

**Abstract (in English):**

In this thesis I concentrate on theory of concepts and ideas in philosophy of Henri Bergson. He treats the problematic mainly in the third chapter of his book *Matter and Memory*. There he construes his theory in the spirit of his preceding theories of perception and memory that we will also have to understand first. First, he confronts two traditional philosophical approaches to the problematic, those of nominalism and conceptualism, because he recognizes that their conceptual apparatus had been appropriated by the psychological theories of his time even though it does not correspond with reality. Both these theories wrongly conceive of perception as of registration of individuals, whereas the processes of generalization and abstraction are thought by them to be executed afterwards by the intellect. To Bergson, on the other hand, generalization is present already in the uniformity of instinctive reactions of the body to various outer impulses. Besides, thanks to the presence of memory and reflection, the uniformity which was only felt during the habitual reactions can be transform into generality, and thus become a general idea. We will see that although the general ideas are created primarily for practical purposes, there exists a lot of secondary ideas, called “concepts” by Bergson that can be deliberately created by the human intellect.