as a threat to his ambition for power, Aidid and his forces launched attacks, to which American forces responded and as fighting escalated, 19 American Rangers and more than 1,000 Somalis were killed (Bowden, 2010). Consequently, the UN withdrawal and the killing of Aidid in August 1996 left Somalia without a government and a failed state.

Since the withdrawal of American and UN troops, several attempts have been made for Somalia to have a government and gain stability. Since 2013, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), with the support of the UN has assisted in credible elections and peacebuilding to the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) (Jones, 2016). However, the Al-Shabaab insurgency becomes the main impediment to peace and security in Somalia.

1.6 Origins and Evolution of Al-Shabaab

Considered from the background of conflictual and violent clan-based relations and the fact that since the fall of Mohamed Siad Barre, there has been no functional central government in Somalia, it could be understood how the country's conflicts increasingly assumed militant politico-religious dimensions. The setting also explains why religious outbidding (Vidino et al, 2010) led to the ascendancy of disparate Islamist groups struggling for the soul of Somalia.

Notably, one of the many violent actors to emerge in post-Siad Barre's Somalia was al Ittihad al Islami (Islamic Union, AIAI), a group whose political goal was to create an

Islamic state in Greater Somalia (Rabasa, 2009 cited in Vidino et al , 2010). AIAI, whose military wing was led by an ex-army colonel, Shaykh Hassan Aweys, managed to gain control over a large part of Somali's South. It established links with Al-Qaeda, which began to look towards Somalia for a base after its leaders moved to Sudan from Afghanistan in the 1990s (The 9/11 Report, 2004).

By the dawn of the millennium, internal dissent and pressure from Ethiopia led AIAI to splinter into several factions, with the most significant being the Islamic Court Union (ICU), a loose union of clerics and militia that mirrored the Taliban in Afghanistan. It promised to end warlordism, return Somalia to law, order and lasting peace (Vidino et al, 2010). As ICU extended its control of Somalia to Baidoa, the base of the United Nations, it posed a direct threat to the (UN)-supported Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The 2006 invasion by Ethiopia, Somalia's historical enemy, at the request of the TFG for the security of Baidoa, provided the environment favourable to the emergence of a new group. Conflating global Islamist vision with the nationalistic sentiments that simmered following the invasion, former AIAI leaders Aweys and Ayrow led a jihadist-inspired ideological and well-trained young volunteers militia (Al Shabaab, "the youth") to splinter off ICU.

Al Shabaab's carefully framed narratives of the Somali conflict resonated with that of al Qaeda: Ethiopia as the "near enemy" (for its military forces invading Somalia) and the "apostate Somali government" as colluding with the United States and Europe- the "far enemy"- to attack and humiliate Islam and Muslims. By 2007, Al-Shabaab had begun emulating Abu Musab Zarqawi, a Key Iraqi Al Qaeda leader, by posting stylised "martyrdom" videos on various internet platforms. After pledging its allegiance to Al Qaeda in 2012, Al-Shabaab had become the go-to Jihadist sect in suicide attacks, kidnapping for ransom, and occasional conventional pitch battles against African Union-led forces despite the systematic killing of some of its prominent leaders by the US in airstrikes and Special Forces operations (CFR, 2020).

1.7 Jihadist Insurgency of Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab as Wicked Problems

Among the intractable and open-ended societal problems such as poverty, inequality, climate change, and drugs abuse, scholars have added warfare to the variant of "wicked problems" (Bebber, 2015). While wicked problem framing of such knotty societal problems allows for refocusing of policy interventions necessary to solve it,

complexity and indeterminate characteristics, which Jihadist insurgency possess, seemingly defy state-designed policy solutions. Thus, it is more fitting to classify it as a wicked problem.

In their 1973 seminal article, design theorist Horst Rittel and urban designer, Melvin Webber, used the term "wicked problem" to explain intractable societal problems of social nature. They argued that such issues manifest ill-defined complex characteristics. Since their first use of the concept in policy science, its applicability has widened to other academic fields in which experts have struggled to provide solutions to complex problems.

Jihadist insurgency, which Boko Haram and Al Shabaab exemplify, is analogous to a wicked problem. The conceptual explanation of wicked problems posits that such problems have numerous causes and actors with unpredictable behaviour. They do not have a right answer applicable to all contexts and insoluble in a finite time frame using fundamental theories and techniques. (Camillus, 2008). Equally, the likelihood of a problem being wicked due to the enabling conditions of structural complexity, [un]knowability; knowledge fragmentation; knowledge framing; interest differentiation; and power differentiation (Alford and Head, 2017) are all present in the Nigerian and Somalian contexts.

1.8 Statement of the Problem

As Chapters Two and Three will exhaustively discuss, the resolution of insurgency is by theory and practice assumed to be amendable to pacification or brutalisation or a combination of both approaches. Therefore, COIN theoretical logic is premised on the effectiveness of either of or both methods. Implicit in this theorisation is that jihadist insurgency is also solvable by adopting either or both approaches. However, COIN theoretical conceptualisation appears to be confounded in cases where the two paradigms fail to resolve Jihadist insurgency conflict. The possibility of this failure appeared to be unanticipated, as evident in the case of Jihadist insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. Arguably, therefore, there is a pre-deterministic formulation of COIN theory to solve the problem of insurgency. Unfortunately, this theory has so far been ineffective in resolving Salafist-Islam inspired insurgencies.

A cursory look at the literature on wicked problems reveal mainly three strands of ideas: those questioning the conceptualisation and ontological basis of wicked problems; those explicating how various challenges (such as climate change, poverty, crimes, and environment-related issues, etc.) are wicked problems; and those exploring techniques, procedures, and practices and proposing governance solutions to countries and organisations experiencing wicked problems. (Wilczek, 2017). Very few academic research in these categories address insurgency and COIN as wicked problems. In cases where conflicts are mentioned, wars, in general, are explained under the rubric of wicked problems (Bebber, 2015), while in other cases, insurgency is mentioned only in passing as a category of a wicked problem without an in-depth study (Kilcullen, 2009). In the case of the Jihadist category of insurgency, such as those motivated by Salafism, no study addresses it within the context of wicked problem. Therefore, Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab insurgencies inspired by Salafism, with their fanatical and indeterminate characteristics, is worthy of an in-depth study with an interdisciplinary approach.

1.9 Aim of the Study

This study aims to analyse Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab (franchises of Jihadist insurgency), using the wicked problem theory. It is centred on two main themes: the complexity of Jihadist-inspired insurgency and COIN against it as wicked problems; and the application of governance solutions for managing wicked problems to Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab insurgencies.

1.9.1 Research Questions

Research on the concept of Wicked Problems has focused on sectors other than national security and its threats. There are no studies that apply the wicked problems theory to address a Salafist-Jihad-motivated insurgency to the state. Hence, the overarching research question for this study is:

What is the utility of the wicked problem theory in managing a Jihadist-inspired insurgency?

In order to adequately answer this question, it will be essential to understand if and how the theoretical lens of the wicked problem can help explain Jihadist insurgency. This provides the basis for the first subordinate question:

- **In what ways can the concept of wicked problem help an understanding of the Boko Haram and Al-Shabab insurgencies?**

The response to this question will be evident from the in-depth analyses of the properties of wicked problems in Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab insurgencies, including their similarities and differences. The question is intended to address the conceptual puzzle embedded in it: in what ways can wicked problems be seen as Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab insurgency threats? The expectation of the indicated frame of analysis of the conflicts in wicked problem terms leads to how they can be governed, which is the focus of the second research question.

- **How can the concept of wicked problem frame effective governance solutions to the Boko Haram and Al-Shabab insurgencies?**

This question will provide an understanding of the various aspects of state weakness and its institutions in Nigeria and Somalia and the incapacity to defeat the Jihadist insurgencies. The analyses will reveal the factors responsible for the failings and their manifestations in wicked problem terms. They will propose the dimension of governance approaches applicable to the Nigerian and Somalian contexts.

1.9.2 Research Justification

Even though there are academic research on the Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab insurgencies and the COIN efforts to resolve them, the focus is on their origin, evolution and destructive effects, and extra-regional and international support provided to the incumbent states in the prosecution of the COIN wars (Thurston, 2016; Weeraratne, 2017; Hentz and Solomon, 2017; Anzalone, 2016; Solomon, 2015). The framework applied in the researches are limited to the rational security and strategic studies paradigms: problem understanding and definition, information collection and analyses, solution proposition, implementation and review. This framework and process of solving "tame" (easily solvable) problems contrasts and is inconsistent with the properties of wicked problems: indeterminacy, non-definitiveness, irreversible consequentiality, insolubility, and individual uniqueness, which are characteristic of the two insurgencies. As jihadist insurgencies adopt fanaticism-inspired instruments to their political ends, the rational model of the existing COIN paradigm has so far proven inadequate and unsuccessful in solving Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab conflicts. Therefore, the choice of the topic and the decision to look beyond the "traditional"

theoretical approach and apply the wicked problem literature as a knowledge base for research into Jihadist-motivated insurgencies' complexity is considered viable, appropriate, and timely. Significantly, the study will help address the literature gap and contribute to the existing body of knowledge in insurgency and COIN, thus enriching its scholarship.

1.9.3 Significance of the Study

This dissertation makes a dual contribution to knowledge. The first contribution—understanding the challenges posed by Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab insurgencies to the incumbent states as wicked problems—places the insurgent groups, and more broadly, Jihadist insurgency at the centre of the effort to comprehend and tackle wicked problems, allowing for the critique of the traditional concepts of studying the complexity of political conflicts. More than merely using the concept of wicked problems to frame Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab insurgencies, this study provides a fresh perspective and a generative effect (Termeer et al, 2019) with a potential for further research. Secondly, the study produces transferable findings that can better understand the complexities of Salafist ideology-driven insurgency and COIN governance solutions.

1.9.4 Theoretical Framework

This work applies wicked problem as a conceptual lens for analytically studying the Boko Haram and Al-Shabab insurgencies and the incumbent governments' COIN. The framework of the study is discussed in detail in Chapter Three. The wicked problem concept posits that such problems have innumerable causes, are associated with unpredictable actors with diverse social environments, do not have a correct answer applicable to all contexts (Camillus, 2008). Therefore, the wicked problem theory rejects the rational choice assumptions inherent in the approach to national security issues (Termeer et al, 2019), including insurgency and COIN.

The discussion of wicked problems, particularly in the design literature, which it was first applied, demonstrates and explains a nexus between defining wicked problems and proposing governance solutions. In other words, defining wicked problems is interlinked with proffering governance solutions for managing them. This premise provides a basis for undertaking this study and exploring, in the process, the

relationship between the "wickedness" of jihadi insurgency and the governance solutions to address them within the context of wicked problems.

1.9.5 Research Design

This dissertation is an explanatory case study of the Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab insurgencies. Distinguishing case studies approaches is vital for understanding, executing, and evaluating a case study research. The research design recognises that concepts and theories such as wicked problems have a functional role in knowledge generation because they provide the loci for research programs and the structure assumed by scientific discourse (Blatter & Haverland, 2012). This case study explains three ideas: The constituents of the wicked problem theory, the qualification of Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab as wicked problems in the context of jihadist insurgency, and how such wicked problems could be governed. Details of the methodology of this study is presented in Chapter Three.

Four approaches are used to generate, analyse and present research data. Document survey and analyses are used to illuminate the economic, socio-political, and religious contexts that enable Boko Haram and Shabaab to thrive. After that, a content analysis of the characteristics of Salafist Jihadist insurgencies typified by Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab, how and why they are termed wicked problems are made. Furthermore, a critical analysis of the "how" and "why" of the failures of the incumbent states to defeat these insurgent groups are presented. Finally, the governance framework for managing conflicts using the wicked problem theory is proposed.

1.9.6 Thesis Structure

The study is organised in six chapters. This introduction is followed by Chapter 2, which undertakes a review of the relevant literature and provides the context of the study. Chapter 3 highlights the research methodology, explaining the relevance and suitability of adapting the wicked problem theoretical lens and framework to the study. Chapter 4 presents the detailed analysis of the dimensions of Boko Haram and Al-Shabab in wicked problem terms, setting the scene for proposing management measures and framework for dealing with the Boko Haram and Al-Shabab COIN in Chapter 5. The key insights framing the conclusions, and the proposals for further research are made in Chapter 6.

1.9.7 Limitations

An explanatory case study of two insurgencies is undertaken in this dissertation. Because the theoretical approach chosen for the study has not been previously used to study the same phenomena, there would be claims that might require further interrogation using different methodological and theoretical approaches. In the research, claims are made to theoretical applicability of wicked problems to solving jihadist-motivated insurgencies. These claims are meant to provide lessons that are transferable because they can provide comparative examples and insights. However, as it is normal of applying the findings of any case study, the lessons would need to be used with caution.

The study is restricted to the Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab insurgencies. The two cases may not embody nor exhibit the complete characteristics of the whole Jihadist brand. Issues in other countries outside the scope of this study may manifest different characteristics that are context-specific. Although this dissertation explores the spectrum of enabling conditions of the Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab insurgencies, the activities of other splinter groups like Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP) in Nigeria, and the al Ittihad al Islami (Islamic Union, AIAI) in Somalia, which are part of the larger web of the insurgencies in the two states are not covered in this study. Thus, the whole dynamics of the insurgencies in Nigeria and Somalia may not be comprehensively addressed by this dissertation. Also, the resultant propositions of the study for managing the insurgencies may have gaps that require further research.

1.9.8 Ethical Considerations

The scope of this study and its conclusions have considered the need to protect the national security of the incumbent states. The researcher acknowledges the ethical implications of using classified state documents; therefore, only secondary literature from open sources are used in the study. The author bears ethical responsibility not to divulge the identity of the sources of any privileged information received in this research. Apart from this, proper credits have been given to all the authors whose work are used in the study.

CHAPTER TWO

Literature Review

2.0 Introduction

Fisher (2007) posits that a literature review explores the main themes of a study, evaluates and critically analyses the appropriate existing research to date on the subject. This chapter presents a review of the literature on the main themes of this research: Salafist Jihadist insurgency, counterinsurgency (COIN), and wicked problems. As stated in Chapter One, this dissertation aims to analyse the Salafist jihad insurgency typified by the Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab insurgencies using the wicked problem theoretical lens. It is focused on two main themes: the complexity of Jihadist insurgency and COIN against it as a wicked problem; and the application of governance solutions for managing wicked problems to Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab insurgencies.

Accordingly, this literature review illuminates the trajectories of thinking on Jihadist insurgency and the concept of wicked problems, including the previous research on them. It provides a brief overview of the theory of insurgency and the Salafist insurgency. It places Salafism and the insurgency it inspires in the context of academic studies and the scholarly debate it generates. In discussing these themes, the contestations inherent in their body of literature are put in focus. Furthermore, the literature review offers a critical analysis of the themes highlighted and also a review of the scholarly writings on them.

2.1 The Concept of Insurgency, Salafist thought and Salafist-Jihad Insurgency

Historically, insurgency as a category of irregular warfare has remained a preferred and viable option of forcing political change by dissatisfied groups and individuals who seek to right perceived injustices and wrongs. It serves as the strategy of the weak, useful to coerce, weaken, and destroy political opponents, and in cases of incumbent states, politically supplant them in the process (Kiras, 2018). Due to the asymmetries of organisation, equipment and tactics between insurgents and incumbent states, insurgents usually resort to guerrilla tactics of hit-and-run raids to exasperate their opponents, force them to commit grave errors of overreaction and use that against them in propaganda campaigns. In the process, insurgency is often confused with terrorism when the former uses the latter's techniques in pursuit of tactical and

strategic goals. Although insurgencies are context-specific or manifest the characteristics of its local environments, it is also differentiated by type: revolutionary, nationalist, anti-communist, liberationist, and Salafist-Jihadist (the focus of this study). In all these, gaining power and political control remains its ultimate strategic goal and external support is a critical determinant for success (Kiras, 2018).

2.1.1 Salafism and the Salafist thought

In its simplest form, Salafism refers to the virtuous forebears of Muslims. According to (Maher, 2016: 7), it is 'a philosophical outlook which seeks to revive the practices of the first three generations of Islam.' These generations are sacredly held as the golden age of authentic Islam, undiluted and derived directly from the source: Quran and Hadith of the Prophet Muhammad. Five features are essentially considered characteristic of a Salafi-Jihadi movement: tawhid (oneness of God); hakimiyya (supremacy and dominion that is of God only); al-wala wa-l-bara (loving and hating for the sake of God); jihad (struggle); and takfir (the unbelief/apostasy of a fellow Muslim). While all these characteristics normatively exist in Islam, they have been assigned literalist interpretations by Salafists. The five properties are an expression of basically two issues fundamental to the body of Salafist thought: protection of the faith- which comes from Jihad (The struggle), al-wala wa-l-bara, and takfir; and promotion- which tawhid and hakimiyya are the main instruments. Drawn from the "protection" and "promotion" obligatory injunctions, the Salafist ideology and jurisprudence embody the notions of rightful authority, legitimacy, obedience, and rebellion. Salafists confer on themselves the right to declare other Muslims apostate and legitimise attack on them and other "unbelievers" (Maher, 2016).

2.1.2 Origin and the Rise of Salafism

The genealogy of the Salafi Jihadism is easily traced to Islamic theologians of the mediaeval times like Aḥmad Ibn ḥanbal (780–855), Imam Abū Ja'far al-taḥāwi (853–933). The ideology is also widely viewed to have gained popularity in the 1950s with the intellectual body of thought easily identified with Sayyid Qutb, a member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, who has significantly influenced what has become the global Salafi Jihad movement (Schultz, 2008). Notably, Qutb, espoused the welding of fundamental interpretation of the Quran to a violent political ideology for armed struggle. To Qutb and his followers, holy war assumes the importance equal only to

the five pillars of Islam. Therefore, armed violence is the only rational and legitimate means of dealing with “apostate” regimes and “infidel” citizens. His ideas are mainly considered foundational to the mobilisation of the Muslim Ummah for Jihad, first, against the near enemy (apostate regimes of the Middle East and elsewhere) and second, the framework for a global Jihad against the West. Having been influenced by the mediaeval theologians like Ibn Taymiyya (Kilcullen, 2004), Qutb in turn, influenced and later produced ardent disciples like Mohammed Abd al-Salam Faraj, and Ayman al Zawahiri, who according to Schultz (2008 : 63) became ‘religious nationalists’ and ‘next-generation’ Jihadists.

It is argued Salafi-Jihadism gained momentum during the Algerian civil war. Still, it wasn't until the Second Gulf War (initiated by the 2003 US invasion of Iraq) that its body of thought began to flourish (Maher, 2016). With the invasion, Al Qaeda, leading other disparate Jihadi groups began to explain and justify their violence with a carefully authored body of thought, and ascribing theological basis to their activities. The invasion also provided the foundation and a fertile environment for jihad. It offered a coherent and convincing narrative of “Islam is under attack” enabling a global Jihadist agenda, thus delimiting it from the locality, geography, and culture. (Maher, 2016).

However, the Iraq War also created the most visible division within the Salafi-Jihadist movement, especially between the theorists, the field fighters and jihad activators. Many other Muslims, including some Salafists, disagree with the Jihadists on their modus operandi. The main point of divergence centres around killing fellow Muslims, attacking Mosques, and other abhorrent behaviours like sexual intercourse with female captives (Roth, 2015). Thus, some of the points of disagreement have, in some cases, led to intra-Salafist fragmentations and splintering. An example is a breakaway of Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP) from Boko Haram over killing of fellow Muslims and suicide attacks on Mosques; and ISIS, from Al Qaeda over similar reasons. Therefore, division is acute among the Salafists on the issues of a true Muslim and an acceptable level of casualties in the cause of its jihad (Byman, 2012).

2.1.3 Jihadist Insurgency Literature

Compared to the other typologies of insurgency, it is fair to say that the Salafist-Jihad insurgency literature has been sizeable in about two decades. Expectedly, it witnessed a surge after 9/11 and the US and its coalition invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. Also,

the jihadist literature has grown because Al Qaeda and ISIS have been at the centre of Jihadist insurgency discourse. The two groups have served as the main inspiration for jihadists in other locations of the world. In the process, they have transformed disparate groups from Europe to Asia, African Sahel to the Caucasus, into a global movement and what David Kilcullen (2004) referred to as “global Islamist insurgency”, and Bergen and Footer (2008) termed “freelance terrorists.”

Bergen and Footer (2008) used the concept of global Jihadist insurgency to characterise the vision and aspiration by Al Qaeda, in a supranational sense, forming a bond of localised insurgencies into a unified global force. They proposed a long list of what the US government should do to counter the global insurgency successfully. This list enumerates resources: material, human, ideational and technological, in which the US should invest, while denying the global insurgents similar investment, as well as the defence of the US homeland against Jihadist attacks, domestically or from external sources.

Explaining the variations of Jihadist norms in their insurgency wars, Aisha Ahmad (2019) provides insights into differences in gendered violence, particularly those against women across the theatres of Salafist insurgency wars. She observes that, unlike the Taliban that abhors rape of women, ISIL in Iraq and Syria, and Boko Haram in Nigeria approve and carry out such acts. In sum, her research reveals that variations in norms of violence do not accord with jihadist conventional strategic, economic, or ideological rationalisations. Also, fluxes in material resource endowments, ideological affiliations, and battlefield conditions are not correlated with the implementation of new jihadist norms of violence. Instead, she concludes that ‘because Islamists are self-professed purists, jihadist leaders can push forward dramatic normative changes at critical moments’ (Ahmad, 2019: 84).

In his analysis of the place of religion in fighting Salafist-Jihad insurgencies and what the United States government should do, Daniel Byman (2013) distinguishes between conventional nationalist and anti-communist insurgencies and the Salafist-Jihad variants. He states the similarities and differences of each in terms of the cause they fight, their grievances; narratives and propaganda strategy; tactics; and support base. He argues that some of the strengths like ideological appeal, which Salafist-Jihadis enjoy, also become a weakness when it alienates them from moderate Muslims.

The Jihadist Insurgency literature generally engages with the Salafist thought, its intellectual roots and inspiration, the contradictions inherent in Salafism and the varied interpretations by its scholars. Indisputably, there is a growing and rich body of literature on Salafism as an ideology, just as the insurgency it inspires attracts an increase in academic research and scholarship.

2.1.4 Definition of Salafist-Jihad Insurgency

Academic use of the term jihadi-Salafism or Salafist-Jihadism is generally without proper definition. A few have offered contextual explanations in their analysis of religious terrorism. One notable definition is from Petter Nesser (2013 :417) who defines jihadi-Salafism as ‘the ideology of al-Qaida and like-minded movements, mixing Wahhabi-inspired Sunni fundamentalism (Salafism) with a revolutionary programme of overthrowing unjust and un-Islamic regimes in the Muslim world, as well as irredentism aiming at expelling non-Muslim military presence and influences from Muslim lands.’ In this dissertation, Salafist-Jihadism is defined as the puritanical ideology of Salafism, which nostalgically reaches back to Islam’s early founders attempting to re-enact its “glorious” era with the re-establishment of a Caliphate and its political system modelled on Islamist fanaticism, sharia laws, suicide terrorism, and which calls upon the Muslim faithful to support violent struggles against “corrupt” and “apostate” Muslim regimes, the United States and the West. Salafist-Jihad insurgency is, therefore, an insurgency that is inspired and shaped by this ideology.

2.1.5 Differences Between Traditional and Salafi Jihadist Insurgencies

In this study, conventional insurgency refers to all other categories of insurgencies that are not inspired by the Salafist ideology. They, among others, include secessionist, revolutionary, nationalist, liberationist, preservationist, and reformist typologies of insurgencies.

Table 2-1. Differences between Traditional and Salafist Jihad Insurgencies

Insurgency elements	Traditional Insurgency	Salafist-Jihadist Insurgency
Cause(s)	Revolution, national liberation, change of political order, secession	Jihad at national, regional and global levels. Re-establishment of the

		Caliphate, Imposition of Sharia laws.
Narratives and propaganda	Anti-colonialists and liberationist narratives and propaganda.	Victimhood narratives, Offensive anti-democratic and virulent anti-US propaganda.
Organisational Structure	Hierarchical and top-down, centralised leader-oriented command structure, limited by geographic and national boundaries.	Loose, independent, self-cooperating cells. Decentralised, de-territorialised cell structure, delimited by pan-Islamism and global caliphate vision.
Strategy and Tactics	Subversion, terrorism, switch from defensive guerrilla warfare to offensive mobile warfare, and to decisive conventional warfare.	Integrate local grievances and disparate conflicts into broader ideologies through globalised communications. Subversion, guerrilla tactics, suicide terrorism, conventional warfare. Kidnap for ransom, weaponisation of commercial airplanes and attempt to acquire WMD.
Support <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Local • International 	Support from local communities, factions of political parties, opinion leaders, warlords. Foreign power, neighbouring states, governments in exile.	Religious leaders, charities, zaqqat, Kidnapping for ransom, taxes, piracy, extortion. Transnational intergroup support, local, regional,

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Logistical • Ideational 	<p>Local sources, cross border trade, black market economy</p> <p>Local intellectuals and leaders of thought, cadres of fighters trained locally and abroad.</p>	<p>and international recruitment.</p> <p>Local origin of weapons, improvisation and innovation. Cross-border weapons smuggling and acquisition from affiliates.</p> <p>Islamist scholars and ideologues, foreign fighters and multi-skilled experts, volunteer suicide bombers, combat veterans, martyr brigades & armies.</p>
--	--	--

Adapted from (Kilcullen, 2005 ; Engelkes ,2017; and Byman, 2013).

In conventional insurgencies, political goals and cause(s) are easily amenable to compromise and negotiation. While insurgents' methods may be regarded as unacceptable, their grievances are often assigned some levels of legitimacy provided they are pursued through peaceful means (Kilcullen, 2005). Also, a hierarchical and leadership-based organisational structure is easier to infiltrate, dismantle, and cohesion vulnerable to kinetic and non-kinetic attack by the counterinsurgent. Funding and other logistical support are also easily disrupted and severed in traditional insurgencies.

Contrastingly, Salafist-Jihad insurgencies adopt universal ideology, with transnational political goals framed by fanatical ideology. They are unamenable to mediation and political settlement. Their victimhood narratives and propaganda enables unity of purpose of a global Muslim ummah. Targeting and selection of targets by Jihadist insurgents are indiscriminate, sometimes with fellow Muslims as acceptable targets. A web-like, decentralised and de-territorialised structure defies successful attack by using weapons or easy influence by superior ideas.

2.1.6 Origin and theory of Counterinsurgency

So long as people have had cause to rebel against state political authorities, countering such insurrections has been a long-established government activity. In other words, COIN is as old as the state, and inherently, an element of its evolutionary process. The theory and practice of COIN are also deeply rooted in military and strategic thought and practice. Historically, COIN is associated with an orthodox tradition of coercion and conciliation or a blend of both. Thus, since the Roman empire era, political settlement with leaders of subjugated populations has been a viable approach to neutralising insurgency in addition to coercive military means (Rich and Duyvesteyn, 2012).

Claims to the intellectual origin of COIN thinking varies. It is considered an outcome of political ideas and conceptual frameworks developed during the decolonisation era to address the independence ambitions and challenges of groups and movements. (Rich and Duyvesteyn, 2012). There is also a claim that the period of its inception was in the 1950s and 1960s, precisely in a US RAND symposium and COIN research programme of 1962, which responded to the prevalent African and Asian communist-inspired Cold War low-intensity conflicts (Kilcullen, 2012). Despite a lack of agreement on its conceptual origin, scholars, however, agree that revival in COIN intellectual thoughts and its ascendancy was in the early post-9/11 period, as the United States and its coalition got into the Iraq and Afghanistan quagmire, following resistance to the invasion and the occupation (Martin Jones & Smith, 2010; Spear, 2018).

Irrespective of its origin, COIN thinking has come to be broadly identified with three strands of ideas: Classical thinking with the received wisdom from the empire era to the decolonisation period; the school of neoclassical counterinsurgency thinking; and the school of global counterinsurgency or post-classical counterinsurgency, which views counterinsurgency struggle from a global perspective (Martin Jones & Smith, 2010). There is obvious contestation among these three schools of thought. Regarding the classical thinkers and their revolutionary framework of Leninist-Maoist orthodox COIN principles, arguments have been advanced that their principles are no longer efficacious in stemming insurgencies because of three main reasons: the ecosystem of classical insurgencies have changed from being predominantly rural; insurgents no longer primarily live off the populations; they are no longer restricted to national

boundaries. By contrast, contemporary insurgencies, apart from retaining a rural base characteristic, also thrive in urban settings with a densely populated environment that constrains military manoeuvres. They are diffused and comprises a complex web of transnational interactions (Mackinlay, 2001 cited in Martin Jones & Smith, 2010); rather than depend on the population, contemporary insurgencies receive colossal funding and support from abroad (Kilcullen, 2006). There are also concerns that due to pre-occupation with insights of past case studies, the context of which have largely changed, neoclassical counterinsurgency theorists, some of whom are scholar-practitioners, run the risk of inflexibly accepting counterinsurgency as a tactical toolkit, amendable to all insurgencies and their contexts (Rich and Duyvesteyn, 2012). Similarly, from a universalist perspective, the global counterinsurgency thinkers are criticised for a tendency to conflate local grievances (even if linked to ideology that has global appeal) fought on home soil with a worldwide counterinsurgency struggle in far-flung places. Their analyses imply that by sharing religious affinity, insurgency inspired by transnational jihadism is monolithic, with adherents unified by a common creed.

This present author agrees with the non-monolithic Jihadist insurgency argument because by disregarding disaggregation of insurgency conflicts, there is the tendency towards accentuating a globalist thinking and overgeneralisations. This has the potential of constraining inward-looking efforts and generation of creative local solutions. Considering that some of the local franchises of religious-inspired 'global insurgency' are amenable to political negotiation, merging the local variants with the global franchise just for reasons of ideological similarity is counter-productive in terms of resolution. For example efforts in Mali to dialogue with two leading jihadists, Iyad ag and Ghali and Amadou Kouffa faltered not due to ideological obstinacy but logistical problems and the state's ambivalence (Thurston, 2018).

2.1.7 Critique of the Counterinsurgency Concept

The concept of COIN is problematic and immensely criticised. From a renowned strategic theorist like Colin Gray (2012) comes a smiting criticism of COIN as neither a concept nor a strategy. According to him, the general theory of strategy (and war) transcends and conceptually embodies such subjects as COIN, subordinate to the former. Citing Harold Winton, Gray asserts that the five functions of a competent theory: definition, categorisation, explanation, connection, and anticipation are absent

from the COIN conceptual theorising. He argues that there are no such historical phenomena as guerrilla wars. Rather, some wars have applicability for, or wherein guerrilla tactics have been successfully employed. Therefore, according to him, defining and conceptualising a type of war according to a tactical style is flawed and confusing. Drawing heavily on the Iraq and Afghanistan conundrum, he maintains that considering the almost impracticality of nation-building in those two places, which Western COIN conceptualisation entails, it ought not to be attempted in the first place. This is because as a strategy of eliminating the insurgency that ensued after the invasion, COIN (as a means to the political end) was no viable option ab initio. In sum, Gray argues that the debate over COIN and its doctrine would be more conceptually coherent, meaningful and valuable if done within the intellectual context of the general theory of strategy.

Although Gray's argument largely has merit when considered against the seeming conceptual confusion with which COIN is associated: coercion and co-option; enemy-centric; population-centric; stabilisation operations; political and economic reforms, and asymmetric warfare. This author's point of departure is that not all conceptual definitions and theorising would meet Winton's five functions, on which Gray primarily premises his argument. For example, some theories like Network-centric Warfare and Hybrid Warfare are being studied despite their definitional and conceptual untidiness and lack of explicit lateral connection to other strategic concepts. What is important about COIN conceptualisation is whether it has a practical value, and requires an improvement? The answer to these questions is a resounding yes because successes have been recorded in the practical application of COIN theory in some cases. Malaya and Algeria are a few examples of successes. On the second question, of course, no subject of academic enquiry is so complete and infallible to the extent that it requires no further study and improvement. Therefore, COIN cannot be an exception.

Regarding Iraq and Afghanistan, and Gray's COIN conceptual failure argument, historical examples can be cited that the conceptual landscape of strategic theories (most cherished by Gray) is littered with failures. A good example being deterrence theory. The Invasion of Kuwait by Iraq (1990 Gulf War) and the failure of the US to deter Saddam Hussein, Argentina-British war over the Falklands Islands and the British failure to deter Argentina, Indo-Pakistan wars and border skirmishes, despite

nuclear weapons possession, the U.S. failure to deter Japan from conquering Southeast Asia during world War 2, are but few examples of deterrence theory failures. Therefore, for Gray to use implementation challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan as a basis of determining conceptual success or failure is an intellectual overreach.

In terms of conceptual definition, COIN is fraught with ambiguity. The most authoritative definition of the concept is drawn from the US military doctrine, which defines counterinsurgency as “those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency” (US Department of the Army and US Marine Corps 2006: 1:1). This definition has some shortcomings as it only describes the sum of measures taken to defeat irregular forces. The effectiveness or otherwise of such measures are silent in the definition. So is the absence of a time frame, thus making COIN to be conceptually viewed as an open-ended and indeterminate action and process. Also, the definition focuses on the intent rather than the effectiveness and success to defeat an insurgency (Ucko, 2012). Lastly, the definition presents a binary relationship between the insurgent and a counterinsurgent, thus discounting other intervening variables like external support, stakeholders’ interests and incumbent government weakness. However, part of the reason adduced for no better definition of COIN is because it is inherently a fluid concept that is also context and circumstance-dependent. As David Kilcullen (2009: 183) notes, ‘there is no such thing as a “standard” counterinsurgency ... the set of counterinsurgency measures adopted depends on the character of the insurgency.’

2.2 Origins and evolution of the concept of Wicked Problems

As briefly mentioned in Chapter One, the concept of Wicked Problems became popular with the 1973 seminal Policy Sciences article of design theorist Horst Rittel and urban designer Melvin Webber titled “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning.” The article categorised attributes of planning-type problems, which they termed “wicked problems” into ten distinctive properties summarised by Peters (2017) as:

- (1) Wicked problems are difficult to define. There is no definite formulation.
- (2) Wicked problems have no stopping rule.
- (3) Solutions to wicked problems are not true or false, but good or bad.
- (4) There is no immediate or ultimate test for solutions.
- (5) All attempts to solutions have effects that may not be reversible or forgettable.
- (6) These problems have no clear solution, and perhaps not even a set of possible solutions.
- (7)

Every wicked problem is essentially unique. (8) Every wicked problem may be a symptom of another problem. (9) There are multiple explanations for the wicked problem. (10) The planner (policymaker) has no right to be wrong.

Webber and Rittel's definition explained wicked problems as societal problems that are complex, ill-defined and "rely upon elusive political judgement for resolution." (Rittel and Webber, 1973: 160) Wicked problems are therefore, conceptualised as the opposite of scientific ('tame' or 'benign') problems, which are amendable to solutions (Turnbull and Hoppe, 2019). They argued that social problems are different from scientific problems and its system engineering-resolution approach. For example, they contended that a typical rational system engineering approach to problem-solving consisted of a three step process of: understanding and defining the problem; gathering, analysing and synthesising relevant information on the problem; and proffering and implementing solutions. In other words, the design field was steep in problem-solution model and social problems were not easily amendable to this model, which Rittel and Weber called first generation design approach. Rather, they argued for the adoption of a second-generation approach to societal challenges (wicked problems), that requires not only scientific knowledge, but for which political sagacity was more valuable, and comparatively, was also a better approach (Wilczek, 2017).

Although "Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning" catalysed the birth of the Wicked Problem concept, its foundation had been laid through a series of papers delivered in courses and seminars between 1969 and 1971 (Crowley & Head, 2017). However, before the explicit use of the term "Wicked Problem", others like Russell Ackoff had originated a similar concept of "messes" which he defined as a "system of external conditions that produce dissatisfaction." He coined the term "messes" to express the concept of "a system of problems," denoting their interaction and interrelatedness. He opined that "because messes are systems of problems, the sum of the optimal solutions to each component problem taken separately is not an optimal solution to the mess. The behaviour of a mess depends more on how the solutions to its parts interact than on how they act independently of each other." (Ackoff, 1974 cited in Wilczek, 2017: 75).

Similarly, drawing on the notion of ill-structured problems and messes, Mitroff (1979) also examined wicked problems from the perspective of management information

systems. He categorised it into six defining characteristics of complicatedness, interconnectedness, ambiguity, uncertainty, conflict, and societal constraint. He suggested the adoption of the approach of management methodologies to mitigate system design challenges.

With the emergence in the 1980s and 1990s of wicked problems in the evolution process of design as an academic discipline, it became a novel concept that found applicability in the analysis of various challenges, such as climate change, and environment-related issues, poverty and inequality (Termeer et al., 2019; Wilczek, 2017). The analytic value of the concept has inspired research in many academic disciplines and is also being exploited in war studies and security studies.

2.2.1 Wicked Problem in Counterinsurgency Literature

The use of the concept of wicked problem to frame national security issues and irregular warfare like COIN, although not widespread, is nonetheless gaining momentum. By the early 2000s, after the US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq and the ensuing insurgencies, the intractability of the conflicts found an explanation in wicked problem theory, even if without an in-depth study. Greenwood and Hammes (2009), both retired US Marine officers, undertook a review incorporating wicked problems frameworks and principles into the US military line of effort in executing COIN operations. Thus, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) publication became an example that discussed wicked problems as part of a framework for designing and implementing joint military campaigns (TRADOC, 2008).

As the concept was gaining currency in the US military, some scholars began to identify irregular warfare and measures to overcome it, particularly COIN as a category of a wicked problem (Rathmell, 2009). In maintaining the trend, Franklin Kramer, used the term to describe irregular warfare-analogous to COIN warfare. He acknowledged the complexity of such conflicts, stressing that they "are often multicausal, unstable, and present problems that keep evolving... are socially complex, with multiple stakeholders... they often have no clear solution." (Kramer, 2011:83). The explanatory value of the wicked problem theory was also acknowledged by an International policy analyst and retired Marine Corps officer, Ben Connable, who characterised COIN warfare and the complexity of its assessment as wicked problem (Connable, 2012). Similarly, scholar-practitioner and COIN expert David Kilcullen (2009: 152-153)

assessed the conundrum that the Iraq war had become and described it as a wicked problem, stressing that "Iraq represents a fiendishly difficult, complex, and constantly changing set of problems whose dynamic interaction drives the conflict."

In his study of the complexity of solving the problem of sanctuary available to the Taliban in the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) of Pakistan and its negative effects on the COIN operations of the US and its coalition, a US Navy officer, Commander Bernie McMahon placed the complexity of the Afghan conflict and the US Administration's failure to fully understand it within the context of a wicked problem. He concluded that the solution to FATA lies partly in employing a non-linear and an adaptive approach to problem-solving (McMahon, 2009).

2.2.2 Critique of the Wicked Problem Concept

The wicked problem concept is critiqued in four main ways: First is the conceptual definition and the ambiguity surrounding the concept. Specifically, the argument here is whether wicked problem has conceptual clarity and value-added quality for solving complex social problems (Termeer et al, 2019). Second, the theory is critiqued as inherently flawed, therefore, should be rejected altogether, even though this group of critics appreciate the value of viewing 'problematicity' as a continuum, differentiated across the dimensions of which problems vary (Turnbull & Hoppe, 2019). Third, faulty philosophical grounds is another way wicked problems is criticised. Here, the argument is on the uncritical acceptance of the theory without the more extensive interrogation of the policymaking capacities and limitations of government within the historical context when the concept was formulated. Lastly, wicked problem is critiqued as an overstretched concept due to its rhetorical appeal, especially when exploited by policy practitioners to avoid blames for failures (Peters, 2017).

On the conceptual ambiguity and definitional impreciseness of wicked problem, it could be argued that while definitional issues raised by (Alford & Head, 2017; Noordegraaf et al., 2016; Peters, 2017) are germane, and a more precise definition to encapsulate the current spectrum-oriented assumptions of the concept is necessary, other related arguments lack merit. For example, due to its inadequacy, the rejection by Rittel and Webber, of the classical rational choice science and engineering assumptions upon which explanation of social issues in the 1960s and 1970s were based, led to the formulation of the wicked problem concept in the first place. This

initiated a refocus of planning approaches from engineering science to a more complex social science perspective. Therefore, a conceptual improvement, rather than ambiguity and confusion as alleged by the critics (Turnbull & Hoppe, 2019), has resulted in recent works on the theory transcending the wicked-tame problem binary (Xiang, 2013; Noordegraaf et al., 2019; Bannink and Trommel, 2019; Kirschke et al, 2019). The improvement has enabled a spectrum-oriented analytical approach, allowing 'wickedness' to be considered in terms of its extent, with differentiation between the dimensions (Head and Alford, 2015), and importantly, helping its understanding in relational terms (Termeer et al, 2019). Arguably, these efforts and their results have largely disambiguated the concept.

For the rejectionists, their position implies that the assumption of a difference between scientific and social problems that informed Rittel and Webber's proposed wicked problem framework at the time were false and should also be rejected. Since the original wicked problem formulation was primarily in response to the shortcomings of the engineering-driven rational policymaking approach, it would be an oversimplistic argument to reject the concept of wicked problems, which proposed a broader and interdisciplinary approach to solving social problems. Doing that would mean that those challenges governments and policy makers confronted have become any easier or no longer exist today (Peters, 2017). Moreover, the rejectionists' acceptance of 'problematicity' along a continuum contradicts their position. This is because the concept's originators did not argue for binary and dichotomous conception, but its understanding as a non-linear and multi-layered concept, hence their discussion of interrelatedness as one of the embedded characteristics of wicked problems. This, they explicitly stated that "there are no ends to the causal chains that link wicked problems" (Rittel and Webber, 1973:162). Importantly, in the proposition and attribute Number eight of wicked problems, the authors stated that every wicked problem can be considered to be a "symptom of another problem". In other words, wicked problems occur in a range and are interlinked, which the rejectionists do not dispute.

On the arguments of flawed philosophical foundations of wicked problems (Turnbull & Hoppe, 2019), ontological questioning to enhance our cognitive understanding of the existence and nature of a concept is apt. However, merely offering '-problematicity' (an alternative expression of the complexity of policy problems and the necessary

responses) as a solution, which the critics have seemingly done, does not justify the much-vaunted philosophical defectiveness of the concept. Moreover, stating the levels of problematicity—higher and lower levels, does not resolve the ontological questioning of the concept. Instead, it proposes how it should be questioned, and a methodology issue in itself is epistemologically rooted. The critics only reframed wicked problem in terms considered to be non-linear, spectrum-defined, and more comprehensive for describing the handling of complex policy problems in practice, which is implicit in the original conceptualisation of wicked problems by Rittel and Webber.

Regarding the last point of overstressing the concept, the present author's view is that concepts would always be malleable just as knowledge generally is. Concepts and theories explaining specific issues would always find applicability in similar or related subjects. For example, systems theory has been applied, among others, to economics, migration and engineering fields. The critical question is whether the concept of wicked problems offers analytic value to, for example, issues like climate change and environmental problems, poverty and inequality etc, and applies to other concepts like Jihadist insurgency and COIN. The answer, of course is a yes. This is because stretching a concept from one discipline or subject area to another and expanding its rhetorical appeal helps to increase its re-generative value for knowledge creation and replication. Therefore, the argument of concept overstretch is irrelevant.

It is obvious from the foregoing arguments that the concept of wicked problems suffers contestation on its ontological significance, epistemological value, and methodological approach to its study. There is a tendency to conflate the concept of the wicked problem with complex systems theory even though the latter explains a distinct body of knowledge: the interaction in systems of individual parts—called "components" or "agents"—resulting in large-scale behaviours, not easily discernible and predictable, from a knowledge only of individual agents behaviour. (Mitchell & Newman, 2001). Complex systems theory is no doubt conceptually different from wicked problems. While the former is more of a phenomena-interaction explication lens with scientific and social problem-solving utility, but with less political colourations, the latter is primarily a complex social problem-solution-actor paradigm steep in political judgement (Rittel and Webber, 1973).

All said, the analytical value of the wicked problem continues to span academic disciplines and rekindle scholarly interests in the concept almost half a century down

the line. Despite the disputations, this study modifies and adopts the Xiang (2013) model, which condenses the ten characteristics of wicked problems into five: indeterminacy in problem formulation; non-definitiveness in problem solution; non-solubility; irreversible consequentiality; and individual uniqueness. They form the basis for analyses of the wicked problem sub-theme subsequently in this dissertation.

2.2.3 Jihadist Insurgency as Wicked Problem

Unarguably, the Jihadist insurgency, framed as a wicked problem in this dissertation, is different from traditional insurgencies. The table below shows the elements of Jihadist insurgency and how they correlate with the characteristics of wicked problem.

Table 2-2 Framing Jihadist Insurgency as a Wicked Problem

Wicked Problem Characteristics	Properties of Salafist Jihadist Insurgency
Indeterminacy in problem formulation	Uncompromising cause of the re-establishment of a global caliphate and the fanatical Salafist ideology with which the political goal is framed. Unwavering Jihad at local regional and global levels.
Non-definitiveness in problem solution	[mis]perceived grievances of "attack on Islam and Muslims," victimhood narratives and propaganda, transnational and pan-Islamic global agenda.
Non-solubility	Transnational and pan-Islamic global agenda, fanaticism-inspired use of jihad as a means to political end.
Irreversible consequentiality	Affiliation with, and alliance to Al Qaeda and Islamic State, which seeks the destruction of the United States, the West and its values; indiscriminate target selection and attack, including fellow Muslims.
Individual uniqueness	Loosely structured and decentralised command. Nested web of local, regional and global actors. Deployment of indiscriminate targeting tactics and terrorism as insurgency strategy.

Adapted from (Xiang, 2013).

The Jihadist insurgency characteristics include inapplicability of political solutions due to fanatically uncompromising ideology with which political goals are framed. Others

are [mis]perceived grievances of “attack on Islam and Muslims”; victimhood narratives and propaganda; uncompromising use of jihad as a means to a strategic end; indiscriminate target selection and attack including fellow Muslims; transnational and pan-Islamic global agenda; affiliation with, and alliance to Al Qaeda and Islamic State, which seeks the destruction of the United States, the West and its values. Undoubtedly, all the elements of the Jihadi insurgency accord well with the wicked problem characteristics as categorised and corresponded in the table.

2.3 Conclusion and Literature Gap

This Chapter has reviewed the literature on the themes of the study, covering a variety of issues, for which the theory of the wicked problems provides analytic value. However, no Salafist-Jihad insurgency is studied from the perspective of a wicked problem.

Specifically therefore, and in the context of this study, conflict specialist and attorney, Cynthia Irmer, (2009:170) argues that while wicked problems can provide explanation and illumination of the character of insurgencies, “it still frames these conflicts within a “linear, problem/solution paradigm,” which limits the concept’s ability as a tool for identifying strategies that can help mitigate and manage a society’s insurgency threats.” The obvious gap here is that even when the wicked problem theory is applied to insurgencies, it is framed in a linear model. The Salafist-Jihad variant (a non-linear type of insurgency) is yet to be explored with the theoretical lens. Therefore, a gap exists within the insurgency, COIN and wicked problem literature to explore the Salafist Jihad-inspired insurgency as a category of wicked problem, both as an area of scholarship and as a governance solution to real-world problem.

CHAPTER THREE

Research Methodology

3.0 Introduction

Myers (2009) has discussed the significance of research methodology, stating that it is the determinant of the relevance, reliability, and validity of academic research findings. This chapter outlines the research method and design adopted in the study to provide insight into how the author achieved this study's quality, validity, and reliability. The aim is to explain and justify the methodological framework, present the research tools' details and provide clarification on how research questions were answered. Accordingly, the qualitative research approach, the main methodological tool used in this study is discussed before the research design is outlined. Furthermore, content analysis as the sole qualitative data analysis tool used in the study is discussed.

Conceptually, the framework of wicked problems, combined with a case study of two jihadist insurgencies, supports investigating the relationship between Jihadist insurgencies and wicked problems. To explore this relationship, this inquiry has been framed with two research questions, each tied directly to the case study and the conceptual puzzle embedded in it: What is the utility of the wicked problem theory in managing a Jihadist-inspired insurgency threat; and in what ways can wicked problems be seen as Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab insurgency threats?

3.1 Justification for the Use of the Qualitative Approach in this Case Study.

The qualitative approach is an umbrella term that denotes the collection, analysis, and interpretation of interviews, participant observation, and document data to provide the understanding and describe meanings, relationships, and patterns of a phenomenon under study (Tracy, 2013). The qualitative paradigm is rooted in an idealist worldview which argues that no single reality exists. Rather, multiple realities are founded on one's creation or interpretation of such reality. (Smith, 1983). It is based on the logic that an inquirer offers an interpretation of a phenomena from the interpretations of others. Investigating a phenomenon with the qualitative research approach enables the interweaving of viewpoints and various perspectives to achieve a meaningful, appealing, and useful synthesis (Tracy, 2013). This research does not utilise primary data but relies exclusively on secondary data. Thus, a deductive technique enabling second-order interpretations (constructing explanations from existing explanations and viewpoints) provides the basis for arriving at the study's findings.

In justifying the merits of qualitative over quantitative methods, Conger (1998) noted that the latter is inadequate to exhaustively investigate complex phenomena. He added that comparatively, qualitative methods, when appropriately used, offer many unique advantages over quantitative methods. These include further opportunities to significantly investigate a phenomena in depth and breadth, and in a flexible way discern and detect unforeseen trends in the course of the research; ability to examine processes with more effectiveness; greater prospects to examine and be contextually perceptive to important factors of the study.

Similarly, Tracy (2013:5) summarises the advantages of qualitative research to include the following: "it is rich and holistic; provides an understanding of a sustained process; interprets participant viewpoints and stories; preserves the chronological flow, documenting what events lead to what consequences, and explaining why this chronology may have occurred; celebrates how research representations (reports, articles, performances) constitute reality and affect the questions we can ask and what we can know; illustrates how a multitude of interpretations are possible, and how some are more theoretically compelling, morally significant, or practically important than others." Therefore, the use of qualitative methodology in this research enabled the author to:

- Take a holistic view of the concept of wicked problems (complex social problems, inherently pluralistic, framed by a diversity of values and rooted in political complexity).
- Examine commonalities with and relationships between the concept of wicked problems and Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab insurgencies.
- Pay attention to the socio-economic and politico-religious contexts of the insurgencies, with an understanding of their characteristics and commonalities with wicked problems.
- State the researcher's potential biases, including the limitations of the study.
- Be aware and responsively incorporate ethical concerns into the study.

The study of Jihadist insurgency with the theoretical lens of the wicked problems lends itself best to a qualitative research strategy. This is because, in addition to the preceding reasons, the focus of the study is how Jihadist insurgency can be seen as a wicked problem and how it can be managed with the theoretical toolkit available.

This requires an application of the analytic value of the theory to the problem. Therefore, determining theoretical applicability and analytic worth is not a suitable subject for a quantitative research approach, which models and makes predictions with the instrumentality of mathematical measurements and statistics. Thus, the key considerations of “compatibility, suitability, feasibility and yield of the desired outcome” (Tracy, 2013: 12) are met in choosing the qualitative over the quantitative approach for this study.

3.2 Justification for Case Study Design and Case Selection

This study adopted the case study design because of the advantage of in-depth knowledge of a phenomenon (Yin, 1994), which enables a focus on the peculiarities of groups (Burnham et al, 2008) like the Salafist Jihadists groups of Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab, aiming to make causal explanations (Levy, 2008). Also, Yin (1989) argued that case studies becomes the preferred strategy when answers to the ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are being sought. Furthermore, Schramm (1989: 22-23) asserted that the “essence of a case study illuminates a decision or set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result”. In answering how and why the Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab insurgencies are wicked problems; and how the wicked problem governance solutions can mitigate these Jihadist brands of insurgencies, a case study design was chosen for this research.

As cases for this study, the insurgencies of Boko Haram in Nigeria and Al-Shabaab in Somalia were privileged over other insurgencies in Sub-Saharan Africa due to three reasons : First, Osama Bin Laden had seen Nigeria as a strategic foothold in Sub-Saharan Africa due to the demographic potential (most populous country in Africa) it offers to his vision of global jihad and caliphate (Thurston, 2016). Second, Nigeria is surrounded by weak states, and a spill over of the insurgency into Niger, Chad and Cameroon with significant Muslim populations and similar culture, would provide a big boost to the global Jihad, especially with huge material resources (Nigeria is the largest economy in Africa) that could accrue in the aggregate from Nigeria and its neighbours in support of the Jihadist agenda. Lastly, Northern Nigeria has Jihadist heritage in Usman Dan Fodio’s Sokoto Caliphate wars of 1804 and the Maitasine uprising of 1980. Borno and Yobe States (the epicentre of Boko Haram insurgency) have been centres of Islamic learning and part of the Kanem-Bornu empire (c. 700–

1376). At its zenith and as Islamic State under Mai Dunama Dabbalemi, it had declared Jihad against surrounding tribes in a bid to ensure their conquest (Martin, 1969).

In the case of Al-Shabaab and Somalia, first, the sacralisation (Vidino et al, 2010) of the clan-based conflict presents a good case for a study. Second, Somalia has a history of its religious rulers declaring jihad against weaker clans. For example, in 1920, Sayyid Hassan declared jihad against “unbeliever” neighbours. This, however, ended abruptly when he blundered by attacking the Isaq clansmen, who promptly took side with the British colonialist against him (Lewis, 1980). Third, the interest of Osama Bin Laden in Somalia is worthy of note. After the demise of Siad Barre, Somalia’s longest ruler, one of the many actors to emerge was al Ittihad al Islami (Islamic Union, AIAI), a group whose avowed goal was the establishment of an Islamic state in Greater Somalia. Al Qaeda, which was then based in Sudan, became interested in the war-torn country because of the information that U.S forces were going to be deployed there in the wake of the humanitarian crises caused by a combination of clan-based fighting and drought (Vidino et al, 2010). In other words, Somalia was already well disposed to, and a candidate for Jihadist insurgency because of the seeds already sown by the Islamic union, its past history of jihad, and the weakness and vulnerability created by intractable clan-based conflicts. Lastly, the Al-Shabaab insurgency enjoys significant external support from diasporic Somalis, thus, contributing to its intractability. Therefore, there are discernible similarities between Nigeria and Somalia regarding the fertile and enabling conditions for Salafist-Jihadism.

This case study is explanatory (Smith, 1988). It is focused on two cases and used to explain and develop transferable findings of a theoretical concept. Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab insurgencies are investigated to incorporate Jihadist insurgency into the concept of wicked problems and inform the study of Jihadist insurgency with the concept of wicked problems.

3.3 Data Collection Using Qualitative Methodology

As rightly asserted by (Rau et al, 2018), an empirical field under investigation should drive the data collection strategy of the researcher. A “phronetic” approach was chosen for this research project. According to (Tracy, 2013:4), this approach means that “qualitative data can be systematically gathered, organised, analysed, interpreted, and communicated to address real-world concerns”. Since this researcher has

identified a particular real-world dilemma: Salafist-Jihad insurgency against weak states, it became necessary to choose a research design and data collection strategy that enables a systematic collection and interpretation of secondary data to present an analysis that provides insights into the phenomena and possibly opens a path for problem-solving.

Qualitative data collection from secondary sources of journals, books, policy papers, newspapers and magazines was made for this study. Apart from paper-based documents, data were also sourced from the internet. Web-based sources provided an avalanche of data using basic and advanced web search and different academic search engines, including google, google scholar, Academic Info, Virtual LRC (Virtual Learning Resources Centre), and Microsoft Academic Search. The data enabled the author to, with content analysis, focus on context-dependent and discernible information and thus, obtain the perspectives, insights and meanings created by scholars regarding wicked problems and Jihadist insurgency.

3.4 Data Analysis

The primary method of data analysis of this research was content analysis since there was no primary data generated due to the many limitations imposed by the global COVID 19 pandemic. Content analysis as a research tool enables the author to determine meanings from specific words or concepts within texts or sets of texts and relationships of such words and concepts to make interpretations about the messages they convey (Busch et al., 2012). It is defined by " (Bryman, 2004: 542) as "an approach to documents that emphasises the role of the investigator in the construction of the meaning of texts with an emphasis on allowing categories to emerge out of data and on recognizing the significance for understanding the meaning of the context in which an item being analysed". Texts include but are not limited to books, book chapters, interviews, discussions, essays, newspaper headlines, articles, features and editorials, historical documents, conversations, speeches, advertising, theatre, informal conversation, or any occurrence of communicative language (CSU, 2021).

This study did a content analysis of the data gathered iteratively. A key element of qualitative content analysis is that it is highly systematic because it involves the examination of all parts of the material that are connected and relevant to the thesis research question(s) (Schreier, 2014). Another reason the method is systematic is that

regardless of the research question posed and supporting material, it requires a certain sequence of steps. Therefore, through an iterative process, and going through the steps repeatedly, modifying the coding frame, and adopting a concept-specific framework, enabled comparing the data applicable to each category and a nuanced analysis of the study's themes and sub-themes. (Charmaz, 2006). Analytic memos and loose analysis outlines helped the author maintain focus on essential concepts in the data, serving as a key transitional measure between drafting the analysis and tracking the research questions (Tracy, 2013).

Within the texts, commonalities between the characteristics of Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab insurgencies and wicked problems were examined and further analysed, enabling the relationships between them to be determined, including how the different parts of their analysis fit together. Second-order analysis allowed the researcher a degree of freedom to further analyse the textual analyses made within the secondary sources and to verbalise thoughts and bring to light new conclusions arrived at from a re-analysis (Harding, 2019).

3.5 Content Analysis of the Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab Insurgencies

The content analysis approach of the Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab insurgencies evolved considerably throughout this study. Texts were read, categorised and coded according to cause(s) for which the insurgencies are fought; Mobilisation theory adopted-(greed/grievances/selected incentives); narratives and propaganda; organisational structure; strategy and tactics; and support system-internally, regionally and globally. Apart from paper texts, digital texts were also coded by highlighting and overwriting them with a distinct colour. Categorising or coding the data plays a vital role in analysing data qualitatively. According to Dey (1993), coding involves assigning categories after sub-dividing the data. Basit (2010: 34) posits that: "codes are assigned to chunk words, phrases, sentences or whole paragraphs, of varying-sizes connected or unconnected to a specific information compiled during a study."

Comparison across data was enabled and enhanced by the coding scheme, allowing the researcher to make changes where necessary. The author made an initial draft of the similarities and uniqueness of the two insurgencies from the categorisation and coding. Further refinement of the draft revealed that even though there were similarities within these categories at the macro level, there were also micro-level

differences, especially on power relations within and between groups. Therefore, more scrutiny of the text and the embedded meanings regarding power relations and their effects on the organisational structure and operations of the insurgent groups was done.

Table 3-1 Jihadist Insurgency Content Analysis Framework

Content Topic	Category of Insurgency Elements Coded	Similarities	Differences
Boko Haram Insurgency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cause(s) for which it is fought • Political goal(s) • Mobilisation Theory- (Greed/Grievance(s)/Selected Incentives • Narratives and propaganda • Organisational Structure • Strategy and Tactics • Support System- national/regional/global - Logistical - Financial - Ideational 		
Al-Shabaab Insurgency	-Ditto-		

The content analysis framework was designed to address questions about the intersection of elements of the Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab insurgencies and wicked problems. It helped the researcher to maintain a focus between the texts, themes and sub-themes, and the research questions.

3.6 Content Analysis of the Wicked Problem theory

Content analysis of the wicked problems data followed the same pattern and sequence as the Jihadist insurgencies. However, a slightly modified framework was necessary as the properties of the wicked problem are different. Textual contents with the characteristics of wicked problems were coded into five categories that helped investigate how the constituents of the Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab insurgencies correlate with wicked problems.


Table 3-2 Wicked Problems Content Analysis Framework

Content Topic	Characteristics Coded	Similarities and Relationships with Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab Insurgencies.
Wicked Problem	Indeterminacy in problem formulation	Uncompromising fanatical ideology with which political goals are framed.
	Non-definitiveness in problem solution	[mis]perceived grievances of "attack on Islam and Muslims," victimhood narratives and propaganda, transnational and pan-Islamic global agenda.
	Non-solubility	Transnational and unwavering commitment to Jihad at local, regional, and global levels. Pan-Islamic global agenda, fanaticism-inspired use of jihad as a means to political end.
	Irreversible consequentiality	Affiliation with, and alliance to Al Qaeda and Islamic State, which seeks the destruction of the United States, the West and its values. Indiscriminate target selection and attack, including fellow Muslims.
	Individual uniqueness	Uncompromising use of jihad as a means to strategic end, loosely structured and decentralised command. Global players connection and exploitation of local level conflicts through regional affiliates.

The five categories of wicked problems properties: indeterminacy in problem formulation; Non-definitiveness in problem solution; non-solubility; irreversible consequentiality; and individual Uniqueness (Xiang, 2013) were coded as the criteria for the content analysis of the wicked problem. The investigation was done by closely examining the textual meanings of the insurgency characteristics and matching them with that of the wicked problems to see how they fit together. The overall research design and the analysis framework is shown diagrammatically in Figure 3-1.

Figure 3-1

Research Design and Analysis Framework



3.7 Validity and Research Limitations

Validity is an uncompromisable part of any academic research, and it is widely debated in the qualitative research literature. Scholars have also used other alternative concepts (authenticity, trustworthiness etc), to reframe the fundamental notions of validity (Wilczek, 2017). The Random House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary (1999) defines validity broadly as "the state or quality of being sound, just, and well-founded." As logical components, these characteristics underpin all research, be they quantitative, qualitative, or a mixed of both.

Validity specifically addresses the following in research: if the research question is valid for the desired outcome; the appropriateness of the choice of methodology for answering the research question; the suitability of the research design for the methodology; the appropriateness of the data analysis; and the results and conclusions as outcomes of valid sample size and context (Leung, 2015). The definition of validity proffered by educational psychologist Linda Mabry is adopted in this study because it encapsulates the attributes of accuracy, suitability, and logicity. She defines validity as "the accuracy of data, and the reasonableness and warrantedness of data-based interpretations, to the adequacy and appropriateness of inferences." (Marby, 2011: 221). Implicit in Mabry's definition is its support of the school of thought, which argues that evaluation of validity should be at the methodological and interpretive levels. The former, known as internal validity, is concerned with the methods used to create and analyse data, while the latter, referred to as external validity, explains the interpretation of such data (Harding, 2019).

This study aims to understand Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab insurgencies in the context of wicked problems and how the study of jihadist insurgency typified by these two conflicts informs the concept of wicked problems. Evaluation of the study's internal validity should be against the quality of judgement of the author on the components of wicked problems, (as revealed by content analysis method) discernible and discerned in the Jihadist insurgencies selected. Also, validity should be evaluated by how those components correlate with and illuminate the conceptualisation and the generalisability of the study's outcome in wicked problem terms. Furthermore, internal validity should be assessed against the rigour of analysis of the texts' contents on Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab, and how they inform knowledge of wicked problems, including the governance solutions proposed to mitigate them.

External validity should be assessed against how the quality of the data generated from the case study has been interpreted as generalisation is made to the theoretical propositions of Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab insurgencies as wicked problems and the actual relationship between them and wicked problems. This study therefore, is not aimed at exploring insurgencies in general terms and categorising them as wicked problems as doing that would be an over-simplification and an over-generalisation, a banality not intended in this research.

Because every research has potential for bias and threats to its validity, and all research methods have limitations (Whittemore, Chase and Mandle, 2001), researchers have to be attentive to and aware of their personal biases and subjectivity, including managing them appropriately without affecting the research outcome. Therefore, the researcher was vigilant and made efforts to guard against the threats to the validity of this study.

However, a threat to the internal validity of this study is the overuse of relational analysis in seeking to achieve a higher level of interpretation. Also, in the process of second-order analysis, there were cases of inadvertent disregard to the context in which the text was produced ab initio. Therefore, the analysis could have manifested some errors. Efforts were made to mitigate this in three ways. First, the research questions were kept in focus, and they constantly directed the analysis. Second, reflexivity was exercised by keeping records of key decisions. For example, a research diary of thoughts and decisions was maintained, showing how analysis developed throughout the research and focusing it on the research questions. Also, analytic memos served as key transitional measure between the analysis made and focus on the research questions. Lastly, the accuracy of the findings were checked through out the research.

The most significant limitation of this study was the absence of triangulation due to COVID-19 imposed restrictions that prevented the use of questionnaires and interviews. Therefore, there was an over-reliance on document analysis. Accordingly, the core strategy for mitigating this limitation was to carefully manage the claims made in terms of interpretation of texts and work within this study's limits.

CHAPTER FOUR

Conceptualising Boko Haram And Al-Shabaab Insurgencies

as Wicked Problems

4.0 Overview

This chapter aims to present the analyses to support Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab insurgencies' framing as wicked problems. It is structured as follows: first, the factors that domestically provide the enabling conditions for the two insurgencies are presented since insurgency does not exist in a vacuum. Thereafter, the elements of traditional and Salafist Jihadist insurgencies are contrasted. Lastly, analyses of how the characteristics of Jihadist insurgencies correlate with that of Wicked Problems, how and why the former can be categorised as the latter, is expounded. Finally, the predisposing conditions of wicked problem are discussed. Ultimately, this chapter aims to achieve the purpose of this study: validly concluding that Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab Jihadist insurgencies can conceptually be categorised as wicked problems to inform the study of Jihadist insurgency with the concept of wicked problem.

4.1 Boko Haram and the Nigerian Enabling Environment

Insurgency, like other threats to domestic and international security incubates and grows under certain favourable conditions. In the Nigerian context, as briefly stated in Chapter One, the factors of identity politics, socio-economic conditions that breed inequality, historical intra-Islamic divisions, and the culture and values of corruption are the enablers.

Identity politics instrumentalises the factors of ethnicity, religion and linguistic affiliations in the fierce struggle for access to political power and control of state resources (Marshal et al, 2001). This polarises and weakens the state, making it vulnerable to insurrections. Inequality, a combination of economic, religious and cultural factors that creates disparity in standard of living between the Northern and Southern parts of Nigeria, generates grievances and convincing narratives for recruitment by Boko Haram. Intra-Islamic feud produces fanatical leaders and adherents for supremacy struggle, generating volunteer fighters in the process, that swells the ranks of the Boko Haram sect. The effects of corruption is multidimensional but the aftermath is unmistakable: a country with the larger segment of its population living in abject poverty, thus, becoming the push factor for many youths with bleak future to join the Boko Haram group. Culture and values are closely related to corruption, and in fact, enables it. Feudalistic culture and values prevalent in the Muslim North of Nigeria support high power distance between the leaders and the

elites on the one hand, and the ordinary citizens on the other hand. This culture incentivises corruption as the elites and leaders generally are tolerated to be unaccountable to the people, and their well being is prioritised over and above that of those they lead.

The consequence of the above-stated factors is a weak state and coincidentally, a weak contiguous neighbours which are all vulnerable in four ways: First, the cross border spill over of intra-Muslim fragmentation from Northern Nigeria, enable emerging Salafist extremist voices who preach violence and exclusivism to become active cells in the contiguous countries. Second, regarding state weakness and vulnerability, Niger and Chad, for example, are among the lowest in the UN Human Development Index. Third, by the escalation of Boko Haram attacks in all four neighbouring countries of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger, the political space is constrained, thus reinforcing the vulnerability of the states. Lastly, Boko Haram exploits the perception of anti-Islam sentiments to provoke an overreaction from governments of Nigeria and its neighbours. In Chad, for example, the government, overreacting to suicide bombings in the capital city, prohibited the use of full-face veils by Muslim women and executed alleged Boko Haram members (Thurston, 2016). Such actions and violent retaliation sustains the cycle of violence perpetrated by the sect, which has killed about 310,000 people in the four contiguous countries in the last decade (UNOCHA, 2021).

4.2 Al-Shabaab and the Enabling Environment of Somalia

In Somalia, the enabling conditions of the Al-Shabaab insurgency are a combination of interlinked factors, including clannism, absence of political legitimacy, corruption, drought, and poverty. The main centrifugal forces in Somalia revolve around clannism because historically, Somalia has never been a cohesive and united political entity (Pham, 2013). Bifurcation along clan and sub-clan identities has pitched segments of the Somali society against each other. In the process, Al-Shabaab emerged and exploited clan ties and Islamic identities (Solomon, 2014).

Related to clannism is the absence of political legitimacy, which has been the bane of Somalia soon after independence due to a combination of conflictual clan loyalties and corrupt leadership. Since the fall of the Siad Barre's military government, the re-establishment of a national government in Somalia has been an arduous task, underscoring the state's vulnerability to the conflictual centrifugal forces that pull it

apart, undermining cohesion and shared vision. (Pham, 2013). Thus, internal contradictions of nationalism like the eviction of foreign troops, especially the Ethiopian military deployed under the auspices of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), versus clan-based loyalties have further undermined state cohesiveness. Al-Shabaab has thus, exploited this for the establishment of a Sharia-ruled state under a pan-Islamist identity that it claims would transcend clan allegiances.

In Somalia, corruption is rife and its overall effects are a weakened public sector institution and state power. For example, the endemic corruption in Transitional Federal Government and its leadership's attempt to monopolise power and resources have undermined the transitional process and the war against the Al-Shabaab insurgency (Pham, 2013). Moreover, international efforts to bolster the beleaguered regime have been both ineffective and counter-productive as over ninety per cent of its "2009 and 2010 bilateral assistance totalling about \$75 million US dollars was outrightly stolen by government officials" (Pham 2013 : 19). Prevalent corruption has also led to some of the weapons and equipment procured with donor funds for COIN operations ending up in Al-Shabaab's armoury.


Famine and poverty have symbiotic effects on the lives and livelihood of Somalis. Prevalent droughts render subsistence agriculture, which employs the majority of the population unviable, thus accentuating the poverty rate in the country (Warsame, et al., 2021). Al-Shabaab, therefore, exploits this humanitarian situation to impose "security fees" and "taxes" on relief materials and its distribution logistics chain, which are used to fund the insurgency.

4.3 Traditional Insurgency Conceptualisation and Analysis Framework

Insurgencies other than the Jihadist typology is referred to in this study as traditional insurgency. It essentially follows a hierarchical framework of elements, leading to, or is derived from, or mutually supporting and reinforcing the other. For example, the causes for which the insurgency is fought generate grievances and vice versa. The grievances in turn, produce the insurgency narratives, which enables the propaganda strategy of the group. Similarly, the insurgents' organisational structure is hierarchical and vertical. This shapes the strategy and tactics deployed by the insurgent movement for the attainment of its strategic goals. The support system regarding logistics, recruitment, training and administration of the fighters is contingent upon the field

tactics and the operational strategy of the insurgent group, which is also derived from the vision of the command echelon. In sum, the traditional insurgency's functional elements operate in a linear model. The model in Figure 4-1 describes the elements and their interconnections with the domestic environment in which the insurgency incubates and thrives.

Figure 4-1 Traditional Insurgencies Conceptualisation and Analysis Framework



Adapted from (James, 2008)

In the traditional (anti-colonialist) insurgencies, for example, the causes for which the insurgencies are fought and the grievances are often straightforward. They are usually framed in political independence, autonomy and self-rule. Therefore, such causes and grievances are amenable to a negotiated political settlement. The nationalist and anti-colonialist insurgencies of Malaya and Algeria, for example, exemplified politically negotiated solutions between the colonialists and the colonised, and thus the termination of the insurgency. Despite the so-called “hearts and minds” and the “population-centric” theories common with COIN, Malaya became a famous success story in COIN literature simply because the British colonial authorities made political concessions to grant independence, political autonomy and self rule (Corum, 2006;

Dixon, 2012). Similarly, the lessons of the Algerian war of independence, a classic nationalist and anti-colonial struggle was unambiguous: political independence and self-rule are the panaceas to anti-colonial insurgencies (Connelly, 2002).

The narratives and the propaganda strategy take the same path as the cause(s) for which the insurgency is fought. The narratives pushed domestically to kindle anti-colonial insurgency almost always centre on racial discrimination, oppression of indigenous people, insensitivity to cultural norms and heritage of the colonised, and inequalities of various dimensions. These would usually resonate locally, and in some cases, with international human right organisations, including faith-based groups, that would support the cause morally through advocacy campaigns for the independence of the colonised people (UNESCO, 2018).

To function effectively, insurgency needs organisation and a leadership structure. This enables communication of the leadership vision of the group. It also provides direction, command, control and coordination of activities, including field tactics and techniques (Byman, 2012). Anti-colonialist movements of Malaya and greed-motivated models of Liberia and Sierra Leone generally had a hierarchical organisational structure of tribal leaders and elites. The strategic leadership occasionally permitted decentralisation of command of the movement if the need arose (Käihkö, 2015).

The strategy and tactics of traditional insurgency, be it the use of conventional tactical drills or the adoption of terrorism for an attack on soft targets, draws on the organisational structure. For example, the order to carry out an attack would originate from the higher echelon of leadership. For the counterinsurgent, adopting a comprehensive or whole-of-government approach of military, political, socio-economic, intelligence, 'hearts and minds', and security measures could easily lead to success. This was the case in most 'Wars of National Liberation' of the 1950s–1970s, in which the measures effectively could unhinge the insurgents' 'Centre of Gravity' and lead to capitulation (Kilcullen, 2009).

The support in terms of availability of willing and recruitable youths, food supply, and intelligence on the counterinsurgent is critical for the success of traditional insurgencies. Support could also be in weapons supply or states permitting supply routes across their territories. If popular acquiescence is unavailable to the insurgents,

the counterinsurgent is likely to have an edge, and its firepower and whole-of-government advantage would enable the neutralisation of the former.

Figure 4-1 shows that the linear systems generally follow a straight line and meet two conditions. First, they are relational and mutually inclusive. Second, additivity inherent in linearity means that essentially, the whole system equals the sum of its parts (James, 2008). Also, the domestic enabling conditions shown on the left of the model and the external support on the right sustain the insurgency elements from “cradle to grave.” For example, Algeria's conservative religious and cultural values supported and enabled the communication of the grievances of oppression levelled against the French colonial government and independence as the goal of the insurgency, was granted and the insurgency consequently ended (Connelly, 2002). Similarly, the moral support of Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso and their territories as weapon supply routes sustained the insurgency of Charles Taylor in Liberia. With the severance of the supply routes by the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), the insurgency was imperilled and was finally terminated by the UN mission.


By implication, the linear model of traditional insurgency is vulnerable to the counterinsurgent, and easily attacked both kinetically and non-kinetically. For example, the support base of the insurgency and its organisational structure, which are mostly located internally within the incumbent state could be attacked and degraded with weapons; or by influence operations that could win the insurgents and its support base to the side of the counterinsurgent without the use of weapons. A successful attack of any of the rung of the traditional insurgency ladder would weaken the cause and course of activities, and therefore, imperil the insurgency.

4.4 The Salafist Jihadist Insurgency Conceptualisation and Analysis Framework

The Salafist Jihadist insurgencies share similar properties with the traditional variant but are more complex as it combines elements of the latter and other factors (Byman, 2012). Its non-linearity and complex interconnection are subsequently analysed using Figure 4-2.

Figure 4-2 THE SALAFIST-JIHAD INSURGENCY CONCEPTUALISATION AND ANALYSIS MODEL

The Non-Linear (Wicked Problem) Model



- Legend**
- 1. Boko Haram/Al-Shabaab and their enabling local conditions
 - 2. Salafist Jihad Insurgency Elements
 - 3. Regional Jihadist groups
 - 4. Global Jihadist groups and enablers
 - 5. Extra-global variables

The complexity, extremist and fanatically framed attributes, and interconnected web of actors of jihadist insurgency lends it to a non-linear frame of analysis and provides the basis for its conceptualisation as wicked problems. With a complex web of

interconnections and interactions of the insurgency properties, including the enabling conditions of the local, regional, and global environments, the Jihadist insurgency exhibits a sharp contrast with the traditional insurgency's hierarchical, mutually dependent and reinforcing elements.

As Figure 4-2 depicts, within the inner perimeter of the heptagonal shape representing Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab numbered one, are the local enabling conditions of political; and socio-economic systems; the values they collectively produce; culture; and the weak state as the overarching enabler. The political system of identity politics breeds the belief system common among Nigerian and Somalian Salafist Muslims that policymaking frameworks, which shape public life should be delivered with the instrumentality of Islam. This marrying of religion with public policy-making breeds fundamentalism as there is the tendency to view the two interchangeably, and as inseparable. For example, in 2000, there were large demonstrations across the Northern states of Nigeria for the imposition of Sharia laws in the area to harmonise public policies with Islamic laws even though Muslims do not exclusively inhabit the region.

The socio-economic system, which is poorly managed and the high level of poverty it breeds, provides the excuse for Salafists to condemn the Western economic system, its liberal market philosophy and values of materialism, which they view as evil, and against which they declare jihad. Similarly, a weak state lacking resilient institutions to resolve socio-political issues becomes the incubator of grievances, resentment and eventual fanaticism-inspired rebellion. Also, a culture that tolerates illiteracy produces an environment fertile for brain washing and indoctrinations in fanatical ideology of Salafism.

The local enabling conditions in black rectangles interconnect with the elements of insurgency in the circle numbered two, outside the perimeters of Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab. For example, the values of fundamentalism and the culture of a literal interpretation of the Quran connect well with the skewed narratives of attack on Islam, anti-US and Western sentiments, and suicide terrorism. Also, a socio-economic system that breeds poverty resonates with the narratives of a utopian Islamic caliphate, where "life will be merry". Furthermore, a dysfunctional political system and weak state accords well with, and enables victimhood narratives and external support

that nurtures the Jihadist insurgency eco-system. The local enablers inexorably interconnect with the regional groupings of Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP), Boko Haram's benefactor organisation, and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), to which Al-Shabaab is affiliated, in the circle numbered three. These in turn connect with the global enablers of virtual sanctuaries; cyber domain, where a high level of mobilisation and indoctrination occur; and Al-Qaeda and ISIS pan-Islamic Salafist ideology. Similarly, at the global level, easily accessible and limitless global communications; global transport system; and the ubiquitous global media all interconnect the regional and local conditions. All the regional groups and global enablers beyond the reach and control of the state support, strengthen, and mould the Salafist insurgency into a well-nested web and a powerful wand that torments the weak incumbent states of Nigeria and Somalia. Additionally, the flux of the international system produces new domestic and international agenda that takes the attention of powerful countries away from the menace of the Salafist insurgencies. For example, domestic politics and incendiary Trumpism grabbed the attention of the United States away from the Taliban, Afghanistan, ISIS, and the franchise of Salafist insurgencies in Nigeria and Somalia. Similarly, international laws prohibit the use of nuclear weapons and torture of captured jihadist fighters but constraints the international community and the incumbent states to the advantage of the Jihadist insurgents, who do not obey international laws in the course of their activities.

Therefore, unlike the linear framework of the traditional insurgency, whose element like organisational structure, if successfully attacked, can affect the support system, and ultimately the cause for which it is fought, the non-linear model responds to such attack differently. For example, the networked and loose cell structure of the Salafist Jihad insurgency is elusive to locate and attack. Even when it is attacked, it is mutually supported and reinforced by combining the regional and global groups and their enablers.

In sum, the traditional insurgencies linear framework is inadequate to analyse and manage the complexity of the Salafist-Jihadist insurgencies because the latter is a web of a series of interlinked elements, none of which can be treated in isolation. In contrast, traditional insurgencies are easily resolved through pacification, coercion or a combination of both, while the non-linearity of Jihadist groups do not respond to

pacification, and brutalisation generates second and third-order violent effects from regional and global support networks. This makes the Salafist-motivated insurgency complex, intractable, non-soluble, and therefore, qualify as a wicked problem.

4.5 Jihadist Insurgency Elements and Wicked Problem Conceptualisation

Further analysis of the wickedness of Jihadist insurgency is done with the consideration of insurgency elements one after the other. Starting from the cause(s) for which Salafist-Jihadist insurgency is fought (re-establishment of a global caliphate) and the uncompromising ideology (Salafism) with which it is framed, the Salafi-jihadist insurgencies are distinct from the traditional variant. Aside from [re] establishment of an Islamic state, Salafi-jihadist political goal includes toppling supposedly “apostate regimes of the Middle East” and elsewhere, expelling the United States and other Western powers, and their local non-Salafi allies from their countries (Byman, 2012). To this mandate, Salafists are universally committed and maintain no deviation from what they perceive as the oneness of God and hostility to non-believers (Brachman, 2009). Therefore, the Salafist-Jihadist cause becomes unresolvable with negotiation, thus qualifying its variant of insurgency as a wicked problem.

Closely related to the causes Jihadists fight is their grievances, including (depending on the context) oppression and attack on Islam and Muslims. They are ready to retaliate, including with their lives. Often, the fanaticism and martyrdom associated with the expression of this grievance renders it irreconcilable with political remedies and thus qualify as a property of wicked problem since the grievances of traditional insurgencies can easily be resolved with negotiated solution(s). Similarly, the victimhood narratives of the traditional insurgency, Just like the grievances, are easily accommodated and resolved with political concessions. Like in the nationalist and anti-colonial insurgency, it is mostly about discrimination, segregation and unequal opportunities for the colonised or oppressed people. In contrast, the Salafist victimhood narratives of “Islam is under attack, and Muslims are being humiliated” are proximate to acts of revenge through suicide terrorism and sacrificing human lives in the process.

Regarding organisational structure, the loose cells and general non-linearity of the Salafist-Jihad insurgent group render it difficult to degrade and enfeeble with the military instrument, including a non-military attack like influence operations and

perception management. This, when contrasted with the linear framework of the traditional insurgency, which is vulnerable to military and non-military attacks, adds to the insolubility of the Jihadist insurgencies.

Suicide terrorism and mass casualty as a strategy to spread intimidation and fear are peculiar to Jihadist insurgency. Even though the traditional insurgents do carry out acts of terrorism, however, the legitimisation of attack on fellow Muslims that are unsupportive of the Jihadist cause or are indifferent to it, which the Salafists do, adds to the complexity of the jihadist insurgency. This is in addition to the uncompromising avowal of its adherents to their cause, the means with which it is pursued no matter the barbarity and repugnancy it produces.

The support of traditional insurgencies is limited mainly to the territorial space of a state. The civil population provides support in various forms, while foreign support comes morally and in the forms of advocacy initiatives. In contrast, Jihadist insurgencies garner support from local, regional and global pan-Islamic sources, both material and ideational, thus making it difficult for the incumbent state to tract, monitor, and terminate. The opacity of the sources of most of the support generated for Jihadist insurgencies and the difficulty of severing them confounds the incumbent state. For example, the support Al-Shabaab generates from the Somali diasporic community in Europe, America and Australia is beyond what the Somali Transitional Government can tract and disable. This thus enhances the complexity of the Al-Shabaab insurgency and qualifies it as a wicked problem.

4.6 Jihadist Insurgency Characteristics as Correlates of Wicked Problem

To reiterate what has been stated in Chapter Two, Wicked Problems as formulated by Rittel and Webber (1973) comprises ten characteristics summarised by Head (2008: 102) as follows:

Proposition One. There is no definitive formulation of a wicked problem, even the definition and scope of the problem is contested.

Proposition Two. Wicked problems have no 'stopping rule', no definitive solution.

Proposition Three. Solutions to wicked problems are not true-or-false, but good-or-bad in the eyes of stakeholders.

Proposition Four. There is no immediate and no ultimate test of a solution to a wicked problem.

Proposition Five. Every (attempted) solution to a wicked problem is a ‘one-shot operation’; the results cannot be readily undone, and there is no opportunity to learn by trial-and-error.

Proposition Six. Wicked problems do not have a clear set of potential solutions, nor is there a well described set of permissible operations to be incorporated into the plan.

Proposition Seven. Every wicked problem is essentially unique.

Proposition Eight. Every wicked problem can be considered to be a symptom of another problem.

Proposition Nine. The existence of a discrepancy representing a wicked problem can be explained in numerous ways.

Proposition Ten. The planner has no ‘right to be wrong’, i.e. there is no public tolerance of initiatives or experiments that fail.

Further, Xiang (2013) abridges the ten properties of wicked problems into five:

Property One. Indeterminacy in problem formulation.

Property Two. Non-definitiveness in problem solution.

Property Three. Non-solubility.

Property Four. Irreversible consequentiality.

Property Five. Individual uniqueness. These five properties have been adopted as the Wicked Problems frame of analysis in this work.

The Salafist movement and its Jihadist insurgency, on the other hand is an embodiment of the following attributes:

Attribute One. Fanaticism-inspired means to a political end—unwavering Jihad at local, regional and global levels.

Attribute Two. [Mis]perceived grievances of “attack on Islam and Muslims,” victimhood narratives and propaganda, transnational and pan-Islamic global agenda.

Attribute Three. Uncompromising ideology with which political goals are framed. Unyielding use of jihad as a means to a strategic end.

Attribute Four. Affiliation with and alliance to Al Qaeda and Islamic State. Pursuit of an agenda of the destruction of the United States, the West and its values.

Attribute Five. Decentralised command, de-territorialised, loose, and web-like organisational structure. Indiscriminate target selection and attack, including fellow Muslims. Global players, aggregators and exploiters of local grievances, and interconnectors of local, regional, and global networks.

The attributes are tabularly grouped and correlated with the properties of wicked problems as subsequently shown.

Table 4-1 Jihadist Insurgency Characteristics as correlates of Wicked Problems Properties

Jihadist Insurgency Characteristics	Wicked Problem Characteristics
Fanaticism-inspired means to political end. Unwavering Jihad at local, regional and global levels.	Indeterminacy in problem formulation
[Mis]perceived grievances of "attack on Islam and Muslims," victimhood narratives and propaganda, transnational and pan-Islamic global agenda.	Non-definitiveness in problem solution
Uncompromising ideology with which political goals are framed. Inflexible use of jihad as a means to strategic end.	Non-solubility
Affiliation with, and alliance to Al Qaeda and Islamic State. An agenda of the destruction of the United States, the West and its values.	Irreversible consequentiality
Decentralised command, de-territorialised, nested, and web-like organisational structure. Indiscriminate target selection and attack, including fellow Muslims. Global players, aggregators and exploiters of local grievances, and interconnectors of local, regional, and global networks.	Individual uniqueness

The first property of Wicked problem (Indeterminacy in problem formulation) correlates highly across the dimensions and remit of the first Jihadist insurgency characteristic: "fanaticism-inspired means to political end. Unwavering Jihad at local, regional and global levels." 'Wickedness' of this attribute lies in the division even among Muslims of the definition of the political goal of the Jihadists. For example some Muslims contend that a caliphate with Sharia laws is possible for only Muslims within a geographical boundary also populated by only Muslims. Clearly, this view is at odds with the Salafists' global caliphate vision and ambition, thus raising questions whether the caliphate is for all races, religions, demographics, and culture? What variables would define the global caliphate and its "successful" establishment? Since this characteristic of Jihadist insurgency embodies indefiniteness, and is undefinable, it fits the first characteristic of wicked problem-**indeterminacy in problem formulation**.

Non-definitiveness in problem solution is the second characteristic of Wicked Problem. This correlates with Jihadist insurgency's [Mis]perceived grievances of "attack on Islam and Muslims," victimhood narratives and propaganda, transnational and pan-Islamic global agenda. The weightiness yet unsubstantiated nature of the grievances and the narratives through which it is advanced begs the question whether such misperception has a 'stopping rule', or a definitive solution to resolve the issues. The questions that remain unanswered from the grievances held by the Salafists are: What can the global community or the US and the West, in particular, do to eliminate this misperception and the pan Islamic narratives? Could the resolution of the Israel-Palestinian dispute, the withdrawal of the US forces from Saudi Arabia, or elimination of the "corrupt" Middle East regimes (near enemy), which are all complex problems in their own right, be the solution to the grievances? Unavailability of clear answers to these questions thus correlates this property of the Jihadist insurgency with the second Wicked Problem property-**Non-definitiveness in problem solution**.

The third of Jihadist insurgency characteristics, "Uncompromising ideology with which political goals are framed, unyielding application of jihad as a means to a strategic end" evinces complexity and intractability. It is inconceivable that the Salafists will discard their ideology, the goals, and the jihad (struggle) to accomplish them. For example, Godane, a local Al-Shabaab leader, declared in 2010 that "We will fight and the wars will not end until Islamic shar'ia is implemented in all continents of the world and until Muslims liberate Jerusalem." (Harper, 2012: 86.) To the extent that the abandonment of these creed-like elements of the Jihadist Salafism is infeasible, they remain **Non-soluble**-the third characteristic of Wicked Problem.

The affiliation with Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, their avowed destruction of the United States, the West and their values, and indiscriminate targeting, including fellow Muslims, is the fourth property of the Salafist Jihadis. This property indeed produces action and reaction, which are often disproportionate. For example, attack by the Jihadists on the US, Israel and the West often results in unanticipated consequences. The attendant cycles of retribution and retaliation include airstrikes, drone attack, Special Forces targeted killings, denial of visas to some people with Muslim names, profiling, and creation of suspect community. For example, as a response to a terrorist attack on the US mainland from Yemen, the base of Al Qaeda in Arabian Peninsular (AQAP), the US in 2015 targeted and killed over 100 Al-Shabaab rank and file fighters

(Jones et al, 2016). All these actions, including their second and third-order reactions and effects, correlate with the third property of wicked problem: **irreversible consequentiality**.

Lastly, Salafist Jihad insurgency characteristics are unique compared to the traditional type. For example, de-centralised and de-territorialised web of actors exploit and aggregate local grievances into a pan-Islamic agenda with a strategy and tactics that validate indiscriminate targeting such as weaponisation of commercial aeroplanes as Weapons of Mass Destruction are all exclusive to the Salafists. Contrastingly, traditional insurgencies have a hierarchical and centralised command. They operate in no autonomous and nested cells, can easily be targeted kinetically and non-kinetically, and solved like in Algeria, Northern Island, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. Jihadist insurgency typified by Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab, therefore posses the fourth characteristic of wicked problem-**individual uniqueness**.

4.7 Nigeria and Somalia : Environments Predisposed to Wicked Problems

Apart from Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab characteristics correlated with that of wicked problems, the likelihood of the two insurgencies being wicked problems exists in the conditions of their Nigerian and Somalian environments, which are predisposed to their intractability and wickedness. Alford and Head (2017:407) assert that “a problem is more likely to be wicked if several conditions (or most of them) namely, structural complexity; [un]knowability; knowledge fragmentation; knowledge framing; and interest differentiation are present.” They are elaborated as follows:

- **Structural complexity:** The stakeholder-related part of the problem is intrinsically complex. There is evidence of intra and inter Salafist complex relationships in both Nigeria and Somalia. For example, not all Muslims or even Salafists accept the exclusivist ideology and worldviews of the Jihadists in the two countries. This is further complicated when considered against the values and beliefs of moderate Muslims, non-Muslims, clan and ethnic groups, and neighbouring countries with interests in both Nigeria and Somalia, who oppose the insurgents and have conflictual relations with them.
- **[Un]Knowability:** There is a lack of relevant information about the problem, the mechanisms required to carry out actions to ascertain its causal links, and probable solutions are opaque. Relating this to the insurgencies, the cult-like

nature of Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab prevent the disclosure of information about them by members. It inhibits full knowledge of its modus operandi, the support system of collaborators and supporters. This renders knowledge necessary to analyse the sects' activities and intentions and how to counter their actions and defeat them incomplete.

- **Knowledge fragmentation:** Among multiple stakeholders in the Nigerian and Somalian environments, each has some but not the totality of the available knowledge necessary to tackle the problem of the insurgencies. Even within the incumbent governments' bureaucracy, there is divergence of opinion on the problems' causal factors and how they can be tackled. For example, while some Northern Nigerian Muslims and elites support dialogue with Boko Haram, others consider the sect's actions too atrocious for negotiation.
- **Knowledge-framing:** Understanding of the problem of the Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab insurgencies is distorted by its framing either with too much or too little information and focus. Often, this is complicated by governments' incremental and episodic efforts in tackling the insurgencies including miscommunication and mixed messaging that conveys ambiguity in plans and intentions.
- **Interest-differentiation:** Stakeholders have conflicting interests or values that complicate the problem. Some Salafists in government or powerful ones in the society are either supporters or sympathisers of the insurgencies. Their actions and inactions incentivise and encourage the insurgents' activities. For example, a Nigerian Senate Committee Chairman on the Army was accused of sponsoring the activities of Boko Haram and hiding some of their members in his country home. Despite being an indigene of Borno State, the epicentre of the insurgency, his alleged interests are at variance with other stakeholders, including what the government and its agencies pursue. Actions of this nature complicate and adds intractability to the insurgencies.
- **Power-distribution:** Division and conflict of interests correspondingly results in fragmented power and political will with which the problem is tackled. Very influential actors overcome and alienate less powerful ones, even if the latter is in the majority. The case of the Nigerian senator and that of former governor of

Borno State, Ali Modu Sheriff and other powerful politicians accused of being sponsors of Boko Haram ensure that political power and the will required to end the insurgency are fragmented and dysfunctional in distribution. Similarly, powerful Somalian stakeholders like some members of the diasporic community supportive of Al-Shabaab seem to overwhelm ordinary Somalis that are against the group and want the insurgency to end.

4.8 Conclusion- Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab Insurgencies are Wicked Problems

The traditional insurgency has elements that generally follows a straight, vertical line and a linear framework. Therefore, an attack on each of its elements has a direct link and effect on the other. Also, traditional insurgency elements are limited and confined to state boundaries and could mostly be confined to such an environment for resolution. In contrast the Salafist Jihad brand of insurgency elements is networked and interlinked within local, regional and global spaces. Effect on one element hardly impacts the other directly due to mediating factors. Therefore, the linear model of traditional insurgency is inadequate to analyse and manage the Salafist Jihad insurgency. Furthermore, the characteristics of the Jihadist insurgency correlates with that of wicked problems and the enabling conditions of wicked problems exist in both Nigeria and Somalia.

From the foregoing, it could be concluded that the Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab insurgencies are wicked problems because first, they are a series of nested and interlinked problems; none is resolvable in isolation. Second, their global, national, regional, and local impacts also generate differing approaches to its analyses and resolution, thus enhancing its insolubility. Third, the predisposing factors of wicked problems are inherent in the insurgencies' environments of Nigeria and Somalia. Lastly, extremely violent second and third-order effects of the actors and their actions (insurgents and incumbent states) are ineffective in resolving the problem and counterproductive in many cases.

CHAPTER FIVE

Governing the Wicked Problem of the Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab Insurgencies

5.0 Introduction

Having conceptualised the two Salafist-inspired insurgencies of Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab as wicked problems in Chapter Four, the object of Chapter Five is to present the proposition of a set of governance solutions to the insurgencies. Accordingly, the conventional framework of resolving traditional insurgencies is presented to contrast with the governing approaches of wicked problems and set the scene for the proposition of the governance model of the Jihadist insurgencies. Before the governance prescriptions are made, why weak states (represented by Nigeria and Somalia) cannot overcome their insurgencies are stated.

One of the arguments in Chapter Four is that wicked problems have no stopping rules. It is argued that the Jihadist insurgency motivated by Salafism is a wicked problem with some unique characteristics, where the tests of the efficacy of solutions are infeasible. Further, Wicked problems are non-soluble; therefore, it is “managed” in various ways- and in the case of a jihadist insurgency, taming through degradation to the extent that it poses no existential threat to the status and functioning of the incumbent state becomes a viable option.

5.1 Resolving Traditional Insurgencies

Classical COIN theory prescribes either pacification or brutalisation or a combination of both for the successful resolution of insurgencies. For the brutalisation approach, a COIN model opposed to the ‘hearts and minds’ paradigm is commonly associated with the British school and the US COIN doctrine (Army Field Manual 3-24). Brutalisation theorists often cite the successes of authoritarian regimes like the Russian campaigns against several uprisings/ revolts in Zainsk, Tambov, Chapan, Western Siberia, Volga, Kronstadt, Ural Kulaks, Karelia, and Basmachi (Zhukov, 2012); and the Sri Lankan government forces against the Tamil Tigers of Elam (Lewis, 2012) as some of the examples of the viability of the brutalisation approach. Also, the concept of ‘pacification’, which was prominent in classical French counterinsurgency theory is credited as a tool for engendering political support at the local level and attaining successes at the tactical military level (de Durand 2010).

However, the pacification and the brutalisation approaches have been criticised as inadequate because as Kilcullen (2012: 146) argues, the classical paradigm “from a very specific and peculiar set of historical circumstances... may not be applicable in differing circumstances... since its social-scientific component is based on post-war thinking about development, governance, information and the nature of colonial or post-colonial societies..., which is almost certainly out of date due to the effects of globalisation, modern mass media, transnational proliferation, and virtual sanctuaries” that characterise contemporary Salafist Jihadist insurgencies. Thus, the classical COIN paradigm could be regarded as an outdated model for today’s Salafist jihadist COIN wars since the former assumes absolutely that coercion or conciliation or combination is adequate for resolving the latter even though it defies this solution model.

5.2 The Classical/Traditional Insurgency Resolution (Counterinsurgency) Model

Also, one of the main criticisms of the classical/ traditional COIN model is the assumption of a bilateral struggle between the insurgent and the incumbent state or the intervening power-the counter insurgent. This binary relationship is emphasised by notable classical scholars like Galula (1964), and the influential US Counterinsurgency doctrine, FM 3–24. These two powerful theoretical voices in the COIN scholarship prefer the categorisation of the ‘insurgent’ and the ‘counterinsurgent’ while other reputable classical COIN scholars like Robert Thompson (1970; 1972) favours the actorship of the ‘insurgent’ and the ‘government.’ The multiplicity of actors at the local, regional and global levels and other intervening variables in contemporary Salafist Jihad insurgency milieu renders the binary conceptualisation ineffectual both in COIN theory and practice. For example, in the Somalian, Nigerian, Iraq, and Malian insurgencies, the counterinsurgent has had to deal with multiple jihadist groups (some divergent in belief systems and ideology, but with a common strategic goal), including their well nested global support base from which volunteer fighters and logistical support emanate.

5.3 Incumbent States' Weakness and the Unconquerability of the Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab Insurgencies

When facing wicked problems such as the Salafist-inspired insurgencies, the option to “engineer” solutions as it is with traditional insurgencies, is hardly plausible. The problem ‘wickedness’ requires much more than just any designed blue-print (Raisio, 2010), which over time defies different strategies. The ‘wicked context’ of the Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab insurgencies as complex and open-ended socio-political problems and national and international security threats have been copiously acknowledged and analysed in previous chapters. Wicked Problem as a theory is explicit that such problems defy easy resolution, are uniquely complex (Ludwig, 2001), and are ideology-inspired and ‘value-based (McBeth and Shanahan, 2004). The reasons that are adduceable regarding the inability of weak incumbent states like Nigeria and Somalia to defeat Jihadist insurgencies are: insurgents’ organisational structure, weakness of the incumbents, the ideology factor, and the difficulty of mustering international cooperation of superpowers and other countries against Salafists Jihadists due to differing national interests and realpolitik.

The multilateral character of Salafist Jihad insurgencies like those in Mali, Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Nigeria comprise multiple, diffuse, competing Salafist groups with a complex global virtual sanctuary and ecosystem that allows them to operate largely beyond the reach of the counterinsurgent. For example, the Jihadists use the internet to recruit, mobilise, raise funds and wire it to different locations beyond what the weak incumbents states can track and stop. This elusiveness-enabling environment of the insurgent has increased the impreciseness of the counterinsurgent’s targeting-kinetic and otherwise. It underlines the necessity for non-linearity in the incumbent’s conceptualisation, analysis and COIN campaign plan.

As Chapter Four has stated, a combination of internal factors: political and socio-economic institutions unable to resolve conflicts; cultural values and belief systems that enable fanaticism; and political culture that polarises and pauperises the people, and creates grievances, enables the armed struggle, and the insurgencies in the two states. The defeat of Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab insurgencies represents a nightmare and complex inter-connected problems for the weak states of Nigeria and Somalia. First, Somalia and Nigeria’s status of statehood is highly compromised. Somalia is a long-standing failed state, while Nigeria seems to be heading in that

direction. The 2021 Fund for Peace Failed States Index Report, places Somalia at the second position (after Yemen) of the 179 countries assessed, while Nigeria competes at the twelfth position (The Fund for Peace, 2021). Among the criteria considered in the Failed States Index Report is national cohesion, with the security apparatus as a sub set. The Security Apparatus indicator considers the security threats to a state, such as rebel movements, terrorism, and related deaths. It also considers organised crime, and the perceived trust of citizens in their country's domestic security. Suffice to say that a weak state is an aggregate of weak bureaucratic institutions, of which the military is one. Weak state institutions mean ineffective border management and stemming weapons smuggling from neighbouring countries of Niger and Chad, embroiled in civil conflicts for more than two decades. It also means a lack of capacity to protect the population and to secure ungoverned spaces.

Furthermore, state weakness does not allow for counter-narratives to discredit and defeat the Salafist ideology, which is the inspiration for the insurgencies. Weakness means that professionally, the military's fighting power (three components of physical, conceptual and moral, that encapsulates physical fitness of troops, their education/training, a just cause to fight for, and inspirational leadership) is of low quality unable to neither match nor defeat the insurgents militarily. Poor Professional Military Education (PME) and Professional Military Training (PMT) are compounded by obsolete Cold War fourth-generation military equipment. Added to this is corruption that prevents the acquisition of first rate equipment, as money budgeted is often stolen, while equipment acquired ends up in the insurgents' armoury, either captured from government forces or sold by government forces, as is the case in Somalia. Also, global enablers of virtual sanctuaries, pan-Islamic global ideology, global media and communications, transport system, and cyberspace keep the two insurgencies and their actors beyond the reach and capacity of the incumbent states. Internationally, consensus on tackling global Salafist insurgency and its regional franchises are yet to emerge due to the differing interests of superpowers. Owing to the foregoing reasons, the intransigence and intractability of the Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab insurgencies require bespoke management solutions, which are proposed subsequently.

5.4 Taming as a Wicked Problem Governance Strategy of the Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab Insurgencies

As Kilcullen (2006: 11) has aptly argued, in the Salafism-inspired global insurgency "conflict ecosystem with multiple competing entities seeking to maximise their survivability and influence, the counterinsurgent's task may no longer be to defeat the insurgent, but rather to impose or maximise its own interests in an unstable and chaotic environment". This author supports the non-solubility argument of the Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab insurgencies because of the characteristics they exhibit, which have been analysed in Chapters 2 and 4 and agrees with David Kilcullen. Unstable, chaotic and unpredictable environments, especially under state weakness, in which the two insurgencies operate, validate the governing option of a "taming" strategy, which wicked problem theory proposes instead of "resolution", which COIN theorists hold on to tenaciously.

Years of expert research have led to the emergence of the wicked problem governance framework (Head, 2008). Holistic strategies for a comprehensive resolution of wicked problems; taming strategies aimed at reducing wicked problems to a manageable level; and coping strategies aimed at reflecting the fragmented, ambiguous, and indeterminacy of wicked problems by leveraging a tentative process of formulating and operationalising policy responses (Daviter, 2017). The first proposition requires cross-government coordination and more inclusive approaches to stakeholder engagement. Within this framework, inheres collaboration, effectively working across agency boundaries, stimulating debate for problem understanding, adopting a comprehensive focus, tolerating uncertainty, and accepting the imperative of a long-term strategy (Head, 2008). Unarguably, these conceptual and practical approaches are dependent on the institutional capacity of the incumbent state, which are lacking in the Nigerian and Somalian contexts. Their weakness and failure to resolve socio-economic and political issues resulted in the insurgencies in the first place. The second approach (the problem taming model) aims to transform an ill-structured wicked problem into a more manageable and tolerable problem allowing for targeted decision-making. Rather than aim for problem resolution, taming targets problem reduction and control by scoping and segmenting it in such a way as to align it with available domestic expertise and the support that could be externally sourced. The last approach accepted as the most poorly theorised (Daviter, 2017), is the coping

strategies of wicked problem governance. It operationalises the deployment of "multiple approximate solutions to ill-structured problems."(Dunn, 1991: 49 cited in Daviter, 2017: 580). Coping strategies enable the analytical and administrative tasks to be disaggregated and split up irrespective of problem interdependencies. Its inherently less coherent and uncoordinated mechanisms across policy responses and regimes remain its main demerit.


Since the resolution model of wicked problems is as open-ended as wicked problem itself and because some wicked problems like poverty and crime are never resolved but reduced and managed, adoption of the resolution approach for the governance of Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab insurgencies is inadvisable. Coping strategy of governing wicked problem is equally problematic as it thrives in disjointedness, requiring few but competent and highly skilled state agencies and individuals to drive its delivery mechanisms and success. Since these competencies are hardly available in weak state institutions, the option does not merit consideration. After eliminating the two options, the taming strategy of governing wicked problems remains the most promising in the Nigerian and Somalian fragile state contexts.

5.5 Governing Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab Insurgencies: The Wicked Problem Taming Model

As Kilcullen (2006: 11) has rightly argued, the complexity of the Jihadist insurgency means "a traditional counterinsurgency paradigm will not work for the present (jihadist insurgency) war: instead, a fundamental reappraisal of counterinsurgency is needed." This author cannot agree with him more. One way of rethinking COIN in wicked problem terms could be the strategy of taming (Daviter, 2017). As it has already been argued, the mobilisation of instruments of state power and adoption of the whole-of-government approach for resolving traditional insurgencies is ineffective in the Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab contexts because of the weaknesses and vulnerability of the incumbent states. Therefore, the model of governing the wicked problems of Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab is proposed to begin with advocacy and tangible actions of the Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in the two states of Nigeria and Somalia. The weakness and incapacity of a state to envision and implement its security strategies have far-reaching implications. In the 21st Century, where national strategy is no longer the exclusive province of state actors, the jettisoning of state-centricity in strategy making and implementation enables non-national or non-state actors

powerful enough in terms of ideational resource possession, credibility, and legitimacy, to play greater roles and take responsibility (Hulme, 2019). With CSOs (hardly reckoned in traditional COIN solutions) leading in mobilisation and joined-up programmes, the capacities of government departments and agencies could be developed for more effective roles in addressing the insurgency threats.

Figure 5-1 The wicked Problem Taming Model



Spectrum of Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab Enfeeblement

Equally, the CSOs in the two countries could work with regional actors: Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Lake Chad Basin Commission, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the African Union (AU), and bilateral and multilateral partners like the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), the UK, US, France and China, to accomplish the insurgent groups' degrading programmes through robust advocacy campaigns. Steadfast implementation of the programmes could enfeeble the insurgent groups along a weakening continuum.

Taming strategies generally entail defining, scoping wicked problems along Jurisdictional and functional areas, and creating an independent agency to take charge (Daviter, 2017). Accordingly, the requirements of Taming Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab could comprise capacity building of government institutions, better border management functions to eliminate weapons smuggling, population protection and security programmes. Others could include counter-radicalisation programmes, security sector reform, including the establishment of Special Operations Forces (SOF), which are currently non-existent in the two countries, and the provision of situational awareness through Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) activities. Bilateral and multilateral partnerships could better achieve these expectations.

With the bilateral and multilateral partners fully taken on board, the following could be achieved as tangible outcomes: more effective and efficient public sector institutions, more effective and robust inter-agency coordination and collaboration for the degradation of the insurgent groups. Also, with the groups weakened, the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) confidence to return to their homesteads would be boosted just as the recruitment capacity of insurgent groups would decline. Availability of real-time information on the insurgents through technology provided by bilateral partners means better and more effective kinetic targeting programmes, which would ultimately weaken and degrade the capacity of Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab groups to the level that they could no longer pose existential threats to the incumbent states. The remnants could be monitored and contained through regular policing programmes and activities. These programmes, however, depends on the ability of the CSOs to forge a close relationship and cooperation with state authorities.

5.6 Chapter Summary

The diversity and complexity of the Salafist Jihadist insurgency elements, ecosystem, and enablers suggest a rethinking and re-evaluating traditional COIN theories. This chapter examined the prospects of applying the wicked problem governance approach of taming to the Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab insurgencies due to the weakness of incumbent states to defeat them. The analysis indicates that there is potential in this approach in a weak state context. Therefore, re-conceptualisation of the Salafist Jihad insurgencies in wicked problem terms and its governance systems shows the promise of taming and minimising their threats to the incumbent states' corpus.

CHAPTER SIX

Conclusion

6.0 Overview

This study has explored the relationship between Jihadist insurgency and wicked problems. An understanding of Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab insurgencies in the context of wicked problems and how the study of jihadist insurgency typified by these two conflicts inform the concept of wicked problems has been examined. In other words, this case study investigated the challenges weak incumbent states face in governing the wicked problems of Jihadist insurgencies due to the challenges of its equally weak institutions. The case study essentially explored the commonalities between the characteristics of Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab insurgencies and wicked problems, and how wicked problems may be understood as Jihadist insurgency, enabling the relationships between them to be determined. It also analysed the conditions of the Nigerian and Somalian environments, which are structurally predisposed to the wickedness of the insurgencies.

The traditional elements of insurgency has been contrasted with the Salafist Jihad insurgency elements. The analysis shows that the former generally follows a straight, vertical line and a linear framework, enabling one element, if compromised, to affect the integrity of others, with a consequence of the weakening of the whole framework and an ultimate defeat. This contrasts with the latter, which exhibits non-linearity, with its whole elements unaffected consequentially by a compromise of one of them. This analysis concluded that the linear model of traditional insurgency is inadequate for understanding and governing the Salafist Jihad insurgency because the latter possesses qualities of wicked problems (its elements correlate with the characteristics of wicked problems). Therefore, the non-linear (wicked problem model) is more suitable for analysing and prescribing governance solutions to the Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab insurgencies.

At the core of this dissertation, to reiterate is the claim that Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab insurgencies are wicked problems. As threats confronting weak states, they are insoluble because of the compromised status of such statehood-unable to leverage its power, levers of authority and influence in resolving conflicts. Implicit in this claim is the argument that even if Salafist Jihadist insurgency is solvable in a

strong and resilient state context, it is insoluble in the context of a weak state, and the imperative of governing such problem by taming it to a manageable level that routine policing policies and programmes could mitigate its risks to state security.

Notably underlined in this dissertation is the argument that the concept of wicked problem has analytic value in the study of Salafist Jihad insurgency and the latter has an important role in the wicked problem scholarship. Therefore, the wicked problem theory has an explanatory utility that can illuminate the character of jihadist insurgencies. This claim is indicative of a generative quality of the academic field of wicked problem, and of a future study that could build on the insights provided by this dissertation to specifically research the effect of a weak state on COIN against Salafist Jihad insurgencies. For example, the role political culture plays in state weakness and, ultimately, its [in]capacity to wage COIN campaign against ideology-motivated conflicts.

6.1 Future Research for COIN against Salafist-inspired insurgency and Wicked Problems

An area to which researchers can focus their attention on Jihadist insurgency and wicked problems is going beyond the incapacity of weak states to defeat Salafist insurgencies to the broader issue of state weakness and its effects on managing national security threats generally. This could include studying how national security management could be decentralised in line with the increasing role of powerful non-state actors in mitigating threats to national security. A conventional approach assumes that national COIN strategy, like other forms of national strategy, has to be conceptualised, designed and implemented centrally under the direction of the state authority. With the growing relevance of non-state actors in strategy making, CSOs could work directly with International NGOs and Intergovernmental Organisations to achieve national and international security interests. They could fill existing gaps in national security of weak states and serve as the coordinator while seeking cooperation with state authorities.

One could therefore, more deeply explore the role of CSOs in COIN. Also in the context of super power contributions to the resolution of wicked problems in weak states, the involvement of some countries in neutralising the actors of global Salafist Jihad franchises through the use Special Operation Forces (SOF) as the United States

does in Somalia and Niger, and the contributions of such efforts to the governance of jihadist insurgency could be studied.

Using the conceptual lens of non-state actors in national security threat management could enrich research on governing counterinsurgency threats or any wicked problem, such as crime, inequality, or poverty. National security and specifically insurgency and COIN theories and concepts, such as insurgency elements, linear and non-linear insurgency and COIN frameworks, the context and structure used in this study could add new breadth to our understanding and governance of wicked problems. Research into the intersection between Salafist Jihad insurgency and wicked problems could also proceed in different directions. First, the research could build on the foundations of some early scholarship that used the concept of wicked problems as a frame of analysis of complex social issues to include intractable national and international security challenges like migration. Second, opportunities exist to explore how the insurgency and COIN research community can bring its knowledge to bear on particular wicked problems, such as how the non-linear conceptualisation of insurgency may provide insights into studying poverty and crime. This frontier of research could also benefit from exploring other studies on the resolution of insurgencies and how such knowledge could help and inform efforts to address wicked problems such as slavery, which was once thought to be eradicated but manifest in new forms in our modern world. If undertaken, these research projects could support greater efforts that could place insurgency and COIN and other threats to national and international security at the heart of the study of wicked problems. That agenda is capable of promoting a body of knowledge that pushes and challenges the conventional and rational model of researching insurgency and COIN. It could ultimately facilitate a richer interdisciplinary research culture on national and international security issues equally from an interdisciplinary perspective.

Bibliography

Books

Ackoff, Russell L. (1974) Redesigning the Future: A Systems Approach to Societal Problems, New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Anter, Andreas. (2014) Aspects of the Concept of the State. In: Max Weber's Theory of the Modern State, Palgrave Macmillan, London.

Balint, P. J., Stewart, R. E., Desai, A., & Walters, L. C. (2011). Wicked environmental problems: Managing uncertainty and conflict, Washington DC: Island Press.

Baylis et al (2014) The Globalization of World Politics An Introduction to International Relations, Sixth Edition Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Beckett, Ian (ed.) (2007) Modern Counterinsurgency, Aldershot: Ashgate.

Beckett, Ian (2012) 'The Historiography of Insurgency' in The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, Paul B. Rich and Isabelle Duyvesteyn (eds) London and New York: Routledge.

Brachman, J. (2009) Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice, Oxon: Taylor & Francis.

Bryman, A (2004). Social research methods (2nd ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.

Bowden, Mark (2010) Black Hawk Down, New York: Grove Atlantic Press.

Charmaz, K. (2006). Constructing grounded theory: A practical guide through qualitative analysis, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Connelly, Matthew James (2002). A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-cold War Era, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

John, W. C. & Dana, L. M. (2000) Determining Validity in Qualitative Inquiry, Theory Into Practice, 39:3, 124-130, DOI: 10.1207/s15430421tip3903_2.

Dey, I. (1993) Quantitative Data Analysis: a User-Friendly Guide for Social Scientists, London: Routledge.

Dixon, Paul ed (2012) The British Approach to Counterinsurgency From Malaya and Northern Ireland to Iraq and Afghanistan, London, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Etienne, de Durand, (2010) 'France', in Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney (eds), Understanding Counterinsurgency: Doctrine, Operations and Challenges, London and New York: Routledge.

Fisher, C. (2007). Researching and Writing a Dissertation: A Guidebook for Business Students. 2nd Edition, London: Prentice Hall.

FitzGerald, N. J (2002) Somalia: Issues History and Bibliography, New York: Nova Science.

Galula, D. (1964) Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, London: Pall Mall.

Griffiths, M., and O'Callaghan, T. (2002) International Relations: The Key Concepts, London: Routledge.

Guevara, C. (1969) Guerrilla Warfare, London: Penguin.

Harding, J. (2019) Qualitative Analysis From Start to Finish, (Second Edition), London: Sage Publications.

Harper M. (2012) Getting Somalia Wrong? Faith, War and Hope in a Shattered State, London: Zed Books.

Held, D., and McGrew, A. eds (2007) Globalization Theory: Approaches and Controversies, (First Edition) Oxford: Polity, 2007.

Hentz, J. J. , and Solomon, H. (ed) (2017) Understanding Boko Haram: Terrorism and Insurgency in Africa, London and New York Routledge.

Hoffman, B. (2017) Inside Terrorism Third Edition, New York: Columbia University Press.

Jones, S.G., Liepman, A.M., and Chandler, N. (2016) Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency in Somalia, Santa Monica: Rand Corporation.

Lewis IM, (1980) ,A Modern History of Somalia: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa. London: Longman Group.

Kaldor, M. (1999) New and old wars : organized violence in a global era, Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Kilcullen D. (2009) The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kilcullen, D. (2012) 'Counterinsurgency the State of the Controversial Art' in Rich, P, B. R., and Duyvesteyn, I. (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency.

Kiras, James D (2018) 'Irregular Warfare: Terrorism and Insurgency' in Strategy in the Contemporary World (6th edn) John B., James W., and Colin G. (eds) (Oxford: University of Oxford Press.

Laqueur, W. (1998) Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical and Critical Study, New Brunswick: Transaction.

Lewis, D. (2012) 'Counterinsurgency in Sri Lanka, a Successful Model?' in Rich, P. B. R., and Duyvesteyn, I. (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency.

Maher, S. (2016) Salafi-jihadism: The History of an Idea, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Merriam, S.B. (1998). Qualitative research and case study applications in education. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Neuman, W. L. (2014) Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches. (7th edition). Essex: Pearson Education Limited.

O'Neill, B. (2005) Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse, Washington DC: Potomac Books.

Pierson, C. (2004) The Modern State (2nd Edition) (London and New York: Routledge)

Rau, Asta, Florian Elliker & Jan K. Coetzee (2018) 'Collecting Data for Analyzing Discourses' in The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Data Collection, (ed) London: SAGE Publications Ltd.

Reno, W. 'Insurgent Movements in Africa' in Rich, P. B. R and Duyvesteyn, I. (eds) (2012) The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency.

Richard O. M., and Ian I. M. (1981) Challenging Strategic Planning Assumptions: Theory, Cases, and Techniques, New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Schreier, M. (2014) 'Qualitative Content Analysis' in: The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Data Analysis, Uwe Flick (ed) London: SAGE Publications Ltd.

Shamir, E. (2021) 'Deterring Violent Non-state Actors'. In: Osinga F., Sweijts T. (eds) Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2020, The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press.

Solomon, H. (2015) Fighting Insurgency from Al Shabaab, Ansar Dine and Boko Haram, UK Palgrave Macmillan.

Spear, J. (2018) 'Counterinsurgency' in Security Studies: An Introduction, Williams and McDonald (eds), London and New York: Routledge.

The Random House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary (1999), New York: Random House.

Thompson, Robert (1970) Revolutionary War in World Strategy 1945–1969. New York: Taplinger.

Thompson, Robert (1972) Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam, London: Chatto & Windus.

Thurston, A. (2018), 'Political Settlements with Jihadists in Algeria and the Sahel', West African Papers, N°18, Paris: OECD Publishing.

Ucko, D. H. (2012) 'Whither Counterinsurgency The Rise and Fall of a Divisive Concept' in Rich, P. B. R., and Duyvesteyn, I. (ed) The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency.

Yin, R.K. (1989). Case study research: Design and methods (Rev. Edn.), Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publishing.

Yin, R. K. (1994). Case study research – Design and methods, Thousand Oaks, California: Sage.

Journal Articles

Adesoji, A.O., (2011) 'Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Response of the Nigerian State Africa Today Vol. 57, No. 4, pp. 99-119..

Ahmad Aisha (2019) 'We have captured your women: Explaining Jihadist Norm Change' International Security 44 (1) 80-116.

Anzalone, Christopher (2016) 'The Resilience of al-Shabaab' Combating Terrorism Centre, Sentinel, Volume 9, Issue 4.

Bannink, D., & Trommel, W. (2019). 'Intelligent modes of imperfect governance'. Policy and Society. doi:10.1080/14494035.2019.1572576.

Bebber, Robert (2015) 'The Wicked Problem of War' ResearchGate <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280111838>, accessed on 8th January, 2021.

Bergen, P. and Footer, L. (2008) 'Defeating the attempted global jihadist insurgency: forty steps for the next president to pursue against Al Qaeda, like-minded groups, unhelpful state actors, and radicalised Sympathisers', The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences 618 (1) 232-247.

Bernie, M. (2009) 'Pakistan's FATA--A Wicked Problem', Strategy Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College.

Blatter, J. and Haverland, M. (2012) 'Two or three approaches to explanatory case study research'? Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, USA available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/256025256_Two_or_Three_Approaches_to_Explanatory_Case_Study_Research/link/02e7e526859361a12c000000/download. Accessed on 21 January 2021.

Busch, C., De Maret, P., Flynn, T., Kellum, R., Le, S., Meyers, B., Saunders, M., White, R. and Palmquist, M. (2012) Content Analysis, Colorado State University, [online], available at <http://writing.colostate.edu/guides/guide.cfm?guideid=61>. Accessed 5 March 2021.

Camillus, J. C. (2008) 'Strategy as a Wicked Problem' Harvard Business Review 86, 98-101. <https://hbr.org/2008/05/strategy-as-a-wicked-problem>.

Cassese, S. (1986) 'The Rise and Decline of the Notion of State' International Political Science Review Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 120-130.

- Churchman, C.W. (1967) 'Wicked Problems' Management Science 14, No.4 :141–42.
- Connable, B. (2012) 'Embracing the Fog of War: Assessment and Metrics in Counterinsurgency'. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
- Collier, P., and Hoeffler, A. (2000) 'Greed and Grievance in Civil War' Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=630727>. accessed on 10 February 2021.
- Council On Foreign Relations (2021) <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/boko-haram-nigeria>. accessed on 10 June 2021.
- Council on Foreign Relations (2020) Backgrounder Al Sahabaab <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-shabab> accessed on 6 March 2021.
- Crowley, K., & Head, B. W (2017) 'The enduring challenge of 'wicked problems': revisiting Rittel and Webber Policy Sciences 50:539–547.
- Corum, J. S. (2006) 'Training Indigenous Forces In Counterinsurgency : A Tale Of Two Insurgencies.' Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College. Available at: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep11838>. Accessed on 25 April 2021.
- Daniel B. (2013) 'Fighting Salafi-Jihadist Insurgencies: How Much Does Religion Really Matter?', Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 36:5, 353-371.
- David, M. J. & Smith, M. L. R. (2010) 'Whose Hearts and Whose Minds? The Curious Case of Global Counter-Insurgency', The Journal of Strategic Studies, 33:1, 81-12.
- Daviter, F. (2017) 'Coping, taming or solving: alternative approaches to the governance of wicked problems.' Policy Studies, 38:6, 571-588.
- Dunn, W. N. 1991. "Assessing the Impact of Policy Analysis: The Functions of Usable Ignorance." Knowledge, Technology and Policy 4 (4): 36–55.
- Ellen, M. van Bueren, Erik-Hans, K. and Joop F. M. K, (2003) 'Dealing with Wicked Problems in Networks: Analyzing an Environmental Debate from a Network Perspective,' Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 13, no. 2 193–212.

Engelkes, S. (2017) 'Modern Jihadist Insurgency in post-2011 Libya: Revolutionary Warfare and Jihadist Foreign Fighters' Kings College London Evolution of Insurgency Seminar Paper.

Gray, C. S. (2012) 'Concept Failure? COIN, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Theory' PRISM, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 17-32. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26469743>.

Greenwood, T. C., and Thomas, X. H. (2009) 'War Planning for Wicked Problems: Where Joint Doctrine Fails.' Armed Forces Journal, available at: <http://armedforcesjournal.com/article/2009/12/4252237>. accessed 4 April 2021.

Head, B. (2008) 'Wicked Problems in Public Policy' Public Policy, Volume 3, Number 2, 101 – 118.

Horst, W. J. Rittel and Melvin, M. W., (1973) 'Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,' Policy Sciences 4: 160.

Hulme, C. (2019) 'Grand Strategy in the Age of Climate Change: A Theory of Emergent Grand Strategy', The Strategy Bridge, available at <https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2019/9/29/grand-strategy-in-the-age-of-climate-change-a-theory-of-emergent-grand-strategy>. accessed 10 May 2021.

Irmer, C. (2009) 'A Systems Approach and the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF),' in Cornwallis XIV: Analysis of Societal Conflict and Counter-Insurgency, Vienna: The Cornwallis Group. 170.

James, G. B. Lt Col, (2008) 'A Nonlinear Approach To Strategy Formulation' US Army War College Strategy Research Paper, Carlisle Barracks. Available at: <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA482263.pdf>. accessed : 30 April 2021.

Jones, D. M., and Smith, M.R.L (2010) 'Whose Hearts and Whose Minds? The Curious Case of Global Counter-Insurgency.' The Journal of Strategic Studies, 33: (1) 81–121.

Käihkö, Ilmari (2015), 'No die, no rest'? Coercive Discipline in Liberian Military Organisations, in: Africa Spectrum, 50, 2, 3–29. Available at <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/000203971505000201>. accessed on 5 May 2021.

Kilcullen, D. J. (2004) 'Countering global insurgency', Journal of Strategic Studies, 28:4, 597-617.

Kilcullen, D.J. (2006–7) 'Counterinsurgency Redux', Survival, 48 (4): 111–30.

Kirschke, S. F, C., Newig, J., and Borchardt, D. (2019) 'Clusters of water governance problems and their effects on policy delivery', Policy and Society. doi:10.1080/14494035.2019.1586081.

Kramer, F. D. (2011) 'Irregular Conflict and the Wicked Problem Dilemma: Strategies of Imperfection.' PRISM 2, no. 3 75–100.

Leung, Lawrence (2015) 'Validity, reliability, and generalizability in qualitative research' Journal of Family Medicine and Primary Care, 4(3) : 324–327.

Levy, J S. (2008) 'Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference' Conflict Management and Peace Science, 25:1–18.

Lewis, P. 'Dysfunctional State of Nigeria'. Available at: <http://www.cgdev.org/doc/shortofthegoal/chap3pdf> accessed 12 January 2021.

Ludwig, D. (2001). 'The era of management is over.' Ecosystems, 4, 758–764.

Mackinlay, J. 'Tackling bin Laden: Lessons From History', Observer, 28 October 2001.

Marshal, Wendy I, Schwoebel, Mary Hope Thomson, James T and Wunsch, James S (2001) 'Future Directions for USAID Support to Conflict Mitigation in Nigeria' United States Agency for International Development Democracy and Governance Analytical Support and Implementation Paper. Available at https://www.researchgate.net/profile/MarySchwoebel/publication/309618326_Future_Directions_for_USAID_Support_to_Conflict_Mitigation_in_Nigeria/links/581a158608aeffb294131075/Future. accessed on 4 May 2021.

Martin, B. G. (1969) 'Kanem, Bornu, and the Fazzan: Notes on the Political History of a Trade Route' The Journal of African History , Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 15-27.

McBeth, M. K., & Shanahan, E. A. (2004) 'Public opinion for sale: The role of policy marketers in Greater Yellowstone policy conflict.' Policy Sciences, 37, 319–338.

Metz, S (2017.) 'Abandoning Counterinsurgency: Toward a More Efficient Antiterrorism Strategy.' Journal of Strategic Security 10, (4) : 64-77.

Mitchell, M. and Newman, M. (2001) 'Complex systems theory and evolution, Encyclopedia of Evolution, https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/30841539/10.1.1.63.2636.pdf?1362517762=&responsecontentdisposition=inline%3B+filename%3DComplex_systems_theory_and_evolution.pdf&Expires=. accessed on 16 March 2021.

Mitroff, I. I., and James R. E. (1979) 'On Strategic Assumption-Making: A Dialectical Approach to Policy and Planning.' Academy of Management Review 4, no. 1 1–12.

Moghadam, Assaf (2008) 'The Salafi-Jihad as a Religious Ideology' Combating Terrorism Centre SENTINEL February 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 3 <https://ctc.usma.edu/the-salafi-jihad-as-a-religious-ideology/>

Nesser, P. (2013), 'Abū Qatada and Palestine' Welt des Islams (53) 416-44 DOI: 10.1163/15685152-5334P0005.

Noordegraaf, M., Douglas, S., & Geuijen, K., & van der Steen, M. (2019). 'Weaknesses of wickedness: A critical perspective on wickedness theory'. Policy and Society.

Pearlman, W., and Cunningham, K. G. (2012) 'Nonstate Actors, Fragmentation, and Conflict Processes' Journal of Conflict Resolution 56(1) 3-15.

Pham, J. P. (2013) "State Collapse, Insurgency, and Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Somalia" (2013). Monographs, Books, and Publications. 513. <https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/513>.

Peters B. G. (2017) 'What is so wicked about wicked problems? A conceptual analysis and a research program', Policy and Society, 36:3, 385-396.

Raisio, H. (2010) 'Embracing the Wickedness of Health Care: Essays on Reforms, Wicked Problems and Public Deliberation' Social And Health Management 5, Acta Wasaensia No. 228. Available at https://www.univaasa.fi/materiaali/pdf/isbn_978-952-476-316-5.pdf. accessed on 20 May 2021.

Rathmell, A. (2009) "Adapting Government for Stabilisation and Counter-Insurgency Operations," The RUSI Journal 154, no. 6 10,

Roth, K. 'Slavery: The ISIS Rules' (New York: Human Rights Watch, September 5, 2015), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/09/05/slavery-isis-rules>.

Smith, R.E. (1988). 'The logic and design of case study research'. The Sport Psychologist, 2(1), 1-12.

Solomon, Hussein (2014) 'Somalia's Al Shabaab: Clans vs Islamist nationalism', South African Journal of International Affairs, 21:3, 351-366,

Shultz, Richard H. (2008) Global Insurgency Strategy and the Salafi Jihad Movement, United States Air Force Institute for National Security Studies Occasional Paper No 66. Available at

[https://books.google.com.ng/books?hl=en&lr=&id=0s0gAQAAIAAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP13&dq=Shultz,+Richard+H.+\(2008\)+Global+Insurgency+Strategy+and+the+Salafi+jihad+movement&ots=QEUe_fDGup&sig=rzdNifSr5qDeX4v3tqeO9krE3sA&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=Shultz%2C%20Richard%20H.%20\(2008\)%20Global%20Insurgency%20Strategy%20and%20the%20Salafi%20jihad%20movement&f=false](https://books.google.com.ng/books?hl=en&lr=&id=0s0gAQAAIAAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP13&dq=Shultz,+Richard+H.+(2008)+Global+Insurgency+Strategy+and+the+Salafi+jihad+movement&ots=QEUe_fDGup&sig=rzdNifSr5qDeX4v3tqeO9krE3sA&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=Shultz%2C%20Richard%20H.%20(2008)%20Global%20Insurgency%20Strategy%20and%20the%20Salafi%20jihad%20movement&f=false).

Accessed on 15 May 2021.

Termeer, C. J.A.M, Art D. & Robbert B. (2019) 'A critical assessment of the wicked problem concept: relevance and usefulness for policy science and practice', Policy and Society, 38:2, 167-179.

The 9/11 Commission Report (2004) Available at <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-911REPORT/pdf/GPO-911REPORT-8.pdf>. accessed on 14 April 2021.

The Fund for Peace (2021) Fragile States Index. Available at: <https://fragilestatesindex.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/05/fsi2021-report.pdf>. accessed on 20 May 2021.

Thurston, A. (2016) 'The disease is unbelief': Boko Haram's religious and political worldview, The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World Analysis Paper. Available at: <https://www.brookings.edu>. accessed on 22 February 2021.

Thurston, A. (2016) 'The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World' Analysis Paper | No. 22.

Thurston, A. (2018), 'Political Settlements with Jihadists in Algeria and the Sahel', West African Papers, N°18, OECD Publishing, Paris.

Turnbull, N. & Hoppe, R. (2019) Problematizing 'wickedness': a critique of the wicked problems concept, from philosophy to practice, Policy and Society, 38:2, 315-337.

US Army (2006) Field Manual (FM) 3–24 Counterinsurgency. Leavenworth: Department of the Army.

US Department of the Army (2008) 'Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design.' Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet. Fort Monroe, VA.

UNESCO (2018) Human Rights for the Colonised People, available at <https://en.unesco.org/courier/2018-4/human-rights-colonized> accessed on 14 April 2021.

Vidino, L. Raffaello, P. & Evan K. (2010) 'Bringing Global Jihad to the Horn of Africa: al Shabaab, Western Fighters, and the Sacralization of the Somali Conflict', African Security, 3:4, 216-238.

Warsame, A.A., Sheik-Ali, I.A., Ali, A.O. et al. (2021) Climate change and crop production nexus in Somalia: an empirical evidence from ARDL technique. Environ Sci Pollut Res 28, 19838–19850. Available at: <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11356-020-11739-3>. accessed 10 May 2021.

Weeraratne, S. (2017) 'Theorizing the Expansion of the Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria', Terrorism and Political Violence, 29:4, 610-634.

Wilczek, E. (2017) 'The Wicked Problem of Documenting Counterinsurgencies: A case study of US province reports written during the Vietnam War' <https://beatleyweb.simmons.edu/scholar/files/original/dc64d17dcd2244c2d1a1453fc177ad81.pdf>. accessed 10 January 2021.

Whittemore, R. C., Susan, K. & Mandle, Carol Lynn (2001) 'Validity in Qualitative Research' Qualitative Health Research, Vol. 11 No. 4, 522-537.

Xiang, W.N. (2013). Working with wicked problems in socio-ecological systems: Awareness, acceptance, and adaptation. Landscape and Urban Planning, 110, 1–4.

Websites

African Union Mission in Somalia (2021) Somalia A Brief History <https://amisom-au.org/about-somalia/brief-history>.

Colorado State University Writing Centre Webpage (2021)
<https://writing.colostate.edu/about/contact.cfm>.

Nigeria Overview-World Bank. Available at:
<https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/nigeria/overview>. accessed 19 January 2021

<https://en.unesco.org/courier/2018-4/human-rights-colonized>.

<https://www.unocha.org>.

<https://www.unocha.org/nigeria>

Appendix A Thematic Content Analysis and Coding Guide

This coding guide outlines instructions for the content analysis of Jihadist Insurgency elements and Wicked Problem characteristics in the Linear and non-linear framework of traditional insurgency and Jihadist insurgency as detailed in Chapter Four. The guide enabled analyses made in the different chapters of the dissertation and the conclusions made thereof. The conclusions from the analyses are stated in Chapter Six.

Coding Instructions

1. Record texts related to the themes, sub-themes and the constituent issues analysed. Code characteristics similar to, and its relationship with each theme and sub-themes in terms of overall meanings stated or implied in the text.

2. **Colour code:** Jihadist insurgency-blue, wicked problem-red

a. Jihadist Insurgency

- (i) Cause (s)- enabling conditions
- (ii) Grievances- (political system/intra-religious rivalry, socio-economic system and inequalities).
- (iii) Narratives
- (iv) Propaganda messages
- (v) Organisational Structure
- (vi) Strategy and tactics
- (vii) Support (domestic, external, logistical and ideational)

b. Wicked Problem-Characteristics

- (i) Indeterminacy in problem formulation (ideology, political goals)
- (ii) Non-definitiveness in problem solution (misperceived grievances of attack on Islam/Muslims, victimhood narratives, pan-Islamic global agenda.
- (iii) Non-solubility (commitment to jihad at local, regional and global levels. Use of Jihad as a means to political ends.
- (iv) Irreversible consequentiality (Affiliation with, alliance to Al-Qaeda, ISIS, mission to destroy the US/West and their values.)
- (v) Individual uniqueness (loose, nested organisational structure, global players with local roots and regional enablers. Aggregations of local conflicts to global pan-Islamic agenda.

Coding example

The Disease is unbelief: Boko Haram's Religious and Political Worldview
By Alex Thurston

As with opposing democracy, it was not enough to criticize the state's persecution of Muslims. Al-wala' wa-l-bara' and izhar al-din demanded an aggressive defense of Islam, because Islam's enemies were on the move.

Everyone knows the kind of evil assault that was brought against our community. Beyond us, everyone knows the kind of evil that has been brought against the Muslim community of this country periodically.

For Shekau, Boko Haram was the victim: "They're fighting us for no reason, because we've said we'll practice our religion, we will support our religion and stand on what God has said....."

Code for Victimhood narratives of Boko Haram-attack on Muslims/Islam.

Boko Haram's best-known stance is its rejection of Western-style schooling. Yet the concept "Boko Haram" encompasses a broader critique of Nigerian society, targeting the perceived fruits of such schools.

Yusuf objected to the content and effects of Western style education. Ideas like Darwinism, he said, contradicted the Quran.

Western Schools led Muslim children to adopt the mannerisms of Jews and Christians. Children of different genders interacted at school, promoting "fornication, lesbianism, homosexuality, and other [corruptions]."

code for grievances. Anti-Western sentiments

which contradicts [Islam's] law."

For Yusuf, the credentials conferred by Western-style schools were useless to genuine Muslims: "Our movement rejects work under any government that rules by something other than what God has revealed

Suranjan Weeraratne (2017) Theorizing the Expansion of the Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria, Terrorism and Political Violence, 29:4, 610-634,

Not only has Boko Haram inexorably pursued territory in recent times, it has also declared an "Islamic Caliphate" across the land under its control with the city of Gwoza designated as its headquarters.

Cause- Political goals of re-establishment of a global caliphate with fanatical use of Jihad as a means to the end.

The formal proclamation of the establishment of the caliphate was made in a video released by the group shortly after the seizure of Gwoza. In the video, Boko Haram's leader Shekau declares, "We are grateful to Allah for the big victory he granted our members in Gwoza and made the town part of our Islamic caliphate." "We are an Islamic caliphate. We have nothing to do with Nigeria. We don't believe in this name.

Jones, S.G., Liepman, A.M., and Chandler, N. (2016)
Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency in Somalia,
Santa Monica: Rand Corporation

After Al-Shabaab's public merger with Al Qaeda in 2012, which resulted in closer ties between the two organisations,

the group became increasingly serious potential threat to the United States interests in East Africa. Of particular concern was Al-Shabaab's relationship with Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsular, which plotted a series of attacks against the US mainland from its base in Yemen base.

Irreversible
Consequentiality-affiliation
with and alliance to Al-
Qaeda/ISIS, and intent to
destroy the US and the West

Observers have generally probed Al-Shabaab and state collapse in Somalia, the movement's link with clannism, its alleged ties to Al-Qaeda, its relations with the Boko Haram (Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'wati wal Jihad) in Nigeria, its operations in Kenya, its discursive battles with the Somali government and its usage of social media, such as Twitter and YouTube.

Irreversible
consequentiality

These issues included al-Shabab's actions toward Muslims—specifically, the group's killing of large numbers of Muslim civilians—as well as the treatment of al-Shabab figures who disagreed with certain policies of the leadership.

Individual
uniqueness

Similarly, it is possible that al-Shabab would target the United States, especially since U.S. drones and special forces have targeted and killed al-Shabab members in Somalia. Moreover, the United States and other Western targets serve as a "media enhancer" for al-Shabab;

Irreversible
Consequentiality

it gains more attention through attacks on Western targets and creates the impression that the organization is increasingly powerful. Even though Al-Shabaab has lost territories, fighters, finances, cohesion and popular support, and appears to be weak, it has the capacity to resurge if steps are not taken to address the challenges at the heart of the insurgency: economic, socio-political, and governance.

