The bureaucratisation and professionalisation of security in INGOs: Security-risk management from the perspective of field workers.

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Abstract

Based on eight in-depth interviews conducted with humanitarian workers working in high-risk areas, this research examines the impact of bureaucratisation and professionalisation of INGOs on their security-risk management. Whereas twentieth century theorist have argued that bureaucracy and professionalisation increase efficiency in public institutions, this research has found that it also impedes on the delivery of humanitarian aid. The increased bureaucratisation and professionalisation of tasks in INGOs has created tensions between different hierarchical levels. In particular, field staff perceives the growing bureaucratisation of security risk management as a coercive and controlling tool used by headquarters to monitor their work at field level. At the same time, field staff have developed strategies to counter restrictive measures to retain independence and autonomy in their security-risk management. These tensions reflect the evolution of the humanitarian sector and the evolving drive behind aid delivery. This research thus contributes to debates around the securitization of the humanitarian sector and the implementation of efficient security risk management.

1. Cover of the book Saving Lives and Staying Alive by M.Neuman and F. Weissman (2016)

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Introduction

Just a couple of weeks ago, on June 25th, three members of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) were brutally murdered as they were travelling in Ethiopia's Tigray region, prompting the organisation to suspend parts of its activities in the country (MSF Statement, 25 June 2021). A few weeks before, the Islamic State claimed responsibility for the murder of ten deminers working for the HALO Trust in Afghanistan, while sixteen others were left injured (Goose, 2021). Three days before, two aid workers working for Doctors with Africa CUAMM were killed in Yirol West, South Sudan when their convoy was ambushed as they returned from a health facility (UN Press Release, 8 June 2021). Since the beginning of the year, ninety major attacks against humanitarian workers have been recorded by the Aid Worker Security Database. These attacks, like so many before them, have prompted international condemnation and called for better protection of humanitarian workers and the respect of international humanitarian law.

From the impact of humanitarian work to the legacy of colonialism in humanitarian interventions and the white saviour complex, the humanitarian sector has for decades been a widely discussed topic among academics. Yet, in recent years, the growing securitization of the humanitarian sector and the blurring lines between military interventions, politics and humanitarian aid has increasingly been studied. Multiple authors have argued that the humanitarian sector was becoming more dangerous as INGOs lost their reputation of being impartial and neutral (Lischer, 2007; Roth, 2015; Williamson and Darby, 2011). Marked by violent attacks against humanitarian workers in the past decade as well as court cases such as *Dennis v. Norwegian Refugee Council,* security-risk management policies in the humanitarian sector and the responsibilities of international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) towards their staff working in high-risk areas received increased scrutiny by academics (Abu Sa'Da and Crombé, 2015; Lohne and Sandvik, 2017). This further fuelled the debate on the extend of the so-called "duty of care" of INGOs towards their employees.

At the same time, multiple studies have been conducted on the evolution and growth of the humanitarian space since the end of the Cold War and the multiplication of organisations present in active conflict zones (Barnett and Weiss, 2011, p.50; Abu Sa'Da and Combré, 2015, p.144). The growth of organisations led to the evolution of their internal structures and the introduction of stricter bureaucratic procedures and hierarchies. While twenty century theorists (Weber, 1922; Merton, 1940; Caiden, 1985) have argued for the benefits of bureaucracies as efficient and rational work systems in the public sector, recent authors have also noted frictions between the different levels of hierarchy in the humanitarian sector. Unlike public institutions,

the humanitarian sector is surrounded by strong, romanticized preconceptions. Aid workers are commonly thought of as adventurous, selfless, and brave human beings who sacrifice their well-being and safety to help the most in need. Some authors such as Roth (2015) and Schneiker (2018) have thus argued that the rigid structures of hierarchy and the bureaucratic constraints can sometimes clash with these preconceptions and lead to internal conflicts. At the same time, INGOs increasingly face pressure to comply with legal requirements to protect their organisations from legal jeopardy. This in turn leads to stricter measures to closely monitor the work of their field staff. Multiple authors have thus identified power struggles between the so-called 'headquarters' of INGOs, ie the highest level of hierarchy, and the 'field staff' (Duffield, 2012; Beerli, 2018).

Despite extensive research on the humanitarian sector, few have looked at the impact of bureaucracy and professionalisation on security risk management at field level. This research aims to contribute to the existing research gap by combining theories on bureaucratisation, professionalisation, and security-risk management in the humanitarian sector. It will thus study to what extended the bureaucratisation and professionalisation of security-risk management have impacted the work of field staff active in high-risk environments, by focusing on the perceptions and lived experiences of field staff working in conflict-prone countries such as Afghanistan, Yemen, and South Sudan. Focusing on the perception of field staff is particularly relevant since they are the most affected by security-risk management policies. Field staff must juggle between carrying the main objective of INGOs, namely providing humanitarian aid, while also ensuring security-risk management policies and sometimes constraining bureaucratic procedures are implemented. Therefore, this research is based on eight qualitative in-depth interviews carried out with participants who are or have been working in various large INGOs in high-risk areas.

To start with, the dissertation will address the existing literature and debates regarding security risk management in INGOs and the impact of bureaucratisation and professionalisation on the work of field staff. After introducing the rationale behind the research method used to carry out the research, the results and findings will be exposed and analysed. The first part will focus on the evolution of the humanitarian space and the professionalisation of security-risk management through the creation of security-dedicated positions in INGOs. The second part will focus on the impact of bureaucratisation on the relation between headquarters and field staff as well as the growing influence of donors in security-risk management. Finally, the third part will focus on the impact of excessive security policies on field staff and the latter's strategies to counter

bureaucratic procedures to retain some decision-making power regarding security-risk management.

Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

Introduction

This section will provide an overview on existing theories on bureaucratisation and professionalisation, as well as on literature on security-risk management in INGOs. It predominantly includes recent research and publications addressing the management of risk, the professionalisation of security management, and the influence of different stakeholders in decision-making within INGOs. The literature review is organised in six sections addressing themes and questions that were recurrent across the literature.

Yet, it is necessary to first understand what is meant by security-risk management in the humanitarian sector. The aim of humanitarian security-risk management as defined by the Global Interagency Security Forum (GISF) is "to enable organisations to reach those most in need whilst fulfilling their duty of care" (GISF). In other words, security-risk management is understood as an enabling tool which supports organisations in carrying out their work and accessing vulnerable populations while ensuring their assets, including their humanitarian workers, are protected. Since security-risk management heavily impacts aid delivery, it touches upon the core values of humanitarianism, namely humanity, impartiality, independence, and neutrality (OCHA, 2012).

Bureaucratisation and professionalisation are closely linked to security-risk management, as they influence the organisational structure of risk management in INGOs and thus the perception of risk and security amongst aid workers. The key debates on security-risk management in INGOs include the growing securitisation of humanitarian aid, and to some extend, the blurring lines between military and humanitarian interventions. In particular, the changing nature of the humanitarian space and whether it is increasingly becoming dangerous and thus requires increased security has been a widely debated issue. Other research has focused on the friction that arises between headquarters and field workers when it comes to security management. This is linked to an emerging issue in the humanitarian sector, which is the responsibility of INGOs towards their staff, in particular their legal liability in case of incidents. This study will address these debates and focus on the perceived benefits and constraints posed

by the bureaucratisation and professionalisation of security-risk management on the work and role of field staff.

An evolving humanitarian space

Numerous studies carried out in the past three decades have focused on the debate whether the humanitarian sector was increasingly becoming dangerous and insecure. And indeed, an increase in violent incidents against humanitarian workers has been recorded in the past years. However, whether that perception of unprecedented violence targeting humanitarian staff is founded on a real increase of risk or is due to other reasons remains debated among academics (Abu Sa'Da and Crombé, 2015, p.135). For Wille and Fast, the rising number of incidents can be explained by an increase in risk-acceptance among aid workers. In their view, humanitarian organisations and their workers increasingly go into active fighting zones and remote areas to reach the most vulnerable beneficiaries (Wille and Fast, 2013, p.15, p.23). An argument is thus that staff is more likely to be exposed to so-called "freak accidents".

However, empirical evidence is lacking to support the argument that aid work is becoming more dangerous in itself (Duffield, 2012, p.477). The data on incidents and acts of violence against aid staff differs greatly among organisations. The definition of what constitutes a 'severe' event or how INGOs record their incidents varies considerably between organisations, meaning there is a reporting bias. Additionally, with the implementation of new technologies, incident reports and their dissemination have been facilitated, leading to an increase of absolute reported incidents. Comparing incident reporting through time is thus misleading since the technologies available varied greatly (Wille and Fast, 2013, p.7). Meanwhile, some incidents against humanitarian staff get reported because they receive media coverage while others go unreported (Neuman and Weissman, 2016, p.111, p.128).

At the same time, available data indicates that national staff is disproportionally the victim of incidents compared to international staff, especially in zones of active armed conflict (Wille and Fast, 2013, p.10). While incidents involving international staff working for UN agencies or other international organisations has decreased, it can be explained through risk-transfer to local partners and staff, and the implementation of remote management mechanisms where international staff is not physically present anymore (*Ibid*., p.13). Local or national staff thus remain in zones of active fighting, ensuring the INGO's presence (*Ibid*., p.21). Therefore, while security incidents against international staff have decreased, it has not necessarily translated into a decrease in incidents overall (*Ibid*., p.2, p.4).

Multiple articles argue that the humanitarian space has radically changed since the end of the Cold War, with many INGOs and NGOs entering the humanitarian space throughout the years. This has created an increase in competition for donor funding which in turn has led INGOs to establish themselves at the heart of conflicts zones rather than on the outskirts (Abu Sa'Da and Combré, 2015, p.144). Aid organisations started to reach territories previously deemed too dangerous, thus exposing their staff to more security risks (Duffield, 2012, p.476). Duffield argues that humanitarian space has profoundly changed from an institutionalised framework, often through UN programmes and Western aid diplomacy, to a much more fragmented landscape composed of a multitude of organisations with differing mandates (*Ibid*., p.483). While previous humanitarian access was negotiated through recognized institutions such as the UN, nowadays INGOs and NGOs seek out access to remote or high-risk territories by themselves (*Ibid*., p.484). This also means that they are responsible to seek out their own security for their programmes, sometimes by contracting private security and/or by negotiating with warring parties and local actors (*Ibid*., p.484).

In her research, Roth analyses the interplay of the politicization, securitization, and professionalisation of humanitarian work since the 1990s (Roth, 2015, p.141) She argues that the motivations behind humanitarian aid have evolved and so has the nature of aid and assistance programmes, which now operate directly in crisis environments rather than in the periphery (*Ibid*.). Collaborations between different non-governmental and supranational organisations as well as new types of donors have also tempered with the perception of neutrality that has long been the protective shield of humanitarian work (*Ibid*.). This argument is shared by Williamson and Darby, as well as by Donini and Maxwell who claim the growing number of organisations has led to the corrosion of the humanitarian reputation of NGOs and the politicisation of aid (Williamson and Darby, 2011, p.6; Donini and Maxwell, 2013, p.389). To describe the changing environment of the humanitarian sector, Schneiker employs vocabulary used to describe a capitalist system, such as "growth" and "market share", to emphasize the business-like mindset that NGOs have acquired. She further argues that the humanitarian system has become a mixture of military, political and economic interests, which has profoundly transformed the aid sector (Schneiker, 2018, p.111).

There is thus a consensus among the literature that the humanitarian space and the nature of humanitarian work have changed since the 1990s. In particular, the growing number of organisations has led to more competition for funding, which has professionalised the humanitarian space and turned it into a form of market, thus challenging the core foundation of

humanitarianism. While the rising insecurity of the humanitarian space remains contested in the literature, INGOs' incentive to operate in insecure environments and be at the forefront of crisis has increased the risk-acceptance among organisations.

Theories on bureaucratisation and professionalisation

Max Weber, German sociologist of the 19th century, was among the first to explore the benefits of bureaucratisation in the public sector. In his theory on bureaucratisation, he argues that the three main aspects of bureaucratisation are the fixed division of labour, a rigid chain of command and hierarchy among the workers, and the execution of precise tasks by qualified people with certifications (Waters and Waters, 2015, p.5). Hierarchization and bureaucratisation thus allow for the completion of precise tasks and remove ambiguities or inconsistencies in the workflow (*Ibid.*, p.32). Weber's theory thus supports growing professionalisation, where people acquire training and certifications for their qualifications in very specific fields (Ritzer, 1975, p.629). According to Weber, the strict regulations mean workers carry out their task irrespective of personal concerns or fluctuating circumstances (Waters and Waters, 2015, p.34). Instead, everything is predictable, and all personal sentiments or irrational handlings are eradicated. For Weber, bureaucratisation is the most efficient way to organise public institutions, whereas in the absence of bureaucracy, chaos erupts (*Ibid*., p.54).

Merton builds on Weber's theory on bureaucratisation an argues that it prevents 'friction' within the organisation since tasks are clearly separated. However, he also argues that a key limitation to bureaucracy is when its means become its end (Merton, 1940, p.563). In other words, when the strict rules are being followed to the extended that they become more important than the completion of the task or the overall purpose of the organisation. For Merton, this rigidity of bureaucracy can lead to the inability to adapt to 'special conditions' that were not foreseen by those who drafted the rules and regulations (*Ibid*., 564). Similarly, in 1985, Caiden argued that Weber's theory of bureaucratisation could lead to counter-productivity when bureaucracy was excessive (Caiden, 1985, p.22). He modelled his theory with the 'J-Curve of bureaucracy', whereby the efficiency gained by bureaucratisation reaches a tipping point and decreases. Among others, he attributed this effect to the dehumanisation of tasks (*Ibid*., 24). In this sense impersonal treatment of every situation can lead to ineffective treatment of the 'client' and service delivery.

Complementing the above theories on the benefits and limits of bureaucracy, Lipsky's theory on bureaucratisation in the public sector focuses on what he calls 'street-level bureaucrats', namely the workers that are the link between the highest branches of the hierarchy and the beneficiaries of the service (Michigan Law Review, 1981, p.811). Since street-bureaucrats work closely with the beneficiaries, Lipsky argues that they have a precise knowledge of the needs of their beneficiaries that do not necessarily coincide with the impersonal structure of bureaucracy. Street-level bureaucrats thus seek to retain autonomy and attempt to resist the strict adherence to the rules imposed by higher levels of their hierarchy. In this sense, contrary to Weber's theory, Lipsky argues that an autonomous street-level bureaucracy increases productivity since workers shape their own work patterns and adapt them to the individual needs of clients (Lipsky, 1980, p.19).

Bureaucratisation and power struggles between headquarters and field staff

While Weber, Merton, Caiden and Lipsky's theories focus on public and governmental institutions and the service they provide for their clients, their theories can also be mirrored unto INGOs and the aid programmes they deliver to beneficiaries. In this sense, Lipsky's 'street-bureaucrats' are reflected in field staff working for INGOs.

And indeed, recent literature on bureaucratisation in INGOs has focused on the dilemmas regarding the benefits and limitations of increased bureaucracy and professionalisation in their security-risk management. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) marked the beginning of the institutionalization of security within the humanitarian sector by creating the first security-dedicated position in 1992 (Beerli, 2018, p.72). This marked a shift in INGOs' approach to security risk management and created debates among organisations whether the growth of their structures required professionalisation and bureaucratisation of their security protocols, or whether the growth was in itself a source of additional risk for their staff (Abu Sa'Da and Crombé, 2015, p.136). Within MSF, the increasing bureaucratisation of the organisation ignited debates which ultimately led to the founders leaving the organisation (Neuman and Weissman, 2016, p.25). Critics argued that the professionalisation of security would lead to the 'bunkerization' of field staff. This in turn would jeopardize MSF's long strategy founded on 'acceptance' by the local population where it was carrying out its programs (Redfield, 2012, p.369).

Moreover, the bureaucratisation of the organisation was seen as taking away field staff's autonomy and independence, as they would now have to report and implement directives sent

by the higher levels of the hierarchy (Abu Sa'Da and Crombé, 2015, p.146). Beerli argues that the more standards of procedures, security manuals and monitoring tools implemented onto the work of field workers, the more headquarters indirectly assessed their control over field staff (Beerli, 2018, 78). Some regulations such as with whom field staff was allowed or not to have intimate relationships went so far as to blur the lines between the professional and private lives of field staff (*Ibid.,* p.71, p.81*)*. Duffield describes elements of security-risk managements as an "anxiety tool for governance", suggesting threats and risks are used by higher management to exert power over field staff by implementing rigid safety and security procedures (Duffield, 2012, p.486). Thus, the rigidity of rules imposed by higher levels of management and the attempt to retain flexibility by field staff were the main sources of internal struggles in INGO (Beerli, 2018, p.75).

The emergence of new technologies further exacerbated these power struggles, as top managers were able to monitor whether their decisions were respected and implemented at field level (*Ibid.*, p.74). Already in the 19th century, Weber argued that the development of communication means, and transmission of news were additional tools at the disposition of administrations to strengthen hierarchies and enforce strict bureaucratic organisation (Waters and Waters, 2015, p.33). Yet, Donini and Maxwell argue that the increased availability and use of technology is also detrimental to the delivery of humanitarian aid. They argue it facilitates remote management, which contributes to the distancing between international staff and local staff, between headquarters and field staff, and between aid workers and beneficiaries (Donini and Maxwell, 2013, p.386).

Yet, Beerli also argues that these bureaucratic and power structures within NGOs only exist if field staff accepts and respects them. In other words, they depend on the willingness of the field staff to abide to the power structure (Beerli, 2018, p.76). While higher management retains most of the decision-making power, Beerli argues that field staff might try to resist growing micro-management of headquarters and retain some flexibility in their work by bypassing security procedures (*Ibid*., p.75). Thus, while Brugger argues that information-sharing between all bureaucratic levels is key for effective security-risk management, Country Directors might also decide to not report certain incidents to headquarters, exerting their own decision-making power and countering control of headquarters (*Ibid*., 80; Bugger, 2009, p.438). Likewise, through interviews Schneiker found that field staff sometimes decide to omit sharing information with headquarters when they believe such information would be detrimental to the continuation of their program and thus their employment (Schneiker, 2018, p.115). Field staff thus avoids

addressing security concerns with their managers or headquarters because they assume their answers will be restrictive measures, which will hinder the field staff's work. Since the field staff is aware that their employment is dependent on the continuation of the program, they tend to not report security concerns or incidents to their superiors (*Ibid*.). Schneiker further found that field staff managers tended to see some security practices as excessive and even burdensome in their work, since the added administrative procedures would take up much of their time. They thus tended to neglect these procedures and focus solely on the aid program itself (*Ibid*., p.120).

Thus, while Weber and Merton argued that bureaucratisation prevents friction and ensures efficiency in public institutions, other researcher have argued the opposite when it comes to humanitarian security-risk management. While bureaucratisation advocates for the completion of pre-determined tasks among strictly defined roles, humanitarianism seeks first and foremost to address the needs of beneficiaries and is thus bound to adapt rules and procedures as needs change or context of aid delivery changes. The power play between headquarters and field staff has thus been a recurrent theme in the literature on security-risk management in INGOs. Some authors have argued that security risk management is becoming a power tool for headquarters to monitor their staff at field level, while field staff tries to retain decision-making power over headquarters or to influence their decision making by sharing limited information. Power imbalances thus prevent fluid communication and impede on efficient information sharing between different hierarchical levels.

Security strategies in the humanitarian sector

Roth identifies three types of security strategies among humanitarian organisations, namely (1) acceptance, (2) protection, and (3) deterrence. Acceptance tends to be the preferred strategy for humanitarian organisations, as it is founded on a close relationship with beneficiaries and local communities and mutual understanding regarding the INGO's role and objectives (Roth, 2015, p.142). Yet, the protection strategy is increasingly necessary, as INGOs decide to 'stay and deliver', i.e. continue their work despite growing risks to the safety of their staff (*Ibid*., p.142). The protection strategy thus pushes organisations to adopt increasingly restrictive measures such as curfews and limitations on movements to protect their field staff and continue their aid programmes. When security threats become unbearable, INGOs resort to the deterrence strategy, which often consists of suspending aid programmes for an undetermined period.

INGOs are continuously updating their security management and security structures as they become witness or victims of security incidents. Humanitarian organisations can only stay in a place if it is deemed secure enough for their staff. When it is not, options to increase security or better predict risks are put in place. However, as Beerli addresses in her research, the notion of security, upon which the continuation or the withdrawal of a humanitarian programme depends, is very subjective and there is a fine line between 'secure enough' and 'too insecure' (Beerli, 2018, p.72). Schneiker also found in her research that different members of an NGOs frame 'security' differently depending on their interests. For field staff, 'security' meant mostly restrictions and an additional burden, while Security Advisors, aware some staff opposed their position within the NGO, tried to frame 'security' as a mean to enable the program to continue. In other words, they framed 'security' as being essential to the continuation of the program and accessing its beneficiaries, rather than the reason programs would get stopped (Schneiker, 2018, p.124).

Yet, Beerli criticizes the securitization of humanitarian aid and the professionalisation of security, which translated into the creation of Security Advisor within INGOs, whose task it is to produce procedures to anticipate and mitigate risks (Beerli, 2018, p.70). The author argues that the profession of Security Advisors and their strategies to predict risk by laying out precise response plans gives an artificial sense of security (*Ibid*., p.72). At the same time, the securitisation of aid has also challenged humanitarian principles of aid organisations. Through a constructivist lens, Schneiker analyzes how security-management within NGOs sometimes comes to clash with humanitarian ideas, values, and principles. In particular, she identifies conflicting interests between security procedures and an NGO's humanitarian aim when tangible security measures such as fences, armored vehicles and armed security are implemented as part of the 'protection' strategy of INGOs (Schneiker, 2018, p.110).

The 'stay and deliver' strategy has further politicized INGOs. According to Myfawny's research on MSF, the humanitarian space in which the organisation operates is never apolitical or entirely neutral. Instead, despite an increase insecurity, MSF is in continuous negotiation and bargaining with local and regional political stakeholders to continue its programs and ensure staff security (Myfawny, 2020, p.32). In this sense, security-risk management is inherently political, which stands in contradiction to humanitarian principles. Moreover, Duffield points out that the growing "bunkerization" of humanitarian aid provoked by the 'stay and deliver' strategy of INGOs leads to a further distancing between aid workers and aid beneficiaries which can further impede adequate aid delivery (Duffield, 2012, p.475).

The understanding of security thus varies between roles in the INGO and is sometimes a source of conflict when security measures are not accepted or recognized as legitimate. The literature remains critical when it comes to predicting future risks and the growing emphasis put on Security Advisors is portrayed as in contradiction to the 'acceptance' strategy which comes closest to the principle of humanitarianism. The debate lies whether security-risk management is essential to humanitarian work and an enabler for aid delivery, or whether it is a hinderance to humanitarian aid. This debate will be addressed in this study from the perception of field staff.

Brand management and competition for donors

Security matters are of particular importance for headquarters removed from the field because security is closely linked to the INGO's brand image in the humanitarian space. In this sense, rigid bureaucratic tools and procedures are put in place to ensure staff security and to preserve the institution that is the INGO (Beerli, 2018, p.77). Fee and McGrath-Champ found parallels between the private business sector and the humanitarian sector. They argue that human resource management (HRM) in humanitarian organisations increasingly replicate the models of private, capitalist companies, as NGOs focus on the business costs of crisis rather than its human dimension (Fee and McGrath-Champ, 2017, p.1962).

The competitive environment for donor funding has emphasized the importance of brand marketing and brand recognition, and INGOs are more and more concerned about upholding their brands. This means aid organisations must uphold the organisation's name and their reputation by being visible in today's most risky countries during conflicts. Duffield argues that brand image increasingly dictates INGOs programmes and consequently their perception of risks (Duffield, 2012, p.485). According to Duffield, this pushes INGOs to accept or normalise risk and danger (*Ibid.*). In this sense, INGOs' brand image is increasingly becoming a key argument behind security decisions. Abu Sa'Da and Combré even argue that headquarters are exercising pressure on their field staff to stay in high-risk environments to continue the organisation's programmes (Abu Sa'Da and Combré, 2015, p.143).

Fee and McGrath-Champ also investigate the donor's influence on the behaviour of INGOs. Their research found that INGOs become increasingly politicised as donors become aware of the backlash and negative impact accidents on expatriate staff can have for the INGO's brand. The demands of donors thus become more exigent as to how the INGO operates (Fee and McGrath-Champ, 2017, p.1963). The donors' demands can thus sometimes influence an INGOs

security strategy, which also lead to tensions between funding actors and INGO staff (*Ibid*., p.1979).

For example, the main security strategy pursued by the ICRC is acceptance, which is closely tied to its brand and to the recognition of its name (Brugger, 2009, p.436). In this sense, upkeeping the brand management is also used as a protective shield for field staff. Therefore, the ICRC provides training to its staff to ensure they are aware of the limits of the ICRC's mandate and will not jeopardize the organisation's neutrality and reputation abroad (*Ibid*., p.444). However, on the opposite, Roth points out that an organisation's internationally recognized brand can sometimes also become a specific target for terror attacks, since the incidents will attract worldwide media coverage (Roth, 2015, p.141). And INGO's brand can therefore also become a target.

Interestingly, Schneiker found that staff at headquarters whose role it is to design programs tends to omit shedding too much light onto security risk management, since they are trying to be as sparing as possible with donor money (Schneiker, 2018, p.118). When security is integrated into the program design, it tends to focus on tangible security measures such as security equipment, as donors are more inclined to give funding for programs where they can see direct results. Hence, other type of security-risk management such as trainings, assessments, advisors, and dialogue with local stakeholders is less likely to get funding. This thus leads NGOs to implement security elements that do not necessarily correspond to the context or to their overall strategy of acceptance, which is the commonly preferred security strategy for NGOs (*Ibid*., p.119).

This section showed that competition for donor funding and the growing market approach of INGOs has an influence on security-risk management. Some authors have drawn parallels between the business-like mindset of INGOs and their brand management which increasingly draws them into riskier zones or pressures organisations to implement inadequate or unnecessary security measures. While some authors argue that donors are becoming more exigent regarding security measures implemented by INGOs because incidents reflect negatively on their own brands, other have argued that headquarters purposefully omit to mention them in proposals to reduce the costs of programs. Therefore, the influence of donors and brand management on security management at the field level will also be analyzed in this research.

Responsibilities & duty of care in a changing legal framework

The struggle between the individual's right to take risks and the organisation's right to control their staff's behaviour was a recurrent theme in research papers addressing the security risks linked to humanitarian work (Abu Sa'Da and Crombé, 2015, p.152). The balance of individual responsibility and the organisation's responsibility in risk-taking is constantly evolving as legal and moral frameworks change. Thus, the sharing of risk responsibilities has been constantly negotiated between the individuals and organisations, as INGOs grew and became more bureaucratised (*Ibid*., p.136).

Abu Sa'Da and Crombé studied how individual risk-taking, and responsibility is framed within MSF and how the understanding of the Charter evolved within the organisation. They question the legality and ethical value of the MSF Charter's last paragraph, which states that members and volunteers of the organisation are aware of the risks that their work entails and cannot claim any compensation for these (*Ibid.,* p.135). The authors also point out the choice of words used to describe the staff working within MSF. While they are called 'volunteers', which has a connotation of free will and puts a heavy load of the responsibility on the individual, MSF 'volunteers' are all staff hired by the organisation. In other words, they are professional employees of MSF rather than volunteers (*Ibid.,* p.316). The drive for professionalisation came as organisations grew and needed new skills and capabilities, yet the name of their positions did not evolve (*Ibid.* 146).

In multiple articles, it was argued that the adventure spirit which is linked to humanitarian work was often used by organisations to justify the risks and dangers as acceptable trade-offs. In the general mindset, humanitarian work is seen as a selfless act for which humanitarian workers must be brave, bold, and fearless by putting themselves voluntarily in danger. Thus, the appeal of humanitarian work is linked to the danger it implies. NGOs use this acceptance of danger to continue their programmes in highly sensitive environments. In her research, Roth explores aid work from the lens of edgework. In doing so, she argues that risk-taking is perceived by individuals as a key component of humanitarian work and the risk is even seen as a thrill and motivation. She compares humanitarian workers to extreme athletes, as both consciously put themselves in dangerous situation (Roth, 2015, p.39). Through interviews she carried out with international humanitarian workers, she found that multiple 'Western' humanitarian workers enjoyed the risk and challenging environments associated with humanitarian work. This was partly because they knew they could leave and return to their normal life should the situation become too unbearable (*Ibid*., p.145). The findings of her research also point out that some

individuals consciously sought danger and put themselves in risky situations to feel a thrill and to 'brag' about it later (*Ibid*., p.146, p.150). In that sense, the tendency of INGOs to use the protection strategy might further retrieve the edgework appeal of humanitarian work, thus making humanitarian work less attractive for 'Western' humanitarians in search of adventure and thrill (*Ibid*., p.151).

However, individuals who have been working in high-risk environments for a while and who feel they have decision-making power might sometimes be too risk-inclined as well. Roth's research found that humanitarian staff gets used to the risks they are exposed to, which simply become the 'new normal'. Risk becomes normalized and rationalized by humanitarian staff (*Ibid*., p.150). At the same time, participants in Roth's research still felt that it was their decision if they wanted to take a risk or not, and as such they engaged in individualize risk-taking on a day-to-day basis (*Ibid*.). Individuals with a large risk-appetite would therefore be more likely to put themselves at risk. Building up on Roth's research of aid work as 'edgework', Schneiker argues that omitting to report incidents and thus preventing more restrictive security measures is also a strategy of field staff to remain in a high-risk environment, which they seek (Schneiker, 2018, p.121). In that way, they also retain more decision-making power and responsibility over their own security.

Yet, multiple articles questioned the relevance and time-appropriateness of the founding principles and Charters of INGOs to the changing legal framework and the evolving humanitarian space. With the growing bureaucratisation of INGOs came also more legal obligations and in particular in the humanitarian space, the so-called 'codes of best practices', i.e. a set of rules meant to set standards for humanitarian organisations to ensure their staff's safety (Abu Sa'Da and Combré, 2015, p.154). Interestingly, Lohne and Sandvik argue in their research it was inevitable for the humanitarian space to be confronted to more restrictive legal frameworks as it expanded. The growing number of international humanitarian actors required regulations and legal mechanisms to better govern the humanitarian sector (Lohne and Sandvik, 2017, p.19).

In particular, the court case *Dennis v. the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)* was a turning point in the customary approach and implementation of 'duty of care' of INGOs towards their staff. On June 29th, 2012, an employee of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) was kidnapped and injured during an attack on a refugee camp in Dadaab, Kenya, on the same day a high official of the NGO was set to visit. The employee and three of his colleagues were released four days later during an armed rescue operation. In 2015, the employee, Steve Dennis,

sued the NRC for gross negligence and requested compensation. The Norwegian Court found the NRC guilty, and the NGO had to pay damage compensation to their former employee (Merkelback and Kemp, 2016, p.3). During the trial, the NRC argued its field office carried the responsibility for the breach in security and the resulting violent incident. In this case, bureaucracy thus became a tool to for the NRC to avoid responsibility and liability (Sandvik, 2018, p.367). However, in its ruling the court found that the NRC could have anticipated the kidnapping and put in place measures to reduce the risks. More importantly, the ruling of the Court established a link between the NRC's gross negligence and the occurring of the kidnapping, arguing the kidnapping could have been prevented.

Before the court case, there had been little debate about the duties of NGOs towards their employees. Most of legal debates were about NGOs' accountability towards their donors (Sandvik, 2018, p.361). Lohne and Sandvik argue that the case conceptualized the previously loose interpretation of 'duty of care', which was seen as a 'good practice' within the humanitarian space, but which did not have a legal framework (Lohne and Sandvik, 2017, p.17). After the court's ruling it became the minimum standard to which NGOs had to abide to, to ensure they were within the law (*Ibid*.). Multiple authors argue that the court case led to a change in the conception of 'duty of care' from being a moral responsibility to becoming a legal obligation between an employer and employee (Sandvik, 2018, p.358; Merkelback and Kemp, 2016, p.15). The verdict of the court case found that the law was the only legitimate legal framework for the employer-employee relationship of NGOs and could not be replaced by moral contracts or the culture of 'duty of care' (Sandvik, 2018, p.368). As such, this case set a precedent for other NGOs and INGOs in their legal responsibilities and thus liability towards their employees (Merkelback and Kemp, 2016, p.16).

Interestingly, the court also argued that employees must give their informed consent to the risks they are exposed to, something which was omitted in the case involving the NRC (*Ibid*., p.6). This also raised the question of organisations' responsibility to ensure their staff is thoroughly aware of the risks they are taking and urged NGOs' to be fully transparent about the security climate in which it is operating its programmes. The court's ruling raised concerns within the humanitarian sector as some feared they would no longer be able to carry out their programmes and missions in high-risk environments since the liability risk became too high (Lohne and Sandvik, 2017, p.18).

This section addressed one the most recent and central issues of security-risk management in INGOs. As the humanitarian space changed, volunteers who were in search for risk and danger

and got involved in humanitarianism turned into employees for whom running the programmes was a regular job. The legal and moral framework, which remained vague for INGOs for a long time, thus progressively changed to a legal liability and responsibility towards their employees. This liability threat has become a guiding aspect of today's security-risk management in INGOs, similar to legal liability and risk management for capitalist companies. The changing moral and legal responsibilities between INGOs and how they influence security management will be a core component of this study.

Conclusion

This literature review has thus addressed the key aspects and debates surrounding the bureaucratisation and professionalisation of security-risk management in INGOs. Across the literature, authors have addressed the transformation of the humanitarian space. Notably the fragmentation of the humanitarian space has challenged the core value of what *humanitarianism* represents and impacted the work of aid workers. According to the literature, INGOs have increased their risk-appetite and acceptance of risk which has led them to be present amid conflict and high-risk zones. However, academics have differing views on whether humanitarian work has become more dangerous or targeted by violence, or whether data biases give the impression of a more dangerous sector. In the past three decades, INGOS have progressively adopted a market-oriented approach that influences how they seek funding, how they manage their brand and how they address security-risk management. The business-like approach has also professionalised the sector, with staff members no longer being considered as volunteers but as employees. The inevitable bureaucratisation of INGOs linked to their expansion, has in turn led to the professionalisation of security-risk management. The existing literature on security-risk management in INGOs thus already identifies a growing bureaucratisation in the organisation of security, and the emergence of security-specific roles within the aid sector. According to some authors, the growing bureaucratisation has become a tool for headquarters to closely manage field staff, as INGO face more and more legal liabilities that did not exist thirty years ago. Theories on bureaucratisation have counted the merits of inflexible structures, clear distribution of tasks among professionals and rigid hierarchies. However, in the humanitarian sector, this growing bureaucracy has led to friction and power imbalances between headquarters and field staff, the 'street-level bureaucrats'. This study aims to analyze how the bureaucratisation and professionalisation of security-risk management has impacted the work field staff and aid delivery.

Research Design and Methodology

Research Question

As noted above, security-risk management in INGOs is increasingly becoming bureaucratised and professionalised, with dedicated departments at headquarters and security-specific positions at field level. These bureaucratisation and institutionalization of specific security positions have a direct influence on the work experiences of aid staff on the field, the "street-level" bureaucrats as Lipsky defines them (Lipsky, 1980, p.19).

Out of the twenty-three research papers mentioned in the literature review, less than a third have conducted interviews with INGO staff as part of their methodology to gather data. Most of the research was based on the analysis of security documents and materials as well as press statements, internal memos, and minutes of meetings. The perception and impact of a growingly bureaucratisation in security-risk management on field staff remains a sparsely researched topic. It also remains very subjective and evolving depending on the individuals, the organisation, and the context of operation. Building up on previous research, this dissertation thus aims to answer the question:

How does the bureaucratisation and professionalisation of security in INGOs impact security risk management at the field level?

Background and rationale for the design choice

Interviews are the preferred methodology for this type of research since the researcher is looking to gather data on personal perceptions and accounts of personal experiences regarding security-risk management and its implementation among humanitarian field staff, the interviewees work relations with their co-workers at headquarters, experienced work dynamics, and the impact of security measures they felt when working on the field (Richards, 1996, p.200). Accounts of personal experience and perception of security-risk management are scarce or inaccessible in the existing literature, thus gathering primary data was needed to complete this research project (Marczyk et al., 2005, p.48). As argued by Richards, interviews provide valuable information if they are carried out with key eyewitnesses and important actors in a specific field, both of which coincide with the nature of this research (Richards, 1996: 200). Wilson argues that semi-structured interviews are particularly suitable when the relevant debates are already identified, and the interviewer seeks to identify new aspects and previously unknown issues. The interviewee is thus able to give their opinion and perceptive on already

these issues (Wilson, 2014, p.24). For this study, where key debates have already been explored as demonstrated in the literature review, semi-structured interviews were thus the most suitable method.

Remote interviews were particularly accessible and an advantageous method for this study since interviewees were scattered around the globe. As argued by King et al. remote interviews allow the inclusion of participants living in remote areas or inaccessible to the researcher and is a significantly cheaper option than travelling (King et al., 2018, p.155, p.116; Wilson, 2014, p.65). Especially during the COVID-19 pandemic, travelling to gather data for this study was not an option. Thus, through remote interviews, international data could be collected at nearly zero costs (King et al. 2018, p.116). Remote interviews tend to more time-efficient, as they can be scheduled more conveniently than face-to-face interviews, thus present also a time advantage for the researcher and participants (Wilson, 2014, p.65).

Moreover, King et al. argue that remote interviews can present advantages when addressing sensitive topics, as the sense of anonymity is stronger among interviewees, who are thus more likely to share their own experiences and opinions (King et al., 2018, p.117). While remote interviews are often seen as the back-up option if face-to-face interviews are not feasible, Ward et al. found in their research that interviewees are sometimes more comfortable with that method and remote interviews should in certain contexts be prioritized over face-to-face interviews (Ward et al., 2015, p.2779).

Moreover, interviewees were Country Directors as well as security advisors on the field, and multiple interviewees had also gone to work at headquarters. Hence, with the assumption that specific values and interests are attached to specific roles within INGOs as discussed in the literature review, interviewing people from these different roles allowed the research to be more nuanced and cover a larger scope of perspectives.

Interviews also proved to be a more accessible method to study the subject of security-risk management. Indeed, accessing documents such as standard operating procedures (SOPs), contingency plans, security assessment, training descriptions, incident reports…etc. was particularly difficult. While they could have provided a great insight into security-risk management on the field level, INGOs are very reluctant to share these. Since these documents contain delicate information regarding perceived threats in their country of operation, they can be politically sensitive. They also contain evacuation plans and other emergency procedures which could compromise the safety of staff if leaked. Interviewing individuals about their own

personal experiences, perceptions and opinions was thus much more conceivable for this study. On the contrary to documents, the interviewees were expressing their own views, without engaging the organisation.

Description of design and method

The research design of this dissertation is based on the analysis of eight qualitative interviews carried out between the 21st of April and the 13th of May. The interviews took between one hour to two hours and were conducted over Zoom since the interviewees were based in Central Asia, the UK, North America, and Africa (see ANNEX 1). The interviews were semi-structured and contained open-ended questions to allow more in-depth questions. It also established a two-way communication and made the interviewees more comfortable and thus talkative. All interviews were conducted in English, the main language of operation for most of these INGOs, and the main language used in security-risk management.

Interviewees were selected based on multiple criteria: all interviewees had been or were current Country Directors or Country Security Advisors and were or had been working in high-risk countries, because such programmes are more likely to have a security-dedicated position in the field team. They were or had been working in large and medium-sized INGOs and had experience in leadership positions on the field. In all the INGOs included in this research, the Country Director was the main representative of the organisation in the country and the main liaison point between the field and the headquarters. All programmes in high-risk countries had security-dedicated position, also known has "Security Advisor" or "Security Manager" in the country itself, sometimes even "Area Security Advisor" responsible for the different regions where the INGOs were active. Other organisations also had an intermediary between the Country Director and the headquarters, so-called "Regional Security Advisors".

The criteria for INGO were that they had to be medium or large-sized organisations, thus more likely to have a bureaucratised security-risk management system in place, namely regional offices, and headquarters outside of the country where the aid programmes were being carried out. To include the variety of type of organisations and their operations and organisational structure, the researcher sought to select interviewees who were or had been working for different INGOs and in different countries, some working on emergency response while others were working on more development-oriented programmes, although the distinction between the two tends to be blurred. The researcher looked for potential interviewees on LinkedIn based on their profiles. Some interviewees had worked for multiple organisations during their careers

and had worked in multiple roles. A couple of the interviewees had also experience working on the field and at headquarters or at regional offices, which was also interesting for this research. In total, the researcher interviewed individuals who are or had been working among eleven different INGOs.

Interviews were recorded, and interviewees sometimes decided to leave their cameras on while others turned it off. All interviews were saved on an external hard drive and encrypted. Later, they were transcribed and de-identified to ensure completed anonymity of the interviewees. Any information that could identify the interviewee such as role, date, country, specific incidents, and name of the INGO was removed and de-identified. Therefore, some events that were used as example in the analysis were described as vaguely as possible, without information on the exact date or location of incidents to not identify the organisation. Once the interviews were transcribed, the researcher coded the data into recurrent topics based on the identified themes in the above literature review. In this sense, the analysis of the interviews follows a deductive approach, as the research is seeking for predetermined themes based on already existing research on the subject and the defined theoretical framework. From each interview the researcher coded recounts of experiences, incidents, anecdotes, comments, or personal opinions related to the structure of the INGO, the evolving humanitarian space, bureaucracy, professionalisation, security-risk management on the field, brand management and donor influence, duty of care and liability. Each theme also had sub-categories, to allow an in-depth analysis of the retrieved data. The specificities of each interviewee's profile were considered to allow a differentiated analysis depending on their previous experiences, the interviewee's background, the type of INGO as well as the type of donor funding their organisation relied on. The deductive qualitative analysis of the data facilitated the evaluation of the interviews since the pre-defined broad themes from the theoretical framework gave a structure from the start.

Evaluation and statement of limitations

However, the research design and chosen methodology presents multiple limitations. First, the qualitative nature of interviews makes them highly subjective and prone to biases. The analysis and findings of the research are specific to the interviewees of the research and their own perspectives and experiences (Marczyk et al. 2005, p.149). It was also difficult to get people to participate in this research; only a small percentage of the people who were contacted agreed to be interviewed. The findings of this research are thus not applicable to the entirety of INGOs and the researcher does not claim to have a representative sample of the aid sector. While they

do not provide a universal truth to a research question, it is also not the objective of this type of methodology. Rather, the analysis of interviews seeks to provide an additional perspective to already existing literature.

Moreover, as argued by Herod and Richards, it is almost inevitable that interviewees are biased in their accounting of events, and from an epistemological point of view, the 'truth' is almost unattainable (Herod, 1999, p.325). Especially in the case of this research which studies perceptions, the opinions and subjective perceptions of interviewees is pursued and examined. While biases are thus part of the study and are analysed, there is a risk that not all biases are identified by the researcher. Richards also argues that some interviewees might have an interest in distorting the truth to avoid responsibility or to portray themselves in a positive light (Richards, 1996, p.201). Especially in the case of security-risk management where human lives depend on decision-making and legal liability is a constant pressure on INGOs, the avoidance of responsibility or distortion of truth is a plausible limitation. Biases can also be made unconsciously since human memory tends to be selective or distorted, especially in extreme situations such as high-risk countries. To prevent the risk of bias to some extended, interviews with people from the same organisations were conducted and questions on similar or identical incidents with organisation-wide repercussions where asked. The difference in the recounts of these incidents could thus be identified. The researcher was also aware that depending on the interviewee's position and role within the organisations, their perception or account of certain issues could be biased. Therefore, the background, level of experience and role within the organisation of interviewees will be considered when analysing the findings.

Another limitation to this research is the researcher bias, whereby the analysis of the data relies mainly on the perception and subjective interpretation of the researcher (Marczyk et al. 2005, p.149). Epistemological research around interviews have demonstrated that the researcher tends to blur the lines between raw, objective data and their own interpretation of the data. Recounting interview findings relies on the subjective interpretation of the researcher (Kvale, 2007, p.48, p.52). Especially in the case of thematic deductive analysis, there is a risk of losing a nuanced approach to the data, since the researcher is seeking to pick out data that corresponds to their predefined themes. Wilson also argues that there is a risk interviewers guide the interviews into a particular direction, influencing the answers of the interviewees (Wilson, 2014, p.28). Semi-structured interviews also make the analysis of the findings more difficult, as the lack of rigid structure might make interviews too diverse to be compared (Wilson, 2014, p.28). While these limitations are certainly present in this research, the researcher was aware of them while

analysing the data and could thus pay close attention to their own biases. In particular, the semi-structured interview was designed with open-ended questions that would leave more room for the interviewees to answer more freely with limited influence from the researcher.

Cultural differences and language barriers are often cited as common limitations to interviews, and even though English was not every interviewee's mother tongue nor the researcher's, all had an excellent level, thus the language limitation was significantly reduced. However, out of the eight interviewees, six were from "Western" countries, while only two were from Asia. Moreover, out of the eight interviewees only one was a woman. The lack of diversity among the interviewees remains a significant limitation of this research and certainly does not give an adequate representation of the impact of security-risk management on all field staff.

Another limitation of this research is the lack of voices from so-called "national" or "local" staff. The topic of the national-international staff divide in INGOs came up in multiple articles on security-risk management, yet it tended to be superfluously addressed. Because of that distinction made in most organisations, national and international staff have different roles within security-risk management and experience it differently (Myfawnwy, 2020, p.31). While security advisor positions are also held by national staff, management positions are almost exclusively held by international staff, who also hold the main decision-making power over security measures. This distinction between national and international staff thus raises questions over the impact one's categorization can have on security-risk management. However, no "national" or "local" staff was included in this study because of ethical concerns and difficulty to contact. Therefore, this study fails to address the specific impacts the bureaucratisation of security-risk management has on local staff.

Ethical considerations

This study addresses sensitive issues such as risk exposure, power dynamics and safety and security measures. In particular, the interviews raise ethical questions since the interviewee will discuss a context that they are currently working in. However, since the project involves interviews with educated professionals in relation to their work, this project is considered low risk. No questions regarding particular incidents or attacks against humanitarian workers were raised by the researcher during the interview. If the interviewee talked about incidents out of their own initiative and was comfortable discussing them, then follow-up questions were raised regarding the reporting of the incident. Interviewees also received a consent form and a participant information sheet before the interviews and were informed at the beginning of each

interview that they could retrieve from the study at any point. All interviewees who participated in this research indicated that they felt safe in their work environment and within their organisation and would not stay if they did not. This study received ethical approval from the School Ethics Forum of the School of Social & Political Sciences of the University of Glasgow (see Annex 2).

Results & Findings

The following chapter will introduce and analyse the findings of the research. As described in the methodology part, the theoretical framework of the analysis will be based on the main themes identified in the literature review and on the bureaucratisation and professionalisation theories of Weber, Merton, Caiden and Lipsky.

The main findings of this research show that the securitisation of the aid sector has become a catalyst to increased bureaucratisation and centralization of management in INGOs. The perceived growing threat against humanitarian workers has justified increased monitoring and control of headquarters over field staff. While field staff shares decision-making power over security-risk management issues with headquarters, the growing constraints and procedures imposed by headquarters create disagreement and friction within the organisation. This research thus found that field staff adopted strategies to circumvent some of the perceived restrictive measures to ensure efficient delivery of aid.

In this section, the key findings of the research leading to the above argument will be elaborated and analysed. The analysis is divided in three main chapters: the securitization of the humanitarian space, the growing bureaucratic constrains in security management, and the perception and impact on field staff.

Chapter 1: The securitization of the humanitarian space

To begin with, this chapter will look at the evolution of security-risk management in INGOs operating in arguably increasingly dangerous environments. It will then analyze the impact of the professionalisation of security roles in INGOs and the seemingly militarization of the humanitarian sector.

An evolving humanitarian space

Similarly to the findings of previous research (Abu sa'Da and Combré, 2015; Wille and Fast, 2013; Neuman and Weissman, 2016; Duffield, 2012), the this research found that humanitarian workers perceive an increase threat against their safety when working on the field. Interviewees who had long careers in the humanitarian sector or who had witnessed key security incidents during their work reported that they had noticed a shift in the humanitarian space and how it affected their way of working. Multiple interviewees recalled that when they first started as Country Director, they were left almost completely on their own to implement security-risk management. While interviewees noted that some security procedures existed, they reckon that they were not particularly useful nor implemented. They noted that at the time they enjoyed being left in charge of security-risk management because they had the freedom to do what they wanted. However, with hindsight they argued that this approach to security-risk management only worked until major incidents happened within INGOs. An interviewee who worked in Afghanistan for multiple years recalled that the time they enjoyed most was when they could travel to places within the country and go on regular field visits. With the perceived growing threats of kidnapping and violence, field visits became much more restrained in the past couple of years.

For multiple interviewees, specific security events targeting humanitarian workers became "wake-up calls" in their understanding of security-risk management. The murder of humanitarian worker David Haynes by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Syria in 2014 was mentioned multiple times by interviewees, regardless of their INGOs. Unanimously, all interviewees stated that they could understand how the changing humanitarian space created the need for systems, procedures, and duty of care to protect staff. While these procedures and measures existed before, they were not necessarily applied on the field. Nowadays and in the current security environment in which INGOs operate, interviewees argued that the previously laid-back approach to security-risk management was no longer possible. The sole name of the organisation, the protective shield of humanitarian principles and the flag were not enough protection anymore, one interviewee noted. Another interviewee who worked in Sudan before the state divided into South Sudan in 2011 noted that at the time, there was a risk to be incidentally caught into a localised conflict, meaning an aid worker could be at the wrong time, at the wrong place and become a casualty in an incident. A couple of years later, the same interviewee noticed a shift, where aid workers were being deliberately targeted because of their job and their affiliation to an INGO. Multiple interviewees reiterated this sentiment, that violent

events had shifted from being incidental to becoming targeted and premeditated against aid workers. As argued by other researcher (Duffield, 2012; Wille and Fast, 2013), the interviews showed that aid workers are perceiving an increased threat against them. Whether the threat is real and whether humanitarian workers are indeed increasingly targeted is not the main issue here, but rather it shows that the humanitarian sector is becoming securitized.

While there are various securitization theories and schools of thoughts, securitization is defined as the framing of an issue as a threat to security. By identifying an issue as a threat to security, one also constructs the threat and defines it as a political priority (Balzacq, 2010, p.1). In this sense, securitization is subjective and serves to advance a political agenda or to direct public opinion and funding to defined security priorities. In the humanitarian space, multiple actors and stakeholders participate in the securitization of the humanitarian sector and frame threats. The interviews showed that INGOs on the field played a role in constructing perceived threats. Multiple times during the interviews, interviewees referred to their relations with other INGOs in the area as an influential factor in their own security-risk management. There was a consensus that the security-risk management of different INGOs present in the same country or area influenced each other. In some places, INGOs would share information amongst each other and there existed established, formal forums of organisations. In other places, communication, or cooperation among INGOs was weak or deliberately hindered by local authorities. Nonetheless, in both cases interviewees stated that the security-risk management policies of their organisation depended on what other organisations were doing in the same area. Some said it was to ensure one's organisation was not perceived as "the weakest target" which would make them particularly vulnerable to attacks. Others argued that INGOs had to protect their reputation and thus adjusted their security-risk management to those of other organisations. According to one interviewee working in Yemen where most INGOs had their staff living in compounds, this pressure to adjust security measures to other INGOs lead to a situation where no INGO wanted to be the first to take the risk and let their staff out of the compound, out of fear its reputation could be tarnished if an incident occurred. Other interviewees recalled that in some of their postings, even though they had not been any security incidents, or they had become predictable, there remained a high perceived threat among staff which resulted in unnecessarily restrictive policies.

These examples show that security-risk management does not necessarily reflect real threats against humanitarian workers, but rather reflects the degree of insecurity constructed by INGOs. In this sense, INGOs influence each other into enforcing restrictive security measures by

justifying increase threats against their staff, thus contributing to the securitization of the humanitarian sector.

The professionalisation and militarization of the aid sector

As argued by Ritzer (1975, p.633) who builds up on Weber's theory on bureaucratisation, growing bureaucratisation is accompanied by a professionalisation of roles in an organisation, and constitutes the "rationalization" of tasks. Through the interviews, the research found that the professionalisation of the humanitarian sector was indeed an ongoing phenomenon, as INGOs grow, and the humanitarian sector becomes more and more competitive. In almost haft of the interviews, the changing nature and profile of the humanitarian worker was discussed. The interviewees noted that a couple of year ago, humanitarian work was seen as an adventure, one would do during a year off before going back to their normal lives. Humanitarian workers did not necessarily have any diplomas or qualifications and were described as looking for adrenaline and stories to tell upon their return to their home countries. Humanitarian work was thus seen as voluntary work done sporadically in one's lives before embarking on another career path. Yet today, interviewees noted that humanitarian work had become a career, a field people enter with the objective to grow and pursue their professional development. This shift in the common understanding of humanitarian work and the professionalisation of the aid sector also influences how people behave and work. Interestingly, one interviewee noted that because people make a living from humanitarian work, they are less inclined to directly challenge directives from headquarters, out of fear it could damage their career. With the priority becoming one's own career and professional development, it is thus also conceivable that humanitarian objectives and priorities are no longer the drive behind certain decisions made in INGOs.

Moreover, as Weber argued back in the 19th century the professionalisation of tasks requires workers with specific qualifications (Waters and Waters, 2015, p.11). This led to the development of certification and training requirements in order to access to certain positions in organisations (Ritzer, 1975, p.629). In the humanitarian sector, this shift became evident with the creation of security-related positions. As noted in multiple interviews, the creation of security-related positions has attracted former military personnel and security personnel into the humanitarian sector. In this sense, two seemingly opposite sectors began working together. The militarization of the humanitarian sector was thus also an important point of discussion during the interviews, and interviewees had very different opinions on the matter. Multiple

interviewees noted that increasingly, former military professionals entered the humanitarian sector to work as security advisors, which sometimes challenged the humanitarian principles of INGOs. In particular, one interviewee noted that there is often a difference in the way humanitarian security is perceived:

> *"Some humanitarians are still very committed to the idea that we should walk unarmed, missionary style, without taking into account security risks. On the other side there are people with military backgrounds who cannot believe the risks that we are still taking. Since a lot of security risk managers are former militaries, we are now moving from the flagged vehicle to more militarization." Interviewee A*

Another interviewee who himself had a military background did not think it influenced their approach to security or to humanitarian work. On the contrary, they believed it was a "massive asset" to have someone with a military background because of their ability to communicate concisely, to manage different staff members with different profiles and to think strategically.

While Ritzer and Weber argue that the professionalisation of roles with specific skills and certifications enhances the efficiency of an organisation, interviewees stated that the creation of security-related roles sometimes led to friction among staff. Interviewees stated that throughout their careers, they have witnessed friction between Country Directors and Security Advisors, especially when the latter came from a military background. Interviewees attributed the disagreements to power struggles, whereby the Security Advisors tended to overstep their role and give orders to Country Directors. Others argued there were fundamental disagreements in how to approach and handle security in a humanitarian setting between military-trained staff and humanitarian-trained staff.

On multiple occasions, the United Nations (UN) was taken as a negative example of the growing securitization and militarization of the humanitarian sector. Interviewees noted that the UN tends to have highly secured compounds that look like military bases and big armoured cars. On the other hand, one interviewee explained that in their organisation, they try as much as possible to avoid attracting attention and becoming a target. Hence, they drive old looking cars to disappear in the crowd. The approaches to security thus vary drastically between organisations and institutions. However, in a sector where the distinction between the different humanitarian stakeholders is not easily made by the local population, some organisations might not be able to avoid becoming perceived as militarized.

The growing securitization of the humanitarian sector is also reflected in the increased shift to the "protection strategy" as defined by Roth (2015, p.142). Fostering local networks and good relations with the local population and authorities was repeatedly mentioned as the "most humanitarian" approach to security and thus to ensure access and implementation of the programme. One interviewee stated that "real information comes from local sources" (Interviewee C, Afghanistan). However, interviewees also noted that more and more, the "acceptance strategy" was being replaced by the "protection strategy", whereby movement and fields visit are restricted, and staff lives in secured designated areas. International staff are particularly affected by restrictive security measures and tend to manage programmes from compounds while national staff carries out the field work. The increased security measures also meant larger infrastructures and visible security items such as barbed wires, cameras, or roadblocks. Various interviewees argued that the larger the infrastructure and the more visible the security was, the more they felt alienated and distanced from the local community and beneficiaries. It thus seemed that Country Directors, who are overwhelmingly international staff, are increasingly dissociated from beneficiaries. In this sense, this raises the question to what extend they are able adequately assess the efficacy of the aid programme, and subsequently take decisions impacting its continuation.

To sum up, interviewees argued that they perceived an increase in risks in their work as humanitarians in the past decade and thus they could comprehend the necessity to introduce procedures and rules to formalize and standardize the security-risk management in INGOs. And while professionalisation led to efficiency and brought new qualified people into the sector, some interviewees also saw the arrival of former militaries in the humanitarian sector as a challenge to the core humanitarian principles of their sector. Moreover, the drive behind humanitarian aid also seemed to evolve, as roles within INGOs no longer are volunteer experiences, but rather professional careers. The approach to humanitarian aid thus changed through the increased securitization of the sector and the professionalisation of roles within INGOs.

Chapter 2: Growing bureaucratic constraints in security risk management: hierarchies, donor requirements and duty of care

This chapter will first look at how bureaucratisation and multiple hierarchical layers impact the implementation of security risk management at the field level. It will then assess the influence

of the donor requirements on INGOs' risk-appetite and decision making. Finally, this chapter will analyze the different perceptions and utilization of duty of care between headquarters and field staff.

Hierarchies in security-risk management

"Bureaucratisation" was described as the administrative procedures and chains of hierarchical decision-making within INGOs. Interviewees named the growth of the organisation and the volume of work as the reasons why procedures were bureaucratised and to some extend centralized at headquarters. The more pressure organisations had in term of insurance and legislation, the more paperwork they had, and therefore dedicated roles were created such as the Security Advisor, to lift off work from the Country Director. Multiple interviewees noted that the administrative procedures such as country assessments and context follow-ups take a lot of time and energy. In this sense, the delegation of work to other dedicated roles was seen as useful, and interviewees working at headquarters also described their role as sharing the load of risk management with field staff and providing psychological and moral support.

> *"Regular reporting is quite a bureaucratic headache because it is a huge amount of documents. It's worth having a security manager just to avoid having to do it." Interviewee F*

However, during the interviews, multiple pejorative remarks regarding large, centralized organisations were made, particularly regarding their slowness and inefficiency.

> *"In big organisations, the wheels turn slowly sometimes". Interviewee E*

Some interviewees expressed mixed feelings regarding the benefits of bureaucracy and described bureaucratic procedures as a *"burden"* but also *"helpful"*, while another interviewee called it a *"necessary evil"*. One interviewee said that after working for many years in different large NGOs, they chose to work for a medium-sized organisation where procedures were not centralized. While the organisation still had headquarters, the interviewee noted that the leadership team and the board members were not *"bureaucrats"*, suggesting again that bureaucracy was not something positive or to strive for.

Regarding the impact of bureaucratisation on the security risk management in their organisation and programmes, interviewees had mixed responses. Interviewees noted that having multiple sources of information was necessary to build complete risk assessments, thus having more people at different hierarchical levels involved in security management was seen as a benefit

gained from bureaucracy. Since headquarters had a more global and regional perspective, they could identify potential patterns and risks with a different viewpoint than field staff. Yet, in most organisations included in this research, field staff were responsible for producing the country security assessments. And while most assessments and security guidelines were drafted at the field level, they required the approval of headquarters. Headquarters sometimes provided overall and general security guidelines, but interviewees pointed out that staff working at headquarters had rarely ever been to the programme country, so they tended to give advice that was not necessarily useful for field staff who was much more aware of the local context. The involvement of multiple layers of bureaucracy in security-risk management thus led to constant negotiations between headquarters and field staff over security policies. Interviewees working at the field level stated that a large part of their job consisted of convincing management to adapt their guidelines to the local context of their programmes.

For field staff, the involvement of multiple people removed from the local context was sometimes perceived as irrelevant for security-risk management and ultimately became an extra workload that required time and resources. Therefore, on a day-to-day basis, field staff tried to manage "small issues" by themselves, as they considered the support headquarters could provide was limited. Only when serious incidents or emergencies occurred such as kidnappings or staff evacuation did field staff request support from headquarters. There was thus clearly an attempt by field staff to retain most decision-making power regarding security-risk management, by limiting the involvement of multiple hierarchical levels in their day-to-day operations.

The perception of bureaucracy and the establishment of hierarchies were thus seen as both a necessary evolution for growing organisations with increased administrative paperwork, but also as an obstacle to efficiency. The main perceived obstacle to efficiency were the long administrative procedures, as numerous documents had to go through various layers of hierarchy who did not necessarily have the right knowledge of the local context. As Caiden models in his J-Curve theory of bureaucracy, hierarchies provide many advantages, such as a distinctive division of responsibilities administered to different layers and a clear chain of command (Caiden, 1985, p.25). This is also the case in INGOs, where tasks are divided among dedicated roles which in theory leads to a lesser workload for Country Directors and better security assessment and risk monitoring. However, Caiden argues that the excessive layers of hierarchy can also become an impediment to efficiency. Hierarchies create a distance between the higher levels and the lower levels of an organisation (*Ibid*., p.26). In the case of INGOs, it

distances the headquarters from the realities of the daily work of field workers. Friction between the hierarchical layers thus appear, as field staff perceives the administrative paper load as excessive and an obstacle to their humanitarian work, while headquarters see it as their role to implement standardized procedures and strict reporting mechanisms to enable the continuation of programmes. Caiden goes so far as to say that hierarchies create internal power struggles, whereby each layer of hierarchy seeks to either upkeep their power or challenge the power of the higher level (*Ibid*.). As seen in the findings, to some extend these power struggles over decision-making and rules also arise within INGOs.

In large, centralized humanitarian organisations, a negotiation process is thus generated where field staff engages in discussion with headquarters to adapt or loosen given restrictive guidelines to their local context. While interviewees working at headquarters described their role more as a support to field staff, some interviewees working on the field also perceived headquarters' directives as burdensome and thus sought to remove them as much as possible from their work. Within this hierarchical and bureaucratic structure, external stakeholders also have an influence on security strategies. The following part will examine the influence of donors on security risk management.

Competition for donors and their influence on security risk management

The bureaucratisation of security risk-management and competition for donors were not always seen as clearly linked by all interviewees. At first instance, most interviewees stated they did not believe donors had any influence on the security-risk management within their organisation. Security advisors noted that the security requirements given by donors were still at the minimum of what organisations were already implementing. In this sense, they argued that donors had little impact on security-risk management in their organisations. However, upon further questioning, even if the links were not always obvious, it became clear that donors had an influence on security-risk management to some extend.

According to interviewees, the main concerns for donors are the control, supervision, and compliance of the project with the requirements attached to the funding. Such requirements include risk management, due diligence, anti-terrorism, and anti-corruption policies. In high-risk environments with poor governance systems and lack of legitimate authorities, requirements such as anti-corruption policies tend to be difficult to implement. One interviewee talked about a *"huge amount of work and pressure coming from European and American donors to be completely compliant" (Interviewee H)*. As almost all projects are audited and

donors can claim funding back if they notice non-conformity to requirements, organisations increasingly face pressure to comply with heavy administrative requirements. This means they have to spend a lot of time and human resources on the monitoring of donor requirements. This increased scrutiny from donors has thus further pushed organisations to bureaucratise their procedures. Field staff as well as headquarters are increasingly spending time on writing reports according to donors' requirements. This thus raises the question to what extend donor requirements are impeding the delivery of humanitarian aid. Fee and McGrath-Champ had found similar results in their research, arguing donors' requirements imposed on INGOs could lead to friction, as the pressure to comply to requirements restricted an organisation's capacity to efficiently provide humanitarian aid (Fee and McGrath-Champ, 2017, p.1979).

One interviewee said donors sometimes claim to refuse giving funding on grounds of security concerns. In reality, the interviewee argued that donors refuse because they believe the organisation cannot guarantee access to programme locations and thus will not have enough control over the programme and will have to transfer monitoring capacities to local partners. One interviewee added *"we cannot separate the security risk from the financial risk or fraud risk anymore" Interviewee G*. INGOs are pressured to ensure proper monitoring of their programmes, which largely goes through field visits. At the same time, organisations can become risk averse and restrict field visits in high-risk areas to be compliant with security risk management policies required by donor. There is thus a twofold pressure on INGO: they have to implement scrupulous monitoring of their programme through field visits in high-risk areas to ensure full compliance to donor requirements, and at the same time they also have to ensure strict safety of their field staff.

However, interviewees also noted a difference in "risk-appetite" among large donors such as ECHO and the UN. They stated that some donors would ask for detailed security assessments and risk management plans during the proposal plans, but in practice very few would comment on them or require changes.

> *"These security assessments are more a cover-up for donors. They have a list of documents they want to see; they check that they received it, and after that they don't really challenge it." Interviewee E*

Interviewees noted that while donors are very vocal about enhancing security-risk management, it was rarely reflected in the funding covered by donors. Yet, at the same time, the funding environment was becoming tighter and competition for funding increased among a growing

number of organisations. Two interviewees noted that at the beginning of a crisis, funding is more prevalent, and programmes can get funding for almost anything. As the programme goes along and the crisis receives less attention or evolves, funding becomes scarcer. One interviewee stated:

> *"People start looking at riskier locations to attract more funding as money is becoming tighter". Interviewee A*

Another interviewee stated that by working in difficult areas, INGOs can publicize their work and make themselves visible to donors. In this sense, the risk acceptance among organisations is presumably growing, and INGOs try to push the boundaries of the locations they are willing to implement programmes in. Multiple interviewees stated that their organisations no longer asked themselves *"Can we go there?"* but rather *"How can we safely go?"*. One interviewee went so far as to argue the humanitarian sector had adopted a capitalist mindset where organisations were pursuing business-like models to attract funding. Another interviewee stated that the risk acceptance was not only growing among INGOs but also among host governments. They argued that some host governments, who tend to also belong to the donor community, increasingly push humanitarian actors to work in hard-to-reach areas, such as areas controlled by non-governmental armed groups. On the one hand, INGOs are thus under pressure to enhance their security risk management, to comply with demanding donor requirements, invest resources in heavy monitoring and reporting exercises. On the other hand, they are also faced with increased competition for funding and sometimes lack thereof to cover necessary security measures.

To sump up, the pressure to attract donors and comply to their requirements has increased the bureaucratisation in INGOs, and the amount of resources spent on administrative procedures. Since the fulfillment of donors' requirements affects the viability of an organisation's programme and indirectly of the organisation itself, donors yield influence over an organisation's decisions making. While they do not directly command security-risk management, they influence the priorities and strategies that organisations adopt, which in turn are closely linked to security matters in high-risk countries. At the same time, the competition for donors has increased the risk-appetite of organisations to implement programmes in higher-risk areas. There is thus a dichotomy between the increase call for security-risk management, and the increase pressure for organisations to be present in high-risk areas.

Duty of care and legal liability

The requirements for better security-risk management are also reflected in the increased expectations regarding duty of care. As argued by multiple researchers (Abu Sa'Da and Crombé, 2015), the legal framework around duty of care has increasingly put pressure on INGOs to enhance their standards of staff protection. The NRC case was mentioned in each interview, although interviewees were quite divided if this court case had really had an impact on the security-risk management and understanding of duty of care in their organisations. Only one interviewee argued that the NRC case became a warning for the humanitarian sector that the lack of duty of care had consequences. In their opinion, the NRC case had a wide repercussion on the sector and impacted how NGOs and headquarters dealt with duty of care. The other interviewees were more nuanced and believed the NRC case did not have a significant impact on security-risk management and duty of care. They argued that the understanding of duty of care had already been evolving in the aid sector before the NRC case. The killing of David Haines by ISIS among other attacks against humanitarian workers as well as the growth of several organisations and the expansion of their activities led to the reinforcement of their security risk management capacities and the creation of roles dedicated to security. Coupled with the increased pressure in terms of insurance and legislation, organisations naturally evolved to implementing stricter "duty of care" to protect themselves from legal jeopardy. In this sense, it appears as if the NRC was more symptomatic of an evolving sector rather than a catalyst event in the understanding and implementation of duty of care. Thus, while the NRC case had an impact on the humanitarian sector, this research would not go as far as Lohne and Sandvik (2017) or Merkelbach and Kemp (2016) who argue this court case conceptualized duty of care into a legal requirement. Instead, this research found that the implementation of a legally binding duty of care was a progression evolving alongside changing legislations and insurance requirements. Nonetheless, this progression was certainly accelerated by incidents such as the NRC case as well as other incidents against humanitarian workers.

Yet, the pressure INGOs face, and the costly legal procedures they incur if they do not comply with their legal duty as employer to keep their staff safe was mentioned by all interviewees. One interviewee stated, *"Incidents can kill the NGO" Interviewee D*. Bureaucratisation and the implementation of strict reporting procedures and security rules had thus become the safeguards to protect organisations from any liabilities. One interviewee argued that bureaucratic implementation of duty of care not only keeps staff safe, but it also protects the organisation from legal lawsuits that would require lots of money and resources. This in turn leads to a higher

workload for staff within organisations, as the protection from legal liability goes through the completion of a number of administrative tasks. For field staff, regular reporting on the security context as well as the drafting of security assessment are not only put in place to enable the safe implementation of the programme, but these documents have also become legally required documents. In case an incident happens, and the organisation is brought to justice, duty of care will stand up in court if such documents have regularly been completed. The bureaucratic procedures are thus deemed unavoidable to ensure legal accountability of organisations.

Yet, while the legal framework and responsibilities of organisations became more rigorous, one interviewee argued that duty of care became a *"list where INGOs have to mark everything they're doing"* to make sure they are covered for any legal liability, even when the policies and procedures are not justified for the local context where field staff operate. One interviewee stated that in their experience working in Afghanistan, they were multiple instances where they had doubts whether the safety of the field staff was the main priority in the policies implemented by the headquarters of the organisation. In their perceptions, the duty of care implemented by headquarters was first and foremost designed to protect the organisation from liability, rather than adequately and efficiently protecting field staff.

> *"My biggest question was: why are we doing HEAT [Hostile Environment Awareness Training]? It's completely useless in Afghanistan! This is a different kind of war, it's a completely different perspective. HEAT training is for typical warzones. Here in Afghanistan, you don't know where you're going to be when something happens, you live a normal life in a city. To me, HEAT training wasn't teaching me what I needed to protect myself. The HEAT training was [organisation's name]'s way of saying: we've done our duty of care." Interviewee B*

Yet, at headquarters, duty of care was framed as way to ensure access to high-risk areas and the continuation of programmes while also protecting staff. Headquarters thus described duty of care as an enabler of the programme, rather than an obstacle to aid delivery. Yet, according to interviewees working at headquarters, Country Directors rarely addressed duty of care when implementing their programmes, as they argued field staff's main priority was the set only on the completion and expansion of aid programmes, rather than protecting the organisation from any liability. One interviewee at headquarters said that framing duty of care as an 'enabler' of humanitarian aid delivery had less traction from field staff than its legal threat. In other words, headquarters used the legal liability and threat of legal procedures around duty of care to ensure

procedures and regulations were implemented at the field level. In this sense, duty of care was also used by headquarters as a tool to coerce field staff into implementing adequate security risk management and follow bureaucratic procedures.

Throughout the interviews it thus became clear that participants had different perceptions regarding the implementation of duty of care. Duty of care was understood has having two objectives: the protection of staff and the protection of the INGO from any legal liability. The balance between the two was often the friction point between staff. However, it would be to simplistic and reductive to argue headquarters only have the protection of the INGO in mind while field staff solely cares about the protection of staff and the delivery of aid. The reality is more nuanced and both juggle with the two priorities of fulfilling legal requirements while protection staff and ensuring their capacity to carry out their work on the field. And these priorities are not necessarily contradictory, as the continuation of programmes depend on the survival of the INGO. However, the legal aspect associated to duty of care has reinforced the bureaucratisation of security procedures as legal documents and paperwork are used to protect INGOs from legal liabilities. This legal liability looming above INGOs has however not only had positive impact on the protection of staff. Some security-risk management measures implemented on the field were not necessarily efficient or appropriate for field staff. Rather, they were designed and implemented to protect the INGO. Therefore, friction appeared when duty of care and the bureaucratic procedures were perceived by field staff as a controlling and coercive tool used by headquarters.

This chapter thus showed that while bureaucracy was deemed necessary by interviewees, field staff in particular perceived the multiple hierarchical layers in their organisations as an additional hurdle to efficient security risk management. In particular, the additional constraints and prolonged administrative procedures were perceived as slowing down the overall operations of the INGOs. For field staff, having to constantly negotiate and discuss security policies with people removed from the local realities was time and resource consuming. They were thus trying to remove headquarters as much as possible from their daily work at the field level. Moreover, external stakeholders such as donors were increasingly influencing security risk management in INGOs. Although not directly, their requirements and ability to retrieve funding if INGOs did not fulfill them put an additional pressure on headquarters to closely monitor their field staff. To some extend this led to a vicious circle: increased competition for funding pushed INGOs to implement projects in increasingly dangerous areas where security risk management became increasingly complicated to monitor. In addition, the pressure of duty

of care further pushed the bureaucratisation of procedures to ensure INGOs complied to labour laws. While in principle duty of care should ensure better protection of field staff, the latter have argued that some security measures implemented in the name of 'duty of care' were really designed to protect the organisation from legal liabilities and to increase headquarters monitoring tools over field staff. Hence, the next chapter will examine how field staff resists restrictive security measures in their daily work.

Chapter 3: Perception and impact of security risk management on field staff

This last chapter will first examine how field staff perceive security risk management policies enforced by headquarters and how these impacted their delivery of humanitarian aid. The chapter will then look at the constraints of brand management imposed on the work of field staff, but also how the latter uses brand management to expand their activities. Finally, the last part will analyse how field staff counters and resists perceived restrictive security risk management.

Impact of bureaucracy on aid delivery

The impact of bureaucratic procedures of security risk management on the humanitarian work of field staff was a core issue discussed throughout the interviewees. Overall, participants working at the field level described reporting procedures as *"quite boring"* and *"burdensome"*. Some Country Directors said they reported all incidents on a daily basis to their headquarters, noting however that some of the reports were just done because it was a requirement, even though they did not see an added value in them. Others said their reports would be *"buried in history"* and not necessarily used for further assessment but are nonetheless drafted because they are required by donors. Thus, there was a lack of understanding behind certain requirements and procedures imposed on field staff. One interviewee argued that this lack of understanding of what the paperwork is used for, led some field staff to believe their work was simply another entry in a database that will not be used, and therefore was not essential. Almost all interviewees also stated that they could imagine that the heavy workload related to administrative procedures and reporting could deter humanitarian workers in reporting incidents. These findings thus join what Caiden argued in 1985, namely that when workers are removed from the end product, they will care less about the successful completion of their intermediary task (Caiden, 1985, p.24). In other words, if workers cannot see the added benefit of producing reports, they will not invest time and resources in it.

Many interviewees acknowledged that they could relate to Country Directors who did not report incidents out of fear headquarters would implement new, excessive security measure or would misinterpret the incident and blow it out of proportions. Especially in risk-prone countries where staff members were living relatively normal lives, the fear that one incident could change their lifestyle made them reluctant to share information with their headquarters. The lack of understanding behind certain security-risk management measures also meant field staff tended to be more hostile towards restrictive security measures. Interviewees explained that when field staff experienced a security incident or witnessed violence in their host country, they were very acceptant of the security measures put in place such as barbwires, high walls, curfews, confinement in compounds…etc. There was no resistant against such restrictive measures. However, as staff rotated every couple of years and new people arrived, they did not necessarily witness the conflict. If they arrived after a period of conflict or violence and there was no clear, tangible threat anymore, they would perceive the security procedures as excessively restrictive. When no incidents had happened in a while, the acceptance among field staff regarding restrictive security measures decreased, even though the threats were still present.

> *"In Bamako, life is quite nice, you don't feel at risk. There will be one incident, and everyone will be happy with a curfew. Then you'll have new people coming in and staying there for two years and of course they won't be happy to have a curfew. So there is more resistance with that kind of restrictions on social life than with programme activities. Although, programme managers sometimes are not happy with programme restrictions either." Interviewee A*

Interestingly, one interviewee noted that when local or national staff expressed concerns regarding security measures and said they need to be adjusted, there was usually an immediate consensus among the rest of the field staff that security measures needed to be changed, even if it meant they would become more restrictive. Field staff thus had a different approach to security risk policies depending on who requested them. While they tended to trust local staff in their ability to assess what security measures were most appropriate and needed, since they knew best the context of the host country, they perceived measures imposed by higher management as excessive, restrictive or unjustified. Field staff thus saw the removal of headquarters from the local realities as their lack of legitimacy to impose rules on the field level.

Throughout the interviews, multiple instances of disagreements and friction between headquarters and field staff regarding security-risk management were reported by participants. In particular, participants recalled that they often had to argue with their regional offices or

headquarters regarding the introduction of new security measures. One interviewee described his experience working for a large INGO with headquarters in New York as *"horrible"*. The organisation was highly centralized, with multiple hierarchical levels between the country director, the regional security advisor and the security department at headquarters. The participants recalled how all the final decisions regarding security measures came from headquarters, and while they certainly had expertise in security management, the interviewee believed field staff should retain the ultimate authority to decide what is best for field staff and for the programme.

> *"The system was very bureaucratic. […] Everything that came from headquarters were complete restrictions on our [field staff's] movements, meetings, field visits. I was completely dependent on the management team in New York and could not deviate from their restrictions." Interviewee C*

The interviewee noted that despite these restrictive security measures, multiple local and international staff were killed while working on the field.

> *"Even more structured and strict security systems with very high bureaucratic channels and hierarchical systems do not work." Interviewee C*

This sentiment of excessive restrictions imposed by headquarters was reiterated by multiple interviewees. Most disagreements between headquarters and field staff tended to arise because "management" and board members are outside of the country and do not have the inside country perspective that field staff have. There appeared to be a discrepancy between the way headquarters manage security outside of the country and how security is practically managed and implemented inside the country.

> *"I had to get people who had never been to Afghanistan to understand how things work here. […] If you are sitting outside of the country then you have no right to direct. You should be listening to the people on the ground." Interviewee B*

Interviewees working at the field level argued that restrictions on movement and field visits imposed by headquarters created an important disconnect between the field staff operating the programme and the beneficiaries of the programme. The lack of monitoring and visits meant field staff was not able to collect feedback from beneficiaries and involve them in the programme. However, the perception and involvement of the communities in the programme was crucial to ensure the programme was accepted by the community, tailored to their needs

and ultimately successful. In this sense, interviewees argued that restrictive security measures created a distance between field staff and beneficiaries and communities. This jeopardized the local acceptance towards the programme and the presence of the INGO, which ultimately influenced the security and safety of staff. The findings of this research thus reflected what Lipsky notes is the contradiction street-level bureaucrats face in their daily work (Lipsky, 1980, p.71). Street level bureaucrats, ie field staff, are motivated to help beneficiaries through the delivery of services, where human contact and interaction is necessary to build trust. At the same time, and that is where the contradiction lies, they have to deliver aid through a bureaucratic structure which imposes strict norms and procedures, which are ultimately impersonal and detached from individuals and do not consider specific context or situations (*Ibid*.) Street-level bureaucrats are thus torn between using their position as "advocates" for beneficiaries, ie ensuring they receive the best possible support and aid from the organisation, and their obligation to implement certain guidelines and measures that eventually distance them from beneficiaries (Lipsky, 1980, p.72).

Thus, the lack of understanding behind certain bureaucratic procedures and the perceived excessive intrusion of bureaucracy and hierarchical power dynamics into programme implementation not only created resistance towards security measures among field workers, but it also alienated them from the beneficiaries of the programme. Field staff perceived the strict measures imposed by higher hierarchical levels as a hinderance to the delivery of aid and successful completion of the programme. The conformity to procedures, impersonal and rational delivery of services, which according to Weber (Waters and Waters, 2015, p.32) were virtues of bureaucracy, Caiden (1985, p.30) and Lipsky (1980, p.71) see as an impediment to service delivery. The excessive bureaucracy and pressure to comply with requirements has shifted the priorities of their organisation; the accessibility and proximity of beneficiaries has been overshadowed by the need to conform to strict security measures often perceived as unjustified. Merton argues that "the devotion to the rules leads to their transformation into absolutes; they are no longer conceived as relative to a given set of purposes" (Merton, 1940, p.564). In other words, the conformity to bureaucratic procedures has become the main priority of organisations, rather than the initial goal of aid delivery for which bureaucratic procedures were only meant to be enabling tools. Interviewees have attributed the inflexibility of procedures to the centralized management of organisations, where people at headquarters drafted rules without necessarily understanding the context in which these rules would ultimately be implemented. This was particularly noticeable when on the contrary to

headquarters, security measures recommended by local staff were almost immediately accepted among field staff. Yet, as will be discussed in the next part, brand management at the global and field levels has emerged as an additional constraining factor organisations have to consider in their security strategies.

Brand management: between constraints and possibilities for field staff

The growth of INGOs and the multiplication of aid organisations in the humanitarian sector has created a competitive environment. Bureaucracy and professionalisation have led to the creation of dedicated communication and press departments in INGOs to maintain good relations with the media and ensure the visibility of the organisations. Multiple authors have argued that brand management increasingly dictates organisations' security risk management, as it is closely linked to the competition for donors. Authors such as Schneiker (2018) and Beerli (2018) have argued that organisations are adopting business-like brand management to ensure they remain visible by the international community and attractive for donors. Multiple interviewees explained that especially after serious security incidents which attracted international attention and tarnished the name of the INGO, their organisations had to have a public reaction to restore their reputation and mitigate the bad publicity. The reaction often involved the introduction of new security policies or the revision of existing ones. While some interviewees noted that INGOs tended to overreact after serious incidents, they also acknowledged that organisations had to upkeep their brand as reliable and safe organisations.

However, friction between headquarters and field staff would arise when reactions were perceived as unjustified. As one interviewee recalled, a couple of years ago, a serious attack against multiple staff members drew international attention. Following the attack, the headquarters of the INGO introduced new global security measures. The interviewee explained that in the case of this specific incident, there had been no failing of the security management, meaning the attack had been incidental. Yet, the new measures introduced by headquarters were affecting all the programmes of the organisations, regardless of the country or context. There was thus a complete disregard whether the new measures were necessary or useful in all contexts. Headquarters requested all the organisation's country directors to make some security adjustments in their countries, so that headquarters could in turn show the donor community that the organisation was responding to the attack. The interviewee perceived headquarters response as reactionary to an incidental attack and the arbitrary measures as unnecessary for most programmes.

"Security is not a cookie-cutter. Security policies do not apply equally everywhere to everybody." Interviewee B

Another factor of friction between headquarters and field staff was the discrepancy between brand management rules given by headquarters and their practical implementation at the field level. For example, an interviewee recalled that while working as a Country Director in Afghanistan, they had made the decision to use armoured vehicles. These were however forbidden by the organisation, which believed armoured vehicles would tarnish the 'humanitarian' reputation of the INGO as they would be perceived as too militarized. However, for the interviewee, it was the safest transportation option for field staff and since the Country Director is responsible for security measures, they went against headquarters advice. There was thus a discrepancy between the headquarters demand to upkeep the organisation's brand as neutral and 'humanitarian', and the perception of the Country Director that armoured vehicles were the only equipment adequate to ensure the safety of their field staff. Hence, while the Country Director was tasked with implementing security measures to protect field staff they were limited in what they were allowed to do because of brand management strategies enforced by headquarters.

However, contrary to most research done previously on brand management within INGOs, this research found that brand management was not only a priority or a concern for headquarters. Instead, this research found that field staff also dealt with brand management in their host countries. Multiple interviewees argued that the upkeep of the organisation's name was also a priority for them at the field level. However, interviewees still reported instances of disagreements with headquarters regarding brand management and security risk management. While Abu Sa'Da and Combré argue that headquarters tend to pressure their staff to stay in high-risk environments to maintain the organisation's visibility (Abu Sa'Da and Combré, 2015, p.143), this research found that the opposite also occurred. For example, one interviewee who was a former Country Director recalled how they had tried to push for a humanitarian intervention in Taliban territory. For the interviewee, going into Taliban territory and providing humanitarian aid to the neediest was necessary to put the organisation on the radar of donors. Headquarters however deemed the area too dangerous and rejected the programme extension based on security concerns. For the interviewee who was country director at the time, the rejection was not understandable. They argued it was crucial for the organisation to be present in Taliban area in a time when all the media attention was there too. In this sense, the findings of this research correspond to Duffield's argument that brand image increasingly dictates INGO

programme strategies and consequently their perception of risk (Duffield, 2012, p.485). However, the push for a growing risk acceptance did not solely come from headquarters. On the contrary, this research found that brand image is increasingly became an argument for field staff to expand their programmes.

Brand management was thus becoming a core strategic component within INGOs and posed additional constraints on the everyday work of field staff. Brand management is closely linked to the competition for donor funding that increasingly put pressure on INGOs. Especially after security incidents, INGOs ought to have a public reaction to upkeep their reputation and brand. However, brand management strategies and global responses to security incidents can lead to friction between headquarters and field staff when the latter perceives headquarters' response to an incident as reactionary and enforced irrespective of diverse local contexts. There was thus a resistance from field staff who would also go against headquarters' brand management strategy, in particular when they did not perceive them as fitting to the local security concerns. However, unlike most previous research done on the topic, this research found that field staff was equally concerned by brand management. However, brand management carried out by staff at the field level tended to have different priorities and concerns than the global brand management carried out at headquarters level: headquarters were particularly wary of incidents that would tarnish the entire organisation, while field staff tried to make their programmes visible to attract funding from partners and donors present locally. They were thus also pushing the boundaries of risk acceptance expand their programmes in high-risk environments.

Resisting restrictions and the burden of bureaucracy

Throughout the interviewees, the strategies to counter bureaucratic constraints or resist restrictions were discussed with the participants. The profile of staff seemed to have an influence on the degree of acceptance regarding restrictive measures. According to interviewees, people who entered the humanitarian sector first and foremost because they were looking for a thrill seemed to be the least acceptant of restrictive measures. Especially in situations were the perceived risk seemed low, security measures were perceived as too restrictive. Interviewees recalled multiple situations where members of their staff had tried to break out of compounds, violated curfew hours or restrictions on movement. Restrictions on social lives were the most common cited restrictions that were the least accepted by staff.

> *"I have seen many very young staff from the US coming into the humanitarian sector and their lifestyle is very different. So when they land in a country and they*

find themselves in a cage, which makes their lives miserable, they try to breach security measures. […] People try to counter [security measures], they think that they are more brave, more adventurous, or they just cannot manage this lifestyle." Interviewee F

On the other hand, interviewees noted that local staff tended to speak out less against security procedures, out of fear they would lose their jobs if they did. The ability to challenge security measures and even violate them was thus linked to a certain privilege of being able to jeopardize one's job and income. This research thus found similar results as Roth, namely that the romanticization of humanitarian workers as 'edgework' led certain profiles of humanitarian workers to counter restrictive measures on their lives (Roth, 2015, p.139).

However, without plainly breaking security rules, field staff used other tools to retain some of their independence. Just as Beerli (2018), Schneiker (2018) and Lipsky (1980) have argued in their research, field staff were trying to resist the control of headquarters to maintain some independence in their decision making. For Lipsky, every social order relies on the acceptance or permission of its members (Lipsky, 1980, p.117). Since the essence of aid work is to help other humans, Lipsky argues that so-called 'street-level bureaucrats' have to use their own judgment to make individual decisions depending on the specificities of the beneficiaries, more or less in the scope of limits imposed by higher bureaucrats (*Ibid*., p.161). In this sense, field staff have developed strategies to either counter bureaucratic constrains or use hierarchical levels to their advantage. For example one interviewee worked for an organisation who was in partnership with another INGO. The bureaucracies of both organisations were thus intertwined which made the overall policies very restrictive. To get around these restrictions, the interviewee made informal agreements with colleagues in the hierarchy to get exceptions from certain measures granted.

"I would ask myself: Who is my ally? Who within these hierarchies will back me up and then convince the other levels of hierarchy? I had to work like a politician!" Interviewee B

"Educating management" at headquarters on the realities of the field and bargaining with *"bureaucratic leaders"* was also a core strategy conducted by Country Directors to obtain permission to change certain procedures as they saw fit. Country Directors recognized that they had to go through many loops and used strategies and tactics to get certain aspects of programmes approved by headquarters. One interviewee confessed they tended to avoid

security approval until the last minute, so that when every other department at headquarters had already given their approval, it put more pressure on the security department to do the same. A couple of interviewees also confessed that they sometimes took decisions that they knew headquarters would disapprove of, and *"just said sorry later"*. The relationship and level of mutual trust between headquarters and field staff thus had an important influence on the flexibility field staff could retain in implementing security measures on the field.

Another leverage field staff has over headquarters was their detention of information. Lipsky notes that street-level bureaucrats are the source of information for headquarters and thus they are able to adjust information in a way that is beneficial for them (Lipsky, 1980, p.163). Country Directors admitted they would sometimes report to headquarters on the current security climate in a way that would not be detrimental to their way of working and programme. Others would select which incident they reported and simply omit reporting certain incidents. Throughout the interviewees, underreporting of incidents was seen as a major occurrence in the humanitarian sector. Most INGOS had their own specific databases where they reported and recorded incidents. Headquarters had repeatedly tried to simplify and fasten the reporting system, with more yes and no questions. However, yes-no questions would sometimes also deter field staff from reporting, as they would leave little room to give a nuanced description of incidents, thus leading to the risk that reports would be misinterpreted by headquarters.

For example, one interview recalled an incident where a bullet had gone through the window of the organisation's field office and was found the next day in the office. By assessing the trajectory of the bullet, they found it had not been shot at the building but had ricochet and gone through the window. It was thus deemed a freak incident and not an intentional attack targeting the organisation. The interviewee explained that in Afghanistan, it is custom to shoot guns for celebrations. The Country Director thus ordered the field security advisor to inquire whether a nearby party had taken place the day before. Since the Country Director knew that if they would report the incident, it would be disseminated to headquarters and the other branches of the organisation, they decided to not report it and the field Security Advisor agreed. However, another colleague advised the Country Director to report the incident for legal liability reasons; if another shooting incident would happen later and it would be known that the Country Director did not report the first incident, the Country Director would be blamed for it. Thus, the Country Director went back on their initial decision and reported the incident.

> *"My security advisor said 'This is going to make my life miserable because [headquarters] are not going to understand what this is. This is going to waste my time". Interviewee B*

And indeed, the interviewee recalled how they received about thirty e-mails from headquarters after they reported the incident, because headquarters did not understand the context in which the incident had happened. They subsequently gave field staff more directions on how to investigate the incident, which the Country Director perceived as an overreaction. These types of incidents deter field staff from reporting information to headquarters to preserve their own independence in the way they will handle incidents, and to avoid spending time and resources on administrative procedures they deem wasteful.

Other interviewees recalled that they drafted the required documents and fulfilled the required administrative procedures but did so with little drive and thoroughness. They admitted to not always fully commit to the drafting of security documents demanded by headquarters.

> *"I did the security assessments, but I only paid lip service to some elements of it in all honesty…for the same reason that country directors still do; they're very busy, there's lots to do." Interviewee G*

Forty years ago, Lipsky argued that for the higher levels of bureaucracy, which are removed from the realities of the field, contradicting the reports of street-level bureaucrats is extremely difficult (Lipsky, 1980, p.163). Even interviewees who worked in the sector for a decade recalled how headquarters had not the capacity to follow every security context of programmes and thus rarely challenging reports coming from the field. However, this research found that with the development of technology, headquarters increasingly have tools are their disposition to verify information transmitted by field staff. With social media and NGO platforms such as the International NGO Safety Organisation (INSO), headquarters can receive security alerts on incidents and updates on current events almost in real time. Since they have access to multiple sources of information, they are in a better position to challenge reports or information given by field staff. Field staff on the other hand can no longer withhold information regarding incidents, even if they are deemed "small".

While Bugger argues that the flow of information between all bureaucratic levels is beneficial to the smooth functioning of an INGO (Bugger, 2009, p.38), Caiden argues that the filtering and censoring of information coming from the lower layers to the higher levels of a hierarchy in bureaucratic is part of a larger power struggle (Caiden, 1985, p.26). The omission or

withholding of information, such as "small" incidents was thus a strategy for field staff to retain some decision-making power over how to handle them, without getting directives from headquarters. On the other hand, headquarters tried to ensure they gather knowledge on what is happening on the field, by going through other channels to receive information.

This chapter has thus shown that the lack of incentives for field workers to pour resources and time in administrative procedures they did not perceive as necessary partly impeded the information flow between headquarters and field staff. To resist administrative constraints, field staff sought to retain most decision-making power by selecting the information they would share with headquarters and omitting to share information they thought would generate an overreaction from headquarters. The disagreements between headquarters and field staff regarding security policies were further fuelled by brand management constraints. Field staff argued that some brand management policies, such as the ban to use armoured vehicles, was impossible to implement in high-risk countries if the safety of staff ought to be ensured. Yet, field staff also sought to raise their organisation's brand visibility at the field level to secure more donors and expand their aid programmes into high-risk areas, which headquarters did not always support out of security concerns. Headquarters and field staff were thus continuously involved in a negotiation processes with each other, where the former sought to strengthen its monitoring capabilities and the latter sought to retain independence and autonomy over security risk management. Moreover, field staff perceived excessive restrictions on their work to be harmful to their relations with aid beneficiaries. In this sense, excessive bureaucracy had a direct impact on the quality of humanitarian aid.

Conclusion

The aim of this research was to identify the impact of bureaucratisation and professionalisation of security-risk management in INGOs on field staff. The main finding of this research is that the intensification of bureaucratic procedures in security risk management has become an obstacle to the efficient delivery of humanitarian aid. In other words, the strict conformity to bureaucratic and administrative requirements has become a main priority in INGOs to the extend that it has overshadowed the initial goal of aid delivery at the field level. In this sense, bureaucracy and professionalisation, which were initially meant to be enabling tools of humanitarian aid are increasingly absorbing time and resources away from aid delivery and becoming hurdles to the work of field staff.

Arguably, the bureaucratisation and professionalisation of INGOs were inevitable as organisations increasingly faced legal and financial constraints. While 20th century theorists have argued that bureaucratisation and professionalisation present numerous benefits for the efficiency of organisations, field staff has mostly experienced it as a burden. The professionalisation of the sector and the legal standardization of duty of care reinforced the employer-employee relations between the organisation and its staff. The legal responsibilities of INGOs in terms of safety keeping of their staff led to an increase in administrative procedures of security risk management. Furthermore, the research found that factors such as competition for donors, and brand management and visibility increasingly added pressure on INGOs and dictated their security strategies.

Yet, based on the eight in-depth interviews conducted with current or former staff working for INGOs in high-risk environments, the increased bureaucratisation meant increased control and monitoring from headquarters over the work of field staff. The perceived growing threats against humanitarian workers were used to justify restrictive measures and the growing supervision of headquarters over field staff. From the perspective of field staff, security risk management strategies and duty of care policies were often not drafted in the best interest of field staff. Rather, they argued these policies were first and foremost designed to protect organisations from legal liability and to centralize decision-making at headquarters. The balance between protection of staff and the protection of INGOs from legal liability thus often became a source of friction between field staff and headquarters.

At the same time, field staff sought to resist the growing control of headquarters over their work. In particular, they perceived the involvement of multiple people removed from the local context as irrelevant for security-risk management and ultimately as an extra workload that required time and resources. To retain independence and autonomy in their day-to-day work and lives, field staff thus adopted strategies such as underreporting incidents, filtering information sent to headquarters and engaging in negotiations with higher management or simply refusing to implement security measures requested by headquarters.

Throughout this research it thus became clear that the acceptance and implementation of security-risk management relied on interpersonal relations, whether it be between field staff and the local community, between field staff and headquarters or between multiple INGOs. These interpersonal relations were used to counter certain restrictions or to ensure measures were adapted to local contexts. In this sense, the findings of this research contradicts core arguments of theories on bureaucratisation which claim that the main benefits of bureaucracy

lay in its strict procedures that eliminate biases and personal influences in decision-making, to carry out services in the most rational way possible. Yet, as demonstrated in this research, interpersonal relations and human judgment were perceived by field staff as essential to implement efficient and appropriate security-risk management without impeding on humanitarian aid delivery.

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ANNEX 1 – Profile of Interviewees and Schedule

Interviewee A

- 12 years experience in the humanitarian sector in East Africa, West Africa, South East Asia
- Worked for multiple governmental institutions and two INGOs
- Latest position as Country Director in Yemen
- Interviewed on the 21st of April, duration: 1,5 hours

Interviewee B

- 4 years experience in the humanitarian sector in Afghanistan for one INGO
- Former Country Director in Afghanistan
- No longer working in the humanitarian sector
- Interviewed on the 26th of April, duration: 2 hours

Interviewee C

- 9 years experience in the humanitarian sector
- Worked for three INGOs
- Current Country Director in Afghanistan
- Interviewed on the 27th of April, duration: 1 hour

Interviewee D

- Over 10 years of experience in the humanitarian sector for three INGOs
- Worked in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, Haiti
- Currently a Security Advisor at headquarters
- Interviewed on the 28th of April, duration: 1 hour

Interviewee E

- 4 years experience in the humanitarian sector for two INGOs
- Worked in Afghanistan and South Sudan
- Current Security Manager
- Interviewed on the 30th of April, duration: 1 hour

Interviewee F

- 21 years of experience in the humanitarian sector

- Worked in Afghanistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Tadjikistan, Kirghizstan
- Current Country Director in Afghanistan
- Interviewed on the 3rd of May, duration: 1,5 hours

Interviewee G

- 11 years of experience in the humanitarian sector
- Worked in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Jordan
- Has a military-background
- Current Security Advisor at headquarters
- Interviewed on the 7th of May, duration: 1,5 hours

Interviewee H

- 15 years of experience in the humanitarian sector
- Worked in Niger, Tchad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Central Asia
- Current Security Advisor at headquarters
- Has a military-background
- Interviewed on the 13th of May, duration: 2 hours

ANNEX 2 – Ethics confirmation letter

University of Glasgow

School of Social & Political Sciences

School Ethics Forum for Non-Clinical Research Involving Human Subjects

Notification of Ethics Application Outcome – UG and PGT Student Applications

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Application Details

Undergraduate Student Research Ethics Application ☐ Postgraduate Student Research Ethics Application ☒

Application Number: PGT/SPS/2021/008/IMSISS

Applicant's Name: Johanna Cottin

Project Title: The bureaucratisation and professionalisation of security in INGOs: Security management from the perspective of field workers

Application Status: Fully Approved

Date of Review: 12/04/2021

Start Date of Approval 12/04/2021 End Date of Approval 26/07/2021

NB: Only if the applicant has been given approval can they proceed with their data collection from the date of approval.

Fully approved
Means that the applicant can proceed with data collection with effect from the date of approval.

Amendments required
Where amendments are required by reviewers, applicants must respond in the relevant boxes below to the recommendations of the School Ethics Forum and provide this as an 'Amendments Response' document to explain the changes made to the application as well as amending the documents, as relevant. Changes to the application form or supporting documents should be highlighted either in block highlight or in red coloured text to assist the reviewers. All amended application documents should then be sent to the ethics administrator by the Supervisor for the approval of the SEF before data collection can proceed.

Rejected
If your application is Rejected a new application must be submitted to the School Ethics Forum. The reviewer feedback below will indicate whether a similar future project is likely to be supported. Where recommendations are provided, they should be responded to and this document provided as part of the new application. A new reference number will be generated. The new application forms should be signed off and submitted to the ethics administrator by the Supervisor.

REVIEWER MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS APPLICANT RESPONSE

REVIEWER MINOR RECOMMENDATIONS	APPLICANT RESPONSE

ADDITIONAL REVIEWER COMMENTS	APPLICANT RESPONSE
This application is now fully approved, good luck with your research.	

ANNEX 3 – Dissertation Archive Permission Form

International Master in Security, Intelligence and StrategicStudies 2019/2021

Dissertation Archive Permission Form

I give the University of Glasgow and Charles University permission to archive ane-copy of my Master dissertation in a publicly available folder and to use it for educational purposes in the future.

Student Name (BLOCK LETTERS) JOHANNA LUISE COTTIN

Student Number: 2281606C (UoG) 33275520 (CU)

Student Signature:  Date: 23 July 2021