

CHARLES UNIVERSITY

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**History as Political Weapon: Conflicting narratives of
Autocephaly in Ukraine**

Bachelor Thesis

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that no portion of the work referred to in this thesis has been submitted in support of an application of another degree, or qualification thereof, or for any other university or institute of learning. I declare that this thesis is my own independent work. All the used material and literature has been duly referenced and quoted.

In Prague, 29th July 2021

signature: _____

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Abstract

In 2018 Patriarch Bartholomew signed the tomos and thus the new and autocephalous Orthodox Church of Ukraine was established. This event created turmoil in Eastern Orthodoxy and the two major Orthodox Churches of Constantinople, and the Russian Orthodox Church broke off the communion. This thesis explores the history of Ukrainian autocephaly, the phenomenon of autocephaly, and historical preconditions of the emergence of the modern Orthodox Church of Ukraine. This thesis is concentrated on the study of primary sources considering Ukraine's autocephaly, especially created by the main actors of the Church's revival, exploration of the relations between the Church and state in Eastern Orthodoxy, and its application in the Ukrainian case throughout the periods of the revival of the autocephalous movements in the Ukrainian Church. The aim of this research is to define the conflicting narratives of autocephaly in Ukraine.

Key words: Church, church-state relations, autocephaly, History of Eastern Orthodoxy, Ukraine, interpretation of history, nationalism

Introduction

In 2018 Bartholomew, patriarch of Constantinople signed the tomos on the establishment of the new local Orthodox Church - Orthodox Church of Ukraine. That created the schism between the Russian Orthodox Church which regards Ukraine as their canonical territory and claims that the signing of tomos is the act of interference from the Ecumenical Patriarchate to the internal business of Moscow. Bartholomew was no longer commemorated in the churches of Russia, thus the communion between Moscow and Constantinople was broken: the ongoing religious conflict began with this break-off. For now, the question of Ukraine's autocephaly is the main topic in Eastern Orthodoxy which would be discussed for a long time.

Another important topic aside from canonical discussions of this matter is the interference of the political authorities in the internal realms of the Church, and the consequent implication of the autocephaly in achieving the political goals. Such an influence from the state could be attributed to the tradition of church-state relations in Eastern Orthodoxy that could be traced to the period of the Byzantine empire. The role of Petro Poroshenko in the obtaining Church's ecclesial independence is hard to be underestimated, as he personally met with patriarch Bartholomew and wrote an appeal to him asking the provision of the autocephaly.

The aim of this thesis is to study the phenomenon of autocephaly, its importance in the matrix of church-state relations throughout the history of Ukrainian autocephaly. The research question is: what are the narratives that define the Ukrainian autocephaly? And another important research question is: what is the impact of the state in the autocephalous movements?

This research requires a broader insight into the history of autocephaly in Eastern Orthodoxy, the specifics of the relations between the Church and the state,

historical preconditions of the Ukrainian autocephalous movement and the current situation with the Orthodox Church in the territory of modern Ukraine. The investigation of these topics is made in the first part of this thesis by analyzing both historical documents and relevant literature on these topics. Thus, the context of the autocephalous movements in Ukraine would become clearer.

In the second part of this thesis, the three periods of revival of the autocephalous movements in Ukraine are studied with the use of primary sources created by the personalities that were active participants in those movements. Through the analysis of those sources, the narratives of autocephaly are investigated. The main focus in the thesis is to regard autocephaly from the historical perspective and through the matrix of Church-state relations. The canonical dimensions of the autocephaly are also discussed in the first part of this thesis with the use of Church canons that are accepted in Eastern Orthodoxy and the interpretations of the Orthodox theologians that are proficient in the interpretation of the religious aspect of the autocephaly. That is why the main primary sources are the memoirs and other primary sources created by the people who took part in those events, and their personal background is connected to both Church and the state. The primary sources are written in Russian and Ukrainian language and are not translated into English. All fragments provided are translated by me and the limitation that could be outlined is the level of my proficiency in Ukrainian language and the subsequent possible drawbacks in the interpretation.

Methodology

The historical method, the researching and analysis of primary and secondary sources is the main method of this thesis. The thesis is subdivided into the two main sections. In the first section the theoretical and historical context is provided. In the first chapter the concept of autocephaly is discussed through the canonical and political perspectives. In this section the canonical dimensions are introduced and discussed with the help of the relevant selected literature. The work of Wace and Schaff (1994) is the biggest available collection of the Christian canons and dogmas in English with the interpretations and commentaries. In this section the attribution to the Orthodox theologians such as John Meyendorff (2001), Alexander Schmemmann (1972) and Sergei Troitskiy (1948) is the great help as they provide the information about not only canonical dimensions of phenomenon of autocephaly but also, they discuss the political motives behind its emergence in Eastern Orthodoxy which is critical in answering this thesis' research questions. The dissertation of C.W. Sanderson (2005) is an important source of knowledge on this topic as he discusses the importance of autocephaly in preserving the organizational stability of Eastern Orthodox Churches as the institution.

In the second chapter of this section the matrix of relations between the church and the state in Eastern Orthodoxy is investigated. In this chapter, the concept of symphonia is discussed. Article of Ukrainian religious historian and theologian Cyril Hovorun (2016) is worth mentioning as he discusses the symphonia in Church-state relations applied in modern-day churches. It is important to mention the Patriarch Cyril's interpretation of the symphonia in Church-state relations expressed in public after his enthronement and in the conversation with Dmitri Medvedev, prime minister of Russia as it provides us the regard on the contemporary relations between the political authorities and Orthodox Church. It is also important to trace back the idea of symphonia to the early days of the Orthodox Christianity, that is why the Justinian novels are discussed in this chapter as it is the first historical document considering such relations.

The case of Russian autocephaly after the Council of Florence, Unia and the transition of the Kievan metropolis is worth to be discussed because it provides context both for the interconnection between the Church and the state and for the autocephaly of Ukrainian Church in future. Works of Joseph Gill (1959) (1964) are worth mentioning because it is a fundamental research of the Council of Florence in which he used the memoirs of the participants of this council such as Sylvester Syropoulos and other historical characters. The monograph of Jonatan Harris *The end of Byzantium* (2010) provides great insight to the last decades of Byzantine Empire and especially the situation with the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the preconditions for the Council of Florence and the subsequent Unia with the Catholic Church. Considering the transition of Kievan metropolis, the monograph of Vasily Lourie (2010) is one of the main works on this topic as the author analyzes the documents on the transition issued by both Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Russian Orthodox Church. Worth mentioning the critique on this monograph expressed in the article by Mikheev and Ostapenko (2019). Through investigation of both research allows us to maintain a balanced position on this key event that defined the future autocephaly of Ukrainian Church. Considering the issue of Ukrainian nationalism and the Church works of Markus (1989), Reshetar (1951) and Yelensky (2005) are a great help in researching this topic.

The second part of this thesis is dedicated to the study of history of revival of autocephalous movements through the XX century in Ukraine. The method of historical periodization was applied, and the three main periods of autocephaly in Ukraine were defined: the first after the Russian revolution and the establishment of the independent Ukrainian state; the second under the German occupation; and the third which is the modern times. As the research question of this thesis is what are the narratives that define the autocephaly in Ukraine, it was decided to select and analyze the narrative primary sources created by the people which actively participated in autocephalous movements. During the first period, memoirs of two people are analyzed: Vasily Zenkovsky and Oleskandr Lototsky were two ministers of confessions in the independent Ukrainian state which had different

regards on the question of autocephaly. That is why their personal first-hand accounts on the events of First Autocephaly are worth researching and discussing. It contains not only personal regards on the question of autocephaly but provides us with the insights on the mechanisms of church-state relations in the context of the autocephaly.

Unfortunately, considering the German occupation none of such elaborated narrative sources is available for us. That is why the chapter on the German occupation is based on the fundamental monograph of professor Mikail Shrarovsky (2007) which researched the Orthodox Church in the occupied territories. His work is based on the archival documents which includes the directives, letters and orders retrieved from the German, Ukrainian and Russian archives. The monograph of John Armstrong (1980) is also a useful research which is also based on the archival documents and provides us with the information on the relations between Ukrainian nationalists and Orthodox clergy.

The last chapter is dedicated to modern autocephaly. Here the importance of Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko and his interference in the internal matters of the church is outlined. Fortunately, we have the narrative sources created by Poroshenko which are interesting to analyze in order to answer the research questions of this thesis.

It is important to notice, that the selection of the sources is based on the interest in the political aspects of the autocephaly which could be regarded as the limitation of such a selection. Another limitation as it was already mentioned is that some of the primary sources analyzed are written in the Ukrainian language and are not translated into Russian or English. My quite low proficiency in Ukrainian language should be mentioned as the limitation of this thesis. All the sources are properly cited. Sources in Russian and Ukrainian are translated by me.

PART I. THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1.1. Autocephaly and its dimensions

While researching the problem of autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine it is important to know the terminology, specifics of the organizational structure of Eastern Orthodox Churches and canonical laws, and its juridical origins. *Autocephaly* came from the Greek language and the most accurate translation of this term is “appointing its own leader” (Hanks, Pearsall, Stevenson 2010, p. 108). Therefore, an autocephalous church in Eastern Orthodoxy is the church that could elect its own patriarch, primate over the Church. Unlike Roman Catholic Church, with its exclusive hierarchical and vertical structure that ends with the institution of the Pope as the head of the Church, Orthodox Churches are more decentralized and in denying papal supremacy.

John Meyendorff, a prominent Orthodox theologian of the XX century, explains the emergence of this system as the result of the regionalism of the Imperial Church in Byzantium. Decisions of the Nicean council gave provincial councils the supreme authority in appointing bishops. However, this action did not create a schism and did not divide religious groupings that possessed more independence in organizational matters, rather than they enjoyed this level of authenticity. As Meyendorff (2001, p. 222) explains:

“The full integrity and catholicity of each local church required its communion with all the churches <...> the initial form of this communion was normally realized with neighboring churches in the framework of existing politics. These canonical groupings were meant to serve unity, not create divisions”.

As long as local autocephalous churches are in communion with each other, they cannot be condemned into heresy as they share the same system of beliefs,

priests could serve liturgy together and live in the sense that the Orthodox church is Apostolic, e.g. its legacy ascends from the teachings of Apostles that are the closest followers of Jesus Christ - formal head of the Church. Moreover, this structure corresponds to the spirit of the 31st Apostolic Canon in which it is forbidden to “erect another altar”. Meyendorff also points out that the structure of Orthodox Churches is close to the early Christian communities in the sense of locality and equality of all bishops. (p. 237).

However, this egalitarian structure is challenged by the idea that the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople (EPC) as being the first among the equal and thus possesses primacy in decision-making. Due to the Byzantine theological idea of *symphonia*, the Patriarch of Constantinople had more power than the other Orthodox patriarchs because of close relations with the Emperor. The fourth Ecumenical council was convened by Emperor Marcian in 451 AD in Chalcedon. The decisions of this council granted the Patriarch of Constantinople prerogatives that distinguished it from the other Orthodox churches. For example, the 28th canon claims that the Bishop of New Rome (Constantinople) shall enjoy the same privileges as the Bishop of Old Rome (Schaff, Wace 1994, p. 287)

This canon could be attributed to the political situation during this period. Operating in the matrix of the *symphonia*, a bishop has special powers and authority exclusively in the city where the Emperor lives. Old Rome was in the state of decline which was much closer to the fall as it was already captured by Alaric, king of Visigoths, in 410 AD. Thus, the desire for New Rome to replace the old one could be explained.

Moreover, it grants the patriarch to ordain bishops for areas outside the canonical territory of the EPC. Canon 9 extends the judicial power of Constantinople: “<...> if a bishop has a dispute with his metropolitan let him carry the case to Constantinople” (Schaff, Wace 1994, p. 274) That means if a bishop from an autocephalous Orthodox church cannot rely on just trial because he has a conflict with local clergy and the metropolitan that constitute the synod which is

designed for solving arbitrary cases within its canonical territory, he could go directly to Constantinople and pass his case to the EPC for further consideration. As fairly concludes Anna Komnene, daughter of the Byzantine Emperor Alexios I Komnenos,

“For when the imperial seat was transferred from Rome hither to our native Queen of Cities, and the senate, and the whole administration, there was also transferred the arch hieratical primacy. And the Emperors from the very beginning have given the supreme right to the episcopacy of Constantinople, and the Council of Chalcedon emphatically raised the Bishop of Constantinople to the highest position, and placed all the dioceses¹ of the inhabited world under his jurisdiction”. (Comnena 2000, p. 25)

This quote reflects the perception of the political authorities which were content with this decision of the council. Thus, due to the decisions of the Fourth Council, the Patriarch of Constantinople transformed from being first among equals towards being first without equals.

What is the main function of autocephaly in Eastern Orthodoxy? It appears to be that the division of one universal church into the local one could be attributed to nationalism. There are existing theories in which the development of autocephalous churches relates to the nationalistic tendencies. The autocephalous, independent churches emerged as the opposition to the Imperial Byzantine and the dependence on the decisions that are made in the center of the Empire both by the patriarch of Constantinople and his patron the Byzantine emperor. Alexander Schmemmann, theologian, religious historian and researcher of the autocephalous phenomenon, argues that the division between Orthodox churches is the product of nationalism, not ecclesiology. Thus, the connotation of the word ‘autocephaly’ is not just jurisdictional and purely religious, but national. And the negotiations that

¹ Diocese (lat. *diocesis* - governing) is a unit of administrative division in Roman and later Byzantine Empire. Was adopted by the EPC in their administrative division

are made on the question of religious independence are made on the state level rather than on the religious. (Schmemmann 1971, pp. 9-10)

As for the proof of his thesis, he provides an example of the autocephaly of the Russian Church in 1448 (p. 12). This historical justification could be supported as at the end of the XV century Byzantine Empire was in a state of decay due to the loss of its territory and political power after the invasions of the Seljuks. The fall of Constantinople happened only five years after the proclamation of autocephaly. On the contrary, the Russian state, the Grand Duchy of Moscow was in a state of growth and strengthening due to the continuous expansionist politics of the successors of Ivan the Great and the centralization of the Russian state.

It is interesting to look at the other conceptualizations of autocephaly. Autocephaly could be regarded as the act of sovereignty. Muscovian prince Basil II by the convocation of the second council of Russian bishops in 1448 in which the autocephaly of the Russian Church from the EPC was proclaimed could be described as the establishment of sovereignty. Theologian Sergei Troitskiy was one of the founders of such conceptualization. In his program article that was published in the Journal of Moscow Patriarchate named "On Autocephaly", he defines the Church as being autocephalous as "<...> Churches that are self-headed, that means that they have their head, their own, independent from the others, supreme and sovereign power" (Troitskiy 1948, p. 36). In his regard, the autocephalous Church possesses supreme authority in administrative and juridical matters: "<...> Local councils of bishops are in power to judge their own first hierarchs" (p. 48) and "<...> It [Church] uses its freedom by producing its own chrism, through canonization of its own saints, by writing new chants and defining the time and place of liturgy etc.". (p. 48)

However, in the question of dogmatic doctrines, an autocephalous Church does not possess freedom because it exists in communion with the other Orthodox Churches (p. 48). Thus, this does not contradict Meyendorff's regard on the question of which Church could be defined as autocephalous. Moreover, Sergei

Troitskiy stresses the importance of self-sufficiency in the question of relations with the other Orthodox churches. That is why no church could interfere in the internal matters of the autocephalous Church and thus undermine its sovereignty. (p. 49) Canonically speaking, these regards on independence are again in the spirit of the 31st Apostolic Rule.

The origins and justifications for the existence of autocephaly is still an arbitrary question in the field. Charles Wegner Sanderson, aside from the nationalistic theory of autocephaly in which the Church and the state actively operate as political actors, describes the opposite theory: autocephaly as the result of organizational change under institutional constraints. In this theory, the autocephalous church accommodates the existing political geography. As the political boundaries are changing, new political entities are emerging, so the Church is adapted. Ecclesiastical demarcations tend to correspond to the administrative (Sanderson 2005, p. 31). This adaptation is made in order to maintain the organizational structure of the Church. It presupposes the change in the political structure and thus changes its organizational structure in order to overcome constraints and meet certain institutional criteria. (pp. 29-30). An example of the constraint is the involvement of an exterior force, a third party which is the state authority (p. 36). Therefore, the Church in such a theoretical framework is passive, capable of adjusting to the actual political situation.

What is unifying both existing theories is the excessive role of the state in the development of autocephalous churches. In the first theory, the Church operates with the state collectively as active actors in the proclamation of autocephaly. The Church through this coalescence could be described as the ecclesial state within a political state. In the second theory, in response to external threats such as the change in the political boundaries and the interference of the state authority, the Church adapts and thus has no other choice than to attribute itself to the existing political entity through the proclamation of autocephaly. Such an over-encompassing impact on the Church from the state authority could be attributed to the notion of symphonia which is going to be described in the following chapter.

1.2. Symphonia in the Church-state relations

Symphonia is one of the main concepts in Eastern Orthodoxy that was developed in the center of the Orthodox world - Byzantine Empire. This is the idea of the Church and the state working collaboratively in order to achieve separate goals: for the state is to remain a status quo and political survival in the borders and out of them - internationally through the projection of power; for the Church is to apply religious practices in a way that would lead its people to the salvation. Noteworthy that in order to achieve those goals, the church and the state must not interfere in the interior matters of each other. (Leustean 2009, p.11) Ideally, the Church and the state must be in a state of harmony and synergy. The idea of symphonia in Church-state relations could be traced back to Byzantine emperor Justinian. The first and definitive feature of symphonia we can find in the preface to 6th Novel entitled “How bishops and priests and other ecclesiastics shall be ordained and concerning the expenses of the church”. The addressee of Justinian’s novel is Epiphanius, Archbishop, and Patriarch of Constantinople. Let us move to the quotation:

“The **priesthood** and the **Empire** are the two greatest gifts which God, in His infinite clemency, has bestowed upon mortals; **the former has reference to Divine matters, the latter presides over and directs human affairs**, and both, proceeding from the same principle, adorn the life of mankind; hence **nothing should be such a source of care** to the emperors as the honor of the priests who constantly pray to God for their salvation”. (Scott, 1932)

The division between the political power represented by the Emperor and religious power represented by the priesthood is quite clear. The Emperor is supervising civic aspects of the state such as laws, persecution, foreign policy, etc. while the patriarch and the other clergy could exercise their power in the religious and canonical dimensions. Symphonic relation is described in this formula: a priest

as a citizen would be protected by the emperor, while as being the clergyman he is supervised by his superior or the patriarch himself.

However, this situation is ideal for the church not for the emperor. De-facto everything was more complex. Let us look at the novel that was made by Justinian. The fact that the law considering the ordain of priests and bishops is created by the emperor and then sent to the patriarch is the indication of power relations of a different kind. Thereby it is nothing but direct interference from the civic authority in the interior matters of the Church. The symphony is therefore asymmetrical or basically nonexistent. Ukrainian theologian and historian Cyril Hovorun, researching the phenomenon of symphonia in Byzantium, argues that its modern interpretations are based on the speculative construct of church-state relations in Byzantium rather than on the actual ontological meaning. (Hovorun 2016, p. 281). According to him, Justinian interpreted symphonia as “their [emperors ‘] right to interfere in matters of ecclesial and administration and doctrine. They also regarded themselves as a kind of hieratic, priestly persons”. (p. 286). Concluding this, he claims that at the peak of the development of symphonia as the theological and political idea of the Empire, the emperor positioned himself as the head of both church and state. An indeed wonderful passage from Byzantine emperor Leo III is stated as the embodiment of such a development: “I am emperor and priest” (p. 286)

Thus, the concept of symphonia as the perfect balance between religious and political authorities cannot exist ontologically i.e. on the essence of its being. As the concept of symphonia is formulated in the formal document created by the emperor with the direct prescription to the patriarch on how to deal with internal religious matters. The self-identification and the feeling of Byzantine emperors in those power relations contribute to the denial of the initial definition of symphonia. The church and the state in Eastern Orthodoxy are therefore in the relations of revision and control in which the state is the superior structure, the church is the inferior.

1.3. Council of Florence, Unia and Russian autocephaly

Let us look at the event that was no less significant in the history of Orthodoxy: how the Russian Orthodox Church gained its autocephaly from Constantinople. The autocephaly of the Russian Church is a long process that started with the Council of Florence. The autocephaly of the Russian Church was caused by the Council of Florence where the Pope negotiated unions with various eastern churches. Leon van der Essen, the Belgian historian, wrote an article on the Council of Florence in which he listed the main actors in this council:

“On the Epistle side was placed the throne of the Greek Emperor. Besides the emperor and his brother Demetrius, there were present, on the part of the Greeks, Joasaph, the Patriarch of Constantinople; Antonius, the Metropolitan of Heraclea; Gregory Hamma, the Protosyncellus of Constantinople (the last two representing the Patriarch of Alexandria); Marcus Eugenicus of Ephesus; Isidore of Kiev (representing the Patriarch of Antioch); Dionysius, Bishop of Sardes (representing the Patriarch of Jerusalem); Bessarion, Archbishop of Nicaea; Balsamon, the chief chartophylax; Syropulos, the chief ecclesiarch, and the Bishops of Monembasia, Lacedaemon, and Anchiolo. In the discussions the Latins were represented principally by Cardinal Giuliano Cesarini and Cardinal Niccolò Albergati. Andrew, Archbishop of Rhodes; the Bishop of Forlì; the Dominican John of Turrecremata; and Giovanni di Ragusa, provincial of Lombardy". (Van der Essen 1909)

In 1437 Byzantine emperor John VIII Palaiologos, Patriarch of Constantinople Joseph, and the metropolitan of Kyiv Isidor arrived at this council in order to sign the union and thus proclaim the Pope as the head of all Christianity. (Gill 1959, pp. 176-177) After the proclamation of the union, many parishes that were under the control of Constantinople joined the union with the Pope, accepting his supremacy and catholic dogmas with the preservation of Greek liturgy (p. 177). The metropolitan of Kyiv Isidor also joined the union and became the cardinal and

papal legate. (Gill 1959, p. 300) (Lourie 2010. p. 23) When he was on his way to Moscow in order to proclaim union, the news about the union of Western parishes was already known by Moscovian hierarchs. The response towards the events that happened at the Council of Florence was fiercer than it was expected: while serving the metropolitan's liturgy at the Cathedral of Dormition - the main cathedral of Moscow, Isidore commemorated Pope Eugenius, who was seen as the heretic and the enemy of Orthodoxy and read from the ambo of the cathedral the Act of the Council of Florence that established the union between Orthodox Churches and the Catholic Church. Muscovian prince Vasil II which was present at this liturgy was enraged by such an action and ordered to arrest Isidore and send him to Chudov Monastery. In consequence, metropolitan Isidore was able to escape imprisonment. There is the supposition that he was rather allowed to escape. Afterward he, however, did not return to Constantinople, he fled to Rome where he was appointed as cardinal. (Harris 2010, p.160)

The union was convicted and called "the Greek betrayal". Metropolitan of Kyiv and patriarch of Constantinople were condemned of heresy, and the communion with the Ecumenical Patriarchate was interrupted. De-facto, the autocephaly of the Russian Church was proclaimed in 1448, and the bishop of Ryazan and Murom Jonas was elected as the first patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church. (Lourie 2010, p.37) The proclamation didn't have a juridical basis because it was made without the sanction of Constantinople mother-church: specialist in canonical law, monk Diodor (Larionov) claimed that "the Moscovian autocephaly can be regarded as lawful only after 1589, when the Tomos was given by Constantinople, or even after 1593 where the decision of autocephaly endowment was recognized by all four ancient patriarchs (Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, Jerusalem)." (Borzenko 2018).

Let us look at the events that predeceased the proclamation of the union. This would allow us to understand the causes and the reasoning of Byzantine religious and political authorities. The outcomes of the unsuccessful war (1421-1424) with Murad II - the Ottoman Sultan resulted in the loss of Thessalonica and

the strengthening of the Ottoman presence both in Anatolia and the Balkans. Constantinople, therefore, was surrounded, the trade and provision were problematic, vast territories lost, etc. thus, the existence of Byzantine was threatened. The underestimation of the Ottoman threat ended with redeciding on which actions must be done in order to stop their imminent invasion. Naturally, the best idea was to attract a large-scale coalition of Christian powers in the West. John VIII and his advisors came up with the idea that in order to attract military help from the West, it is important to find a way of resolving a schism between Orthodoxy and Catholicism. Because the authority of the Pope could incline Western rulers to set up the crusade against the Turks and thus help the brothers in faith. Such a radical transition from condemning Catholics in heresies and schism towards the urge of making an alliance could be also explained by the social situation around John VIII - he and his brother Constantine were influenced by the Latin groups in Constantinople. Like his father, Manuel II, John VIII continued his policy of attracting useful Latins to the court as they are the most suitable candidates to represent the Empire in the Western countries. (Harris 2010, p.105). Beforehand, Isidore was sent to Rome by John VIII in order to discuss with the Pope what kind of military help would be provided after the negotiation of the union. (Gill 1964, p. 72) Pope Eugenius IV as the exchange for signing the Act of union, promised the Byzantine emperor: “permanent guard of three hundred soldiers for the Byzantine capital, a fleet of twenty-six ships when the need arose, and if a land army were needed the Pope would urge the Christian princes of the west to provide it” (Harris 2010, p. 147).

Noteworthy that Joseph Hill in his work “Council of Florence” insists that there was no clear identification that members of the council were bribed and thus their decisions on the council were not affected by the Pope and other Catholic clergymen. The accusations of venality came only after the council and were promoted by the anti-unionists back in Constantinople as the majority of hierarchs of the EPC strictly opposed the union (Gill 1959, p. 400). However, if we even assume and agree that bribery of Orthodox representatives did not take place, the political and military benefits of the union achievement for the Byzantine side

could not be denied. Eugenius IV during the council began to take steps in order to gain the attention of the Western rulers on the Byzantine's problems with the Ottomans. (Harris 2010, p.147) He issued the bull called 'Postquam ad Apicem', or "after the peak". Aside from the publications and general proclamation of support to the Byzantine emperor, concrete deeds were made by Eugenius IV. The Pope organized the construction of the fleet with a major investment of Venetians. Moreover, European rulers agreed on joining the crusade. For example, young Polish and Hungarian king Ladislas III provided a powerful army (p. 149).

From the events of the Council of Florence, we could again see how church and state relations are intermingled in Eastern Orthodoxy. However, in a quite peculiar way, Byzantine emperor interfered in the religious realm in order to resolve political problems and save his country from the Ottoman invasion. The Council of Florence is an example of religious diplomacy in which church hierarchs, such as Isidor of Kyiv, were sent as emissaries of the Emperor to the Holy See for discussing the military and financial help and make both religious alliances manifested in the union with the Catholic Church and political alliances with the Pope and the West.

1.4. The transition of the Kievan metropolis in 1686

The transition of the Kievan metropolis from the Ecumenical Patriarchate to the Russian Orthodox Church is an important event that allows us to understand the historical and canonical basis for the autocephalous movements in Ukraine and its relations with Constantinople. Therefore, let us move to the earliest years of the Orthodox Church in Russia and Ukraine - to the time of common state - Kievan Rus'.

Rus' was baptized in 988. Prince Vladimir after long considerations about which religion should be adopted as the state one made his choice of Eastern Orthodoxy. As the main historical source on these events, "A Tale of Bygone Years", or Russian Primary Chronicle as known in the Western historiography tells

us how the decision was made. Vladimir sent his noblemen, boyars, to various lands in order to see how the world is worshipping God. After the long journey, they returned home to Kyiv and told their prince:

“When we journeyed among the Bulgars, we beheld how they worship in their temple, called a mosque, while they stand ungirt. The Bulgar bows, sits down, looks hither and thither like one possessed, and there is no happiness among them, but instead only sorrow and a dreadful stench. Their religion is not good. Then we went among the Germans and saw them performing many ceremonies in their temples, but we beheld no glory there. Then we went to Greece, and the Greeks led us to the edifices where they worship their God, and we knew not whether we were in heaven or on earth. For on earth, there is no such splendor or such beauty, and we are at a loss how to describe it. We only know that God dwells there among men, and their service is fairer than the ceremonies of other nations. For we cannot forget that beauty. (Nestor, Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor 1953, p. 111)

The other argument for the adoption of Greek-style liturgy from boyars is related to the family tradition of Vladimir, that if the Greek faith was evil, so his grandmother, Princess Olga, would not have adopted it as she was “wiser than all other men” (Nestor, Cross and Sherbowitz-Wetzor 1953, p. 111) Those all are undeniably beautiful justifications for the adoption of Greek religion, however, the Primary Chronicle lacks the other argument - the adoption of Christianity from Greeks (Byzantine) is the proclamation of the strategic alliance between Vladimir and Byzantine emperor Basil II. A more detailed description of this alliance we could find in the foreign documents of that period, especially in Arabic sources. Yahya of Antioch writes in his chronicles that Basil II while fighting with his enemy Phocas was in need of an alliance, as his wealth was depleted. Thus, he asked the help from Vladimir in exchange for his baptism. As an indication of their alliance, Basil II allowed the Kievan prince to marry his sister. His sister was sent to Kyiv with metropolitans and bishops and there they built a lot of churches and baptized its people. And when the marriage was finally decided, armies of Basil II

and Vladimir joined their forces and smashed Phocas (Jakson, Konovalova, Podosinova 2009, p.106)

Metropolitans and bishops were ordained by the patriarch of Constantinople and thus the new diocese of Ecumenical Patriarchate was established in Kyiv. Even after the centralization of the Russian state during the reign of Ivan the Great and his successors, the metropolitan cathedra remained in Kyiv and did not move to the new capital of Moscow. However, Kyiv during the time of centralization remained in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and thus was not governed by the Russian state. A transition of the Kievan metropolis happened due to the extension of the Grand Duchy of Muscovy to the territories of modern Ukraine after the Russo-Polish war of 1654-1657. After the war, the peace treaty was signed which is commonly known as the Treaty of Perpetual Peace (1686). This treaty secured the Russian possession of Left-bank Ukraine and the city of Kyiv.

Autocephalous Russian Orthodox Church already existed by the time of the integration of Kyiv into the Russian state. The change in the administrative borders required a change in the ecclesial. The possession of Kyiv for both political and religious authorities was significant and symbolic. For the Church, Kyiv is the city with the first metropolitan cathedra, a city of sacred religious sites, and the center of religious education. Even after the formation of the metropolitan in Moscow and proclamation of autocephaly from Constantinople, the Russian patriarch still holds the title of “Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Russia”. For the political authorities, possession of Kyiv is the other indicator that the centralized Russian state is successful in its unification, and Kyiv, as being the old capital of the first Russian state, - Kievan Rus’, in such a manner, was the most sacred and symbolical city for Russian rulers. Thus, the transition of the Kievan metropolis from being the diocese of Constantinople to the newly emerged Russian Orthodox Church could be regarded as the most logical action.

The decision on the transition was made by Dionysios IV, patriarch of Constantinople. After consultations with his synod, he sent two letters that allowed the Russian Patriarch to install the metropolitan of Kyiv. However, the metropolitan of Kyiv was obliged to commemorate the patriarch of Constantinople during the Divine liturgy bore the patriarch of Moscow (Lourie 2010, p. 200). Thus, he was demonstrating his canonical dependence and subjugation to the Ecumenical Patriarchate. However, the Russian side interpreted this as the inclusion of the Kivan metropolis into the Russian Orthodox Church. The commemoration of the patriarch of Constantinople was ceased, instead the metropolitan of Kyiv commemorated only the Muscovian patriarch thus finally indicating that Kyiv is in the canonical territory of the Russian Orthodox Church. (Clark and Vovk, 2020 p. 183)

Debate on the transition of the Kievan metropolis is one of the core narratives in the academic field. Basil Lourie, a prominent researcher of ecclesial documents considering this event, considers that formally the Kievan metropolis was not given from Constantinople to Moscow. Patriarch Dionysios IV only allowed the Moscow patriarch to ordain the Metropolitan of Kyiv due to the “Orthodox congregation of Kyiv being in a difficult state when their fate was in danger. That is why we do approve the ordination of the Metropolitan by the patriarch of Moscow” (Lourie 2010, p. 200). Lourie, by analyzing the documents, especially two acts that were given by the synod of Ecumenical Patriarchate, concludes that Constantinople did not give entirely Kyiv to Moscow but rather just delegated the part of their administrative and control mechanisms over the Kievan metropolis. De-jure, Kyiv remained the diocese of Constantinople and the Metropolitan of Kyiv remained patriarch’s exarch, i.e., his representative on this ecclesial territory (p. 201)

However, there are scholars that do not share Lourie’s regard for this event. The notable critique of his work is the article written by Russian historians Mikheev and Ostapenko in which they critiqued Lourie’s interpretation of Dionysios’ transition acts. The commemoration of the Constantinople patriarch

during the Divine liturgy is not an indication of subjugation of the Kievan metropolitan. On the contrary, this was just the proposal of Dionysios IV as he wanted to impose the commemoration of two hierarchs: patriarch of Constantinople on the basis of elder privileges, and patriarch of Moscow on the basis of canonical subjugation. This contradicts the practice of the liturgical ritual and common habituations in general. (Mikheev, Ostapenko 2019, pp. 182-183) Lourie was also criticized for the limitations in the literature use, as he was using only Greek sources on the transition of the Kievan metropolis. (p. 187)

Noteworthy, that the historical interpretation of the canonical rules regarding the transition is critiqued in the field. Jurist and specialist in canonical law Valery Olejnikov provides the example of the impossibility of historical interpretation by applying the 'hermeneutic circle' - the method of interpretation of the historical document which requires the researcher to self-transform and transit to the time of the creation of historical document in order to understand its essence. (Olejnikov 2018, p. 107) Thus, the researcher is required to abstain from modern assumptions while studying the historical documents. In other words, a researcher has to avoid the fallacy of presentism because it is a form of cultural bias and restrain the limits of the researcher's objectivity. Moreover, the study of the legal and canonical side of the transition is problematic because the originals of the documents that are studied in the field were destroyed due to the great fires in Moscow and Kyiv in the XIX-XX centuries and most probably the original Greek texts were destroyed in fires in Constantinople. What do historians possess are copies that were made by the Greek canonists at the beginning of the 18th century (p. 109). That is why we cannot claim for sure that the originals were not rewritten to the benefit of one side. Hence, Russian researchers find some inconsistencies with the documents that could be found in the Russian archives. However, he evaluates the transition of the Kievan metropolis as a unique and extraordinary event in the history of Eastern Orthodoxy and concludes that the finding of juridical established practice that predeceased the transition is problematic and yet could be regarded as incorrect.

Thus, we could conclude that the interpretation of canonical laws and historical documents regarding the transition of the Kievan metropolis in 1686 is overall problematic due to the lack of original authentic documents and historian fallacies that could be the obstacle for objective and accurate interpretation. However, in spite of this fact, both sides of the conflict in the newly emerged Orthodox Church of Ukraine do not cease to use opaque canonical justifications in order to prove the rightfulness of their position.

1.5. Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian nation

Unlike Russia, Ukraine is a more religious country with a population of 50 million people, and it has 35,000 churches (Suslov 2016, p. 135) The level of religiosity is hard to measure although statistics demonstrate that in 2007 the number of attendances to Christmas service was 6.5 million people from the population of 42 million. While in Russia, only 2.4 million people attended the divine liturgy during Christmas (p. 135) Russia's population in 2007 is 143 million people in which the majority is attributing themselves to Orthodox Christianity (p. 135). The Church is a major topic in Ukraine, especially nowadays after the proclamation of its autocephaly. Let us look at how the religious identity of Orthodox Christian corresponded to the national identities of the Ukrainians.

Kyiv is the first city that accepted Eastern Orthodoxy from the Greeks. Even in the period of its possession by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, it remained the important religious center of Orthodoxy. Orthodox Church as the cultural identity of Ukrainians was important in the question of confrontation with Catholic Polish-Lithuanian elites. The main bearers of such an identity were Cossacks - an ethnic group of Eastern Slavs that lived in semi-militarised communities with the principles of autonomy and self-governing. For them, Orthodox Christianity serves as a pillar of collective identity with Russians as the basis of the faith. That is why they played a key role in the transition of the Kievan metropolis into the Russian Orthodox Church and the integration of Left-bank Ukraine with the city of Kyiv into the Russian state. Lately, the Kievan Orthodox

heritage was entirely absorbed by Moscow and autonomist projects and movements of Kievan clergy were effectively pacified. Thus, the idea of Holy Rus' and the related concept of "Pan Russian" was restored and incorporated into the Ukrainian mindset and became the dominant propagated identity by the Russian Church. Thus, Orthodox Church played an assimilative role.

However, the nationalist tendencies were embedded into the Ukrainian Orthodoxy. As historian Vasyl Markus (1989, p. 139) writes "Church and religion often have been articulators and supporters of imperial universal designs. But within the same church, and among adherents of the same religion, movements have emerged to hinder such designs in the name of national self-assertion and cultural self-actualization". The Church in the period of Ukraine's political dependency on Russia as we said played an assimilative role and constructed the common identity thus creating the imagined community. Nevertheless, it could serve as the catalyst for the strengthening of the national consciousness and building of the independent Ukrainian identity in the period of autonomy or independence. It was the case with the Ukrainian national revolution in 1917 after the collapse of the Russian Empire when the Autocephalous Church of Ukraine emerged and was standing on the nationalist positions. For example, the translation of divine liturgy to Ukrainian, and the use of it instead of traditional Old Church Slavonic (Reshetar 1951, p. 39). The first Autocephalous Church of Ukraine will be discussed in the subsequent chapters.

Though, leaders of Ukrainian national movements were skeptical in regard to religion being the building material for national identity. Mikhailo Hrushevs'kiy asked their compatriots to keep their distance from religion as it only divides and causes tensions between Ukrainians. As an example, he provided the conflict between Serbs and Croats which are divided on a religious basis. Another authority, Ukrainian writer Ivan Franko shares the same point of view with the addition that religion is not a fuel for nation-building. The basis for nation-building for Ukrainian intellectuals is the orientation towards Europe and its democratic values,

formation of a nation-state, and secularism that contradicts the Church's aspirations for serving as a unifying institution. (Yelensky 2005, pp. 152-153)

The Ukrainian Orthodoxy has not been a unified structure with a common ideology shared among its clergy. The two projected ways of the future of the Church are reflected in the two parties. The first party is nationalistic clergy that is inspired by the Ukrainian national movements of the 19th century, and they stand for the use of national language in the liturgy, separatism, and political independence from Russian imperial projects, formation of and thus canonical autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church should be proclaimed in order to secure the integrity of a new nation-state (Markus 1989, pp 141-142). The second party is representing integrationists with the view that Ukraine should still have strong political ties with Russia, and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church should be autonomous within the Russian Orthodox Church (p. 142). These groups existed before the proclamation of the first autocephaly in 1921, and still until today constitute the confrontation in the modern Church.

The most notable example of such a division is the distinction between the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kievian Metropolis (UOC KP) and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Metropolis (UOC MP). The Kievian church stands in more nationalistic positions, as the majority of their parishes are situated in Western regions of Ukraine with a predominantly Ukrainian population. They actively supported the idea of Ukraine's political independence from Russia and the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church. During the Euromaidan protests in 2013 against the corrupted government of President Yanukovich, his integrationist politics regarding relations with Russia, and for further European integration, UOC KP was stranded on the side of protesters allowing them to use their temples as shelters, Church's clergy actively participated in the protests and prayers for the activists of Maidan, and in the last days of protest called its congregation to no longer pray for President Yanukovich which could be regarded as an anathema (Sagan 2015, p. 17). Leader of the Church, patriarch Filaret publicly condemned the annexation of Crimea and Russia's support of the separatist movements in the

South-East of Ukraine (Eliott 2014 p. 8). The political stances of the Moscow church are more complex because the positions of Church authorities regarding the political situation in Ukraine differ from the actions made by its clerics. On the one hand, conservative clerics within the Church are pro closer ties with the mother church of Russia. They are not prone to recognize the Ukrainian identity and share the belief that Ukrainians and Russian are one people (Sagan 2015, p.20). There are existing cases of clerics of UOC MP joining the pro-Russian separatist forces in the Southeast of Ukraine. However, those are the extreme cases. On the other hand, there is a strong autocephalous party in the Church. Representatives of this party such as metropolitan Sofronii criticize the Russian government and wish for the unification of the Orthodox churches in Ukraine and their autocephaly from the Moscow Patriarchate. In their regard, the Ukrainian state should be involved in the process of autocephaly obtainment. One of the prominent representatives of the autocephalist party was Sofronii (Dmitruk), the metropolitan of Cherkass'k and Kanev. His arguments for autocephaly were in a manner that the Church should follow the Ukrainian path because Kyiv is having a historical and religious primacy over Moscow. The autocephaly for Sofronii is natural because Ukraine became an independent state and requires an independent Church. How he said in one of his interviews on the topic of autocephaly:

“That is inevitable: when there are two separate states [Ukraine and Russia] - there must be separate Churches with whom it is possible to solve problems of state significance. When the Ukrainian parliament or president is dealing with some kind of problem, they do not go to Moscow for the blessing. They must have a blessing here” (Khlivny 2012)

This quote indicates how Church and state relations are regarded among the clerics of Orthodoxy in Ukraine. The state authorities should consult with the religious on the matter of important strategic decisions. Hence, every significant action from the representatives of the state requires some form of blessing, i.e. approval from the Church.

That, however, corresponds with the tradition of *symphonia* in relations of this kind, and Ukraine is not a unique country. In neighboring Russia, *Symphonia* in church-state relations is part of the discourse since the enthronement of patriarch Cyril. After his enthronement, patriarch Cyril defined the new policy of the Russian Orthodox Church. The church “must go out from the ghetto” (Timoshenko 2009) and apply the matrix of *symphonia* in church-state relations. They must work hand in hand in order to reach the goals of increasing the moral values of the people and achieve social justice. However, the state should not interfere in the internal realm of the Church, and the Church should behave accordingly regarding the state (RIA, 2009). Prime minister Dmitri Medvedev on the meeting with patriarch Cyril in 2018 dedicated to the anniversary of his enthronement, expressed hope in “remaining the special relations that were made in the period of your [patriarch Cyril] patriarchy. The relations that you defined as the Greek word *symphonia* and which until nowadays are remaining in this state” (Patriarchia 2018a). Patriarch Cyril answered that a “*Symphonia* which is consonance and concord is the ideal type of relations in the state <...> *Symphonia* is existing under the circumstances of mutual purposefulness and the wish and aspiration for collective work” (Patriarchia 2018a).

Thus, we could say that the matrix of symphonic relations between the church and the state is applied both in Ukraine and Russia. Contradictions between autocephalist and integrationist positions in Ukrainian Orthodoxy is one of the defining narratives in the discussions on the autocephaly of the Ukrainian church. This tension is defined by the political orientation of the clerics and the interference of the state in the internal deeds of the church.

PART II. THE UKRAINIAN AUTOCEPHALIES

2.1. The First Autocephaly

2.1.1. Political situation

In February of 1917 Russian Empire collapsed. Former parts of the Empire began to form the new state structures in order to fill the power vacuum. Ukraine was not the exception. Already in the first half of March in Kyiv, the first temporary governmental committee was organized. The Ukrainian first government - the Central Rada, was the first parliament that coordinated the Ukrainian national revolution and the building of the new nation-state. The leader of Central Rada was the famous leader of the national movement Mikhaylo Hrushevs'kiy - author of the concept "ukrainstvo" - the cultural and political detachment of the Ukrainian nation from Russia. His regards on this question are expressed in his works "Essay on the history of Ukrainian people" published in 1912 and in his magnum opus "History of Ukraine-Rus" where he critiqued the Russian historiography and outlined the continuity of the Ukrainian state since the period of Kievan Rus. When the temporary government of Kerensky collapsed in October of 1917, Central Rada proclaimed Ukrainian independence and the formation of the Ukrainian People's Republic - the first nation-state of the Ukrainians.

The Central Rada collapsed after the capture of Kyiv by the German army in April of 1918. The territory that was controlled by the Central was given to Germany after the signing of the separate Brest-Litovsk peace treaty between the Bolshevik Government and Germany which allowed Soviet Russia to leave the First World War. On April 28th, German military patrol entered the building of the Central Rada. Ukrainian anthropologist and diplomat Nikolai Mogilyanskiy witnessed the fall of the first Ukrainian government. In his memoirs that we could find in the Archive of Russian Revolution - collection of memoirs of the political

immigrants that were published in Berlin in 1922-1937, he writes (Mogilyanskiy 1923, p. 89):

“A small squad of armored German soldiers came into the conference hall leaving the guard against all exits. “Hands up!” - German officer commanded. All the people raised their hands up with the exception of M.S. Hrushevs’kiy which was confused and remained in the seat of the Rada’s chairman. Firstly, the general public was allowed to leave the building after the examination of the documents, and then the members of the Rada were allowed to do so. Some members of the government were arrested”.

The German occupation forces supported Pavel Skoropadsky and installed him as a hetman of Ukraine. Thus, a new political entity was born - the Ukrainian State or the Second Hetmanate under the protection of German Empire. Due to the fact that Germany was losing the war and the victory of the November Revolution, the political regime of Skoropadsky lost its protection from German allies, and his regime fell after the uprising of Simon Petlyura who was the leader of the emerged Directory - the new alternative government formed by the ex-members of Central Rada - main enemies of the Hetmanate.

Simon Petlyura, while being a head of the Ukrainian government, paid attention to the formation of the national Orthodox Church. It could be explained by the past of the new national leader - Simon Petlyura was a seminarian and studied at the Theological Academy in Poltava. Therefore, a religious policy of Ukrainian state became more consequent in the question of religious autocephaly.

2.1.2. Religious policies of Ukrainian governments

The government of Central Rada paid little attention to the matters of the Church. The majority of Central Rada was constituted by the socialists and Hrushevs’kiy himself was a member of Socialist-Revolutionist Party. As was discussed in the previous chapters, representatives of the Ukrainian national

movement such as Hrushevs'kiy were skeptical considering the role of the Church. Noteworthy, that only one church member of the Central Rada was a priest - Pavel Pohorilko. However, we should not deny the success of Ukrainization policies imposed on the Ukrainian the Central Rada: on March 22, 1917, the Central Rada in their appeal "to the Ukrainian people", one of the first documents issued by them it is claimed:

“And in the near future, the right to introduce the native language in all schools, from lower to higher in the courts and all government institutions. With the same calm, but resolute, People, seek the same right for the Ukrainian language from the pastors of the church, zemstvos and all non-governmental institutions in Ukraine” (UINP 2019)

Ukrainianization movements of Orthodox churches existed aside from the decisions of the Central Rada. As an example, is the appeal of Ukrianians made on 2 of April in Petrograde to the first prime-minister of the Temporary Government Evgeny Lvov. In this appeal, Ukrianians asked the Temporary Government to pursue the policy of ukrainization of Ukrainian clergy and religious administration in Ukraine, and force the priests to preach exclusively in Ukrainian (Ulyanovsky 1997, p. 46). Herein, the Secretariat of Education in Kyiv suggested Ukrainian bishops the mandatory introduction of Ukrainian language, literature, history and geography at the expense of academic hours of Latin, Greek and Russian language (p. 46). Moreover, a delegate of Central Rada N. Kovalevsky on the session in 8th of May, told about the convention of clergy and laity in Kamianets-Podilskyi in which is was decided to accept the resolution on the federal autonomy of Ukraine, immediate redistribution of landed estates to the peasantry, and more on that Ukrainian clergy must speak Ukrainian exclusively. And according to Kovalevsky, the convention decided on returning to the old way of electing the Metropolitan of Kyiv independently from the patriarch of Russian church. Kovalevsky's report was taken into consideration by the Central Rada (p. 47).

More elaborated religious policy came in the period of Hetmanate. Under the new minister of confessions, Vasil' Zenkovsky, the all Ukrainian Council of the Churches was established. This council (sobor) was called in order to determine which path should the Ukrainian Church take - towards the autocephaly or remaining the status quo with the creation of autonomy within the Russian Orthodox Church. And another important aim of the sobor was to appoint the new metropolitan of Kyiv. The first sobor was the creation of Vasil' Zenkovsky about whom we would talk about in the subsequent chapter.

2.1.3. Vasil' Zenkovsky and his role during the first autocephaly

Vasil' Zenkovsky is probably the most important historical character in the period of the first autocephaly. He was born on July 16th 1881 in a small town of Proskurov (modern Khmelnytskyi) near Kamianets-Podilsky in a family of a teacher and the headmaster of the gymnasium. His grandfather was a priest in a local church which determined the future pathway of young Zenkovsky. In his biographical essay "From my life" (1984, p.83) he wrote: "In my childhood, I was a religious kid, and went to the service with my father who was a churchwarden. All my childhood was consecrated by somewhat opaque but luminous lights of the church". He received a brilliant formal education: gymnasium in Kyiv and then the Faculty of History in Imperial University of st. Vladimir in Kyiv where he received his master's degree in 1915 in philosophy. After the defense, he was allowed to read a course on the philosophy of religion in the Institute of Preschool Education in Kyiv and after two years he was appointed director of this institute (p. 97). As Zenkovsky wrote he was happy while he was just a professor because he lacked ambition and vanity. That is why initially he was against the decision of Skoropadsky of inviting him to the Ukrainian government and he did not want to become the minister of Confessions. However, he could not say no to the Hetman as he believed that his expertise in religious matters would help to establish peace in the Church. (pp. 98-99) This motive prevailed, and Zenkovsky became a minister in Skoropadsky's government.

On 14 of May 1918 Zenkovsky was invited to the session of the Ministerial Council by Skoropadsky and his prime-minister Fedir Lizohub. As Zenkovsky writes in his memoirs he did not enjoy the fact that he was invited at 11 pm in order to discuss his appointment to the Skoropadsky's government (Zenkovsky 1995, p. 52). During the meeting, Skoropadsky asked Zenkovsky what are his plans on the Church and its possible autocephaly. Zenkovsky knowing that Skoropadsky and Lizohub are Ukrianian nationalists nevertheless answered that he is completely against the autocephaly of the Church, that the main objective for the construction of the Ukrainian Church should be interpreted by the application of the autonomy within the Russian Orthodox Church because it is not right, uncanonical and simply impossible to break off relations with Moscow by proclaiming the revolution in the Church (p. 52). According to Zenkovsky the main step in order to preserve religious life in Ukraine is to establish the Church Council which would be competent in the organization of Church life in Ukraine. The state has to help and support the Church Council without interfering (p. 52). Zenkovsky expected the backlash from Skoropadsky and Lizohub, however, one of them (Zenkovsky unfortunately does not remember who said it) said "We do express fondness in you. Do everything as you want to" (p. 53)

Vasil' Zenkovsky was aware of the sobor's necessity. During the meeting with Ukrainian episcopate, Zenkovsky was argumenting for the convocation of the sobor. As he writes, the old and traditionalist episcopate was afraid of the Sobor because it could bear the autocephalous tendencies and Church separatism which is uncanonical and threatens the existence of Orthodoxy in Ukraine (p. 78). The new minister of confessions understood these fears and insisted that only sobor could change the state of the Church. Accepting the autonomy during the sobor would allow the Ukrainian clergy to be more independent and normalize Church life. Zenkovsky during the address explicitly pointed out that disorganized parishes cannot help each other without the centralized control from sobor, and the hazard of preaching activities from the unionists (p. 77). He persuaded the episcopate by claiming that the Skoropadsky's government is not seeking and not insisting on the autocephaly of Ukrainian church but nevertheless it would not tolerate disorder in

the religious matters which is happening due to the lack of Church leadership which requires a greater autonomy from Moscow in order to pacify the religious life in Ukraine (p. 79)

The first session of Ukrainian sobor began on the 2nd of July and lasted about half a month because clergy who arrived in Kyiv had to return home to their parishes. Zenkovsky writes that he was upset that the members of the council did not agree on the autonomy of the Church, because the contradictions between Ukrainian and Russian parties during the sobor were too strong (p.109). The metropolitan of Kyiv was not elected as well, nevertheless, the sobor was successful in electing the first Ukrainian synod (p. 110). Thus, the period of turmoil ended, and the religious institution was established - the objectives of Vasil' Zenkovsky were met.

However, he had conflict with the head of the synod, the metropolitan Antony (Khrapovitsky). They had very different views on the future of Orthodox church in Ukraine. Metropolitan Antony was a monarchist and integrationist who was initially against the idea of the separate Ukrainian Church Council without the blessing of Moscow patriarch. Metropolitan Antony was an unpopular figure among the members of Skoropadsky's government - he was blamed for being black-handrenit - ultra right Russian nationalist, and for being out of turn (pp. 85-86). Nevertheless, Zenkovsky was protecting metropolitan Antony and refused the government's plan to prevent him of going to sobor as he could put a crimp to the discussion about Church's autonomy - Zenkovsky's main expectation from the sobor.

On July 10th, 1918 at the session of the sobor, Zenkovsky addressed a speech in which he defined the main objective of the sobor - the establishment of autonomy within the Russian Orthodox Church (p. 101) Zenkovsky's reformativ projects such as the autonomy and the state control over the theological academies and general reforms of theological education were refused by the conservative part of the clergy with the metropolitan Antony. According to the metropolitan, reforms

of Zenkovsky could be regarded as the direct interference of the state in the internal matters of the Church. Due to the support from the members of the sobor, reforms of Zenkovsky were denied. After the summer session of the council, Antony wrote a letter to Skoropadsky with a complaint about the pressure on the sobor from the minister of confessions. That was one of the reasons for the resignation of Zenkovsky. How Zinkovsky writes in his memoirs: “In fact, he [metropolitan Antony] achieved my resignation, and Oleksandr Lotosky came on my place and later established the autocephaly of Ukrainian Church” (p. 168)

Thus, the attempted reformations of Zenkovsky ended with his resignation and later his emigration to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1919. He did not achieve the autonomy of the Ukrainian parishes from the patriarch of Moscow; however he was successful in establishing the Ukrainian Church Council which could collectively resolve Church's significant problems with finance and self-government. He was not a supporter of Church's autocephaly and attempted to remain a balanced position and to allow all church parties to be represented in the Council.

2.1.4. Vasil' Zenkovsky and his political stances

When Zenkovsky was a director of the Institute of Preschool Education he allowed the creation of the first kindergarten in Kyiv which was entirely in Ukrainian. In his biographical essay “From my life” he writes that this decision was affected by the fact that his father was a ukrainophile which established Vasil's love for Ukrainian songs and poetry. He allowed the creation of the kindergarten because he calls himself a liberal, and on his regard, the freedom is the “magical key which opens the most lovely problems” (Zenkovsky 1984, p. 93)

His liberalism was not only political but religious as well. As a young man he was inspired by religious philosopher Sergei Bulagakov with whom and his friends created the first Christian newspaper in 1905 (p. 92). Thus, they became friends and exchanged letters with each other. Zenkovsky is upset that the majority

of their correspondence was lost due to his emigration from Kyiv in 1919 (p. 93). During the time of his ministry, Bulgakov once came to Kyiv in the autumn of 1918 where he spent a month on a way to Crimea where he planned to spend his vacation. In Kyiv, Zenkovsky writes, he was meeting with his old friend every day and spent time together in the vivid discussion on religious topics (Zenkovsky 1995, p. 168). And Bulgakov expressed support to Zenkovsky in their long-lasting conflict with the metropolitan Antony (p. 169).

Sergei Bulgakov was an advocate for the “freedom of the Church”. This freedom is constituted in the independence of the Church from the state. This idea is clearly expressed in his essay “Orthodoxy and the state”. In this essay, Bulgakov critiques the dependency of the Church on the state, and the interference of the church in Church life. I will provide the quote that demonstrates the essence of this critique:

“In general, linking Orthodoxy, which is the religion of freedom, with reactionary political or class aspirations, is a blatant contradiction that finds its explanation in history, but not in the dogma of Orthodoxy. Of course, for many centuries Orthodoxy was associated with the monarchy, which provided irreplaceable services to the Church, although it inflicted severe wounds on it. The “Christian” statehood, which ensured the “dominant” position of the Orthodox Church, also turned out to be fetters for her, retarding her free development, and much in the historical tragedy of Orthodoxy, both in the fall of Byzantium and in modern Russia, is explained precisely by this disturbance of the balance in the relations of the Church and the state”. (Bulgakov 1991, p. 339)

He concludes that the Orthodoxy as the religion is free and should not serve any political regime (p. 340). Zenkovsky interpreted Bulgakov's ideas in a way that the relations between the church and the state must be in a legal perspective. He writes that these relations have to limit to: financial support from the state (especially support must be given to schools); question of the involvement from the government, whether it should take part in appointing bishops and define the

governing principles of the Church, or it is enough to turn the Church into the private institution with no public functions; and the question of legal recognition of the Church acts (such as marriages, divorces and parish register) (Zenkovsky 1995, p. 169)

Regarding the autocephaly of Ukrainian Church, Zenkovsky was completely against it. This position is reflected in his memoirs. He did not believe in Ukrainian state as the separate and independent project, and he stood for the autonomy of Ukraine as the subject of federation with Russia. In the chapters dedicated to his position on the future resolution of Russian-Ukrainian tensions, he writes that the federation is the most suitable form of the state. Autonomy of Ukraine within the federation could allow Ukraine to escape the responsibility of self-governing which will be transferred to Russia, and pay more attention to the development of the national culture, isolate itself in the search of national identity under the protection of a huge and powerful state as Russia (p. 223). Religious autonomy is thus the reflection of political in Zenkovsky's system of view.

2.1.5. Vasil' Zenkovsky and his evaluation of Oleksandr Lototsky

Oleksandr Lototsky is another important figure during the first autocephaly of Ukrainian Church. He replaced Zenkovsky and became the new minister of confessions under the new government of Simon Petlyura. His vision of the religious future in Ukraine was different from Zenkovsky's aspirations. According to Zenkovsky, the proclamation of the autocephaly made by Lototsky was contradicting the decisions made by the all Ukrainian Church Council that was his creature. And thus, Lototsky made a terrible assault on the members by following the instructions of Ukrainian radicals such as father Vasil' Lipkivsky, and the proclamation of the autocephaly falsified all the decisions that were made by its members (p. 105). Lototsky is described as a radical nationalist who made a decision on autocephaly against the will of the sobor (p. 169). That is how he describes it (p. 180):

“In November, the Church Council met - and at the very first meeting it had a sharp conflict with Lototsky, who demanded a council decision on autocephaly.

He did not hesitate to back up his demand with the threat of dissolution of the Council. But the Council vigorously refused to obey Pototsky's [*sic!*] demand, for which it was disbanded. Lototsky, on behalf of the Government and the minority of the Council, declared (!) the autocephaly of the Church, its independence from Moscow. The clergy did not want to accept this, they continued to commemorate patr. Tikhon (as was done all the time with me - since I defended the principle of autonomy, not autocephaly)”

Zenkovsky regrets that he could not make compromises with his enemies on the sobor and did not remain the minister of confessions and did not anticipate that on his place will come “extremist radical nationalist and autocephalist, embittered and harsh Lototsky” (p. 177)

Thus, we could say that Zenkovsky's estimation of his successor in the Ministry of Confession could be defined as negative. Lototsky did not follow the line of Zenkovsky in the search of the compromise between the clergy on the sobor, and the proclamation of autocephaly was contradicting the decisions of the council. Lototsky made what Zenkovsky was against: through the proclamation of the autocephaly in the council and menacing the clergy who were not willing to accept it, he made a direct impact on the decision of the council. Thus, he went against Zenkovsky's principle of the “free Church” which was inspired by his close friend Sergei Bulgakov. More detailed information on Oleksandr Lototsky and his role will be provided in the subsequent chapter.

2.1.6. Role of the Oleksandr Lototsky

Oleksandr Lototsky who was described by Vasil' Zenkovsky as an extremist radical nationalist, was in fact a Ukrainian nationalist since his life and work in Saint Petersburg when he was a state official. He was close with Mikhaylo Hrushevs'kiy, a father of Ukrainian national movement and was quite an often

guest in Lototsky's apartment in Saint Petersburg. As Lototsky remembers it in his memoirs (Lototsky 1966, p. 155): "it [Hrushevs'kiy's stay] was as if a beam of rays was falling on our lives. For in that man with a fragile body the soul was so multifaceted, with such an inexhaustible source of initiative and energy, so imbued with holy anxiety, that its vital force would not be enough for one man ... He did not live, but burned, and it was not temporary his way of life, and constant "

Lototsky's origins are quite similar to Zenkovsky. He was born in 1870 in the small village of Bronica in the family of an orthodox priest, Gnat Lototsky, and that again defined his future pathway. He received religious education in the Kievan Theological Academy which he graduated in 1896 (Andrusyshyn 1997, p. 14). While working in Saint Petersburg he joined the Society of Ukrainian Progressivists in 1908 organized by Hrushevs'kiy. The aim of this secret political organization was to resist Russian nationalists, and to promote the autonomy of the Ukrainian state. After the February revolution in Russia, Lototsky became the representative of Ukrainian Central Rada in Saint Petersburg. However, his highest position was reached when he became the General Clerk of the Ukrainian Central Rada, and in the period of Skoropasky's reign he became the minister of confessions where he replaced Vasil' Zenkovsky (p. 15)

The main achievement of Lototsky was the proclamation of the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. He was the author of the law issued by the Ministry of Confessions with the consent of the Ukrainian government on January 1st, 1919. This law was against the spirit of the "free Church" policy that was pursued by Zenkovsky. Autocephaly of Ukrainian Church made the religious authorities more dependent on the decisions of the government. Let us look closely at the text of the law that is included in Lototsky's "Sources of the Ukrainian Church law" published in Warsaw in 1931. Paragraph 1 of this law indicates that the administrative, legislative and judicial power belongs to the all Ukrainian Church Council, and its decisions have both church and state importance as the Church is financed from the government of Ukraine (Lototsky 1931, p. 297). What is more interesting in regard to increased dependency of the Church on the

government is indicated in the following paragraphs, more precisely in 2nd, 4th, 5th and 7th. In total the majority of the paragraphs are dedicated to the church-state relations. Second paragraph enacts that the members of the Ukrainian synod are assigned by the Superior Republican Ukrainian Administration (or simply government) (p. 297). Fourth paragraph indicated that the government representative must be present at every session of Ukrainian synod. His functions are: provide information to the synod, explain the governmental legislative acts, monitor forgings and ordinances of the synod in case they would contradict the interests of the state (pp. 297-298). Paragraph five decides that the activity of the Church is funded by the payments from the State Treasury (p. 298). And the final seventh paragraph declares that the legal acts of the Church enter into force only after the approval from the Ukrainian Government (p. 298)

That intensive control of the Church from the state could be explained by Lototsky's position on the role of the Church in the building of the Ukrainian nation-state. In his memoirs, Lototsky writes (1966, p. 81):

“The matter of autocephaly - independence - the Ukrainian church has respectful significance next to the cause of state independence and almost to the same extent is a nuisance in the eyes of those who consider the national liberation of the Ukrainian people as an injustice for the "united Russian people." Therefore, from the inborn “moskali” and from our "selfless" compatriots we often have to hear about the independence of the Ukrainian church too strong objections, usually with reference to church canons, which the Ukrainian church somehow violates”

As we see, the autocephaly of Ukrainian church for Lototsky is another indicator of a national liberation from the Russian imperial project and the foundation for the nation-state. How he concludes in the following pages: the source of Church's autocephaly is the state authority (p. 84). Lototsky highly evaluates the significance of the proclamation autocephaly on the national consciousness of the Ukrainians: “In the history of Ukrainian people this act [proclamation of the autocephaly in the law of January 1st, 1919] does not stand

aside, on the contrary it is just another ring in the historical chain of Ukrainian national life. The case of the Church's independence for us is historical and became a part of the national tradition" (Lototsky 1966, pp. 84-85). The narrative of the national liberation is presented in the other text of Lototsky when he states that "our old national and religious traditions manifested with vitality in the period of general liberation of Ukraine. It was brightly affected by our traditional connection between religious and the national pursuits" (Lototsky 1931, p. 297)

Thus, we could say that for Lototsky, autocephaly of Ukrainian Church is the manifestation of Ukraine's independence and national integrity.

2.1.7. Oleksandr Lototsky's regards on autocephaly

Lototsky being the minister of confessions had a consecutive policy and regards on the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and its political importance for the Ukrainian government and Ukrainian people. Let us look at Lototsky's historical speech at the all Ukrainian Church Council where he declared the Church's autocephaly. Luckily we have access to this speech because it was added in footnotes in Lototsky's "Sources of the Ukrainian Church Law ". Here is the quote that I will provide in an abridged version but nevertheless it will contain the Lototsky's main arguments (Lototsky, 1931, pp. 133-134):

"<...> The state authorities and the Church Council have the same task again: to establish the church system, and to do so, first of all, to establish the basic law of the Ukrainian National Church. The situation requires that the government clearly and firmly states the principles on which it stands for the establishment of legal church-state relations. In our country, the Church is in connection with the State, so the State has not only the right but also the obligation to establish relations between them. In this manner, state authorities are more willing to fulfill such a duty that corresponds to our old national traditions: in the history of our nation-building, Church and the nation were closely connected and helped each other

<...> The basic principle of Ukrainian government is that an independent state should have an independent Church. This is equally demanded by the interests of both the State and the Church <...> The autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church is not only our ecclesiastical but also our national-state necessity. This is the ultimate need of our Church, our State, our Nation. And the one who understands and sincerely accepts the interests of the Ukrainian people, also accepts the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church”.

Thus, for Lototsky the linkage between the state and the church is the part of national tradition, the way how things are established. That is why the state is interested in the autocephalous church as it corresponds to the aspirations of the building of the new nation-state of Ukraine. The Church therefore serves as the mediator of the state’s national oriented policy. That is the difference between Zenkovsky’s and Lototsky’s view on the role of the Church in the new Ukrainian state. Zenkovsky was a defender of the Church's independence from the possible impact of the state, and as minister of confessions he was pursuing the strategy that every decision regarding the future of the Church should be discussed within the Church structures such as all Ukrainian Council of Orthodox Churches. His role as the government representative as he writes in his memoirs was to help to establish the council in which everything would be discussed, and which would have a supreme authority in ecclesial decision-making (Zenkovsky 1995, p. 53). Lototsky’s role as the minister of confessions as we could see was not limited to the help in organizing the sobor, but to impose the agenda of the state on the council, to transform the sobor from the enclosed and self-sufficient institution towards the subordinate and dependent one. That, however, corresponds with the goals of Oleksandr Lototsky which regarded the autocephaly of Ukrainian Orthodox Church as another embodiment of cultural and political independence of Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

The period of the first autocephaly was not long as the existence of an independent Ukrainian government ended after the Red Army occupied the territory controlled by Ukrainian Directory with Simon Petlyura in charge.

Petlyura, Lototsky and Zenkovsky emigrated to Europe escaping persecution from the Bolsheviks. Soviet press was attacking the representatives of the newly emerged Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church accusing them in the support of Petlyura's government-in-exile and general counter-revolutionary tendencies (Bociurkiw 1991, p. 245). The Soviet administration conducted the consecutive policy of repressions against the former state-church as it could serve as a platform for future nationalist counter-revolution (p. 246). However, the autocephalous movement did not end with the Soviet takeover and its revival happened during the German occupation of Ukraine during the Second World War which will be discussed in the next chapter.

2.2. German Occupation and the Ukrainian Church

2.2.1. Position of the German administration on the Ukrainian Church

After the occupation of the territory of Ukraine, among the German authorities the question was raised regarding the future of Orthodox Church in Ukraine. Historian Mikhail Shkorovsky who researched the religious policy of Germans in the occupied territories claims that this policy was defined by the interests of two political actors: Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories (or simply Ostministerium) with Alfred Rosenberg and his subordinate Karl Rosenfelder who was in charge of commission of religious policy under the Ostministerium and Reichskommissariat Ukraine (RKU) with its head Erich Koch (Shkarovsky 2007, p. 429).

Ostministerium was more inclined to support the local Orthodox churches in the occupied territories and their autocephaly as it could counterbalance the impact of the Russian Orthodox Church which according to ministry's information is backed by the Soviet government (p. 156). That is why since the autumn of 1941, Ostministerium began to support Orthodox hierarchs in Baltic states, Belarus and

Ukraine which supported the autocephaly of their local churches. Reichskommissariates to some extent did not support the effort of Ostministerium, a special and quite peculiar case was with the occupied Ukraine where the initial position of RKU was the support of autocephalous tendencies that are beneficial for the Ukrainian nationalism. However, after the breach between the RKU and Ukrainian nationalists which organized the partisan movements both against the Germans and the Soviets, such as OUN-M of Andrei Melnik and OUN-B of Stepan Bandera, Erich Koch changed his initial favorable position towards the creation of autocephalous Orthodox Church in Ukraine (p. 157).

Ostministerium, as we have already said, had a strategy of intensifying the role of the Church in order to counterbalance the Russian factor in the occupied Ukraine. Let us look at the Rosenberg's directive to Erich Koch which demonstrates the plans of the Ostministerium (p. 429):

“In no case should the Russian Orthodox Church be supported in the Reichskommissariat "Ukraine", since it is the bearer of Great Russian and Pan-Slavic ideas. The autocephalous Ukrainian Church, on the other hand, should be supported as a counterbalance to the Russian Orthodox ... It seems most correct to transfer the center of gravity of church life to separate commissariats, which will lead to each commissariat receiving its own bishop. If these bishops, due to a different understanding of dogmas, become at enmity with each other or come into conflict with their patriarch, then the German civil administration should not attempt to reconcile them or reach an agreement. Also, one should not object if individual bishops submit to different patriarchs”

As we could see the policy of Ostministerium could be described in the form “divide and rule”. The separation of the Ukrainian Church corresponded to the general patronage of the Ukrainian nationalists by the German civil administration (p 430). However, German administration did not pursue independence and the creation of the separate Ukrainian nation-state in the occupied territories - the main

goal was to divide the Ukrainian and Russian national elements and thus create the tension between them (Armstrong 1980, p. 200). Nevertheless, the favoritism on the national autocephalous Church and attraction of Ukrainian nationalists in the civil administration, created quite the opposite situation. Ukrainian nationalists were discontent about the non-consequent policy of Germans regarding the creation of an independent state. In occupied Ukraine an indeed dangerous situation began with the revitalization of movements that were for national independence that were against both the Soviets and German administration. Thus, the conflict between the Germans and Ukrainian nationalists was inevitable. In the reports of the SS Security Service (SD) from September 9th 1941 it is described that in Galicia, Western region of Ukraine, the group of Stepan Bandera propagated the national independence of Ukraine by using the religious festivals. The same was happening in the city of Pinsk, and in Lutsk members of Bandera's organization (OUN-B) took the oath of allegiance for OUN-B during the liturgy (Shkarovsky 2007, p. 431). Revitalization of Ukrainian national movement for independence was a menace for the German administration. That is why the initial favorable position and support of the Autocephalous Church of Ukraine changed to the policy of non-interference to the Church affairs with the prohibition of further opening of theological academies in the RKU (pp. 432-433).

In order to counterbalance the influence of Autocephalous Church which was becoming according to Erich Koch 'a national church' and thus served the groundwork for the creation of an independent center of Ukrainian life, the RKU became supporting another Church organization in Ukraine - Autonomous Church (Armstrong 1980, pp 201-202). Autonomous Church with its leader Alexius (Gromadsky), metropolitan of Volyn and Zhitomir, emerged after the episcopal council in Pochaevskaya lavra (monastery) in November 25th 1941, where he was elected as an exarch of Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine (Cypin, 1997, p. 323). The Autonomous Church, unlike the Autocephalous Church with metropolitan Polikarp (Sikorsky) as the administrator, remained a canonical dependence with Moscow and stood aside from politics, did not contact the German administration

and did not support Ukrainian nationalists (p. 324). Hence, the support changed in favor of the Autonomous Church as it did not have any political ambitions.

There was also another reasoning behind the support of the Autonomous Church. The majority of Orthodox Christians were attending the liturgies in the parishes of the Autonomous Church. Mikhail Shkarovsky provides the example of Kyiv - the center of religious life in Ukraine. By 1943, Nikanor and Igor, two bishops of the Autocephalous Church that were ordained to Kyiv by the metropolitan Polikarp, were able to open only two new parishes. At the same time, Panteleimon (Rudyk), bishop of the Autonomous Church and the temporary administrator of the metropolitan of Kyiv, already had twelve parishes. All the working monasteries in Kyiv were administered by the Autonomous Church as well (Shkarovsky 2007, p.446). Shkarovsky argues that the popularity of the Autonomous Church among the people could be explained by their conservatism. Modernist features such as the replacement of Old Church Slavonic with the Ukrainian during the divine liturgy, wearing of the civic clothes and short hair by the autocephalous clergy, or allowing the marriages for the episcopate - all these alienated conservative Orthodox Christians from the Autocephalous Church (p. 450)

However, the project of the one national Church for Ukrainian people was not seized. Ostministerium after they got information on the possible unification between Autocephalous Church and the Autonomous Church as Alexius signed the act of the conciliation on October 8th, 1942. The act proclaimed that the Autocephalous Church is an existing ecclesial body, and that all the canonical differences between Autonomous and Autocephalous Churches that divided them were taken into consideration and recognized as non-significant (p. 438). There were various speculations about the Alexius' signature as it was regarded as a truly unexpected decision by the Autonomous episcopate because Alexius before was quite consequent in the question of conciliation with the Autocephalous Church: he would not recognize it because their autocephaly is uncanonical and could be regarded as a schism with the Mother-Church of Russia. Shkarovsky thinks that

the political values of Alexius played a key role as he was a zealous ukrainophile which was quite common among the Orthodox clergy in the 1930s (p. 439). For the Ostministerium, the conciliation was the chance to create the national Church in Ukraine. They decided to convene the synod of Ukrainian Orthodox Church in order to proclaim the unified Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalous Church. The synod was to take place in Kharkiv from 22nd till 24th of December of 1942. However, the German administration in Ukraine and Reichskommissar Erich Koch restricted the movement of the episcopate to the city of Kharkiv to the annoyance of Ostministerium and Karl Rosenfelder in particular. In his report to Rosenberg, he wrote (pp. 442-443):

“The Reichskommissar of Ukraine has so far suppressed all the wishes expressed by the Orthodox side to hold a church meeting (Council). So in the end it was necessary to cancel the congress of all Ukrainian bishops in Kharkiv (22-24.12.42), since the Reichskommissar did not allow the bishops to travel to Kharkiv, although this meeting was approved by the military administration and the commander of the security police Kharkiv. Such a policy is slowly but surely leading to the complete loss of confidence of a significant part of the population (and not only believers) in the German leadership ... If the German side hinders every attempt to regulate church life, such cases will naturally turn the views of believers to Moscow”.

Here we could see again the different approaches of Ostministerium and German civil administration towards the religious policy in occupied Ukraine. While Ostministerium was hoping to achieve the establishment of a national Church in Ukraine which could counterbalance the influence of Russian Orthodox Church with the russophile elements in the occupied territories which are the threat for the German expansion in the East, RKU and Erich Koch were pursuing the policy of religious decentralization and non-involvement of the administration in the internal matters of the Church. According to the Reichskommissariat, Orthodox Church became too politicized, and the lack of the obvious support should prevent the collaboration between the Church and the Ukrainian nationalists which became

hard to control and use against the Soviets. The linkage between the clerics of Autocephalous Church and Ukrainian nationalists will be discussed in the following chapter.

2.2.2. Orthodox clergy and the Ukrainian nationalists

As one of the proof of the linkage between the Ukrainian nationalists and the Autocephalous Church is the incident that happened on May 7th 1943 that changed the course of Church history in Ukraine. This incident was the killing of archbishop Alexius, leader of the Autonomous Church. Alexius was traveling through the woods from his monastery near the city of Kremenets with a small convoy of Germans. Approximately at eight o'clock in the morning the convoy was attacked by the partisan group of Ukrainian nationalists of Andrei Melnik's group (OUN-M). As historian John Armstrong writes on this matter that the partisans did not know that in the vehicle there was Alexius, they thought that this convoy escorted the German officials which was the initial target of the group (Armstrong 1980, p. 206) Hence, the debate of the researchers is on the question was the assassination of Alexius intentional or not. John Armstrong indicated that this murder was unintentional because there are no justifications available that indicate that the partisan group was planning the assassination in order to aid the Autocephalous Church to eliminate the leader of the opposing group (p. 206). Indeed, there was a linkage between the autocephalous clerics and the Ukrainian nationalists. For example, Mstislav (Skrypnyk) the bishop of Pereyaslav and the right hand of Polikarp before his ordination was a prominent figure in the Ukrainian nationalist movement. He was the nephew and aide-de-camp of Simon Petlyura, the former head of the Ukrainian state, and fought in the Civil war against the Red Army. In 1930s he emigrated to Poland when he served as a deputate in the Polish Sejm where he was representing the Volyn' region (p. 498). However, there was no sense for bishop Mstislav to organize the assassination of Alexius as he has already conciliated with the Autocephalous Church. What is known for sure is that Alexius was killed by the partisans of Andrei Melnikov because there is one source that proves it. This source is the memoirs of the Melnik's partisan Maxim

Skorupsky (nickname Maks) who took part in the assassination of Alexius. Let us look at the quote from his memoirs (Skorupski 1992):

“Not far from the highway, in the woods, we stopped for breakfast before the action. Guys already dreamed of sharing rich booty. Makukh jokingly said that we would kill some priest and return home <...> From 5 to 8 o'clock we looked for the German cars. A truck with workers passed by, we missed another German postal car, we didn't touch it. We wanted to get weapons, we were waiting for a military vehicle. Finally, I got tired of waiting and decided to hit "the first car that will appear. In a few minutes a taxi rumbled, arrows rang out, Rusky's machine gun rattled, we ran to the car and couldn't believe our eyes: four corpses fell out of the car, between them the priest and the bishop Alexius (Gromadsky). All were terrified. It was a fatal mistake. We took the bishop's folder and the hat he was carrying in a round box (white bishop's hood) and left as soon as possible in the direction of the camp. Opinions were divided, some said along the way that he should, Muscovites - (he opposed the Ukrainian church), others did not approve of our action. I was ashamed of myself, and I considered this action a terrible mistake and a great sin. When we entered the depths of the forest. Chorny opened the folder, read all the papers that were there, and our doubts were dispelled <...> In his papers there was a wide memorial, in which Alexius asked for the support of the autonomist priests who were disliked by the population, and for this he assured the cooperation of the autonomists in the matter of "maintaining order in Ukraine." It was an unequivocal hint that the autonomist priests would cooperate with the German security authorities on his orders. Who destroyed this "order" if not nationalist and independent circles in general, but first of all Ukrainian guerrillas. This, in fact, dispelled our doubts. Accidentally, but at our hands, the one who wanted to turn the Church into a network of German provocateurs”.

As we could see even if the assassination of Alexius was non-intentional, the documents that were found by the partisans contained the incriminating evidence of Alexius' cooperation with the German administration. By 1943 as we already know the armies of Ukrainian nationalists were already fighting both with

the Soviets and the Germans. Unfortunately, we do not have the documents that could tell us the motive for the assassination. It could be that Skorupski is hiding that they knew who was in that car, and the assassination was therefore ordered either by their leader Melnik, or they operated in the interests of German administration or even the high clergy of the Autocephalous Church. Nevertheless, all presuppositions on the account of who ordered the murder and was it as Skorupski says “a fatal mistake” could be regarded as speculations as we do not know the names of the people which organized it and the motive behind this murder.

The German religious policy on the occupied territories in general would be regarded as non-consequent because of the tensions between Ostministerium and RKU. Even after the successful conciliation between the Autonomous Church and Autocephalous Church, it was seeming that the unification and the establishment of the national Church in Ukraine was already achieved and the wishes of Rosenberg and Resoenfelder came true. However, the resistance of Erich Koch and indifferent position on religious questions in the occupied territories only made everything difficult and stopped this process. After the Soviet Army liberated Ukraine many autocephalous priests and the high clergymen were forced to leave their parishes as they feared the persecution from the Soviet government for their collaboration with the German administration (Shkarovsky 2007, p. 452). Polikarp and Mstislav ran away with the German army and continued their work in the diaspora. Polikarp became the head of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church in Western Europe and died in Aulnay-sous-Bois, a small commune near Paris on July 26th 1953. The last and the most successful attempt of autocephaly of Orthodox Church of Ukraine happened only in the new millenium and quite recently - in 2018.

2.3. Modern autocephaly

2.3.1. Autocephaly as a political project

For Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko the obtaining of the tomos was a question of political importance as 2018 was the election year for him. In the last years of his presidency the question of Church autocephaly was prominent in the state discourse. Let us look at Poroshenko's speech (Poroshenko 2018) at Verkhovna Rada - the Ukrainian parliament on the question of Poroshenko's appeal to Bartholomew, patriarch of Constantinople. Noteworthy that this session of Rada was on 23rd of April - during the celebration of Orthodox Easter:

“I want to emphasize that my work with the Church has been a priority - both in my election program and from the very first days of the presidency. I have repeatedly emphasized this in my speeches and supported the words with deeds to fulfill the promise. And all these years the dialogue between Ukraine and the Ecumenical Throne, which was invisible to the naked eye, continued. Representatives of our team went to Fanar as they were going to work, because to fight for the Ukrainian Church is a job that is important, honorable, but at the same time extremely responsible”.

Here as we could see, Poroshenko acclaims that the autocephaly of Ukrainian Church was his priority during his presidency. Interestingly enough he points out that the government representatives held meetings with the representatives of the Ecumenical Patriarchate as it was the diplomatic negotiations of state importance. The fact that the president himself made the appeal that was later published in the president's official website indicates the importance of this action for the government officials, and it is not merely the question of canonical and ecclesial matters as it appears to be but the strategic question for the state. It would be evident later by the observation of another speech addressed by Poroshenko. However, it becomes evident even in this speech:

“Such a Tomos, my dears, will strengthen our independence. It will remove the rudiments of the political project called the "Russian world" and which was invented, by the way, by the hierarchs of the ROC. Only later did the authorities

of the Russian Federation adopt this political heresy, which is dangerous for Ukraine”

Here it becomes more evident that the acquisition of Church autocephaly is the matter of cultural independence of Ukraine from the “Russian world” and from the orbit of cultural impact of Russia on Ukraine.

“I emphasize once again: we should proceed from the ancient canonical principle: "civil and land divisions should be followed by the division of church." After independence, the state has always begun a discussion of autocephaly. This was the case at different times in Greece, Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia, in the same Russia, etc.... Ukraine as an independent state, according to the traditions of the Orthodox world, not only has the right, but is obliged to constitute such a Church and ensure its recognition by the world Orthodoxies”.

President Poroshenko is proven to be quite competent in the knowledge of the emergence of autocephalous Churches that their ecclesial borders were corresponding to the national. However, let us critically examine the word “canonical” in Poroshenko’s speech. The emergence of the autocephalous Churches was not canonically based, i.e. there is no existing canon that obliges the Church to follow and adapt to the changes in the political borders. As it was discussed in the first part of this thesis, the emergence of autocephalous Churches could be attributed to the historical necessity for the preservation of the Church in the constantly changing political conjuncture.

“A church that will be Eucharistic, prayerfully united with other local churches, but administratively independent of any foreign ecclesiastical jurisdictions. Especially from the one that is directly related to the aggressor country”.

The fact that in Ukraine there were two major Orthodox Churches, the first one UOC KP which has close ties with the Ukrainian government and expressed support for the creation of the national Church, and the second one is UOC MP

which is canonically dependent from the Russian Orthodox Church which is working collaboratively with the Russian government since the enthronement of patriarch Cyril was unacceptable for president Poroshenko. According to Poroshenko, due to the close relations of the Russian government with the Russian Orthodox Church, the Kremlin uses UOC MP as the bridgehead for russophile propaganda. The unified Orthodox Church of Ukraine has its practical and political significance in counterbalancing the ‘aggressor’, especially, after the Russian involvement in the South East of Ukraine and the Crimean crisis. Later the application of the words ‘unity’ and ‘aggressor’ for example in this passage: “For all true patriots, strengthening the unity of Ukraine is a priority. Because unity is our main weapon in the fight against the Russian aggressor”. In this passage we could see the embodiment of weaponization of the ecclesial, using the Church as a weapon against the aggressor. The political implication of the autocephaly becomes more obvious in the last passages in Poroshenko’s speech:

“It's worth it [autocephaly]. It goes far beyond the Church! It is about our final independence from Moscow. It's not just religion, it's geopolitics. And for me, it is a matter of establishing an independent local Church - the same weight as the already obtained visa-free travel and the Association Agreement with the European Union. As our joint struggle with you for membership in the European Union and NATO membership, which are still ahead. This is a matter of national security and our defense in a hybrid war, because the Kremlin sees the ROC as one of the key instruments of influencing Ukraine”.

This quote demonstrates the true motivation of Petro Poroshenko. The creation of the unified Orthodox Church of Ukraine is not just the ecclesial affair which corresponds to the historical tradition of the emergence of the autocephalous churches. It is the deed of geopolitical importance which he compares with the EU integration and the military alliance with NATO. Creation of the autocephalous Church is again the matter of national security against the political and cultural influence of Russia that is manifested also in the Kremlin’s policy on the Church. Hence, Poroshenko by interference to the internal matters of the Church, by

politicizing and using the Church as the weapon against Russia, is securing the integrity of the Ukrainian state. For that he has a common position with Oleskandr Lotosky whom he cited during the Grateful Prayer for the Autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church in front of Cathedral of st. Sofia in Kyiv: “Minister of confessions of Hetman’s state, Olekandr Lototsky, clearly stated the impossibility and rejection of the Church governance from the other state centers. In the independent state there must be the independent Church” (NEWSONE, 14.10.18)

Thus, we could say that the obtaining of the tomos on the autocephaly for Petro Poroshenko is not only the matter of canonical justifications and historical justice but also the matter of geopolitics and the hybrid war against Russia. The political implication of religion is appearing to be quite obvious and straightforward in Poroshenko's discourse.

2.3.2. The ecclesial side of the autocephaly

The autocephaly of Ukrainian Church could not be regarded as the matter of only political significance. It created the great divide between Russian Orthodox Church and the Eucumenical Patriarchate. The dispute on the autocephaly lies in defining the canonical territories of the two Churches, e.g. could Ukraine be attributed to the canonical territory of Russian Orthodox Church, or it remains in the realm of Eucumenical Patrairchate. As it was discussed in the first part of this thesis, the main debate lies in the interpretations of the documents about the transition of the metropoly of Kyiv to the patriarch of Moscow. Did this document outline only the temporary transition as it corresponded to the political reality of that time, or was the transition permanent? As it was discussed we do not know the initial content of those documents because they did not survive. However, regardless of this fact, the two Churches are still disputing on this matter and interpret the copies of those documents to the benefit of their side. In the statement of Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church concerning the uncanonical intervention of the Patriarchate of Constantinople in the canonical territory of the Russian Orthodox that was adopted in its extraordinary session on September 14th 2018, it is stated that Russian Orthodox Church is outraged by the fact of the negotiations of the EPC with state and religious representatives of Ukraine without the notifying the Moscow which claims Ukraine to be the part of their canonical territory. In the document published on the official website of the ROC as the proof of that it is stated:

“The reunification of the Kiev Metropolia with the Russian Church took place in 1686. It was done in a form of the Act signed by Patriarch Dionysius IV of Constantinople and members of his Synod. The document says nothing about the temporary nature of the transfer of the Metropolia, contradicting the current groundless allegations of Constantinople’s hierarchs. No statements concerning the temporary transfer of the Kiev Metropolia can be found in Patriarch Dionysius’ other two Letters of 1686, addressed to the Moscow tsars and the Metropolitan of Kiev”. (Patriarchia 2018b)

The main argument of the Russian Orthodox Church is that it was not mentioned in the documents issued by the patriarch Dionysius IV about the temporality of the transition of the Kyivan metropolitan. That is why the position of Moscow is clear and supported by, however, inexistent originals of those documents. Nevertheless, the actions of Constantinople were claimed to be uncanonical and the lack of the mutual dialogue between two great Churches, forced Russian Orthodox Church to stop commemorating patriarch Bartholomew and the “complete break off the Eucharistic communion with the Patriarchate of Constantinople” (Patriarchia 2018b). However, the break off of the communion between the Churches would not solve the issue of the Ukrainian autocephaly because Moscow by doing this seized any possibility of the future dialogue with the Ecumenical Patriarchate and thus only intensified the conflict between Churches and prolonged the crisis in the Eastern Orthodoxy.

CONCLUSIONS

By analyzing the history of the autocephalous movement in Ukraine through the application of primary narrative sources we could say that the key narrative in the autocephaly of Ukrainian Church is the cultural and political independence of the Ukrainian state from Russia's imperial projects. The implication of the ecclesial domain, the interference of the civil authorities into the internal realm of the Church served as a catalyst for the autocephalous movements. As the initial nature of the religious autocephaly is being in accordance with the changing in the political situation. That was in the case of the Autocephaly of the Russian Orthodox Church due to the centralization of the Russian state, and the weakening of the role of Constantinople due to the Ottoman invasions. It is the case of the Ukrainian autocephalies in which the state authorities were searching the religious and political basis for the independence of the Ukrainian nation. The interconnection between the church and the state that could be traced back to the first years of the Apostolic Church, the rule of Justinian, is strong, and for centuries created the historical tradition and the matrix in which the state authorities interfered into the ecclesial domain for reaching their political goals. The initially perverted ideal of *symphonia* defined the policy of the state regarding the religion. The conflict of the canonical versus the political during the First Autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church is still prevailing in the modern discourse on this matter. The ideas of Oleksandr Lototsky are recited by the government officials such as president Poroshenko.

The first attempt of the autocephaly was the political project of the Ministry of Confessions with its nationalist leader Oleksandr Lototsky which viewed the religious independence of the Ukrainian Church as the other step in the creation of the Ukrainian nation and further separation from the Russian political orbit. The autocephalous movements in Ukraine were used by the German occupational administration in order to counterbalance the possible effects of the Russian

political influence over the population of Ukraine. And the last and successful autocephaly and the subsequent creation of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine could be regarded as the president Poroshenko's political project in the strengthening of the national unity in Ukraine against the aggression of the Russian state which also uses the Church as a weapon in the geopolitical game.

The further research on the basis of this thesis should be conducted on the question of canonical justifications and the general theological narrative that is appearing in this conflict. It is required to be more proficient in the questions of the dogmas of the Eastern Orthodoxy. Also it would be interesting to make a research on the Soviet religious policy considering the Orthodox Church as it could provide a broader context in the topic of church-state relationships in the Soviet Union and the post-Soviet countries. And finally, the Autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is still an on-going event that requires the more precise observation of the statements and the documents that would be issued both by political and religious authorities. It would be interesting to conduct a discourse analysis of the modern media that write on the religious topics and precisely on the topic of autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church. I personally hope that more interesting articles and documents will be produced and will become the part of the religious and political discourse that we, researchers, would be eager to analyze and interpret.

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