

UNIVERZITA KARLOVA V PRAZE

FAKULTA HUMANITNÍCH STUDIÍ

Katedra elektronické kultury a sémiotiky



Anastasiia Yevdokimova

Bilingualism as a conflicted form of life

Diplomová práce

Vedoucí práce: **Mgr. Michal Ivan, Ph.D.**

Praha 2021

Prohlášení

Prohlašuji, že jsem práci vypracoval samostatně. Všechny použité prameny a literatura byly řádně citovány. Práce nebyla využita k získání jiného nebo stejného titulu.

V Praze dne 20. 07. 2021

Anastasiia Yevdokimova

Table of Contents

Introduction	1
1. Bilingualism and Bilinguality: Defining the Phenomena.....	7
1.1 Key Definitions.....	8
1.2 Dimensions of Bilinguality and Bilingualism	10
1.2.1 Bilinguality.....	11
1.2.2. Bilingualism	13
1.3 Bilingual (dis)Advantage Hypothesis	14
1.4 Conclusion	19
2. Conflicted Form of Life.....	21
2.1 Form of life	21
2.2 Role of Myth in Building an “It Is As It Should Be” State: Reading Roland Barthes, Ernest Cassirer, and Henry Tudor.....	23
2.2.1 Henry Tudor’s “Political Myth”.....	23
2.2.2. Ernest Cassirer’s “Myth of the State”	25
2.2.3 Roland Barthes’ “Mythologies”	26
3. Politicizing Bilingualism	28
3.1 Crimean Perspective	31
3.1.1 Historical Overview	31
3.1.2 Cultural Background	32
3.1.3 Crimea: Actual or Perceived Injustice?.....	36
3.1.4 Reading the Crimea Myth	40
3. 1. 5 Conclusion.....	47
3.3 Possible Solution.....	52
3.4 Conclusion	55
Conclusion	57
Bibliography.....	60

Abstract

The work presents competing discourses around bilingualism that surround fluctuating national identity in Ukraine. The use of Ukrainian and Russian languages has been for a long time a highly sensitive issue, repeatedly taking shape as an instrument of political campaigns and overt propaganda, and continues to be a subject of debates and tensions. Crimean crisis and the war in the East of Ukraine are not merely clearly-cut results of Russian military strategy and aggression. Other poignant factors are: long-lasting unresolved language issues, artificially imposed linguistic monism, and conflicted national identity that constituted a conflicted form of life characteristic to Ukraine. They are attributable to centuries of particular historical development and bewildering post-Soviet heritage but constructed through Russian political propaganda and forced Ukrainian policies toward exclusion. This work explores national identity through the language situation in Ukraine to gain a holistic grasp of how exclusive Ukrainian language legislation influences the nation's cultural-linguistic settings.

The given study claims that the development of the linguistic landscape in Ukraine climaxed in a setting of de jure monolingual, yet de facto bilingual country: the new language legislation requires all Ukrainians to switch to Ukrainian. The solution was deemed effective as of the date the Crimean crisis began in March 2014, to become a cornerstone of the new Ukrainian national identity. The given study argues that the stated approach fails in the face of the number of Russian speakers in Ukraine and specifics of Ukrainian bilingualism, i.e., dominant bilinguality with prevailing mastery of one language in the circumstances of diglossia: Russian-speaking Ukrainians who are fluent in one language, communicate professionally and socially in their native language even though being bilinguals. To remain Ukrainian, those bilinguals face language attrition and the hazard of staying in the state of interlanguage as a consequence of subtractive bilinguality. Diglossic bilingualism, as long as it is a percept of traumatic events of the past enacted in the present (the case of post-Soviet republics), requires mitigation. But such abrupt mitigation as witnessed in Ukraine nowadays inflicts cognitive and cultural damage onto the already divided society.

Key words: bilingualism, bilinguality, national identity, Ukraine, Russia, Crimea, form of life, language.

Abstrakt

Práce představuje konkurenční diskurzy o bilingvistu, které obklopují kolísající národní identitu na Ukrajině. Používání ukrajinského a ruského jazyka je po dlouhou dobu velmi citlivým tématem, které se opakovaně formuje jako nástroj politických kampaní a zjevné propagandy, a nadále je předmětem debat a napětí. Krymská krize a válka na východě Ukrajiny nejsou jen jasnými výsledky ruské vojenské strategie a agrese. Dlouhodobě nevyřešené jazykové problémy, uměle zavedený jazykový monismus a konfliktní národní identita představovaly rozpornou formu života charakteristickou pro Ukrajinu. Dá se to z velké části přičíst historickému vývoji a matoucímu post-sovětskému dědictví, ale finálně obnoveno prostřednictvím ruské politické propagandy a vynucené ukrajinské vylučující politiky. Tato práce zkoumá ukrajinskou národní identitu skrze jazyk, pro získání uceleného pochopení, jak vylučující jazykové zákonodárství ovlivňuje kulturně-jazykové prostředí národa.

Predložená studie tvrdí, že vývoj jazykové krajiny na Ukrajině vyvrcholil v prostředí de jure monolingvní, přesto de facto bilingvní země: nová jazyková legislativa vyžaduje, aby všichni Ukrajinci přešli na ukrajinštinu. Řešení bylo považováno za účinné v době, kdy krymská krize začala, tedy v březnu 2014, a stalo se tak základním kamenem nové ukrajinské národní identity. Tento přístup selhává tváří v tvář množství rusky hovořících na Ukrajině a specifikům ukrajinského bilingvistu, tj. dominantní bilinguality s převládajícím ovládním jednoho jazyka za okolností diglosie. Rusky mluvící Ukrajinci, ve svém profesionálním a společenském životě používají ruštinu, přestože jsou bilingvní. Aby zůstali Ukrajinci, bilingvní lidé čelí opotřebením jazyka a riziku, že zůstanou ve stavu mezijazyka v důsledku subtraktivní bilinguality. Diglosický bilingvistu, pokud jde o vnímání traumatických událostí minulosti, které se odehrávají v současnosti (v případě postsovětských republik), vyžaduje zmírnění. Ale takové náhlé zmírnění, jaké jsme dnes svědky na Ukrajině, vyvolává kognitivní a kulturní poškození již rozdělené společnosti

Klíčová slova: bilingualismus, bilingualita, národní identita, Ukrajina, Rusko, Krym, forma života, jazyk.

Introduction

“How many languages do you speak?” – a question to be heard under social circumstances of any type. Within these situations, as a rule, for an answer best works a principle “the more – the better.” Practical use of being bilingual and, to a certain extent, social benefits of linguistic skills of this type hold a rather influential role in a common bilingual image which has been building along with the development of the modern human culture from its very beginning. In the 20th century, the influence of bilingual experience on language processing became undeniable (beyond some of the most prominent scholars in the area of bilingualism studies to raise this argument were Otto Jespersen and Ellen Bialystok).

However, for quite a while, bilingualism was not considered within a theoretical approach to language studies. Vivian Cook quotes Illitch and Sanders, noting that “... by and large, linguists implicitly believe that the monolingual native speaker is the norm: From Saussure to Chomsky ‘homo monolinguis’ is posed as the man who uses language - the man who speaks” (Altarriba and Heredia, 2018). The application of this conclusion can be extended to describe the situation of political bilingualism in contemporary Ukraine, where the prospect of having one official language comes with the goal to cement, unsurprisingly, both cultural and political blurred borders by escaping the notorious ‘muddy waters’ of multilingual society. However, the efficiency and tolerance of such a course towards new post-Maidan identity are still an open question within the historically multilingual community of this country still extant.

Acquiring a language means learning a system of rules - grammar, phonological, syntactic, etc.; learning a language demands incomparably greater input and comes with particular losses. It is substantially observable that bilinguals differ from monolinguals in terms of cognitive and linguistic performance. Despite a varying degree of attrition ¹of the first language, a common modern approach to individual and social bilingualism is that it is per se of more advantage than monolingualism. This approach is supported by a number of studies but mostly thrives on cultural and social advantages brought by the economic and social benefits of being able to operate more than one language. Nonetheless, the discourse of social advantages of bilingualism comes with an inevitable dispute of whether the shared language (considered that at least one party’s command of language is not that of a native speaker) is a launching point for a shared world of the involved ones. In line with this thinking, it should be mentioned that language is a part of the overall

¹ In this work, the term ‘attrition’ will be used to describe the decline in language abilities that were previously demonstrated by an individual (Schwieter, 2015, p.646)

behavior which is considered meaningful in a given culture - it does not exist by itself. Albeit, how does the theory of a shared world work in the circumstances of conflicted life form sustained within a bilingual society?

Functions of language are universal, while the linguistic forms vary across languages and cultures. Language, being a part of a cultural context, is one of the major variables which define culture (Hamers and Blanc, 2003, p.8). Underlined by Das: “Wittgenstein takes language to be the mark of human sociality: hence human forms of life are defined by the fact that they are forms created by and for those who are in possession of language even as the natural is absorbed within these “social” forms” (Das, 2007, p. 15). However, in terms of bilingualism, which is commonly considered to be an advantage both in terms of social and cognitive skillset (Bruin et al. 2014, p.100), where does an ability to operate at least two languages situate a person in question in relation to these “social” forms? But how does the discussion, over and above, taken in a broader sense develop under the circumstances of conflicted bilingualism? And even for someone with a high language aptitude - does mastering the language equips with the key of properly grasping the circumstances where this language is ‘happening’? Definitely, that would suffice for interaction in a downright primitive language (Wittgenstein, 1968, p.3). Luckily (or unfortunately), it is not the case for the overwhelming majority of our speech interaction situations.

Thus, does conflicted bilingualism on a large scale undermines the communication in the state of interlanguage instead of enhancing it, making it the conversation of ‘lions’?² There are two most probable outcomes to be enacted: first, the languages are separated by layers of poorly related cultural background; second - the already mentioned scenario of conflicted bilingualism (the clash of related, yet still different backgrounds). Conflicted bilingualism is constituted through languages in one’s bilingual set of the speech tools that developed under one cultural roof and these “superficial manifestation(s) of hidden, highly abstract, cognitive constructions” (Fauconnier, 2010, p. 34) are not foreign. Yet, one (language) is shamefully banned from all areas of social life due to its relatively recently earned adverse status. The circumstances spell new rules on how bilingualism is approached and evaluated.

The topic of this work reflects the author's personal experience of growing up as a Ukrainian citizen of a Russian origin in the post-Soviet Ukraine. More so, having two places called home: one in Vinnits, the city situated in central Ukraine and thus predominantly Ukrainian-speaking,

² (Wittgenstein PI, p.223)

and another one in, nowadays, infamous, Crimea. Witnessing how an indispensable part of cultural heritage - a Russian one (though formed into a part of authentic Ukrainian culture, yet never appropriated) - was set out to become threatening, and all the benefits of bilingualism associated with the enemy, quite conveniently, overlooked.

Some post-Soviet countries that claim to be monolingual simply because only one language is official fail in the face of reality, and, even though rightful hostility towards the major language of what can be called a post-empire, doesn't justify the worsening of an already complicated reality. While a sweeping statement cannot be made about all the post-Soviet countries, since all the cases are different, it should be noted that they do share a few identifiable traits of building ineffectual language ideologies that can be transported to other contexts, grossly inclining to one of two, strategically harmful to national integrity, sides. On one side of the scale, we have identification with Russia and the Russian language at the expense of Belorussian. In the same line of thinking, another extreme is applying sanctions against the Russian language after labeling it a *language of the enemy* (Pavlenko, 2003). "It can be noted, in passing, that traditional approaches to language planning in the third world also adopt a homogeneous frame of reference, in which societal multilingualism is equated with instability and in which a monolingual (or "oligolingual") nation-state is taken as the unquestionable model for progress and development" (Schieffelin, Woolard and Kroskrity, 1998, p.206).

The data of the first (and so far, the last) national census of Ukraine from 2001 indicates that 80% of the adult population in Ukraine speak (at least) one other language fluently in addition to their first language (Lozyns'kyi in Csernicskó and Máté, 2017, p. 15). According to a survey from 2017, when talking to a Ukrainian speaker:

- 63% of Ukrainians will speak Ukrainian;
- 18.4% will use both Ukrainian and Russian;
- 17% will speak Russian.

Characteristically, when talking to a Russian speaker:

- about half of the people will speak Russian;
- 22.7% will use both languages;
- 28.8% will keep speaking Ukrainian (Ohoiko, 2020).

Forced linguistic monism, considered a cultural parameter of a modern state with a complicated historical path, is not a one-stop-shop to cure a politically inflicted maelstrom. In this respect, the case of the Ukrainian language situation would be a worthy example, since the boundaries between language and culture are politically charged, especially, given an ongoing, to put it mildly, tension with the Russian Federation that brought to drastic changes to how Ukrainian identity is perceived after the dramatic changes of the last 7 years. More on the issue is within the third chapter of this work.

The aim of this work is to explore the current situation of diglossia³ in Ukraine through the lens of a conflicted form of life that is characteristic of the current condition of Ukrainian society.

With this framing of the aim, it is to be achieved by juxtaposing linguistic and political characteristics of bilingualism in Ukraine and accessing language as the instrument of group identity in the conflicted form of life. Many hypotheses regarding the issue in question appear to be ill-defined and biased, following the political tendencies of Ukrainian history - is in large part attributable to the centuries of particular historical development but constructed through Russian political propaganda and forced Ukrainian exclusive identity. The inclination towards either...or mentality has already enabled the Crimean crisis and war in Ukrainian East.

A growing body of literature has examined the problem through a one-sided approach. This study suggests that the policy and culture makers should encourage inclusive weaving together of both planes to overcome a many-faceted (in terms of hated heating) conflict of Ukrainian identity.

Conflicted Ukrainian bilingualism is a destabilizing factor, but the problem is not bilingualism per se; rather a forced tendency to build a national identity on exclusive instead of inclusive principles. This work is aimed towards assessing **the hypothesis** that the only path to achieving equilibrium is through the appropriation of the Russian language, ergo Russian-speaking Ukrainians as a constitutional part of indivisible Ukrainian identity.

This thesis challenges assumptions in line with those raised by Lara Ryazanova - Clarke in her cogent analysis of *The Russian Language Outside the Nation*: “the Russian metropolis and the

³ Sociolinguists may also use the term diglossia to denote bilingualism, the speaking of two or more languages by the members of the same community, as, for example, in New York City, where many members of the Hispanic community speak both Spanish and English, switching from one to the other according to the social situation or the needs of the moment. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/diglossia>

Russian language to be major pulling forces of the imagined union” (Ryazanova - Clarke, 2014, p. 274).

The major **research questions** guiding this study are:

- Is bilingualism advantage theory a subject of political manipulations?
- Is linguistic diversity a viable option for Ukraine given the political developments of the past decade?
- To what extent does conflicted bilingualism reflect the socio-political and historical currents that have shaped an approach to Ukrainian national identity?
- What is the role of myth in converting language into a “soft power tool”?⁴

By mapping all the factors and actors of Ukrainian-Russian bilingualism, this thesis is designed to disprove the validity of a narrative that is dividing the country on the basis of language, assigning Russian-speaking Ukrainians to Russia through the alienation of Ukrainian-Russian bilingualism.

Due to the nature of the type of research I have conducted, I have used a blend of academic, peer-reviewed sources, government publications, and credible news reports.

Structure

The main body of text consists of three chapters, each carefully organized with intentions stated, issues outlined, arguments and counter-arguments presented for reaching implications and conclusions in line with the stated objectives.

Since the meaning of the concepts ‘bilingual’, ‘monolingual’, and ‘multilingual’ is often blurred within its common usage, the first chapter will be dedicated to establishing these concepts’ edges to be employed within this work. Additionally, a part will be devoted to uncovering the bilingual (dis)advantage hypothesis in light of the Ukrainian language situation. Categorization frames of bilingualism and bilinguality are also to be discussed.

⁴ Ryazanova - Clark, 2014 p. 249

The second part will elaborate on Wittgenstein's concept of a form of life and attend to a question of what is the role of myth in building a rigid state of political conformity.

The third part of this work sheds light on politicized bilingualism in contemporary Ukraine and its role in the conflicted form of life as a general socio-cultural background in Ukraine.

1. Bilingualism and Bilinguality: Defining the Phenomena

The ability to operate more than one language has been studied throughout the fields of medical, health, social sciences, and humanities. The studies show that bilingualism field issues are related to such areas as immigration, acculturation, social identity and ethnicity, especially as dealt with in the domains of sociolinguistics and the sociology of language, are all connected with language as a tool (Aronin and Singleton, 2012). The topic of bilingualism stays controversial, especially, in this day and age, with political tension continuing to gather momentum on ethnic grounds and language being a resourceful fuel to keep the tension vital and viral. Language dwells at the core of any type of group identification: “The language is perceived as a group attribute and thus activates stereotypes and value judgments attributed to the speakers of this language” (Hamers and Blanc, 2003, p. 222). This approach allows me to argue that in bilingual societies in a state of inner conflict, such as nowadays Ukraine, bilingualism is a major conundrum. In a given situation, one language is stigmatized, evoking a general air of malaise, along with desirable yet, never achievable disdain. We are witnessing how, depending on which language pairs the official one, how the attitude towards bilingualism is rapidly changing.

Bilingualism has a history of controversial approaches by scholars. Adverse arguments are not accounted for, and this controversy is picking up steam when the general public takes a stand on the matter. Sociocultural settings, nature of a situation, or persona of a bilingual dictate the outcomes. In the context of modern Ukraine, the matter of bilingualism is a two-sided coin. On the one hand, the most significant after the official language is a token of authentic Ukrainian heritage; on the other - it is a voice of the enemy. Thus, Ukrainian bilingualism is not devoid of negative connotations, even for a split of a second. The country is in denial of bilingualism on a state level and is working hard towards monolingualism, cutting ties with the ‘foreign’ language, with quite a list of ideological implications.

In this chapter, I will outline the historical development of studies of bilingualism in order to give a complete picture of the issue and avoid using unsubstantiated terms and allegations. For the purposes of the work, I will present the development of a scientific approach to bilingualism and offer a comprehensive overview of the contradictions in this field of study. This chapter bears the purpose of building a base for appealing to the idea that the scientific approach to bilingualism is very different from the politicized one, that can be easily changed with new regimes and ideologies.

1.1 Key Definitions

The following section addresses the key concepts related to defining those who bear “languages in contact” (Hamers and Blanc, 2003, p.1). For this study, among the relevant terms are bilingualism, multilingualism, bilinguality, diglossia, as well as monolingualism. A number of forms of bilingualism, compelling for the purposes of this work, will be covered as well.

It should be mentioned that since monolingualism and bilingualism belong to non-static multidisciplinary categories, making the list of those falling under the definition of being in the disposition of languages in contact considerably nuanced. To be more precise, these two terms both stand for a spectrum rather than being a categorical variable (Kaltsa et al., 2017), allowing a welcoming room for speculation with the terminology. Therefore, as anticipated, most of the definitions are wide-ranged, differ from one publication to another, hence, lack precision. Moreover, obscured by the issue of identifying the difference between bilingualism and bilinguality, which are often merged by default. The comparison of examples from a fundamental study of *Bilinguality and Bilingualism* by Josiane Hamers and Michel Blanc (2003) will help to underline a contrasting approach to defining what bilingualism is:

“In the popular view, being bilingual equals being able to speak two languages perfectly; this is also the approach of Bloomfield (1973: 56), who defines bilingualism as ‘the native-like control of two languages’. In contradistinction to this definition which includes only ‘perfect bilinguals’ Macnamara (1967) proposes that a bilingual is anyone who possesses a minimal competence in only one of the four language skills, listening comprehension, speaking, reading and writing, in a language other than his mother tongue” (Hamers and Blanc, 2003, p.6).

As one can see from the examples above, definitions can be quite polar, either accepting under the umbrella term of bilingualism the cases of balanced bilinguals exquisitely or not setting distinct criteria as in the latter case. Webster’s dictionary even offers a quite controversial, within the context of the given work, definition of bilingualism as “the political or institutional recognition of two languages”.⁵ This definition works for some countries, for instance, Switzerland or Canada. However, how should we define a situation when two languages are widely, would be safe to say, equally used, yet are not recognized to be politically or institutionally equal? Let’s take the liberty of calling this paradox a “ghost bilingualism”,

⁵ <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bilingualism>

since it exists de facto, whilst de jure is denied. More on the issue within the second and third chapters of the work.

Given that the properties of being bi/monolingual belong to the pertinent points of interest of this study, the terms ask for an unequivocal definition. The author will expand on the interpretation offered by already introduced here Josiane Hamers and Michel Blanc:

“The concept of **bilingualism** refers to the state of a linguistic community in which two languages are in contact with the result that two codes can be used in the same interaction and that a number of individuals are bilingual (societal bilingualism); but it also includes the concept of bilinguality (or individual bilingualism). **Bilinguality** is the psychological state of an individual who has access to more than one linguistic code as a means of social communication; the degree of access will vary along with a number of dimensions which are psychological, cognitive, psycholinguistic, socio-psychological, ... sociological, sociolinguistic, sociocultural, and linguistic” (2003, p.6). A valuable addition would be the definition by Titone (1972 cited in Hamers and Blanc, 2003, p. 6), who stressed that bilingualism is the individual’s capacity to speak a second language while following the concepts and structures of that language rather than paraphrasing his or her mother tongue. However, this work does not follow a path of “continued adherence to an implicit assumption of the monolingual as the standard language user and a related assumption of the bilingual as the sum of two monolinguals” (Libben, 2017, p.8). Taking into consideration the fact that this work is far from being an attempt to scrutinize the subtleties of bilingual terminology, let us put the definitions in simple terms: bilingualism is a broad concept and it includes bilinguality, which covers the psychological aspect of an individual's ability to operate two languages. The given study won’t follow the tradition of most publications within the area of bilingualism that, for common purposes, merge the terms bilinguality and bilingualism.

Along the same lines, here, the working definition of **multilingualism** will signify the state of knowing three or more languages (Hammarberg, 2009, p. 6). Any further specification by the logic used for bilinguality/bilingualism is not relevant for this particular study.

Another term that shouldn’t be left unexplained is **diglossia**. For a definition, let’s turn to Hamers and Blanc:

“When different varieties or languages co-occur throughout a speech community, each with a distinct range of social functions in complementary distribution, we have a situation of diglossia” (2003, p.294).

Originally, the term was coined by an American linguist Charles A. Ferguson. He explained diglossia as the usage of two or more varieties of one language under different social circumstances. “Perhaps the most familiar example is the standard language and regional dialect as used, say, in Italian or Persian, where many speakers speak their local dialect at home or among family or friends of the same dialect area but use the standard language in communicating with speakers of other dialects or on public occasions” (Ferguson, 1959, p.325). The interesting thing here is that in nowadays Ukraine, ⁶diglossia has taken a unique turn, with standard, high language being either Ukrainian or Russian and the low one being surzhyk. Surzhyk is a nonstandard language that incorporates elements of both Russian and Ukrainian. “Disregarded by officials and despised by purists, Ukrainian-Russ surzhyk, ... remains a poorly understood phenomenon in contemporary Ukrainian society” (Flier, 1998, p. 113). One approach to explaining the existence and wide use of this hybrid is taking into account the fact that the interlocutors (Ukrainian residents) are largely bilingual and use their languages regularly in a range of settings, giving the green light to language mixing. We will return to the issue later in the work.

In the given framework, **monolingualism (also unilingualism)** is defined as a condition of being able to use just one language as opposed to bi/multilingualism. The term will also be applied to describe a situation of institutional enforcement of one language over others. The author would not elaborate further than the word's etymology since this concise definition would quite suffice for the needs of this study.

A notion on dimensions and types of bilingualism and bilinguality is in place.

1.2 Dimensions of Bilinguality and Bilingualism

The 20th century brought a heightened interest to people capable of mentally juggling at least two languages. Early bilingual research that had a lasting impact began in the 1950s (Schwieter, 2015, p. 31).

⁶ In Ukraine, due to long-lasting adverse historical settings for development of Ukrainian language, in some parts of the country, mostly eastern and southern, including Crimea, Ukrainian was considered provincial.

Whatever the findings and consequent allegations, only the bilinguals with a high level of both their languages competency were found worthy of consideration. The approach did not make it past the field tests:

“Research on bilingualism and bilingual experience (and subsequently on the case of knowledge and use of more than two languages) gradually took account of the fact that the bi-/multilingual language user was not to be evaluated in terms of ‘perfect’ or ‘native-like’ command of the languages at his/her disposal but rather in terms of degrees of functionality in any given language environment” (Aronin and Singleton, 2012, p.31).

This subchapter will discuss the types of bilinguality and bilingualism along with the dimensions to profile them correctly.

1.2.1 Bilinguality

Relative nature of the term *bilinguality* urged the need for more clarity on what constitutes a bilingual person. For this work, I will rely on an exhaustive comparative description of psychological dimensions of bilinguality drawn from Hamers and Blanc (2003, p.26).

Dimension	Type of bilinguality	Comments ⁷
According to competence in both languages	Balanced bilinguality Dominant bilinguality	$L_{A/1}$ competence = $L_{B/2}$ competence $L_{A/1}$ competence > or < $L_{B/2}$ competence
According to cognitive organisation	Compound bilinguality Coordinate bilinguality	$L_{A/1}$ unit equivalent to $L_{B/2}$ unit = one conceptual unit $L_{A/1}$ unit = one conceptual unit 1 $L_{B/2}$ equivalent = one conceptual unit 2

⁷ L_1 Denotes the mother tongue or first language.

L_2 Denotes a second language learned after the first.

$L_{A/B}$ Denotes the co-occurrence of two mother tongues learned simultaneously.

According to age of acquisition	<p>Childhood bilinguality:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Simultaneous • Consecutive <p>Adolescent bilinguality</p> <p>Adult bilinguality</p>	<p>L_{B2} acquired before age of 10/11</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • L_1 and L_2 = mother tongues • L = mother tongue; L_2 acquired before 11 <p>L_2 = acquired between 11 and 17</p> <p>L_2 = acquired after 17</p>
According to presence of L2 community in environment	<p>Endogenous bilinguality</p> <p>Exogenous bilinguality</p>	<p>Presence of L_2 community</p> <p>Absence of L_2 community</p>
According to the relative status of the two languages	<p>Additive bilinguality</p> <p>Subtractive bilinguality</p>	<p>L_{A1} and L_{B2} socially valorised = cognitive advantage</p> <p>L_2 valorised at expense L_1 = cognitive disadvantage</p>
According to group membership and cultural identity	<p>Bicultural bilinguality</p> <p>L_1 monocultural bilinguality</p> <p>L_2 acculturated bilinguality</p> <p>Deculturated bilinguality</p>	<p>Double membership and bicultural identity</p> <p>L_{A1} membership and cultural identity</p> <p>L_{B2} membership and cultural identity</p> <p>Ambiguous membership and anomic identity</p>

The above table will provide grounds for reference when identifying the nature of the situation of Ukrainian bilingualism within the third chapter of the given inquiry.

Whilst bilinguality is measured and limited by the qualities of a particular carrier, bilingualism is a multidimensional phenomenon with rather blurred edges. Frege speculated that “The content of a concept diminishes as its extension increases; if its extension becomes all-embracing, its content must vanish altogether” (Frege, 1953, p.40). This exceptional German philosopher had in mind a word in his mother tongue, *Einheit*⁸, when he wrote those lines. However, the idea of the grave significance of establishing distinct frames to concepts can and should be extrapolated to how we operate pieces of knowledge.

To use the terms *bilingualism and bilinguality* here, I considered it vital to define the extensions of such. Only an elaborate description to which I have deliberately allotted sufficient space in this work (one chapter to be exact), will help us, in Frege’s terms, preserve the content and convey the messages this work carries.

1.2.2. Bilingualism

In order to satisfy the requirements laid out by multidimensional qualities of *bilingualism*, the term’s standards of measurements are range, scale, and sometimes spectrum, with degrees appropriated as legitimate metrics. The same “toolbox” used for measuring the extent of individual bilinguality with the core difference of focus shifting to socioethical parameters of speaking two languages. Thus, we are entering the realms of a bilingual community. Such a community is constituted by “... at least two languages commonly used by some members of the community” (Hamers and Blanc, 2003, p.31). This work operates on definitions offered by the leading experts in the field. Best complements the needs of this study the typology of societal bilingualism, offered by Hamers and Blanc (2003, p.31):

Type	Characteristics	Example
Territorial	Ethnic groups are native to their politically established territories, with their languages having an official status	Belgium, Switzerland, Spain, Canada, India
Superposed	Additionally to native languages of the given territories, exists either a lingua franca or a	Swahili in Eastern and Central Africa and Tok Pisin

⁸ Einheit (German) - Unity, whole. Retrieved from: <https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/german-english/einheit>

	language imposed by political authorities (colonial past). Either way, such language is native to none or few indigenous ethnic groups	in Papua New Guinea, French or English in several African countries
Diglossic	Two languages are spoken by a variable section of the population, but they are used in a complementary way in the community, one language or variety having a higher status than the other and being reserved for certain functions and domains	Spanish and Guarani in Paraguay and of French and Creole in Haiti, Russian in the USSR

As illustrated above, the dimensions along which bilinguality and bilingualism can and do vary. Throughout this work, the outlined terminology is to be referred to analyze bilingualism and bilinguality, characteristic of Ukraine.

1.3 Bilingual (dis)Advantage Hypothesis

In Principles of Pragmatics, Geoffrey N. Leech (2018, p.2) wrote: “There is a justifiable tendency in scientific thought to assume that an existing theory or paradigm works until it is shown to fail.” The quote displays the linguist’s thoughts on the condition of “semantics spilling over into pragmatics”, yet it is undeniably universally applicable to all things human. In this particular case, it is perfectly applicable for describing how the scientific, alongside common perception of bilingualism, was developing.

To better understand a long-lasting discourse on bilingualism, this chapter is called to set the record straight about the multiplicity and volatilization of bilingual thought development. Attention is given to the cognitive aspect of the bilingualism context, its ambivalence, and inflicted connotations, i.e., the bilingualism advantage hypothesis. Such scrutiny is required to shed light on the polarity not just within the perception of the cognitive value of the term but also in the domain of societal/political representation. In the grand scheme of things, phenomena that provide a fertile ground for speculation, unsurprisingly, are never really overlooked but instead lavishly supplied with generalizations or forced inclinations towards one or another polarity dictated by the external order of things.

By providing a retrospective analysis of scientific interest to the bilingualism of cognitive psychologists and linguists, we get a grasp on a more coherent understanding of the term and its multifaceted nature. Outlining the main misused hypothesis in the field of bilingualism, i.e., its umbrella-advantage hypothesis, allows me to argue that it is, in this case, a typical example of how accommodating the field of bilingualism is to planting biases, including the one in a climate of the conflicted bilingual form of life.

This part will present the discussion of the fact that the widely accepted so-called bilingual advantage has fallen victim to a bias: the idea that bilingualism is supreme to monolingualism in all spheres, starting with cognitive and expanding its hegemony to the cultural sphere and beyond. In the *Bilingualism: a framework for understanding the mental lexicon*, the authors refer to some of the most prominent publications within the current study of bilingualism (e.g., Bialystok, Craik and Luk, 2012; Kroll et al., 2012, Libben and Goral, 2017), claiming that: “In contemporary cognitive research it is not uncommon to characterize bilinguals as “exemplary” or as “skilled mental jugglers”, or to refer to knowledge of multiple languages as a “remarkable cognitive feat” and one that both requires and perhaps enhances cognitive control” (Libben and Goral, 2017, p. 9). Within the sphere of research on bilingualism and cognition, the above-mentioned principle does not appear to be the favorable one per se. It may be assumed that this image’s controversy has been fruitful soil for different arguments within the area of bilingualism and cognition research.

As will be discussed further, the issue of bilingualism and cognition has a history of a dual approach, with either positive or adverse attitudes to a bilingual's cognitive abilities. However, there is more to the image of bilingualism’s pros and cons. In this context, I tried to argue the influence of political factors and the bilingualism advantage hypothesis that is generally accepted to be a new norm ((Bruin, Treccani and Sala, 2014). This peculiarity will be presented within this chapter and discussed further in contrast to the bias of bilingualism disadvantage in relation to the politicization of language(s).

Existing theories within the field of bilingual/monolingual non-linguistic advantages will be presented chronologically. Therefore, I will start with the evaluation of the situation in question at the dawn of the 20th century when the bilingual disadvantages theories prevailed. Then, defining studies of the second part of the 20th century will be overviewed, when the bilingual advantage theory took the leading part. But when there are so many subtleties to an

issue, like within the bilingualism advantage theory, is there a possibility of an actual scientific hegemony? This will be the last but not least question to contemplate in this chapter.

In the 20th century, a new issue arrived at the forefront of various studies involving the human ability to operate in more than one language. A number of them considered whether bilingualism indeed has a detrimental effect on general intelligence and cognition. Within the first studies in the area was the work made by a Danish linguist Otto Jespersen. In his fundamental book *Language; its nature, development and origin*, the author supports the possibility of becoming proficient (though still, not on the same level as a native speaker) in more than one language by opening polemics with authors of earlier times, like Hugo Schuchardt, and criticizing their views on the issue. However, a clearly visible difference is drawn between a person with an ability to use only the mother language and someone with, using the author's terminology, the other language. The linguist claims that even though undoubtedly it is an advantage to be able to operate in more than one language, the benefits of this skill are not worth the shortcomings attached. Jespersen states that being bilingual equals having weaker intellectual abilities compared to monolingual peers. Drawing on the author's conclusions, for language learners, it might be because the time, as the most valuable of human resources, is not spent developing what counted as noticeable intellectual profits: "The worst of the system is, that instead of learning things necessary to us we must spend our time and energy in learning to express the same thought in two or three languages at the same time" (Jespersen, 1922, p.148).

Considering the following development of the theory, the message of this statement became the leitmotif of bilingual research of the first half of the 20th century - it sums up a dominant approach of that time - that an ability to use more than one language had a negative cognitive impact on a supposedly unfortunate bilingual speaker, who spend all of the resources on a constant juggle of two or even more languages within a mind. The idea was that this process leads to the thinking abilities' decreasing, adversely affecting bilingual's performance in non-linguistic cognitive tasks.

The above said is in line with the earlier characterizations of bilingualism that link it to reduced or slowed cognitive capacity. For example, Mägiste (1979) compared the speed of performance on a range of cognitive tasks (including simple object naming) in German-speaking bilinguals living in Sweden and found that these individuals performed reliably slower in Swedish as well as in German, their first language, relative to monolingual speakers of either language and that trilinguals performed more slowly still. The study by Mägiste, besides portraying bilinguals as

cognitively disadvantaged, brings about the point that bilinguals are constructed as atypical relative to the more typical (and, therefore, unremarkable) single language user, constructed as the norm.

The research results on bilingualism from the beginning of the 20th century were later criticized, mainly because of researchers' insufficient data collection techniques, like having bilingual subjects tested in only one language. With conclusions derived from these tests appeared to be highly opinionated (Aronin and Singleton, 2012, p.28).

In the second half of the 20th century, the bilingual advantage theory prevailed in publications. Bilinguals' benefits have been known to generate from the lasting encounter of managing two languages that need reluctance of the presently inappropriate language, changing between languages, and keeping track of the language contexts to select the suitable language of interest (Montrul and Potowski, 2007). Canadian psychologist and professor Ellen Bialystok have done a great quantity of work within the area. She started her academic work in the 1970s, now being one of the leading specialists in the field. Bialystok stands on the grounds of bilingualism's general advantage on cognitive abilities, hypothesizing that bilinguals have better executive control, meaning that they are able to focus on a specific task better than monolinguals. Bialystok argues that: "For adults, the idea of an 'uncontaminated' monolingual is probably a fiction" (Bialystok, 2001, p.1). As for children, who invariably more successful than adults in acquiring a second language, facing this need circumstantially, depending on their caregivers, bilingualism significantly impacts children's ability to select cognitive processing information, which proved beneficial in a child's studying process (Bialystok, 2001, p.151). Moreover, the constant necessity to, as was said before, juggle different languages within a bilingual's mind is beneficial for non-linguistic cognitive abilities because of bilingual's effort to constantly train concentration and filtering out processes besides the focus point (Bialystok, 2001, p.246).

Bilingualism and multilingualism for a long time lacked coherent definitions and were approached in broad terms. Scholars have observed how up until the 2d half of the 20th century, there was still no accepted definition. Brunner (1929, cited in Hakuta and Diaz, 1985), for example, operated on the premise that children's bilingualism may be estimated by the foreignness of their parents. Prior to the early 1960s, most studies investigating the effects of bilingualism on children's intelligence did not take into account group differences in socio-economic status (Ibid., p. 321). McCarthy (1930, cited in Hakuta and Diaz, 1985, p. 321) pointed

out that bilingualism in the US was seriously confounded with low socioeconomic status: “more than half of the bilingual school children could be classified as belonging to families from the unskilled labor occupational group”, therefore, bearing all the extrapolated negative connotations. Peal and Lambert's study (1962, cited in Hakuta and Diaz, 1985), was one of the first methodologically reliable inquiries into bilingualism to discover that bilingualists demonstrate “superior performance on measures of verbal intelligence and non-verbal tests” (Hakuta and Diaz, 1985, p.319). To perform the study with the subjects carefully grouped, the following criteria were accounted for: sex, age, socioeconomic status, bilingual's language skills. Within bilinguals, pupils were divided into two groups depending on their second language proficiency – a group of ambilinguals, ‘balanced bilinguals’ who had their two languages mastered, actively using both French and English, and the second group of ‘pseudo-bilinguals’, who had not yet obtained proficiency in their second language. This study of Canadian bilinguals showed that bilinguals outperform monolinguals on general non-linguistic cognitive tasks. Thus, making a new statement within this research area that having obtained two languages can positively affect general intelligence can give bilingual children cognitive advantages over their monolingual peers. Following these results, a new tendency saw its dawn, namely, monolinguals sentenced inferior to bilingual peers.

The reality is always nuanced and having some particular number of languages would not equal a head start in life: where differences between bilinguals and monolinguals exist, they are often “specific to a particular task and sometimes rather subtle” (Grosjean, 2010, p.223). The crucial issue that influences the lack of one definite answer is pinpointed by Grosjean (1996, cited in Bialystok, 2001, p.7); it lies in the following: “bilinguals rarely develop equal fluency in their languages. He discusses how different causal factors, such as migration, nationalism and federalism, education, trade, and intermarriage, lead to different uses of each language in each setting. The proficiency that the child develops in each language, therefore, is a specific response to a set of needs and circumstances.” Thus, the question of a bilingual advantage remains fluctuating, ergo - open.

With the development of bilingual scientific thought, a new question has been raised. It is not the question of bilingualism or monolingualism under the spotlight this time, but the problem of how biased are the conclusions on bilingual advantage theory within our disposition.

In 2014, Bruin, Treccani, and Sala, in their research article *Cognitive Advantage in Bilingualism: An Example of Publication Bias?* have advanced the frontiers of the

bilingual/monolingual confrontation, asking whether the public is provided with the “correct reflection of all research in this field” (Bruin, Treccani and Sala, 2014, p.100). For this research, the data was collected from conference abstracts presented between 1999 and 2012 on the topic of bilingualism and executive control. Abstracts were classified on the basis of their outcome. The results showed a significant difference between the publication outcomes (published or unpublished) of abstracts that challenge and support bilingual-advantage theories. The table below (ibid. p.102) shows an overview of analyzed abstracts:

Result type	Number of abstracts	Number published	Percentage published
All abstracts supporting the bilingual advantage	54	34	63
Bilingual advantage	40	27	68
Mixed data supporting the bilingual advantage	14	7	50
All abstracts challenging the bilingual advantage	50	18	36
Mixed data challenging the bilingual advantage	33	13	39
No bilingual advantage	17	5	29
Bilingual disadvantage	4	2	50
No differences between monolinguals and bilinguals	13	3	23

This research article draws attention to the issue of an academic bias: “Our overview shows that there is a distorted image of the actual study outcomes on bilingualism, with researchers (and media) believing that the positive effect of bilingualism on non-linguistic cognitive processes is strong and unchallenged” (ibid. p.105).

The authors prove their concern regarding possible publication bias within the area that interferes with actual research results. Even though in this research bilingualism is not being criticized as a phenomenon itself, authors believe that there is a certain bias that thrives on socio-cultural and political debates that are “addressing the relevance of bilingualism should not be promoted by ignoring null or negative results” (ibid. p.106). Authors claim that they do not have data on what stage does it become problematic to work on bilingual disadvantage research and whether authors, upon facing it, just opt to ignore results that are not in demand.

1.4 Conclusion

Contradictory historical approaches presented in this chapter represent bilingualism as either only a negative or solely positive set of circumstances whilst not giving the complete picture of the state of the arts. Currently, considering all the research on cognitive aspects of bilingualism, there is no unified and clear answer whether it is more beneficial to be bilingual or

to go through life with only one's mother language in mental disposition. What can be assured about bilingualism advantage theory is that even though it might hold a publication hegemony nowadays, it is not a panacea for intellectual superiority. Like any other skill, bilingualism has its benefits and costs, and finding out new advantages will not automatically cancel out its disadvantages. In this line of reasoning, bilingualism, released from under inspection of scholars into its natural habitat - human society - becomes a hanger for superimposed meanings.

The goal of presenting the progress of bilingualism studies brings more data to the table in order to disclose the details and underlying processes of Ukrainian bilingualism.

When having the topic of bilingualism under discussion, one should keep in mind that being a powerful tool of communication and an open field to grow biases, supplied in excess by a number of factors, such as media, politics, society, and other influential variables like the multicultural dialogue of today.

2. Conflicted Form of Life

2.1 Form of life

A specific to humans' form of life is attributable to our ability to operate an arbitrary system in terms of abstract concepts, encode and decode, and create meaning through a language that we have acquired culturally. Ludwig Wittgenstein charged the notion of a form of life with the utmost importance of language in providing intelligibility and particular order to our perception of the world.

Within this context, Wittgenstein emphasizes the potentiality of heterogeneity, opines that one's world's limits are not rigid, but constituted through one of the most flexible tools at human's disposition: "*The limits of my language mean the limits of my world,*" further adding that "The world and life are one" (Wittgenstein, 2002, p.68). An American anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1973, p.5), famously wrote that "man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun", specifying himself that under the metaphor of the 'webs of significance' he understands the culture. Geertz's analogy calls our attention to distinct similarities in regards to how both scholars define human's main distinctions from the natural world - language and culture as entities that determine the limits of our world. In line with this logic, how do we 'assign' a place for others in our world and life?

Wittgenstein opens one of the passages in *Philosophical Investigations* with the following phrase: "We also say of some people that they are transparent to us" (Wittgenstein, 1968, p.225). This opening sentence is only here to contrast with the rest of the passage that I will return to in the following paragraph. What stands behind this transparency? Shared context, and on the larger scale - a shared form of life. Since language is inherently bound to human social practices, the simple truth in Wittgenstein's terms is "To imagine a language is to imagine a form of life"(Ibid., para 19). Doesn't this observation profoundly describe how the Ukrainian nation is being reconstructed now? As the reality suggests, it is easier to offer just one criterion - Ukrainian language - on a large scale and exclude Russian-speaking Ukrainians to achieve transparency. Especially under the given circumstances when the enemy is well-known, long-standing, and more than willingly indulges in providing the reasons to uphold the conflict. When everything is unified, all the actors and factors are transparent and simplified.

Now back to the rest of the passage from *Philosophical Investigations*: “It is, however, important as regards this observation that one human being can be a complete enigma to another. We learn this when we come into a strange country with entirely strange traditions; and, what is more, even given a mastery of the country's language. We do not understand the people. (And not because of not knowing what they are saying to themselves.) We cannot find our feet with them” (Ibid., p.225). The events of the past decade in Ukraine proved that it doesn't take to travel to a different country to meet complete enigma personifications - they are in one's fellow citizens. To have a right to be identified as Ukrainian, starting with the year 2014, one is required to switch to the Ukrainian language, keep one's bilinguality to be revealed only in the circumstances that bear personal character, and deny everything that the enemy states as the extension of the state, which is the Russian language. Ukraine is a bilingual country, and the mastery of the country's two major languages is a given. But people do not understand each other. Faced with these developments and divided by so many layers of inflicted different life forms, it is as though Russian-speaking and Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians don't understand each other, as if one group grew to become lions (in Wittgensteinian terms) (Ibid., p. 225) in the eye of another, and sharing at least one common language doesn't serve its function anymore. Nonetheless, the roots of these developments are not within a subject.

An anthropologist Veena Das in her book on the subject of violence *Life and Words. Violence and the Descent into the Ordinary*, offers the study of violence of the events that frame the ethnography (Das, 2007, p.4) on the example of the consequences of the Partition of India. In regards to Wittgenstein's understanding of the form of life, Das derides that “Wittgenstein takes language to be the mark of human sociality: hence human forms of life are defined by the fact that they are forms created by and for those who are in possession of language even as the natural is absorbed within these “social” forms” (Das, 2007, p. 15). Being primarily concentrated on the inquiry into violence as a sociopolitical phenomenon, Das, referring to Stanley Cavell's work *Deciding Decline: Wittgenstein as a Philosopher of Culture*,” (1988, cited in Das, 2007, p. 15) concludes that philosopher's “conventional view of forms of life... emphasizes *form* at the expense of *life*” (Das, 2007, p.15). Thus, life is the object of theorizing in powerful ways, where management of life becomes an affair of the state (Ibid.). Arguing about ethnographies of violence, Das denotes what I consider the process of transformation of a shared form of life into a conflicted one, when “everyday life absorbs the traumatic collective violence that creates boundaries between nations and between ethnic and religious groups” (Ibid., p.16). In the given circumstances, a human being is reduced to fulfilling “... everyday tasks of surviving - having a roof over your head, being able to send your children to school, being able to do the work of the

everyday without constant fear of being attacked” (Das, 2007, p.216). Reducing people to their constitution in the survival mode of being, based on their ethnic origin or their mother tongue, demarcates a form of life with the outside restrictions, using people in question inner characteristic that, as was mentioned at the beginning of the chapter in the quotes from Wittgenstein and Geertz are meant to comprise our personal, internal limits. In this body of study, such a reversed by outside forces form of life will be scrutinized, referring to as a conflicted form of life.

Further in this paper, the above conclusion will be used to study the development of the linguistic landscape in Ukraine to offer an analytically-driven analysis of the Crimea crisis, distorted by propaganda and misinterpretation from all the interested parties.

2.2 Role of Myth in Building an “It Is As It Should Be” State: Reading Roland Barthes, Ernest Cassirer, and Henry Tudor

Roland Barthes, a French philosopher, semiotician, and literary theorist, brought about new perspectives to understanding how to build influence through repurposing all the properties the phenomena in question possess. Barthes was primarily focusing on a myth that strives on popular culture, whilst mythology within its political influence was studied by authors such as Baruch Spinoza, Ernest Cassirer, and Henry Tudor (Bottici, 2009; Cassirer, 1946; Tudor, 1972). However, there is a decisive remark to be made here: with political propaganda, realized by means of mass media and justified through linguistic issues (Ukrainian case), the borders of different myths are not that vivid, and political and everyday merge. Politics succumb to what is considered to be an “it is as it should be” state, forming a form of life that thrives, to a large extent, on artificial grounds. Modern technologies play a crucial part in extending the frontiers of political mythology, making propaganda omnipresent.

Before expanding Barthes’s approach, I want to provide a succinct overview of how several major *Mythologies*’ author conceptual predecessors - Henry Tudor and Ernest Cassirer perceived political myth. It will help to broaden the understanding of the issue on the whole and Barthes’s view in particular, by offering strong points to compliment the ability to read myths today.

2.2.1 Henry Tudor’s “Political Myth”

Henry Tudor in his work *Political myth* draws a generalized definition of a myth, suggesting that: “A myth ... is an interpretation of what the myth-maker (rightly or wrongly) takes to be hard fact. It is a device men adopt in order to come to grips with reality”. It should be added that for a political myth, it is about creating a device to make the general public, foreign policymakers - all the actors of the political process to “come to the grips” with the created reality. In the following chapter, I will go into more details of reading political myths, driven by the example of the current Crimean crisis. The author makes a similar point to that of Barthes, ascertaining that: “The well-known myths of the Greeks are clearly stories, and so are the various political myths we have discussed. This, however, does not mean that myths are the product of pure fantasy” (Tudor, 1972, p.137). A modern political myth, in order to withstand the competition with reality (I guess we can omit the validity of this truism for some countries, such as North Korea), has to grow to become a superstructure above the reality: “We may disagree with the account they give of these people and events, but they are not fiction” (Ibid., p.138). Regarding the narrowing definitions of what constitutes a political myth, the author continues that “... (it) is one which tells the story of a political society” (Ibid., p.138). The following passage is of particular interest for this study, as will be illustrated in the third chapter: “In many cases, it (a political myth) is the story of a political society that existed or was created in the past and which must now be restored or preserved” (Ibid., p.138) ... “Furthermore, a political myth is always the myth of a particular group. It has as its hero or protagonist, not an individual, but a tribe, a nation, a race, a class or even a chance collection of exiles and immigrants” (Ibid., p.139).

When Ukrainian national integrity was hanging by a thread in 2014, the myths that were misusing the reality singled out not one tribe, but several: those who were proper Ukrainians - i.e., speaking Ukrainian and ‘the others’. Those others, also known as the Russian-speaking Ukrainians, were not left to be mere outsiders to the Ukrainian form of life; instead, rather promptly, this ‘tribe’ was included into a granted ‘protagonist's' role in yet another myth, generated by the current Russian government. The following extract from Tudor gives an accurate account of what such mythological appropriation constitutes: “A political myth may, for instance, establish the claim of a certain group to hegemony, sovereign independence or an extension of territory; it may help strengthen the solidarity of the group in the face of a major challenge; it may serve to encourage the resistance of an oppressed minority; or it may supply compelling arguments for the abolition of undesirable institutions. And, where the myth is the story of a political society already in existence, it may sanctify the constitution of that society, inspire its members with confidence in their destiny and glorify their achievements” (Ibid., p.

139). Tudor avers the power of a political myth to influence socio-political processes through its extensive influencing resources to shape a new reality.

2.2.2. Ernest Cassirer's "Myth of the State"

Ernest Cassirer offers a more radical definition of Mythology: "Mythology is ... represented as pathological both in its origin and in its essence. It is a disease that begins in the field of language and, by a dangerous infection, spreads over the whole body of human civilization" (Cassirer, 1946, p.19). In his study on political mythology, *The myth of the state*, Cassirer merges a modern (for the author) understanding of a myth as one of the major powers that stands behind the politics with that reading of a myth as a narrative of a folklore genre. The author draws a comparison of living in a political system to living on volcanic soil; thus, those affected by political processes (which is everyone), "... must be prepared for abrupt convulsions and eruptions" (Cassirer, 1946, p.280). In all critical moments of man's social life, the rational forces that resist the rise of the old mythical conceptions are no longer sure of themselves. In these moments, the time for myth has come again. For myth has not been really vanquished and subjugated. It is always there, lurking in the dark and waiting for its hour and opportunity. This hour comes as soon as the other binding forces of man's social life, for one reason or another, lose their strength and are no longer able to combat the demonic mythical powers" (Cassirer, 1946, p.280). In other words, political myth is at its most powerful during times of disruption, times of the need for critical change, and radical choices. Myth becomes, in Cassirer's terms both "fruitful soil" for new meanings and a "dangerous infection" of a society.

The following passage from Cassirer is built on the assertion that political myths are aimed at setting and saving the "it is as it should be" state in line with Barthes's approach to mythology definitions. The author sees political myths as an artificial construct that promises justification, required to preserve a fabula: "The new political myths do not grow up freely; they are not wild fruits of an exuberant imagination. They are artificial things fabricated by very skillful and cunning artisans." Cassirer elaborates the idea that he finds rather fascinating, connecting the technical "accomplishments" of the twentieth century of creating modern and more efficient weapons with to new opportunities in myths' production: "...myths can be manufactured in the same sense and according to the same methods as any other modern weapon - as machine guns or airplanes" (Cassirer, 1946, p.282).

When working towards revealing the technique of the modern political myth, Cassirer offers new perspectives on the function of the language that, with the development of civilizations, grants the word with additional function, beyond its semantical (in authors definition) one. The additional function is the “magical use of the word” (Cassirer, 1946, p. 283). The author develops the theory that a semantic function of the word is an inherent function since it serves the core role of human speech existence. The influence of the magical word, however, is no less crucial - “it tries to produce effects and to change the course of nature” (Ibid., p. 283). What is required to realize the true potential of the latter’s function is “an elaborate magical art. The magician, or sorcerer is alone able to govern the magic word. But in his hands, it becomes a most powerful weapon. Nothing can resist its force” (Ibid., p. 283). And this place is occupied by a politician - the modern voice of mythical creation and transvaluation.

The author claims that the above magical transformation can be easily spotted in the German books, printed in the last decade.⁹ “New words have been coined; and even the old ones are used in a new sense; they have undergone a deep change of meaning. This change of meaning depends on the fact that those words formerly used in a descriptive, logical, or semantic sense are now used as magic words destined to produce certain effects and stir up certain emotions. Our ordinary words are charged with meanings; but these new-fangled words are charged with feelings and violent passions” (Cassirer, 1946, p. 283). This statement resonates with Barthes approach towards the details of myth creation. Barthes’ myth uses “materials of speech” as a raw material for mythogenesis. Let’s take words of language for example: their unity is achieved through being reduced to a mere language, a sum of signs. Next, myth inhibits them (Barthes, 1991, p.113). Cassirer contrasts “powers of myth” to “superior forces ... intellectual, ethical, and artistic”. In his scheme of definitions, such forces are the factor that “guard” the language from “the evil myth powers”, from “mythical thought then starts to rise anew and to pervade the whole of man's cultural and social life” (Cassirer, 1946, p. 298).

2.2.3 Roland Barthes’ “Mythologies”

Ten years later, in 1957, Roland Barthes will publish his *Mythologies*, making amends to what constitutes the function of myth, which for him is to “... empty reality: it is, literally, a ceaseless flowing out, a haemorrhage, or perhaps evaporation, in short a perceptible absence” (Barthes, 1991, p. 155). One sees striking similarities to the latter author’s reading of myth as violent actions against reality. “What is characteristic of myth? To transform a meaning into

⁹ Considering that the book was released in the year 1942, we may draw a safe assumption that Ernest Cassirer means the 30th.

form. In other words, myth is always a language-robbery” (Ibid., 1991, p. 131). This action of language-robbery is pertinent to bilingualism discourse in Ukraine and Crimean crisis in particular - more on this convoluted issue in the following chapter.

Language robbery allows for all the richness of the meaning of some phenomena to be torn apart from it, put at a distance, making room for second-order mythological schema (Ibid., 1991, p. 116, 131). In the third chapter ¹⁰I will offer my analysis of Vladimir Putin's speech on the annexation of Crimea, hailed as Crimean Spring by Russian political propaganda. This naming is a vivid example of language's, in Barthes terms, “robbery by colonization”. This colonization is possible since “... a language offers to myth an open-work meaning. Myth can easily insinuate itself into it, and swell there” (Barthes, 1991, p. 132). Barthes' views will be more thoroughly approached in the following chapter for an analytical walk-through of one notorious political speech. To conclude this chapter, I will dare to include Tudor's comment on the nature of political myth: “A political myth, I have suggested, purports to be a plain account of events. It is a story told with a view to promoting some practical purpose, and it is successful only insofar as it is believed to be a true story” (Tudor, 1972, p. 132-133).

¹⁰ Subsequent subchapter 3.1.4

3. Politicizing Bilingualism

*“Nothing is more inconsistent than a political regime that is indifferent to the truth: but nothing is more dangerous than a political system that claims to prescribe the truth.”*¹¹

Ukraine, in its independence years, while zigzagging economically and culturally between East and West with other post-Soviet countries (post-Soviet world), had to deal with the language policies dilemma to regulate the language of the ethnic majority, which is Ukrainian, and the lingua franca of the former Soviet Union - Russia.

The path has been arduous, and the country has always been influenced by mixed settlements of borderlands, the ones on the East forming the second biggest ethnolinguistic group of Ukrainian with Russian heritage. The issue culminated in 2019 at the legislative level in the new Language Law adopted by the former Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko and approved by the Ukrainian Parliament on the 25th of April, 2019. “The law provides that every citizen of Ukraine is obliged to speak Ukrainian as the language of his or her citizenship” (UNIAN Information Agency, 2019). On the surface, the step towards establishing presents itself as the only logical step, with only a fair question of why it was adopted 28 years after independence from the USSR.¹² During these 28 years, Ukrainian has always been one only state language. However, in fact, during these turbulent times, the reality of all the spheres the language was used in, was not conveying this linguistic unification. Half of the Ukrainian territory - East, South, and some central cities such as the country’s capital city of Kyiv did not comply with the denomination of Ukrainian-speaking territories, with the Russian language dominating media and culture as well. More details on this will be given below. A compelling idea, popularly referred to in Ukrainian realities of today, declares inability to achieve cultural growth and the country's evolvement without language unification. Curiously, however, it would be ignorant to deny that Ukraine is a multilingual country with two languages sharing the major influence – the Ukrainian and Russian, the latter language being, to put it mildly, on an official level out of favor.

¹¹ Foucault, 1989, cited in Das, 2007 p. 39

¹² The Act of Declaration of Independence of Ukraine was adopted by the Ukrainian parliament on 24 August 1991

This chapter argues that the language situation in Ukraine was not attended to for 24 years,¹³ developing mostly under the given circumstances such as the language preferences of the ethnic majority of the population that varies from one region to another, and the influence of the state of shared borders with either Eastern or Western neighboring countries, hence a particularly polarizing cultural narratives, used in the crisis to fuel hostility and mistrust on both sides of conflict. The aforementioned factors were shaping the culture that was never exhaustively formed as a unified one within the state borders of modern Ukraine. To a large degree, these features were a decisive factor in the conflict in the Ukrainian East and the annexation of Crimea in 2014.

Since 2014, the aim to fortify territorial borders with Russia evidently led to intangible borders being drawn on a language principle within this bilingual country. The separation is happening by enabling the linguistic division within the country, where Ukrainian and Russian languages coexisted and formed a unique multilingual modern Ukrainian culture, which is today in denial¹⁴. The given circumstances are agitated by the fact that the Ukrainian language is undergoing its revival from a state of decline. Today, in the capital city of Kyiv, both Russian and Ukrainian languages are spoken, yet, these days mark a notable shift from the recent past when the city was primarily Russian-speaking. The shift was primarily caused by an influx of the rural population and migrants from the western regions of Ukraine. To a large extent driven by inner duty to ‘fight the enemy’ through available means, Kievans turn to use the language they speak at home more widely in everyday matters. In northern and central Ukraine, Russian is the language of the urban population, where in urban areas, Ukrainian was considered provincial. While in rural areas, the Ukrainian is much more common. In the south and the east of Ukraine, Russian is prevalent even in rural areas, and in Crimea, Ukrainian is almost absent. The Ukrainian language was under an adverse influence of dominating countries, mostly the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires, that set the frames of language usage by not raising its status to the level of administrative usage. “The years of Soviet rule created a hierarchy, in which Russian became the language of economic and social mobility, while Ukrainian was considered a rural language” (Peterson, 2014). The oppressive laws that clearly delivered the message of the Russian republic being above all others were delivered in the Russian language.

¹³ 1991-2014

¹⁴ more on the issue in the subchapter dedicated to culture restrictions

Faced with these developments, it may be concluded that Ukrainian culture meets two major stumbling blocks: first, an ever-present for Ukrainian history absence of national unity and no substantial and continuous policy towards formulating it since the collapse of the USSR. Second, appropriation of exclusion and unification policy evoked by the unfortunate yet predicted results that the just mentioned path brought along.

In an extensive work on bilingualism titled *Dangerous Multilingualism: Northern Perspectives on Order, Purity and Normality*, Blommaert et al. (2012, p.3) claim that luckily, nowadays, a person would not get their mouth washed with soap as a punishment for being bilingual, more specifically, for speaking one's native language, which was the case of Native American children, Aborigines in Australia and Africans in the colonial empires. Metaphorically speaking, these brutal instances rather accurately illustrate the language situation and nation-wide inflicted trauma of the USSR policy of establishing lingua franca across the Soviet States. Today, the tables have turned, and the Russian language in Ukraine is a language non grata. To be more precise, not the language itself, but people who are the 'carriers' - those happen to be Ukrainians yet Russian speakers. Those people belong to a linguistic group that can hardly be labeled a linguistic minority. In several regions, namely, Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk, native Russian speakers constitute more than 50% of the population (Ogarkova, 2018). Fascinating coincidence that these are the infamous regions that have been in major political and military distress for the last seven years. Hence, the premise of this chapter is that Ukrainian bilingualism is the cornerstone of the conflicted form of life that is characteristic of Ukraine. This line of inquiry will be defended against positions that offer a denial of the fact that language conflict is completely a product of Russian military strategy thus must be mitigated through the precipitous exclusion of one language.

The aim of this chapter is to offer some insights and suggestions for a more comprehensive understanding of Ukrainian-Russian bilingualism as not merely a political set of circumstances, instead, as a form of life manifested as a conflict. Needless to stress, it is not the author's intention to provide a comprehensive account of the complex processes of the Ukrainian identity crisis. Instead, I will only recapitulate some of the ideologies that serve as the primary source for molding the particular form of life built on the distorted nation's self-image. Let us begin by expounding on the historical and cultural background to clarify the root causes of one of the major conundrums in contemporary Ukraine.

3.1 Crimean Perspective

3.1.1 Historical Overview

Crimea is, as one might venture to say, a territory with a complicated historical background. Since ancient times, the peninsula's position on the Black Sea maintained a geographically strategic location, making the land much sought after by various external actors.

Crimea peninsula is a vivid example of a cultural melting pot. Hence, a better picture would be drawn by presenting a brief historical overview of the main ruling forces. It should be mentioned that for the purposes of this work, a rough listing would suffice.

Beginning with the 15th century BCE, the Cimmerians migrated to the region. Later, they shared the territory with the Tauri, Scythians, and Sarmatians, who were the major tribes to settle in the peninsula a few centuries later after the Cimmerians (Hrapunov, 2012).

After, the Greek and Roman empires incorporated the region into their realms. Among the peninsula's occupiers were Goths, Huns, Bulgars, Khazars, Kievan Rus', the Byzantine Empire, the Kipchaks, and the Golden Horde. In the 13th century CE, Crimean harbors were controlled by the Republic of Venice and Genoa. Time from the 15th up to the 18th century went under the auspices of the Ottoman Empire: Crimea's territory was formed into The Crimean Khanate, a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire, followed by becoming a part of the Russian Empire at the end of the 18th century. In the year of 1954, Crimea was claimed to become a "gift" to Ukraine by Khrushchev ¹⁵(though, the details are still under question - to what extent the decision on the transfer of the Crimean region of the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR was beneficial for Ukraine at that time, namely to what extent it was a gift rather than a burden Ukraine had shouldered at that moment) (Snyder, 2005). What is remarkable about this transfer is that the Crimean people have not felt this change. My grandmother recalled that it just happened overnight and, one winter's morning, she read in a newspaper that now they were a part of Ukraine. No one really paid attention to that, allegedly, striking news. The water in the sea was still salty, the Sun was up in the skies, and the Crimeans were still the invincible Soviet Union. As we today know, she was wrong - empires always fall, so did the USSR.

¹⁵ Nikita Khrushchev was first secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (1953–64) and premier of the Soviet Union (1958–64).

After the collapse, following a brief tussle with the newly independent Ukrainian government, Crimeans voted to remain a part of Ukraine, but with significant autonomy (including its constitution, legislature, and the president). In 1997, Ukraine and Russia signed a bilateral Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership, which formally allowed Russia to keep its Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol (Taylor, 2014). Which, in turn, had a significant role to play in the notorious event of 2014. According to the above mentioned, Crimea is an apple of discord (that is to say, one out of the many on the discord apple tree) between the Russian Federation and Ukraine. Nowadays Crimea, distorted with the turmoil of being Ukrainian *de jure* and Russian *de facto*, as years pass by, is probable to become a ‘frozen conflict,’ with many reasons and seemingly no real solution that will satisfy both sides in the conflict.

3.1.2 Cultural Background

The main determinants of the unfortunate linguistic complexity of the Ukrainian - Russian bilingualism on the modern Ukraine territory are certain historical and cultural factors that are to be discussed below. Ukraine as a state underwent a long and thorny path of establishing statehood. As political scientist Volodymyr Kulyk mentions, the Soviet past is “... the only past common to all Ukrainian regions, because it was only in the 1940s that they found themselves in one polity after many centuries of divided existence” (Kulyk, 2006, P. 287). This past was dominated by stressing the importance of unifying, first and foremost, under the Russian language hegemony. The current problematic language situation in Ukraine is ‘much obliged’ to the historical repository of experiences related to the Russian language, most of which may be traced to the claim that originated in imperial Russian times that Ukrainian is not a language, yet rather a dialect of Russian - ‘Malorosian’¹⁶. It refrained through the Russian-Ukrainian relationship for centuries. Given the conventional nature of the distinction between language and dialect, it has been yet another log on this long-lasting fire. "A language is a dialect with an army and navy" (O'Leary, 2000) - a popularized by Max Weinreich claim aptly characterizes the position of national languages of Republics of the Soviet Union. Language establishes its supremacy over dialect through power, and, according to Max Weinreich, any dialect can become a language given an army and a navy.

According to the Soviet census of 1989, Ukraine had a population of 72.7 percent who spoke Ukrainian as their first language, while a further 22.1 percent spoke Russian as a mother

¹⁶ Malorosia (*rus Малороссия; eng Little Russia*) - a geographical and historical term used to describe the modern-day territories of Ukraine.

tongue. These numbers do not seem to represent a complete picture since Ukrainian territory is a patchwork of regions that underwent different state-forming paths and were not united into a territory known today as Ukraine until its USSR period. Therefore, the ethnic variable in Ukraine is quite vibrant and complex. As Andrew Wilson (1997, cited in Barbour, 2002, p.273) has argued, Ukraine is “a society that is both bi-ethnic and bilingual, but which on the other hand is not strictly bipolar because the ethnic and linguistic divides between the Ukrainian and Russian spheres do not coincide”. This assumption appeared to be valid until its inefficiency was definitively exposed by the crisis of 2014.

The language conflict has been repeatedly highlighted throughout the history of Ukrainian independence on the occasion of significant political or social turbulence such as presidential as well as parliamentary elections or revolutions (Orange Revolution in 2004 - 2005, Euromaidan 2013 - 2014). One of the greatest misconceptions that have been leading to a growing number of negative connotations of Russian-Ukrainian bilingualism is assigning the Russian language solely to Russia as a state, denying the possibility of separating language and culture from a state that claims to ‘own’ the language. The language conflict is falsely assumed by default to belong intrinsically to East/West civilization choice. To illustrate this widespread and highly popular embellishment, let us consider the argument presented by a sociologist Hanna Zalizniak: “...building a balanced language model for Ukraine is complicated by the fact that Ukrainian speaking and Russian speaking citizens differently view not only the linguistic future of the country but also its civilization choice. Consequently, the language problems in Ukraine go beyond the realm of pure linguistics into the sphere of politics...”(Zalizniak in Juliane Besters-Dilger, 2009, p.171). We cannot deny obvious merit in suggesting that “language problems in Ukraine go beyond the realm of pure linguistics into the sphere of politics”. However, Zalizniak has, as I see it, the order wrong. The conflict starts with politics. This approach allows me to paraphrase Zalizniak’s statement as follows: language problems in Ukraine go beyond the realm of pure politics into the sphere of linguistics. The author claims that “... the spread of European integration preferences in the country will be accompanied by strengthening the state language's positions. The task of the language policy will be to find a balance of interest between various parts of the public during the transition period of Ukraine’s European integration” (Ibid., p.171). In this piece, Zalizniak was working on developing the idea of an unavoidable civilizational clash within the borders of modern Ukraine. Following the studies by the American political scientist Samuel Huntington the author was working on proving the point of strict division of Ukraine on East and West in terms of Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations. Through the above approach, Zalizniak promotes the idea of aspect blindness, allowing for perceiving only one

aspect at a time of a highly complex phenomenon of Ukrainian bilingualism. I will return to this notion at the end of this subchapter.

To further prove the above statement, an evaluation of historical and research data is in place. The Constitution of Ukraine adopted in 1996 states that there is one state and official language within the Ukrainian state borders. However, this statement has been in power rather on the grounds of symbolism than pragmatism. The state, from the beginning, has tolerated a vast extent of the use of Russian in various spheres of public life, culture, and even on the parliamentary level. This was possible due to the mutual transparency (intelligibility) of the Russian and Ukrainian languages (Olszański, 2012, p.5). As it turned out, Ukrainians today all bear the costs of their languages' transparency.

In 2012, the Kivalov-Kolesnichenko Language Law was adopted. It expanded the authority of regional languages, resulting in a number of Ukrainian oblasts and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea recognizing Russian as their official regional language (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, revised version 2020). Other languages used, in accordance with the Law, by more than 10% of locals in particular regions that also got a status of regional language were Belarusian, Bulgarian, Armenian, Gagauz, Yiddish, Crimean Tatar, Moldavian, German, Modern Greek, Polish, Romani, Romanian, Slovak, Hungarian, Rusyn, Karaim, and Krymchak. In 2014 with a former pro-Russian president Victor Yanukovich fleeing the country, the Law was repealed by a new government. It was proclaimed unconstitutional and recognized as a curtailment of Ukrainian language within the regions where the position of regional language(s) was strengthened due to Kivalov-Kolesnichenko Language Law adoption. This Law could have been a major breakthrough, but it was corrupted in its core by the poor intentions of the delinquent, openly pro-Russian government.

In March 2014, after the Maidan killings and around the time of a controversial Crimean Status Referendum, Ukrainian TV Channels all aired with the same logo that displayed the following slogan: “Єдина країна – Единая страна.”¹⁷ This initiative, by equating the phrase ‘A Unified country’ in both languages, stressed the importance of unity through diversity, equality, and value of both major languages, yet, was not widely welcomed by the Ukrainian-speaking population who viewed the Russian language as a threat to national identity. One of the best-known Kyiv-based linguistics, Larysa Masenko made a following statement regarding the

¹⁷ Єдина країна (ukr) Единая страна (rus) - A unified country (my translation)

initiative: “The currently popular slogan ‘Єдина країна – Единая страна’ is faulty: it solidifies bilingualism on a country level, that is, it strengthens Russian as a second state language. In other words, it does not unify the country but divides it. By saying ‘A Unified country’ (Единая страна) in Russian, we turn to those living in the east and assert that Ukrainian, which is a special symbol of the unification of the nation, is not obligatory, even for the president. With this, we betray Ukrainians, primarily those living in the east, who are loyal to their language despite the constant pressure from the Russian speaking environment” (Masenko, 2014).

The issue of bilingualism was never thoroughly attended to, corroding national integrity. The practical absence of adequate cultural, especially language policy and underfunding over the years of Ukrainian independence, along with failure to count in Russophones¹⁸ as an integral and equal part of Ukrainian society, are presented as undeniable prerequisites of the current crisis. Only when the present has uncovered all the past mistakes appeared a trend for setting a nationwide (now except for Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk regions) course for building identity, alas, through exclusive unification. A prime statement of post-Maidan political course and values was raised by the then-incumbent¹⁹ president Petro Poroshenko. He became the first president of Independent Ukraine to proclaim a defined line of action towards unquestionable unification. His 2019 presidential election slogan “Army! Language! Faith!” (BBC News, 2019), striving after unification based on exclusion and othering of Ukrainian Russophones²⁰. This path raises a broader issue, moral and cognitive, at its core. Exclusion and marginalization of part of the population also inflict cognitive disadvantages on those with dominant bilinguality in the Russian language.

William E. Conklin (in Riggins, 1997, p.226) states that “Excluded groups are considered as existing outside the norm. Thus texts, interpretive practices, and social conduct differentiate among persons to render benefits to some persons and to exclude others”. Such tendencies drive Russophones out of the accepted norm of what constitutes the property of being a Ukrainian citizen. Patriotism is being reduced to and enforced within the strictly defined criteria of unity on the basis of one language, one religion, and an army to protect the unidimensional state.

¹⁸ Russophone – the term will be used to “refer to all those who use Russian as their daily and/or preferable language of communication regardless of what language they consider to be their mother tongue” (Skvirskaja in Juliane Besters- Dilger (ed.) p. 179)

¹⁹ Petro Poroshenko served as the fifth President of Ukraine from 2014 to 2019. Volodymyr Zelensky was elected President of Ukraine on 21 April 2019, beating incumbent president Petro Poroshenko with nearly 73% of the vote to Poroshenko's 25%. <https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2019/04/21/7213119/>

²⁰ Military message and religious appeal of the slogan were intentionally omitted.

²¹Overwhelming patriotism, which rather brightly establishes itself as a uniform behavior in authoritarian states or those in a state of a war crisis, is often supported by chauvinism, xenophobia, and blind hatred, as the cornerstones of true devotion to one's motherland. Bernard Russell argues that the process of substituting a state for the father bears dire consequences. In his work *Marriage and Morals*, he refers to the state authorities, who are "... probably peculiarly apt to regard human beings, not as ends in themselves, but as material for some kind of construction. Moreover, the administrator invariably likes uniformity" (Russell, 2009, p.78). The cornerstone of the current Ukrainian nationalism is a transition into a monolingual country since bilingualism is disadvantageous when viewed as a political tool. Russell radically states that: "Undoubtedly patriotism, so-called, is the gravest danger to which civilization is at present exposed, and anything that increases its virulence is more to be dreaded than plague, pestilence, and famine" (Ibid. p.79). Patriotism that asserts its norms through the exclusion of others on the basis of language within the state borders of one country with a cultural and historical background such as Ukraine does fall under an alarming Russell's description.

3.1.3 Crimea: Actual or Perceived Injustice?

In the contemporary discourse on possibilities of bilingualism in Ukraine, the Crimea case's role and significance are conveniently omitted. An official version is built exclusively on implications of Russian aggression as the only reason behind the current Crimea crisis.

However, there is substantial evidence that deficient language policy that has been cultivated for the last 30 years²², along with failure to build one nation on the grounds of cultural and linguistic inclusion of several major ethnicities, are, in reality, the major factors that contributed to separation and creation of the conflicted form of life.

Exclusion instead of appropriation of the Russian language resulted in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine (Donetsk and Luhansk regions) existing in different cultural and linguistic settings than the rest of Ukraine, more excluded than the other regions on the basis of the dominant language within. Crude statements regarding Ukraine's national identity, such as "possession of a single, common language is considered the main requirement for forming and consolidating a nation" (Shevchenko, 2015, p. 1) are resonating with a deep divide between what constitutes Ukraine on

²¹ Referring to the election slogan *Army! Language! Faith!*

²² Ukraine gained its independence in 1991

papers and in reality. In reality, Crimea and the Eastern Ukrainian regions were not counted in, and the locals of those regions were not heard in their mother tongue, Russian, that their bilingualism was not a factor to ignore when rebuilding a nation.

Wittgenstein opens one of the passages in *Philosophical Investigations* with the following words: “We also say of some people that they are transparent to us” (Wittgenstein, 1968, p.225). This opening sentence is only here to contrast with the rest of the passage that I will return to in the following paragraph. What stands behind this transparency? Shared context, and on the larger scale - a shared form of life. Since language is inherently bound to human social practices, the simple truth in Wittgenstein’s terms is “To imagine a language is to imagine a form of life” (Ibid., para 19). Doesn’t this observation profoundly describe how the Ukrainian nation is being reconstructed now? As the reality suggests, it is easier to offer just one criterion - Ukrainian language - on a large scale and exclude Russian-speaking Ukrainians to achieve transparency. Especially under the given circumstances when the enemy is well-known, long-standing, and more than willingly indulges in providing the reasons to uphold the conflict. When everything is unified, all the actors and factors are transparent and simplified.

Now back to the rest of the passage from *Philosophical Investigations*: “It is, however, important as regards this observation that one human being can be a complete enigma to another. We learn this when we come into a strange country with entirely strange traditions; and, what is more, even given a mastery of the country's language. We do not understand the people. (And not because of not knowing what they are saying to themselves.) We cannot find our feet with them” (Ibid., p.225). The events of the past decade in Ukraine proved that it doesn’t take to travel to a different country to meet complete enigma personifications - they are in one’s fellow citizens. To have a right to be identified as Ukrainian, starting with the year 2014, one is required to switch to the Ukrainian language, keep one’s bilinguality to be revealed only in the circumstances that bear personal character, and deny everything that the enemy states as the extension of the state, which is Russian language. Ukraine is a bilingual country, and the mastery of the country’s two major languages is a given. But people do not understand each other. Divided by so many layers of inflicted different life forms, it is as though Russian-speaking and Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians don’t understand each other, as if one group grew to become lions (in Wittgensteinian terms) (Ibid., p. 225) in the eye of another, and talking doesn’t serve its function anymore.

The previous chapter underlined that a form of life is a notion that inevitably interweaves references to culture, world view, and language. In Ukraine, forms of life were normally conflated under one signifier - a so-called Ukrainian form of life, which, institutionally, is characterized solely through Ukrainian language and culture that, consequently, is constituted through the Ukrainian language only. Drozda states: “The present situation in Ukraine is an example of how a linguistic and cultural war can become a precondition and official principle of a real war” (Drozda, 2014, p. 48). At the same time, Osnach (2015) ascertains: “Wherever we look, the current Russian-Ukrainian war began because of the language. It is an indisputable fact. Russia has just used the language factor as a reason for aggression – by explaining that they need to protect the Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine.” I want to add that this clandestine operation was perfectly timed - when Ukraine was under a wave of unification under the Ukrainian language, which would not have been an applicable option for the lost East and South. To prove this point, it is on time to draw meaning from the data collected during the last poll, conducted before the occupation of Crimea in 2014. The poll presents the data collected during September 20 – October 2, 2011, on attitudes regarding the Crimean economic, social, and political landscape. Let us take into consideration several results that regard self-identification of people living in Crimea:

Regardless of your passport, do you consider yourself a...?

Russian - 45%

Crimean - 28%²³

Ukrainian - 14%

Crimean Tater - 8%

Other - 2%

DK/NA 3%²⁴

Ethnicity

Russian - 64%

Ukrainian - 23%

Crimean Tatar - 9%

Other - 4%

Language usually spoken at home

²³ Not an ethnicity but a territory-based common self-identification in Crimea

²⁴ Do not know/no answer

Russian - 88%
Ukrainian and Russian equally - 4%
Russian and other equally - 4%
Crimean Tatar - 3%
Ukrainian - 1%

Most studies on the Ukrainian language situation have deliberately avoided taking this region to draw a whole picture of the language conundrum in Ukraine. The above data remains at the margins of the Crimean discourse.

Crimea is used in this work as a case study to illustrate how a form of life manifested through a conflict can evoke a major nationwide disruption on the basis of bilingualism. Crimean political heritage is rich and multicultural. A glance at the history of the times sovereignty changed hands reveals that the Crimean question did not come about as a result of the recent conflict. The Crimeans have a complicated sense of national identity. According to political analyst and specialist in Ukrainian studies Tadeusz Andrzej Olszański (2012, p.7), the main reasons were:

- The short-term character of the region's links with Ukraine
- Crimea's geographic isolation²⁵
- The formal autonomy of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea

The gains of the last legitimate poll on public opinion presented valuable information on the linguistic state of affairs in Crimea prior to the annexation, allowing to draw substantial conclusions of how an idea of unification under one language and culture might not have been the brightest idea. In fact, it obliterated the chance of an equitable dialog in every sense of the word.

Beissinger (2010, p.150) elaborates on the idea of the state delivering the policies, at all hazards, to normalize the gains: "through its policies the state seeks to shape the beliefs of its citizens about nationhood in accordance with dominant understandings, to naturalize these

²⁵ Crimea is a peninsula connected to the mainland of Ukraine by the Isthmus of Perekop, a 5-7 kilometers wide strip of land.

understandings, and to present them as inevitable and unalterable.” But, as mentioned in the first chapter, in the case of state bilingualism, the losses cannot simply be ignored.

People will not willingly switch to another language with a wave of a magic wand. Balanced bilingualism is not so common, and the use of language can shift through an individual’s life in a dynamic fashion. In this work, bilingualism is described as a broad sense of the potential to use two languages irrespective of the current language utilization, proficiency, and age of acquisition²⁶. Thus, there is always one dominant language, and the switch to another one in adult age results in language attrition (Hamers and Blanc, 2003). As was already stated in the first chapter of this study, it is not the author’s intention to comprehensively account for this complex phenomenon on these pages. Instead, to demonstrate the toll that using bilingualism as a political tool takes on the country.

In the situation of superimposed and diglossic bilingualism (both terms are explained in the first chapter of the current study), the question of whether bilingualism's advantages or disadvantages prevail does not even arise to see the light of the day. Neither the problems of possible language attrition are considered - the dialog has never been opened. The internal dispute is resolved by silencing the voices that articulate the disputed reality that does not fit pre-set unification frames. The state commands and sets the principal course of development and action, at the same time distancing itself from reality: “... the state can penetrate the life of the community and yet remain distant and elusive” (Das, 2007, p.178).

3.1.4 Reading the Crimea Myth

In her talk on NPR's Morning Edition, Nina Khrushcheva, an associate professor of international affairs at The New School in New York City, highlights that “... the brutal Soviet legacy is fueling resistance to Russian domination today” (Greene, 2014). This statement legitimately refers to the refusal to succumb to the imperialistic inclinations of the current Russian government. However, unfortunately, it has already spread to characterize all things Russian in the context of modern Ukraine. The fatal failure in distinguishing what was worth appropriation - meaning the issue of Russian language status in Ukraine - as I have already pointed out, was initially fueled by ideological flair. This “flair” breeds on an artificial ideological and not utterly logical construct, which has its own independent laws and logic in

²⁶ Refer to the chapter 1.2 of the given study

itself and is a major power when it comes to common ideas, for example, on a scale of one country. I dare to interpret it through the lenses of the artificial construct named myth. According to Roland Barthes (1991), the special trick of myth is to present an ethos, ideology, or set of values as if it were a natural condition of the world, when in fact it's no more than another limited, man-made perspective. A myth doesn't describe the natural state of the world but expresses the intentions of its teller, be that a person of any trade and walk of life (Ibid.). Cassirer wrote that: "The preponderance of mythical thought over rational thought in some of our modern political systems is obvious" (Cassirer, 1946 p.3). In this chapter, I will attempt to prove this statement by analyzing one of the most famous and unsettling speech, given in regards to the Crimea peninsula.

Speaking about limited, man-made perspectives, I want to offer for analysis a quite remarkable speech (if approached equipped with Barthes' view of mythology), delivered by one of today's most controversial political figures - Vladimir Putin. Before we dive into this discourse analysis, it is important to recognize one influential factor for this specific body of work, i.e., that "The new Kremlin doctrine aiming to recover Russia's role as the geo-political center of the post-Soviet space was linked to Vladimir Putin's political era" (Ryazanova, 2014, p.253). Thus, his notorious Crimea speech (Putin, 2014) is an invaluable tool in interpreting the grounding in the polarization of Ukrainian society on the basis of its conflicting bilingualism.

On the 18th of March, 2014, shortly after a non-legitimate referendum that took place in Crimea, the Russian President delivered an address in a vast guildhall of the Kremlin. The clandestine operation in Crimea that led to the region's annexation, he christened the "Crimean Spring" - the naming bearing the connotation of liberalization and unity in the face of military invasion - a quite ironic choice of the epithet in the light of the circumstances of another politically charged 'Spring' - the Prague one. Yet, it is imperative to leave a notice here that the Crimean situation is not entirely relatable to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The arguments presented within this work beg to differ. The arguments referred to are the language and cultural settings already brought to a detailed mention in previous chapters.²⁷

Now let us give our undivided attention to the infamous Kremlin speech with the goal to scrutinize it through Barthes' reading of the concept of myth. How does Barthes describe today's myth? The author succinctly states that "Myth is a type of speech...it (myth) is a message"

²⁷ See the subchapters 3.1 and 3.2

(Barthes, 1991, p. 107). But in order to “decipher the myth” (Ibid., p. 118), it takes to “... pass from the state of reader to that of mythologist” (Ibid., p. 122).

Let me venture to enter the state of Barthes’ mythologist to decode the messages incorporated into the narrative of justification of the current Crimea situation. The President opens his speech by claiming that “the referendum that took place on the 16th of March was held in full compliance with democratic procedures and international law”²⁸(Putin, 2014). A claim, contradictory in its nature, summoned to justify the pro-Russian results of the Crimean referendum that took place in the spring of 2014. The speech progresses with more attempts of justification, bringing to the central stage the war history narrative. The President lists historical sites in the peninsula, such as Sevastopol, Balaclava, Kerch, Mount Sapun, and the area of the Battle of Malakoff, imposing the meaning of military sacredness that these places bear: “...military glory and unprecedented valor.”²⁹This opening is a vivid example of a mythical speech, first of all, since, as justified by Barthes, we are presented with void concepts - the concepts that are merely serving to impose a propaganda message and make the fact of Russian intervention justifiable through engaging a shallow concept of holiness, the Russian state is a sole owner of: “... the knowledge contained in a mythical concept is confused, made of yielding, shapeless associations. One must firmly stress this open character of the concept; it is not at all an abstract, purified essence; it is a formless, unstable, nebulous condensation, whose unity and coherence are above all due to its function” (Barthes, 1991, p. 118). What function does it serve in this case? Justification through appropriation and claiming ownership rights to a formless abstract. Second, in agreement with Friedrich and Brzezinski’s (1965, cited in Tudor 1972, p.16) definition of myth: “‘A myth,’ they say, ‘is typically a tale concerned with past events, giving them a special meaning and significance for the present and thereby reinforcing the authority of those who are wielding power in a particular community.’” Tudor continues: “In all these myths, there is indeed a critical event by reference to which men can order their present experience, but the events in question are thought of as having taken place in the past. The view suggested by Friedrich and Brzezinski at least allows us to include these doctrines as being genuine myths” (Ibid., p.16). Finally, a notion by Tudor, mentioned in one of the previous chapters³⁰, captures

²⁸ «16 марта в Крыму состоялся референдум, он прошёл в полном соответствии с демократическими процедурами и международно-правовыми нормами.»

Note: Here and further in the chapter mine Russian - English translation is offered.

²⁹ «В Крыму – могилы русских солдат, мужеством которых Крым в 1783 году был взят под Российскую державу. Крым – это Севастополь, город-легенда, город великой судьбы, город-крепость и Родина русского черноморского военного флота. Крым – это Балаклава и Керчь, Малахов курган и Сапун-гора. Каждое из этих мест свято для нас, это символы русской воинской славы и невиданной доблести»

³⁰ Supchapter 2.4

the essence of the above Putin's claim to Crimea's historical sites and a whole peninsula as well: "A political myth ... establish(es) the claim of a certain group to hegemony, sovereign independence or an extension of territory; it may help strengthen the solidarity of the group in the face of a major challenge... And, where the myth is the story of a political society already in existence, it may sanctify the constitution of that society, inspire its members with confidence in their destiny and glorify their achievements" (Ibid., 139).

Next follows, posed as a truism, appeal to the incontrovertibility that Crimea has always been and remains an integral part of Russia. Especially since "this unquestionable incontrovertibility is built on truth and justice, and is being passed down through the generations..."³¹ Thus follows the allusion to Russia **feeling robbed of** Crimea, with a stress on a differentiation between the act being not a mere theft, but, what, as the President declares a much worse crime - a robbery³². Speaking about this event, Putin mentions that the decision to transfer the Crimea Oblast from Russian SFSR to Ukrainian SSR was made with the "obvious violations of the constitutional norms that were in force at that time. The decision was made behind the scenes"³³. However, as was mentioned above, the notion of the Crimean referendum being in compliance with democratic procedures and international law was an opening postulate of this speech, an unquestionable reason, and justification of the "Crimean Spring." Mythification of Crimean clandestine operation has in its core a will to distance all the meanings that do not serve the success in the delivery of "better" meanings. As Barthes points out: "One believes that the meaning is going to die, but it is a death with reprieve; the meaning loses its value, but keeps its life, from which the form of the myth will draw its nourishment" (Barthes, 1991, 117). The meaning of the "Spring" as a political phenomenon, an embodiment of one nation's movement towards freedom and new hope, is inhabited with new, bluntly reversed meanings that do not *kill* the original one; they *impoverish* it in order to support these new meanings. "However paradoxical it may seem, myth hides nothing: its function is to **distort**, not to make disappear" (Ibid., p. 120). The process is vital for the success of a new system of signification, a new message delivery:

³¹ «Уважаемые коллеги! В сердце, в сознании людей Крым всегда был и остаётся неотъемлемой частью России. Эта убежденность, основанная на правде и справедливости, была непоколебимой, передавалась из поколения в поколение, перед ней были бессильны и время, и обстоятельства, бессильны все драматические перемены, которые мы переживали, переживала наша страна в течение всего XX века.»

³² «И когда Крым вдруг оказался уже в другом государстве, вот тогда уже Россия почувствовала, что её даже не просто обокрали, а ограбили.»

³³ «Для нас важно другое: это решение было принято с очевидными нарушениями действовавших даже тогда конституционных норм. Вопрос решили кулуарно, междусобойчиком.»

Russia is a savor.

Russia is a new hope.

Russia is a provider of a much-sought and fought-for freedom.

The aim to deliver this three-part message across is all-consuming, stressed with blatant deceit: “We are being told about some kind of Russian intervention in Crimea, about aggressive invasion. Quite strange to hear that. For some reason, I cannot remember a single intervention with no human casualties³⁴.” Suppose we omit the decisive part that language conflict took in the development of the Crimea crisis. In that case, Putin’s rhetoric is showing resemblance to that of 1968, justifying a Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. In Russian naming of both events - the Crimea crisis of 2014 and the invasion of Czechoslovakia of 1968, the word *invasion* is strategically omitted, by substitution with a neutral *entry* in order to create the aura of operations’ benignity, stripping them off anything that implies “militariness”: *the entry of Soviet/Russian troops*, as in *being invited*. As a result, we have “the mythical signifier: its form is empty but present, its meaning absent but full” (Ibid., p.122).

By appealing to the unification of East and West Germany, “an unstoppable desire of the Germans for national unity³⁵,” the President calls for support and understanding from “the citizens of Germany (to) also support the aspiration of the Russians, of historical Russia, to restore unity.” A reader can observe a not-so-subtle indication of an attempt to demarcate borders of “historical Russia”, seeking the ability to add more weight through the far-fetched comparisons. In his speech, Putin is constantly switching from stating that “Crimea is our common historical legacy”³⁶ and assuring that “Crimea was and now remains a Russian, Ukrainian and Crimean-Tatar land”³⁷ to a rather worrying statement, linking the fact that the majority of Crimeans speak Russian language and have Russian ethnic background: “... there are millions of Russian- speaking people living in Ukraine and in Crimea...Russia will always defend their interests using political, diplomatic and legal means”³⁸ and stating that “... this

³⁴ «В этой связи, конечно, возникают и другие мысли. Нам говорят о какой-то российской интервенции в Крыму, об агрессии. Странно это слышать. Что-то не припомню из истории ни одного случая, чтобы интервенция проходила без одного-единственного выстрела и без человеческих жертв.»

³⁵ «...граждане Германии также поддержат стремление русского мира, исторической России к восстановлению единства.»

³⁶ «Крым – это наше общее достояние»

³⁷ «Что касается Крыма, то он был и останется и русским, и украинским, и крымско-татарским.»

³⁸ «на Украине, и в Крыму живут миллионы русских людей, русскоязычных граждан. Россия всегда будет защищать их интересы политическими, дипломатическими, правовыми средствами.»

strategic territory should be part of a strong and stable sovereignty, which today can only be Russian.”³⁹

Above I have elaborated on the theoretical rationale of how alluding to military glory of the past presents a robust case of mythological speech repertoire. Putin resorts to this source once more towards the final passages of the Crimea speech, having already planted the idea of exceptional Russian rights to owning the peninsula by identifying with wars of the past, language, and ethical components. With even more blatant reasoning: “Nato remains a military alliance, and we are against having a military alliance making itself at home close to our fences or even on *our historic territory*⁴⁰. I simply cannot imagine that we would travel to Sevastopol to visit Nato sailors. Of course, most of them are wonderful people, but it would be better to have them come and visit us, be our guests, rather than the other way round⁴¹.”

Upon reading the transcript of Putin’s Crimea speech from March 18th, 2014, drawing on the arguments by Barthes, Cassirer, and Tudor mentioned in this work, I couldn’t help but notice a vivid function that was pulsating through all the paragraphs and every single message to claim and celebrate Russia’s ‘rights’ to a new territory - rationalizing imagination. Every loud message, either referring to exclusive rights based on relation to war memorials, referring to self-proclaiming truth and justice, or appropriation of the Russian language, widespread on the given territory is yet another try to rationalize through over-simplified statements; it is the act of “saluting to the French Empire” (Stafford, 2013, p.97) yet, in this case, one self-proclaimed empire actually being on the receiver end. Modern Russian imperialism, supported by Putins’ apparatus of the government, arrests and condemns the Russian language and heritage of Crimeans to be nothing more than an instrumental signifier, “freezing into an eternal reference meant to *establish Russian* ⁴²imperiality (Barthes, 1991, p.124). Myth is speech stolen and restored. Only, speech which is restored is no longer quite that which was stolen: when it was brought back, it was not put exactly in its place. It is this brief act of larceny, this moment taken

³⁹ «...эта стратегическая территория должна находиться под сильным, устойчивым суверенитетом, который по факту может быть только российским сегодня.»

⁴⁰ italics mine

⁴¹ «Мы против того, чтобы военный альянс, а НАТО остаётся при всех внутренних процессах военной организацией, мы против того, чтобы военная организация хозяйничала возле нашего забора, рядом с нашим домом или на наших исторических территориях. Вы знаете, я просто не могу себе представить, что мы будем ездить в Севастополь в гости к натовским морякам. Они, кстати говоря, в большинстве своём отличные парни, но лучше пускай они к нам приезжают в гости в Севастополь, чем мы к ним.»

⁴² In the original Barthes describes French imperialism; mine italicized word ‘Russian’ substituting the word ‘French’

for a surreptitious faking, which gives mythical speech its benumbed look (Barthes, 1991, p.124).

Like all other myths, a political myth offers an updated meaning. It renders human experience more coherent through offering “corrected” views on the world in which people live. And it does so by enabling them to see their present condition as an episode in an ongoing drama (Tudor, 1972, p.139). A political myth may explain how the group came into existence and what its objectives are; it may explain what constitutes membership of the group and why the group finds itself in its present predicament; and, as often as not, it identifies the enemy of the group and promises eventual victory. It offers, in short, an account of the past and the future in the light of which the present can be understood. And as one would expect, this account is not only an explanation but also a practical argument. In order to fulfill this, a myth requires delivery - it requires its creation and fulfillment. In the Russian part of the mythologization of the Crimea crisis, the role is gracefully taken by the President. In Cassirer’s terms - a modern magician (Cassirer, 1946, p.288).

Cassirer compares a politician’s role to that of a magician in primitive cultures. “They were the absolute rulers; they were the medicine men who promised to cure all social evils” (Ibid., p. 288). The philosopher calls our attention to yet another important task of a sorcerer: “The *homo magus* is, at the same time, the *homo divinans*. He ... foretells the future” (Ibid., p. 288). The author continues by saying that in this day and age, “We have developed a much more refined and elaborate method of divination - a method that claims to be scientific and philosophical. But if our methods have changed, the thing itself has by no means vanished. Our modern politicians know very well that great masses are much more easily moved by the force of imagination than by sheer physical force. And they have made ample use of this knowledge. The politician becomes a sort of public fortuneteller. Prophecy is an essential element in the new technique of rulership. The most improbable or even impossible promises are made; the millennium is predicted over and over again” (Ibid., p. 289). Putin is a clear representation of what Cassirer calls a magician who takes on the responsibility of producing new meanings.

A conflicted life form was nurtured to become a tool to both producing and examining bilingualism as an issue that must be overcome. And Putin, as a notable “public fortuneteller,” uses the tool to distribute meanings that are coherent within this life form. All the efforts culminated in exclusion instead of diversity and “evoking the authority of the law when the law was clearly dead” (Das, 2007, p.167). In this regard, Veena Das condenses that “It is this

illegibility of the state, the unreadability of its rules and regulations... that makes it possible for the oscillation between the rational and the magical to become the defining feature of the state in such margins” (Ibid., p.167 -168).

3. 1. 5 Conclusion

In his work titled *The myth of the state*, Cassirer (1946) points out a remarkable, in my opinion, observation. A philosopher looks back at 1933 when the world community started showing signs of concern about the growing military confrontation. In 1933, the political world began to worry somewhat about Germany's rearmament and its possible international repercussions. As a matter of fact, this rearmament had begun many years before but had passed almost unnoticed. The real rearmament started with the origin and rise of the political myths. The later military rearmament was only an accessory after the fact. The fact was an accomplished fact long before; the military rearmament was only the necessary consequence of the mental rearmament brought about by the political myths (Cassirer, 1946, p.283). In the Crimean case, this mental rearmament geared towards lax borders with Russia rooted in Ukrainian insufficient cultural and exclusive language policies. Putin's ‘justified’ impunity of the Russian state from international law and lost identity as a nation for Ukraine are foisted on Ukrainians and Crimeans, in particular. Foucault (1996, p.77) opines that “...power is always exercised at the expense of people.” The philosopher argues that the above-cited single perception is not to be solved with a more equitable form of justice (Ibid., p.77). In the Crimea crisis, both powers exploit people: one through its excessiveness, while the second one through its long-standing insufficiency.

3.2 New Language Policy’s Toll on Text-Based Art

A long history of complex development of the language situation in Ukraine, sustained by particularly polarizing opinions on what constitutes national identity, bore arduous consequences for many spheres of human manifestation as social beings, resulting in the conflicted form of life - a self-conflicting form of being Ukrainian. For the purposes of this particular body of work I have shed light on the linguistic and political aspects of the above, yet, as the epitome of everything that is wrong with national identity in Ukraine, a mention of the state of the local art scene cannot be omitted. To be more precise, these forms manifested through a word - literature and the performing arts.

The politically infused events of recent years, such as the crisis in Russian-speaking parts of Ukraine, are a part of a ripple effect, caused by conflicting life forms defined by unaccepted bilinguality. In this chapter I have purposely limited myself to an overview of yet another ‘ripple’ of the ongoing Ukrainian crisis - the results of how the current anti-Russian language laws are influencing journalism, literature, the performing arts, and freedom of speech overall, having thus omitted the state of the arts’ affairs before the 2010s, which is a worthy topic of study in its own right. In line with this thinking, I shall focus on the exclusive art frames, dictated by Ukraine’s support of the Russian government’s tendency to “attribute to the Russian language-specific symbolic values, salient among which is the ability to structure an integrative ideology aimed at fostering an enduring sense of identification with Russia” (Ryazanova, 2014, p.249), and omit other issues, since they do not fall within the scope of this work.

Art is a well-suited tool in this situation to investigate a faulty way to regulate a country's bilingualism through reducing it to mere rudiment of the post-Soviet heritage.

Ukrainian text-based culture has a convoluted history of text-based art.⁴³ On one hand, we have centuries of Ukrainian literature being constrained on the language basis (Loutskyu, 1971 cited in Čyževs’kyj and Luckyj, 1997)⁴⁴; on the other hand there are times of Soviet censorship, prosecuting any forms of expressions that displayed potential of sparking disbelief in the system, regardless of the language of its manifestation (Ramm, 2017). A Russian-speaking Ukrainian poet, also a crucial figure of samizdat poetry in Odessa in 1970-1980, Boris Khersonsky, engages the above-discussed issue as follows: “The exclusion and blacklisting of truly great writers such as Pasternak, Solzhenitsyn and others was not a by-product, but rather the primary intended function of the Soviet state-sanctioned literary process” (Khersonsky, 2016). Expanding on this quote, I should add that both mentioned within it writers were Russian-speaking Russians. The problem was not with the form of expression, but its “anti-Soviet” content. Soviet censorship was a burden all Soviet ‘artists of the pen’ suffered through. Undeniably, this historical duality has taken its toll on how text-based expression is approached in Ukraine today, namely, after the notorious events of 2014.

The Ukrainian dichotomy of the oppressors and the oppressed has long been a moving power of many political processes within the country. However, with the establishment of

⁴³ A text-based art includes all art forms that are realized by means of words and phrases as its primary artistic means of representation.

⁴⁴ Original transliteration of Jurij Luckyj’s surname for both publications

Ukrainian independence, Russia ceased being an inner power, shifting into a state of outer influence and leaving its controversial cultural-linguistic heritage. Centuries of a pro-assimilation policy of the Russian Empire that the USSR ‘inherited’, evoked issues regarding Ukrainian identity that had, to a large extent, added to the current conflict.

Infused by long-standing confusion, many Russian-speaking literary authors of Ukrainian origin, such as Nikolai Gogol, Anna Akhmatova, Mikhail Bulgakov, Ilya Ilf and Evgeny Petrov - could not be valorized by Ukraine as part of its literary heritage, despite these authors’ work being intrinsically linked to Ukraine - its culture, history, and places. Places, such as Kyiv and Odessa that are not simply marked by writings of the above stated prominent authors, but bear their narratives, augmented realities, and fictional and real-life characters as part of a city’s cultural code, do not fit into the new Ukrainian identity that is currently under development. Steering away from Ukrainian-Russian bilingualism is not supported by premises of its factual advantages or disadvantages but is constituted instead solely as an attempt to establish a new form of life that is manifested through pure Ukrainianism. Bulgakov, Akhmatova, and Kiev reflected through the lenses of their artistic expression, Ilya Ilf and Evgeny Petrov and Odessa that is pronounced on the pages of their *The Twelve Chairs* as yet another actor of the book, and Gogol and his brilliant portrayal of rural Ukrainian life - all of the above are not perceived on the same level as, for example, Franz Kafka and ‘his’ Prague.

Mentioned at the beginning of the 3d chapter Law on Ukrainian Language (UNIAN Information Agency. 2019), adopted in 2019, was aimed to mitigate the previous Law⁴⁵ that came into force during the presidency of pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovich⁴⁶. As the country and the rest of the world witnessed Yanukovich’s state apparatus neglect legitimate rights of Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians, “giving the green light for Russian government to claim Russian language as its “soft power tool” (Ryazanova, 2014 p. 249), this message of depreciation brought the effect of the last straw. It added to the causes of the Revolution of 2014 and Crimea crisis that, and, as the history has already proven, not only exiled a political system that was serving the interests of one neighboring country but, on a closer look, also exasperated fair inclusiveness. Wherever politics are involved in the socio-cultural area in Ukraine, one side of the scales always outweighs, giving grounds for aspect-blindness, bringing into effect tacit, hatred or ignorance -induced solutions on both sides.

⁴⁵ European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission). “Opinion On the Draft Law on Languages in Ukraine.” Opinion no. 605 / 2010 of 25-26 March 2011. Accessed July 15, 2021. [https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD\(2011\)008-e](https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2011)008-e)

⁴⁶ Presidential term: 2010 - February 2014

The Council of Europe's advisory body on constitutional matters, better known as the Venice Commission ⁴⁷ released the official Opinions on the major language laws adopted in the years of Ukrainian independence. The language law of 2011, even though being: “a step towards an approximation with the linguistic reality of the country” (European Commission for Democracy through Law, 2011, p7.), includes statements on the nature of the status of Russian language that are “too general in (their) nature and potentially highly controversial” (Ibid., p.15). The Law singles out Russian language, by questioning the role of the official language of the state: “At the same time, while being aware of the complex linguistic situation in Ukraine, in particular in the specific context resulting from the dissolution of a former larger multi-ethnic State, the Commission is of the view that the preferential protection of the Russian language as a general measure might be questionable from a legal point of view and raise undue tensions within the Ukrainian society. Where the use of the Russian language is already an everyday fact, and the Russian language is used even by people who identify themselves as Ukrainians with the Ukrainian language as linguistic identity, such a preferential level of protection is not needed and would have an adverse impact on the efforts made to consolidate Ukrainian as a State language” (Ibid., p.16). The unfairness of Yanukovich’s pro-Russian policy on the whole and his language policies, in particular, resulted in the need to adopt changes. These changes to the linguistic situation on the governmental level were offered by means of the State Language Law from 2019.

Considered together, these laws, separated by eight years between their adoption and the whole different country they were adopted within, are yet another example of uneven scales mentioned above, both failing to augment Ukrainian reality with a more scalable solution. The main issue with the latter State Language Law is the vivid limitations and financial burdens it evokes on national minorities. In accordance with the official Opinion released by the Venice Commission, the Law “fails to strike a fair balance between the legitimate aim of strengthening and promoting the Ukrainian language and sufficiently safeguarding minorities’ linguistic rights” (European Commission for Democracy through Law, 2019, p.29). As foreseeable in its application, the Law, through restrictions of text-based art manifested in the Russian language, puts a financial burden on culture organizations, publishers, and independent performers, since the financial aid to cover the expenditures is not foreseen in current legislation. The Opinion (2019) draws the example of a similar case in the Slovak Republic (European Commission for

⁴⁷ as it meets in Venice

Democracy through Law, 2010). In 2010, the regard of the absence of financial support for translation, interpretation, dubbing, or voice-over showed concerns about “... provisions (that) impose additional work and costs on the organizers of cultural events in minority languages, and that although such provisions serve a legitimate aim, namely informing persons belonging to the Slovak majority of cultural events intended for national minorities, this legitimate aim must be proportionate, and that the Slovak government should provide funding to support translation” (European Commission for Democracy through Law, 2019, p.20).

In continuation of this strategy, in order to “balance the scales,” the Venice Commission advises the following:

- protect the rights of linguistic minorities to support a fair balance between the strengthening of the status and use of the State language on one hand and the protection of minority languages on another;
- repeal the mechanism of complaint and sanctions pronounce by the Law (or limit it strictly to the public sphere and only severe cases), given the presence of legal repercussions for the absence of translation, dubbing, post-synchronization, and subtitling activities, or reprinted materials to be compliant with the new norms;
- cancel the provisions of the Law differentiations on the basis of the languages considered to be of indigenous peoples, the languages of national minorities which are official languages of the EU, and the such that are not official languages of the EU (Russian included) provided that the distinction is not based on an objective and reasonable justification. (European Commission for Democracy through Law, 2019, pp.29-30).

In continuation of this strategy, the Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research (International Alert/Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research, 2017), in their attempt to pinpoint working recommendations on fighting alienation of Ukraine’s ethnic Russian citizens in the present circumstances, revealed the list that included the following suggestions:

- stress the importance of the development of a comprehensive set of government policies (information, education, and cultural) that seeks to maintain and develop the full integration of Ukraine’s ethnic Russian citizens;
- combat hate speech targeted at minority groups irrespective of the languages used;
- offer Russian-speaking Ukrainians access to text-based art and opportunities to receive information from Ukrainian Russian- language sources by promoting the development of Ukrainian content in Russian-language media and cultural products produced in Ukraine.

Some of the above points go beyond the topic of text-based art, addressing other text-based media as well. However, the current policies impose the conditions under which literature, theatre, performance art, journalism, etc., function today. Not exactly an atmosphere for these media to thrive. Unrequired. Alienated. Stripped of its identity. Russophone art and media is *bête noire* of current Ukrainian culture. In an attempt to Alleviate pressure, it is inflicted with more self-damage since Russophone art becomes yet another “property” of the Russian state, and Ukrainian artists are left with little choice in sustaining their artistic expression – unrequired outcast without any governmental support (including financial).

The support of the Russian Federation’s approach to the Russian language as its ‘commodity’ leaves Ukraine without its indivisible heritage on the basis of the current conflict with Russia, failing to make a separation between cultural dimension and politics.

3.3 Possible Solution

Is there any foreseeable approach to solving the language conundrum in Ukraine, thus to enter a different than merely conflicting, on the premises of Ukrainian bilingualism and bi-ethnicity, an inclusive Ukrainian form of life, without following the well-trodden path of unification? Considering that the previous question is not, as it turns out in practice, closed-ended, it leaves one more query here: is there any possible direction of action towards uniting Russian-speaking and Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainian citizens without increasing the growth of mutual intolerance?

In the light of the above questions, I want to refer to a remark offered by Veena Das in her *Life and Words. Violence and the Descent into the Ordinary*. The author describes the Partition of India as a unique occurrence in terms of “the metamorphosis it achieved between the idea of appropriating a territory as nation...” (Das, 2007, p. 52). Following this line of thought, it may be derived that Crimea’s territory was appropriated as a Russian nation whilst the Russian nation within was demarcated by the Russian language. The solution might be lying at the premises of freeing the significance of the Russian language from its appropriation by Russia as a state and nation. As was mentioned in the previous chapter⁴⁸, the Russian government is using the Russian language as a “soft power tool”, fostering its identification solely with Russia (Ryazanova, 2014 p. 249).

⁴⁸ The chapter 3.2

A rather severe impediment to this situation's improvement lies in the lack of differentiation between the words 'ruskij' and 'rosijskij'⁴⁹, which, in English, stand for a plethora of meanings relating to "Russian". The latter adjective, 'rosijskij' covers all meanings in relation to Russia as a state, whilst 'ruskij' is an adjective of the ethnic and cultural dimension in a world drained from political connotations. Even though speaking Russian, Putin seemingly follows a West-germanic language group's rules and uses the terms interchangeably in his Crimea speech. Unfortunately, this is not the case. So what is the purpose behind merging borders of two words with different meanings? Through obscuring the definitions of 'ruskij' and 'rosijskij,' "a magician" (Cassirer, 1946, p. 288) expands the authority of Russia as a state onto everything Russian - thus, turning all the Russian-speaking Ukrainians to Russian subjects, stripping them of context and exploiting the gap in language policy and the state course towards exclusion.

The solution currently adopted in Ukraine on a national level requires all Ukrainians to switch to Ukrainian: the solution was deemed effective as of the date the Crimea crisis began in March 2014 and today it is found to be one of the cornerstones of the Ukrainian national identity. Despite the statistics on the number of Russian speakers in Ukraine⁵⁰ and specifics of Ukrainian bilingualism, i.e., dominant bilinguality with prevailing mastery of one language in the circumstances of diglossia⁵¹, means that Russian-speaking Ukrainians who have a native-like command of one language, perform professionally in their native language even though being bilingual. Switching to their second language in all settings (except for personal communication as it is now required by the State Language Law adopted in 2019), spells language attrition and hazard of staying in the state of interlanguage as a consequence of subtractive bilinguality. Diglossic bilingualism,⁵² as long as it is a living memory - a percept of traumatic events of the past enacted in the present (the case of post-Soviet republics), requires mitigation. But such abrupt mitigation as we witness in nowadays Ukraine evokes cognitive and cultural damage to the already divided society.

The possible solution, I dare to assume, is for Ukraine to accept the Russian language on the ethnocultural grounds of the composition of the Ukrainian population as its own. If Ukraine had its own version of the Russian language, it would have meant having authority not just over the language itself but over what it represents, which to a larger extent means freedom to use it,

⁴⁹ "русский" и "российский"

⁵⁰ In this study the data is presented in the Introduction and the chapter 3.1.3

⁵¹ Chapters 1.1 and 1.2 of this work: pp.11-14

⁵² Chapter 1.2 of this work p.15

which Russia does not grant. Since freedom of speech is undergoing what can be called a crisis in Russia, Ukraine could have taken the place of an ‘asylum’ for the Russian language. A print vocabulary of the standardized Russian language in Ukraine gives a language an asylum. An institution to standardize, officially recognize and manage the Russian language as a heritage of the Ukrainian community’s ethnolinguistic duality (Hromadske International, 2019). Josiane Hamers and Michel Blanc describe the linguistic procedures within such communities: “Inside these institutions members of the different language groups may use one language, which can be a language of the community, a lingua franca, or an exogenous language; alternatively, several languages from the community may be used to a varying extent, as for example when two members of different language groups speak to each other in their respective languages; in this case, each understands but does not necessarily speak the other’s language, or if they do not understand each other’s language they make use of an interpreter” (Hamers and Blanc, 2003, p.32).

A valuable approach is developed by Timothy Snyder, who is a professor of History at Yale University and a permanent fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna (“Timothy Snyder's Bio,” n.d.). The historian elaborates his theory of the necessity of a new approach to Ukrainian bilingualism: Ukrainian-speaking people “switch back and back and forth to Russian in a very characteristic way. So, what I think is, if it would be better in Ukraine if there was a little bit less mixing around, a little bit more clarity for when one is speaking Ukrainian and when one is speaking Russian, and I think it would help if Russian would be owned by Ukraine” (Hromadske International, 2019). One of the major obstacles to appropriating Russian is an omnipresent “element of shame” (Ibid.). This element of shame is inflicted by the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and the long history of political tension. This strand of shame granted credibility to language conflict, which paired with the exclusion of the Russian-speaking Ukrainians from the Ukrainian nation. On these grounds, as in the lion analogy made by Wittgenstein, forced and sudden nationwide switching to the Ukrainian cannot bring the understanding of Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians’ reasoning to their counterparts in bilingualism.

Language falls victim to a military conflict. Codifying the Russian language in Ukraine could have been a forward-looking move that could have become a basic contradiction to propaganda, preventing Russian Federation’s entitlement to it: “For Russia to invade Ukraine to protect the right of Ukrainian citizens to express themselves in the Russian language makes no more sense than Germany invading Switzerland to protect the rights of its German speakers, or

France invading Belgium to protect the rights of its French speakers” (Snyder, 2015). Having an asset such as an important second language in a country and not claiming it for decades, letting literature and theatre in the Russian language develop as a part of Ukrainian culture without standardizing the Ukrainian version of the Russian became a lucrative ground for a conflict as a form of life. Lax language legislation kept Russian-speaking Ukrainians off the process of creating the collective identity of Ukrainians. Snyder frames his argument by drawing a comparison with Americans, writing their dictionaries of the English language, with a proxy aim to indicate that they are a different country from England. Likewise, Quebec French is a different French than the French that is spoken in France (Hromadske International, 2019). Ukraine has two emergency zones today - East and Crimea. And, in Veena Das’ words: “...the zones of emergency are marked by diffuse images of the unfinished past, voiding the other of all subjectivity, and the peopling of the world with a phantasmagoria of shadows” (Das, 2007, p.134). The unfinished past between Russia and Ukraine allowed for Russian military aggression to exploit the shared history and justify, even in the eyes of the Crimean population, the annexation of the peninsula in 2014.

Gwendolyn Sasse, the director of the Centre for East European and International Studies in Berlin, offers her view on prerequisites for Crimea returning to Ukraine. Sasse takes an unpopular stand on the issue, stating that it takes more than just work towards establishing “...a lasting ceasefire (Sasse, 2020). I’ll end with this extended quote: “a Ukrainian policy towards Crimea requires amends. Active efforts must be involved to maintain ties with the Crimean population rather than simply reiterating that Crimea is part of Ukraine, offering its own political narrative as an alternative to the official Russian narrative and lifting restrictions on access from the Ukrainian side in order to allow more domestic and international coverage of developments in Crimea would allow Ukraine to take small steps along the way” (Ibid., 2020).

3.4 Conclusion

My attempt to juxtapose the cultural and historical backgrounds of Ukrainian bilingualism with current Russian propaganda and political misjudgments of the Ukrainian government was not a pursuit towards winning the argument for one of the sides. Rather, a venture to state the obvious: in Ukrainian realities, a framework ‘one language equals one nation’ was never a working option but a contribution to an actual geographical split of the country.

Existing explorations of Ukrainian national identity are to a large extent shaped by exclusive nationalist conceptions on one side and Russian political propaganda on another.

In the light of recent political events in Ukraine, such as Euromaidan, the military conflict with Russia in the East of Ukraine, and the annexation of Crimea, it may well be argued that even a mere possibility of acknowledging bilingualism on a state level is not foreseeable. Different forms of life cannot be sealed together in a day, let alone a conflicted form of life redeemed years of downfall. And what is being presented as a political manifesto is already resulting in language attrition, paving straight paths to its abuse in favor of sustaining a conflicted form of life in contemporary Ukraine.

Conclusion

*From its seeming to me - or to everyone - to be so, it doesn't follow that it is so.
What we can ask is whether it can make sense to doubt it.*⁵³

The present study investigated bilingualism, inherent to the Ukrainian state and how it became a crucial factor in forming a conflicted Ukrainian identity. In this work, I took the courage to *doubt* the narratives put forth by both sides of the conflict to analyze whether the current course of Ukraine away from linguistic pluralism is the only available and the most efficient solution to the current Ukrainian identity crisis.

Factors, such as long-lasting unresolved language issues, artificially imposed linguistic monism, and conflicted national identity were misused by Putin's regime to impose on Crimeans a narrative of a shared form of life within physical borders of Russia, justifying its validity mostly through language. There is a saying that travels across Ukrainian and Russian media, with a vogue source of origin: Russia ends where the Russian language ceases to exist. Depending on the goal of an interlocutor, the phrase bears either an intimidating or cautious message. The remark brings to mind another quote mentioned earlier in this work : *The limits of my language mean the limits of my world* (Wittgenstein, 2002, p.68). In consideration of this parallel, it is needless to mention that by refusing the Russian language as a whole, the country is refusing its Russian-speaking citizens who were overnight presented with new national identity requirements. Even though it is a good strategy, in the long run, it cannot claim to be a wise political move that will solve the state of conflicted life form expeditiously.

Foucault (1996, p.77) opines that "...power is always exercised at the expense of people." The philosopher argues that the above-cited single perception is not to be solved with a more equitable form of justice (Ibid., p.77). In the Crimea crisis, both powers exploit people: one through its excessiveness, while the second one through its long-standing insufficiency.

Ukrainian and Russian sides develop conceptualizing theories that are out of their depth when it comes to explaining the current events and their consequences. Failure to make an analytic separation between the cultural dimension and politics reduced the Russian language - a language spoken by 88% of Crimeans - to a mere rudiment of the post-Soviet heritage. The

⁵³ Wittgenstein, 1969, p.7

current cultural and political state of Ukraine has already proven that such an abrupt condemnation of a vital element of human identity - language, is a dangerously wrong decision.

The use of Ukrainian and Russian languages has been for a long time a highly sensitive issue for Ukraine, which has repeatedly become one of the main topics in different election campaigns and continues to be a subject of debate and tensions of varying severity. Explorations of national identity through languages in Ukraine have hitherto been heavily influenced by many propagandistic and misleading notions. The issue of Ukrainian bilinguality is an enduring dormant conflict that surfaces at the first signs of any major political disturbance. The Crimea crisis (and, of course, the hybrid war in the East, but for the purposes of this study, the focus was on the case of Crimea) is an unprecedented event in the Ukrainian history of independence. The development of the linguistic landscape in Ukraine was heavily influenced by a specific historico-cultural context that resulted from the dissolution of a former larger multi-ethnic Union. As was discussed in this study, during the years of its independence since 1991, Ukraine as a state has undertaken a series of insufficient cultural and exclusive language policies that demarcated a border within a country that, soon enough, not without the help of a neighboring country with imperialistic inclinations, became quite tangible. An indispensable part of Ukrainian cultural heritage - the one constituted through the Russian language (though formed into a part of authentic Ukrainian culture, yet never appropriated) - was set out to become threatening, and all the benefits of bilingualism associated with the language of the enemy, quite conveniently, overlooked.

The Ukrainian dichotomy of the oppressors and the oppressed has long been a moving power of many political processes within the country. Paradoxically, within its own borders, newly established national identity appropriated rather radical and exclusive decisions to solidify national identity through oppressive solutions.

By challenging existing interpretations of the Crimean crisis and mapping all the factors and actors of Ukrainian-Russian bilingualism, this work poses a question of whether the path towards unification under one language is still a viable, efficient solution. The given study argues that the stated approach fails in the face of the number of Russian speakers in Ukraine and specifics of Ukrainian bilingualism, i.e., dominant bilinguality with prevailing mastery of one language in the circumstances of diglossia: Russian-speaking Ukrainians who are fluent in one language, communicate professionally and socially in their native language even though being bilinguals. To remain Ukrainian, those bilinguals face language attrition and the hazard of staying in the state of interlanguage as a consequence of subtractive bilinguality. Diglossic

bilingualism, as long as it is a percept of traumatic events of the past enacted in the present (the case of post-Soviet republics), requires mitigation. But such abrupt and enforced mitigation as witnessed in Ukraine nowadays inflicts cognitive and cultural damage onto the already divided society. Ostracizing a part of a nation on a language basis after 13 years of independent nation's formation is not uniting it - quite the contrary.

Returning to the hypothesis posed at the beginning of this study, it is now possible to state that the most reasonable way to mitigate the conundrum of characteristic of Ukraine conflicted form of life is through the appropriation of the Russian language, ergo Russian-speaking Ukrainians as an integral part of a Ukrainian society.

Bibliography

1. Altarriba, Jeanette, and Roberto R. Heredia. *An Introduction to Bilingualism: Principles and Processes*. New York: Routledge, 2018.
2. Aronin, Larissa, and D. M. Singleton. *Multilingualism*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Pub. Co., 2012.
3. Barbour, Stephen, and Cathie Carmichael. *Language and Nationalism in Europe*. Oxford etc.: Oxford University Press, 2002.
4. Barbour, Stephen, and Cathie Carmichael. *Language and Nationalism in Europe*. Oxford etc.: Oxford University Press, 2002.
5. Barthes, Roland. *Mythologies*. Twenty-fifth printing, 1991.
6. BBC News. BBC. "Ukraine Election: Why Comic Zelensky Is Real Threat to Poroshenko." March 27, 2019. Accessed July 15, 2021. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-47654242>.
7. Beissinger, Mark R. *Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010.
8. Besters-Dilger, Juliane. *Language Policy and Language Situation in Ukraine: Analysis and Recommendations*. Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2009.
9. Bialystok, Ellen. *Bilingualism in Development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
10. Birnbaum, Michael. "In Kremlin Speech, Putin Rails at West, Tries to Bolster Economy as Recession Looms." The Washington Post. WP Company, December 4, 2014. Accessed July 15, 2021. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/in-kremlin-economy-speech-putin-rails-at-west-tries-to-avert-russia-recession/2014/12/04/f940afe8-79b4-11e4-8241-8cc0a3670239_story.html.
11. Blommaert, Jan. *Dangerous Multilingualism: Northern Perspectives on Order, Purity and Normality*. Edited by Sirpa Leppänen, Päivi Pahta, and Tiina Räisänen. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
12. Bloomfield, Leonard. *Language: BRITISH EDITION*. London: Allen and Unwin, 1973.
13. Bottici, Chiara. "Philosophies of Political Myth, a Comparative Look Backwards." *European Journal of Political Theory* 8, no. 3 (2009): 365–82. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1474885109103840>.
14. Bruin, Angela de, Barbara Treccani, and Sergio Della Sala. "Cognitive Advantage in Bilingualism." *Psychological Science* 26, no. 1 (2014): 99–107. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797614557866>.

15. Cassirer, Ernst. *The Myth of the State*. New Haven etc.: Yale University Press, 1946.
16. Chruščeva, Nina L. *The Lost Khrushchev: a Journey into the Gulag of the Russian Mind*. Mustang: Tata Publ., 2014.
17. Csernicskó, István, and Réka Máté. “Bilingualism in Ukraine: Value or Challenge?” *Sustainable Multilingualism* 10, no. 1 (2017): 14–35. <https://doi.org/10.1515/sm-2017-0001>.
18. Das, Veena. *Life and Words. Violence and the Descent into the Ordinary*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007.
19. Drozda, Andrij. “Розрубати Мовний Вузол. Скільки Російськомовних Українців Готові Наполягати На Російськомовності Своїх Дітей і Внуків?” [Rozrubati movnij vuzol. Skilki rosijskomovnych ukrajinciv gotovi napoljagati na rosijskomovnosti svojich ditej i vnukiv?] in: Портал мовної політики [Portal movnoyi politiki], December 20, 2014. Accessed July 15, 2021. <http://language-policy.info/2014/11/rozrubaty-movnyj-vuzol-skilky-rosijskomovnyh-ukrajintsiv-hotovi-napolyahaty-na-rosijskomovnosti-svojih-ditej-i-vnukiv/>.
20. European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission). “Opinion On the Act on the State Language of the Slovak Republic.” Opinion no. 555/2009 of October 21, 2010. Accessed July 15, 2021. [https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD\(2010\)035-e](https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2010)035-e)
21. European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission). “Opinion On the Draft Law on Languages in Ukraine.” Opinion no. 605 / 2010
22. of 25-26 March 2011. Accessed July 15, 2021. [https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD\(2011\)008-e](https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2011)008-e)
23. European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission). “Opinion On the Law Supporting the Functioning of the Ukrainian language as the state language.” No.960 / 2019 of 9 December 2019. Accessed July 15, 2021. [https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD\(2019\)032-e](https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2019)032-e)
24. Fauconnier, Gilles. *Mappings in Thought and Language*. Beijing: Beijing World Publishing Corporation, 2010.
25. Ferguson, Charles A. “Diglossia.” *WORD* 15, no. 2 (1959): 325–40. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00437956.1959.11659702>.
26. Flier, Michael S. “Surzhyk: The Rules of Engagement.” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 22, Cultures and Nations of Central and Eastern Europe (1998): 113-136. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41036734>

27. Foucault, Michel. *Foucault Live: (Interviews, 1961-1984)*. Edited by Lotringer Sylvère. Translated by Lisa Hochroth and John Johnston. Semiotext(e), 1996. p. 308
28. Frege, Gottlob. *The Foundations of Arithmetic*. Translated by J. L. Austin. Second revised ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953.
29. Geertz, Clifford. *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*. New York: Basic Books, 1973.
30. Greene, David. Interview with Nina Khrushcheva. "Soviet Legacy May Fuel Ukraine's Resistance To Russian Domination." NPR/ Podcast audio. February 28, 2014. Accessed July 22, 2021. <https://www.npr.org/2014/02/28/283773421/soviet-legacy-may-fuel-ukraine-s-resistance-to-russian-domination>.
31. Grosjean, Francois. *Bilingual: Life and reality*. Harvard University Press, 2010
32. Guardian News and Media. The Guardian. "Post-Soviet World: What You Need to Know about the 15 States." June 9, 2014. Accessed July 22, 2021. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/09/-sp-profiles-post-soviet-states>.
33. Hamers, Josiane F., and Michel Blanc. *Bilinguality and Bilingualism*. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
34. Hammarberg, Björn. *Processes in Third Language Acquisition*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009.
35. Hrapunov Igor' Nikolaevič. *The Crimea in the Early Iron Age an Ethnic History*. Translated by Nikita Hrapunov. Simferopol: Dolya Publishing House, 2012.
36. Hromadske International. "Historian Snyder on Language, Zelenskyy and Vakarchuk." 7 July, 2019. Accessed July 22, 2021. <https://en.hromadske.ua/posts/ukrainians-own-russian-but-dont-admit-it-historian-snyder>
37. International Alert/Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research. "Russophone identity in Ukraine in the context of the armed conflict in the east of the country". March 2017. Accessed July 15, 2021. http://www.ucipr.org.ua/publicdocs/RussophoneIdentity_EN.pdf
38. International Republican Institute, Baltic Surveys Ltd. / The Gallup Organization.
39. Rating Group Ukraine. "Public Opinion Survey Residents of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea September 20 – October 2, 2011." IRI, USAID, Baltic Surveys / The Gallup Organization. September 2011. Accessed July 1, 2021: http://ratinggroup.ua/files/ratinggroup/reg_files/2011_november_21_survey_of_crimean_public_opinion_september_20-october_2_2011.pdf.
40. Jespersen, Otto. *Language: Its Nature, Development and Origin*. London: Allen & Unwin, 1922.

41. Kaltsa, Maria, Alexandra Prentza, Despina Papadopoulou, and Ianthi Maria Tsimpli. "Language External and Language Internal Factors in the Acquisition of Gender: the Case of Albanian-Greek and English-Greek Bilingual Children." *International Journal of Bilingual Education and Bilingualism* 23, no. 8 (2017): 981–1002. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13670050.2017.1385591>.
42. Kendall, Bridget. "Crimea crisis: Russian President Putin's speech annotated." BBC News, March 19, 2014. Accessed July 22, 2021. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26652058>
43. Khersonsky, Boris. "On The Languages Of Ukrainian Poetry." *Odessa Review*, December 2, 2016. Accessed July 16, 2021. <http://odessareview.com/languages-ukrainian-poetry/>.
44. Kulyk, Volodymyr. "Constructing Common Sense: Language and Ethnicity in Ukrainian Public Discourse." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 29, no. 2 (2006): 281–314. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870500465512>.
45. Leech, Geoffrey N. *Principles of Pragmatics*. London: Routledge, 2018.
46. Libben, Maya. *Bilingualism: a Framework for Understanding the Mental Lexicon*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2017.
47. Loutskyi, Iouriy. *Between Gogol' and Ševčenko: Polarity in the Literary Ukraine 1798-1847*. München: W. Fink, 1971.
48. Macnamara, John. "The Bilingual's Linguistic Performance-A Psychological Overview." *Journal of Social Issues* 23, no. 2 (1967): 58–77. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.1967.tb00576.x>.
49. Magiste, Edith. "Recall of Concrete and Abstract Sentences in Bilinguals." *Scandinavian Journal of Psychology* 20, no. 1 (1979): 179–85. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9450.1979.tb00699.x>.
50. Montrul, Silvina, and Kim Potowski. "Command of Gender Agreement in School-Age Spanish-English Bilingual Children." *International Journal of Bilingualism* 11, no. 3 (2007): 301–28. <https://doi.org/10.1177/13670069070110030301>.
51. Masenko, Larysa and Maya Orel. "Нам потрібен мовний кордон із Росією. Сучасна мовна політика в Україні очима соціолінгвіста" [Nam potriben movnij kordon iz Rosijeju. Sučasna movna politika v Ukrayini očima sociolingvista], in: Портал мовної політики [Portal movnoyi politiki], December 26, 2014. Accessed February 6, 2021. <http://languagepolicy.info/2014/12/nam-potriben-movnyj-kordon-iz-rosijeyu-suchasna-movna-polityka-ukrajini-ochymasotsiolinhvista/>
52. Ogarkova, Tetyana. "The Truth Behind Ukraine's Language Policy." Atlantic Council, March 12, 2018. Accessed April 30, 2021.

<https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/the-truth-behind-ukraine-s-language-policy/>.

53. Ohoiko, Anna. "Language Situation in Ukraine in 2020 and Beyond." Ukrainian Lessons, August 25, 2020. Accessed June 11, 2021. <https://www.ukrainianlessons.com/language-situation/>.
54. Olszański, Tadeusz A. "The Language Issue in Ukraine: An Attempt at a New Perspective. OSW Study 40/2012." AEI Banner, May 1, 2012. <http://aei.pitt.edu/58393/>.
55. Osnach, Sergij: Мовна складова гібридної війни [Мовна skladova gibridnoyi vijni], in: Портал мовної політики [Portal movnoyi politiki], June 13, 2015. Accessed April 12, 2021. <http://language-policy.info/2015/06/serhij-osnachmovna-skladova-hibrydnoji-vijny/>.
56. O'Leary, Brendan. "Ernest Gellner's Diagnosis Of Nationalism: a Critical Overview, or, What Is Living and What Is Dead in Ernest Gellner's Philosophy of Nationalism?" Essay. In *The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism*, edited by John A. Hall. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
57. Pavlenko, Aneta. "Language of the Enemy': Foreign Language Education and National Identity." *International Journal of Bilingual Education and Bilingualism* 6, no. 5 (2003): 313–31. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13670050308667789>.
58. Penguin Random House. "Timothy Snyder's Biography." n.d.. Accessed July 1, 2021: <https://www.timothysnyder.org/bio>.
59. Peterson, Britt. "The Long War over the Ukrainian Language." BostonGlobe.com. The Boston Globe, March 16, 2014. Accessed May 19, 2021. <https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2014/03/15/the-long-war-over-ukrainian-language/HXILbK9wVnhwGShNVPKIUP/story.html>.
60. Pidkuimukha, Liudmyla. "Law of Ukraine 'On Ensuring the Functioning of Ukrainian as the State Language': The Status of Ukrainian and Minority Languages." Forum For Ukrainian Studies, October 20, 2020. Accessed June 26, 2021. <https://ukrainian-studies.ca/2020/10/20/the-official-act-on-the-state-language-entered-into-force-on-16-july-2019-the-status-of-ukrainian-and-minority-languages/>.
61. Putin, Vladimir. "Address by President of the Russian Federation." Presidential Executive Office 2021. March 18, 2014. Accessed July 17, 2021. <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603>
62. Ramm, Benjamin. "The Writers Who Defied Soviet Censors." BBC Culture. BBC, July 24, 2017. Accessed July 15, 2021. <https://www.bbc.com/culture/article/20170724-the-writers-who-defied-soviet-censor>.

63. Rhees, Rush, and Dewi Zephaniah Phillips. *Wittgenstein and the Possibility of Discourse*. Malden: Blackwell, 2006.
64. Riggins, Stephen Harold, ed. *The Language and Politics of Exclusion: Others in Discourse*. Sage Publications, Inc., 1997.
65. Russell, Bertrand. *Marriage and Morals*. New York: Routledge, 2009.
66. Ryazanova-Clarke, Larissa. *The Russian Language Outside the Nation*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014.
67. Sasse, Gwendolyn, and Graeme Robertson. "Will Crimea Ever Return to Ukraine?" Archipel Krim, March 19, 2020. Accessed April 30, 2021. <https://crimea.dekoder.org/relationships>
68. Schieffelin, Bambi B., Kathryn Ann Woolard, and Paul V. Kroskrity. *Language Ideologies: Practice and Theory*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1998.
69. Schwieter, John W. *The Cambridge Handbook of Bilingual Processing*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
70. Shevchenko, Natalya. "The history of bilingualism in Ukraine and its role in today's political crisis." *Cahiers Sens public* 1-2, no. 17-18 (2015): 203-225. Translated from the French by Cadenza Academic Translations. <https://doi.org/10.3917/csp.017.0203>
71. Skvirskaja, Vera. "Language is a Political Weapon: or on Language Troubles in Post-Soviet Odessa." In *Language Policy and Language Situation in Ukraine: Analysis and Recommendations*, edited by Juliane Besters- Dilger, 175–200. Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2009.
72. Snyder, Timothy. "Part II The Embattled Ukrainian Borderland." Chapter. In *The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus: 1569-1999*, 105–217. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005.
73. Snyder, Timothy. "Ukraine's Easy, Misunderstood Babel." POLITICO. July 3, 2015. Accessed July 1, 2021: <https://www.politico.eu/article/crisis-in-ukraine-talk-shows-in-language-war/>.
74. Stafford, Roy. "The Face of Noomi Rapace." Essay. In *Barthes' "Mythologies" Today: Readings of Contemporary Culture*, edited by Peter Bennett and Julian McDougall, 96–103. Routledge Research in Cultural and Media Studies, 2013.
75. State Statistics Committee of Ukraine. "General Results of the Census". English version, 2001. Accessed July 11, 2021. <http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/>.
76. Taylor, Adam. "To Understand Crimea, Take a Look Back at Its Complicated History." The Washington Post. WP Company, February 27, 2014. Accessed April 30, 2021.

- <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/02/27/to-understand-crimea-take-a-look-back-at-its-complicated-history/>.
77. Tudor, Henry. *Political myth. Key concepts in political studies*. Macmillan Education UK, 1972
 78. UNIAN Information Agency. "Draft Law on Ukrainian Language Adopted by 278 Lawmakers." April 25, 2019. Accessed July 22, 2021. <https://www.unian.info/politics/10530402-draft-law-on-ukrainian-language-adopted-by-278-lawmakers.html>.
 79. Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Legislation of Ukraine. Document 5029-VI, current version - Revision on January 1, 2020, on the basis - 396-IX. "On Principles of the State Language Policy", Accessed July 21, 2021. <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/5029-17?lang=en#Text>
 80. Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Legislation of Ukraine. Law of Ukraine 'On National Minorities' no. 2494-XII of 25 June 1992. Accessed July 15, 2021. https://www.minelres.lv/NationalLegislation/Ukraine/Ukraine_Minorities_English.htm.
 81. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Culture and Value*. Edited by Georg Henrik von Wright and Heikki Nyman. Translated by Peter Winch. Oxford: Blackwell, 1984.
 82. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1968.
 83. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *On Certainty*. Edited by G. H. Wright and G. E. M. Anscombe. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe and Denis Paul. Oxford: Blackwell, 1969.
 84. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. Translated by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness. Paris: Routledge Classics , 2002.
 85. Zalizniak, Hanna. "Language Orientations and the Civilisation Choice for Ukrainians." In *Language Policy and Language Situation in Ukraine: Analysis and Recommendations*, edited by Juliane Besters- Dilger, 139-174. Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2009.
 86. Zhurzhenko, Tatiana. "A Divided Nation? Reconsidering the Role of Identity Politics in the Ukraine Crisis." *Die Friedens-Warte* 89, no. 1/2 (2014): 249-267. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24868495>
 87. Čyževs'kyj, Dmytro I., and George Luckyj. *A History of Ukrainian Literature: (from the 11th to the End of the 19th Century). With An Overview of the Twentieth Century / George S.N. Luckyj*. New York: Ukrainian Acad. of Arts and Sciences, 1997.