



IMSISS
International Master
Security, Intelligence
& Strategic Studies



**Erasmus
Mundus**

**Securitization of an Imaginary Threat as an Authoritarian
Legitimation Instrument:
The Cases of Belarus and Uzbekistan.**

July 2021

GUID: 2458329A

DCU ID: 19108281

CU ID: 22199053

**Presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the
Degree of
International Master in Security, Intelligence and Strategic Studies**

Word Count: 22 451

Supervisor: Donnacha Ó Beacháin

Date of Submission: 31.07.2021



CHARLES UNIVERSITY

Abstract

This research explores how the securitization of imaginary and exaggerated threats is used as a legitimization instrument in hegemonic authoritarian regimes. Approaching the task through the cases studies, this thesis will situate the securitization practice within the performance mechanism of authoritarian legitimation and apply it in two hegemonic autocratic regimes – Uzbekistan of Islam Karimov and Belarus of Alexander Lukashenko. This dissertation picks qualitative research design. Methodologically, discourse and content analysis will be used to test the theory that will be developed in this project. The arguments presented in the thesis draw upon the primary sources such as speeches, official statements, and memoirs. The dissertation will also refer to the secondary sources in order to synthesise arguments provided by the existing literature related to the issue in question. This research project reveals that because of deeply rooted kleptocracy and corruption in Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov could not offer public goods to the people, thus replacing it with the rhetoric of stability amid the threat of terrorism and instability over the border. He institutionalized the securitization of terrorism and the threat stemming from the West. Lukashenko, on the contrary, relying on the Russian economic support, has performed economically relatively well, which allowed him to provide public goods. Nevertheless, amid critical junctures, such as post-election protests Lukashenko had to resort to the securitization practice showing to the public that in addition to economic performance, the regime is also ensuring stability in the country.

Keywords: Securitization; Copenhagen School; Legitimation; Performance; Uzbekistan; Islam Karimov; Belarus; Alexander Lukashenko; Terrorism; The West; Propaganda; Threat.

Acknowledgements

Thank you to my supervisor, the best ever expert on Eurasian and post-Soviet Studies, Professor Donnacha Ó Beacháin for guiding me through this project.

Table of Contents

ABSTRACT	2
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	3
1. INTRODUCTION	6
1.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS	7
1.2 CASE SELECTION	7
1.3 LIMITATION AND DISCLAIMER	8
1.4 CHAPTER OVERVIEW	9
2. LITERATURE REVIEW	9
2.1 AUTHORITARIAN LEGITIMATION	9
2.2 CONTEXTUALISING THE SECURITIZATION PRACTICE FOR AUTHORITARIAN SETTING: BACK TO BUZAN ET AL	13
2.2.1 THE SPEECH ACT	15
2.2.2 FERENT OBJECTS	16
2.2.3 SECURITIZING ACTOR	16
2.2.4 AUDIENCE	17
2.3 LEGITIMATION LITERATURE: UZBEKISTAN	17
2.4 LEGITIMATION LITERATURE: BELARUS	19
2.5 CONCLUSION	20
3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY	21
3.1 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: SECURITIZATION AS A LEGITIMATION INSTRUMENT	21
3.2 METHODOLOGY	22
3.2.1 SOURCES AND DATA COLLECTION	23
4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS	24
4.1 UZBEKISTAN: INTRODUCTION	24
4.1.1 PASSIVITY AND SECURITIZATION OF IMAGINARY THREATS AS PERFORMANCE	27
4.1.1.1 SECURITIZING TERRORISM	28
4.1.1.2 HISTORICAL MEMORIES OF EXAGGERATED THREATS	31
4.1.1.3 STIGMATISATION OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN POST-SOVIET REGION: COLOUR REVOLUTIONS	35
4.1.1.4 SECURITIZATION AS A PERFORMANCE: PEACE AND STABILITY IN UZBEKISTAN AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO PUBLIC GOODS	39
4.1.2 CONCLUSION	42

4.2 BELARUS: INTRODUCTION	43
4.2.1 PERFORMANCE IN TERMS OF PROVIDING PUBLIC GOODS	45
4.2.2 SECURITIZATION OF IMAGINARY THREATS	46
4.2.3 RFORMANCE IN TERMS OF ENSURING ABILITY	49
4.2.4 CONCLUSION	50
4.3 CONCLUSION	51
5. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS	52
6. CONCLUSION	54
7. BIBLIOGRAPHY	55

Chapter 1: Introduction

Recent research on authoritarian regimes shows that the persistence of non-democratic¹ systems to date is not solely based on repression, but also on co-optation² and legitimation³ and other non-coercive measures⁴. Yet, the existing literature on authoritarian legitimation overlooked the way the securitization practice can contribute to autocratic durability.

The securitization theory, proposed by the Copenhagen School in their seminal book *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* and further developed by representatives of other schools⁵, can be applied as a legitimation instrument and instrument of mass mobilization⁶, as "the social design of a security problem conditions and legitimates the kind of means used to stop it"⁷. However, the securitization practice is a democratic instrument; it is used by democratic leaders to present an issue "as an existential threat requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure"⁸. Thus, democracies utilize this antidemocratic action because, allegedly, it is the only way to mobilize their citizens amid threats to national security⁹. However, this begs the question if the securitization concept is applicable in hegemonic authoritarian regimes where the "normal bounds of political procedure" is totally absent, if yes, then why? Although non-democratic regimes frequently resort to securitization practice¹⁰, the utility of it in authoritarian setting constitutes a significant gap both in security studies and comparative politics.

Seeking to fill this gap, this dissertation project aims to show that hegemonic authoritarian regimes frequently resort to the securitization practice, despite the absence of the "normal bounds of political procedure". Investigating and comparing two cases (Uzbekistan during the Islam Karimov era and Belarus of Alexander Lukashenko), this research project will show that non-democratic

¹ The terms autocratic, authoritarian, and non-democratic will be used interchangeably throughout this dissertation

² Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski, "Authoritarian Institutions and The Survival of Autocrats", *Comparative Political Studies* 40, no. 11 (2007): 1279-1301, doi:10.1177/0010414007305817; Lee Morgenbesser, *Behind The Façade: Elections Under Authoritarianism in Southeast Asia* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2016).

³ Johannes Gerschewski, "The Three Pillars of Stability: Legitimation, Repression, and Co-Optation in Autocratic Regimes", *Democratization* 20, no. 1 (2013): 13-38, doi:10.1080/13510347.2013.738860; Alexander Dukalskis and Johannes Gerschewski, "What Autocracies Say (And What Citizens Hear): Proposing Four Mechanisms of Autocratic Legitimation", *Contemporary Politics* 23, no. 3 (2017): 251-268, doi:10.1080/13569775.2017.1304320.

⁴ Seraphine F. Maerz, "The Many Faces of Authoritarian Persistence: A Set-Theory Perspective On the Survival Strategies of Authoritarian Regimes", *Government and Opposition* 55, no. 1 (2018): 64-87, doi:10.1017/gov.2018.17.

⁵ Thierry Balzacq, "The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context", *European Journal of International Relations* 11, no. 2 (2005): 171-201, doi:10.1177/1354066105052960; Ken Booth, *Theory of World Security* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Jef Huysmans, *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in The EU* (New York: Routledge, 2006).

⁶ A. Vuori, Juha. "Religion Bites: Falungong, Securitization/Desecuritization in The People'S Republic of China". In *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve*, 186. Thierry Balzacq. London: Routledge, 2011.

⁷ Thierry Balzacq, *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve* (London: Routledge, 2011), XII.

⁸ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 24.

⁹ John J Mearsheimer, *Why Leaders Lie: The Truth About Lying in International Politics* (Cary: Oxford University Press, USA, 2014), 82.

¹⁰ Juha A. Vuori, "Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization: Applying The Theory of Securitization to The Study of Non-Democratic Political Orders", *European Journal of International Relations* 14, no. 1 (2008): 65-99, doi:10.1177/1354066107087767.

regimes use the securitization practice as a legitimation tool. This project will argue that non-democratic regimes securitize imaginary internal and external threats to instill fear among the public and present themselves as the indispensable guarantor who can protect the people and their identity, and ensure long-lasting stability amid external threats.

This thesis reveals that because of deeply rooted kleptocracy and corruption in Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov could not offer public goods to the people, thus replacing it with the rhetoric of stability amid the threat of terrorism and instability over the border. He institutionalized the securitization of terrorism and the threat stemming from great powers (mainly in the face of the US or generally the West), but actively propagating through official statements, books of Karimov and movies. When it comes to our second case, Lukashenko enjoyed popularity for so long time because of more or less economic performance, which allowed him to offer public goods to the people of Belarus, forming a sort of hidden social contract between the latter and the regime. That is why, Lukashenko did not need to implement the institutionalization of the securitization of imaginary threats, but used it in an ad hoc form — amid critical junctures such as protests or before, during and after the elections, the falsification of which always brought the people to the streets to challenge the regime.

1.1 Research Questions

In order to reveal the main arguments mentioned above, this dissertation sets several research questions that will guide us through this project: Why do hegemonic authoritarian regimes utilise the securitization instrument, notwithstanding the absence of the normal bounds of political procedure? And what kind of threats do autocratic regimes select to securitize in order to legitimate their power? How do we explain differences in the way these two autocratic regimes (Uzbekistan and Belarus) select securitization narratives? How do we explain differences in the frequency of referring to securitization of imaginary or exaggerated threats? These research questions will be addressed within our two cases.

1.2 Case Selection

As this thesis develops a legitimation theory, by extending the performance mechanism and adding the securitization practice as a legitimation instrument, it requires case studies approach. Thus, this project picked Uzbekistan of Islam Karimov and Belarus of Alexander Lukashenko as case studies stemming from several factors. Firstly, the post-Soviet Eurasia, which is represented by several autocratic regimes, is a useful "laboratory" of sorts in authoritarian politics. Nevertheless, not all the regimes in the region are similar in terms of the level of authoritarianism. There are competitive

authoritarian regimes (Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine¹¹)¹², which "allow for several parties to compete during elections"¹³, that are beyond the focus of our research project, while hegemonic autocratic regimes¹⁴ with non-competitive multiparty and strictly controlled system are pertinent for application of our theory. Secondly, despite some similarities in the way Islam Karimov and Alexander Lukashenko came and hold on to power, there are certain differences in their strategies of earning popularity among the public. Thirdly, although there are several differences in terms of geographical location of these states (Uzbekistan is located in Central Asia, while Belarus in Europe) and geopolitical threats (terrorism is considered as one of the acute threats in Uzbekistan, while Belarus is, allegedly, threatened by the West) we can trace some vivid similarities in the securitization rhetoric of the Islam Karimov and Alexander Lukashenko regimes. Finally, given the fact that Russian was official language of the Soviet Union and now it is lingua franca in the region, it would be logical to work within these two post-Soviet states due to my fluency in the Russian language, which provides me unimpeded access to primary sources and allows me to analyse official rhetoric.

1.3 Limitation and Disclaimer

This research project, due to time constrain and word limit, is not going to investigate N-quantity of cases to trace if all hegemonic authoritarian regimes are using securitization practice within performance mechanism for the legitimation purposes. For instance, there are other hegemonic authoritarian cases in Eurasia, such as Kazakhstan and Tajikistan that I could include in order to enrich my dissertation. Nevertheless, this project is laying a foundation for more a detailed investigation in PhD dissertation with the inclusion of the foregoing and other potential additional cases. Also, there are other types of authoritarian regimes (hybrid or competitive authoritarian regimes) that could/not use this concept for the same purpose, which beyond the scope of this dissertation. In addition, analysing the way the securitization practice is utilised in Uzbekistan, I will limit my analysis solely to the Islam Karimov regime, because the current president Shavkat Mirziyoyev is in the transition period and the policy that he conducts more open and directed to satisfy the needs of people. Another limitation could be that this dissertation will solely focus on the official rhetoric on threat construction, while understanding how the public perceives these threats is beyond the scope of this project. Thus, the focus of this dissertation is not to measure the acceptance

¹¹ Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After The Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 183.

¹² The authors included Belarus in the list of competitive authoritarian regimes, however, it was until Alexander Lukashenko came to power in 1994, when he started consolidating his power and transforming Belarus to hegemonic regime.

¹³ Seraphine F. Maerz, "Simulating Pluralism: The Language Of Democracy In Hegemonic Authoritarianism", *Political Research Exchange* 1, no. 1 (2019): 2, doi:10.1080/2474736x.2019.1605834.

¹⁴ Daniela Donno, "Elections And Democratization In Authoritarian Regimes", *American Journal Of Political Science* 57, no. 3 (2013): 703-716, doi:10.1111/ajps.12013.

of the securitization act by the public, but to see how authoritarian regimes use it as a legitimation instrument.

1.4 Chapter Overview

This research project consists of six chapters. Following this first chapter, where we introduced the project by outlining main questions, arguments and cases selection, Chapter Two critically reviews the literature on authoritarian legitimation and securitization. In this chapter, we will narrow down our review of the foregoing field and tailor the literature towards our two cases (Uzbekistan and Belarus), and identify the gap in the literature which this dissertation aims to address. Chapter Three outlines the conceptual framework, which will be developed in this thesis, and methodology. It will introduce qualitative research design, which will be based on textual, discourse analysis, and data collection method that this project applies. The fourth chapter presents empirical findings by showing the results of textual analysis of the official rhetoric of the way Karimov's Uzbekistan and Lukashenko's Belarus securitized internal and external imaginary or exaggerated threats to instill fear in the public and present themselves as beacons of stability as a part of the performance mechanism of legitimation policy. The following chapter discusses the results and their theoretical implications. The final chapter concludes the dissertation by summarizing main ideas discussed throughout the project.

Chapter 2: Literature review

This Chapter critically reviews the existing literature on legitimation and securitization, and tailor it to Uzbekistan and Belarus. Firstly, it will discuss the literature on authoritarian legitimation and reveal the gap in it, which can be addressed by applying the securitization theory. Secondly, building a bridge between legitimation and securitization, the following subsection presents a critical review of the securitization theory in retrospective, bringing up its main concepts, and contextualizes the Copenhagen School within the legitimation theory. The following two sections of the chapter review the legitimation literature in respect to Uzbekistan and Belarus, respectively. Finally, the last section concludes the chapter by summarising the conceptual set-up and laying path for the theoretical and empirical contribution that this dissertation purports to make.

2.1 Authoritarian Legitimation

Legitimacy of power or "just and right rule"¹⁵, which is reflected in the popular support of the incumbent government, forms the foundation of both democratic and authoritarian states. However,

¹⁵ Dukalskis and Gerschewski, "What Autocracies Say", 252

there is a difference in the way the legitimacy is earned between these political systems. For instance, in democratic system the social contract between the ruler and the ruled¹⁶ constitutes the backbone of legitimacy of power. The provisions of social contract are enshrined in constitution, taking the form of regulations and law, and defining and setting the rules of game¹⁷ for both the government and people. Any violation of these rules results in punishment measures: the government resorts to its monopoly on legitimate violence to punish its citizens for breaking the law, while people through the provision of impeachment has the right to deprive the incumbent of right to govern, if the latter violates the rules by abusing power. However, in authoritarian regimes, due to concentration of power in the hands of the ruler and one's circle and the absence of check on one's power, the public have no choice, but "hide their true beliefs for fear of repression"¹⁸. If the ruler uncovers their hidden beliefs, one might repress people by using violence because of fear that such beliefs could cast a shadow on the autocrat's power. Thus, if autocratic regimes rely predominantly on power and frequently resort to violence, brushing aside people's support, then "legitimate autocracy [is] nothing more than an oxymoron"¹⁹. This, logically, begs the question if legitimation matters in non-democratic systems? Firstly, it matters as the rule based solely on the instrument of coercion is not durable in a long run²⁰ and " [e]ven the most tyrannic rulers try to justify their reign"²¹. Secondly, the claim "legitimate autocracy [is] nothing more than an oxymoron" is acceptable only normatively, while the Weberian, empirical tradition of considering legitimacy "as the process of gaining support"²² refutes the latter. Thus, building on the Weberian tradition, this section will firstly review the literature on authoritarian legitimation, then it will introduce the framework of legitimation mechanisms proposed by Dukalskis and Gerschewski, which is instrumental in developing our theory.

The academic research on understanding authoritarianism has grown voluminous since the mid-1960s²³. What generated an academic interest in understanding autocratic regimes at that time

¹⁶ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (London: Printed for A. Crooke, 1651).

¹⁷ Andrew F. March, "From Leninism to Karimovism: Hegemony, Ideology, And Authoritarian Legitimation", *Post-Soviet Affairs* 19, no. 4 (2003): 309, doi:10.2747/1060-586x.19.4.307.

¹⁸ Dukalskis and Gerschewski, "What Autocracies Say", 258

¹⁹ Gerschewski, "The Three Pillars of Stability", 18

²⁰ Alisher Ilkhamov, "Neopatrimonialism, Interest Groups and Patronage Networks: The Impasses of the Governance System in Uzbekistan", *Central Asian Survey* 26, no. 1 (2007): 65, doi:10.1080/02634930701423491; Barbara Geddes, "What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?", *Annual Review Of Political Science* 2, no. 1 (1999): 125, doi: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.115; Gerschewski, "The Three Pillars of Stability", 21.

²¹ Mattei Dogan, "Conceptions of Legitimacy", in *Encyclopedia Of Government And Politics* (London: Routledge, 1992), 116.

²² Gerschewski, "The Three Pillars of Stability", 18

²³ Zbigniew Brzezinski. "Totalitarianism and Rationality." *American Political Science Review* 50, no. 3 (1956): 751–63, doi:10.2307/1951557; E. Allardt and Y. Littunen, *Cleavages, Ideologies, and Party Systems* (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1978), 291-342.

was the influence of "social authoritarianism"²⁴. Since then, the bulk of research have been made to reveal the nature of authoritarianism and its types, ranging from examining totalitarianism²⁵ and comparing it with authoritarianism²⁶, military²⁷ and one-party-system authoritarian politics²⁸ to bureaucratic²⁹ and electoral autocracies³⁰. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the victory of the democratic West, interest in understanding authoritarian system waned for a while: Francis Fukuyama's provocative idea that the Western liberal democracy would be universally dominated this period³¹. After a while, Fukuyama's thesis started losing its relevance amid the persistence of non-democratic regimes. This, in turn, revived the interest in authoritarian studies, and a new academic area emerged in understanding the sources of authoritarian durability. The growing literature in this field widely explored the internal workings of modern authoritarian regimes³².

However, the way autocracies legitimate their hold on power had not been analysed systematically until recently. Of course, Weberian legitimation approach based on charisma, tradition and legal statute³³ was an invaluable contribution in revealing the nature of authoritarian persistence, however, modern authoritarian regimes adapted to the contemporary realities, which needed a comprehensive analysis. Thus, Johannes Gerschewski was successful in conceptualizing this issue. Addressing the question "what makes autocracies endure?", Gerschewski proposes a conceptual framework — three pillars of stability: legitimation, repression, and co-optation³⁴. One of the major contributions that the author made in this paper is that he revitalized academic attention to authoritarianism and autocratic durability, which had waned after the "demise of the totalitarianism paradigm"³⁵. Nonetheless, Gerschewski acknowledges in his paper that "[a] more solid theoretical basis is needed"³⁶. Thus, further revealing the legitimation pillar, Johannes Gerschewski with

²⁴ Hal Draper, "The two souls of socialism." *New Politics*, 5, no. 1 (1966): 57-84.

²⁵ Leonard Schapiro, *Totalitarianism* (New York: Praeger, 1972).

²⁶ Juan J. Linz, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000).

²⁷ S. E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback* (New Brunswick, N.J: Transaction, 2003).

²⁸ Samuel Huntington, S., *Social and Institutional Dynamics of One-party Systems*. (New York: Basic Books, 1970).

²⁹ Guillermo O'Donnell, G. (1973). *Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism*. (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973).

³⁰ Andreas Schedler. *Electoral Authoritarianism*. (London: Boulder Co Rienner, 2006).

³¹ Francis Fukuyama, "The end of history?", *The National Interest*, 16 (1989): 3-18. Derived from: URL: www.jstor.org/stable/24027184

³² David Art, "What Do We Know About Authoritarianism After Ten Years?", *Comparative Politics* 44, no. 3 (2012): 351-373, doi:10.5129/001041512800078977; Patrick Köllner and Steffen Kailitz, "Comparing Autocracies: Theoretical Issues and Empirical Analyses", *Democratization* 20, no. 1 (2013): 1-12, doi:10.1080/13510347.2013.738859; Thomas Pepinsky, "The Institutional Turn In Comparative Authoritarianism", *British Journal Of Political Science* 44, no. 3 (2013): 631-653, doi:10.1017/s0007123413000021.

³³ Max Weber, *Essays in Sociology* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1993).

³⁴ Gerschewski "The Three Pillars of Stability"

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 18.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 19.

Alexander Dukalskis offered a comprehensive conceptual framework — four mechanisms of legitimation in authoritarian regimes³⁷.

Addressing the question "how do non-democratic leaders gain followings among their people?", Gerschewski and Dukalskis propose four legitimation mechanisms: indoctrination, passivity, performance, and democratic-procedural. This theory will be briefly introduced here. First, the indoctrination is a legitimation mechanism which is carried out through ideological propaganda. This mechanism was actively used in most totalitarian regimes, such as the Soviet Union, which was "aimed at creating a homo novus, a new man"³⁸. However, this mechanism in the form that was used before is "relatively rare in today's world"³⁹, say, in North Korea, or could be observed today in "lighter shades"⁴⁰.

If the purpose of the indoctrination is to "mobilize the entire population and shape the daily lives of their citizens"⁴¹, then the passivity mechanism is utilised to depoliticize the people and leave them alone unless they question the power of the incumbent autocratic regime and its goals⁴². Furthermore, the incumbent positions oneself as indispensable, while "discrediting political alternatives as unrealistic"⁴³. They do it by "interven[ing] in domestic affairs in order to restore political order, revive the economy, and protect the nation", so presenting themselves as "the guarantor of stability, order, and national interests"⁴⁴. The next mechanism is performance that complements the passivity mechanism. As the authors argue, the people would be passive and would not go against the incumbent's goals, if the regime "provides public and private goods [forming] hidden social contract between the ruled and the ruler"⁴⁵. The fourth legitimation mechanism is democratic-procedural, which presupposes a simulation or imitation of democratic procedures, as parliamentary elections. For example, autocratic regimes legitimate their rule by organizing semi-competitive elections to "demonstrate the popularity and the power of the ruling regime"⁴⁶ both to internal and external audiences.

Although Dukalskis and Gerschewski have made an invaluable contribution to understanding authoritarian persistence, however, some points in their legitimation theory should be revisited. The authors, explaining the passivity and performance mechanisms, are attaching paramount importance to providing public goods that would form a sort of social contract between the people and the regime.

³⁷ Dukalskis and Gerschewski, "What Autocracies Say".

³⁸ Dukalskis and Gerschewski, "What Autocracies Say", 254.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 259.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid., 256.

⁴³ Ibid., 259.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 255.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 256.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 257.

As Dukalskis and Gerschewski argue, "authoritarian regimes claimed to be economically successful and aimed to foster passivity and political indifference among most of the population"⁴⁷. Indeed, in order for the public to bear with the authoritarian regime, the latter should give something in return. The authors stress that this something is manifested in public goods produced out of effective economic performance. However, most authoritarian regimes cannot produce sufficient public goods due to the kleptocratic⁴⁸ system that they build, making national wealth as a source of one's own and inner circle's enrichment. Nevertheless, performance does not necessarily have to produce satisfactory economic output, but it could be any actions or decisions that meet the people's expectations. If the population sees that the regime is performing well, they might accept and even support it turning a blind eye on its authoritarianism⁴⁹. Thus, what autocrats offer at the expense of public goods and freedom is stability in terms of security amid the instability over the border⁵⁰, which form a sort of hidden social contract between the ruler and the ruled. They achieve this goal through the securitization practice, which we will discuss in the next section.

2.2 Contextualising the Securitization Practice for Authoritarian Setting: Back to “Buzan et al”.

Seeking to "move security studies beyond a narrow agenda which focuses on military relations between states"⁵¹ the representatives of the Copenhagen School (Barry Buzan, Jaap de Wilde and Ole Wæver) developed the securitization framework in their seminal book *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, which provides an alternative, critical constructivist view of the way security issues emerge. The securitization practice is an instrument of legitimation and mass mobilization⁵², as "the social design of a security problem conditions and legitimates the kind of means used to stop it"⁵³. However, the securitization is essentially a democratic instrument⁵⁴: leaders working in democratic

⁴⁷ Ibid., 256.

⁴⁸ Daron Acemoglu, James A. Robinson and Thierry Verdier, "Kleptocracy and Divide-And-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule", *SSRN Electronic Journal*, 2003, doi:10.2139/ssrn.471821.

⁴⁹ Dukalskis and Gerschewski, "What Autocracies Say", 259.

⁵⁰ Natalie Koch (2018) Disorder over the border: spinning the spectre of instability through time and space in Central Asia, *Central Asian Survey*, 37:1, 13-30, DOI: 10.1080/02634937.2017.1338667

⁵¹ Jef Huysmans, "Security! What Do You Mean?", *European Journal of International Relations* 4, no. 2 (1998): 448, doi:10.1177/1354066198004004004.

⁵² Vuori, "Religion Bites", 186.

⁵³ Balzacq, *Securitization Theory*, XII.

⁵⁴ Ole Wæver, "Securitization And Desecuritization", in *On Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 46–86; Ole Wæver, "Conflicts Of Vision — Visions Of Conflict", in *European Polyphony: Perspectives Beyond East–West Confrontation* (London: Macmillan, 1989); Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, "*Security*"; Jef Huysmans, "Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, On The Creative Development Of A Security Studies Agenda In Europe", *European Journal Of International Relations* 4, no. 4 (1998): 479-505, doi:10.1177/1354066198004004004; Vuori, "Religion Bites»; Michael C. Williams, "Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization And International Politics", *International Studies Quarterly* 47, no. 4 (2003): 511-531, doi:10.1046/j.0020-8833.2003.00277.x; Stefano Guzzini and Dietrich Jung, *Contemporary Security Analysis And Copenhagen Peace Research* (London and New York: Routledge, 2004).

systems use this practice to present an issue "as an existential threat requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure"⁵⁵. Thus, leaders engage in this antidemocratic action reasoning that it is the only way to mobilize their citizens amid a threat to national security⁵⁶. Stemming from this democratic use of the securitization practice, the securitization framework in the form offered by the representatives of the Copenhagen School is deemed to be incomplete and suffers some limitations. For instance, theoretically, if the role of political elites as securitizing actors is overemphasized⁵⁷, then the mass media as a securitizing actor is discredited, and the audience is ignored⁵⁸; methodologically, discourse analysis is designated as the "obvious" method for security construction, so making it difficult to measure security discourse objectively⁵⁹. Hence, the development of the securitization theory took place within the democratic context such as acknowledging the role of media as a securitizing actor⁶⁰ and acceptance of the securitizing act by the audience⁶¹.

However, the utility of the securitization practice in non-democratic setting is doubted⁶². This limitation is reasoned by the argument that the securitization instrument helps democracies to avoid the normal bounds of political procedure, i.e. democratic process⁶³ in reacting to urgent issues or threats, while non-democratic regimes do not need political legitimacy in the way democracies do, as the former rule by force⁶⁴. This begs the question if the securitization concept is applicable in non-democratic regimes where the "normal bounds of political procedure" is totally absent. In the previous section, we have already answered this question that authoritarian regimes also need legitimacy as "the rule based solely on the instrument of coercion is not durable in a long run" and so they also need to legitimate extraordinary measures⁶⁵. If so, the securitization practice is also one of legitimation

⁵⁵ Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, "Security", 24.

⁵⁶ Mearsheimer, "Why Leaders Lie", 82

⁵⁷ Karyotis, G. 2012. 'Securitization of Migration in Greece: Process, Motives and Implications', *International Political Sociology*, vol. 6, no. 4, 390-408.

⁵⁸ Balzacq, "The Three Faces", 171-201; Scott D. Watson, "'Framing' The Copenhagen School: Integrating The Literature On Threat Construction", *Millennium: Journal Of International Studies* 40, no. 2 (2011): 279-301, doi:10.1177/0305829811425889. Watson, S. D. (2012). 'Framing' the Copenhagen School: Integrating the Literature on Threat Construction. *Millennium*, 40(2), 279-301. doi:10.1177/0305829811425889; Balzacq, T. 2005. 'Three faces of Securitisation: Political Agency, Audience and Context.', *European Journal of International Relations* 11(2), 171- 201.

⁵⁹ Qadri, Syed Nasser (2020) Framing terrorism and migration in the USA: the role of the media in securitization processes. PhD thesis, p. 36.

⁶⁰ Qadri Syed Nasser, "Framing Terrorism And Migration In The USA: The Role Of The Media In Securitization Processes" (PhD, University of Glasgow, 2020).

⁶¹ Georgios Karyotis, "Securitization Of Migration In Greece: Process, Motives, And Implications", *International Political Sociology* 6, no. 4 (2012): 392, doi:10.1111/ips.12002.

⁶² Cai Wilkinson, "The Limits Of Spoken Words: From Meta-Narratives To Experiences Of Security", in *Securitization Theory; How Security Problems Emerge And Dissolve* (London: Routledge, 2011), 94-115.

⁶³ Jef Huysmans, "The Question Of The Limit: Desecuritisation And The Aesthetics Of Horror In Political Realism", *Millennium: Journal Of International Studies* 27, no. 3 (1998): 569-589, doi:10.1177/03058298980270031301; Balzacq, "The Three Faces Of Securitization".

⁶⁴ Vuori, Juha A. "Illocutionary Logic", 4.

⁶⁵ Ulla Holm, "Algeria: Securitisation Of State/Regime, Nation And Islam", in *Contemporary Security Analysis And Copenhagen Peace Research* (London: Routledge, 2004), 219.

instruments that non-democratic regimes use to ensure durability. Although non-democratic regimes frequently resort to securitization practice⁶⁶, the utility of it in authoritarian setting still remains an under-researched area both in security studies and comparative politics, which is limited to few papers⁶⁷.

Thus, seeking to fill this gap this dissertation will use the securitization framework in its "underdeveloped" form proposed by the Copenhagen School, as this is just what we need in terms of its utility in non-democratic context. Indeed, as was underscored above, this framework essentially overemphasizes the speech act, and ignores the public and the mass media, which are pertinent in authoritarian system. The people in such regimes are passive due to the passivity mechanism (see the section 2.1.) and censorship and controlled media. Because of the absence of freedom of speech and total control of media, and active propaganda of "prosperity" through indoctrination (see the section 2.1.), the people cannot discern the reality and if they can, they keep silence due to repressive measures that the government implement to silence them. Thus, the audience in authoritarian regimes simply consumes the speech act without questioning it and accepts a "[securitized] issue as such"⁶⁸. The securitization practice is comprised of several fundamental elements that will be discussed in the following subsections.

2.2.1 The Speech Act

Positivist approaches in International Relations work with "'brute facts' about the world, which remain true independent of human action"⁶⁹, while securitization scholars stick to constructivist ontology, for whom a threat is socially constructed "through an intersubjective negotiation between speakers and their audiences"⁷⁰. Generally, the securitization practice takes place on a high political elite level⁷¹, where the latter tries to convince its public through constructing a security issue as if posing existential threat to its national security and which immediately needs to be eliminated by using extraordinary measures⁷².

The process of convincing the audience by political actors regarding the existence of existential threat is the speech act, which constitutes the foundation of the securitization framework. As Wæver⁷³ argues, security is not a "real thing", but a "speech-act":

⁶⁶ Vuori, Juha A. "Illocutionary Logic".

⁶⁷ Vuori, Juha A. "Illocutionary Logic"; Natalie Koch, "Disorder Over The Border: Spinning The Spectre Of Instability Through Time And Space In Central Asia", *Central Asian Survey* 37, no. 1 (2018): 13-30, doi:10.1080/02634937.2017.1338667.

⁶⁸ Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, "Security", 34.

⁶⁹ Chris Brown and Kirsten Ainley, *Understanding International Relations* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

⁷⁰ Qadri, "Framing Terrorism", 54.

⁷¹ Jef Huysmans, "Defining Social Constructivism In Security Studies: The Normative Dilemma Of Writing Security", *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 27, no. 1 (2002): 54, doi:10.1177/03043754020270s104.

⁷² Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, "Security".

⁷³ Wæver, "Securitization And Desecuritization", 55.

security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance *itself* is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship). By uttering "security" a state representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it.

As was argued above, resorting to exceptional measures such as coercion and use of force will undermine the authoritarian regimes in a long run; that is why, even one of the most totalitarian regimes as the Soviet Union justified the use of extraordinary measures⁷⁴. Thus, the political elite by using the speech act construct an issue as a security threat and so justify the use of extraordinary measures to mitigate that threat.

However, not all securitizing issues need to be preceded by a speech act. Some persistent threats, such as terrorism, are usually institutionalized⁷⁵. For instance, the 9/11 events have brought the terrorism as one of the urgent threats to national security of many states, so providing golden opportunity for states to capitalize on the 9/11 tragedy to vindicate the limitation of freedom in democratic states and use of coercion in some authoritarian states, as we will see in the case of Uzbekistan during the Islam Karimov era.

2.2.2 Referent Objects

Referent object is an ideal "that [is] seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival"⁷⁶. Stemming from the nature of the threat, referent object could be sovereignty, identity, culture, environment, etc. However, what referent object non-democratic regimes mostly securitize is stability and national identity.

2.2.3 Securitizing Actors

Securitizing actors are, as Buzan et al. states, "political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists and pressure groups"⁷⁷ who are in authority to represent state or nation. Huysmans also designates a special role to statesmen in the securitizing process⁷⁸. However, as Qadri argues, the Copenhagen School overemphasizing the role of the political elites, ignored the media as an securitizing actor⁷⁹.

⁷⁴ James Ryan, "The Sacralization Of Violence: Bolshevik Justifications For Violence And Terror During The Civil War", *Slavic Review* 74, no. 4 (2015): 808-831, doi:10.5612/slavicreview.74.4.808.

⁷⁵ Faye Donnelly, *Securitization And The Iraq War* (New York, N.Y.: Routledge, 2013), 48-49; Paul Roe, "Actor, Audience(S) And Emergency Measures: Securitization And The UK's Decision To Invade Iraq", *Security Dialogue* 39, no. 6 (2008): 618-619, doi:10.1177/0967010608098212.

⁷⁶ Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, "Security", 36.

⁷⁷ Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, "Security", 40.

⁷⁸ Huysmans, "Defining Social», 54.

⁷⁹ Qadri, "Framing Terrorism", 64.

He brings up the CNN effect as an example in order to show the role the press could play as a strategic actor⁸⁰, however, this is the case applicable in democratic context. When it comes to the autocratic setting, then the "undertheorised" version proposed by the Copenhagen School that ignores media is relevant for and pertinent to use in this dissertation. Indeed, media in authoritarian states is biased and controlled by the government⁸¹, which deprives the press of the status of independent securitizing actor. Thus, although the media contribute to securitization of certain threats, they do it disseminating the official version of "truth".

2.2.4 Audience

As was discussed above, the securitization practice is intersubjective process. Although securitizing actors are the ones who through the speech act tries to present an issue "as an existential threat requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure"⁸², it is the audience that decides if the securitization act is successful and so legitimate. Although with this statement the representatives of the Copenhagen School state that the audience, as if, has the last word on the legitimacy of the securitization, nevertheless, by "making discourse analysis the 'obvious' method of inquiry"... they "reduce[d] audiences or remove[d] them from analysis altogether"⁸³. The only argument that Buzan et al. proposed to measure how the audience accepts the securitization is by endorsing the incumbent by giving one`s vote in elections⁸⁴. However, as we know, in non-democratic regimes elections are falsified in favour of the incumbent, that is why we cannot measure the real endorsement of the securitization act by the audience; moreover, the focus of this dissertation is not to measure the acceptance of the securitization act by the public, but to see how authoritarian regimes use it as a legitimation instrument.

2.3 Legitimation Literature: Uzbekistan

The first president of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov ruled the country for almost three decades. Although the source of the durability of his power was the omnipotent National Security Service (reminiscent of the Soviet KGB) instilling fear and obedience in the public, there was also non-coercive means that ensured the longevity to his regime. In this subsection, we will discuss legitimation strategies of the Karimov regime, which were similar to those of the Soviet Union.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Daniela Stockmann and Mary E. Gallagher, "Remote Control: How The Media Sustain Authoritarian Rule In China", *Comparative Political Studies* 44, no. 4 (2011): 436-467, doi:10.1177/0010414010394773.

⁸² Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, "Security", 24.

⁸³ Qadri, "Framing Terrorism", 61.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 68

Seeking to earn hearts and minds of the people Islam Karimov used several legitimization instruments. The literature on legitimization strategies that the first president of Uzbekistan utilised has grown voluminous. For example, Andrew March shows that the Karimov regime, using books authored by Islam Karimov himself⁸⁵, promoted national ideology and justified autocratic regime, by placing enormous "emphasis on the importance of a strong state with a strong leader"⁸⁶, which, in turn, "replaced Marxism–Leninism as the ideological underpinning"⁸⁷. March also tries to conceptualise the state ideology in Uzbekistan, by situating his argument between the political-vs-the-pre-political concepts⁸⁸. Further developing this topic, Rafael Sattorov sheds light on the way the Karimov regime used *Ma'naviyat va Ma'rifat* (spirituality and enlightenment) to substitute the Soviet Marxism-Leninism ideology⁸⁹. Furthering the research on the ideology as a legitimization policy in Uzbekistan, Seraphine Maerz discloses the elements of the Soviet style rhetoric in using *Ma'naviyat* as a legitimization tool⁹⁰, while Bernardo Fazendeiro ties it with anti-Western propaganda⁹¹. The research on legitimization strategies in Uzbekistan is not limited to ideological aspect as was discussed above, but also scholars put forward other perspectives revealing the nature of legitimization policy of Islam Karimov. For instance, scholars researched how e-governance⁹² and the language of democracy⁹³ that non-democratic regimes utilise to legitimate their hold on power. Also, instrumentalisation of Islam for legitimization purposes was noticed rightly. Academics show how the first president of Uzbekistan Karimov associated Islam with radicalization⁹⁴, a source of insecurity and instability to justify repressions⁹⁵ and suppress opposition⁹⁶.

Although the foregoing has made a noteworthy contribution in understanding Uzbekistan's legitimization policy, the way the Karimov regime systematically used the securitization of imaginary threats as a legitimization instrument constitutes a significant gap both in comparative politics and

⁸⁵ Karimov's books are reminiscent of the books of Lenin that were mandatory readings within special course Ideology of National Independence at schools, colleges and universities.

⁸⁶ Andrew F March, "The Use And Abuse Of History: 'National Ideology' As Transcendental Object In Islam Karimov's 'Ideology Of National Independence'", *Central Asian Survey* 21, no. 4 (2002): 382, doi:10.1080/0263493032000053190.

⁸⁷ March, "From Leninism to Karimovism», 212.

⁸⁸ Ibid, 307-336.

⁸⁹ Rafael Sattorov, "'Spirituality And Enlightenment': Uzbekistan'S State-Backed Ideological Policy - Central Asia Program", *Central Asia Program*, 2021, <https://centralasiaprogram.org/archives/11408>.

⁹⁰ Seraphine F. Maerz, "Ma'Naviyat In Uzbekistan: An Ideological Extrication From Its Soviet Past?", *Journal Of Political Ideologies* 23, no. 2 (2017): 205-222, doi:10.1080/13569317.2018.1419448.

⁹¹ Bernardo Fazendeiro, "Spirituality And Anti-Western Rhetoric In Uzbekistan In The Early 2000S: The Consequences Of International Misrecognition", *Post-Soviet Affairs* 34, no. 4 (2018): 228-245, doi:10.1080/1060586x.2018.1468686.

⁹² Seraphine F. Maerz, "The Electronic Face Of Authoritarianism: E-Government As A Tool For Gaining Legitimacy In Competitive And Non-Competitive Regimes", *Government Information Quarterly* 33, no. 4 (2016): 727-735, doi:10.1016/j.giq.2016.08.008.

⁹³ Maerz, «Simulating Pluralism".

⁹⁴ Mariya Y. Omelicheva, "Islam And Power Legitimation: Instrumentalisation Of Religion In Central Asian States", *Contemporary Politics* 22, no. 2 (2016): 144-163, doi:10.1080/13569775.2016.1153287.

⁹⁵ Edel, Mirjam, and Maria Josua. "How Authoritarian Rulers"

⁹⁶ Jessica N. Trisko, "Coping With The Islamist Threat: Analysing Repression In Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan And Uzbekistan", *Central Asian Survey* 24, no. 4 (2005): 373-389, doi:10.1080/02634930500453509.

security studies. Of course, the contribution by Natalie Koch, who in comparative perspective investigates the way Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan stigmatize political instability in Kyrgyzstan "as indicative of the dangers of political liberalization and a weak state"⁹⁷, is an invaluable work that sheds light on how autocrats frame instability over border to legitimate authoritarianism. However, it is limited to one imaginary threat that authoritarian regime of Karimov used to vindicate repressions in Uzbekistan and detached from the wider context that will be discussed in this dissertation project.

2.4 Legitimation Literature: Belarus

The regime stability in Belarus, as in Uzbekistan during the Islam Karimov era, depends mainly on force⁹⁸ and preempting democracy by liquidation of opposition, even those who do not pose a serious challenge to the Lukashenko regime⁹⁹. However, the force and coercion is not the only means that helps Lukashenko to remain in power for a long period of time. There is a vast literature on authoritarian legitimation and regime stability in Belarus. For example, some argue that it is the external support¹⁰⁰ of the authoritarian regime in Belarus, including subsidies from Russia in the form of revenues from oil and arms sale and subsidised oil price¹⁰¹, at the expense of political loyalty of Lukashenko to Moscow which is called "sovereignty entrepreneurship"¹⁰², that vastly contributes to the durability of the Lukashenko regime. The popularity of the regime¹⁰³ is also a factor that helped the regime to be bypassed by the so-called colour revolutions. When it comes to what contributed to the regime's popularity, the literature mentions "a gradual, adaptive process of nation-building ..., leading to a widely shared state-framed authoritarian national identity"¹⁰⁴. Another legitimation strategy that the Lukashenko regime used, as the literature shows, is propagation of World War II memories and the liberation of Minsk during the War, which solidifies the regime durability¹⁰⁵. Also,

⁹⁷ Koch, "Disorder Over The Border», 13.

⁹⁸ Jovita Neliupšienė and Valentinas Beržiūnas, "The Impact Of Force Structures And The Army On Maintaining The Regime In Belarus", *Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review* 12, no. 1 (2014): 189-219, doi:10.2478/lasr-2014-0009;

⁹⁹ Vitali Silitski, "Preempting Democracy: The Case Of Belarus", *Journal Of Democracy* 16, no. 4 (2005): 83-97, doi:10.1353/jod.2005.0074.

¹⁰⁰ Katsiaryna Yakouchyk, "The Good, The Bad, And The Ambitious: Democracy And Autocracy Promoters Competing In Belarus", *European Political Science Review* 8, no. 2 (2015): 195-224, doi:10.1017/s1755773914000459.

¹⁰¹ Levitsky and Way, "Competitive Authoritarianism", 201.

¹⁰² Alex Nice, *Playing Both Sides: Belarus Between Russia And The EU* (DGAP Analyse, 2012), https://dgap.org/system/files/article_pdfs/2012-02_DGAPana_Nice_www_2.pdf.

¹⁰³ David R. Marples, "Color Revolutions: The Belarus Case", *Communist And Post-Communist Studies* 39, no. 3 (2006): 351-364, doi:10.1016/j.postcomstud.2006.06.004.

¹⁰⁴ Fabian Burkhardt, "Concepts Of The Nation And Legitimation In Belarus", in *Politics And Legitimacy In Post-Soviet Eurasia* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 149.

¹⁰⁵ David R Marples, "Europe's Last Dictatorship: The Roots And Perspectives Of Authoritarianism In 'White Russia'", *Europe-Asia Studies* 57, no. 6 (2005): 895-908, doi:10.1080/1080/09668130500199509.

the way ideology¹⁰⁶ and "egalitarian nationalism"¹⁰⁷ contributes to the durability of Lukashenko's authoritarian regime was not left unnoticed by the academia.

The aforementioned literature is indeed invaluable in terms of revealing the sources of the authoritarian persistence in Belarus, nevertheless, this project would be first to conceptualise the securitization of imaginary threats as a legitimation instrument that the Lukashenko uses to ensure durability of his regime. Of course, there is an indirect account of how Lukashenko "styled himself as the defender of sovereignty... [from] domestic opposition as enemies of the nation, as the heirs of 'fascist collaborators', and as agents of Western adversaries"¹⁰⁸. However, this dissertation purports to fully reveal when and how the Lukashenko regime refers to the securitization practice as a legitimation instrument.

2.5 Conclusion

As this is an interdisciplinary dissertation project, it purports to make contributions to several areas. Firstly, this dissertation will make an input to International Security by revealing the utility and actuality of the Copenhagen School to contemporary cases. The securitization theory that was developed by Buzan et al was found incomplete by the representatives of other schools, such as Welsh and Paris Schools. They further advanced the securitization concept by explaining the role of media and public in securitization practice, which, allegedly, was ignored by the Copenhagen School. Nevertheless, this research project shows the applicability and relevance of the concept developed by the latter in authoritarian regimes. Secondly, this project will enrich Comparative Politics, by proposing a new way of looking at how non-democratic regimes use internal and external threats for authoritarian legitimation purpose. The main theoretical contribution of this dissertation is that it extends the performance mechanism of authoritarian legitimation, proposed by Dukalskis and Gerschewski, by situating the securitization of imaginary threats and ensuring stability as an alternative to public goods. Also, revealing how a concept (the securitization theory) from the field of Security Studies can be used as a legitimation instrument is another major input in Comparative Politics. Thirdly, the project will also enrich the Area Studies, and Eurasian Studies, particularly. As this dissertation applies the foregoing theories in the cases of Uzbekistan and Belarus, which are a part of Eurasia and former Soviet Union Space, it will trace differences and similarity in the way the Karimov regime in Uzbekistan and the Lukashenko regime use securitization practice as a legitimation instrument.

¹⁰⁶ Katsiaryna Yakouchyk, "Belarusian State Ideology: A Strategy Of Flexible Adaptation", *Opus4.Kobv.De*, 2019, <https://opus4.kobv.de/opus4-uni-passau/frontdoor/index/index/docId/602>.

¹⁰⁷ Natalia Leshchenko, "The National Ideology And The Basis Of The Lukashenka Regime In Belarus", *Europe-Asia Studies* 60, no. 8 (2008): 1419-1433, doi:10.1080/09668130802292234.

¹⁰⁸ Aliaksei Kazharski and Andrey Makarychev, "Belarus, Russia, And The Escape From Geopolitics", *Political Geography*, 2021, 1-3, doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2021.102377.

Chapter 3: Conceptual Framework and Methodology

This chapter introduces the conceptual framework that will be applied further in this research project. It will present an alternative explanation of the performance mechanism of legitimation, then was developed by Dukalskis and Gerschewski. Also, this chapter outlines research design and methodology that will be instrumental in collecting and analysing data.

3.1 Conceptual Framework: Securitization as a Legitimation Instrument

As was shown in the section of legitimation literature, passivity and performance mechanisms complement each other. Dukalskis and Gerschewski argue that the main goal of the passivity mechanism is to depoliticize the people and leave them alone unless they question the power of the incumbent autocratic regime and its goals¹⁰⁹. However, as the authors further argue, the people would be passive and would not go against the incumbent's goals, if only the regime "provides public and private goods [forming] hidden social contract between the ruled and the ruler"¹¹⁰, which constitutes the performance mechanism. In order to prove their argument, the authors bring up as an example authoritarian policy of Park Chung Hee in South Korean to show that the latter oppressed leftist and pro-labor forces that could challenge the regime's project — reviving national glory and economy, while leaving the rest, the passive part of population alone¹¹¹. Nevertheless, we should underscore the fact that, although Chung Hee was strongman and autocrat to the core who fiercely protected the interests of big business (*Chaebol*), he, unlike the majority of autocrats, also cared about the overall development of the country¹¹². For instance, the Chung Hee regime created opportunities for the middle class. That is why he later would become known as "the architect of the South Korean economic miracle"¹¹³. However, so far as the majority of autocratic regimes and, particularly, Uzbekistan is concerned, the Karimov regime built a kleptocratic system who use national wealth as a source of personal and one's inner circle's enrichment. When it comes to Belarus, Lukashenko is successful in terms of providing satisfactory public goods due to the external support of Russia. As a result of predatory economic policy, where such regimes allocate significant amount of resources to strengthen their hold on power and enrich themselves, an option of providing public goods that could form a social contract between the ruled and the ruler comes to the naught. Thus, they need an alternative source that could satisfy the public and encourage the latter to bear with the incumbent regime. This source, as the dissertation argues, is security or stability in terms of absence of internal

¹⁰⁹ Dukalskis and Gerschewski. "What Autocracies Say», 255.

¹¹⁰ Ibid, 256.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Eun Mee Kim, *Big Business, Strong State* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1997).

¹¹³ Nicholas Kristof, "Ruthless Ex-Dictator Getting Credit For South Korea's Rise (Published 1995)", *New York Times*, 1995, <https://www.nytimes.com/1995/11/24/world/ruthless-ex-dictator-getting-credit-for-south-korea-s-rise.html>.

and external threats to the majority of people who do not mingle in politics and do not challenge the incumbent. In order to achieve this "security", authoritarian regimes create the illusion of stability by exaggerating existing threats or even creating imaginary threats.

As was shown above, security is not a "real thing", but a "speech-act", the utterance of security represents a move, which is followed by claiming a right to use all means possible to stop it¹¹⁴. Securitizing actor in our case is the government that designates referent object as stability and peace in the country, while announcing certain internal and external threats threatening it and that they need to be stopped or eliminated. Autocrats use the securitization practice as an instrument of legitimation, that is to say as a part of the performance mechanism. They intentionally exaggerate or create imaginary threats as if they are threatening their referent object and present their efforts to eliminate them as a performance that the audience should accept.

When it comes to types of threats that autocrats to select and exaggerate, it stems from geographical location, geopolitical condition in and around the securitizing government, its historical memories. For instance, geographically Uzbekistan is located in Muslim-dominated Central Asia region and it is close to Afghanistan, where Islamic fundamentalism and extremism is considered as a real threat. Belarus, on the contrary, is located in Europe, with its ethnically Slavonic population. Stemming from this geographical and geopolitical rationale, Uzbekistan mostly stresses and exaggerates the threat of terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism. Above all, Uzbekistan has experienced several terrorist attacks, which is used as historical memories to vindicate the authoritarian rule and to further exaggerate this threat. As far as Belarus is concerned, then using the case of terrorism in the realities of Belarus would be unconvincing for the people of Belarus, who never experienced such threat. However, what unites almost all hegemonic authoritarian regimes, and in particular our two cases, is the securitization of sort of democratic threat. Popular protests as a sign of democracy is not acceptable in autocratic states, as it could challenge the authoritarian regime. Thus, the West supporting or promoting democracy, which is incompatible with the autocratic regimes, is securitized as a threat to the stability that non-democratic regimes ensure.

3.2 Methodology

As was shown in the previous section (2.2), discourse analysis is designated by the representatives of the Copenhagen School as the "obvious" method¹¹⁵ for security construction, because it reveals "how the socially produced ideas and objects that populate the world were created and are held in place"¹¹⁶. The focal idea of the discourse analysis is that "it tries to explore the relationships between text,

¹¹⁴ Wæver, "Securitization and Desecuritization", 55

¹¹⁵ Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, *Security*, 176.

¹¹⁶ Nelson Phillips and Cynthia Hardy, *Discourse Analysis* (Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage, 2002): 6.

discourse, and context"¹¹⁷. Thus, stemming from this logic, the qualitative research design and textual analysis per se will be instrumental for this research project.

The speech act, which underscores that "people use their language to do things: to order and request, persuade and accuse"¹¹⁸, constitutes the foundation of the securitization theory; thus, it would be natural to work within textual — discourse analysis, especially in understanding the securitization practice in authoritarian context. Of course, discourse analysis is not the only textual analysis method. Another frequently used tool is the content analysis, which is also used to work with texts. The content analysis method helps us to quantify the frequency of words without contextualising their social context. When it comes to the discourse analysis, it equips us with the tool that helps us understand "written or spoken language in relation to its social context"¹¹⁹, which is instrumental and pertinent to address research question in this project. This dissertation will investigate the official political rhetoric in order to examine how Islam Karimov and Alexander Lukashenko have constructed imaginary or exaggerated internal and external threats into an existential problem with the purpose to instill fear in the public and so portray their regimes as the only viable option that will protect the citizens from those threats and ensure stability. Thus, if the discourse analysis will help us to reveal the context in which these governments securitize internal and external threats and to understand the extent these threats exaggerated or imaginary, then the content analysis will be applied to disclose how much these regimes use the word stability and peace so trying to show how they perform well amid some urgent threats.

3.2.1 Sources and Data Collection

In this dissertation project, we will analyse how the Karimov and Lukashenko regimes securitize imaginary internal and external threats to instill fear among the public and present themselves as the indispensable guarantor who can protect the people and their identity, and ensure long-lasting stability amid these threats. This project will draw on the primary sources such as speeches, official statements, interviews, and memoirs. The dissertation will also refer to the secondary sources in order to synthesise arguments provided by the existing literature related to the issue in question. More specifically, in the case of Karimov`s Uzbekistan, books of Islam Karimov (reminiscent of the Works of Lenin, that were mandatory readings within special course "Ideology of National Independence" at schools, colleges and universities) and official statements will be scrutinised. These sources, especially books, will help us disclose how the Karimov regime institutionalised the securitization of terrorism. When it comes to Belarus, we will thoroughly analyse official statements that have been

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Jonathan Potter and Margaret Wetherell, *Discourse And Social Psychology* (London: Sage, 2009):32.

¹¹⁹ Amy Luo, "Discourse Analysis | A Step-By-Step Guide With Examples", *Scribbr*, 2019, <https://www.scribbr.com/methodology/discourse-analysis/>.

made by Lukashenko; to be more precise, the section on Belarus will draw on two main sources — online archive of meetings and speeches on the official website of the president of Belarus (<https://president.gov.by/>) and one of the major official media platform (<https://www.belta.by/>). When it comes to gathering data, we will collect it using key words (Russian equivalent of word "terrorism", "instability", "external" and "internal threats", "the West") in relation to context.

Chapter 4: Empirical Findings

Huntington argues that "the survival and legitimacy of authoritarian regimes depends heavily on their economic performance"¹²⁰. If this is partially the case in Belarus, where Lukashenko could extract subsidies from its patron Russia, then in the case of Uzbekistan, good economic performance was only in statistics, which was falsified, while the socio-economic reality in the country was way worse than presented in numbers.

Representing the empirical part of this dissertation, this chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section shows the way the Karimov regime in Uzbekistan used the securitization practice as a legitimation instrument. In particular, this section reveals how Uzbekistan during Islam Karimov exaggerated the threat of terrorism and securitized democracy in order to suppress or prevent the emergence of the opposition. Seeking to vindicate the autocratic rule in Uzbekistan, the Karimov regime referred to historical memories of internal instability related to Islamic fundamentalism and instability over the border. As a result, this section discloses how ensuring peace and stability in Uzbekistan amid the foregoing exaggerated or imaginary threats was presented by the Karimov regime as an alternative to public goods. The following section reveals how and why the Lukashenko regime in Belarus has used the securitization practice, while it has afforded itself to provide relatively satisfactory public goods due to the Russian economic support. This section shows that Lukashenko, like Karimov, also used this practice, while designating the West as the threat. It argues that securitizing the West and democracy, the Lukashenko regime used the securitization on an ad hoc basis as a complementary instrument to public goods.

4.1 Uzbekistan: Introduction

Islam Karimov, before an unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union, was the first secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan in 1989, and in 1990 he was elected as the president of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Karimov stayed in power as the president of, this time, independent Uzbekistan. He later was reelected several times, notwithstanding the constitutional limitation on presidential terms that presidents could serve. The

¹²⁰ Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization In The Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, Okl.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991): 46-58.

beginning of the 1990s were crucial period for Karimov in terms of consolidation of power that would lay a solid foundation for his rule for the next quarter of a century. At the initial stages of his rule, Karimov faced twofold opposition against his presidency: secular opposition in the face of *Birlik* (Unity) and *Erk* (Liberty) parties on the one hand, and Islamic opposition represented by two Islamists — Tahir Yuldashev and Juma Namangani, on the other. Both secular and Islamic opposition forces were eliminated from the political stage.

Seeking to protect the kleptocratic regime, Karimov was intolerant towards any kind of opposition, especially those who fought for human rights and democracy. Opposition political parties *Erk* and *Birlik* competing for power at the initial stages of independence were ruthlessly suppressed, and "public assemblies [were] banned and their leaders [were] driven into exile"¹²¹. In 1991 Uzbekistan held presidential elections, where Islam Karimov defeated the chairman of the opposition party *Erk* Muhammad Salih by winning 86 per cent of the vote. Salih complained that the elections were not fair, as the media was totally controlled and the entire apparatus of voting and vote counting were manipulated by Islam Karimov¹²². When it comes to another opposition party *Birlik*, its leader Abdurahim Pulatov could not enter the race, allegedly, because the incumbent prohibited the party from collecting necessary votes¹²³. As a result, these leaders and anyone who dared challenge the rule of Islam Karimov were either intimidated or exiled¹²⁴. For example, one of the Karimov's opponents Jahongir Mamatov, who was a member of parliament in the early 90-s and fiercely critiqued Karimov for human rights violations, ended up in the US as a political refugee. Also, as Mamatov said, "very few MPs out of five hundred 'survived': some were either forced and others had to leave the country or end up in jail" for the same reason¹²⁵.

When it comes to the Islamic opposition who wanted to establish Islamic state based on Shariah, they were also liquidated from the political scene of Uzbekistan. Notorious Namangan events happened in August 1991, when Tahir Yuldashev and Juma Namangani demanded from the presidential candidate Islam Karimov to abolish secular laws and establish Shariah and announce Uzbekistan as Islamic state¹²⁶. Karimov travelled to Namangan at the day to try to convince two

¹²¹ Nate Schenkkan, "Islam Karimov And The Dictator'S Playbook", *Foreign Policy*, 2016, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/30/islam-karimov-and-the-dictators-playbook-uzbekistan/>.

¹²² *The Referendum On Independence And Presidential Election In Uzbekistan: December 29, 1991* (Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1991), <https://www.csce.gov/sites/helsinkicommission.house.gov/files/The%20Referendum%20on%20Independence%20and%20Presidential%20Elections%20in%20Uzbekistan.pdf>.

¹²³ *Ibid.*

¹²⁴ "U.S. Department Of State Country Report On Human Rights Practices 1993 - Uzbekistan", *Refworld*, 2021, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6aa5610.html>.

¹²⁵ "Chetirnadsat Let Nazad V Uzbekskoy Tyurme Ot Pytok Skonchalsya Odin Iz Yaryh Kritikov Karimova", *Ozodlik Radiosi*, 2015, <https://www.ozodlik.org/a/27158436.html>.

¹²⁶ Islam Karimov, *Uzbekistan Na Poroge Dostizheniya Nezavisimosti* (Tashkent: Uzbekistan, 2011): 24.

Islamists Yuldashev and Namangani, and endured a dressing down¹²⁷ at the hand of these two Islamists that Karimov never forgot and revenged against them fiercely. The security service launched mass arrests in Namangan, detaining and arresting suspects without warrants¹²⁸. Of course, the threat of fundamentalism always exists in the region of Central Asia and Uzbekistan per se, however, it is not in a dramatized or exaggerated form that the regime of Karimov presented to the public, because the military strength of Uzbekistan has always been highly ranked both in the world¹²⁹ and Central Asian region¹³⁰. The following statement of Mikhail Ardzinov, the chairman of the unregistered independent human rights community in Uzbekistan, on this issue clearly describes the situation of that period:

Clearly, there are Wahhabis in Uzbekistan, above all, in the Fergana valley — Namangan and Andijan. I can't deny that many of those arrested were, in fact, adherents of that branch of Islam. But there is no doubt that this trial was fabricated by the government. I can't help noticing a strange coincidence: as soon as the conflict in Tajikistan died down, these events took place in the Fergana valley. I guess that Karimov simply needed to find a new threat to justify the necessity of his dictatorship ...¹³¹

Eliminating the opposition from political scene once and for all, Islam Karimov embarked on depoliticization of the people and inculcating in the latter's minds that his authoritarian rule was indispensable amid internal and external threats, which were exaggerated and imaginary. The Karimov regime institutionalized the securitization of terrorism and launched a propaganda campaign through books, movies and official statements. In order to prove that the government was performing well and ensuring stability in the country, the Karimov regime suppressed and imprisoned people for any dissent, and labeled the latter as extremists who plotted coup d'état and planned to build Islamic state in Uzbekistan. Also, the regime securitized democracy and presented the latter as the threat to stability in the country. As a source of vindication of autocratic rule in the country the Karimov regime referred to historical memories of internal instability related to Islamic fundamentalism and instability over the border, such as Islamic fundamentalism and religious terrorism in the world, civil war in Tajikistan, consecutive revolutions in Kyrgyzstan that toppled several governments and colour revolutions in post-Soviet space at large.

¹²⁷ *Karimov Namanganda*, video, 2021, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xwVS8CQg2s4>.

¹²⁸ Igor Rotar, "'Enlightened Islam', Uzbek-Style: Islam Karimov Is Getting Rid Of His Most Dangerous Rival", *Jamestown*, 1998, <https://jamestown.org/program/enlightened-islam-uzbek-style-islam-karimov-is-getting-rid-of-his-most-dangerous-rival/>.

¹²⁹ *2021 Uzbekistan Military Strength*, accessed 28 July 2021, https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country_id=uzbekistan.

¹³⁰ "Army Of Uzbekistan Strongest In Central Asia", *Kun.Uz*, 2020, <https://kun.uz/en/news/2020/01/23/army-of-uzbekistan-strongest-in-central-asia>.

¹³¹ Rotar, "'Enlightened Islam'".

4.1.1 Passivity and Securitization of Imaginary Threats as Performance

As was shown in the literature review, two mechanisms — passivity and performance — are interconnected and complement each other. The passivity mechanism is related to depoliticisation of people, by presenting the incumbent regime as irreplaceable and "discrediting political alternatives as unrealistic"¹³². The main argument that autocratic regimes put forward, according to Dukalskis and Gerschewski, is that they are the ones who "[ensure] stability, order, and national interests"¹³³. As the authors argue further, people would be passive and would tolerate the autocratic regime, if the latter "provides public and private goods [forming] hidden social contract between the ruled and the ruler"¹³⁴. However, due to predatory nature and corruptness of authoritarian regimes, they not always can ensure satisfactory public goods. Thus, they need an alternative source that could satisfy the public and encourage the latter to bear with the incumbent regime. This source, as the dissertation argues, is security or stability in terms of absence of internal and external threats to the majority of people who do not mingle in politics and do not challenge the incumbent. In order to achieve this "security", authoritarian regimes create the illusion of stability, by contrasting the latter with exaggerated or even imaginary threats.

Symbolically, a step to depoliticize the public was made in 2013, when political science as a major subject was found unnecessary in Uzbekistan, with its further removal from the education curricula in 2015¹³⁵. However, before this symbolic step was taken, there had already existed a saying among people *siyosatga aralashma* (do not discuss/meddle in politics), which was referred to whenever someone started discussing politics. This saying became actual in light of fear of the coercion instrument that the regime utilised against "dissidents" that ordinary people felt. However, along with intimidation that the ordinary public felt, they also have admiration for Islam Karimov who established peace and stability in Uzbekistan.

People could not praise other things than stability in Uzbekistan and the government intentionally propagated that the regime was ensuring security and stability in the country, because all knew that the "great" economic performance that Karimov achieved was falsified. Benjamin Disraeli once said, "there are three types of lies – lies, damn lies, and statistics"¹³⁶. As we see, the third level of lie is attributed to statistics, because the majority are predisposed to trust numbers, rather than words: they perceive statistics as if they present an indisputable reality, while the latter might be

¹³² Dukalskis and Gerschewski. "What Autocracies Say», 259.

¹³³ Ibid., 255.

¹³⁴ Ibid., 256.

¹³⁵ "Knowledge Is Power: Uzbekistan Lifts Ban On Political Science", *Reuters*, 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uzbekistan-education/knowledge-is-power-uzbekistan-lifts-ban-on-political-science-idUSKCN1PP2A8>.

¹³⁶ Lorna Hawtin, "Lies, Damned Lies And Statistics", *Ipa.Co.Uk*, 2017, <https://ipa.co.uk/knowledge/ipa-blog/lies-damned-lies-and-statistics>.

the opposite. Thus, the Karimov regime manipulated the statistics to show the public that his government is performing effectively. There were two government bodies that were manipulating statistics in favour of the regime — the State Committee on Statistics (SCS) and *Ijtimoiy firka* (Public Opinion, a government-based social survey organization). The main function of the SCS was to ensure that numbers on economic performance were falsified to prove that Uzbekistan had "macroeconomic stability"¹³⁷, private business development, employment and income growth. When it comes to the *Ijtimoiy firka*, it regularly published social surveys indicating an overall happiness of citizens — the satisfaction of citizens with socio-economic and political situation in the country¹³⁸. However, the average people in underdeveloped countries do not read surveys and statistics. Thus, the Karimov regime utilised media and Karimov's books to bring the indicators of prosperity and happiness to the public's attention. For instance, almost all of Karimov's works include statistics presenting how productive economic performance was during the rule of Karimov¹³⁹. Media was totally controlled by the government, which was actively used to propagate prosperity under the current regime. Thus, the economic performance of the Karimov regime was based on falsification of the social and economic reality¹⁴⁰. Nevertheless, given that this rhetoric and falsification of statistics on economic performance are unconvincing as the consequences of corruption and ineffective governance negatively and directly affect the daily lives of the people, the Karimov regime securitized imaginary and exaggerated internal and external threats that need to be eliminated, and propagated the rhetoric that the only one that could accomplish this mission was the irreplaceable incumbent regime of Islam Karimov.

4.1.1.1 Securitizing Terrorism

It is not a myth that Post-Soviet Central Asia, and Uzbekistan per se, has experienced a thorny test of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism. Islam Karimov raised alarm regarding these issues way back in 1993 in his first speech in United Nations General Assembly¹⁴¹. This concern was reasoned by the civil war in Tajikistan and situation in Afghanistan, which were safe havens for terrorists. However, the Karimov regime intentionally overreacted to the issue of terrorism in order to legitimate strict autocratic rule, on the one hand, before the international community, and, on the other, its own

¹³⁷ Kuanyshbek Kari, "Mirziyoyev Sobiraetsya V Moskvu. Stanet Li Uzbekistan Chlenom EAES?", *Radio Azattyq*, 2020, <https://rus.azattyq.org/a/chaikhana-uzbekistan-eeu-economy/30397416.html>.

¹³⁸ Feruza Djanni, "Goskomstat Uzbekistana Poobeshal, Chto Budet I Vpred Povyshat Kachestvo Jizni Naseleniya", *Fergana*, 2009, <https://www.fergananews.com/articles/6083>.

¹³⁹ Islam Karimov, *Obespechit Postupatelnoy i Ustoychivoe Razvitie Strani — Vajneyshaya Zadacha* (Tashkent: Uzbekistan, 2009): 4-5; Islam Karimov, *Na Puti Reshitelnogo Prodoljeniya Dalneyshego Prosvetaniya I Modernizatsii Strani*. (Tashkent: Uzbekistan, 2013): 14-18.

¹⁴⁰ Djanni, "Goskomstat Uzbekistana».

¹⁴¹ Islam Karimov, *Nasha Tsel: Svobodnaya i Prosvetayushaya Rodina* (Tashkent: Uzbekistan, undated): 31-33.

citizens. The endorsement of international community Islam Karimov obtained after notorious 9/11 events, after which the US President George W. Bush declared Global War on Terror¹⁴². As Andrew W. Neal argues in his seminal book *Exceptionalism and the Politics of Counter-Terrorism: Liberty, security and the War on Terror*, this event brought a significant transformation in political practice and discourse. Many officials started arguing that

this is a new kind of war, that exceptional times require exceptional measures... that has been invoked to legitimize and mobilize an array of violent and illiberal practices..., such as detention without trial, extraordinary rendition, derogations from human rights law, sanction or connivance in torture, the curtailment of civil liberties and aggressive war against international law¹⁴³.

If Neal shows how major democracies invoked non-liberal methods in order to fight terrorism, that is to say securitized terrorism to use exceptional measures beyond normal politics, then autocracies such as the Karimov regime capitalized on this situation by obtaining international endorsement of strict authoritarian rule in Uzbekistan. Indeed, as Craig Murray, a former Ambassador to Uzbekistan puts in the telegram to his government:

Between 7,000 and 10,000 political and religious prisoners are currently detained, many after trials before kangaroo courts with no representation.... Opposition political parties remain banned. There is no doubt that September 11 gave the pretext to crack down still harder on dissent under the guise of counter-terrorism.... Yet on 8 September the US State Department certified that Uzbekistan was improving in both human rights and democracy, thus fulfilling a constitutional requirement and allowing the continuing disbursement of \$140 million of US aid to Uzbekistan this year. Human Rights Watch immediately published a commendably sober and balanced rebuttal of the State Department claim¹⁴⁴.

If in the Soviet Union citizens who deviated from the main ideology and main political course, or to put it another way, who questioned the regime, were labeled as "national traitors" and either were imprisoned or sentenced to death, then the Karimov regime used the label of Islamic extremist or radical islamists to eliminate opponents. The regime of Karimov securitized Islam; by so doing they claimed "a right to apply 'urgent and exceptional' measures that fall outside the typical religious policies and constitutionally mandated principles of human rights"¹⁴⁵. The manifestation of these

¹⁴² "President Declares "Freedom At War With Fear"", *Georgewbush-Whitehouse.Archives.Gov*, 2001, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>.

¹⁴³ Andrew Neal, *Exceptionalism And The Politics Of Counter-Terrorism: Liberty, Security And The War On Terror* (Oxon: Routledge, 2010): 1.

¹⁴⁴ Craig Murray, *Dirty Diplomacy* (New York: Scribner, 2006): 177

¹⁴⁵ Barry Buzan and Ole Waver, *Regions And Powers: The Structure Of International Security*. (Cambridge University Press, 2003): 491.

exceptional measure seen in the way the government conducted religious policy. As Pauline Jones Luong argues,

President Karimov of Uzbekistan in particular has maintained Soviet attitudes toward religion and dissent. He has moved beyond the notion that the state should simply "manage" Islam by institutionalizing and depoliticizing it, however, to the conviction that it must be eliminated as an independent social force. Thus, while Karimov created his own Committee for Religious Affairs to perform essentially the same function as the Soviet Islamic Central Asian Directorate – to oversee the practice of Islam – he has also executed a widespread crack-down on nonmilitant Islamists, which includes practicing Muslims and imams in both officially recognized and unofficial mosques¹⁴⁶.

Indeed, the Karimov regime officially was fighting "Wahhabism" or fundamentalism, while in practice "all Muslims who try to observe the canons of Islam undeviatingly, who are subjected to persecution"¹⁴⁷.

The suppression of Islamists had two functions. Firstly, it was used as an exemplary measure for the rest of the population not to question the regime, otherwise the same measures would be used against them. The regime argued that if the political course of the government would be questioned, Uzbekistan could end up in a civil war like in neighbouring Tajikistan. As Stuart Horsman argues, "[t]he proliferation of political movements and demands for 'radical reforms' in neighbouring Tajikistan were perceived and portrayed in Uzbekistan as the causes of the civil war"¹⁴⁸. That is why it was argued by the regime that "opposition groups should not compete for power, because such a behaviour would result in a situation similar to Tajikistan"¹⁴⁹. Whoever fails to meet with these criteria were designated as extremist and associated with external enemies attempting to destabilize Uzbekistan¹⁵⁰. Secondly, it was also used as an indication of performance. Indeed, active broadcasting and propagation through mass media that one or another man or a group of people were arrested for being a member of a terrorist group, who, in reality was arrested for simply wearing Islamic clothes, wearing beard or visiting mosque for practicing Islamic duties, created an impression among the majority of people that the government ensures the stability and peace by preventing the repetition of previous terrorist attacks that Uzbekistan experienced and instability over the border, such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

¹⁴⁶ Pauline Jones Luong, *The Transformation Of Central Asia: States And Societies From Soviet Rule To Independence* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004): 22.

¹⁴⁷ <https://jamestown.org/program/enlightened-islam-uzbek-style-islam-karimov-is-getting-rid-of-his-most-dangerous-rival/>

¹⁴⁸ Stuart Horsman, "Uzbekistan's Involvement In The Tajik Civil War 1992-97: Domestic Considerations", *Central Asian Survey* 18, no. 1 (1999): 42, doi:10.1080/02634939995731.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

4.1.1.2 Historical Memories of Exaggerated Terrorism

Securitization can be facilitated by attributes of the threat itself, especially by historical memories of similar threats¹⁵¹. For instance, As Qadri argues, "the memory of a recent terrorist attack may increase support for the suspension of civil liberties or military engagements abroad to prevent future terrorism"¹⁵². The regime of Karimov utilized this method by actively referring to historical memories of terrorist attacks. For instance, the government always referred to three main events — Namangan events in 1991, bombings in Tashkent 1999, and Andijan events in 2005 — to securitize terrorism and claim "a right to apply 'urgent and exceptional' measures that fall outside the typical religious policies and constitutionally mandated principles of human rights"¹⁵³. Although Uzbekistan indeed experienced those events related to terrorism, but the way the Karimov regime presented them to the public was falsified and exaggerated, on the one hand in order not to let the emergence of opposition, and on the other hand, to create the illusion of imminent threat that the regime fights to ensure stability in the country.

The situation in Uzbekistan after gaining the independence was indeed turbulent as Karimov always referred to in his books. The emergence of small, but militant Islamist opposition, such as Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which was conducting military operations that were directed at toppling the Karimov regime¹⁵⁴. Initially, the leader of IMU Tohir Yoldosh announced himself in 1991, during so-called Namangan events¹⁵⁵, demanding to build Islamic state in Uzbekistan. The emergence of this Movement was both the result of independence and uncertainty, and the actions to build an autocratic rule by the Karimov regime. The policy of the Karimov regime to liquidate internal opposition undermined the emergence of alternative democratic forces, while, at the same time, it fueled the emergence of military Islamists in the face of the IMU¹⁵⁶. This brought to further securitization of fundamentalism and religious terrorism in Uzbekistan, and the regime strengthened the security apparatus. According to Tolib Yakubov, the General Secretary of the Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan, "the government of President Karimov has created a 'huge machine' which fields 40,000 security police in Tashkent alone, and recruits as many as 2,500

¹⁵¹ Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, "Security"; Matt McDonald, "Securitization And The Construction Of Security", *European Journal Of International Relations* 14, no. 4 (2008): 563-587, doi:10.1177/1354066108097553.

¹⁵² Qadri, "Framing Terrorism», 58.

¹⁵³ Buzan and Waver, "Regions And Powers", 491.

¹⁵⁴ *Central Asia: Islamist Mobilisation And Regional Security*, ICG Asia Report (International Crisis Group, 2001), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/central-asia/kyrgyzstan/central-asia-islamist-mobilisation-and-regional-security>.

¹⁵⁵ *Karimov Namanganda*, video, 2011, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xwVS8CQg2s4>.

¹⁵⁶ *Uzbekistan At Ten: Repression And Instability*, ICG Asia Report (International Crisis Group, 2001), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/central-asia/uzbekistan/central-asia-uzbekistan-10-repression-and-instability>.

informers per month nation-wide"¹⁵⁷. Also, human rights abuses and extra-legal detentions became the norm at the time and the government spending on the security services increasingly rose¹⁵⁸.

Seeking to totally eliminate opposition, Karimov scapegoated *Erk* and *Birlik* democratic parties for fighting for power with arms and creating instability in the country. Karimov called these parties as representing unconstructive opposition in Uzbekistan and blamed them for "recruiting youngsters and preparing them for martial arts, shooting and terrorism"¹⁵⁹. However, none of the foregoing parties was terroristic. For instance, the *Birlik* "Unity" Popular Movement espoused "democratic and nationalist goals including a renaissance of Uzbek culture, multiparty democracy and greater independence from Moscow"¹⁶⁰; when the *Birlik* Movement became the *Birlik* Party (also known as the Democratic Party of Uzbekistan), it "demanded liberal reforms, respect for personal freedoms, establishment of Uzbek as the official language, and measures to address ecological and health problems"¹⁶¹. When it comes to *Erk* Democratic Party, it was founded in 1990 and was technically the first registered political party in Uzbekistan. Its leader, Muhammad Solih was first and the last democratic opposition against Islam Karimov in 1991 presidential elections, which, allegedly, was rigged in favour of Karimov¹⁶². Because of increasing pressure from the government, Solih fled Uzbekistan in 1993.

In February 1999, a series of bombings rocked in Tashkent, destroying the Cabinet of Ministers' building, where the president Karimov should have delivered a speech. According to official rhetoric, it was carried out by IMU and "[i]t also alleged the plot was concocted with Solih"¹⁶³, who as a result was sentenced to fifteen years in prison in absentia¹⁶⁴. However, "prosecutors presented no compelling evidence that the Erk leadership was involved"¹⁶⁵. The Karimov regime after catching one of the main figures of the IMU Zayniddin Asqarov, responsible for foreign affairs of IMU, forced the latter state that Muhammad Solih was involved in 1999 Tashkent bombings. However, later in an interview with BBC journalist Asqarov admitted that he was forced to announce that Solih plotted the Tashkent bombings in 1999 under torture. He revealed in the interview that not only Solih was not involved in the bombings, but he refused to align with the leader of IMU Tohir Yoldosh because of ideological divergence and means of gaining power: Solih did not want to build

¹⁵⁷ "Uzbek Government Seen As Increasingly Repressive", *RFE/RL*, 2001, <http://www.rferl.org/welcome/english/releases/2001/03/30-300301.html>.

¹⁵⁸ "Uzbekistan at Ten"

¹⁵⁹ Islam Karimov, *Po Puti Sozidaniya* (Tashkent: Uzbekistan, 1996): 131

¹⁶⁰ "Uzbekistan at Ten".

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶² Catherine Putz, "Uzbekistan: Opposition Erk Party Wants In On October Presidential Election", *The Diplomat*, 2021, <https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/uzbekistan-opposition-erk-party-wants-in-on-october-presidential-election/>.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁴ "Uzbek Dissident Arrested In Prague, Threatened With Extradition", *Human Rights Watch*, 2001, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2001/11/28/uzbek-dissident-arrested-prague-threatened-extradition>.

¹⁶⁵ "Uzbekistan at Ten".

Islamic state, but democratic, and he rejected the fight for power with arms and topple the Karimov regime through terrorism, which were main instruments of Yoldosh. Above all, as Asqarov stated that it was not IMU that organized 1999 bombings in Tashkent, Tohir Yoldosh, allegedly, was even trying to stop the bombing, because the main goal of IMU was not to simply eliminate Karimov, but his surrounding inclusively. As far as the group of people who planned and carried out the bombings are concerned, according to Asqarov, they were those who wanted to revenge the government for kidnapping shayx Abduvali qori. Also, Asqarov said, although the bombings were carried out by radicals, the government knew beforehand about their plans for 16 February 1999, but let them proceed¹⁶⁶.

The third historical memory of terrorism that the Karimov regime referred to vindicate autocratic rule is Andijan events that happened in 2005. On May 13, 2005, armed men attacked several government buildings and the prison to release 23 businessmen, who were unfairly arrested in 2004 for extremism and fundamentalism and charged with being members of, allegedly, terrorist organization Akromiya. From 1000 to 4000 people, who were monitoring the trial outside, joined the protesters who freed the businessmen and denounced social and political injustice in the country. As a result, troops from security service of Uzbekistan (SNB) fired indiscriminately at a crowd of protesters; people who wanted to flee the country to the neighbouring Kyrgyzstan were also met with gunfire by Uzbek military¹⁶⁷. According to official statistics, 187 people died, while human rights organizations estimate that several hundred people were killed¹⁶⁸. One of the eyewitness of these events Chingiz Raimqulov in the interview to the *Ko`zgu* project confirmed that bullets were falling like rain and that the government M113 (BTR) tanks indiscriminately fired in the crowd. Thus, according to Raimqulov, the official estimate of 187 people died in the Andijan Massacre was significantly diminished, and he stated that the number of victims is far higher than the government version¹⁶⁹.

According to the official rhetoric, those 23 businessmen were members of Akromiya terrorist organization, who wanted to toppled the regime and establish Islamic state. However, the Karimov regime rejected an independent investigation as was demanded by the UN¹⁷⁰. That is why, it is difficult to establish the truth about the Andijan events and this is still an open question. Nevertheless, there are certain independent sources which could reveal some evidence that prove that the reality on

¹⁶⁶ "Zayniddin Asqarov Intervyusi", *El Tuz*, 2015, <https://eltuz.com/lat/dokument/414/>.

¹⁶⁷ Mirjam Edel and Maria Josua, "How Authoritarian Rulers Seek To Legitimize Repression: Framing Mass Killings In Egypt And Uzbekistan", *Democratization* 25, no. 5 (2018): 888, doi:10.1080/13510347.2018.1439021.

¹⁶⁸ Anna Neistat, "The Andijan Massacre Remembered", *Amnesty International*, 2015, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/07/the-andijan-massacre-remembered/>.

¹⁶⁹ Ko`zgu, 2005-Yil Andijon Voqeasi Sirlari Ochildi, Guvoh Gapirdi.. Zokirjon Almatov Qamoqqa Olinadimi Endi?, video, 2020, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wHNQW3oewuA>.

¹⁷⁰ Edel and Josua, "How Authoritarian Rulers Seek", 888.

the Andijan events is diametrically opposed to the official rhetoric. For instance, as was investigated and concluded by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights,

the 23 businessmen were also very popular amongst the local community. They are said to have created many jobs in the community and to have treated their employees well. One of these businessmen described to the ODIHR team how he provided his workers with uniforms, shoes and meals free of charge. Many were also engaged in social activities and charities, donating money to schools, orphanages and the poor in their communities¹⁷¹.

Stemming from this fact, the popularity of these businessmen could potentially cast shadow to the name and regime of Karimov. That is why, as was usually done at the time, such popular people were eliminated by associating them with extremism and terrorism. However, when one of the 23 businessmen Abdulboiz Ibrahimov was charged with being an Akromiya member, he protested: "Surely it's clear that Akromiya is just a myth"¹⁷².

According to Sarah Kenzior, the existence of Akromia terrorist organization and associating the 23 businessmen with it, was simply a mythologised and propagated by the Karimov regime. The Author argues that

In researching Akromiya, one is struck not only by the paucity of sources on the group, but of what these few sources consist. Unlike other Central Asian radical Islamic organizations such as Hizb-ut Tahrir or the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Akromiya went almost completely unnoticed and unexamined by both Uzbek and international scholars and policymakers prior to May 2005. While organizations such as Hizb-ut Tahrir have developed elaborate Websites and distributed literature to advance their goals and win adherents, Akromiya has produced no publicly available materials, save one work by the group's eponymous leader, Akrom Yo'ldoshev. While the violent actions of organizations such as the IMU are a genuine threat to Central Asian security, Akromiya has remained dormant since its alleged founding in 1992, only to suddenly be held accountable for the Andijan massacre¹⁷³.

The Akromia organization was not the only organization that was designated as a threat to the stability in Uzbekistan. The Karimov regime also frequently referred to Hizb-ut-Tahrir as an

¹⁷¹ *Preliminary Findings On The Events In Andijan, Uzbekistan, 13 May, 2015* (Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, 2015), <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/1/1/15653.pdf>.

¹⁷² Matluba Azamatova, "Controversial Trial Triggered Uzbek Violence", *IWPR*, 2005, <https://iwpr.net/global-voices/controversial-trial-triggered-uzbek-violence>.

¹⁷³ Sarah Kendzior, "Inventing Akromiya: The Role Of Uzbek Propagandists In The Andijan Massacre", *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal Of Post-Soviet Democratization* 14, no. 4 (2006): 545-562, doi:10.3200/demo.14.4.545-562.

imminent threat to stability in the country¹⁷⁴. However, Craig Murray argues that "Hizb-ut-Tehrir did not evolve as an organized cell structure in Uzbekistan—it is more an idea than an organization"¹⁷⁵. Frequently referring to this terrorist organization as representing a threat to the stability of Uzbekistan, according to Murray, was done to justify repressions and frighten people¹⁷⁶.

If we stem from this logic and all the foregoing arguments, then the conclusion of the Human Rights Watch on the Andijan massacre seems to be convincing:

The government sought to justify its acts by casting the events in the context of terrorism, and has claimed that all of the dead were killed by the gunmen, and has stated that the organizers of the protest were Islamic 'fanatics and militants' who sought to overthrow the government and establish an Islamic state. This is unsurprising. For nearly a decade, the Uzbek government has cast nearly all of its domestic critics as "terrorists", "extremists", and "Islamic fundamentalists". The government has faced serious incidents of terrorism and insurrection, but it has also used threats of terrorism to justify essentially banning nearly all political opposition, religious or secular. Human Rights Watch research found no evidence that the protesters or the gunmen had an Islamist agenda. Interviews with numerous people present at the demonstrations consistently revealed that the protesters spoke about economic conditions in Andijan, government repression, and unfair trials—and not the creation of an Islamic state¹⁷⁷.

4.1.1.3 Stigmatisation of Political Instability in Post-Soviet Region: Colour Revolutions

The regime of Karimov in addition to securitization of terrorism, also stigmatised political instability in post-Soviet region and presented it as a threat to peace and security in Uzbekistan. According to the regime rhetoric, instability in the region emerged because of the efforts of external powers in the face of the West and the US per se that tried to foist democracy that does not suit local traditions and mentality. Such a rhetoric became acute especially after the Andijan events.

Before the Andijan events, relations between Uzbekistan and the US was friendly given the fact that the former was one of the key players of the US Global War on Terror. Uzbekistan accommodated American military base in Karshi Khanabad (K2), which was helping the US and coalitions forces in the War in Afghanistan. Due to this quid pro quo deal between these states, the US even turned a blind eye to human rights violations in Uzbekistan. For example, former

¹⁷⁴ Islam Karimov, *Mirnaya Jizn I Bezopasnost Strani Zavisyat Ot Edinstva I Tverdoy Voli Nashego Naroda* (Tashkent: Uzbekistan, 2004).; Islam Karimov, *Uzbekskiy Narod Nikogda I Ni Ot Kogo Ne Budet Zaviset* (Tashkent: Uzbekistan, 2005).

¹⁷⁵ Craig Murray, "Dirty Diplomacy", 217.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid*, 218.

¹⁷⁷ "Bullets Were Falling Like Rain", *Human Rights Watch*, 2005, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2005/06/06/bullets-were-falling-rain/andijan-massacre-may-13-2005>.

Ambassador of the UK to Uzbekistan Craig Murray puts it in his memoirs that the US was biased in favour of the Karimov regime, as the US Ambassador in Tashkent John Edward Herbst in a meeting highlighted that the human rights situation was improving, and Murray protested: "But what are you talking about? The media is completely censored. There is absolutely no real news at all — it's the most arrant propaganda"¹⁷⁸. However, after the Andijan massacre the rhetoric of the Karimov regime totally changed towards the West.

What is interesting, if initially the Karimov regime depicted the Andijan events as a terrorist attack with the final goal of building Islamic state in Uzbekistan, which was organized by the Akromia terrorist organization, then a bit later Karimov announced that it was the coup d'état planned by the West with the same aim — to topple Karimov's government. On 29 June, 2005, Karimov visited Moscow, where he declared that "[t]he events in Andijon were planned in advance and were a very serious, thoroughly prepared operation, to put it accurately. It is clear that it was prepared in headquarters and centers where there are people who have carried out operations like this before on the territory of both CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] and other states"¹⁷⁹. This was a hint of so-called colour revolutions happened in several post-Soviet republics and that the events in Andijan were "planned by the US, which under the pretext of concern for human rights unceasing attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of the independent state of Uzbekistan"¹⁸⁰.

As we have seen above, the Karimov regime securitized instability, which, allegedly, emerged as a result of external efforts. The logic behind this is simple — the people in Uzbekistan protested against injustice against 23 businessmen, who treated workers well and helped the locals of Andijan better than the government. Expressing discontent through protests is a normal element of demanding something from government in democratic systems, while autocracies do not tolerate them as it questions the authority of the regime. That is why, non-democratic regimes try to quell such protests harshly so that they never emerge again, as it did the Karimov regime. However, repression of people for protesting needs to be justified, and in most cases, they scapegoat some imaginary external forces which under the pretext of democracy promotion plan to organize coup d'état, which was the case after the Andijan massacre.

However, the regime of Karimov vindicated strong autocratic grip on power and repression of opposition far before the Andijan events, by referring to the Tajik Civil War. For instance, Stuart Horsman argues that the rise of political movements and subsequent demands for radical reforms in

¹⁷⁸ Craig Murray, "Dirty Diplomacy", 155.

¹⁷⁹ "Uzbekistan: Karimov, Putin Say Andijon Violence Was Planned Abroad", *Radiofreeeurope/Radioliberty*, 2005, <https://www.rferl.org/a/1059583.html>.

¹⁸⁰ "Uzbekistan: Karimov Battens Down The Hatches", *Radiofreeeurope/Radioliberty*, 2005, <https://www.rferl.org/a/1060313.html>.

neighbouring Tajikistan were perceived and portrayed in Uzbekistan as the causes of the civil war¹⁸¹. That is why it was argued by the regime that the competition for power among opposition groups is doomed because such a behaviour would bring the situation similar to Tajikistan¹⁸². Whoever fails to meet with these criteria were designated as extremist and associated with external enemies attempting to destabilize Uzbekistan¹⁸³.

Another striking example that the Uzbek government referred to legitimize its autocratic grip on power was instability in Kyrgyzstan. As Natalie Koch argues, non-democratic regimes stigmatise political protests and liberal configurations in the world, "as leaders and citizens reference past times of turmoil in conflating democracy with instability and state weakness"¹⁸⁴. "Central Asian authoritarian states", as Koch continues, "invoke and spatialize a fear of instability"¹⁸⁵. That is why the Karimov regime propagated the idea among the public that Uzbekistan is not ready for democracy yet¹⁸⁶, as democracy is, first of all, the power of the people, while in autocratic regime the power belongs to the leader and one's inner circle. Thus, it was argued by the government, a unique, step-by-step approach¹⁸⁷ towards democratisation should be implemented, otherwise the county would result in a chaos similar to Kyrgyzstan.

Instability and the Western democracy were securitized, because the regime of Karimov propagated the idea that it was external powers who try to sow the seeds of destabilisation and strife in the Central Asian region¹⁸⁸ and organizing colour revolutions¹⁸⁹. Thus, the regime rhetorically coded colour revolutions and political instability as a security threat endangering the social order and the integrity of the state¹⁹⁰. That is why Karimov claimed to implement harsh authoritarian measures to prevent the unleashing of instability in the country and protect the social order from external interference.

In reality, however, if we take a close look at these so-called colour revolutions, mostly internal factors create revolutions, while the role of external factors is marginal. A comprehensive investigation into the causes of colour revolutions in the former Soviet republics carried out by Donnacha Ó Beacháin and Abel Polese along with other prominent scholars, who argue that one of

¹⁸¹ Horsman, "Uzbekistan's Involvement" 42.

¹⁸² Goga Hidoyatov, "Sovereignty and Democracy are Inseparable", *Jahon*, (1996): 2.

¹⁸³ Horsman, "Uzbekistan's Involvement», 42.

¹⁸⁴ Koch, "Disorder Over the Border», 13.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 16.

¹⁸⁶ Farhod Tolipov, "Uzbekistan: Sovetskiy sindrom v gosudarstve, obshestve, ideologii", *Gosudarstvennoe Stroitelstvo* 6, no. 60 (2008), <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/uzbekistan-sovetskiy-sindrom-v-gosudarstve-obschestve-ideologii/viewer>

¹⁸⁷ M Kalishevskiy, "Uzbekistan: Diktatura Kak Rezultat "Nauchnogo Podhoda"", *Fergana News*, 2012, <https://www.fergananews.com/articles/7990>.

¹⁸⁸ Horsman, "Uzbekistan's Involvement», 42.

¹⁸⁹ "Andijan God Spustya: Perspektivy Dlya SSHA I Uzbekistana", *Golos Ameriki*, 2006, <https://www.golos-ameriki.ru/a/a-33-2006-05-12-voa3/637851.html>.

¹⁹⁰ Koch "Disorder over the border", 16.

the major factors that motivated colour revolutions or regimes changes in post-Soviet space from 2000 onwards was falsification of elections by incumbent regimes with the purpose of maintaining their power, which, in turn, precipitated spontaneous resistance of people. Throughout this project, authors show convincing arguments against widely-spread myth that these revolutions were planned and carried out by direct external interventions¹⁹¹. For instance, in Georgia no evidence proving direct external interference was found in organization of the Rose Revolution, notwithstanding the claim of the president Eduard Shevardnadze, ousted as a result of this revolution, and traditional circles that the Open Society Georgia Foundation was interfering in domestic affairs¹⁹². In Ukraine, according to Nathaniel Copsey, the Orange Revolution became possible not because of "efforts" of external forces, but due to "the convergence of interests between a disparate opposition and civil society NGOs that mobilized the people of Ukraine"¹⁹³. In the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan, as argues, main actors were "local political leaders, motivated by their own local interests and not the agendas of international NGOs or Western embassies"¹⁹⁴. Thus, as we have seen above, colour revolutions are not planned from above, externally, but the rise of consciousness of people and discontent with the regime who try to falsify elections brought these revolutions.

In stigmatising instability, Uzbekistan mostly refers to Kyrgyzstan, given the fact the both states are parts of the Central Asian region. Kyrgyzstan is the only country in the region that has experienced popular mobilization that resulted in leadership change. If we analyse two revolutions in Kyrgyzstan, we can observe that it was the people or ruling elites themselves who toppled the government, but not someone externally who established a puppet government to rule externally. We have seen above that the Tulip Revolution in 2005, which led to ousting Askar Akayev from power, was the product of local politics. The following protests in Kyrgyzstan in 2010, which resulted in Kurmanbek Bakiyev's fall from power, were caused by the corruption and struggle for power among local political leaders¹⁹⁵.

Although predominantly internal forces and factors created so-called colour revolutions, many autocratic regimes (we will also see it in the case of Belarus), Uzbekistan per se stigmatised instability in neighbouring Kyrgyzstan and propagated that such revolutions are carried out by external forces, such as the West and the US. Stemming from this, the Karimov regime argued that

¹⁹¹ Donnacha Ó Beacháin and Abel Polese, *The Colour Revolutions In The Former Soviet Republics: Successes And Failures* (Oxon: Routledge, 2010).

¹⁹² Françoise Companjen, "Georgia", in *The Colour Revolutions In The Former Soviet Republics: Successes And Failures* (Oxon: Routledge, 2010), 27.

¹⁹³ Copsey, "Ukraine", 43.

¹⁹⁴ David Lewis, "Kyrgyzstan", in *The Colour Revolutions In The Former Soviet Republics: Successes And Failures* (Oxon: Routledge, 2010), 45.

¹⁹⁵ Paul Kubicek, "Are Central Asian Leaders Learning From Upheavals In Kyrgyzstan?", *Journal Of Eurasian Studies* 2, no. 2 (2011): 116-117, doi:10.1016/j.euras.2011.03.002.

without strong and harsh actions, allegedly, Uzbekistan would also be mired in such a chaos as in Kyrgyzstan or Ukraine. Thus, strict autocratic rule is justified "as a temporary measure which will provide a firm and stable basis for gradual political and economic reforms, while diversity is seen as source of divisiveness"¹⁹⁶.

4.1.1.4 Securitization as a Performance: Peace and Stability in Uzbekistan as an Alternative to Public Goods

Of course, elimination of opposition or potential opposition under the guise of terrorism and extremism and preventing political instability is one of the functions of securitization of the threat of terrorism in Uzbekistan and instability over the border. However, another function of it is legitimation mechanism as performance. As was shown in previous sections, predatory nature of the regime and corruption in Uzbekistan cannot create satisfactory public goods for the people. That is why the Karimov regime created alternative to public goods — peace and stability in the country that the people enjoy thanks to Islam Karimov.

The regime of Karimov used various propaganda instruments, including his works, movies and special curriculum classes to exaggerate the threat of terrorists as if they plan to topple the government and establish Islamic state. Also, the regime stigmatised political instability that have occurred in the neighbouring Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and generally in the post-Soviet region. The exaggeration of these threats was made intentionally "to inculcate fear in their citizens through raising the spectre of instability"¹⁹⁷ and create an impression among the public that the regime was effectively fighting these threats and ensuring the stability in the country. Thus, presenting the incumbent regime as indispensable so that the people should bear with the autocratic rule and "sign" a social contract with it, otherwise it will be chaos in Uzbekistan as in Kyrgyzstan or terrorist attacks would happen infinitely.

One way of propagating peace and stability was through movies, which were directed at the general public. One of the famous Uzbek filmmakers, who mostly produces movies on state order is Hilol Nasimov. He made several movies on topics related to terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, watching which you will notice official interpretation of certain events and observe, on the one hand, how through these movies the government securitizes enemies in the face of terrorists and their external supporters who try to undermine the peace and stability in Uzbekistan, and, on the other hand, how the government of Karimov keeps the country safe despite the existence of such threats. For instance, in the movie *Tahdid* (Threat)¹⁹⁸, unknown terrorists plotting several attacks in

¹⁹⁶ Horsman, "Uzbekistan's Involvement», 42.

¹⁹⁷ Koch, "Disorder Over the Border", 16.

¹⁹⁸ *Tahdid*, video, 2009, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E-_qwk1rALo.

Uzbekistan, after their failure one of the leaders refers to some external forces supporting them. In this film, as in many others produced by Nasimov, terrorism is securitized. Such movies are directed at general public who should be regularly reminded of the threat of terrorists. However, the culmination of the movies is that due to the effective work of the government terrorists threatening the stability of Uzbekistan are eliminated, however, the fight against them is not finished, as there are many of them out there. There are several of such movies made by Nasimov, including *Ajal Judosi*¹⁹⁹, *Aldangan Ayol* (Betrayed Woman)²⁰⁰, etc where is also referred to extremists that are around us that we should be careful of, and with the classic culmination where the government eliminated terrorists, but the fight against them will be continued. Another famous filmmaker Rustam Sadiev filmed the Andijan events of 2005 named *Sotqin* (Traitor)²⁰¹. Sadiev also presented the official interpretation of the Andijan events, showing that internal extremists are supported by external forces who are trying to topple the incumbent and establish Islamic state. The main idea of the movies is that the Andijan events were planned by a spy who perpetrated several coup d'états in the Middle East. Throughout the movie, a celebrity of that time Farruh Soipov calls for supporting the government in their efforts to ensure peace and stability in Uzbekistan.

Another way of proving that the regime was performing well and ensuring stability in Uzbekistan was through Karimov's books, which were directed at, firstly, younger generation studying in education institutions, and, secondly, public officers. If the former read these books within special course Idea of National Independence, then the latter had these books on the shelves of their workplace. In order to reveal how the Karimov regime propagated peace and stability in Uzbekistan that became possible thanks to the president Karimov, this dissertation will apply the content analysis to the Karimov works. We will count how many times the words "*стабильность*" (stability), "*порядок*" (order), and "*спокойствие*" (peace) are referred to in the books of Karimov. As a searching and counting technique, we will use the search box in PDF documents of the books, by inserting the foregoing key words in the search box, which will easily allow us to count how many times these words are used. Thus, analysing 23 volumes of Karimov's books²⁰², we found the following: the word "*стабильность*" was stressed 295 times, "*порядок*" was highlighted 146 times, and "*спокойствие*" was underscored 187 times. Generally, in terms of the meaning stability, order and peace, they connote the same thing — stability. Thus, overall the works of Karimov referred to stability 628 times. Despite the fact that the title of one or another book of Karimov indicates that work is dedicated to social and economic topics, these words were used to show that if there is not stability and order, there would not be development in economic and business.

¹⁹⁹ *Ajal Jodusi*, video, 2018, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fGYiCug2gus>.

²⁰⁰ *Aldangan Ayol*, video, 2018, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xYcB5fQXwTw>.

²⁰¹ *Sotqin*, video, 2018, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7XrD7KN1Zpk>.

²⁰² All the books are available in the following website: <http://www.islomkarimov.uz/ru/page/ish>

Discussing the ways the Karimov propagated the threat of terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism within education institutions, on the one hand, to instill fear in people and to show that the government is performing well to ensure stability in the country, on the other, so that the public bear with the strong autocratic rule in the country, we will make a lyrical digression, and through my real-life experience we will try to better depict a situation. During the Karimov regime, the curriculum in universities and schools included several courses that were a part of overall propaganda policy of the government. For instance, when I was an undergraduate student at University of World Economy and Diplomacy (UWED), we had a special mandatory course National Ideology. Throughout this course we had to read Karimov's works (reminiscent of books of Lenin) and discuss "positive" achievements gained during the rule of Karimov, among which peace, stability and order, as was shown above, occupied a special place. The course was built around so-called critical moments in the newest history of Uzbekistan. Among many such moments, the narration of the periods when the country was threatened by fundamentalism and extremism occupied a special place. The classes were in an interactive way, by engaging all the students. We prepared special presentations and played some games that were all related to singing our praises to Islam Karimov for ensuring peace and stability in our country, as a contrast we were referring to instability in Kyrgyzstan, the rise of terrorism in Syria and Iraq and neighbouring Afghanistan. Lecturer was trying to propagate that without stability there would not be a prosperity and development, that is why one was calling us to understand the policy of the government that the reforms in Uzbekistan, due to valid excuses, as one of the leading Uzbek political figures Sodiq Safayev said, such as "geopolitical position, surrounded by enemies and a true bastion against the evils of drugs and terrorism"²⁰³.

Also, we had to attend special brainwashing sessions that were called *murabbiylar soati* or *klassniy chass* (special mandatory non-credited classes at schools, lyceums and universities). In these classes we were exposed to indoctrination by guest-speakers who propagated the state ideology or sang the praises of Karimov, discussing Karimov's books or articles and watching special movies or videos about the president's life and his input in the development of the country. One of the key parts of the *murabbiylar soati* was that it was used as a platform to regularly remind us about the threat of terrorism and appreciate the stability that Islam Karimov ensured amid these threats. For instance, during both National Ideology classes and brainwashing *klassniy chass* sessions we frequently watched the video of the Namangan Events of 1991²⁰⁴ with the official interpretation, when, allegedly, Karimov bravely went into the crowd of fanatics and said not to their request of building Islamic state in Uzbekistan. Another short movie that we regularly watched was on the Andijan

²⁰³ Murray, "Dirty Diplomacy", 478.

²⁰⁴ "Karimov Namanganda"

Events of 2005²⁰⁵, which also narrates the official version of the events, by calling 23 businessmen as Akromia terrorists and that these events were planned from abroad.

There were two positions in educational institutions that oversaw the process of inculcation of fear and admiration of the regime of Karimov — Rector's Advisor²⁰⁶ (a post appointed by National Security Service (NSS)²⁰⁷ and Vice-Rector *Ma'naviyat va Ma'rifat* (Spirituality and Enlightenment)²⁰⁸. In one of brainwashing sessions we were watching a film about the political career of Islam Karimov. Given that I have already watched the movie many times, I was bored and decided to entertain myself by playing a chess on my gadget with my friend. Suddenly, our professor on National Ideology caught us playing a game and took my device away, by threatening to complain about our misdemeanor and disrespect towards the President of Uzbekistan to Rector's Advisor, the status of whom was far higher than the rector oneself, and Vice-rector for *Ma'naviyat va Ma'rifat*. When a new president Shavkat Mirziyoyev came to power soon after Islam Karimov passed away, the institute of Vice-rector for *Ma'naviyat va Ma'rifat* and Rectors's Advisor were abolished, our professor on National Ideology was fired and the class on state ideology was removed from the curricula.

4.1.2 Conclusion

The durability of authoritarian regimes rests on several factors, but the mechanism of performance occupies a special role in their legitimation strategies. Performance is a foundation of the social contract between the ruler and the ruled: in order the latter to bear with the strict rule of the former, there must be satisfactory public goods, as Dukalskis and Gerschewski argue²⁰⁹. What if due to predatory nature and corruption, some authoritarian regimes cannot satisfy their public with public goods. In the case of the Karimov regime in Uzbekistan, we observed that instead of "real" public goods, the government falsified the statistics showing that the regime was performing well and economically prospering. However, falsification of statistics is not a convincing instrument, as the negative consequences of corruption and ineffective governance directly and negatively affect the average people. That is why, the Karimov regime presented ensuring stability in the country amid internal and external threats as a performance. By so doing, the regime of Karimov securitized

²⁰⁵ Film O Sobitiyah, Proishedshix 12-13 Maya 2005 Goda V Andijane, video, 2019, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8ooyHuwoXl4>.

²⁰⁶ Almost every single aspect of the university life was under the control: of Rector's Advisor, who oversaw the issues ranging from state ideology to approving/rejecting professors and students' trips to other countries, be it academic or holiday.

²⁰⁷ For the record, all chargé d'affaires in embassies of Uzbekistan abroad and heads of HR departments in key government bodies had also been appointed and supervised by NSS (successor of the Soviet KGB in Uzbekistan) until Mirziyoyev launched wide government reforms and marginalized NSS by renaming it to State Security Service and firing its erstwhile omnipotent head and vice-heads.

²⁰⁸ This post was responsible for controlling the code of conduct of students and academic staff and their appearance.

²⁰⁹ Dukalskis and Gerschewski, "What Autocracies Say".

imaginary and exaggerated internal and external threats that need to be eliminated and propagated the rhetoric that the only one that could accomplish this mission was the indispensable incumbent regime of Islam Karimov.

Stemming from the geopolitical situation in the Central Asian region, Karimov designated terrorism, as of the major threats to the stability of Uzbekistan. Although terrorism indeed presents the real threat to the peace and stability in the world and especially the republics of Central Asia, Karimov exaggerated this threat and institutionalized the securitization of terrorism, by actively invoking historical memory of terrorist attacks occurred in Uzbekistan and propagating the threat of terrorism through various means, including Karimov's works, special brainwashing sessions in education institutions. In addition to terrorism, the Karimov regime securitized imaginary threat of interference of external power in domestic affairs of Uzbekistan with the aim of toppling the incumbent government and creating instability in the region. Not only did the securitization of imaginary and exaggerated internal and external threats helped Karimov justify repression in Uzbekistan and get rid of potential political opponents, but, more importantly, to show how effective the government was performing and fighting terrorism and ensuring stability in Uzbekistan amid this threat. The government through movies reminded the general public of the existing threat of terrorism and external interference in domestic affairs of Uzbekistan, then through brainwashing classes and credited courses inculcated fear of these threats in the minds of younger generation. When it comes to the 'fruits' of performance, it was the process of elimination of opponents under the guise of terrorism and religious extremism, which was also accompanied by propaganda of peace and stability in Uzbekistan, notwithstanding the foregoing threats.

4.2 Belarus: Introduction

Unlike Islam Karimov, the incumbent president of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko came to power through democratic elections, which was the last such elections in the history of independent Belarus. The beginning of the end of democracy in Belarus associated with the November 1996 constitutional referendum. As a result, Lukashenko concentrated power by obtaining the control over legislature, judicial system and local governments. The people were deprived of the right to elect parliament, as the parliament in the pre-1996 form was replaced with a hand-picked legislature²¹⁰. Consolidating his power, Lukashenko also shut down independent radio stations and newspapers, and took control of media so not letting opponents use media in their campaign²¹¹. Of course, Lukashenko's transition to

²¹⁰ Vitali Silitski, "Explaining Post-Communist Authoritarianism In Belarus", in *Contemporary Belarus: Between Democracy And Dictatorship* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 36.

²¹¹ Silitski, "Preempting Democracy», 86.

autocracy was not smooth: he faced opposition from legislature²¹², even opposition parties called for his impeachment²¹³. However, with the Russian support Lukashenko regime remained in power with subsequent consolidation of power²¹⁴.

Step by step Lukashenko started eliminating the opposition and hindering their participation in politics. For instance, several opposition leaders, including Viktor Hanchar and a businessman Anatol Krasouski along with two other men disappeared in 1999. Also, later was revealed by Yury Harauski, one of the members of a division of Belarus's Interior Ministry called the Special Rapid Response Unit, that he participated in kidnapping and killing of the former Interior Minister Yury Zakharenka²¹⁵, who joined the opposition groups after Lukashenko changed the democratic course to authoritarianism. In the parliamentary elections of 2000 many opposition candidates were denied registration, and merely 3 opposition candidates were elected²¹⁶. Through repressions Lukashenko consolidated his power: he imprisoned several opposition leaders and perpetrated a "massive 'cleanup' of Belarusian civil society"²¹⁷.

Of course, the people of Belarus expressed their discontent with the regime of Belarus, which manifested in street protests. However, through economic means and Russian support Lukashenko could make his power unshakeable. In 2004, Lukashenko called a referendum to eliminate presidential term limits and stand in further elections. In 2006, Lukashenko falsified the voting and easily won the elections with the 83 per cent of the vote, while the opposition campaigns were heavily restricted²¹⁸. As a result, the opposition mobilized around 10 000 people after the elections, to no avail. The Lukashenko regime successfully quelled the opposition²¹⁹, and in 2004 and 2008 parliamentary elections in Belarus opposition parties could not secure a single place in the parliament.

According to Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, there were two factors consolidating autocratic rule of Lukashenko. First, the state monopolized the economy, by controlling almost every economic aspect of Belarus. Thus, the weakness of the private sector deprived the opposition of the potential source of funding for their fight against the regime of Lukashenko. Also, total control of the economy by the government made the protests an expensive adventure: for participation in protests,

²¹² Ibid., 87.

²¹³ Levitsky, and Way. "Competitive Authoritarianism», 204.

²¹⁴ Ibid, 204-205.

²¹⁵ "Former Belarusian Police Officer Says He Was Involved In Killing Of Lukashenka Critics", *Radiofreeeurope/Radioliberty*, 2019, <https://www.rferl.org/a/ex-belarusian-police-officer-says-he-was-involved-in-abduction-killing-of-lukashenka-critics/30328900.html>.

²¹⁶ "Freedom In The World 2008: Belarus", *Freedomhouse*, 2008, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/Freedom_in_the_World_2008_complete_book.pdf.

²¹⁷ Bala Jarabik, "International Democracy Assistance To Belarus: An Effective Tool?", in *Prospects For Democracy In Belarus* (Washington DC: German Marshall Fund, 2006), 88.

²¹⁸ *Final Report On The 19 March 2006 Presidential Election In Belarus* (Warsaw: ODIHR, 2006), <https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/belarus/19395>.

²¹⁹ Ethan Burger and Viktor Minchuk, "Alyaksandr Lukashenka'S Consolidation Of Power", in *Prospects For Democracy In Belarus* (Washington DC: German Marshall Fund, 2006), 33.

people were sacked from workplaces. Second, inability of the West to support protesters due to diplomatic and economic backing of the Lukashenko regime by Moscow²²⁰.

Thanks to the Russian backing of Alexander Lukashenko, by providing economic subsidies, the Lukashenko regime successfully provided economic public goods. Thus, in the case of Belarus, performance was mainly manifested in providing economic public goods. However, Lukashenko also securitized imaginary threats such as the West and the US, depicting them as enemies trying to destabilise the order and peace in Belarus. Nevertheless, unlike Islam Karimov who institutionalised the securitization of certain imaginary and exaggerated threats, the regime of Lukashenko referred to this practice on an ad hoc basis amid critical junctures — before, during and after elections when his regime had a threat of being undermined.

4.2.1 Performance in Terms of Providing Public Goods

Some authoritarian states due to their rich natural resources perform well and provide satisfactory public goods. That is why the public turn a blind eye to the authoritarianism of their government. For instance, United Arab Emirates thanks to their rich oil reservoirs can afford to provide to their people generous retirement plans, free higher education, free health care, interest free loans for land, certain amount money for men for marriage²²¹. Another bright example is gas-rich Turkmenistan. The first president of Turkmenistan Saparmurat Niyazov introduced the following subsidies to citizens: "every citizen is entitled to 35 kilowatt hours of electricity and 50 cubic meters of natural gas each month and [250 liters (66 gallons) of water per day]"²²². As we see from the foregoing cases, they provided public goods and so demonstrated how well they were performing. However, Belarus is a small country with very few natural resources and weak, state-controlled economy. Nevertheless, by trading political loyalty with Russia, Lukashenko could extract economic support from Moscow²²³, which helped the Lukashenko regime perform economically not bad.

Indeed, as Sergey Guriev argues, "Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko has felt safe for his first twenty years in office primarily due to a strong economic performance"²²⁴. For instance, GDP per capita in 2015 was almost three times as high as in 1994, so growing growing 5.5% annually²²⁵. The regime of Lukashenko achieved this growth, according to Guriev, thanks to generous subsidies

²²⁰ Levitsky and Way, "Competitive Authoritarianism», 206.

²²¹ "A Lifetime Of Perks In UAE Help Cushion Wealth Gap", *Alarabiya News*, 2014, <http://ara.tv/pa7vn>.

²²² "Turkmenistan Leader Wants To End Free Power, Gas, And Water", *DW*, 2017, <https://www.dw.com/en/turkmenistan-leader-wants-to-end-free-power-gas-and-water/a-39152012>.

²²³ Alex Nice, *Playing Both Sides: Belarus Between Russia And The EU*, 2 (DGAPanalyse, 2012), https://dgap.org/system/files/article_pdfs/2012-02_DGAPana_Nice_www_2.pdf.

²²⁴ Sergei Guriev, "The Political Economy Of The Belarusian Crisis", *Intereconomics*, 2020, <https://www.intereconomics.eu/contents/year/2020/number/5/article/the-political-economy-of-the-belarusian-crisis.html>.

²²⁵ *Ibid*.

from Russia at around 10-20 per cent²²⁶. When it comes to more concrete examples of economic support, Russia heavily subsidised natural gas, also Minsk earned revenues through the resale of Russian arms and oil, contributing 20 to 30 per cent of GDP of Belarus²²⁷.

Given that Belarus enjoyed the Russian economic support, which allowed the Lukashenko regime provide public goods to the people, the latter did not have to institutionalise the securitization of imaginary threats, but refer to this practice on an ad hoc basis, during critical junctures such as before, during and after elections.

4.2.2 Securitization of Imaginary Threats

The World War II in many post-Soviet countries is called as the Great Patriotic War, which was associated with the defending the fatherland. The first onslaught within the Nazi Germany's Operation Barbarossa against the Soviet Union was in the city of Brest in Belarus. Thus, Belarus was the first country to experience the attack to the Soviet Union coming from the West. Stemming from geographical proximity to and that the threat always comes from the West, the Lukashenko regime securitizes the threat from the West and propagates tight control in the country as a necessary measure. However, this rhetoric is especially vivid amid critical junctures, such as before, during and after elections and mass protests.

Like in the case of the Karimov regime, on the one hand, the purpose of securitization of imaginary threat in the face of the threat from the West was used by Lukashenko to eliminate or to prevent the emergence of opposition to his regime. On the other hand, the securitization of the West was used a complementary performance element in addition to providing public goods. The West in the official rhetoric was portrayed as the enemy of the Belarusian people. As was stated by Lukashenko, "the Belarusian way of life was subject of the cultural and ideational aggression of the Western world"²²⁸. Indeed, the West was securitized and presented by the Lukashenko regime as a threat to national security of Belarus, while democracy was portrayed as alien and dangerous ideology²²⁹.

Seeking to ensure domestic stability that would ensure longevity of his authoritarian regime, Lukashenko launched anti-West and -democracy propaganda. For instance, given that NATO is a political and military element of the West, Lukashenko expressed his regret that the nuclear warheads, which once was located in the territory of Belarus, was given up. Thus, with this regret Lukashenko

²²⁶ Ibid.

²²⁷ Steven and Way, "Competitive Authoritarianism», 201.

²²⁸ "Doklad Na Seminare Rukovodyashchikh Rabotnikov Respublikanskikh I Mestnykh Gosudarstvennikh Organov Po Voprosam Ideologicheskoy Raboty", *President.Gov.By*, 2003, <https://president.gov.by/ru/events/doklad-na-seminare-rukovodjashchix-rabotnikov-po-ideologicheskoy-rabote-5821>.

²²⁹ Leshchenko, "The National Ideology", 1426.

wanted to present his regime as a defender of Slavic world from a so-called threat stemming from the West²³⁰. Also, the Lukashenko regime introduced an idea of state sovereignty, which was actively promoted in the official discourse. This idea was accompanied by the argument that sovereignty would only be possible within the Union State of Russia and Belarus, while the West was portrayed as the 'traditional' enemy of East Slavonic civilisation, and so of Belarus. This strategy was used in fighting the democratic opposition, which was, allegedly, ideologically and financially linked to the West²³¹.

Thus, the Lukashenko regime launched propaganda against any form of opposition movements or revolution. The official position on protests were conveyed through various means, including propaganda broadcasts, newspapers, documentaries, etc. For instance, TV broadcaster Yury Azarionok in his documentaries *Spiritual War* and *Conspirology* propagated anti-revolutionary mood, presenting rivalry between Lukashenko and the opposition "bought out by the West"²³². As Aliaksei Kazharski and Andrey Makarychev argue, Lukashenko pursued a strategy of "branding any domestic opposition as enemies of the nation, as the heirs of 'fascist collaborators', and as agents of Western adversaries"²³³. Also, Lukashenko calls the opposition in the country as a fifth column, hinting at that they are supported by the West²³⁴.

Another element of propaganda was, according to Elena Korosteleva, was pop-propaganda "in the form of mass concerts and other entertainment (street parades, sports events, harvest festivals) delivering images of green-and-red 'flag-waving' happy crowds and official establishment faces mingling with commoners to counteract the effect of orange or any other revolutionary colour used in the neighbourhood to entice the public"²³⁵. Thus, the reason behind interpreting social discontent as national alien and independent media as betrayers of the nation was referring to national security, under the pretext of which to silence opposition or prevent the emergence of potential unrest in the country²³⁶.

Lukashenko has not institutionalized the securitization of the West, as we can see how relations between Belarus and the West was periodically changing from bad to good and vice versa²³⁷.

²³⁰ Roy Allison, Stephen White and Margot Light, "Belarus Between East And West", *Journal Of Communist Studies And Transition Politics* 21, no. 4 (2005): 491-492, doi:10.1080/13523270500363411.

²³¹ Piotr Rudkouski, *Soft Belarusianisation. The Ideology Of Belarus In The Era Of The Russian-Ukrainian Conflict* (Center for East European Studies, 2017): 2.

²³² Vital Silicki, "Belarus: Anatomy Of Preemptive Authoritarianism", in *The Geopolitical Place Of Belarus In Europe And The World* (Warsaw: Wyzsza Szkola Handlu i Prawa, 2006), 78.

²³³ Kazharski and Makarychev, "Belarus, Russia», 2.

²³⁴ "Stenogramma Poslaniya Alexandra Lukashenko K Belorusskomu Narodu I Natsionalnomu Sobraniyu", *Belarusskoe Telegrafnoe Agenstvo*, 2016, <https://www.belta.by/president/view/stenogramma-poslanija-aleksandra-lukashenko-k-belorusskomu-narodu-i-natsionalnomu-sobraniju-190621-2016/>.

²³⁵ Elena Korosteleva, "Questioning Democracy Promotion: Belarus' Response To The 'Colour Revolutions'", *Democratization* 19, no. 1 (2012): 44, doi:10.1080/13510347.2012.641294.

²³⁶ Leshchenko, "The National Ideology», 1421.

²³⁷ Nice, "Playing Both Sides".

The strategy of presenting the West as the enemy has been vivid amid critical junctures, such as democratic protests in neighbouring countries or before, during and after elections or referendum. For instance, amid the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004 Lukashenko launched a massive crackdown on political freedom and civil society. Moreover, he appointed General Stepan Sukhorenka as the new KGB head, so signaling that KGB would play active role in social development monitoring²³⁸. However, in order justify these repressions the Lukashenko regime associated the Colour Revolution as instigated by the West and as if such situation could be imminent if not implemented tight control in the country. Take the referendum in 2004 as an example, when it was decided if Lukashenko would be reelected for third presidential term, that is to say referendum against the constitution of Belarus limiting presidential service to two consecutive terms. In this case, the Lukashenko regime broadcasted a series of documentaries presenting those opposing the referendum as "Nazis, terrorists, and seeders of chaos"²³⁹. Also, Lukashenko invokes the Ukrainian crisis of 2014, arguing that "the protest movement will transform Belarus into another Ukraine"²⁴⁰. As we have observed above, for Lukashenko those planning to destabilise the situation in country are bought out by the West. If we analyse the rhetoric of Lukashenko amid such critical junctures, as protests in country or the period before, during or after elections, then we can observe that any such event happened in Belarus since his rule was associated with the desire of the West to destabilise Belarus or warning not to attempt these actions²⁴¹.

Let's take as another example recent protests in Belarus that emerged due to manipulation of elections results of presidential elections in 2020. The victory of Lukashenko in the presidential elections held on 9 August 2020 is widely believed as rigged in his favour. As a result of falsification of the election results, the incumbent won a landslide victory with more than 80% of the vote, while opposition leader Svetlana Tikhonovskaya 10%²⁴². This, in turn, triggered mass protests bringing thousands of people to the central square²⁴³. As a result, the Lukashenko regime launched a

²³⁸ Aram Terzyan, "Explaining Post-Soviet Authoritarianism In Belarus: Sources And Perspectives", *IHRPD Research Papers* 2 (2019): 5, doi:10.47669/ihprd-2-2019.

²³⁹ Silitski, "Preempting Democracy», 93.

²⁴⁰ Paul Niland, "Lukashenka Is Wrong To Use Ukraine As A Cautionary Tale", *Atlantic Council*, 2020, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/lukashenka-is-wrong-to-use-ukraine-as-a-cautionary-tale/>.

²⁴¹ "Poslanie Belorusskomu Narodu I Nacionalnomu Sobraniyu", 2005, <https://president.gov.by/ru/events/obraschenie-prezidenta-respubliki-belarus-a-lukashenko-s-poslaniem-belorusskomu-narodu-i-natsionalnomu-5848>; "Poslanie Belorusskomu Narodu I Nacionalnomu Sobraniyu", 2014, <https://president.gov.by/ru/events/aleksandr-lukashenko-obraschaetsja-s-ezhegodnym-poslaniem-k-belorusskomu-narodu-i-natsionalnomu-sobraniju-8549>; "Ceremoniya Inauguracii Prezidenta Respubliki Belarus", 2020, <https://president.gov.by/ru/events/ceremoniya-inauguracii-prezidenta-respubliki-belarus>.

²⁴² "Belarus Opposition Holds Mass Rally In Minsk Despite Ban", *BBC News*, 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-53882062>.

²⁴³ "What's Happening In Belarus?", *BBC News*, 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-53799065>.

crackdown on protesters²⁴⁴. This time again Lukashenko justified repressions using the rhetoric that this instability was planned and executed by the West²⁴⁵ and refers to so-called colour revolutions²⁴⁶. He also blames CIA for organizing a plot to kill his family and he blames how some external forces are trying to create a chaos in Belarus²⁴⁷.

If the primary reason of the foregoing rhetoric related to securitization of the West, who with force was trying to foist democracy, has been elimination of opposition and justifying repressions in Belarus, then another rationale is performance. By portraying the West as an imminent threat and actively suppressing opposition and independent media, the Lukashenko regime wanted to portray itself as the only one who can ensure stability in Belarus amid these threats.

4.2.3 Performance in Terms of Ensuring Stability

Belarus has not experienced any serious tragedies or events like terrorist attacks or foreign intervention in its newest history. Thus, the absence of historical memories of such events made the Lukashenko regime vindicate the strict rule in country through propagating stability in Belarus amid instability over the border. Of course, this rhetoric is relatively unconvincing due to absence of real examples of instability or tragedies in Belarus, nevertheless, contrasting the stability in Belarus with instability over the border gave the Lukashenko some advantage that his performance in terms of ensuring peace and stability in country is effective.

Alexander Lukashenko the stability could be undermined by "the right-radical nationalist activity that opposition is trying to manipulate"²⁴⁸. That is why, stemming from the above-mentioned factor, repression of political opposition was legitimated. Thus, Lukashenko argues that peace and stability require strict control. He claims that ensuring peace and so avoiding "rapacious privatization, terrorist attacks, and war on its territory" has become possible, allegedly, thanks to his "wise" policy²⁴⁹. Given that there were not any terrorist attacks in Belarus, the Lukashenko regime indicated to such events in neighbouring countries. For instance, it was referred to ethnic issues and terrorist

²⁴⁴ "Belarus Lukashenko: Hundreds Arrested At Mass Protests In Minsk", *BBC News*, 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54044750>.

²⁴⁵ "Belarus Accuses Western Nations Of Sowing 'Chaos And Anarchy'", *The Guardian*, 2020, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/27/belarus-accuses-western-nations-of-sowing-chaos-and-anarchy>.

²⁴⁶ Eto Uje Ugroza Ne Tolko Belarussii: Lukashenko Zayavil O Namerenii Svyazatsya S Putinim, image, 2020, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GBHglO72qLE>.

²⁴⁷ Lukashenko Zayavil O Gotovivshemsya Na Nego I Sinovey Pokushenii, video, 2021, <http://youtube.com/watch?v=52sKZ-Q2IhM>.

²⁴⁸ Allison, White and Light. "Belarus Between", 498.

²⁴⁹ Andrei Sannikov, "The Accidental Dictatorship Of Alexander Lukashenko", *SAIS Review Of International Affairs* 25, no. 1 (2005): 79, doi:10.1353/sais.2005.0017.

attacks in Chechnya²⁵⁰, Russian Federation. Also. The regime stigmatizing instability over the border contrasted stability in Belarus with the the Beslan massacre²⁵¹ in Russia and instability in Ukraine²⁵².

Although there are not such things as the books of Alexander Lukashenko reminiscent of works of Islam Karimov, stability and peace in Belarus has been actively propagated through mass media. For instance, through mass media the government disseminated information that the rule of Belarus was associated with peace, security and stability in Belarus²⁵³. Also, Lukashenko boasts about the stability that he ensures in Belarus amid instability over the border²⁵⁴, for which the people supported Lukashenko inclusively for ensuring stability in country²⁵⁵. Applying the content analysis and the same data collection tool that we used in our first case, we quantified the words "стабільность" (stability), "порядок" (order), and "спокойствие" (peace) in the annual main speeches of Alexander Lukashenko from 2002 to 2020²⁵⁶ — "Address of the President to the Belarusian people and the National Assembly". As the results show, these words and derivatives were used 98, 59, and 10 times, respectively, which is far less than in Uzbekistan that always stressed its performance as establishing peace amid instability around the world. However, refereeing to these words in Belarus became more frequent amid critical junctures. Let`s take as an example the last events related to post-election protests that took place throughout Belarus. During this period, the Lukashenko regime activated the propaganda of peace and stability in country, where Lukashenko himself was the main propagandist²⁵⁷.

4.2.4 Conclusion

The Lukashenko regime is a pertinent and an ideal case for Dukalskis and Gerschewski`s argument regarding the performance in terms of providing satisfactory public goods forming a social contract between the ruler and the ruled. Nevertheless, as we have observed above, like the Karimov regime, which due to corruption was not able and did not have intention to provide public goods, Lukashenko also securitizes certain exaggerated and imagined threats in order legitimate his power. It was shown

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

²⁵¹ Silitski, "Preempting Democracy", 92.

²⁵² Ibid., 94.

²⁵³ Silitski, "Preempting Democracy», 93.

²⁵⁴ "Obrashenie Prezidenta Respubliki Belarus A.G. Lukashenko K Belarusskomu Narodu V Svyazi S Obyavleniem Referenduma", *President.Gov.By*, 2004, <https://president.gov.by/ru/events/obraschenie-prezidenta-respubliki-belarus-aglukashenko-k-belarusskomu-narodu-v-svjazi-s-objavleniem-5840>.

²⁵⁵ Korosteleva, "Questioning Democracy Promotion", 48-49.

²⁵⁶ We derived all the respective available speeches from the official website of the President of Belarus, however, the earliest available speech was of 2003.

²⁵⁷ *Lukashenko: Ne Hochu, Chtobi Mi Razrushili Mir I Stabilnost, Kotorie Est V Belarussii*, video, 2020, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hlHchNgoBYY&t=136s>; *Lukashenko: Tolko Vnutrennyaya Stabilnost Yavlyaetsya Garantiej Vijivaniya Belarussii*, video, 2020, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uHsojHvcUIg>; *Nikto Ne V Sostoyanii Izvne Pokolebat Stabilnost I Nezavisimost Belarusi - Lukashenko*, video, 2020, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QZMsdbpvDlo>; *Lukashenko: Udalost Spasti Stranu I Stabilnost, No Rasslablyatsya Poka Rano*, video, 2020, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KxqrDc0a4LY>; *Lukashenko Schtiaet Samim Vajnim Podderjivat Bezopasnost I Stabilnost V Strane*, video, 2020, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fyPB8D39XJs>.

in this section that the Lukashenko regime used this practice as complementary instrument to public goods that Belarus provides due to external support from Moscow. When it comes to the way Lukashenko approaches the securitization, the regime designates the West as the main threat, trying to undermine the peace and stability in Belarus. However, due to absence of historical memories of the Western intervention to Belarus and creating instability, as the official Minsk interprets, the Lukashenko regime stigmatised instability over the border and interpreted local protests during or after rigged elections as a plan of the US and the West to destabilise the country. If we include the colour revolution and the events of 2014 in Ukraine as the case used by Lukashenko to stigmatise instability over the border, then recent post-2020 presidential elections protests, which, allegedly, planned and implemented by the West as the imaginary threat. Nevertheless, we figured out that Lukashenko uses the securitization practice as a legitimation instrument amid critical junctures, as was shown above. As far as the performance is concerned, then the Lukashenko regime through propaganda and official speeches has stressed the stability in country that was ensured thanks to his wise policy.

4.3 Conclusion

Comparing our two cases, the main difference between using the practice of securitization as a legitimation instrument is the ability of regimes effectively provide public goods to the people, who, as a result, would bear with the authoritarian regime. In the case of Islam Karimov, the regime, due to deep corruption and ineffective governance, was not able to satisfy the public by providing quality life. That is why, manipulating the statistics the regime tried to depict as if the government was performing economically well. However, the manipulation of statistics is an unconvincing instrument as the consequences of corruptions directly affects the daily lives of people. Thus, in order to show that the Karimov regime was performing well, the incumbent referred to the securitization of exaggerated and imaginary threats. For instance, actively propagating through mass media, Karimov's books and even movies the regime instilled fear of terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism in the minds of people. One of the main elements that helped to solidify the argument of government on the existence of imminent threat of terrorism was historical memories of terrorist attacks in Uzbekistan, such as Namangan events in 1991, bombings in Tashkent 1999, and Andijan events in 2005. Also, Karimov successfully stigmatized instability over the border, by actively referring to civil war in Tajikistan and instability in Kyrgyzstan. Also, one more discourse that was directed to create the impression of threat to the stability in Uzbekistan was the US and the West trying to undermine the Sovereignty of the country. When it comes to the performance, the Karimov regime actively propagated through mass media that one or another man or a group of people were arrested for being a member of a terrorist group, who, in reality was arrested for simply wearing Islamic clothes, wearing

beard or visiting mosque for practicing Islamic duties, created an impression among the majority of people that the government ensures the stability and peace by preventing the repetition of previous terrorist attacks that Uzbekistan experienced. In addition, actively stressing stability and peace in Uzbekistan in the official discourse contributed to showing how the Karimov regime was performing well. That is why, the public had been bearing with the autocratic rule of Karimov, notwithstanding the poor economy and deep corruption, because the people proffered the stability and peace over the public goods.

However, due to the significant external support from Russia, Belarus could partially satisfy the public by providing public goods as a result of good economic performance. That is why this allowed the Lukashenko regime not to institutionalise the securitization of threats, but resort to this practice only amid critical junctures. Discussing the Belarussian approach towards the securitization of imaginary threats as legitimation instrument, the Lukashenko regime referred to imaginary threat stemming from the West, directed to destabilise the country. Given that Belarus did not experience any interventions from the west, that is to say historical memories of such threats, Lukashenko stigmatised instability over the border and presented the post-elections protests as if organized and supported by the West.

Thus, although both our cases are hegemonic authoritarian regimes, their approaches towards the securitization practice as a legitimation instrument is different. This is explained by their ability to perform economical well. So, the Karimov regime had to create alternative source of satisfying the public due to the absence of good governance and existence of deep corruption that hindered to provide public goods. That is why Karimov consistently resorted to the securitization of exaggerated and imaginary threats in order to instil fear of terrorism and external threats in the public, and propagated stability in Uzbekistan as an alternative to economic performance. When it comes to the Lukashenko regime, the Russian economic support of Belarus allowed the latter to perform relatively well. Thus, the Lukashenko did not have to use the securitization practice consistently as it was done by Karimov, but resort to it amid critical junctures, such as protests.

Chapter 5. Discussion of Results

The following chapter discusses theoretical and empirical contributions that this dissertation has made. Theoretically, this project has contributed to two theoretical concepts, including the securitization theory in the field of Security Studies and autocratic legitimation mechanisms in Comparative Politics. Empirically, the thesis makes its contribution in revealing the nature of authoritarian regimes in two post-Soviet countries – Uzbekistan and Belarus.

The main theoretical concept that guided us through this dissertation project is the securitization theory developed by the Copenhagen School. Although Buzan at al laid the foundation

of this theory, it turned out to be incomplete. For instance, the role of political elites as securitizing actors was overemphasized²⁵⁸, the mass media as a securitizing actor was discredited, and the audience was ignored²⁵⁹. Thus, further developing the securitization theory, the representatives of the Welsh and Paris Schools filled this gap by revealing the foregoing actors in the securitization practice. However, this project showed that the abovementioned advancements are pertinent in the context of democratic systems, while in autocratic regimes the very "incomplete" form of the theory is relevant to use, as in non-democratic regimes mass media is censored, which deprives of its status of actor, the audience is merely as a consumer of the securitization act, while the political elites monopolises the right to resorting to the securitization practice. Thus, this project proved the relevance of the securitization practice developed by the Copenhagen School in its "underdeveloped" form. Also, this thesis showed how the securitization practice can be used as a legitimation instrument.

Another theoretical contribution that this dissertation has made is adding alternative source of performance mechanism developed by Dukalskis and Gerschewski. According to these authors, the autocratic legitimation mechanism of performance is based on providing public goods to the public. They argue that if non-democratic regimes are successful in economic performance, by providing satisfactory public goods, the public would bear with the strict autocratic rule. However, they ignore the fact that most autocratic regimes are corrupted, which hinder to perform economically well. Thus, this project proposed that economic performance is not the only way to show good performance of the regime. Thus, it showed that ensuring stability and peace in country, by securitization of imaginary and exaggerated threats, could be another source of the performance mechanism. The application of this approach towards the performance mechanism we have seen in two cases of Uzbekistan and Belarus.

As far as the empirical contribution of this project is concerned, it revealed the autocratic nature of two post-Soviet regimes of Uzbekistan and Belarus by applying the combination of the foregoing two theories. As this dissertation applies the foregoing theories in the cases of Uzbekistan and Belarus, which are a part of Eurasia and former Soviet Union Space, it has traced differences and similarity in the way the Karimov regime in Uzbekistan and the Lukashenko regime have used the securitization practice as a legitimation instrument. Thus, this empirical part also contributes to the Area, particularly, Eurasian studies.

²⁵⁸ Karyotis, G. 2012. 'Securitization of Migration in Greece: Process, Motives and Implications', *International Political Sociology*, vol. 6, no. 4, 390-408.

²⁵⁹ Balzacq, "The Three Faces", 171-201; Scott D. Watson, "'Framing' The Copenhagen School: Integrating The Literature On Threat Construction", *Millennium: Journal Of International Studies* 40, no. 2 (2011): 279-301, doi:10.1177/0305829811425889. Watson, S. D. (2012). 'Framing' the Copenhagen School: Integrating the Literature on Threat Construction. *Millennium*, 40(2), 279-301. doi:10.1177/0305829811425889; Balzacq, T. 2005. 'Three faces of Securitisation: Political Agency, Audience and Context.', *European Journal of International Relations* 11(2), 171- 201.

Chapter 6. Conclusion

This dissertation project was guided through several research questions, including why do hegemonic authoritarian regimes utilise the securitization instrument, notwithstanding the absence of the normal bounds of political procedure? And what kind of threats do autocratic regimes select to securitize in order to legitimate their power? How do we explain differences in the way these two autocratic regimes (Uzbekistan and Belarus) select securitization narratives? How do we explain differences in the frequency of referring to securitization of imaginary or exaggerated threats? Having analysed two hegemonic authoritarian regimes, this thesis argues that the absence of the normal bounds of political procedure does not necessarily mean that autocratic regimes do not need legitimation. Thus, stemming from the logic that non-democratic systems also require to legitimate their hold on power, we came to conclusion that the securitization practice is applicable in authoritarian setting. We have seen above that the securitization practice can be used as a part of performance mechanism to show to the public how the regime is ensuring stability and peace in country. For this, autocratic regimes exaggerate or create imaginary threats to instill fear in the minds of people. Thus, selecting threats takes place stemming from geopolitical situation of country. For instance, in the case of Uzbekistan, we have seen that the regime designated terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism as the main threats to Uzbekistan. This is reason by the fact that Uzbekistan is located in Muslim-dominated region as Central Asia. When it comes to Belarus, the Lukashenko regime mostly stressed the threat of the West, as it is located in a strategic position between the West and the East, and it has always been the door to Eurasia. Explaining the differences in the frequency of referring to securitization of imaginary or exaggerated threats between Lukashenko's Belarus and Karimov's Uzbekistan, we have observed that it depends on economic performance. Given that the Karimov regime could not provide satisfactory public goods, it had to institutionalise the securitization of internal and external threats, and present its efforts towards fighting those threats and ensuring stability as performance. That is why Karimov used this practice consistently and frequently. However, in the case of Belarus, Lukashenko, relying on the Russian economic support, has performed relatively well, which allowed him to provide public goods. Nevertheless, amid critical junctures, such as post-election protests Lukashenko had to resort to the securitization practice showing to the public that in addition to economic performance, the regime is also ensuring stability in the country.

Bibliography:

1. Acemoglu, Daron, James A. Robinson, and Thierry Verdier. "Kleptocracy and Divide-And-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule". *SSRN Electronic Journal*, 2003. doi:10.2139/ssrn.471821.
2. *Ajal Jodusi*, video, 2018, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fGYiCug2gus>.
3. Allardt, E., & Littunen, Y. *Cleavages, Ideologies, and Party Systems*. Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1978.
4. *Aldangan Ayol*. Video, 2018. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xYcB5fQXwTw>.
5. Allison, Roy, Stephen White, and Margot Light. "Belarus Between East And West". *Journal Of Communist Studies And Transition Politics* 21, no. 4 (2005): 491-492. doi:10.1080/13523270500363411.
6. "Andijan God Spustya: Perspektivy Dlya SSHA I Uzbekistana", *Golos Ameriki*, 2020, <https://www.golos-ameriki.ru/a/a-33-2006-05-12-voa3/637851.html>.
7. Art, David. "What Do We Know About Authoritarianism After Ten Years?". *Comparative Politics* 44, no. 3 (2012): 351-373. doi:10.5129/001041512800078977.
8. "Army Of Uzbekistan Strongest In Central Asia". *Kun.Uz*, 2020. <https://kun.uz/en/news/2020/01/23/army-of-uzbekistan-strongest-in-central-asia>.
9. Azamatova, Matluba. "Controversial Trial Triggered Uzbek Violence". *IWPR*, 2005. <https://iwpr.net/global-voices/controversial-trial-triggered-uzbek-violence>.
10. Balzacq, Thierry. "The Three Faces Of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience And Context". *European Journal Of International Relations* 11, no. 2 (2005): 171-201. doi:10.1177/1354066105052960.
11. Balzacq, Thierry. *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve*. London: Routledge, 2011.
12. "Belarus Accuses Western Nations Of Sowing 'Chaos And Anarchy'". *The Guardian*, 2020. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/27/belarus-accuses-western-nations-of-sowing-chaos-and-anarchy>.
13. "Belarus Lukashenko: Hundreds Arrested At Mass Protests In Minsk". *BBC News*, 2020. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54044750>.
14. "Belarus Opposition Holds Mass Rally In Minsk Despite Ban". *BBC News*, 2020. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-53882062>.
15. Brown, Chris, and Kirsten Ainley. *Understanding International Relations*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
16. Brzezinski, Zbigniew. "Totalitarianism and Rationality." *American Political Science Review* 50, no. 3 (1956): 751-63. doi:10.2307/1951557.
17. Booth, Ken. *Theory Of World Security*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

18. "Bullets Were Falling Like Rain". *Human Rights Watch*, 2005. <https://www.hrw.org/report/2005/06/06/bullets-were-falling-rain/andijan-massacre-may-13-2005>.
19. Burger, Ethan, and Viktor Minchuk. "Alyaksandr Lukashenka'S Consolidation Of Power". In *Prospects For Democracy In Belarus*, 33. Joerg Forbrig, David Marples and Pavol Demes. Washington DC: German Marshall Fund, 2006.
20. Burkhardt, Fabian. "Concepts Of The Nation And Legitimation In Belarus". In *Politics And Legitimacy In Post-Soviet Eurasia*, 149. Martin Brusis, Joachim Ahrens and Martin Wessel. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. Buzan, Barry, Wæver, Ole and Jaap de Wilde. *Security: A New Framework For Analysis*. Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998.
21. *Central Asia: Islamist Mobilisation and Regional Security*. ICG Asia Report. International Crisis Group, 2001. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/central-asia/kyrgyzstan/central-asia-islamist-mobilisation-and-regional-security>.
22. "Ceremoniya Inauguracii Prezidenta Respubliki Belarus", 2020. <https://president.gov.by/ru/events/ceremoniya-inauguracii-prezidenta-respubliki-belarus>.
23. "Chetirnadsat Let Nazad V Uzbekskoy Tyurme Ot Pytok Skonchalsya Odin Iz Yaryh Kritikov Karimova". *Ozodlik Radiosi*, 2020. <https://www.ozodlik.org/a/27158436.html>.
24. Companjen, Françoise. "Georgia". In *The Colour Revolutions In The Former Soviet Republics: Successes And Failures*, 43. Donnacha Ó Beacháin and Abel Polese. Oxon: Routledge, 2010.
25. Copsey, Nathaniel. "Ukraine". In *The Colour Revolutions In The Former Soviet Republics: Successes And Failures*, 43. Donnacha Ó Beacháin and Abel Polese. Oxon: Routledge, 2010.
26. Djanni, Feruza. "Goskomstat Uzbekistana Poobeshal, Chto Budet I Vpred Povyshat Kachestvo Jizni Naseleniya". *Fergana*, 2009. <https://www.fergananews.com/articles/6083>.
27. Dogan, Mattei. "Conceptions of Legitimacy". In *Encyclopedia of Government and Politics*, 116. Mary Hawkesworth and Maurice Kogan. London: Routledge, 1992.
28. "Doklad Na Seminare Rukovodyashchikh Rabotnikov Respublikanskikh I Mestnykh Gosudarstvennikh Organov Po Voprosam Ideologicheskoy Raboty". *President.Gov.By*, 2003. <https://president.gov.by/ru/events/doklad-na-seminare-rukovodjaschix-rabotnikov-po-ideologicheskoy-rabote-5821>.
29. Donnelly, Faye. *Securitization and The Iraq War*. New York, N.Y.: Routledge, 2013.
30. Donno, Daniela. "Elections and Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes". *American Journal of Political Science* 57, no. 3 (2013): 703-716. doi:10.1111/ajps.12013.
31. Draper, Hal. The two souls of socialism. *New Politics*, 5, no. 1 (1966): 57-84.

32. Dukalskis, Alexander, and Johannes Gerschewski. "What Autocracies Say (And What Citizens Hear): Proposing Four Mechanisms of Autocratic Legitimation". *Contemporary Politics* 23, no. 3 (2017): 251-268. doi:10.1080/13569775.2017.1304320.
33. Edel, Mirjam, and Maria Josua. "How Authoritarian Rulers Seek To Legitimize Repression: Framing Mass Killings In Egypt And Uzbekistan". *Democratization* 25, no. 5 (2018): 888. doi:10.1080/13510347.2018.1439021.
34. Eto Uje Ugroza Ne Tolko Belarussii: Lukashenko Zayavil O Namerenii Svyazatsya S Putinim. Image, 2020. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GBHglO72qLE>.
35. Fazendeiro, Bernardo. "Spirituality and Anti-Western Rhetoric In Uzbekistan In The Early 2000S: The Consequences Of International Misrecognition". *Post-Soviet Affairs* 34, no. 4 (2018): 228-245. doi:10.1080/1060586x.2018.1468686.
36. Film O Sobitiiyah, Proissshedshix 12-13 Maya 2005 Goda V Andijane. Video, 2019. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8ooyHuwoXl4>.
37. Finer, S. E. *The Man On Horseback*. New Brunswick, N.J: Transaction, 2003.
38. "Freedom in The World 2008: Belarus". *Freedomhouse*, 2008. https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/Freedom_in_the_World_2008_complete_book.pdf.
39. Fukuyama, Francis. "The end of history?". *The National Interest*, 16 (1989): 3-18. Derived from: URL: www.jstor.org/stable/24027184
40. *Final Report On The 19 March 2006 Presidential Election in Belarus*. Warsaw: ODIHR, 2006. <https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/belarus/19395>.
41. "Former Belarusian Police Officer Says He Was Involved in Killing Of Lukashenka Critics". *Radiofreeeuropa/Radioliberty*, 2019. <https://www.rferl.org/a/ex-belarusian-police-officer-says-he-was-involved-in-abduction-killing-of-lukashenka-critics/30328900.html>.
42. Gandhi, Jennifer, and Adam Przeworski. "Authoritarian Institutions and The Survival Of Autocrats". *Comparative Political Studies* 40, no. 11 (2007): 1279-1301. doi:10.1177/0010414007305817.
43. Geddes, Barbara. "What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?". *Annual Review of Political Science* 2, no. 1 (1999): 125. doi: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.115.
44. Gerschewski, Johannes. "The Three Pillars of Stability: Legitimation, Repression, And Co-Optation in Autocratic Regimes". *Democratization* 20, no. 1 (2013): 13-38. doi:10.1080/13510347.2013.738860.
45. Guzzini, Stefano, and Dietrich Jung. *Contemporary Security Analysis And Copenhagen Peace Research*. London and New York: Routledge, 2004.

46. Guriev, Sergei. "The Political Economy Of The Belarusian Crisis". *Intereconomics*, 2020. <https://www.intereconomics.eu/contents/year/2020/number/5/article/the-political-economy-of-the-belarusian-crisis.html>.
47. Hawtin, Lorna. "Lies, Damned Lies And Statistics". *Ipa.Co.Uk*, 2017. <https://ipa.co.uk/knowledge/ipa-blog/lies-damned-lies-and-statistics>.
48. Hidoyatov, Goga. "Sovereignty and Democracy are Inseparable", *Jahon*, (1996): 2.
49. Hobbes, Thomas. *Leviathan*. London: Printed for A. Crooke, 1651. Holm, Ulla. "Algeria: Securitisation Of State/Regime, Nation And Islam". In *Contemporary Security Analysis And Copenhagen Peace Research*, 219. Stefan Guzzini and Dietrich Jung. London: Routledge, 2004.
50. Horsman, Stuart. "Uzbekistan's Involvement in The Tajik Civil War 1992-97: Domestic Considerations". *Central Asian Survey* 18, no. 1 (1999): 37-48. doi:10.1080/02634939995731.
51. Huntington, Samuel. *The Third Wave: Democratization In The Late Twentieth Century*. Norman, Okl.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.
52. Huysmans, Jef. "Defining Social Constructivism In Security Studies: The Normative Dilemma Of Writing Security". *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 27, no. 1 (2002): 54. doi:10.1177/03043754020270s104.
53. Huysmans, Jef. "Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, On The Creative Development Of A Security Studies Agenda In Europe". *European Journal Of International Relations* 4, no. 4 (1998): 479-505. doi:10.1177/1354066198004004004.
54. Huysmans, Jef. "Security! What Do You Mean?". *European Journal Of International Relations* 4, no. 2 (1998): 448. doi:10.1177/1354066198004002004.
55. Huysmans, Jef. *The Politics of Insecurity. Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU*. London: Routledge, 2006.
56. Huysmans, Jef. "The Question Of The Limit: Desecuritisation And The Aesthetics Of Horror In Political Realism". *Millennium: Journal Of International Studies* 27, no. 3 (1998): 569-589. doi:10.1177/03058298980270031301.
57. Huntington, S. *Social and Institutional Dynamics of One-party Systems*. New York: Basic Books, 1970.
58. Ilkhamov, Alisher. "Neopatrimonialism, Interest Groups and Patronage Networks: The Impasses of the Governance System In Uzbekistan". *Central Asian Survey* 26, no. 1 (2007): 65. doi:10.1080/02634930701423491.
59. Jarabik, Bala. "International Democracy Assistance To Belarus: An Effective Tool?". In *Prospects For Democracy In Belarus*, 88. Joerg Forbrig, David R. Marples and Pavol Demes. Washington DC: German Marshall Fund, 2006.

60. Kari, Kuanyshebek. "Mirziyoyev Sobiraetsya V Moskvu. Stanet Li Uzbekistan Chlenom EAES?". *Radio Azattyq*, 2020. <https://rus.azattyq.org/a/chaikhana-uzbekistan-eeu-economy/30397416.html>.
61. *Karimov Namanganda*. Video, 2021. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xwVS8CQg2s4>.
62. Karimov, Islam. *Uzbekistan Na Poroge Dostizheniya Nezavisimosti*. Tashkent: Uzbekistan, 2011.
63. Karimov, Islam. *Po Puti Sozidaniya*. Tashkent: Uzbekistan, 1996.
64. Karimov, Islam. *Mirnaya Jizn I Bezopasnost Strani Zavisyat Ot Edinstva I Tverdoy Voli Nashego Naroda*. Tashkent: Uzbekistan, 2004.
65. Karimov, Islam. *Uzbekskiy Narod Nikogda I Ni Ot Kogo Ne Budet Zaviset*. Tashkent: Uzbekistan, 2005.
66. Kalishevskiy, M. "Uzbekistan: Diktatura Kak Rezultat 'Nauchnogo Podhoda'", *Fergana News*, 2012, <https://www.fergananews.com/articles/7990>.
67. Kazharski, Aliaksei, and Andrey Makarychev. "Belarus, Russia, And The Escape From Geopolitics". *Political Geography*, 2021, 1-3. doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2021.102377.
68. Karyotis, Georgios. "Securitization Of Migration In Greece: Process, Motives, And Implications". *International Political Sociology* 6, no. 4 (2012): 392. doi:10.1111/ips.12002.
69. Kendzior, Sarah. "Inventing Akromiya: The Role Of Uzbek Propagandists In The Andijon Massacre". *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal Of Post-Soviet Democratization* 14, no. 4 (2006): 545-562. doi:10.3200/demo.14.4.545-562.
70. Kim, Eun Mee. *Big Business, Strong State*. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1997.
71. "Knowledge Is Power: Uzbekistan Lifts Ban On Political Science". *Reuters*, 2019. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uzbekistan-education/knowledge-is-power-uzbekistan-lifts-ban-on-political-science-idUSKCN1PP2A8>.
72. Koch, Natalie. "Disorder Over The Border: Spinning The Spectre Of Instability Through Time And Space In Central Asia". *Central Asian Survey* 37, no. 1 (2018): 13-30. doi:10.1080/02634937.2017.1338667.
73. Köllner, Patrick, and Steffen Kailitz. "Comparing Autocracies: Theoretical Issues And Empirical Analyses". *Democratization* 20, no. 1 (2013): 1-12. doi:10.1080/13510347.2013.738859.
74. Korosteleva, Elena. "Questioning Democracy Promotion: Belarus' Response To The 'Colour Revolutions'". *Democratization* 19, no. 1 (2012): 44. doi:10.1080/13510347.2012.641294.
75. Ko`zgu. 2005-Yil Andijon Voqeasi Sirlari Ochildi, Guvoh Gapirdi.. Zokirjon Almatov Qamoqqa Olinadimi Endi?. Video, 2020. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wHNQW3oewuA>.

76. Kristof, Nicholas. "Ruthless Ex-Dictator Getting Credit For South Korea's Rise (Published 1995)". *New York Times*, 1995. <https://www.nytimes.com/1995/11/24/world/ruthless-ex-dictator-getting-credit-for-south-korea-s-rise.html>.
77. Kubicek, Paul. "Are Central Asian Leaders Learning From Upheavals In Kyrgyzstan?". *Journal Of Eurasian Studies* 2, no. 2 (2011): 116-117. doi:10.1016/j.euras.2011.03.002.
78. Leshchenko, Natalia. "The National Ideology And The Basis Of The Lukashenka Regime In Belarus". *Europe-Asia Studies* 60, no. 8 (2008): 1419-1433. doi:10.1080/09668130802292234.
79. Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A. Way. *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Lewis, David. "Kyrgyzstan". In *The Colour Revolutions In The Former Soviet Republics: Successes And Failures*, 45. Donnacha Ó Beacháin. Oxon: Routledge, 2010.
80. Linz, Juan J. *Totalitarian And Authoritarian Regimes*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000.
81. *Lukashenko: Ne Hochu, Chtobi Mi Razrushili Mir I Stabilnost, Kotorie Est V Belarussii*. Video, 2020. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hIHchNgoBYY&t=136s>.
82. *Lukashenko Schtiaet Samim Vajnim Podderjiavt Bezopasnost I Stabilnost V Strane*. Video, 2020. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fyPB8D39XJs>.
83. *Lukashenko: Tolko Vnutrennyaya Stabilnost Yavlyaetsya Garantiej Vijivaniya Belarussii*. Video, 2020. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uHsojHvcUIg>.
84. *Lukashenko: Udalost Spasti Stranu I Stabilnost, No Rasslablyatsya Poka Rano*. Video, 2020. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KxqrDc0a4LY>.
85. *Lukashenko Zayavil O Gotovivshemsya Na Nego I Sinovey Pokushenii*. Video, 2021. <http://youtube.com/watch?v=52sKZ-Q2IhM>.
86. Luo, Amy. "Discourse Analysis | A Step-By-Step Guide With Examples". *Scribbr*, 2019. <https://www.scribbr.com/methodology/discourse-analysis/>.
87. Luong, Pauline Jones. *The Transformation Of Central Asia: States And Societies From Soviet Rule To Independence*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004.
88. Maerz, Seraphine F. "Ma'Naviyat In Uzbekistan: An Ideological Extrication From Its Soviet Past?". *Journal Of Political Ideologies* 23, no. 2 (2017): 205-222. doi:10.1080/13569317.2018.1419448.
89. Maerz, Seraphine F. "Simulating Pluralism: The Language of Democracy in Hegemonic Authoritarianism". *Political Research Exchange* 1, no. 1 (2019): 2. doi:10.1080/2474736x.2019.1605834.
90. Maerz, Seraphine F. "The Electronic Face Of Authoritarianism: E-Government As A Tool For Gaining Legitimacy In Competitive And Non-Competitive Regimes". *Government Information Quarterly* 33, no. 4 (2016): 727-735. doi:10.1016/j.giq.2016.08.008.

91. Maerz, Seraphine F. "The Many Faces of Authoritarian Persistence: A Set-Theory Perspective On the Survival Strategies Of Authoritarian Regimes". *Government and Opposition* 55, no. 1 (2018): 64-87. doi:10.1017/gov.2018.17.
92. McDonald, Matt. "Securitization And The Construction Of Security". *European Journal Of International Relations* 14, no. 4 (2008): 563-587. doi:10.1177/1354066108097553.
93. March, Andrew F. "From Leninism to Karimovism: Hegemony, Ideology, And Authoritarian Legitimation". *Post-Soviet Affairs* 19, no. 4 (2003): 307-336. doi:10.2747/1060-586x.19.4.307.
94. March, Andrew F. "The Use And Abuse Of History: 'National Ideology' As Transcendental Object In Islam Karimov's 'Ideology Of National Independence'". *Central Asian Survey* 21, no. 4 (2002): 371-384. doi:10.1080/0263493032000053190.
95. Marples, David R. "Color Revolutions: The Belarus Case". *Communist And Post-Communist Studies* 39, no. 3 (2006): 351-364. doi:10.1016/j.postcomstud.2006.06.004.
96. Marples, David R. "Europe's Last Dictatorship: The Roots And Perspectives Of Authoritarianism In 'White Russia'". *Europe-Asia Studies* 57, no. 6 (2005): 895-908. doi:10.1080/1080/09668130500199509.
97. Mearsheimer, John J. *Why Leaders Lie: The Truth About Lying In International Politics*. Cary: Oxford University Press, USA, 2014.
98. Morgenbesser, Lee. *Behind The Façade: Elections Under Authoritarianism in Southeast Asia*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2016.
99. Murray, Craig. *Dirty Diplomacy*. New York: Scribner, 2006.
100. Neal, Andrew. *Exceptionalism And The Politics Of Counter-Terrorism: Liberty, Security And The War On Terror*. Oxon: Routledge, 2010.
101. Neistat, Anna. "The Andijan Massacre Remembered". *Amnesty International*, 2015. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/07/the-andijan-massacre-remembered/>.
102. Neliupšienė, Jovita, and Valentinas Beržiūnas. "The Impact Of Force Structures And The Army On Maintaining The Regime In Belarus". *Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review* 12, no. 1 (2014): 189-219. doi:10.2478/lasr-2014-0009.
103. Nice, Alex. *Playing Both Sides: Belarus Between Russia And The EU*. 2. DGAPanalyse, 2012. https://dgap.org/system/files/article_pdfs/2012-02_DGAPana_Nice_www_2.pdf.
104. Niland, Paul. "Lukashenka Is Wrong To Use Ukraine As A Cautionary Tale". *Atlantic Council*, 2020. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/lukashenka-is-wrong-to-use-ukraine-as-a-cautionary-tale/>.
105. Ó Beacháin, Donnacha, and Abel Polese. *The Colour Revolutions In The Former Soviet Republics: Successes And Failures*. Oxon: Routledge, 2010.

106. "Obrashenie Prezidenta Respubliki Belarus A.G. Lukashenko K Belarusskomu Narodu V Svyazi S Obyavleniem Referenduma". *President.Gov.By*, 2004. <https://president.gov.by/ru/events/obraschenie-prezidenta-respubliki-belarus-aglukashenko-k-belarusskomu-narodu-v-svjazi-s-objjavleniem-5840>.
107. Omelicheva, Mariya Y. "Islam And Power Legitimation: Instrumentalisation Of Religion In Central Asian States". *Contemporary Politics* 22, no. 2 (2016): 144-163. doi:10.1080/13569775.2016.1153287.
108. Pepinsky, Thomas. "The Institutional Turn In Comparative Authoritarianism". *British Journal Of Political Science* 44, no. 3 (2013): 631-653. doi:10.1017/s0007123413000021.
109. "Poslanie Belarusskomu Narodu I Nacionalnomu Sobraniyu", 2005. <https://president.gov.by/ru/events/obraschenie-prezidenta-respubliki-belarus-a-lukashenko-s-poslaniem-belarusskomu-narodu-i-natsionalnomu-5848>.
110. Potter, Jonathan, and Margaret Wetherell. *Discourse And Social Psychology*. London: Sage, 2009.
111. *Preliminary Findings On The Events In Andijan, Uzbekistan, 13 May, 2015*. Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, 2015. <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/1/1/15653.pdf>.
112. "President Declares "Freedom At War With Fear"". *Georgewbush-Whitehouse.Archives.Gov*, 2001. <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>.
113. Putz, Catherine. "Uzbekistan: Opposition Erk Party Wants In On October Presidential Election". *The Diplomat*, 2021. <https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/uzbekistan-opposition-erk-party-wants-in-on-october-presidential-election/>.
114. Qadri, Syed Nasser. "Framing Terrorism And Migration In The USA: The Role Of The Media In Securitization Processes". PhD, University of Glasgow, 2020. Roe, Paul. "Actor, Audience(S) And Emergency Measures: Securitization And The UK's Decision To Invade Iraq". *Security Dialogue* 39, no. 6 (2008): 618-619. doi:10.1177/0967010608098212.
115. Rotar, Igor. "'Enlightened Islam,' Uzbek-Style: Islam Karimov Is Getting Rid Of His Most Dangerous Rival". *Jamestown*, 1998. <https://jamestown.org/program/enlightened-islam-uzbek-style-islam-karimov-is-getting-rid-of-his-most-dangerous-rival/>.
116. Rudkouski, Piotr. *Soft Belarusianisation. The Ideology Of Belarus In The Era Of The Russian-Ukrainian Conflict*. Center for East European Studies, 2017.
117. Ryan, James. "The Sacralization Of Violence: Bolshevik Justifications For Violence And Terror During The Civil War". *Slavic Review* 74, no. 4 (2015): 808-831. doi:10.5612/slavicreview.74.4.808.
118. Sannikov, Andrei. "The Accidental Dictatorship Of Alexander Lukashenko". *SAIS Review Of International Affairs* 25, no. 1 (2005): 79. doi:10.1353/sais.2005.0017.

119. Sattarov, Rafael. "“Spirituality And Enlightenment”: Uzbekistan’S State-Backed Ideological Policy - Central Asia Program". *Central Asia Program*, 2021. <https://centralasiaprogram.org/archives/11408>.
120. Schapiro, Leonard. *Totalitarianism*. New York: Praeger, 1972.
121. Schedler, Andreas. *Electoral Authoritarianism*. London: Boulder Co Rienner, 2006.
122. Schenkkan, Nate. "Islam Karimov And The Dictator’S Playbook". *Foreign Policy*, 2016. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/30/islam-karimov-and-the-dictators-playbook-uzbekistan/>.
123. Silitski, Vitali. "Explaining Post-Communist Authoritarianism In Belarus". In *Contemporary Belarus: Between Democracy And Dictatorship*. Elena A. Korosteleva, Colin W. Lawson and Rosalind J. Marsh. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003.
124. Silicki, Vitali. "Belarus: Anatomy Of Preemptive Authoritarianism". In *The Geopolitical Place Of Belarus In Europe And The World*, 78. Valer Bulhakau. Warsaw: Wyzsza Szkola Handlu i Prawa, 2006.
125. Silitski, Vitali. "Preempting Democracy: The Case Of Belarus". *Journal Of Democracy* 16, no. 4 (2005): 83-97. doi:10.1353/jod.2005.0074. SSotqin. Video, 2018. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7XrD7KN1Zpk>.
126. "Stenogramma Poslaniya Alexandra Lukashenko K Belorusskomu Narodu I Natsionalnomu Sobraniyu". *Belarusskoe Telegrafnoe Agenstvo*, 2016. <https://www.belta.by/president/view/stenogramma-poslanija-aleksandra-lukashenko-k-belorusskomu-narodu-i-natsionalnomu-sobraniju-190621-2016/>.
127. Stockmann, Daniela, and Mary E. Gallagher. "Remote Control: How The Media Sustain Authoritarian Rule In China". *Comparative Political Studies* 44, no. 4 (2011): 436-467. doi:10.1177/0010414010394773.
128. *Tahdid*. Video, 2009. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E-_qwklrALo.
129. Terzyan, Aram. "Explaining Post-Soviet Authoritarianism In Belarus: Sources And Perspectives". *IHRPD Research Papers* 2 (2019): 5. doi:10.47669/ihprd-2-2019.
130. *The Referendum On Independence And Presidential Election In Uzbekistan: December 29, 1991*. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1991. <https://www.csce.gov/sites/helsinkicommission.house.gov/files/The%20Referendum%20on%20Independence%20and%20Presidential%20Elections%20in%20Uzbekistan.pdf>.
131. Tolipov, Farhod, "Uzbekistan: Sovetskiy sindrom v gosudarstve, obshestve, ideologii", *Gosudarstvennoe Stroitelstvo* 6, no 60 (2008), <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/uzbekistan-sovetskiy-sindrom-v-gosudarstve-obschestve-ideologii/viewer>

132. Trisko, Jessica N. "Coping With The Islamist Threat: Analysing Repression In Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan And Uzbekistan". *Central Asian Survey* 24, no. 4 (2005): 373-389. doi:10.1080/02634930500453509.
133. "Turkmenistan Leader Wants To End Free Power, Gas, And Water". *DW*, 2017. <https://www.dw.com/en/turkmenistan-leader-wants-to-end-free-power-gas-and-water/a-39152012>.
134. "U.S. Department Of State Country Report On Human Rights Practices 1993 - Uzbekistan". *Refworld*, 2021. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6aa5610.html>.
135. "Uzbek Dissident Arrested In Prague, Threatened With Extradition". *Human Rights Watch*, 2001. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2001/11/28/uzbek-dissident-arrested-prague-threatened-extradition>.
136. "Uzbek Government Seen As Increasingly Repressive". *RFE/RL*, 2001. <http://www.rferl.org/welcome/english/releases/2001/03/30-300301.html>.
137. *Uzbekistan At Ten: Repression And Instability*. ICG Asia Report. International Crisis Group, 2001. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/central-asia/uzbekistan/central-asia-uzbekistan-10-repression-and-instability>.
138. "Uzbekistan: Karimov Battens Down The Hatches". *Radiofreeeurope/Radioliberty*, 2005. <https://www.rferl.org/a/1060313.html>.
139. "Uzbekistan: Karimov, Putin Say Andijon Violence Was Planned Abroad". *Radiofreeeurope/Radioliberty*, 2005. <https://www.rferl.org/a/1059583.html>.
140. Vuori, Juha A. "Illocutionary Logic And Strands Of Securitization: Applying The Theory Of Securitization To The Study Of Non-Democratic Political Orders". *European Journal Of International Relations* 14, no. 1 (2008): 65-99. doi:10.1177/1354066107087767.
141. Vuori, Juha. "Religion Bites: Falungong, Securitization/Desecuritization In The People'S Republic Of China". In *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge And Dissolve*, 186. Thierry Balzacq. London: Routledge, 2011.
142. Wæver, Ole. "Conflicts Of Vision — Visions Of Conflict". In *European Polyphony: Perspectives Beyond East–West Confrontation*. London: Macmillan, 1989.
143. Wæver, Ole. "Securitization And Desecuritization". In *On Security*, 46–86. Ronnie D. Lipschutz. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995.
144. Watson, Scott D. "'Framing' The Copenhagen School: Integrating The Literature On Threat Construction". *Millennium: Journal Of International Studies* 40, no. 2 (2011): 279-301. doi:10.1177/0305829811425889.
145. Weber, Max. *Essays In Sociology*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1993.

146. "What's Happening In Belarus?". *BBC News*, 2020. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-53799065>.
147. Williams, Michael C. "Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization And International Politics". *International Studies Quarterly* 47, no. 4 (2003): 511-531. doi:10.1046/j.0020-8833.2003.00277.x.
148. Wilkinson, Cai. "The Limits Of Spoken Words: From Meta-Narratives To Experiences Of Security". In *Securitization Theory; How Security Problems Emerge And Dissolve*, 94-115. Thierry Balzacq. London: Routledge, 2011.
149. Yakouchyk, Katsiaryna. "Belarusian State Ideology: A Strategy Of Flexible Adaptation". *Opus4.Kobv.De*, 2019. <https://opus4.kobv.de/opus4-uni-passau/frontdoor/index/index/docId/602>.
150. Yakouchyk, Katsiaryna. "The Good, The Bad, And The Ambitious: Democracy And Autocracy Promoters Competing In Belarus". *European Political Science Review* 8, no. 2 (2015): 195-224. doi:10.1017/s1755773914000459.
151. "Zayniddin Asqarov Intervyusi". *El Tuz*, 2015. <https://eltuz.com/lat/dokument/414/>.
152. "2021 Uzbekistan Military Strength". *The Global Firepower*, 2021. https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.php?country_id=uzbekistan.