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Is the Nigerian counterterrorism policy human security centred?

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ABSTRACT

In 2014, the Nigerian government released the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST). This comprehensive strategy aims to tackle the root causes of terrorism. It combines elements of hard and soft approaches but it emphasis soft powers. The root causes of terrorism are grouped in the seven key elements of human security. It is essential to take into account all the aspects of human security because they are intrinsically linked. Therefore a human security centred counterterrorism policy is an effective way to tackle the leading factors to terrorism. This dissertation aims to establish whether the Nigerian counterterrorism policy is human security centred both in paper and in practice. This dissertation demonstrates that the counterterrorism policy is human security centred in the policy paper but not in practice. The author argues that the lack of human security in the policy conducted in the ground explains the failure of the government to eradicate Boko Haram.
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INTRODUCTION

In February 2020, the Nigerian president Muhammadu Buhari declared “I wonder how Boko Haram survived up till this time” (Channels Television, 2020). In this television interview, the president explained that the cooperation between the Nigerian armed forces and the local populations, should eradicate the terrorist group. Since its armed insurrection in 2009, the sect Boko Haram is a strong security issue for Nigeria. At its peak in 2014, the terrorist group controlled a territory which was around the size of Belgium (DW News, 2021). The sect was weakened in 2015, but it regained strength by proclaiming allegiance to ISIS the same year (Ragozzino, 2021). Nowadays, the group remains extremely active in the Northeast region and neighboring countries. In 2014, the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR) called Boko Haram “the most ferocious group in the world”. In ten years, Boko Haram is believed to have cost at least 100,000 lives and displaced more than 2.6 million people (Aljazeera, 2018).

There is no consensus about the definition of terrorism, nor about its root causes. The causes of terrorism are numerous. The concept of the root causes of terrorism is that certain factors provide a fertile ground for the development of terrorism (Sandler, 2014: 260). These factors can be grouped in seven elements: economic insecurity, food insecurity, health insecurity, environmental insecurity, personal insecurity, community insecurity and political insecurity (Zwitter, 2010: 91). Terrorism is a threat to human security, but it is also a result of human insecurity (ibid). Indeed, if all the aspects of human security are guaranteed, the chances for terrorism to develop are lower, as a population without grievances will not support terrorists. In order to eradicate terrorism in the long term, it is necessary to tackle its root causes, and consequently, human insecurity (Botha, 2008: 39). Additionally, these causes are intrinsically linked. Thus, it is essential to adopt a comprehensive approach (United Nations, 2017: 21). The human security approach addresses the seven elements that constitutes the root causes of terrorism, and it
recognises their interconnectedness. Therefore, it is extremely interesting to apply this approach to counterterrorism, as it could be an effective way to eradicate terrorism.

Partly due to the fact that terrorism is commonly perceived as a form of radical violence, it is often believed that the only option to respond to it is the use of force (Jackson et al., 2011: 206). Many studies have demonstrated that counterterrorism “cannot be addressed through military force alone” (Hughes, 2011). Indeed, the sole use of military only treats the “symptoms” of terrorism but not the causes (Zwitter, 2010: 93). It also often worsened the situation by increasing the number of deaths and by creating new grievances among the population (Onapajo and Ozden, 2020: 9). Therefore, this hard approach can be counterproductive, as the violence of the army can push people to support terrorist groups (Pérouse de Montclos, 2014: 15). Initially, Western institutions heavily relied on the use of the military to counterterrorism, notably in the 2003 Iraq war (Omenma and Hendricks, 2018: 769). However, in the past few years, politicians and professionals in the field recognised the importance of adopting a comprehensive approach to tackle the root causes of terrorism. Homer-Dixon explained that “Until we understand the sources of terrorism and do something about them, we can arm ourselves to the teeth (…) and still not protect ourselves from this menace.” (Homer-Dixon, 2001). A human security approach to counterterrorism focuses on the underlying factors of terrorism. It would allow to gain a deep understanding of the root causes of terrorism in a specific context, and to build a proactive approach. Indeed, the causes of terrorism differ according to the socio-political context and the counterterrorism strategy needs to be context specific in order to tackle the root causes of terrorism in the country (OSCE, 2018: 19). In Nigeria, terrorism has a multitude of causes. Boko Haram is a result of the abandonments of the seven components of human security (Iba Omenka et al., 2017: 505). Therefore, a counterterrorism strategy centred on human security will aim to restore these key aspects which will eradicate terrorism as they will lose their enabling ground to develop. As long as the causes of terrorism are not tackled,
Boko Haram will not cease to exist. Human security does emphasis a soft approach, but it does not eradicate the hard one. An effective counterterrorist strategy needs to find the right combination between these two approaches, because they are both important.

In 2014, the government of Goodluck Jonathan implemented the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST). It was slightly revised in 2016 by the president Buhari. This strategy established a comprehensive approach to terrorism that aims to address its root causes. According to Ugwueze and Onuoha, this strategy on the paper reflects global best practices in countering terrorism through soft approach (Ugwueze, Onuoha, 2020: 562). The NACTEST is a very elaborate strategy which is the result of a global reflexion on terrorism in Nigeria. This strategy is a central element of the Nigerian counterterrorism policy. It is very interesting to study this document as it gives a deep understanding of the perception of terrorism in Nigeria. Furthermore, it is also interesting to see how the soft approach, which is at the hearth of this strategy, is articulated.

However, there is a gap between the NACTEST in the paper and the policy that is conducted in the ground (Sonnie Bowey,2019: 41). Indeed, since 2010, Nigeria relied mainly on the use of force to respond to terrorism (Falode, 2019: 19). While Nigeria under Buhari managed to temporary weakened the terrorist group in 2015 due to its strong military response, Boko Haram did not disappear (Onapajo, 2017: 70). This failure to eradicate the sect shows that the military option alone is not a solution (Pérouse de Montclos, 2014: 30). The Nigerian state failed to effectively implement the soft approach provided by the NACTEST which is essential to defeat terrorism (Ugwueze and Onuoha, 2020: 548).

Terrorism has a particular impact on people’s mind. Psychological studies explain that people fear violence from human beings more than the violence of accidents or natural processes (Jackson et al., 2011 : 140). This is partly linked to the perception of control: individuals feel that they have control over a car but not over a terrorist attack. Such fears are worsened by the constant
coverage of terrorist events by the media. In Nigeria, the press extensively relies the atrocities committed by Boko Haram (Pérouse de Montclos, 2014). However, because of the difficulty to access the terrain and the blurred around the army actions, the crimes perpetrated by the army are almost no reported in the press. This clear focus of the press hides the violence of the Nigerian security forces which have killed more people than Boko Haram during their confrontations (Pérouse de Montclos, 2019). Amnesty International has warned many times about the violence of the Nigerian armed forces and has accused several members of the military of war crimes (Amnesty International, 2015).

The gap between the strategy and its implementation raised many issues. Indeed, the lack of soft measures is a real impediment to fight terrorism. In order to better understand why the government failed to eradicate Boko Haram, this dissertation will examine the counterterrorism policy through the lens of human security. Therefore, the research question will ask whether the Nigerian counterterrorism policy is human security centred. It will assess if both on paper and in practice all the pillars of the human security approach are respected during the period 2014-2016. As terrorism is a « multi-faceted hydra » in Nigeria, this dissertation will emphasis the need to adopt a comprehensive approach and will verify if all the key elements of human security are taken into account in the counterterrorism policy (Faluyi et al., 2019: 83). The human security theory has been applied to the Boko Haram insurgency in 2009, but it has never been applied to the Nigerian counterterrorism policy (Iba Omenka et al., 2017). It is extremely interesting to apply this theory to the NACTEST and the policy conducted in the ground, because it allows to understand if the government only deals with the symptoms of terrorism or address its root causes. It is important to see if the Nigerian counterterrorism policy takes into consideration all the aspects of human security because it is the only way to tackle the root causes of terrorism, and consequently, to eradicate terrorism in the long term. Examining the Nigerian counterterrorism policy through the lens of human security also
helps to highlight the gap between the NACTEST and its implementation. Therefore, it allows to establish if the failure of the state to pursue a soft approach is linked to its inability to eradicate Boko Haram. Additionally, applying this theory to the policy on the ground also allows to explain why the government failed to eradicate Boko Haram.

In a first time, the literature review will attempt to define the notions of terrorism, counterterrorism and human security. It will then explore the links between these concepts and explains the specific context of Nigeria.

The methodology will further explains how the analysis has been carried out and the choice of methods.

Following this, the dissertation will present the empirical analysis. In a first part it will examine if the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST), as it is written in the policy paper, is human security centred (Chapter I). In order to do so, it will apply the four criteria of the human security handbook established by the UN (UN, 2017). It will assess if the approach of the NACTEST is « people-centred », « context-specific » « prevention oriented » and « comprehensive » (ibid). The chapter will focus more specifically on the « comprehensive » criteria as it treats the root causes of terrorism : the seven aspects of human security.

Finally, the last empirical chapter will analyse if the counterterrorism policy conducted on the ground comply with the principles of human security.
PART I- LITERATURE REVIEW

As terrorism aims to terrorise, this threat holds a particularly deep impact on societies (Cilliers, 2004: 81). Terrorism, as a derivative threat, takes its roots in factors including poverty and inequalities (Zwitter, 2010: 91). Consequently, counterterrorist strategies are diverse, context-specific, but also influenced by theories. Notably, the influence of human security is quite important as the root causes of terrorism also pose a threat to this latter. Thus, a human security approach aims to tackle the root causes of terrorism.

This section aims to define the key terms that will be used in this dissertation. It will first address definitions and debates about terrorism and counterterrorism. Then, it will seek to investigate the notion of human security and the debates around its definition and application. Finally, the section will focus on the case study which is the Nigerian counter terrorism policy.

I- Defining terrorism and counterterrorism

A) Terrorism

1° Definition

There is no universal definition of terrorism. Indeed, this « word is inherently subjective » (Jackson et al., 2011: 104). However, common characteristics are emerging for the numerous definitions of terrorism. The first one is that terrorist actions aim at political change. The second one is that terrorists are looking for the largest media coverage as it is the easiest way to communicate their message. Brian Jenkins argued that «terrorists generally want a lot of people watching rather than a lot of people dead » (Jenkins, 1975 cited in Jackson et al, 2011: 117). Finally, terrorists instrumentalise violence, they use violence to intimidate a large audience beyond that of the immediate victims (Sandler, 2014: 257).
The word « terrorism » comes from the French Revolution but until the early 70’s, terrorism was hardly mentioned in the media and very few states had specific laws about it (Jackson et al, 2011: 1). Likewise, there was very few academic research about this topic. The September 11 attacks had a deep impact in the field of terrorism. This event led to the multiplication of the studies about terrorism (Jackson et al, 2009). It also led to the development of the Orthodox terrorism studies (OTS) which view terrorism as a « military problem » and advocates for the use of force to counter it (Onapajo, 2017: 62). This strategy known as the war model argues for the use of military force in both preventive and reactive actions to terrorism (ibid). The Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) emerged around 2007, in this context of growing interest for terrorism (Jackson et al, 2018). It also developed in reaction to the OTS approach (Onapajo, 2017: 62). The CTS estimates that the OTS is too focused on the state and too short sighted (ibid). According to them the use of military force will not provide long term solutions (ibid). This critical approach states that there is a gap between the actual material threat posed by terrorists, and the level of investment devoted to responding to this threat (Jackson et al, 2019). This statement is controversial as terrorism is responsible for thousands of deaths every year in some regions of Middle East and Africa. However, this approach is interesting as it underlines the exceptional treatment of terrorism and the risk of manipulation that arises from it. Indeed, there is a risk that politicians manipulate terrorism fear and establish oppressive counter terrorism laws in order to emphasis their control over the population or to justify unnecessary use of force. The CTS states that terrorism is not an exceptional category of political violence, rather it is a social construction (Jackson et al, 2011: 3). The meaning of terrorist acts is therefore determined by a series of social and political practices which contribute to the categorisation of events. CTS interrogates the relationship between the act of violence and the « terrorism » label used to describe it because it changes throughout history and is not always necessary (ibid). CTS also underlines the Western influence in the construction of central issues and debates of terrorism
This dissertation acknowledges that the study of terrorism cannot be neutral and that the way in which we study terrorism has important real-world consequences. However, the focus will be more on the role of the state and the legitimacy of its answers to terrorism. Another interesting point of CTS studies is its emphasis on state terrorism. State terrorism is the use or threat of violence by state agents against individuals or groups for the purpose of frightening a broader audience (ibid). According to Kushner state terrorism has one goal: ‘Strengthening of government control by the complete intimidation of a population.’ (Kushner, 2003 cited in Botha, 2008: 31). It is problematic that violence perpetrated by a group against a government is perceived as terrorism while the same acts committed by a government are tolerated (Botha, 2008: 31). The absence of a universal definition of terrorism reinforces the risk of state terrorism as states define terrorism based on their own national interests and perspectives (Nyadera and Bincof, 2019: 14). These varying definitions have been exploded to abuse by states, for instance some states include political opposition in their definition of terrorism (ibid). The study of state terrorism is important as it shows how some governments reaction to terrorism can worsen the situation.

2° Root causes

Scholars have come to little consensus on the root causes of non-state terrorism as terrorism has myriad root causes and is context-specific (Sandler, 2014: 263). The idea of the root causes of terrorism is that there is a causal relationship between social, economic, political, and demographic conditions and terrorism (Newman, 2006: 749). These conditions will create an enabling environment for the occurring of terrorism. According to William O’Neill « human insecurity, broadly understood, provides the enabling conditions for terrorism to flourish » (O’Neill, 2002). Therefore, it is important that counterterrorism policies take these enabling conditions into account. Many
analysts admit that it is essential to address the underlying causes of terrorism (Newman, 2006: 750). However, this idea of root causes is still controversial. Indeed, some academics are skeptical about the link between socio-economic conditions and terrorism. For instance, Robert Jervis while talking about dealing with political oppression, weak states and poverty stated that « we cannot point to solid evidence that doing so would make much difference. » (Jervis, 2005: 43). Indeed, the link with poverty and terrorism is highly complex (Botha, 2008: 31). Poverty can breed resentment and desperation which will push people to join terrorist groups. In addition to providing grounds for grievance poverty also often means weak governance or failed states (Newman, 2006: 751). In this context, terrorism is more likely to develop as a weak state will lack capacities to counter and prevent terrorism. However, numerous studies have shown that individuals involved in terrorism are more often well-educated and middle class than poor (Rinehearth, 2010: 32). Krueger and Maleckova analysed terrorism in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and found that support for violent attacks against Israel does not decrease among those with higher education and living standards (Krueger and Maleckova, 2003). However, in larger terrorist groups the dynamic can differ, if the group needs « foot soldiers » it often recruits them from the poorer classes of the society (Jackson et al, 2011: 206). Indeed, young men can be attracted to terrorists’ movements in a context of unemployment and poverty. The main argument of those who reject the idea of roots causes is that terrorists attacks not only occur in failed states but also in democracies (ibid). Indeed, some democratic and developed countries experienced homegrown terrorist attacks. It seems that the radicalisation of these individuals were not provoked by socio and economic factors. Furthermore, if poverty was linked to terrorism, terrorist attacks would be much more numerous because poverty is prevalent throughout the world (Rinehearth, 2010: 38). While poverty is not a sufficient factor to explain the occurrence of terrorism, its combination with other elements such as unemployment, social inequalities and political factors could lead to alienation and radicalisation (Botha, 2008: 38). It seems difficult
to deny the role of root causes as enabling factors because terrorism acts cannot be detached from their context. In a society riddled by poverty and unemployment people might be more willing to join terrorist groups than people in a richer country that have more perspectives for their future.

Another debate about the causes of terrorism concerns the role of religion. Religious terrorism is a type of political violence guided by the belief that a deity has commended terrorists acts for « the greater glory of the faith » (Martin, 2007: 130). Governments and counter-terrorism practitioners often argue that religious beliefs and extremism are a primary cause of terrorism. For instance, France accords a central place to religion in its national plan against radicalisation and sees alternative religious voices as key in the fight against terrorism (Plan national de prévention de la radicalisation, 2018). « Religious terrorists » have caused more deaths than non-religious ones (Jackson et al., 2011: 203). Laqueur explains that « religious terrorism » differs from other types of terrorism because it is aimed « at the destruction of society and the elimination of large sections of the population » and not at political demands (Laqueur, 1999: 81). Morgan argues that ‘religious terrorists’ are more lethal and indiscriminate because they are inspired by extreme religious beliefs therefore it is almost impossible to negotiate with them (Morgan, 2004: 30). However, religion does not automatically act as a primary motivation (Jackson et al., 2011: 168). Furthermore, the relationship between religious beliefs and behavior is complex, a radicalised individual will not necessarily take violent action. Moghaddam in its staircase model explains that it is only at the last step of the radicalisation process that the individual might be able to realise terrorist actions (Moghaddam, 2008).

Although religion is an important factor, which is sometimes the main reason behind terrorist actions, it is important to take the context into consideration. Indeed, religious beliefs can be intrinsically linked with other factors such as poverty and unemployment which together lead to the growth of terrorist groups in a region. The root causes which are a very broad range of issues
form a fertile ground for terrorism and must not be neglected. Jackson argues that the emphasis on religion is politically popular because they allow states to ignore the political grievances and demands of the terrorists (Jackson et al., 2011: 170). Indeed reducing terrorism to religious motives risks oversimplifying the situation and leading governments to take inappropriate counter terrorism strategies.

**B) Counterterrorism**

**1° Definition**

Having established the main debates around terrorism and the difficulty to define it, this section will now address different approaches to counter terrorism. The way in which a state respond to terrorism is intrinsically linked to how terrorism is defined and constructed culturally and politically in a country (Eji, 2016: 200). Wilkinson explained that there is “no universally applicable counterterrorism policy » (Wilkinson, 2006: 203). Each situation involving terrorism is unique and each counterterrorism strategy needs to be tailored to the specific local issues (OSCE, 2018: 19). The perception of the terrorism threat has a multitude of real-world consequences. Indeed, counter terrorism measures have cost hundreds of thousands of lives and trillions of dollars and led to major changes to the legal and security frameworks for responding to terrorism (Jackson et al., 2011: 125). The U.S. Army Field Manual defined counterterrorism as “Operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism.” (Dubey et al, 2016: 119). This definition is very broad, it is difficult to develop an efficient counter terrorism strategy with such an encompassing approach. The evolution of counterterrorism is intrinsically linked to the evolution of terrorism as counterterrorism strategies are adapted to the nature of the terrorism threat (Rineheart, 2010: 34). Moreover, these strategies are also
influenced by the progress of military technology. The 9/11 attacks marked a major shift for the counterterrorism field, Michael Boyle argues that counterterrorism developed as a model of warfare after this event (Boyle, 2010: 342). According to Jason Rineheart « terrorism had evolved into a more lethal and indiscriminate form of warfare that appeared to be more religiously motivated » (Rineheart, 2010: 35). This led governments to respond forcefully to a threat that it did not completely understand.

2° Security versus liberty

Terrorism has reignited the traditional debate between security and liberty. The main question is if the erosion of freedom is the necessary price to increase security. Rinehearth argues that putting constraints on states about the protection of civil liberties risks reducing the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures (Rineheart, 2010: 37). Moreover, some politicians and academics are in favor of restricting the liberties of citizens because they state that terrorists exploit the freedom of democracies to perpetrate their attacks (Meisels, 2005: 172). The assumption that less freedom equals more security is contested. First, it depends on how security is conceptualised. According to Jude McCulloch, government and security agencies view security almost exclusively in terms of military power and coercion aimed at obtaining or maintaining a political goal regardless of the damages it could inflict to human security (McCulloch, 2003: 295). Thus, these measures are often a source of terror for citizens, they end up violating human rights and provoking the same acts as the ones they are aimed to counter (ibid). Furthermore, terrorism is also present in states with repressive political regimes where civil liberties are very limited. Many scholars reject this idea of the necessity of a trade-off between liberty and security. Critical scholars underline that there is little evidence that restricting individual liberties is effective to protect citizens against terrorism while there are plenty of examples where these restrictions increased
grievances amongst the population and encouraged individuals to support terrorism (Jones and Libicki, 2008). Therefore, reducing liberties for greater security is more likely to have negative effects. Another issue of this approach to counter terrorism is that political leaders can take advantage of this situation to increase the executive and surveillance power or undermine the political opposition (Pérouse de Montclos, 2019). Counterterrorism strategies that reduce individuals liberties are only dealing with the symptoms of terrorism and not with the « root causes » (Jackson et al., 2011). In addition, some studies have demonstrated that antiterrorism measures designed to prepare societies for terrorist’s attacks have little impact in the long-term on the number of terrorist attacks (Enders and Sandler, 1993).

3° Approaches to counterterrorism

Two main approaches of counterterrorism are related by the scholars of this field : the war model also named military model and the criminal justice model (Rineheart, 2010: 31). The war model adopts a military-centric approach where the armed forces of the country are primarily in charge of fighting terrorism. The criminal justice model emphasis the importance of the rule of law and democratic values which prevail in Western democracies (Rineheart, 2010: 37). However, these values are not specific to Western democracies, many countries in South America, Asia or Africa have adopted democratic values. Furthermore, some Western democracies are abandoning part of these values in the name of the fight against terrorism (McCulloch, 2003: 295). According to Rineheart, these approaches « need to be updated in the light of the current state of terrorism ». (Rineheart, 2010: 31). He suggests a new framework around the terms of « hard » approach and « soft » approach (ibid). In order to do so it is necessary to focus the debate around the notions of « direct » and « indirect » approach to counterterrorism (ibid). The « direct » approach entails physical engagement of the state with coercive measures such
as surveillance, arrest and military interventions (Aljunied, 2011). On the other hand, the indirect approach attempts to debase terrorist ideology through population-centric methods such as economic development, counter-extremism discourse and deradicalisation (Rinehearth, 2010: 38). The hard approach is useful to weaken the military capacity of terrorists but is not enough to eradicate them (Onapajo and Ozden, 2020). This approach also questions the ethics and the legality of the use of force (Rinehearth, 2010: 38). Non-military strategies are necessary to tackle the causes that fuel terrorism and therefore provide a long-term peace. However, some scholars remain skeptical that soft power alternatives effectively address the « root causes » of terrorism especially regarding the complex issue of deradicalisation (ibid). Soft power can also offer a way out of terrorism by facilitating disengagement and rehabilitation.

As the approaches are complementary it is imperative to have the right balance between soft and hard approaches in counter-terrorism strategies (Eij, 2016: 207). Joseph Nye calls this balance « smart power », he underlines that soft power alone can not produce effective counter-terrorism policy (Nye, 2009: 160). Oyebade argues that the main role of the military is to secure a terrorist-affected environment in order to allow state actors to put in place soft measures (ibid). States have to take measures to protect their citizens from terrorism but these counter-terrorism measures should be proportionate and cannot result in worsening the situation (Jackson et al., 2011: 224).

One of the main issue in the counter-terrorism field is the question of effectiveness. Indeed, it is difficult to demonstrate what actually works as they are few transparent methods for evaluating the specific effects of counter-terrorism policies (Jackson et al., 2011: 231). Nevertheless, it has largely been related that military-centric approaches to counter-terrorism are often ineffective and counter-productive (ibid). These force-based approaches have negative impacts as they damage human rights, democratic values and social cohesion (Onapajo and Ozden, 2020: 476). These strategies only have immediate effects and should be coupled with long term strategies dealing
with the root causes of terrorism in order to eradicate terrorism and guarantee human security.

II-Human security

A) Defining human security

1° Definition

Having discussed the notions of terrorism and counter terrorism this section will now explain the notion of human security.

The purpose of human security is to move the focus of security from states to individual humans. Rather than focusing on the protection of the state exclusively, human security revolves around the protection of people « both as individuals and as communal groups » (Thakur, 2004: 347). The objective of human security is to reduce and if possible remove the insecurities that threaten human lives. The UNDP report 1994 defined the seven key elements of human security: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, political security (UNDP 1994). According to this program, human security is composed of two branches: « freedom from fear » and « freedom from want ». « Freedom from fear » is the narrow conception of human security, it is the assumption that people should be free from the threat of violence. « Freedom from want » is a broader conception as it encompasses « all the menaces that threaten human survival daily life and dignity » such as hunger, poverty, environmental degradation etc. (ibid). Human security ensures that the elimination of insecurity is driven by considerations of human development and human rights and not the by the interests of the state (Jolly and Ray, 2006: 5). According to the United Nations in its Human security handbook the four
pillars of the human security approach are: «People-centred», «Comprehensive», «Context-specific», «prevention-oriented» (UN, 2017). For national security the essential values that need to be protected are the protection of territorial integrity and sovereignty whereas the core values of human security are the safety and wellbeing of people (UNDP, 1994). However, human security does not replace state security, the state remains a central provider of security (Gregoratti, 2018). Human security comes to balance an overemphasis on state security that could be harmful for human welfare. States can represent a danger for their population either by failing to fulfill their obligations or by relying too much on state security and the use of force (UNDP, 2004). Human security by adopting a multi-pronged strategy takes this dimension into account and therefore protects citizens from their state. In the past, security mainly focused on protecting the state and its sovereignty from external threats. Nowadays, threats are understood more globally, they emerge from various factors that are interconnected and mutually reinforcing (UN, 2017). Therefore, in order to tackle a threat it is necessary to act on multiple issues. The rise of new global trends and non-military threats made the traditional concept of “security” as a pact between nations obsolete since the beginning of the 21st Century (UNDP, 2004).

2° Critics

While state security seems not to be adapted to the current evolution of threats, the notion of human security is not a consensus among academics. The first division concerns the definition of the concept and its relevance as an academic tool. There is no universal definition of human security, the one of the UNDP is very broad and more recently, the Commission on Human Security defines this notion as the protection of «the vital cores of all human lives» which is even less precise (Commission on Human Security, 2003).
Some scholars argue for a more precise definition of human security, with a restriction to encompass only « freedom from fear » while some academics are in favor of a holistic approach. Many scholars such as Roland Paris and Krause have argued that this concept is too vague which makes it useless and meaningless (Paris, 2001). Khong explained that human security by encompassing many factors is emptying the concept of security as everything is prioritised and therefore nothing is (Khong, 2001). On the other hand, Jolly and Ray advocate a holistic approach to human security arguing that only a broad approach will adapt to the variety of threats across the planet (Jolly and Ray, 2006: 5). Moreover, Ewan points that the broadness of security issues is a valuable asset as it regroups specialists from different fields together in order « to understand better the interconnections between diverse aspects of human insecurity » (Ewan, 2007). As we saw earlier, it is essential not to act on a single issue because security threats are multidimensional.

Another line of criticism comes from those who view this liberalism based theory as a mean to further their own interests and to impose inappropriate western values to the Global South (Johns, 2004). For instance, Suhrke has argued that countries such as Japan and Norway have used their human security agenda to reinforce their place in the international community (Suhrke, 1999). Moreover Duffield sees human security and especially the responsibility to protect as a way for the Global North to avoid the threats of the Global South spreading into the developed countries (Columba people, 2015). Human security might be used by some states as a mean to keep their influence on Global South countries like a form of neocolonialism (ibid). However, this approach may also « bolster cooperation between international agencies » according to Ewan (Ewan, 2007). Indeed, these agencies are monitoring the actions of the states and their members are both from the Global North and Global South. Mack also explained that human security opposed the individual to the state which is a western understanding of what should be the individual’s place (Mack, 2004). Finally Duffield and Waddell argued that by linking security and development human security has created a
division between the states that can provide human security and those who cannot (Columba people, 2015). Nevertheless, human security is not only an international concept it can be apply locally by local government. The fact that the human security approach is wide encompassing makes it quite flexible to adapt to local needs.

**B) Human security and Counterterrorism**

This section will now examine how human security can be linked to terrorism. Counterterrorism measures can threaten human security. Indeed, when governments adopt a military-centric approach of counterterrorism the result is often counterproductive and only leads to further radicalisation (Nyadera and Bincof, 2019). According to Nyadera and Bincof it is imperative that counterterrorism strategies address factors that create an enabling environment for the emergence and expansion of terrorist groups (ibid). The UNDP reports on Afghanistan aims to reject the belief that military action alone can provide sustainable peace and argues for an expansion of the meaning of « security » to cover also basic human needs (UNDP, 2004). Botha suggests that « the most effective counter-terrorism strategy is one that maintains a balance between a human security (soft) and a state-centric (hard) approach ». Indeed, it is important for a country to be able to react to terrorists attacks, while it is also essential to identify the root causes of terrorism and act on multiple levels. In 2006, the UN released a global counterterrorism strategy which can be seen as a human security approach because it clearly emphasises the « measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism » (UN, 2006). Human security is an interesting framework to apply to counterterrorism because it allows us to understand and act on the root causes of terrorism (Botha, 2008: 41). Acting on domestic circumstances such as poverty and unemployment might reduce grievances amongst the population and therefore their support for terrorists.
Both terrorism and counterterrorism measures can be a threat to human security. Nyadera and Bincof identify eleven themes such as « the right to life » and « freedom from torture » that are violated by terrorism but also often by counterterrorism measures (Nyadera and Bincof, 2019: 17). The former director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mohamed ElBaradei explains that terrorism is often perceived as a threat to human security while it can be seen as a result of human insecurity (ElBaradei, 2006). Andrej Zwitter sees terrorism as a derivative threat which is the result of a combination of one or more root causes (Zwitter, 2010: 48). Andrej Zwitter defines roots cause as « a real factor that has an impact on a crowd in causing reactive and social action » (ibid). Counterterrorism policies have mainly remained state oriented (Rubenstein, 2017). However, this strategy only cures the « symptoms » of terrorism and not its causes (Botha, 2008: 34). Indeed, root causes are threatening indirectly state security by creating an enabling environment to terrorism. According to Zwitter, the seven aspects of human security are relevant for terrorism and all these root causes have to be addressed because they are interlinked (Zwitter, 2010: 91). Human security has been more applied in internal conflicts and post conflict situations than to terrorism. For instance, the United Nations used the human security approach in human development reports in countries experiencing conflicts or post conflict situations (Gomez and Gasper, 2013). Nevertheless, many scholars affirms the relevance of its approach also for the counterterrorism field.
III- The case of Nigeria

A) Terrorism in Africa

B) 1° Specificities

Having defined the main concepts that will be applied in this dissertation, this section will now focus on the case study which is the Nigerian counterterrorism policy against Boko Haram.

Terrorism is a recurrent threat in the African continent. The threat of and vulnerability to terrorism varies from place to place (Wilkinson, 2006: 203). The phenomenon of domestic terrorism is widespread in Africa (Cilliers, 2004: 84). There is not always a clear distinction between domestic or international terrorism nevertheless nowadays, the emphasis is clearly on international terrorism. This shows the influence of Western countries in the field of terrorism (ibid). Many African states are using Western models of counterterrorism which are not adapted to their situation (Botha, 2008: 28). Furthermore, the 9/11 attacks increased the adoption of a state-centric counter-terrorism approach (Onapajo, 2017: 62). Theses strategies mainly address the external factors causing terrorism while in Africa domestic factors such as economic deprivation or political repression play an important role in the development of terrorism (Botha, 2008: 28). Many African countries experienced political instability (Cilliers, 2004: 91). Colonialism is often held responsible for this instability. Indeed, colonialists placed individuals in power that were only serving their own interests which increased nepotism and corruption (Botha, 2008: 35). Jakkie Cilliers goes further by stating that in such systems political actors have to favour war and disorder since these can provide them with additional opportunities to accumulate resources (Cilliers, 2004: 92). Furthermore, some African governments facing legitimacy crises use security forces to stay in power (Botha, 2008: 37). They often use counterterrorism campaigns to increase their power and to gather information.
about their citizens (Pérouse de Montclos, 2019). All these political issues constitute one of the root causes of domestic terrorism in Africa. Finally, Anneli Botha identified communal security as a potential root cause of terrorism in Africa (Botha, 2008: 39). Indeed, religious, ethnic and cultural marginalisation are providing « fertile conditions for radicalisation » and contributed to many conflicts and terrorism acts in African countries (Botha, 2008: 38).

2° Boko Haram

a- History of the terrorist group

Having introduced some specificities of terrorism in Africa, this dissertation will now consider the terrorist group Boko Haram that is part of the case study. Its real name being Jama'atu Ahlis-Sunnah Lidda'awati Wal Jihad ("Sunni Group for Preaching and Jihad"), the Boko Haram sect ("Western Education is forbidden") was created in 2002 in the state of Borno in the North-East of Nigeria (Pérouse de Montclos, 2014a). It was created by Mohammed Yusuf, a preacher who advocates for a return to the classical practices of Salafism. For him, Western values, brought by the British colonists, are responsible for the country's problems. He denounces corruption, political mismanagement, and inequality but also the poor implementation of Sharia law in Northern Nigeria (Dumain, 2019). Boko Haram is against the secular state and religious pluralism (Higazi, 2013: 141). The discourse of Yusuf attracted many young Nigerians experiencing social and economic issues (Adibe, 2012). From 2005 onwards, the group's relations with the army and the police became increasingly strained but it is in 2009 with the insurrection of the group that a direct confrontation happened between the Nigerian army and police and Boko Haram (Dumain, 2019). A few days after the insurrection, Yusuf is arrested and killed by the Nigerian police, the leader is replaced by Abubakar Shekau.
(ibid). After this event, the group undertook a more international dimension (Pérouse de Montclos, 2014a). In 2011, Boko Haram carried out a suicide-attack against the offices of the United Nations in Abuja. According to Corentin Cohen, this event marked a moment of deep evolution for the group as this was a way for it to position itself on the international jihadist map (Dumain, 2019). The kidnapping of the Chibok girls in 2014 has been widely covered by the international press which confirms the international dimension of the sect. In 2015, Boko Haram proclaimed its allegiance to Daesh and presented itself as the caliphate of the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWAP) (Le Figaro, 2015). This alliance has strengthened the group that was temporarily weakened in 2015 (Raguzzino, 2021). Since 2016, Boko Haram has experienced internal divisions it is now divided in two groups which differs in their modus operandi. Shekau attacks civilians including Muslims, whereas ISWAP targets mostly the army in its attacks (DW, 2021).

b- Strategy of the sect

Since 2009, Boko Haram insurgency is believed to have cost at least 100,000 lives and displaced more than 2.6 million people (Aljazeera, 2018). Scholars have noticed a change of strategy since the insurrection. Indeed, the group is more organised and use guerrillas and terrorism tactics (Higazi, 2013: 142). Furthermore, it also became more violent and expanded its targets. Before the insurrection the group was « only » targeting Nigerian state officials and « bad Muslims » but now it also attacks Christians and expatriates (Pérouse de Montclos, 2012: 13). This change of strategy and increasing of violence is partly explained by the brutality of the Nigerian police and army. The Nigerian security forces violently repressed the attacks of Boko Haram in July 2009, killing more than 1,000 people, and it is clear from Boko Haram's own communiqués that this violence fueled a campaign of revenge (Higazi, 2013: 142). Boko Haram changed its modus operandi to reverse an unfavourable
balance of power by resorting to attacks. Boko Haram appears to be an organisation intrinsically linked to the Nigerian context nevertheless it has also committed attacks in countries around Lake Chad (Pérouse de Montclos, 2014b).

c- Nature of the terrorist organisation

Another debate is about the nature of the group: it is difficult to establish if this organisation is a sect, a religious insurgency or a political contestation (Pérouse de Montclos, 2012: 7). Since 2002, the group is sectarian with its religious intransigence, its cult of the leader and its indoctrination techniques (ibid). As it grew, it also became a social protest movement by denouncing the incapacity of the state to govern, corruption… (Nyaburi Nyadera and Bincof, 2019: 10). Boko Haram's agenda is therefore 'political' as it tends towards the ideal of a fundamentalist Islamic republic (Pérouse de Montclos, 2012: 8). Aboubacar Shekhau turned the sect into an insurgent Islamist group, using terrorist methods on a large scale (Bastié, 2015). The nature of Boko Haram is complex and multidimensional, it is also evolving but it seems that scholars agree that Boko Haram is an insurgency that is religious in nature before being political (ibid).

According to Iba Omenka, the Boko Haram insurgency emerged from difficult socio-economic conditions such as poverty, unemployment and political exclusion (Iba Omenka et al, 2017: 505). Pérouse de Monclos contests this emphasis on the socio-economic context arguing that some regions of Nigeria are poorer than the Borno state (Pérouse de Montclos, 2014a). For him, the development of Boko Haram is primarily linked to the charisma of Mohamed Yusuf. There is no consensus about the reasons of the emergence of Boko Haram nevertheless, the context seems to have play an important role. Therefore, a human security counterterrorism strategy by reinforcing the welfare of citizens could stop them to join or support Boko Haram.
C) Counterterrorism in Nigeria

In 2014, the Nigerian government articulates its first-ever soft approach to counter terrorism through the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST). The policy was revised in 2016 under President Buhari’s administration. This counter terrorism strategy combines the hard military approach with a soft approach, which aims to address the root causes of terrorism (The Counter Terrorism Centre). In the scope of state security, « hard » security measures will be engaged with state officials being the primary agents for its delivery. On the other hand, human security entails « soft » security that involves states structures but also non-state actors such as civil society (Botha, 2008: 31). Mary Kaldor acknowledges that human security is often considerate as a « soft » policy because it aims to combine physical and material security. Nevertheless she argues that human security should be seen as a hard security policy, aimed at protecting individuals from political violence (Kaldor, 2006: 902). Human security does not exclude the use of force and military. However it seems a bit reductive to see human security as a hard approach while it promotes the consideration of underlying factors to terrorism. Furthermore it does not protect only from political violence but from all threats to human life.

It is clear that the NACTEST emphasis the « soft » powers as these powers are mentioned in the first pillar of the counterterrorism strategy which is also the longest one. In theory, NACTEST reflects global best practices in countering terrorism through soft approach (Ugwueze, Onuoha, 2020: 562). However, in practice, the implementation of the policy is largely shaped by hard approach (ibid). The use of violence in Nigeria has a negative impact on the population that further mistrust its government and could be more willing to join terrorists (Knoechelmann, 2014: 16).

In Nigeria, the use of a military-centric approach and its negatives consequences have largely been related (Abang, 2015: 9). Some authors recognised that there is a gap between the counterterrorism policy and its
implementation (Eij, 2016: 205). Some studies are looking at the failures of the NACTEST policy and emphasise the need to adopt a comprehensive approach that will address « the drivers of terrorism » (Ugwueze, Onuoha, 2020: 563). However, none of the studies look at the counter terrorism strategy through the lens of human security. One author wrote about human security and the Boko Haram insurgency but it is not related to a particular policy document (Iba Omenka et al, 2017). It is interesting to explore how Nigeria fought Boko Haram in the past few years. Although the application of force has temporarily weakened the group it « is far from being defeated » (Ugwueze, Onuoha, 2020: 557). Indeed, without fighting the « root causes » of terrorism Nigeria can not eradicate Boko Haram. The NACTEST mentioned some interesting measures to tackle this causes but this « soft » approach needs to be developed. On the other hand, on the ground this soft approach is barely in existence and the Nigerian government employs mostly the use of force to fight Boko Haram. Some researchers have argued that the NACTEST was failing to eradicate terrorism and needed to reinforce its soft approach especially on the ground (Eji, 2016: 216). However, none of them assessed if the NACTEST adopted a comprehensive approach given by human security which could be an effective way to fight the roots causes of terrorism.

To conclude, this section has explored the main subjects that will be analysed in this dissertation. It appears that many counterterrorism policies are state security centred and focus only on the « symptoms » of terrorism. This dissertation will assess if the counterterrorism strategy of Nigeria is human security centred. It is an essential question because the framework of human security allows us to tackle the root causes of terrorism. Therefore is is interesting to see on the « paper » and on the ground if this policy is human security centred and therefore aims to tackle the root causes of terrorism.
PART II- METHODOLOGY

Having determined the research problem which is « Is the Nigerian counterterrorism policy human security centred? », it is helpful to establish the research objectives of this dissertation in order to have a more comprehensive analysis of this issue. The first and main research objective is to assess if the Nigerian counterterrorism policy adopts a comprehensive root causes approach given by the human security framework both in its strategy and on the ground. The second objective is to describe some actions perpetrated by the Nigerian government in relation to the conflict with Boko Haram to establish whether there is a link between the lack of human security and the failure of the state to eradicate Boko Haram.

Based on these research objectives, a case-study design combines with a human security approach has been chosen. A qualitative research method is associated to this flexible research design.

I- A human security approach

Human security changes the focus of security from states to individual humans. This concept revolves around the protection of people and ensures that the elimination of insecurity is driven by considerations of human development and human rights (Jolly and Ray, 2006). Therefore, the scope of human security is wider than the one of state security as it takes more elements into account. Indeed, it does not encompass exclusively the direct threats to human life such as violence but also chronic threats such as hunger and disease (UNDP, 1994: 23). Human security encompasses « all the menaces that threaten human survival daily life and dignity » (ibid). The human security approach has been chose because it aims to address the root causes of insecurity and to emphasise the interconnectedness of these insecurities. It is very interesting in a complex issue such as terrorism to address all the factors
explaining this phenomenon. The comprehensive root cause approach given by the human security framework could be very useful to eradicate terrorism in the long term. Indeed, insecurities are intrinsically linked as each insecurity feeds on the other therefore it is essential to tackle them together (United Nations, 2017: 21). According to the Human development report, human security has seven components: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, political security (UNDP, 1994: 24). A threat to these aspects could lead to political violence (Zwitter, 2010: 42). Indeed, Stewart explains that a lack of human security undermines development which leads to horizontal inequalities that are a root cause for political violence such as conflicts or terrorism (Stewart, 2002: 343). State security tends to focus only on these derivative threats without tackling the root causes of chronic instability which does not resolve the problem in the long term (UNDP, 2004: 123). The human security framework gives an interesting comprehensive approach as root causes can be categorise under the seven human security components (Zwitter, 2010: 46).

This dissertation, will use the human security framework developed by the human security handbook in order to assess if the Nigerian counterterrorism policy is human security centred both in its strategy paper and in the ground. The Human security handbook defined four pillars at the operational level to ensure the application of a human security approach. In order to guarantee the protection and empowerment of people the human security responses must be « people-centred », « comprehensive », « context-specific » and « prevention oriented » (United Nations, 2017: 17). This dissertation will mainly focus on the comprehensive aspect as it regroups the seven components of human security and allows a root causes approach that is key for a durable solution. Chapter I will briefly assess if the Nigerian counterterrorism policy is people-centred, context-specific and prevention oriented and it will then dive into the comprehensive approach. It will assess if all the components of human security are taken into account in the strategy and it will analyse the impact of each of the seven component on the terrorism situation in Nigeria. Chapter II
will focus on the policy in the ground though three events and assess if the four principles of the Human security handbook are respected.

II- A single case study design

The case study enables the researcher to narrow down its focus on a single group, individual, community, event policy area or institution (Burham et al., 2008). A case study tends to describe and explain a phenomenon but it also has to be limited in order to maintain a reasonable and feasible scope for the study (Merriam, 1998). Its epistemological nature is empirical (Yin, 2014), as it uses induction; from a narrow field, the researcher intends to find a general principle. This dissertation will focus on a case study as it seeks to assess if the Nigerian counter terrorism policy adopted a human security framework which could be beneficial to eradicate terrorism. Stake uses the term « intrinsic » to describe an approach where the intent is to better understand the case because the case itself is of interest (Baxter and Jack, 2008). This approach corresponds to this dissertation, Nigeria is such a specific case because this country is particularly affected by Boko Haram and adopted a very developed counter-terrorism policy in response. A single case study design allows us to enter into details and to fully understand the context of the topic which is very relevant for this case. Indeed, the focus will be on tackling the root causes of terrorism in Nigeria through the human security approach. Therefore it will be necessary to give a deep understanding of the socio economic conditions of the country as well as of the government actions. However, a case study is specific to one case thus, it can not be generalised and should only be used to generate theories and hypotheses (Willeman, 2006: 46). This empirical study uses inductive reasoning by taking the strategy and specific events in order to draw more general conclusions. Nevertheless these conclusions will only apply to the specific case of Nigerian counterterrorism which cannot be generalised. As the main terrorist threat in Nigeria is Boko Haram, this study
will focus on the Nigerian government actions against this group. This group is mainly active in the North-East of Nigeria and this is why this region and especially the Borno state is favored in this dissertation (Pérouse de Montclos, 2014).

This study will focus on the time period 2014-2016. 2014 is the year of the implementation of the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST) by the president Goodluck Jonathan, the policy was then revised in 2016 under President Buhari’s administration but there were not significant changes as the aims of the strategy were still to combine the hard military approach with a soft approach (Innocent, 2018: 10). It is interesting to analyse the first years of the implementation of this strategy as it is a new tool that aims to mark a government change of counterterrorism strategy. Furthermore, Boko Haram is a group that evolves very quickly, the 2009 insurrection led to a major shift of its strategy (Dumain, 2019). In 2015, the group was weaker but it was strengthened by its allegiance to Daesh (Ragozzino, 2021). This alliance has led to internal divisions. Indeed, since 2016, Boko Haram is divided in two groups with different ideologies and modus operandi. Moreover since 2019, scholars noticed a change of strategy, the terrorist group seems to be even closer to the EI methods as its actions and communications are more violent and bloody than before (Pérouse de Montclos, 2020: 8). For more coherence and clarity the dissertation will focus on the group before its division. The second chapter will focus on the counterterrorism action of the Nigerian government in the ground. In order to have a global vision of this action three events representing different scope of action have been chosen. The first event will focus on the preventive actions of the government. A case of mass arbitrary detentions has been chosen because it is a frequent phenomenon in Nigeria and it illustrates the aggressiveness of the state preventive measures. The second event concerns the direct confrontation between the armed forces and the terrorists. The battle of Maiduguri in 2015 has been chosen because Maiduguri is a symbolic city as it is the capital city of the Borno state and the place of birth of Boko Haram. Additionally this battle reveals the violence of
the army. Finally, the third event will focus on the action of the government after an attack. The kidnapping of the Chibok girls in 2014 has been selected because it has been extensively covered by the domestic and international press. Thus there are more information available about the reaction of the government. On the other hand, due to the international pressure, the government might have been more reactive than for other attacks. These events do not give an exhaustive representation of the Nigerian counterterrorism policy conducted in the ground but they aim to show and analyse the lack of consideration for the human security principles in the government action.

III- A qualitative methodology

Quantitative research tends to measure while qualitative research tends to describe, it relies more on language and the interpretation of its meaning (Willeman, 2006: 48). For this dissertation a qualitative content analysis has been favored because the analysis of the meaning of the text is important in such a complex and sensitive topic. Analysing terrorism through the lens of human security implies a deep understanding of the context and the mobilisation of a wide range of sources. Content analysis involves the analysis of textual information (Halperin and Heath, 2017: 179). This study will rely on a wide range of secondary sources : academic articles, newspapers, NGO reports etc. This dissertation uses secondary sources because primary sources on counterterrorism have a restricted access. Indeed, at the beginning of the research process, the objective was to analyse the NACTEST policy from the policy document. However, this document is unavailable online so I asked the Nigerian Counter Terrorism centre if the document was confidential they replied but they did not send me a copy of the policy. I deduced that the access to this document is restricted. Thus, I will analyse this policy document through academic articles. This methods comports a risk to be influenced by
the analysis of the authors. In order to minimise the risk of biases I rely on diverse sources and I use the most factual ones for the bulk of my analysis. For the second chapter about the application of the policy in the ground, the analysis will rely on newspapers and NGO reports on the different events. In order to identify bias and interpretation on these events, this dissertation compares data from different sources in the limits of the available data (Willeman, 2006: 86).

One of the main advantage of the textual analysis is that it can reduce bias (Halperin and Heath, 2017: 349). Indeed, in interviews people can come with prejudices or say what they are expected to say without saying what they truly think (ibid). Politicians can also carefully choose their words and not mention important elements to the researcher. Furthermore, textual analysis also allows the researcher to access topics that may be difficult to study though direct contact (ibid). In addition to reduce some types of bias, textual analysis also have been chose because it was difficult to conduct interviews or ethnographic methodology due to the rather short time to investigate, the situation of Covid-19, and the sensitivity of the topic.

According to Robson, « the central requirement in qualitative analysis is clear thinking on the part of the analyst » (Robson, 2002: 459). It is impossible to be completely objective while carrying qualitative analysis as it is inextricably linked to human feelings and judgements (Willeman, 2006: 132). However, it is important to be as systematic as possible and to apply strong logic to support the argument (ibid). It is also important to have a critical analysis of the documents, to regard the status of the author, its interests, the context in which the text has been written (Halperin and Heath, 2017: 180). As Forster say « Documents should never be taken at face value » (Forster, 1994, 149). Even though I am conscious of the subjectivity of the topic and the arguments put forward, important efforts of detachment and objectivity were necessary on my part. Indeed, both the behavior of terrorists and the Nigerian army are very violent and let the population in terrible situation. Therefore it was difficult not to express an opinion and to carry a detached analysis.
PART III : EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Chapter I : The Nigerian counterterrorism strategy : a human security approach ?

This chapter will examine if the NACTEST adopts a human security approach. It will first briefly describe the counterterrorism strategy and then apply the first three criterias of the human security handbook to assess if the strategy is « people-centred », « context-specific » and « Prevention oriented ». In the second part, this essay will focus on the « comprehensive » criteria which analyses the roots causes of insecurity (UN, 2017). It will establish if the NACTEST is anchored on the wellbeing of its citizens by analysing if the strategy addresses the seven key components of human security.

A) A context-specific strategy centred on people and prevention

1° The NACTEST

Until 2014, the Nigerian government did not have a strategy to resolve armed insurrection, it was adopting ad-hoc approaches to respond to conflicts (Faluyi et al., 2019: 83). The 2009 insurrection and the growing resilience and audacity of Boko Haram convinced the Nigerian government that the sole military approach was not sufficient to defeat the sect. Therefore the government developed a comprehensive strategy that aims to tackle the root causes of the crisis (Ugwueze and Onuoha, 2020: 563). In 2014, the government published its first holistic approach to counterterrorism through the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST) (ibid). This strategy was inspired by the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (UN GCTS). The UN GCTS is composed of four pillars, measures to address « the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism », « measures to prevent and combat terrorism », « measures to build states’ capacity to prevent and combat
terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in that regard » and « measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis for the fight against terrorism » (UN, 2006). The essence of the fight against terrorism lies in pillar one which address the factors that create a fertile ground for terrorism such as poverty, unemployment and poor governance (Ugwueze and Onuoha, 2020: 554). In the NACTEST, the Nigerian government included this requirement in its first pillar. Goodluck Jonathan was elected in 2011, he then defined a strategy against Boko Haram influenced by the emergent narrative that Boko Haram was a manifestation of the mismanagement of the nation’s resources (Onapajo, 2017). The 30th April 2014 he adopted the NACTEST, that will be then revised in 2016 under President Buhari’s administration (Innocent, 2018: 10). However, the president reacted late to the threat of Boko Haram and due to his mismanagement the sect became a major security threat both for Nigeria and neighboring counties. In the 2015 presidential elections the ex-military Muhammed Buhari won against Jonathan. The bulk of Buhari’s electoral campaign was the fight against Boko Haram, he promised to eliminate the sect in 6 months (Onapajo, 2017). In December 2015 he declared «I think technically we have won the war » (Omenma and Hendricks, 2018: 765). The Buhari administration countered Boko Haram more seriously than the preceding president and it undeniably weakened the sect (Onapajo, 2017). However, the group remained active, it was not eradicated and it then regained strength by joining the Islamic state (Ragozzino, 2021). Buhari did not carry significant changes in its revision of the NACTEST, only some structural changes (Mentone, 2018).

The NACTEST is based on five pillars : « Forestall », « Secure », « Identify », « Prepare » and « Implement » (Mentone, 2018). The « Forestall » pillar aims to reduce factors that make population vulnerable to radicalisation and terrorism (Ugwueze and Onuoha, 2020: 559). This pillar reflects the « soft » approaches of this policy as it mentioned the « root causes » of terrorism such as poverty and lack of education. The « Secure » pillar is concerned with the
protection of individuals and infrastructures from terrorist attacks (Faluyi et al., 2019: 95). The « Identify » pillar seeks to prevent and stop terrorist threats and attacks on Nigeria (Mentone, 2018). The « Prepare » pillar aims at preparing the state and the population to respond to terrorist attacks (ibid). Finally, « Implement » fosters both national and international cooperation it also explains how the strategy will be implemented (Eij, 2016: 204). The « Identify » and « Prepare » pillar composed the « hard » approach of this policy. It is clear that this policy emphasises the « soft » powers as these powers are mentioned in the first pillar of the counterterrorism strategy which is also the longest one. In theory, NACTEST reflect global best practices in countering terrorism through soft approach but it also includes the hard approach (Ugwueze and Onuoha, 2020: 557). According to the author Anneli Botha « the most effective counter-terrorism strategy is one that maintains a balance between a human security (soft) and a state-centric (hard) approach » (Botha, 2010: 39). Rineheart insists on the imperative to have the right balance (Rineheart, 2010) while Oyebade explained that the role of the military is secondary as it only intervenes to create an environment « for other elements of national power to be employed in the counter-terrorism effort » (Oyebade, 2014). Human security does not exclude state security, in order to assess the human security dimension of the NACTEST it is necessary to analyse if the strategy is people-centred, context-specific and prevention-oriented.
2° People-centred

The human security handbook established four pillars of human security. The first one is « people-centred » which aims to place people at the center of the policy (UN, 2017). According to this criteria people should participate in the identification of insecurities and definition of their needs. Furthermore, they must also be involved in the responses to insecurities (ibid).

The NACTEST encourages the use of a soft approach to security. This soft approach implies actors from different sectors : from the government but also traditional or religious leaders or civil society actors (Ugwueze and Onuoha, 2020: 556). The government with this strategy defends an all-stakeholders approach based on the assumption that the government alone can not eradicate terrorism (Eji, 2016: 216). In order to tackle terrorism different actors of the society need to be actively involved in the fight against terrorism.

The « Implement » pillar of the NACTEST involves “devising a framework to effectively mobilise and sustain a coordinated cross-governmental population-centred effort” (Faluyi et al., 2019: 107). It organises the cooperation within the public sectors between security agencies, police, local authorities but also the cooperation with the private sector with business actors and voluntary organisation (ibid). The aim of this pillar is to create an effective cooperation by defining the role of each actors. Furthermore, the objective is also to organise a system at the national and local scale in order to be close to the needs of the citizens.

The « Forestall » pillar of the NACTEST aims to reduce the risk of radicalisation by a joint effort of the government and civil society (Pate, 2015). Moreover it also focuses on the Criminal Justice system (Faluyi et al., 2019: 94). The strategy insists on the local implementation of this system, police officers must build strong relationships with traditional leaders (ibid). The police has to work with the local community as it is a mean to educate the population on security issues and to gather intelligence (Otu and Aro, 2013). It seems that the NACTEST is people-centred as it involves civilians on the
counterterrorism effort and the strategy aims to be strongly implemented locally in order to be close to the individuals and adapt to their needs.

3° Context-specific

According to the Human security handbook human security also has to be « context-specific » (UN, 2017). This requires a deep analysis of the situation in order to develop responses tailored to the local realities. The NACTEST has been designed to answer to the threat posed by Boko Haram (Mentone, 2018). The methods and motives of this group are specific. Furthermore, it does not have a precise territory but it is implemented in the North East of the country. The terrorism threat differs from one nation to another thus it is essential that each country captures the particularities of its terrorism threat (Eji, 2016: 199). The NACTEST is context specific as it targets a specific group. Furthermore, it is a national strategy but it also insists on its local implementation. Theses measures had been implemented at the national scale but they might be reinforced in the North East regions particularly affected by terrorism.

4° Prevention-oriented

According to the Human security handbook, the last criteria of human security is « prevention-oriented » (UN, 2017). The human security approach should focus on preventive responses rather than reactive ones. The first pillar of NACTEST « Forestall » is preventive as it aims to reduce the factors conducive to the spread of terrorism (Eji, 2016: 204). This pillar focuses on developing an effective counter terrorism narrative in order to enhance the security awareness of the population. It also aims to reduce the conditions that helps terrorists to operate and to recruit new members (Ugwueze and Onuoha, 2020: 555). Finally the objective of this pillar is also to deter people to join
terrorism by creating new opportunities and developing deradicalisation programs. All theses elements are preventive, the government aim to act before the individual decide to join terrorism. This soft approach has the potential to weaken terrorism by reducing the conditions favoring their development especially the recruitment of new members. The essence of the UN GCTS lies in this first pillar which is the most developed of the NACTEST (ibid).

The « Secure » pillar is the second pillar of the NACTEST, is also preventive. Indeed, it focuses on reducing the vulnerability of citizens and infrastructures to terrorist attacks (Faluyi et al., 2019: 95). In order to do so, the NACTEST recommends to strengthen border control and to train security agents to respond to terrorism. Indeed Boko Haram benefits from the porous nature of borders, that facilitates its arms trafficking and the circulation of migrants who constitute easy recruits for the group (Udounwa, 2013).

The « Identify » pillar also contains preventive measures as it aims to prevent, arrest and prosecute terrorists (Falode, 2019: 20). One of the objectives of this pillar is to stop terrorist attacks before their excution notably by reinforcing the capabilities of security agencies to detect attacks (Ugwueze and Onuoha, 2020: 556). Other objectives are reactive as they are related to the prosecution of the terrorists. Among the five pillars of the NACTEST, three of them contain preventive measures while the last one is dedicated to the implementation of the strategy. Therefore, NACTEST has a clear emphasis on prevention which corresponds to the human security approach. It appears that the NACTEST on the policy paper has the first three criteria of the human security approach described by the Human security handbook. It is now time to examine if the NACTEST adopts a comprehensive approach including the seven components of human security.
B) Comprehensive approach : the seven components of human security

UNDP Report 1994 divided human security in seven components : economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security. The « comprehensive » criteria of human security aims to tackle the root causes of a phenomenon which are categorised under the seven human security components (United Nations, 2017). For this case study, this dissertation will attempt to demonstrate if the seven aspects of human security are taken into account by the NACTEST. Indeed, considering the 7 aspects of human security is an effective way to tackle the root causes of terrorism (Zwitter, 2010: 46).

1° Economic security

According to the UNDP Report 1994 economic security requires « an assured basic income » from work or from the public aid of the state (UN, 1994). Nigeria is the primary economic power of the African continent and the most populated country (Franceinfo Afrique, 2019). It is a country rich in oil and gas however it has the largest number of people living in extreme poverty in the world and massive youth unemployment (ibid). Furthermore, there is not a publicly financed social welfare scheme in Nigeria (Iba Omenka et al., 2017: 514). According to the World Poverty Clock research institute, 91 million people live with less than two dollars per day (Franceinfo Afrique, 2019). A small number of Nigerians are rich while the majority is very poor (African Statistical Year Book 2014). It is also a country with important geographical contrasts, the North is economically devastated in part due to Boko Haram while the South has a very important economic activity (Pérouse de Montclos, 2014a).

The « Forestall » pillar addresses the factors creating a fertile ground for terrorism notably poverty and unemployment (Ugweze and Onuoha, 2020:
When Boko Haram emerged, around 70% of North-eastern Nigerians lived below the poverty line (National Human Development Report, 2015). Poverty was one of the reasons explaining the emergence of this group that took advantages of the population’s grievances based on social inequalities (Onapajo et al. 2020: 483). It was also favorable for the development of Boko Haram which recruits members among the jobless and poor people. This high level of poverty can be explained by the high rate of unemployment (Faluyi et al., 2019: 88). Nigeria has a considerable unemployment level which makes its population particularly vulnerable to radicalisation. The majority of the Nigerian population is young and in 2014, about 67% of the unemployed were young people aged between 15 and 35 (ibid). The unemployment rate has increased due to the lower oil prices and the underdevelopment of the manufacturing sector (Iba Omenka et al., 2017: 514). The link between terrorism and poverty is an extremely sensitive debate. However, in Africa, one of the major causes of terrorism is poverty as it is a main factor of recruitment (Bowei, 2019: 27). This phenomenon largely relates to the theory of deprivation which suggests that people who are deprived of things considered essential in their society will join social movements to obtain these things (Longley, 2016). Brush contests the validity of this theory as a primary driver for violence but he recognises that it is a weighty factor (Bowei, 2019: 27). Mongal explains that poverty is one of the major causes for terrorism in Nigeria due to the disastrous economic situation (ibid). Apart from poverty, the lack of education is also problematic as it limits the perspective of employment and the access to information (Botha, 2010: 38). In the North-East of Nigeria, in 2018, 69% of women and 50% of men are illiterate (Varella, 2020). The NACTEST in its first pillar implemented the creation of programmes engaging with key sectors such as education and employment (Ugwueze and Onuoha, 2020: 555). Formal education often influenced by the Western civilisation is a means to prevent terrorism (Faluyi et al., 2019: 92). However, many individuals in the North of Nigeria have an aversion to Western education due to religious reasons (ibid). The Almajiris are especially known for rejecting
formal schools and joining Qur’anic schools. They are extremely poor and participate in religious manifestations in the North as they see an opportunity to loot houses (Bowei 2019: 27). Many of them join Boko Haram which takes advantage of their vulnerability. To avoid the recruitments of Almajiris, the Nigerian government launched a program in 2012 that merged Western and Qur’anic schools (Faluyi et al., 2019: 92). The NACTEST continues this program that created schools and allowed the registration of Almajiris (Mentone, 2018). Furthermore, one of the objective of the NACTEST is to include civic education in the program in order to sensitise pupils against violence and terrorism (Faluyi et al., 2019: 93).

In terms of employment, the NACTEST also establishes some measures to create jobs (Ugwueze and Onuoha, 2020: 555). Indeed, it plans to boost the creation of Medium and Small Business Enterprises by providing credit facilities and infrastructure (Faluyi et al., 2019: 93). Moreover, as stated by the NACTEST, the Federal Ministry of Labor and Productivity generated employment by creating the Skill Acquisition and Entrepreneurship Development (SAED) program for the young graduates (Ugwueze and Onuoha, 2020: 559). However the result is still marginal (ibid).

Furthermore, Boko Haram has led to the displacement of over two million people which constitutes easy recruits for the group (Iba Omenka et al., 2017: 516). The NACTEST does not mention these internally displaced people often targeted by terrorists (Mentone, 2018). The government must take measures to integrate them in society in order to dissuade them from becoming easy recruits of Boko Haram.

The NACTEST in its « Forestall » pillar recognises that poverty and unemployment are conducive factors for the spread of terrorism (Eji, 2016: 204). This strategy does not guarantee economic security as it does not implement a basic income for its population. However it mentions the importance of economic security and reinforces it by taking measures aiming to increase the level of employment and education.
2° Food and health security

The UNDP Report 1994 defines food security as a situation where « all people at all times have both physical and economic access to basic food. » (UN 1994). According to Coker, food security has three aspects: food availability, food access and food adequacy (Coker, 2015:289). The UNDP Report 1994 emphasises that the availability of food is not a sufficient condition to guarantee food security. Indeed, people can still starve if food is available but not affordable, the problem often comes from the food distribution (UN, 1994). Food security is intrinsically linked to economic security as an assured income is necessary to access to food. In North-East Nigeria one out of three people are currently faced with acute food insecurity (Iba Omenka et al., 2017: 516). In the regions that are the most affected by Boko Haram 55 000 people are at risk of famine (ibid). The « Forestall » pillar does not mention the risk of food insecurity (Mentone, 2018). However, it recognises that poverty is a driver of terrorism and these phenomena are interlinked. Furthermore, the strategy also generally plans to create conditions to prevent people from joining terrorism (Ugwueze and Onuoha, 2020: 555). It can be considered that the guarantee of food security is one of them. Indeed, some people are becoming terrorists to survive, access to food could dissuade them from joining these organisations.

Health security means that basic healthcare is available and affordable for all the people (Iba Omenka et al., 2017: 516). According to the UNDP Report 1994 the main causes of death in developing countries are infectious and parasitic diseases (United Nations, 1994). Health security is intrinsically linked with food and environmental security as most of these diseases are caused by poor nutrition and environmental issues particularly polluted water (ibid). There are disparities of health security between poor and rich countries. In developed countries on average, there is 1 doctor for every 400 people while there is one per 36,000 for poor regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa (ibid). As the other aspects of human security, the threats to health security are usually more important for poor people both in developing and industrial
countries (ibid). In Nigeria, health security is not guaranteed as there are not enough health facilities (WHO). Moreover, there are disparities in regions, in the North East, the number of health facilities is eight times less important than in the South (Faluyi et al., 2019: 102). The NACTEST mentions the need to improve health security in its « Forestall » pillar (Eji, 2016: 204). However, the strategy does not describe concrete measures to enhance this key area. NACTEST identifies indirectly food insecurity and directly health insecurity as factors conducive to the spread of terrorism. Nevertheless the strategy lacks of concrete directives to improve this dimensions of human security.

3° Environmental security

Environmental security is defined by a safe environment which does not suffer from the negative impacts of desertification, pollution and other threats that threaten people health (Iba Omenka et al., 2017: 514). In developing countries, the greatest environmental threats are water and land scarcity (UN, 1994). Nigeria, within the last 20 years has been particularly affected by climate change (Nwokeoma and Kingsley, 2017: 173). The climate became increasingly unpredictable, the country has been experiencing excessive flooding and increased aridity which severely impacted agriculture (ibid). In 2012, the Nigerian Federal Ministry of Environment stated that desertification is provoking the loss of 1400 square miles of land in the Northeast especially on the states of Borno and Yobe (ibid). These states thus experiences a strong reduction of agricultural productivity. These states particularly affected by climate change are also the most affected by Boko Haram which questions if there is a link between climate change and the development of criminality or terrorism. Climate change does not create terrorists or criminals but it creates an environment favorable to the development of these groups (Vivekananda, 2019). Climate change is never the only factor that conduces to an escalation of violence (Alex and Baillat, 2017). It is a threat multiplier, it acts always in
interaction with political, economical and social factors which it exacerbates (ibid). These risks create a vicious circle, conflicts, economic and social factors make the population more vulnerable to climate change while climate change worsened these existing risks and the competition around natural resources (Nett and Rüttinger, 2017). The scholars do not establish direct links between climate change and the development of Boko Haram but they recognise that it contributes to fragilise the situation which benefits to the terrorist organisation (ibid). First, climate change negatively impacts the livelihoods of the inhabitants especially the one relying on agriculture and fishing, they feel abandoned by the states and Boko Haram uses theses grievances to recruit (Vivekananda, 2019). Another driver for recruitment is the lack of resources, due to climate change some people, especially the youth, are unemployed and choose to join Boko Haram to survive (Alex and Baillat, 2017). Additionally, the reduction of resources gives power to Boko Haram as they take over the remaining resources and use it to blackmail the population (Nett and Rüttinger, 2017). They ask people to pay or to join the group in order to access the resources which seriously damage food security. Furthermore, they also use natural resources as a weapon, for instance with the poisoning of water like ISIS in Syria.

Apart from Boko Haram, climate change also exacerbates conflicts between farmers and herders (Vivekananda, 2019). Indeed, with desertification herders are forced to migrate to the south and to invade the lands of farmers with their cattle which destroys their crops. The actual climate predictions indicate that the resources are likely to further decrease bringing more tensions (Nett and Rüttinger, 2017). Therefore there is an emergency to consider the impact of climate change on the terrorist activity to counter terrorism. The NACTEST does not mention climate change as a factor conducive to the spread of terrorism (Mentone, 2018). However, the 2019 National security strategy mentions « environmental threats » as a « national security threat » (Nigerian security strategy, 2019). It also recognises that climate change exacerbates conflicts and the terrorist threat. It is essential to include the impact of climate
change in a counterterrorism strategy because it has worsened the situation and its negative impacts will increase in the future. In order to foil the recruitment mechanisms and other factors that empower Boko Haram it is necessary to consider climate security along with economic security, food security and the other aspects of human security. Boko Haram benefits from climate change because it has worsened the situation (Flausch, 2017). The implementation of mitigation and adaptation measures to address climate change will reduce the grievances among the population and make people less vulnerable to terrorist groups. The non consideration of climate change in the NACTEST is a key failing of the strategy.

4° Personal security

Personal security means security from physical violence (UN, 1994). According to the 1994 UNDP Report, personal security has seven dimensions. « Threats from the state » which is the state violence towards its population. « Threats from other state » which is war and invasions. « Threats from other individuals » which can be religious or ethnic conflicts. « Threats from gangs » which is the violence emanating from insurgents, militants, drug cartels. « Threat to self » which concerns the violence that an individual can inflict to himself with acts such as suicide and drug abuse. Finally the last threats are the ones directed against women and those directed at children (ibid). In Nigeria, threats to personal security are increasing overall (Iba Omenka et al., 2017: 516). Indeed, attacks by herdsmen, terrorists or other armed groups are threatening the population. It is difficult to estimate the number of deaths caused by Boko Haram. According to the 2015 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Boko Haram is responsible for the death of at least 20,000 civilians between 2009 and 2015 (UN Human Rights Council, 2015). Moreover, the group also provoked the displacement of 1.8 million Nigerians (Faluyi et al., 2019: 105). The
« Secure », « Identify », « Prepare » and « Implement » pillars of the NACTEST all aim to guarantee personal security as their objective is to prevent terrorist physical attacks or to minimise their effects. Indeed, the « Secure pillar » is concerned with the protection of citizens and infrastructures (Ugwueze and Onuoha, 2020: 555). This strategy plans to accomplish this by strengthening border security and training security agents to fight terrorism. These measures will reinforce personal security as they will prevent terrorist attacks. The « Identify » pillar seeks to stop terrorist threats notably by increasing the means of security agencies and by disrupting the financing of terrorism (ibid). The increase in the capabilities of security agencies to detect terrorism will enhance the protection of population from attacks. The « Prepare » pillar aims to increase the capability of the government response to terrorism in order to mitigate the risk of terrorist attacks (Faluyi et al., 2019: 104). This pillar includes the preparation of specific agencies for response to attacks. This pillar is a guarantee of human security because its objective is to minimise the damage caused by the attacks, to prevent more people from suffering the attacks. Finally, the « Implement » stream specifies the role of each actor in the counter terrorism process for a coordinative and effective strategy (Falode, 2019: 20). This effort contributes to the protection of personal security because a fast and adaptive response to terrorist threats can avoid and limit violence.

Personal security is « the most vital » aspect of human security (UN, 1994). The defenders of the narrow conception of human security argue that human security should only encompass personal security, they only consider human security as the « freedom from fear » which is the freedom from the threat of violence (Krause, 2004). Therefore, the last four pillars of the NACTEST are concerned by personal security as their overall objective is to preserve people from violence. However, the strategy mentions all the aspects of personal security except the violence from the state. As mentioned earlier, the repression of the Boko Haram insurgency by the army has been particularly violent, killing more than 1000 people (Higazi, 2013: 142). There is a bias in
this strategy because it emanates from the government and it is against its interest to recognise the abuses of the army in the counter terrorism approach. The absence of measures to control the army is a loss on this strategy because the Nigerian army still a threat to personal security (Pérouse de Montclos, 2012: 13).

5° Community security

Community security refers to the need to respect the cultural identity and values of individuals and to ensure the preservation of these values (Iba Omenka et al., 2017: 513). Membership in a community, an ethnic group or an organisation can provide security practical support (UN, 1994). At the same time, communities can carry out oppressive traditions such as excision (ibid). Furthermore being member of a community can also cause discrimination. In Africa, religious, ethnic and cultural marginalisation have contributed to many conflicts (Botha, 2010:38). Currently, religious differences are exploited by jihadists to radicalise and recruit people. Religion is one of the main reasons explaining Boko Haram’s actions (Onapajo et al. 2012: 44). It is essential to take into account community security because tensions between ethnic or religious groups or marginalisation can lead to terrorism (Botha, 2010: 38). Nigeria has a great ethnic and religious diversity. Indeed, there are over 521 languages in the country and between 250 and 400 ethnic groups (PBS NewHour, 2007). The four largest ethnic groups are the Muslim Hausa and the Fulani which are predominant in the northern region (Sofolahan, 2016). The Hausa live an agricultural lifestyle while the Fulani are a nomadic community of cattle breeders. There are frequent clashes between these two ethnic groups due to the lack of resources and the presence of Boko Haram (Gürsoy, 2020: 4 ). The Igbo are mainly in the southeast of the country, most of them are Christian and strongly oppose to the Shariah law (PBS NewHour, 2007). Finally, the Yoruba are predominant in the southwest. This group does not
have a pre established religion, members can embrace Christianity, Islam or traditional and animist beliefs (ibid). The NACTEST in its « Identify » pillar recognises the importance of considering community and cultural sensitivities (Faluyi et al., 2019:102). One of the objective is to establish a good relationship between the Nigerian government and « community representatives, traditional and religious institutions » (Ugwueze and Onuoha, 2020: 556). Indeed, there is a gap between security forces and local population because the authorities seek to avoid collusion and to develop a national spirit by spreading police and military personnel, of various origins, throughout the national territory (Pérouse de Montclos, 2019). Nevertheless, this system conducts police and military personnel to work in regions where they do not speak the language of the local population. These communication difficulties breed mutual distrust and fear, which can be fatal especially in the less literate areas of northern Nigeria where Boko Haram operates. Since the year 2000 these rules are more flexible and each state has the opportunity to finance local security forces (ibid). The NACTEST perpetuates this effort by encouraging dialogue between civil servants and local and religious communities. Furthermore, this strategy also recognises the importance of religion in the development of Boko Haram and emphasises the role of the National Interfaith Religious Council (NIREC) in counter terrorism (Faluyi et al., 2019:110). The NIREC is an association formed by representatives of Christianity and Islam it aims to avoid religious conflicts in the country by promoting dialogue and understanding among the leaders and followers of the two religions (NIREC). The NACTEST recognises the relevance of community security in the fight against terrorism. It aims to avoid the marginalisation of ethnic or religious groups that could lead to further development of terrorism.
Political security defines a situation where people live in a society that guarantee their basic human rights (UN, 1994). In Nigeria, the citizens access to political resources is a fundamental issue (Iba Omenka et al., 2017: 517). The Ibrahim Index in 2016 measuring the overall governance ranked Nigeria at the 35th place (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2016). This index includes safety and the rule of law, participation and human rights, sustainable economic opportunities and human development. There is a link between poor governance and the development of terrorism because it fuels grievances among the population which is more vulnerable and eager to join terrorist groups. Good governance must be ensured for an effective counterterrorism strategy because it can reduce grievances and bring socio-economic transformation (Eji, 2016: 213). The author Chinwoku affirms that good governance including youth empowerment and the fight against corruption will eradicate terrorism in Nigeria (Chinwoku, 2012 cited in Bowei, 2019: 27). According to Anneli Botha, political security is guaranteed in a « stable » state which has a high degree of political continuity and where the opponents are tolerated (Botha, 2010: 35). After six coup d’états Nigeria became a federal democracy in 1999 (Gouëset, 2010). From 1999 to 2015, the country has only been governed by one political party : People's Democratic People (Le Monde, 2015). 2015 is a milestone because it marks the first democratic changeover in Nigeria with the election of Muhammadu Buhari. President Buhari is supported by All Progressives Congress, the main themes of his campaign were : security and the fight against corruption (AFP, 2015). Indeed, corruption is endemic in Nigeria, many elections have been falsified. "Presidential elections since 1998 (…) have been systematically marred by multiple irregularities" notes a 2009 French parliamentary report (Duhem, 2014).

Furthermore, the Nigerian army has been particularly violent in the repression of the 2009 Boko Haram insurrection (Higazi, 2013: 142). The Nigerian Police
had paid around 1 billion Naira between 2012 and 2015 in reparation to victims of human rights abuses (Iba Omenka et al., 2017: 517). The objective of the « Identify » pillar of the NACTEST is to strengthen the intelligence and justice system in order to investigate and prosecute correctly terrorists (Mentone, 2018). Amnesty International has identified several times extra judicial killings and unfair trials, the « Identify » pillar aims to implement a criminal justice system respectful of human rights (Faluyi et al., 2019: 101).

Furthermore, it also focus on the prevention of terrorism because it plans to organise a better collaboration between security agencies. « Boko Haram is skilled at exploiting state institutional weaknesses » (Pérouse de Montclos, 2014c:24). Political insecurity benefits to this group that uses the grievances based on the failures of the state to recruit new members and spread its influence. Therefore the strengthening of the criminal justice system and the reorganisation of the cooperation between agencies carried by the NACTEST seems to be an important step to reduce political insecurity especially human rights abuses. Furthermore the strategy also recognises the need to fight corruption in order to eradicate terrorism. However, the strategy does not mention the necessity to guarantee transparent and free elections which is problematic because political marginalisation is a driver of terrorism and an important aspect of political insecurity.

To conclude, the NACTEST considers most of the aspects of human security excepts food and environmental security. The seven elements of human security are intrinsically linked and a threat to one aspect is likely to damage all the others (Zwitter, 2010: 31). On the policy paper, the NACTEST is human security centred as it emphasises a preventive and people-centred approach recognising most of the aspects of human security. However, this dissertation will now show that in practice, the government considers less human security.
Chapter II : The counterterrorism policy on the ground : a different approach

The NACTEST and the comments of the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) implies that the Nigerian government adopted a soft approach to counterterrorism (Eji, 2016: 205). A soft approach, that is human security centred as it almost encompasses all the aspects of human security which are factors leading to terrorism. However, the image given by the government seems to be different from what is done in practice (ibid). Many authors have identified a gap between the policy and its implementation. Indeed, in practice, the government prioritises a military-centric approach rather than a soft approach (Ugwueze and Onuoha, 2020: 548). This chapter will analyse if the counterterrorism policy conducted on the ground respects the principles of human security as it claims to do in the NACTEST. Three events representing different scope of actions will be used to analyse if human security is central in the policy conducted on the ground.

A) Preventive measures : the case of arbitrary detention

1° Aggressive preventive measures

In the last decade, Nigeria has been accused of practicing arbitrary detention. In 2018, Amnesty International denounced the disappearance of thousands of people accused of being affiliated to jihadism (Le Figaro, 2018). They are in jail or detained by intelligence service « arbitrarily and illegally » according to the NGO (Amnesty International, 2015a).

In 2015, Amnesty International (AI) published a report named « Stars on their shoulders. Blood in their hands. War crimes committed by the Nigerian army » in which it denounces the illegal actions and abuses of the Nigerian army (AI, 2015). Among other crimes, Amnesty International reports the mass arbitrary
arrests committed by the Nigerian army notably the one in Gallare (ibid). On the 25th of April 2014, the Nigerian army entered the village of Gallare and told people to come out. They separated men from women and took 42 young men in Giwa barracks in Maiduguri. The families tried to free them but most of them were not released and transferred to Kainji military detention facility in the neighboring Niger state. Since 2009, the Nigerian army has arrested at least 20,000 people (mainly men) who were suspected to be affiliated to the sect (AI, 2015). 7000 of them died because of poor detention facilities and extra-judicial killings (Faluyi et al., 2019: 97). Only 13 of them have gone through a fair trial (Nyadera and Bincof, 2019: 23). Most of the arrested suspects were detained in custody for long period of time without having access to a lawyer and without trial (Faluyi et al., 2019: 97). The Right to a fair trial was mainly not respected during the period 2014-2016 as many detainees were denied the access to a trial. Furthermore, even when the trials were conducted the principles of due process and fair trial were mainly not respected. Indeed, many suspects were being charged with terrorism without enough evidence which is contrary to the presumption of innocence (Nyadera and Bincof, 2019: 23). Additionally, the lack of judges led to massive trials. Many suspects were not present during their trial which impedes the right of the suspect to a fair hearing and to appeal (ibid). The NACTEST in its « Identify » pillar plans to strengthen the criminal justice system (Mentone, 2018). The « Forestall » pillar also focus on the judicial system as one of this objective is to build better relationship between civil servants and the local population (Ugwueze and Onuoha, 2020: 555). Nevertheless, these people-centred measures that aim to reinforce political security are not implemented. In practice, these measures are not respected and the action of the Nigerian civilian servants constitute a threat for both personal and political security. Indeed, arbitrary detentions are a violation of human rights and also often entail physical violence. Nevertheless, the government also takes some soft measures such as the « Operation safe corridor », a program launched by the government in 2016 (Onapajo and Ozden, 2020: 2). This deradicalisation
program aims to reintegrate Boko Haram former members into society. However, the impact of this program still pales in comparison to the thousands of fighters that remain in detention (Mentone, 2018). This human security centred measure at a larger scale could have a positive impact on both society and the detainees. Indeed, if the Boko Haram members know that they have a chance to be reintegrated into society some of them would stop being members of the sect.

Apart from arbitrary detentions, other preventive measures can be a threat to human security. In 2011, the military and security agencies created a joint task security force named Operation Restore Order (JOTRO) later renamed Operation Lafiya Dole (Faluyi et al., 2019: 97). JOTRO conducted operations which imposed curfews, mass arrests, looting of houses and arbitrary detention (Eji, 2016: 206). Moreover, in order to deprive the members of Boko Haram of resources the government stopped trade and closed the borders, it also limited the access to crops and fishing zones (Pérouse de Montclos, 2014: 12). These preventive measures considerably weakened the people of the regions affected by Boko Haram. This has increased grievances and made people more vulnerable to join Boko Haram (Mentone, 2018). These measures seem to be counter-productive and constitute a threat to food, health and economic security. The Nigerian army and police forces do not protect the population in rural areas where the fight against terrorism is played out (Pérouse de Montclos, 2014: 15). In order to attain their « quotas » and to justify their efficacy, the military have multiplied arbitrary arrests (ibid). The army failed to protect civilians, it is more often a threat for them which increase their hatred against the army. In 2014-2015 Nigeria was ranked at the last place for public confidence in the armed forces and the police in Africa (Buchanan-Clarke and Lekalake 2016: 8). These results demonstrate that in the ground the strategy is far from the goals settled by the NACTEST.
2° Intelligence failures

According to Anneli Botha, mass arbitrary arrests reflects the weakness of intelligence strategies and a failure of the intelligence community (Botha, 2010: 37). As Nigeria has frequently practiced arbitrary arrest and detention, this section will now dive in the causes of intelligence failures of the country. The NACTEST in its « Identify » pillar also plans to increase both the capabilities of security agencies and their collaboration (Ugwueze and Onuoha, 2020: 556). Indeed, there is a need to build the capacities of agencies in terms of training, equipment and respect of human rights (Eji, 2016: 212). The NACTEST established the Office of the National Security Advisor (ONSA) as the coordinator of the strategy in order to avoid overlap and conflicts between counter-terrorism institutions and ministries (Innocent, 2018: 16). However, this pillars does not has a precise plan of cooperation processing the role of each agency. The collaboration between security agencies is essential to an effective counter terrorism strategy (Ikeanyibe et al., 2020: 467). The increase of the collaboration of agencies reduce the attacks’s intensity of Boko Haram. In 2015, Buhari relocated the military command center to Maiduguri in order to be closer to the sect (Mentone, 2018).

Furthermore the President also strengthened the cooperation between agencies which has weakened Boko Haram. However, many scholars and politicians admit that the cooperation between security agencies is still unsatisfying which benefits Boko Haram. According to the former Director of Defence Information Maj-Gen, the weak level of cooperation is having negative impacts on the fight against terrorism (Ugwueze and Onuoha, 2020: 561). The cooperation between military and law enforcement agencies is weak, they both heavily rely on local militias to collect intelligence (Mentone, 2018).

Furthermore, there is a rivalry between the security agencies in charge of terrorism. Indeed, they refuse to share information between agencies and there is no a central database to collect information (Faluyi et al., 2019: 98). For instance, individual check points process information but there is not an
national database system to share information. The NACTEST plans to create a national database on terrorism but this has not been applied (ibid). Even with the efforts of the NACTEST to enhance the cooperation between agencies, it seems that the Nigerian security agencies are more of an impediment than an asset in the fight against terrorism (Innocent, 2018: 3). Indeed, the multiplication of agencies brings confusion and overlaps, people do not know to which agency to address. It also brings insecurity because rather than focusing on the security of their citizens, the agencies are spending their resources in jurisdictional conflicts and clashes with other agencies (ibid).

Another cause of intelligence failure is the lack of participation of civilians in counterterrorism, security agencies should include them because they are an essential source of intelligence (Ugwueze and Onuoha, 2020: 561). The use of civilians for intelligence is a traditional counterterrorism strategy. However, in the case of Nigeria this tactic is mainly used by Boko Haram (Bowei, 2019: 42). The army is more suspicious towards civilians because in the past few years, terrorists who presented to be civilians infiltrated the army to commit attacks (ibid). In 2012, Nigeria created the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) in the Borno state to fight Boko Haram but also to avoid the killing of civilians (Pérouse de Montclos, 2019). The CJTF is composed of around 25,000 civilians (Mentone, 2018). This militia allows the participation of civilians that have a better knowledge of the local ground, language and population than the army and the police. It is also a valuable source of intelligence because some CJTF members were former members of Boko Haram (Faluyi et al., 2019: 101). However, Felbab-Brown explains that the CJTF is often an unreliable intelligence source. Their actions are mostly based on unverified claims and motivated by revenge or money (Felbab-Brown, 2018). Furthermore, CJTF members have been accused of many human rights abuses such as rape and looting. They also recruit children in their militia (Mentone, 2018). The CJTF marks an effort to include civilians in intelligence gathering but also to protect civilians from the police and military violence. This militia contributes to the objective of the « Identify pillar » to strengthen the relation between civil
servants and local population, it reinforces community security. On the other hand, they are also a threat to personal security as some members take advantage of their power to commit crimes (Pérouse de Montclos, 2019). Intelligence is essential in counterterrorism operations, it allows to adopt a more preventive approach (Eji, 2016: 213). The NACTEST emphasis the importance of intelligence, civilian participation and cooperation between agencies but in practice operations are reactionary and ad hoc (ibid). The counterterrorism policy applied on the ground is not human security-centred as it is not « people-centred », the role of civilians is very limited in the definition of threats. The prevention is not sufficiently important due to the lack of collaboration for intelligence gathering. The government is taking preventive measures but they are often a threat for all the aspects of human security which violates the « comprehensive » criteria. In the preventive actions of the government human security does not have the same importance in the policy paper and in the ground.

B) Direct confrontation between the armed forces and Boko Haram

After having explored the role of human security in the preventive actions of the Nigerian government in its counterterrorism policy this section will carry out the analysis of the confrontations between the Nigerian security forces and Boko Haram. The NACTEST is a comprehensive approach that recognises the factors creating a fertile ground for the development of terrorism. In 2015, quickly after the adoption of the NACTEST, the terrorists attacks reduced by 32% in Nigeria but the group extended to neighboring countries. In 2016, the amount of deaths caused by the sect decreased by 80% (Ugwueze and Onuoha, 2020: 548). These successes rely mainly to the military operations conducted by the Buhari government (Onapajo, 2017: 68). The comprehensive and soft approach presented by the NACTEST which is essential to eradicate terrorism has been set aside in favor of the hard approach.
On the night of 25th of January 2015, members of Boko Haram attacked the city of Maiduguri in the North-East (Daldorph, 2015). Both militaries and members of the CJTF fought against the insurgents and pushed them back. The confrontation led to the death of around 200 people, mainly insurgents (ibid). However, Boko Haram did not succeed in taking the city but they seized neighboring cities such as Monguno and Baga. Many people fled the attacked towns to Maiduguri to find protection (ibid). These internally displaced people are very vulnerable and their multiplication could lead to a major humanitarian crisis. A week later, on the 31 of January, the insurgents attacked again the biggest city of the North-East of Nigeria (News Wires, 2015). The Nigerian security forces helped by the Chadian army fight back Boko Haram causing at least the death of 72 jihadists and 10 civilians (ibid). These events are examples of the many confrontations that opposed the Nigerian army to Boko Haram. Since 2010, the Nigerian response to terrorism has mainly relied on the use of force (Falode, 2019: 19). Western institutions have been heavily criticised for their use of the military to counterterrorism notably in the Iraq war (Omenma and Hendricks, 2018: 769). This hard approach is common in many sub Saharan African countries (Ikeanyibe et al., 2020: 464). In the case of Nigeria, the resort to military can be understood as it is the only institution that has been developed by colonialism. Additionally, Boko Haram terrorists are extremely well equipped and conduct many attacks which destabilises the police that needs the help of the military (Eji, 2016: 206). However, relying only on the use of force to counterterrorism is ineffective and sometimes even counterproductive (Onapajo, 2017: 67). According to the former British Foreign Secretary David Miliband, responding to terrorism by the use of military was « misleading and mistaken » (Omenma and Hendricks, 2018: 769). Moreover, Onapajo states that the hard approach in Nigeria has not only failed to eradicate terrorism but also increased violence and the number of deaths (Onapajo and Ozden, 2020: 3). Indeed, conversely to the army,
terrorists are not using conventional tactics. The terrorists use guerrilla tactics, they have a deep knowledge of the ground and adopts hit-and-run tactics (Omenma and Hendricks, 2018: 769). In this asymmetrical warfare, terrorists are based on a flexible network and difficult terrain. Conventional tactics have a limited impact on their activities as there are not adapted to it. The Sambisa forest is a base of Boko Haram from which they conduct their attacks (ibid). It is extremely difficult for the military to fight the sect on the forest because soldiers do not know the terrain which is full of thick vegetation and swamps. Therefore, the Nigerian security forces needed a special militia that had a knowledge of the terrain and the local population in order to gather intelligence and to catch terrorists. To this purpose the Nigerian government created the Civilian Joint Task forces (CJTF) in 2012 composed of local volunteers eager to protect their communities from the terrorist threat (Pérouse de Montclos, 2019). The CJTF conduct about 60% of the counterterrorism operations in the North-East (Bamidele, 2016: 132). Omenma and Hendricks did a test to assess the impact of the CJTF actions on the counterterrorism effort. They established, that the number of monthly attacks carried by Boko Haram was « significantly higher » before the involvement of the CJTF (Omenma and Hendricks, 2018: 764). This demonstrates that proactive strategies that include citizens are more efficient to fight terrorism than conventional military tactics. Furthermore these strategies are more respectful of human security as they are people-centred and they protect civilians. However, the deployment of these civilians troops carry is not devoid of dangers (Pérouse de Montclos, 2014b: 15). The first issue is that they lack of discipline and training as they are civilians which make them very vulnerable to Boko Haram. According to the CJTF adviser about 680 have died in operations (Omenma and Hendricks, 2018: 787). The other issue that concerns both military and CJTF is the abuses of human rights. As we saw earlier these abuses have been widely reported particularly arbitrary detention and extrajudicial killings (Menton, 2018). Thus CJTF are an improvement for the
counterterrorism strategy that reinforces personal and political security provided that they are monitor in order to avoid abuses.

2° The lack of resources and the violence of the army

Another factor explaining the ineffectiveness of the Nigerian army is the lack of resources. Indeed, the army and the police face resource constraints due to the high number of conflicts in the country (Ikeanyibe et al., 2020: 470). Some local militias do not receive support such as training and weapons (ibid). Nigeria is the fourth military power of Africa its $2 billion defense budget is the highest since the Biafra war (Pérouse de Montclos, 2014:17). Nevertheless, the forces in operation have less than $100 million a year which does not allow them to have a good equipment and lead to the desertion of discouraged soldiers (ibid). The poor resource management and corruption reduces the capabilities of the army (Omenma and Hendricks, 2018: 764).

Finally, the violence of the army hinders the fight against terrorism. Since the insurrection, the exactions of the armed forces have pushed some civilians to join Boko Haram to find protection. Between 2009 and 2014 the sect has grown from 4,000 members to around 8,000 (Pérouse de Montclos, 2014b: 15). A counterterrorism strategy of the Nigerian army is to burn down entire villages in retaliation of Boko Haram attacks (Faluyi et al., 2019: 95). The army indiscriminately killed members of a community without knowing if they are Boko Haram members (ibid). Amnesty International had several times reported these acts of razing and ask for them to be investigate as war crimes (AI, 2020). This strategy aims to persuade civilians to give intelligence to the armed forces but it has the opposite effect (Omenma and Hendricks, 2018: 782). Indeed, it deepens the gap between local communities and the army, the civilians are forced to flee their community and they are more eager to join Boko Haram in retaliation (Bowei, 2019: 43).
During the confrontations, the army killed more people than Boko Haram (Pérouse de Montclos, 2019). From 2007 to 2009 the army killed around 24,000 people while the sect killed about 19,000 (Pérouse de Montclos, 2020:20). In order to protect the reputation of the army, President Buhari covered these excesses of violence (ibid). Nigeria has a culture of impunity, no members of the military have been punished and commissions of inquiry have never published their reports (ibid). Moreover, the press emphasises the atrocities committed by Boko Haram without mentioning those perpetrated by the army (Pérouse de Montclos, 2014a). Felbab-Brown argues that the human rights violations perpetrated by the Nigerian armed forces played a main role in the rise of extremism (Falode, 2019: 18). It is important to implement other strategies that tackle the root causes of terrorism which are addressed through the elements of human security (Iba Omenka et al., 2017: 516). Human security does not replace state security therefore an efficient counterterrorism strategy needs both soft and hard approach. In Nigeria, the balance between hard and soft approach needs to be revised. The country must reduced its military interventions in favor of more civilian participation (Ugwueze and Onuoha, 2020: 558). Civilian participation is essential for countering terrorism, the military must aim to get closer to civilians instead of threatening them (Bowei, 2019: 48). In order to eradicate terrorism in the long term Nigeria should aim to protect civilians by adopting a human security approach addressing the root causes of terrorism. The NACTEST contains this human security approach but it is not implemented. The NACTEST established a balance between the soft and hard approach with an emphasis on soft approach but it is not respected in practice. The heavy reliance of Nigeria on the military does not comply with any of the four criteria of the human security. Indeed, it is not « people-centred » as civilians are poorly included in the counterterrorism process. It is not « context-specific » because the army does not know the terrain except when it uses the CJTF. It is not « prevention-oriented » as many actions of the military and even of the CJTF are ad hoc and reactionary (Eji,2016: 204). Finally the counterterrorism policy on the ground
does not respect the criteria of « comprehensive approach » because the sole use of force fails to address the root causes of terrorism and is also a threat to the seven components of human security.

C) Mitigation measures : the actions of the government after an attack

Having analysed the place given by the government to human security during direct confrontations with Boko Haram this section will focus on the action of the government after a terrorist attack. The NACTEST aims to reduce the vulnerability of the population to terrorism and to build the capacities of agencies to respond to terrorism (Falode, 2019: 19). The government must have the most effective answer after a terrorism outbreak in order to limit the damage. When prevention fails, the government should be able to react quickly and to help its citizens. This section will analyse though the Chibok schoolgirls kidnapping if the human security principles are at the heart of the mitigation measures in counterterrorism.

1° A weak and slow reaction

On the 14th of April 2014, Boko Haram members stormed the Chibok High School and forced 279 students, ages 12 to 17, to climb into trucks before driving into the Sambisa forest (Jeune Afrique, 2019). 57 hostages managed to escape by jumping from the moving vehicles and returning home. This event shocked the international community and sparked the international campaign « Bring back our girls » (Strolchic, 2020). The reaction of the government has been weak and slow. Amnesty international proved that local official had been warned of the arrival of insurgents but they did not react (Walt, 2014). The Nigerian president spoke publicly about the kidnapping only two weeks after the event (ibid). He also refused immediate offers of foreign help. Three weeks after the abduction none of the girls have been found and the president...
Goodluck Jonathan admitted that he had no idea where they could be (ibid). During this time, the president did not go to Chibok to visit the families of the victims (The Guardian (Lagos), 2014). This lack of actions led to protests in different cities of Nigeria. People gathered to denounce the incentivity of their government and its slow response. This could have led to a larger revolution based on a general feeling that the government disregard the public interest (Walt, 2014). The abduction was a major electoral stake for Buhari. Once elected in 2015, he started to negotiate with the sect to free the girls (Eji, 2016: 208). A total of 107 were released after negotiations with the group, including in exchange for prisoners, or escaped and were found by the army (Jeune Afrique, 2019). Furthermore, the Nigerian government and private donors are offering at least six years of education for each survivor student (Strolchic, 2020). A special program called « New Foundation School » has been put in place to allow the girls to finish high-school and they then have a scholarship to study at the American University of Nigeria (Daldorph, 2017). These initiatives of the government are people-centred and protect civilians by ensuring their personal and economic security. However, in 2020, 112 girls were still detained by Boko Haram and their fate is unknown (Jeune Afrique, 2019). Amnesty international denounces the lack of protection for children in Nigeria. Due to the inability of the authorities to protect schools against abductions, 600 schools closed and 10,000 children do not have access to education. There is no accountability for the kidnapping of pupils and the only answer to kidnapping is to close the schools which worsened the situation (AI, 2021). The parents are afraid to put their children in school because authorities do not secure schools enough.

The NACTEST was approved for implementation by the President Goodluck Jonathan the 30th of April so two weeks after the Chibok girls abduction. The focus of this section is the reaction of the government which takes place days and years after the event so when the NACTEST was into force. The NACTEST in its « Prepare » pillar aims to increase the resilience of the population and the capabilities of authorities to react to terrorist attacks in
order to reduce their consequences (Ugwueze and Onuoha, 2020: 556). This will be achieved by building capacities for agencies to respond to terrorists attacks and to help the victims. The strategy includes notably the creation of a call center to take calls related to terrorism (Faluyi et al., 2019: 104). Additionally, in order to help victims to cope with the shock of terrorist attacks the government opened a special clinic in Kano. This measure should have been implemented in all regions affected by terrorism but it did not happened. Finally, the government also introduced a program called « Safe school initiative » to strengthen the security of schools in the North East (ibid). However, the institution responsible for the program was embroiled in a corruption scandal. This initiative was necessary to protect the children and guarantee their access to education but it had a limited impact due to corruption. All these measures plans by the NACTEST reinforce personal and economic security but their implementation has been compromised by the lack of organisation and corruption. Indeed, Nigeria has not mitigated the consequences of attacks as planned in the « Prepare » pillar of the NACTEST (Ugwueze and Onuoha, 2020: 561). The Victim Support Fund brought help to the victim of terrorist attacks but this contribution is very small in comparison to the amount of damages provoked by the Boko Haram (ibid).

2° The issue of corruption

Many NGOs are operating in the Northeast region but they only bring little improvement to the victim situation. This lack of efficacy is explained by corruption, many NGOs members are using the public fund to enrich themselves instead of helping the victims (ibid). Nigeria is riddled with corruption, in 2020, Transparency international ranked the country at the 149th place out of 179 (Transparency International, 2020). Through weakness, fear of mutiny, or simply indifference, successive civilian governments have been unwilling to tackle corruption. President
Goodluck Jonathan has a direct responsibility for the growth of corruption, which he has used to buy social peace (Pérouse de Montclos, 2014a). During the 2015 presidential elections, Buhari presented himself as an anti-corruption crusader but once he was elected he has not initiated anti-corruption reforms (Pérouse de Montclos, 2019).

The defense budget is very important, in 2014, 23% of the national budget was allocated to armed forces (Pérouse de Montclos, 2014a). However, this budget is used in total opacity, and some military generals have no interest in killing the golden goose of jihadism (Pérouse de Montclos, 2019). Indeed, a very small amount of this money is getting to the field due to corruption. Many scandals have concerned members of the government or armed forces. Recent investigations suggested that military chiefs and politicians diverted around $2.1 billion of the defense budget (Onapajo, 2017: 67). Corruption largely hinders the implementation of the NACTEST and the fight against terrorism. A considerable amount of money is allocated to defense thus the solution is to fight corruption rather than giving more money to corrupt people (Bowei, 2019: 37). An anti-corruption reform would cope with the lack of resources of armed forces and agencies which will increase their reactivity and efficacy to respond to terrorist attacks. The reaction of the government after the Chibok kidnapping only slightly mitigated the consequences of the attack. There is a gap between what is stated in the NACTEST and what is done in the ground. Furthermore, the four criteria of the human security approach established by the UN human security handbook are not respected. Indeed, the measures are not « people-centred » as the people are not included, the families of the victims are not protected. The only « people-centred » measure is the help furnished by the state for the education of the survivor girls. The measures are « context specific » as they deal with the specific issue of Chibok kidnapping but school abductions have multiplied over the years and the government should develop more measures to eradicate this issue. The measures are not « prevention-oriented ». In order to protect schools from abduction the government should take further security measures, it took some
initiatives but they are not conclusive and nowadays many schools are closed because of terrorism (AI, 2021). The emphasis on prevention should guarantee the right to education to children. Finally, the mitigation measures do not adopt a « comprehensive-approach » because they do not address the root causes of terrorism by considering all the seven aspects of human security. Furthermore, the lack of actions of the government and corruption are a threat for personal, politic and economic security.

In conclusion, there is a gap between the NACTEST and its implementation that damages the human security approach. This gap is present in all the three stages of action of the armed forces : in preventive actions, in direct confrontations with Boko Haram and after an attack of the sect. In the ground, the comprehensive approach established by the NACTEST that aims to tackle the roots causes of terrorism is not followed. The government rely heavily on the military forces which is not sufficient to eradicate terrorism. The policy adopted in practice does not respect the four criteria of the human security approach and is a threat to the seven elements of human security. The Nigerian counterterrorism policy is human security centred in theory but not in practice.
The NACTEST is a very elaborated strategy that reflects global best practices in countering terrorism through soft approach (Ugwueze, Onuoha, 2020 : 562). The soft approach established by the NACTEST is the “bulk” of the strategy (ibid). However, while the emphasis is on the soft approach, elements of hard approach are also present. Indeed, the « Secure », « Identify » and « Prepare » pillars contain elements of the traditional use of force. An effective counterterrorism policy finds the right combination between the hard and soft approach (Botha, 2008: 39). The NACTEST has find this combination because it contains both elements and it puts forwards the “soft” powers which are in its first pillar « Forestall ».

The NACTEST, on the policy paper, meets the four criteria of the human security approach established by the Human security handbook. Indeed, it is « people-centred » because it focuses on the need of the people, and it also involves them in the counterterrorism effort. The strategy is « context-specific » as it captures the specificities of the terrorism threat in Nigeria. The NACTEST is the result of a deep analysis of terrorism in Nigeria (Eji, 2016: 200). Furthermore, the strategy is implemented at the national scale, but some measures will be specifically implemented in the Northeast region where Boko Haram is the most active. The NACTEST is also « prevention-oriented » because it emphasis a soft approach. Indeed, its main objective which is developed in the « Forestall » pillar, is to tackle the root causes of terrorism and to prevent radicalisation (Ackerman, 2014). Addressing the root causes is a preventive action because it prevents further development of terrorism notably by deterring people to join the terrorist organisation. The « Secure » and « Identify » pillars also contain preventive measures. Indeed, the « Secure » pillar aims to reduce the vulnerability of citizens and infrastructures to terrorist attacks (Faluyi et al., 2019: 95) and one objective of the « Identify » pillar is to prevent terrorist attacks. Therefore, the NACTEST has a clear emphasis on prevention which comply with the human security
approach. The last criterium is that the strategy must be « comprehensive ». The chapter detailed more this aspect because it treats the root causes of security which are the seven key elements of human security. Throughout the analysis, it established that the NACTEST encompass all the aspects of human security except food security and environmental security. The « Forestall » pillar does not mention the risk of food insecurity but it recognised that poverty is a leading factor to terrorism and these phenomena are interlinked (Mentone, 2018). The strategy indirectly addresses food insecurity by fighting poverty and generally creating conditions to prevent people from joining terrorism (Ugwueze and Onuoha, 2020: 555). However, the NACTEST does not mention climate change as a driver of terrorism. This non consideration is problematic because climate change is a threat multiplier that exacerbates the terrorist threat (Alex and Baillat, 2017). In order to reinforce the comprehensive aspect of its approach, the NACTEST should take into consideration all the aspects of human security because they are very intertwined and a threat to one aspect is likely to damage all the others (Zwitter, 2010: 31). The NACTEST in the policy paper is human security centred because it complies to the four criteria of the human security approach. Nevertheless, in practice, the soft approach of the NACTEST has not been vigorously implemented by the Nigerian government (Ugwueze and Onuoha, 2020: 548). Indeed, there is a gap between the NACTEST and the counterterrorism policy conducted in the field (Sonnie Bowey, 2019: 41). The policy practiced in the ground is not human security centred as the government relies heavily on the use of force instead of the soft measures. The government prioritises a military-centric approach rather than a soft approach while the NACTEST states the opposite (Falode, 2019: 19). Through three events which intervene at a different scope of action (in prevention of a terrorist attack, during an attack and after an attack), the chapter analysed if the policy respected the four criteria of the human security approach. The counterterrorism policy in practice does not respect these four criteria. Indeed, the civilians are poorly integrated in the counterterrorism process. The
counterterrorism actions are more reactive than preventive and preventive actions often constitute a threat for civilians (Eji, 2016: 212). The emphasis on prevention and on people established by the NACTEST is not respected on the ground. The counterterrorism approach does not either comply with the criteria “context-specific”, because the government mainly replied by the use of military forces, and do not tailor its responses to the specific local issues. Finally, the « comprehensive approach » criterium is also violated as in practice, the government does not address the root causes of terrorism by considering all the seven aspects of human security. It mainly addresses one aspect of human security, that is personal security. Furthermore, not only the actions of the government do not guarantee human security but the government also threatens all its aspects. However, the chapter only studied three events. Consequently, it is not enough to generalise to all the counterterrorism’s actions of the government. These events are nonetheless indicators of the failures of the government to eradicate Boko Haram. From 2014-2016, the government failed to effectively conduct the soft approach established by the NACTEST, which explains its failure to eradicate the sect. Indeed, the strict application of a human security centred approach, like NACTEST, would have addressed the root causes of terrorism. This kind of policy would have weakened the group and eradicate it in the long term. As long as the economic and social situation does not improve, Boko Haram will continue to exist (Omale, 2013).

Thus, the Nigerian counterterrorism is human security centred in theory with the NACTEST document but not in practice.

Nowadays, the situation has changed in Nigeria. Boko Haram is now divided, and it modifies its modus operandi. Furthermore, the government strengthens its soft approach with the adoption of the National Action Plan for preventing and countering violent extremism (PCVE) in 2017. Therefore, the recommendations are more relevant to the studied period (2014-2016). NACTEST is a step in the good direction, it is a very promising strategy, but it needs to be vigorously implemented. However, this strategy should consider
climate change because it is an important leading factor to terrorism that will play an increasingly important role in the future. Nigeria should have more effectively conducted the soft approach of the NACTEST in order for the ground policy to be human security centred. The focus of the policy conducted in the ground should be to tackle the root causes of terrorism rather than its symptoms which is clearly recognized by the NACTEST. Therefore, Nigeria must stop to heavily rely on the use of force in favor of soft measures. Nigeria should also redefine its relationship with civilians, the purpose of the army should be to protect civilians and to build a relationship of trust with them (Pérouse de Montclos, 2014: 17). For instance, the military should guarantee the protection of schools in the Northeast. The armed forces should not be perceived as a threat by the civilians. For this purpose, the actions of the security forces should be monitored to reduce violence. Additionally, the human rights abuses perpetrated by the armed forces should be punished. Finally, Nigeria should also fight against corruption that hinders every strategy, reforms and the overall welfare of the country. The NACTEST is a human security centred strategy, and it is exactly what Nigeria needs to eradicate terrorism. The issue lies in the counterterrorism policy conducted in the ground.
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