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Inflow Migration from the Sub-Saharan African Region to the European Union

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Annotation

Bachelor thesis "*Inflow Migration from the Sub-Saharan African Region to the European Union*", deals with the highly actual problematic of the immigration policies. The aim of this work is to elaborate on the background of the migratory process, focusing on the root- causes of migration, as well as on the intensions of migrants themselves. This is set in the context of the current policy- making trends within the European Union and takes into account the development of the EU, including the demographical decline, or the integration of existing immigrant communities. The conclusion of this thesis will bring the outline of the situation on both sides- on the side of the EU, as well as on the sub- Saharan African side and will try to predict the possible future development.

Anotácia

Bakalárska práca „*Prílev ľudí z regiónu subsaharskej Afriky do Európskej únie*“ sa zaoberá aktuálnou problematikou imigračnej politiky. Cieľom tejto práce je načrtnúť pozadie migrácie, zahrňujúce objektívne dôvody, pre ktoré sa migranti rozhodnú opustiť domov, a tiež osobné dôvody, ktoré môžu na ich rozhodovanie vplývať. Problematika je zasadená do kontextu súčasných trendov v rámci imigračných politík EÚ a na dotvorenie celkového obrazu si všíma populačný pokles v rámci Únie a aj integráciu existujúcich komunití imigrantov. Záverečná časť prináša náčrt situácie no oboch stranách a snaží sa zhrnúť predpokladaný vývoj vo vzťahu k budúcnosti, vychádzajúci zo súčasnej situácie.

Keywords

Sub-Saharan Africa, migration, European Union, immigration policy

Kľúčové slová

subsaharská Afrika, migrácia, Európska únia, imigračná politika

Manifestation

I declare that submitted thesis was compiled on my own and I used only the sources and the literature mentioned in the reference list. At the same time, I give my permit to use this bachelor thesis for the study purposes and place it to the Main Library of the UK.

Praze dne 1.ledna 2008

Jana Hetényiová

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Introduction

Sub-Saharan African migration is a very dynamic process that constantly faces shifts and changes of its patterns. This is a result of a fragile and unstable situation that makes the whole continent even more vulnerable towards any of these changes. The importance of colonial linkages is regressing and traditional destinations are being replaced with the new ones. The inner structure of migration is being changed as well- women that used to migrate to accompany their usually male family members are slowly taking the role of the breadwinners and actively are entering the labour market. Armed conflicts, which are a part of every day African life, cause that traditionally women sectors, such as education and health care, suffer from a lack of manpower. Another root- cause is ongoing pandemic of AIDS/ HIV that also influences the situation of lacking medical personnel and creates a vicious circle of African migration. An unstable political situation, poverty, extreme climate conditions and natural disasters all boost the migration potential.

An increase of Sub-Saharan African migration to Europe is apparent to the general public as boats of mass transportation can be seen heading towards the European coasts. However, this forms a very narrow and simplified view. The aim of this thesis is to elaborate on the background of the migratory process in a broader fashion, focusing on the above mentioned root- causes, as well as the intensions of migrants themselves, set in the context of the current policy- making trends within the European Union. A European Union that has witnessed several failures of immigrant integration has applied more restrictive policies to the struggle with illegal migration. On the other hand, it faces the demographical decline that might indicate the entire lack of labour force in certain sectors. The African population is very young, with a high migration potential and therefore, in the near future, even higher dynamics in the migratory process can be expected. Hence, the topic was chosen due to its actual character.

Using the method of critical analyses of the collected data, the following questions will be evaluated:

1. What are the main causes and trends of the Sub-Saharan African migration? Is this migration perceived as a threat or benefit from the side of the EU? (shown on a case study of the Netherlands)

2. How does the EU policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa look like? What are the perspectives according the future?

These questions form a complex unit and look towards current analyses of migration from Sub-Saharan Africa to the EU. The main body of the work is divided into two chapters that will try to come through with reasonable answers.

1.1 Concepts

This chapter clarifies the terms that are commonly used in the topic of migration and consequently in this thesis. Therefore, the main purpose of this chapter is to avoid any misinterpretations.

Delimitation of the Sub-Saharan African region for the purposes of this thesis: Sub-Saharan Africa is the youngest of world regions, while it gained its final shape after the process of decolonization was finished.¹ However, it is problematic to delimitate the Sub-Saharan region, while it might differ from theory to practice and even the attitudes of international organizations differ.

It is necessary to mention that there are different approaches that emphasize the religious and related ethnic and political factors. States on northern border are part of buffer zone between the two regions- Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East,² with Sudan as the most problematic one, while it deals with Muslims on the north as well as the Christians on the south. Somalia, Djibuti, Eritrea and Mauritania are also problematic, due to their membership in the League of Arab States.³ In contrast, IOM doesn't classify Mauritania as a part of the Sub-Saharan region, but classifies Sudan as a Sub-Saharan country.⁴ Henceforth, for our purposes, the geographical factor is the crucial one and all countries situated south from Sahara are considered to be the Sub-Saharan African countries.⁵

¹ Hnízdo, B. (1995). *Mezinárodní perspektivy politických regionů* (p. 68). Praha: ISE.

² From west to east, the Sahel buffer zone enters through Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Sudan and Eritrea.

³ Hnízdo, B. (1995). *Mezinárodní perspektivy politických regionů* (p. 69). Praha: ISE.

⁴ IOM (2005). Regional Overview Selected Geographic Regions. In *World Migration 2005* (p. 33). Geneva: International Organisation for Migration.

⁵ To sum up, the Sub-Saharan region consists of these countries: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Côte d' Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea- Bissau, Chad, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Republic of Congo, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

According to the IOM terminology, an *internally displaced person* (IDP) “is defined in the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement to mean a person forced to leave his or her habitual residence spontaneously in order to flee an armed conflict, situations of widespread violence or systematic human rights violations, or to escape natural or manmade disasters or their effects. This term also covers persons displaced within the borders of their country of origin, who are not covered by the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees because they did not cross an internationally recognized border.”⁶ UNHCR data says that the estimated number of the world’s IDPs reaches 25 million⁷, with civil conflicts and prosecution as one of the main reasons.

Return migration refers to the voluntary return of those migrants that have been living abroad at least 1 year and return back to their country of origin or their habitual residence.⁸ The sub- category of return migration is a *repatriation* “that refers to refugees returning to their places of origin, prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention of 1949, civilians in times of war, and diplomats in times of crises, as per the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relation of 1961 and 1963, respectively.”⁹

The 1951 Convention imbedded the status of *refugees* as which applies to those who suffer under prosecution. After the period of decolonization and gaining independence, young African countries already faced the first conflicts. As a result, the Organization of African Unity¹⁰ adopted in 1969 a broader version of the definition, taking into account those, who “[are] forced to leave his or her habitual residence due to aggression, external occupation, foreign domination, or events seriously disrupting public order in a part or the entirety of his or her country of origin or his or her country of

⁶ IOM (2007). *Commonly Used Migration Terms*. Retrieved April 1, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://iom.int/jahia/page523.html>

⁷ UNHCR (2007). *Protecting Refugees: Who is an Internally Displaced Person?* Retrieved April 1, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.unhcr.org/protect/3b84c7e23.html>

⁸ IOM (2007). *Commonly Used Migration Terms*. Retrieved April 1, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://iom.int/jahia/page523.html>

⁹ IOM (2007). *Commonly Used Migration Terms*. Retrieved April 1, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://iom.int/jahia/page523.html>

¹⁰ The Organization of African Unity was transformed in 2001 into the *African Union (AU)*, after the fusion with the African Economic Community. It has 53 member states that cooperate in order to improve democracy, human rights and economy.

nationality.¹¹ In 1984's Cartagena Declaration, Latin America also adopted broadened formulation.¹²

Economic migration refers to people that decided to leave their place of residence or their country of origin in order to improve their financial status. This category also involves those who try to enter the country without the required work permit, most commonly using the asylum procedures. The temporary labor force, including the seasonal workers, falls into economic migration.¹³

The term *diaspora* is defined as a trans-national community of migrants, who are scattered out of their place of birth, but who still maintain the links to their homelands. The case of African diaspora is very specific, due to the fact that many African countries do not keep records of departing citizens and official data of the host countries does not cover the stocks illegal immigrants.

Irregular (illegal, undocumented) migrant is a person that moves to a new place of residence and uses irregular or illegal means. This may indicate false, or invalid documents.¹⁴

1.2 Theoretical concept: Push-pull theory

There are several approaches that derive from the migration debate. The push-pull theory was chosen, while it suitably describes the incentives of Sub-Saharan migrants. This older, but still widely used theory talks about the movement of people "from densely populated areas to sparsely populated areas, or from low- to high- income areas, or link migrations to fluctuations in the business cycle."¹⁵ Barša and Baršová explain that people from low income countries tend to search for higher income countries and therefore their economic situation becomes a push factor. On the other hand, such immigrants are usually perceived as demand for a cheap labor force. Henceforth, cheap labor is in their eyes

¹¹ IOM (2007). *Commonly Used Migration Terms*. Retrieved April 1, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://iom.int/jahia/page523.html>

¹² According to Cartagena Declaration, refugee is persecuted due to the "reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his or her nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country." IOM (2007). *Commonly Used Migration Terms*. Retrieved April 1, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://iom.int/jahia/page523.html>

¹³ IOM (2007). *Commonly Used Migration Terms*. Retrieved April 1, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://iom.int/jahia/page523.html>

¹⁴ IOM (2007). *Commonly Used Migration Terms*. Retrieved April 1, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://iom.int/jahia/page523.html>

¹⁵ Castles, S., Miller, M. J. (1993). *The Age of Migration* (p. 19). New York: Guilford Press.

obviously a pull factor.¹⁶ Taking into account the migrant's perspective, push factors include low living standards originating from unfavorable economic and political situation, while better salary and better opportunities or freedoms in general form pull factors. According to the African case, inequality and economic disparity within the continent is the main driving force of labor migration. Countries with relatively stable agriculture like Côte d'Ivoire rely on labourers from Mali and Burkina Faso, while countries with mining industries like South Africa or Zambia benefit from labor from Malawi or Mozambique. Conversely, countries with scarcer natural resources but abundant skilled and semiskilled human resources generally export labour.

This neoclassical theory is derived from the fact that the main motivation of individuals is a maximization of utility and migration is a consequence of the uneven distribution of goods. After regaining the balance of economic equilibrium, migration falls down.¹⁷ However, the push-pull theory is criticized for its simplistic nature, as for example the Netherlands, as a densely populated destination country; imply. As well, it doesn't explain why people prefer one destination over another, keeping in mind historical reminiscences. Also, it does not refer to migration from a poor country to another poor country. As well, it doesn't cover emigration as an important feature of fast developing middle- or higher- income countries.¹⁸

2 The main causes and trends of migration from the Sub-Saharan Africa

Relatively young European immigration that witnessed the main inflows after the Second World War¹⁹ changed its patterns in such a way that former sending countries became receiving countries. It is expected that all EU countries, including the new EU 10, are becoming the receivers. New links are being established between already existing immigrant communities and newcomers, possible migrants and finally also receiving

¹⁶ Barša, P., Baršová, A. (2005). *Přistěhovalectví a liberální stát* (p. 267). Brno: Mezinárodní politologický ústav.

¹⁷ Castles, S., Miller, M. J. (1993). *The Age of Migration* (p. 20). New York: Guilford Press.

¹⁸ Barša, P., Baršová, A. (2005). *Přistěhovalectví a liberální stát* (p. 268). Brno: Mezinárodní politologický ústav.

¹⁹ Castles, S., Miller, M. J. (1993). *The Age of Migration*. New York: Guilford Press.

society. The EU board of migrations also covers a range of themes whether talking about legal migrants, predominantly labour migrants and their families; asylum seekers; or irregular migrants. It is in the best interest of the EU to eliminate the last category and therefore the EU finds the issue of irregular migration as a top one.

It is estimated that between 65,000 and 120,000 people from Sub-Saharan Africa enter the Maghreb countries²⁰ every year and most of them (70-80%) try to reach the European coasts.²¹ The rest either stays in the Maghreb or returns to the country of origin. This usually happens as a result of an unsuccessful attempt to migrate to the Europe. Despite the fact that the south European countries are the heaviest attacked by the African migration, migrants do not specify them as their desired destination.²² However, due to the stringent EU immigration policies, further migration is not an easy issue.

African population creates one- tenth of the world's total population and according to the *Euro African Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development* that was held in 2006 in Rabat, 60% of the total population is under the age of twenty- five.²³ What more, since fertility rate has been very high, there has been a big surplus of people of working age. Thus, the young population possibly indicates an extensive migratory flow from the continent in the future, with regard to the fact that the urban population in Africa has increased at the rate of 3.5 % per year, which is the highest rate in the world and even higher than the annual rate of increase in total.²⁴

This chapter discusses the main migration trends and causes, taking into account the push- pull theory. It examines the incentives of migrants, their routes and closer evaluates the problems and negatives of the migratory movement.

2.1 Push factors of the Sub-Saharan migration

This chapter elaborates on some of the major push factors of Sub-Saharan African migration, however not all of them. Specific push factors could be found on the different levels- from

²⁰ Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya.

²¹ Migration Information Source. (2006). *Trans-Saharan Migration to North Africa and the EU: Historical Roots and Current Trends*. Retrieved January 7, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=484>

²² UN (2004). World Economic and Social Survey. Retrieved January 7, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.un.org/esa/policy/wess/wess2004files/part2web/part2web.pdf>

²³ Ministerial Euro- African Conference on Migration and Development. (2006). *Action Plan*. Retrieved January 7, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.maec.gov.ma/migration/Doc/Draft%20Concept-Paper.pdf>

²⁴ United Nations Commission for Human Settlements (UNCHS). (2001). *Cities in a Globalizing World: Global Report on Human Settlements 2001*. Retrieved January 7, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://ww2.unhabitat.org/istanbul+5/globalreport.htm>

microlevel, which implies the individual reasons to migrate to macrolevel, which implies the external circumstances.

2.1.1 Economic situation

Africa is the world's poorest continent and there is still a significant percentage of countries recently emerging from the civil wars that have severely slowed down, or even stopped their development efforts. Also extreme climate conditions determine hardship in the agricultural sector. What more, the deterioration in the terms of trade has led to some loss in the economic situation of the region. Taking the 2006 Human Development Index (HDI) ranking into account, the last twenty ranks are occupied by Sub-Saharan countries.²⁵ The poverty threshold indicator says that approximately 21% of the world's population, which means that 1 billion of people live with less than a dollar per day. According to the 2005 Millennium Development Goals Report, the population of Sub-Saharan Africa that suffers from hunger has increased of 34%.²⁶

2.1.2 Political instability and armed conflicts

Armed conflicts belong to one of the most significant determinants of poverty and misery. Their impact is not limited with the national boundaries and directly affects the poor civilians, who are the most vulnerable group. The huge volume of the migratory process is a mixture of consequences, including armed conflicts and weak democracies. From 1993 to 2002, 27 of 53 African states were facing the danger of armed conflict.²⁷ An overwhelming majority falls into Sub-Saharan region which explains the forced migration within the region, as well as outside. This situation has roots in the fact that, in many cases, the borderline of the state does not include the ethnic border. Thus, the direction of migratory movement in Africa is closely linked to the delimitation of ethnic borders and the issue of migration becomes a security issue as well. Also in relation to the problems with unstable borders, Horn of Africa²⁸, suffered from guerilla warfare and ethnic conflicts. However, the crises reached its peak during the 80's- 90's and current problems

²⁵ UNDP (2006). *Human Development Report 2006*. Retrieved April 1, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/statistics/>

²⁶ UN (2005). *The UN Millennium Development Goals Report 2005* (p. 8). Retrieved April 1, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://millenniumindicators.un.org/unsd/mi/pdf/UN-mdg-05-16-III.pdf>

²⁷ IOM (2005). *Economic Effects of International Migration: A Synoptic Overview*. In *World Migration 2005: Costs and Benefits of Migration* (p. 10). Geneva: International Organisation for Migration.

²⁸ Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, southern part of Sudan.

with refugees has slowly moved to Central and West Africa. In Central Africa, the biggest share of refugee crises was caused by the genocide in Rwanda which burst out in 1994. Together, with the victims of the Burundi civil war, more than 3 million people became displaced.²⁹ Instability of the region was again deepened in the late 90's, when events in the Republic of Congo and in the Democratic Republic of Congo, generated further Great Lakes refugee crises. In the period of the 80's and 90's, West African states, namely Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire, faced conflicts that resulted into humanitarian disasters and also refugee crises. In 2003, displaced people from Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire, after the 2002 military uprising, reached 7 million in total.³⁰ Intra- regional migration affects all neighbor countries and therefore, the peace- making process in one country is vital for the whole region.

Central Africa's current deprivation started in the 90' s and quickly spread all over the Great Lakes region. During the genocide in Rwanda, approximately 800,000 were killed between April and July 1994, as a consequence of tensions between the Hutu and Tutsis that caused instability in the whole region.³¹ UNHCR estimates that about 1.2 million people escaped to Zaire; 10,000 to Uganda; 580,000 to Tanzania and 270,000 to Burundi.³² In Rwanda's neighbourhood in Burundi, ethnic conflict embroiled in 1993 and started clashes between the two major population groups- Hutu and Tutsi. Statistics of the International Crises Group from November 2006 estimate that 770,000 Burundian refugees live in Tanzania.³³ Current government, democratically elected in 2005, nowadays faces the big challenge to bring the last FLN rebel group into the fold and fix the peace building process. As for The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), insecure conditions "have displaced 1.6 million Congolese within their country, mostly in the eastern provinces," as well as the 350,000 Congolese that left the country.³⁴ In August 2007, extra troops were sent to the eastern province of North Kivu and an embargo against

²⁹ IOM (2005). Economic Effects of International Migration: A Synoptic Overview. In *World Migration 2005: Costs and Benefits of Migration* (p. 13). Geneva: International Organisation for Migration.

³⁰ IOM (2005). Economic Effects of International Migration: A Synoptic Overview. In *World Migration 2005: Costs and Benefits of Migration* (p. 13). Geneva: International Organisation for Migration.

³¹ UNHCR (2004). *The Rwandan genocide and its aftermath*. Retrieved April 1, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/3ebf9bb60.pdf>

³² UNHCR (2004). *The Rwandan genocide and its aftermath*. Retrieved April 1, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/3ebf9bb60.pdf>

³³ International Crisis Group. (2005). *Conflict History: Burundi*. Retrieved April 1, 2007, from the World Wide Web: http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=conflict_search&l=1&t=1&c_country=20

³⁴ UNHCR (2007). *The Global Appeal 2007, Democratic Republic of Kongo*. Retrieved April 1, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.unhcr.org/home/PUBL/4554439a0.pdf>

the militia groups operating in DRC has been established by the UN Security Council.³⁵ The Congolese community is also an example of the maintained colonial links, while Belgium still hosts a significant number of Congolese, whose asylum applications make 17.6% off all applications in Belgium. Currently, nearly 12,000 Congolese live legally in Belgium.³⁶ Closer steps towards a regional stability were made in August 2006, when the government of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) began a new round of peace talks. However, there are still many obstacles that have to be overcome, including the biggest one, being the International Criminal Court arrest warrants for criminals like Joseph Kony and other top leaders.³⁷

The **North-East Africa and Horn of Africa** is considered to be the heaviest affected African region, hosting the two tragic conflicts in Darfur (Sudan) and Somalia. The Ethiopia- Eritrean problems lie in the demarcation of their border, concretely the border village of Badma. The former refuses to recognize Badma a part of Eritrea and Eritrea refuses cooperation with the U. N.' s officials. The Situation in Chad is closely connected to the situation in Sudan, whereas the Sudanese government has been accused of supporting the Chadian rebel groups. Chad also has to deal with the influx of refugees from the Darfur.

Armed conflicts in **Western Africa** began in 1989 in Liberia and spread all over the region: Sierra Leone, Guinea, Côte d' Ivore and Nigeria. In 2002, fights in Sierra Leone were finished, and in 2003, war in Liberia officially ended with the negotiated departure of its president Charles Taylor to exile in Nigeria. The new transitional period was initiated in January 2006, after the win of Ellen Johnson- Sirleaf in the presidential elections. Many refugees came back home. Nowadays, the situation is mainly controlled by the UN peacekeeping troops.³⁸ Even though Sierra Leone has significant mineral resources and relatively good conditions for agriculture, it remains in a very fragile state due to the problems with its corrupted elites. The most alarming situation within the region is in Guinea. The tension between the rival clans and presidential circles is being

³⁵ Democratic Republic of Congo: Extra Troops Sent To East. (2007, September). *Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultral Series*. Volume 44 (8), p. 17198A- 17199A.

³⁶ Migration Information Source. (2003). *Belgium' s Immigration Policy Brings Renewal and Challenges*. Retrieved April 1, 2007, from the World Wide Web:
<http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=164>

³⁷ International Crisis Group. (2007). *Uganda*. Retrieved April 1, 2007, from the World Wide Web:
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=2346>

³⁸ International Crisis Group. (2007). *Liberia*. Retrieved April 1, 2007, from the World Wide Web:
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1237&l=1>

intensified due to the poor health of the country's leader, president Conté. Therefore, too much space for the potential of conflict remains.³⁹

Southern Africa is the typical example of regional disparities. Angola faced three decades of civil war fuelled by natural resources (oil, diamonds) and came to a peace agreement in August 2006. As a result, it has become the country with the highest number of internally displaced people. The agreement was signed between Luanda, and the exclave province Cabinda's separatist movement FLEC.⁴⁰ The situation in Zimbabwe is characterized by the authoritative ruling of president Mugabe. Under his rule, the country suffers from political, as well as economical, crises. During his presidency, unemployment and poverty became the greatest fuel of the conflict. The official data says that the inflation rate is 1,033.5%.⁴¹ However, the private sector estimates are much different and talk about even three times higher figures.⁴² Currently, the Republic of South Africa faces huge migration inflow from Zimbabwe.

2.1.3 Environmental disasters

The root cause of underdevelopment and extreme mobility is not only affected by an extreme climate. It is tightly connected to the pattern of migration- from rural to urban areas. This affects the internal movement within Africa, as well as the external. The pace, in which agglomerations grow, is very quick and puts cities under a big pressure, which results in a loss of control. Consequently, people do not possess a suitable social background and many have to live in polluted areas, surrounded with litter and outfall. The opportunity to escape such a situation is very low.

The balance is already heavily damaged and rural areas suffer, lacking adequate conditions and opportunities to get out of the poverty trap. In sum, urbanization, viewed from the environmental perspective is considered both: the consequence, as well as the cause of the problems. It is estimated that 42 billion dollars are lost yearly, due to the degradation of the droughty areas that includes the desertification, and the long-term

³⁹ International Crisis Group. (2007). *Guinea*. Retrieved April 1, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1236&l=1>

⁴⁰ International Crisis Group. (2007). *Angola*. Retrieved April 1, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1234&l=1>

⁴¹ CIA (2007). *The World Fact Book: Zimbabwe*. Retrieved December 1, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/zi.html>

⁴² Zimbabwe: Amendment Gazzetted. (July, 2007). *Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural Series*, 44 (6), p. 17111B- 17113A.

droughts, so common in the Africa. Although these areas are very fragile, they feed almost one third of the world's population and their degradation stands on the opposite side of the sustainable development strategies.⁴³ As a result of extreme weather fluctuations, millions of people might become displaced by flooding, or might lose essential crops after a great drought. The situation in the Sub-Saharan countries implies that it would take a long time for the country to rebound from a natural disaster.

2.1.4 Migrants' intentions

Undisputedly, the migration issue is one that is still gaining a new importance and attention due to the fact that the world's population nowadays is increasingly mobile. Nevertheless, to get the entire view on the migration, it is necessary not only to mention those that migrate, but as well those that do not migrate. The category of non-migrants is constantly higher, even when taking into account the Sub-Saharan region that is known for extremely high mobility. Therefore, this part mainly focuses on non-migrants and the reasons that influence their decisions.

Examining the *non-migrant category* with the migration potential, it includes those that:

- Intend to migrate
- Have a desire to do so in the two years time
- Intend to migrate and already have taken the relevant steps.⁴⁴

Although the intention to migrate is strong in some countries, one should keep in mind that the majority has no intention to migrate abroad. According to Ghana, the percentage regresses from 41% of those, who consider the possibility to migrate; to 13% of those, who plan to migrate in two years. Asked whether they have actually taken any steps to prepare for migration, the percentages drop even further and such preparations rarely include the application and/ or acquisition of visas and/ or residence/ work permits. In the case of Ghana, the figure drops to 8%. As for Senegal, these figures are even lower, while the percentage begins at 38% and through 5% drops to 2%. This clearly indicates that

⁴³ OSN (2005). *Světový den životního prostředí: Neopouštějte pouště!* Retrieved April 1, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.osn.cz/zpravodajstvi/zpravy/zprava.php?id=1151>

⁴⁴ European Communities. (2000). *Push and Pull Factors of an International Migration* (p. 116). Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Retrieved April 10, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.nidi.knaw.nl/en/output/2000/eurostat-2000-theme1-pushpull.pdf/eurostat-2000-theme1-pushpull.pdf>

migration intentions are not at all easy to realize. In Ghana, 46% of males and 55% of females have never migrated before, a total of 49%, and they do not intend to migrate.⁴⁵ The total number of Ghanaians that intend to migrate is lower, 41%. As for the Senegal, data in favor of the non-migration category are even higher. 41% of non-migrant males and 70% of non-migrant females, 54% in total, do not want to migrate in comparison with 38% of that, who have the desire to migrate.⁴⁶

In comparison to other African countries that do not fall into the Sub-Saharan region, these numbers are still high and the intention to migrate is overwhelmingly motivated by economic reasons. In relation to that, Sub-Saharan Africa has the highest number of working poverty. Globally, the number of working poor at the US\$ 2 level declined between 2000- 2006, but in Sub-Saharan African region, it increased by 14 million.⁴⁷ As a main motive, family-related reasons or other reasons, such as pursuing an education, are mentioned much less frequently.⁴⁸ In so far as the intention to stay at home is motivated by economic reasons, non-migrants fall into two opposite categories: either they have no economic need to migrate or they lack the financial means to go abroad. In that sense, the general idea is confirmed that a certain threshold of wealth is required for migration to take place. Again, Sub-Saharan countries form an exception, while generally the latter opposite category is mostly smaller than the former one, which does not apply to the Sub-Saharan case.⁴⁹ In addition, and not surprisingly, non-mobility is strongly motivated by family ties and for older people, by their advanced age. Family ties and “other reasons”⁵⁰ create the most significant reasons why not to migrate.

⁴⁵ European Communities. (2000). *Push and Pull Factors of an International Migration* (p. 107). Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Retrieved April 10, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.nidi.knaw.nl/en/output/2000/eurostat-2000-theme1-pushpull.pdf/eurostat-2000-theme1-pushpull.pdf>

⁴⁶ European Communities. (2000). *Push and Pull Factors of an International Migration* (p. 107). Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Retrieved April 10, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.nidi.knaw.nl/en/output/2000/eurostat-2000-theme1-pushpull.pdf/eurostat-2000-theme1-pushpull.pdf>

⁴⁷ ILO (2007). *Global Employment Trends Brief 2007*. Retrieved December 10, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.ilo.int/public/english/region/ampro/cinterfor/news/trends07.htm>

⁴⁸ European Communities. (2000). *Push and Pull Factors of an International Migration* (p. 108). Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Retrieved April 10, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.nidi.knaw.nl/en/output/2000/eurostat-2000-theme1-pushpull.pdf/eurostat-2000-theme1-pushpull.pdf>

⁴⁹ European Communities. (2000). *Push and Pull Factors of an International Migration* (p. 109). Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Retrieved April 10, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.nidi.knaw.nl/en/output/2000/eurostat-2000-theme1-pushpull.pdf/eurostat-2000-theme1-pushpull.pdf>

⁵⁰ Old age, health problems, study, do not like living abroad and problems in obtaining the visa, permits or passport. European Communities. (2000). *Push and Pull Factors of an International Migration* (p. 109).

Another category worthy to mention are the return migrants that are generally more likely to migrate again. On the other hand, people that already migrated tend to stay abroad and do not intend to come back in a certain time period. The intention to stay might be motivated by the relatively secure positions migrants have obtained, or by the fact that their goals set have not yet been reached. In some cases migrants say that they are prevented from going home because of a lack of financial resources. On the other hand, many of the previously mentioned are forced to return, because they are sent away by the official authorities, or because of the end of their labour contract. There is also a tendency to overestimate the opportunity to start a business in the country of origin.⁵¹

In sum, despite the high mobility within the Sub-Saharan Africa, most of the people do not intend to migrate abroad. This happens due to the combination of several factors: the lack of financial resources; family and other personal reasons or complications within the official procedures (obtaining the permits, visa etc.). According the returnees, as a category that is more likely to migrate, legal procedures and standards seem to be underestimated.

2.1.5 Impact of AIDS and brain drain as a push factor for further migration

Further migration is also caused by factors like diseases and brain drain. HIV/AIDS pandemic attacks Africa more than any other regions in the world and is closely connected to the crises of the health care sector and education, affected by the brain-drain phenomenon. It is also an impact of migration. In Sub-Saharan Africa, it is estimated that 24.7 million people live with HIV, which means almost two thirds HIV positive population.⁵² What more, in 2006, 2.8 million people, both adults and children became infected. This is the highest figure in comparison to all other world regions.⁵³

The most vulnerable group is young women and children. An overwhelming number of these children lose their parents simply due to AIDS. As a result, such orphans live on the streets, lacking the basic knowledge and also material needs to avoid the

Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Retrieved April 10, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.nidi.knaw.nl/en/output/2000/eurostat-2000-theme1-pushpull.pdf/eurostat-2000-theme1-pushpull.pdf>

⁵¹ European Communities. (2000). *Push and Pull Factors of an International Migration* (p. 126). Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Retrieved April 10, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.nidi.knaw.nl/en/output/2000/eurostat-2000-theme1-pushpull.pdf/eurostat-2000-theme1-pushpull.pdf>

⁵² UNAIDS (2006). *Fact Sheet: Sub-Saharan Africa*. Retrieved April 1, 2007, from the World Wide Web: http://data.unaids.org/pub/EpiReport/2006/20061121_EPI_FS_SSA_en.pdf

⁵³ UNAIDS (2006). *Fact Sheet: Sub-Saharan Africa*. Retrieved April 1, 2007, from the World Wide Web: http://data.unaids.org/pub/EpiReport/2006/20061121_EPI_FS_SSA_en.pdf

disease. In the context of migration feminization, when young women are taking the role of the independent breadwinner, they are in a higher degree contributing to Sub-Saharan migrants. The social ratio is losing the balance. Another related problem is the trafficking of women and children that are often abused for commercial sex work. The prevalence of infection increased from 0.76% in 1990 to 26.5% in 2002 and still remains world's number one.⁵⁴ Those figures make 65- 70% of world total population with HIV.⁵⁵

There is a direct link between the population mobility and HIV. The study made by Erasmus University in Netherlands shows that the higher proportion of immigrants, the higher the HIV prevalence.⁵⁶ It is apparent that HIV/AIDS has a direct link to the labor migration, especially when talking about the men engaged in the mining industry. Being away from the family, they receive sexual services including by prostitutes. Lack of awareness in the field of prevention causes many of the labor migrants to become infected and further transmit the disease. As a result, there are many infected labor migrants that infect their whole families just due to their prejudice and lack of information

The **brain drain** phenomenon includes both categories- documented as well as undocumented migrants. According to the IOM definition, brain drain “describes the cross- border movement of highly skilled persons who stay abroad for a longer period of time. Highly skilled persons are defined as having studied or currently studying for a university degree or possessing equivalent experience in a given academic field.”⁵⁷

Since the worsened economic situation as a consequences of economic and oil crises caused that in the mid- 1980s, many skilled Africans decided to leave the continent. Nevertheless, most of them received the education locally at the public expense, which was perceived as the outflow of human capital- the brain drain.⁵⁸ Previously, the movement of persons was merely connected to the colonial linkages and migrants used to decide for the formal colonial powers, where they could find similarities in a cultural and social way. This trend is slowly changing and former colonial powers are being replaced

⁵⁴ IOM (2005). Economic Effects of International Migration: A Synoptic Overview. In *World Migration 2005: Costs and Benefits of Migration* (p. 19). Geneva: International Organisation for Migration.

⁵⁵ IOM (2005). Economic Effects of International Migration: A Synoptic Overview. In *World Migration 2005: Costs and Benefits of Migration* (p. 19). Geneva: International Organisation for Migration.

⁵⁶ IOM (2005). Economic Effects of International Migration: A Synoptic Overview. In *World Migration 2005: Costs and Benefits of Migration* (p. 180). Geneva: International Organisation for Migration.

⁵⁷ IOM (2003). Linkages between Brain Drain, Labour Migration and Remittances in Africa. In *World Migration 2003* (p. 215). Geneva: International Organisation for Migration.

⁵⁸ IOM (2003). Linkages between Brain Drain, Labour Migration and Remittances in Africa. In *World Migration 2003* (p. 221). Geneva: International Organisation for Migration.

by other destinations, depending on several factors. The most considerable one is the immigration policy of the country. However, an important component is also a brain circulation; the movement of highly skilled personal within the continent.⁵⁹ “The most common policy route to encourage circulation has been to ensure that migrants maintain ties with their countries of origin, by providing financial incentives to return or by enforcing strict measures to prevent their remaining permanently in destination countries.”⁶⁰

As a lacking labor force in certain sectors became an unbearable problem, governments tried to attract the highly skilled professionals from among expatriates.⁶¹ Thus, it is vital to create “an environment that helps migrants to reach their goals—as manifested for instance by accumulated savings, newly acquired skills, and successful business ventures—is more likely to foster temporary or permanent return.”⁶²

2.2 Darfur and Somalia: The Sub-Saharan tragedies (case studies) - The biggest migration crises of today's'

Darfur in Sudan and Somalia represent the areas that belong to those, heaviest affected by the armed conflicts. Although numerous groups of immigrants, originating in these countries, try to find their place in Europe, most of them stay in the region. Nowadays, they are considered to be the two biggest migration crises.

2.2.1 Darfur conflict

Sudan is Africa's biggest country, divided by religion into three big groups: 70% Sunni Muslim, 25% indigenous belief and 5% Christians (mostly in south and Khartoum), and by ethnicity into two groups: African and Arab Sudanese.⁶³ Due to its heterogeneous nature, Sudan has been facing armed conflicts since gaining independence in 1956. The tensions between north and south had led to a civil war that lasted from 1956 to 1972. By the end of the civil war and at the same time after the greatest African famine, some tribal

⁵⁹ IOM (2003). Linkages between Brain Drain, Labour Migration and Remittances in Africa. In *World Migration 2003* (p. 215). Geneva: International Organisation for Migration.

⁶⁰ Agunias, D. R., Newland, K. (2007). Circular Migration and Development: Trends, Policy Routes, and Ways Forward. *Policy Brief* (p.1). Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.

⁶¹ IOM (2003). Linkages between Brain Drain, Labour Migration and Remittances in Africa. In *World Migration 2003* (p. 223). Geneva: International Organisation for Migration.

⁶² Agunias, D. R., Newland, K. (2007). Circular Migration and Development: Trends, Policy Routes, and Ways Forward. *Policy Brief* (p.1). Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.

⁶³ CIA (2007). *The World Fact Book: Sudan*. Retrieved January 7, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/su.html>

riots appeared in the western province of Darfur. Rebels blamed the central government from ignoring the province and for its economic regress. Violent and chaotic environment in Darfur caused thousands of people to run away through the western border to Chad. These events ended in 1994, with the Pyrrhic win of the government. However, at the beginning of 2003, Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) rebels, majority of African tribes⁶⁴, revolted again against the government, declaring the same discontent with the marginalization within the country. In the spring of 2003, government officials used Arab Janjaweed militia to clear African tribes and prevented them to join the rebel groups. In 2004, the world was already talking about the Darfur genocide and about the critical situation in the region that resulted into one of the worst humanitarian crises in the 21st century. It is estimated that the conflict displaced 1.5 to 2 million people and at least 180,000 died.⁶⁵ In May 2006, SLM rebels and the Sudanese government signed The Darfur Peace Agreement that contained disarmament of janjaweed, as well as the rebels and establishment of the local government with the participation of rebels. Both sides were accused of committing inhumanities. However, some of the rebel groups refused signing the agreement, National Redemption Front including, which left enough space for further atrocities.

As a consequences of the Darfur conflict, Sudanese, as the origin of the major refugee population became world's number two, with the total of 693,300.⁶⁶ UNHCR statistics estimate that in January 2007, the country hosted about 20,000 refugees mainly of Chad origin; 10,000 returnees (refugees); 700,000 IDPs and 10,000 returnees (IDPs).⁶⁷ Looking at the data regarding the Sudanese immigrants on the old continent, following the IOM statistic in the World Migration Report 2003 stock data; 4,697 were in Germany in comparison to 1,113 in the Netherlands.⁶⁸

⁶⁴ Fur, Zaghawa, Massaleit.

⁶⁵ International Crisis Group. (2006). *Conflict history: Sudan*. Retrieved April 10, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=1230>

⁶⁶ UNHCR (2006). *Refugees by Numbers*. Retrieved April 1, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.unhcr.org/country/sdn.html>

⁶⁷ UNHCR (2007). *Global Appeal 2007, Sudan* (p. 2). Retrieved April 1, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.unhcr.org/home/PUBL/4554439d0.pdf>

⁶⁸ IOM (2003). Linkages between Brain Drain, Labour Migration and Remittances in Africa. In *World Migration 2003* (p. 5). Geneva: International Organisation for Migration.

2.2.2 Somalia conflict

Another country, highly affected by the armed conflict, is today's Somalia. Current events have their roots in 2004, when the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) was established in Kenya. Unfortunately, in 2005 it was clear that internal divisions of the country do not allow TGF to operate on the national level. In the first half of 2006, new atrocities between Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT), supported by the U.S. and Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), culminated. The latter one succeeded to take over the Somalia's capital Mogadishu in June 2005 and ERPCT lost the last strongholds in southern part of the country- Kismaayo.⁶⁹ These events caused fears in the international, as well as the regional community, as such a situation could build a base for a new civil war. What made the situation even more complicated was the U.S. attitude towards the international arms embargo of Somalia. Some voices criticized the States for ignoring the international agreement, concerning the support of Mogadishu militia. Thousands of refugees found protection at the Ethiopian border. However, at the end of 2006, a war between UIC and TGF, allied with the Ethiopian forces, erupted. Slowly, the ascendancy was moving on the side of allies and in January 2007, U.S. officials declared intervention to Somalia, in order to push back the Islamists. At that moment, the Islamists were defeated, but U.S. air strike missed the top targets. However, the legitimacy of their victory was lowered by the publicly accepted view that the presence of Ethiopian troops was just a form of foreign occupation. Using the words of the International Crises Group, the situation in the country remains a vacuum across much of the southern part of the country, while the authority of the TFG is far from being efficient and the situation remains extremely unstable.⁷⁰

From the political perspective, nowadays Somalia has made a return to 2004, the year of TFG formation. The TFG government lead is weakened by factions and clans that operate within the country and suffers from the power struggles of their leaders. Besides these factors, positive attitudes towards the defeated Islamists still live over in Somalia's capital. The crucial role of the government is to gain the public credit and support, especially in the least stable southern part. Due to the on- going warfare and extreme

⁶⁹ International Crises Group. (2007). *Somalia: The Tough Part Is Ahead*. Retrieved April 1, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4630&l=1>

⁷⁰ International Crises Group. (2007). *Somalia: The Tough Part Is Ahead*. Retrieved April 1, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4630&l=1>

natural disasters,⁷¹ Somalia remains “fifth from the bottom on the UNDP Human Development Index and 73.5% of the population lives in general or extreme poverty.”⁷² The conflict caused a massive increase in the migratory movement. According to the UNHCR data, an estimated 350,000 Somali refugees decided to settle in the neighborhood countries, with an open possibility of voluntary repatriation and even more; 400,000 fall to the category of internally displaced people (IDP).⁷³ Refugees and asylum-seeking numbers remain also high, regarding mainly Ethiopians. Figures from December 2006 are estimated to be 2,145 people.⁷⁴ Focusing on the European continent’s available data from IOM; 12,174 Somalians happened to be in Italy in comparison to 54,000 in the UK.⁷⁵ A relatively huge gap between the two following countries is an example of the changing patterns of the African migration and regressing influence of the colonial period.

2.3 Pull factors

To complete and enforce the push- pull theory, this part mentions the pull factors of Sub-Saharan African migrants. Although the Sub-Saharan migrants do not travel only to Europe (lots of them migrate to Asia or the USA), this chapter focuses on the pull factors in relation to the EU.

2.3.1 Economic reasons

In general, it can be claimed that most of men leave their country of origin because of *economic reasons*. Despite the fact that the position of women, according to their role in the migration process is changing, *family reasons* remain the most significant ones and the family reunification the most common way of legal migration. Furthermore, the role of *admission policies* and the perception of these policies by (potential) migrants may strongly influence the distribution patterns of emigration flows. For example, frequent

⁷¹ It is estimated that 700,000 Somalians became impoverished as a consequence of several years of drought and 2005 flooding. UNHCR (2006). *Global Appeal 2006: Somalia*. Retrieved April 1, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.unhcr.org/home/PUBL/4371d1a70.pdf>

⁷² UNHCR (2006). *Global Appeal 2006: Somalia* (p. 3). Retrieved April 1, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.unhcr.org/home/PUBL/4371d1a70.pdf>

⁷³ UNHCR (2006). *Global Appeal 2006: Somalia* (p. 4). Retrieved April 1, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.unhcr.org/home/PUBL/4371d1a70.pdf>

⁷⁴ UNHCR (2006). *Global Appeal 2006: Somalia* (p. 2). Retrieved April 1, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.unhcr.org/home/PUBL/4371d1a70.pdf>

⁷⁵ IOM (2003). Linkages between Brain Drain, Labour Migration and Remittances in Africa. In *World Migration 2003* (p. 5). Geneva: International Organisation for Migration.

campaigns to regularize residence of specific categories of undocumented migrants, as in Italy and Spain, could encourage undocumented migration to these countries. Undocumented or irregular migration is one of the main arguments against the restriction policies of the EU.⁷⁶

Although the number of students in the EU is rising, EU countries generally attract fewer migrants for educational purposes than other countries do. This does not seem to be surprising in the light of “Fortress Europe” policies, which in practice leaves space almost only for family reunification of close kin and marriage as options to legally enter most of the EU countries. This fact is followed by the data from statistics which indicate that young people between 20 and 29 form the most significant migrant category.⁷⁷ It is natural that this age category is leaving the common households of their parents to create their own families. This fact applies especially to men that tend to have a much greater impact on the decision- making.

2.3.2 Information

The role of information is a crucial point in the mechanism of the migratory movement. It is not rare that the lack of information on the destination country causes a complete disillusion of the immigrant. A survey on Ghana and Senegal has shown that the opportunity to find a job, the level of wages and the cost of living are at the top of examined topics and most of immigrants are aware of the conditions. On the other hand, the number of those who had no information at all remains still very high, while 20% of Ghanaians and 22% of Senegalese fall into this category.⁷⁸ Surprisingly, there is also a relatively low number of those, who are aware of the admission rules: only 35- 36% within the both countries.⁷⁹ Talking about the source of information, family and to a lesser

⁷⁶ IOM (2005). Economic Effects of International Migration: A Synoptic Overview. In *World Migration 2005: Costs and Benefits of Migration* (p. 206). Geneva: International Organisation for Migration.

⁷⁷ European Communities. (2000). *Push and Pull Factors of an International Migration* (p. 60). Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Retrieved April 10, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.nidi.knaw.nl/en/output/2000/eurostat-2000-theme1-pushpull.pdf/eurostat-2000-theme1-pushpull.pdf>

⁷⁸ European Communities. (2000). *Push and Pull Factors of an International Migration* (p. 88). Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Retrieved April 10, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.nidi.knaw.nl/en/output/2000/eurostat-2000-theme1-pushpull.pdf/eurostat-2000-theme1-pushpull.pdf>

⁷⁹ European Communities. (2000). *Push and Pull Factors of an International Migration* (p. 92). Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Retrieved April 10, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.nidi.knaw.nl/en/output/2000/eurostat-2000-theme1-pushpull.pdf/eurostat-2000-theme1-pushpull.pdf>

extent friends, are of major importance as a source of information for migrants. Media are used as a source of information in a much lesser extent. This is also a consequence of the socio- economic status that is generally low in the Sub-Saharan region and in comparison with other regions less people have access to these sources. Language is the most important medium of spreading information and that's why the language proximity is so decisive for migrants.

2.3.3 Migration networks

Not to forget, *migration networks* are another important pull factor. This can be applied in a larger extent to women, who tend to migrate to join their spouses or other family members. Therefore, their choice of the destination country is much affected by these family links, while some kind of support or assistance is expected and in many cases actually received.⁸⁰ One should bear in mind that although women are generally less informed than men, they tend to have a networks more often.⁸¹

2.3.4 Admission policies

Strategies of migrants are considerably connected to the *admission policies*. Those of the EU represent the restrictive type; however, there is still space for irregular or undocumented migrants. Irregular migration is a very sensitive topic and usually is not included in the statistics, while most immigrants are afraid to admit the overstaying of their visa or permits. According to the Eurostat statistics, "10% of the Ghanaian migrants said that they had tried to enter a country illegally or overstayed their visa or permit. About two thirds said, they have never done this and almost one quarter refused to answer this question, or said that they did not know."⁸² Therefore, it can be presumed that the number of undocumented migrants is

⁸⁰ European Communities. (2000). *Push and Pull Factors of an International Migration* (p. 95). Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Retrieved April 10, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.nidi.knaw.nl/en/output/2000/eurostat-2000-theme1-pushpull.pdf/eurostat-2000-theme1-pushpull.pdf>

⁸¹ European Communities. (2000). *Push and Pull Factors of an International Migration* (p. 104). Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Retrieved April 10, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.nidi.knaw.nl/en/output/2000/eurostat-2000-theme1-pushpull.pdf/eurostat-2000-theme1-pushpull.pdf>

⁸² European Communities. (2000). *Push and Pull Factors of an International Migration* (p. 100). Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Retrieved April 10, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.nidi.knaw.nl/en/output/2000/eurostat-2000-theme1-pushpull.pdf/eurostat-2000-theme1-pushpull.pdf>

much higher than a statistic can show. As well, it is necessary to add that irregular migrants, like the legal ones, tend to use migration networks to fulfill their migratory process.

2.3.5 Remittances

In recent years, *remittances* are admittedly crucial in the development of poverty in such countries as those in Sub-Saharan Africa. Global flows of remittances of Sub-Saharan African migrants have grown from 5 US \$ billion in 2000, to 9 US \$ billion in 2005. Although in comparison to other world regions, this amount of money is still low.⁸³ Money sent by migrants tends to increase constantly and form a very stable way of income. This money, however, is less likely to react to economical shocks. Even though African migrants create a significant share of the global migratory movement, their remittances do not reach the height of other migrant groups, for example Asians. It is proved that remittances are mostly used to support the private needs of migrant and his family. Often, they are used just to cover the basic needs, not for further investment. As this may indicate the better situation of the individuals, it may also indicate the position of the state to get richer. The state, as well as many organizations, makes common effort in order to support such projects that would invite people to invest their remittances into the private sector.

Migrant diaspora into the receiving society also creates a link with the sending country and therefore establishes new contacts in the economic sphere. The other side of the coin is the fact that well educated immigrants tend to remit less money, because they are more capable to judge the situation in their home country. They tend to save the money, or invest it in the country of their stay. Generally, remittances are increasing, but it must be taken into account that migrants often use unofficial money transfers. This happens as a consequence of complicated or inadequate banking systems. Therefore, migrants prefer to send the money by friends, relatives, or other private channels than to undertake the disadvantaging procedure of money transfer. To sum up, the frequency of remittances is determined by migrant's professional situation. That includes job stability, personal situation in the country of destination, number of dependants to sustain abroad, as well as the political and economical stability in the country of origin. The issue of

⁸³ Ratha, D. (2007). *Leveraging remittances for development* (p. 2). Washington, D.C.: Development Prospect Group- World Bank. Retrieved December 1, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1110315015165/LeveragingRemittancesForDevelopment.pdf>

remittances is viewed ambivalently. On one hand, migrants can contribute to alleviate the poverty as they become the direct agents of development. They also help to build the long- term economic development, because they constitute a potential source of investment. It has been argued that the Africans of the diaspora are, in the present- day, Africa's most important donors abroad. On the other hand, remittances are closely connected to the brain drain phenomenon, perceived also as a deprivation of the home economy of quality skills and an experienced labour force.⁸⁴ Using the UN 2005 data, one can see Nigeria and Sudan on the top of the Sub-Saharan African countries in official remittances. In contrast; 25.9% of GDP in Lesotho is an equivalent for 355 million dollars (the remittances officially received in 2004), while 3.6% in Nigeria is an equivalent for 2,751 million dollars, received in the same year.⁸⁵

Taking into account all previously mentioned facts, pull factors for immigration could be divided into two categories: those that are realistic and those that are not. The former ones reflect the profound situation in the receiving country, as well as the legal part of the migratory procedures. However, there is a remarkable gap in the level of migration issues awareness that makes migrants more vulnerable and also less prepared to begin a new life. Such expectations correspond with the latter ones and can be considered as false pull factors.

2.4 Sub-Saharan migration today

Migration is a process. For one part of the population, it is a choice, for another the only possibility to find a better life, or simply to survive. This global phenomenon involves various dimensions, which can be further divided into sub- dimensions. Taken from the geographical point of view, the migratory process includes both developing as well as developed countries, thus creating a chain as follows: sending, transit, and receiving countries. Viewed from the social perspective, it applies to by contemporary affairs, it carries the big impact of today's decision making towards the future.

2.4.1 Internal migration

Focusing on the international migration; migratory movements within the country of origin, as well as the migratory movement within the whole region are necessary to mention. Due to

⁸⁴ IOM (2003). Linkages between Brain Drain, Labour Migration and Remittances in Africa. In *World Migration 2003* (p. 235). Geneva: International Organisation for Migration.

⁸⁵ Frontex (2006). *African and Mediterranean Irregular Migration Routes*. Retrieved December 13, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.frontex.europa.eu/gfx/frontex/files/mtmmmapen.pdf>

the large dynamics of the Sub-Saharan African migration, it is necessary to mention the internal movement. This type of migration also influences the transcontinental migration to the EU and originates from historical, as well as socio-cultural proximities. Within the region, it has been always common to migrate for work, whether within the country of origin, or to the neighboring countries. It was a result of the fact that most of the important economic centres were situated on the coastline. Nowadays, people tend to migrate for work even further. The situation on the labour market is significantly influenced by the security issue in every single country, whether focusing on the host country or the sending country. This regards the armed conflicts all over the region. An important factor is also a language proximity, which has a serious impact on the labour issue. When transferred on the EU- Africa level, language proximity is one of the most obvious decision-making factors, but not the only. This means that colonial links still play an important role.

A typical feature of internal migration and at the same time the reference to the colonial times is a movement within the two colonial blocs, for example French West Africa and the British West Africa. Within the former one, typical movement directed from Burkina Faso, Mali and Togo to the coffee plantations of Côte d'Ivoire. Similarly, in the latter one, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Gambia obtained labour migrants from Nigeria. Distances and cultural proximity surely play the role in the decision-making of the labour migrants. In the Eastern Africa, character of the internal migration has been different due to the armed conflicts.⁸⁶

During the last period, Western Africa became the vastest source of the brain drain phenomenon, with Libya and South Africa as the usual destination countries. Well-known is the case of the massive outflow of Nigerian doctors to the United States, which lead to an acute lack of health care personal in Nigeria.⁸⁷ Their motives were obviously of politic and economic character. ECOWAS, as the important player of regional integration, enables free movement of labour, which is a significant factor in the migrant's decision-making. Central Africa includes the countries of the Great Lakes region⁸⁸ and Cameroon. After the 90's turmoil and violence, Equatorial Guinea together with Gabon became heavily burdened with

⁸⁶ IOM (2003). Linkages between Brain Drain, Labour Migration and Remittances in Africa. In *World Migration 2003* (p. 220). Geneva: International Organisation for Migration.

⁸⁷ IOM (2003). Linkages between Brain Drain, Labour Migration and Remittances in Africa. In *World Migration 2003* (p. 216). Geneva: International Organisation for Migration.

⁸⁸ DRC, Burundi, Rwanda.

Central African immigration. In Eastern Africa, the greatest outflows were recorded during the oppressive Amin regime in Uganda and migratory movement routed towards the Gulf States. South Africans from Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe tended to move to Botswana, Namibia and South Africa. On the other hand, overpopulated countries like Malawi and Mozambique produced immigrants, heading towards Zambian borders because of the Zambian mining industry. According to the case of Northern Africa, they play a dual role, being the destination countries on one hand and the transit countries on the other hand. One of the best known migrant routes “cross Sahara from Ghana, Niger or Nigeria to Algeria or Libya.”⁸⁹

2.4.2 Main trends in external migration

External migration refers to the movements of Sub-Saharan Africans to the EU, keeping in mind the role of transition migration. Nevertheless, USA and the Gulf States also belong to the destinations popular among Sub-Saharan migrants. More than anywhere else, it is important to distinguish between the two types of migration: labour migration and forced migration, viewed through the impacts of the armed conflicts, HIV/ AIDS pandemic and the brain drain phenomenon. Even more than anywhere else, the migration issue is also a problem of interior affairs. It is a consequence of the fact that Sub-Saharan African countries suffer from the lack of efficient policies on migration in general and particularly on immigrant repatriation, bound to the refugee crises and the movement of highly- skilled personnel, an issue that is bound with the problem of brain drain. The policies on immigrant integration also lack satisfying effectiveness. The insufficient mechanisms of Sub-Saharan African policies, is without doubt, another consequence of generally instable environment.

Feminization of migration also contributes to the change in patterns of the Sub-Saharan African migration. This occurs as a consequence of deepening poverty. According to Adepoju, less than 20% of women own the farmlands, less than 10% have access to agricultural inputs and less than 5% have access to agricultural credits.⁹⁰ Well known are Nigerian and Ghanaian doctors and nurses that have found their employers in the EU, or the USA. The biggest receiver of Ghanaian migrants is USA and 69, 000 of them are found there, 16,100 in Canada, 3,600 in Netherlands and significant

⁸⁹ IOM (2003). Linkages between Brain Drain, Labour Migration and Remittances in Africa. In *World Migration 2003* (p. 3). Geneva: International Organisation for Migration.

⁹⁰ Adepoju, A. (2002). Fostering free movement of persons in West Africa: Achievements, constraints and prospects for Intraregional migration. *International Migration*, 40 (2), Blackwell Publishers.

numbers in UK⁹¹, Germany, Spain and Italy. The UK has established the UK Nursing and Midwifery Council that deals with the recruitment of the health care personal. South Africa got on the top of the list, with over 2000 nurses and midwives registered in 2001/2002. The list was followed by Nigeria with about 500. Overall, the number of nurses and midwives from Sub-Saharan Africa rose from roughly 900 in 1998/1999 to about 3,800 in 2001/2002. It then declined to 2,500 by 2004/2005.⁹²

Smuggling and trafficking, or the sneaking of persons in violation of the law, are also closely bound to the Sub-Saharan Africa. One could hardly estimate the total number of irregular migrants. According to The International Centre for Migration Policy Development, there are about 100,000- 120,000 illegal migrants from Africa per year that try to reach Europe and almost half of them are helped by smugglers.⁹³ Focusing on the Netherlands; 99% of 638 irregular immigrants from Angola, 97% of 566 irregular Sierra Leonean immigrants and 98% of 681 irregular Somalian immigrants, were helped from smugglers in 2005.⁹⁴ These usually help them to get the fake passports, to organize the boat transports or to provide the help at the customs. Mostly, they are internationally active. In 2003, 9,794 irregular migrants were arrested in a strait of Gibraltar in comparison to 12,785 in 2000, according to the Spanish Interior Ministry. As for Canary Islands, the same source talks about 9,382 irregular migrants in 2003 in comparison to 2,410 in 2000. This huge increase might happen as a consequence of improved patrols or radar systems at the airports, or at the seaports.⁹⁵ The Italian results prove this thesis even more. In 2000, 1,724 immigrants were intercepted in comparison to 14,107 in 2003, with Sicily being the most frequent

⁹¹ In 2003, UK work permits were approved for 5880 health and medical personnel from South Africa, 2825 from Zimbabwe, 1510 from Nigeria, and 850 from Ghana. Eastwood, J.B. (2005). Loss of health professionals from sub-Saharan Africa: the pivotal role of the UK. *The Lancet*, 365, Issue 9474, p. 1847-1848.

⁹² van Moppes, D, Spaan, E. (2006). *African Exodus? Trends and Patterns of International Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa* (p. 12). Nijmegen: Radboud University. Retrieved December 2, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.ru.nl/socgeo/html/files/migration/migration4.pdf>

⁹³ van Moppes, D. (2006). *The African Migration Movement: Routes to Europe* (p. 5). Nijmegen: Radboud University. Retrieved December 2, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.ru.nl/socgeo/html/files/migration/migration5.pdf>

⁹⁴ Nederlandse Ambassade Dakar/ Dutch Embassy Dakar (2005). *Illegale migratie in West Afrika*; met detailstudie Senegal en Mauritanie (p. 4).

⁹⁵ van Moppes, D. (2006). *The African Migration Movement: Routes to Europe* (p. 13). Nijmegen: Radboud University. Retrieved December 2, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.ru.nl/socgeo/html/files/migration/migration5.pdf>

landing point. In 2002; 30.4% of the intercepted immigrants came from Sub-Saharan Africa that undoubtedly places them first among the regions of origin.⁹⁶

Human trafficking mainly involves children and women. Whether voluntarily, or not, these people often leave the country with false or lacking information. The most common destination countries in Europe are Germany, Netherlands, Italy, Spain, France and Sweden, where trafficked people usually end up in domestic labour or commercial sex.⁹⁷ However, it is important to say that still an overwhelming majority of Africans come to the EU legally as students or tourists and just afterwards stay without prolonging their legal status.

2.4.3 Migration routes

Sub-Saharan African migrants head towards Europe by sea, which is the most common as well as the most dangerous way, by land, by air, or some might combine different ways of transport.

The land route is scarcely used by Sub-Saharan Africans and there are only two options that can be reached. Besides the Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Melilla on Moroccan territory, the route can run via Egypt and the Eastern Mediterranean states to Turkey.⁹⁸ However, this route is used by Sub-Saharan Africans only in a very limited manner.

Air route is considered to be the safest, the most expensive and the least used way of getting to Europe. Many of the airports that serve as the source of Sub-Saharan immigration and important transit points are situated in the West Africa (Accra- Ghana, Bamako- Mali, Niamey- Niger). Other key transit airports are: Chad (N'Djamena), Ethiopia (Addis Ababa), Egypt (Cairo), Libya (Tripolis) and Morocco (Casablanca).⁹⁹ The air routes are in many cases used by South Africans that fly to the transitional airports and

⁹⁶ Nederlandse Ambassade Dakar/ Dutch Embassy Dakar (2005). *Illegale migratie in West Afrika*; met detailstudie Senegal en Mauritanie (p. 20).

⁹⁷ Adepoju, A. (2005). Review of Research and data on human trafficking in sub-Saharan Africa. In *Data and research on human trafficking: a global survey* (p.75-80). Geneva: International Organisation for Migration. Retrieved December 10, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.nswp.org/pdf/IOM-GLOBALTRAFFICK.PDF>

⁹⁸ van Moppes, D. (2006). *The African Migration Movement: Routes to Europe* (p. 9). Nijmegen: Radboud University. Retrieved December 2, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.ru.nl/socgeo/html/files/migration/migration5.pdf>

⁹⁹ Frontex (2006). *African and Mediterranean Irregular Migration Routes*. Retrieved from the World Wide Web December 13, 2007: <http://www.frontex.europa.eu/gfx/frontex/files/mtmmmapen.pdf>

then they join one of the lands or maritime routes. In Europe, Paris, Milan, Frankfurt and Madrid are the airports, which frequently face the Sub-Saharan immigration.¹⁰⁰

The maritime route is unfortunately the most common transportation route. Even if immigrants know about the dangers of this route, they rather do not admit what might happen. The Spanish territories (Andalusia- Malaga, Almeria, Algeciras; Canary Islands; Ceuta and Melilla) and Italian territories (Sicily and Lampedusa), together with Malta are their usual destinations on the way to Europe. Also, a large percentage of them never succeed to reach the coasts of Europe, whether they get cheated by traffickers and lose all their money, or do not survive the journey. International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) estimates that up to 120,000 irregular migrants cross the Mediterranean every year and through the last decade, at least 10,000 have died on their way to Europe.¹⁰¹ Even though these immigrants are often depicted as victims, “the vast majority migrate on their own initiative. Migrants typically pay for one difficult leg of the journey, usually involving a border crossing.”¹⁰²

Many of the immigrants heading to Europe come from North Africa, through the Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Melilla¹⁰³, through Morocco and Tunisia, Strait of Gibraltar to the territory of continental Spain and further to France and Italy. Another possibility for Sub-Saharan Africans is the scarcely used route from Egypt (Cairo) through Mediterranean Sea to Turkey (Istanbul) and further through Aegean Sea to Greece and Italy.¹⁰⁴

Migration routes of Sub-Saharan Africans have three basic directions: western, central and eastern. However, due to their complicated composition, five main migration routes aiming to Europe can be distinguished. The first is the *West African coastal route*, with the destination of Canary Islands via Northern Mauritania, Western Sahara or Southern Morocco. This route leads via Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Guinea- Bissau,

¹⁰⁰ Unpublished source of The Ministry of Interior of the Czech Republic.

¹⁰¹ Európsky parlament (2007). *Migrants Deaths at Sea: MEPs Reiterate Member State's Responsibilities*. Retrieved December 13, 2007, from the World Wide Web:

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/expert/infopress_page/018-8712-184-07-27-902-20070702IPR08711-03-07-2007-2007-false/default_sk.htm

¹⁰² de Haas, H. (2006). *Trans-Saharan Migration to North Africa and the EU: Historical Roots and Current Trends*. University of Oxford. Retrieved December 13, 2007, from the World Wide Web:

<http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=484>

¹⁰³ These two Spanish colonial enclaves that form a border between Spain and Morocco, witnessed in October 2005 a trial of Africans from Mali, Senegal and Mauritania to reach illegally Southern Europe. Hundreds of them were badly injured and found dead after a police raid.

¹⁰⁴ Šilhavý, I. (2007). *Migrace: Perspektivy pro bezpečný a funkční model pro Českou republiku* (p. 5). Prague: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic.

Senegal, Gambia, Mauritania and Western Sahara, to the northern coast of Morocco. Conakry in Guinea, Dakar in Senegal, Nouadhibou in Mauritania and Dakhla in Western Sahara belong to the most important cities, where possible migrants gather.¹⁰⁵ Pavla Fridrichová, the head of Conceptions, Foreign Affairs and the Countries of Origin Department, from Asylum and Migration Policy Department, Ministry of Interior of the Czech Republic, says that this route is getting closed, because of the strengthening cooperation between the EU and the West African states (mainly Mali and Senegal). She also adds that the West African route is often rather undertaken from the Gulf of Guinea, through Atlantic Ocean to the final destination (Canary Islands, Fuerteventura), than by land.

The *Western Sahara route* is the second option, with the destination of Canary Islands via Northern Mauritania, Western Sahara or Southern Morocco. Most of these migrants originate in Cape Verde, Senegal or Mauritania. The journey starts at the Mali's capital Bamako and then, migrants must cross Sahara, mostly to Dakar or the city of Zouérate, in the north of Mauritania. From here, they "continue to the northern coast of Mauritania, or cross the border to Western Sahara and reach the northern coast of Western Sahara, or the southern coast of Morocco. The two biggest dangers are: the desert and the Liberation Front Polisario, an organisation that fights for the independence of Western Sahara from Morocco. This means that it is almost impossible to undertake the route without any help of smugglers. On the other hand, most of the countries involved in this route are the ECOWAS member states, which make the transit easier."¹⁰⁶

The *Central Sahara route*, the third one, usually attracts Africans that live south of Niger (Cameroon, Nigeria), but might originate in other West African countries. The route begins in Niger, in the city of Agadez, because it offers relatively many opportunities to find a job (mainly in mining industry) and earn some money before starting the journey. It crosses Sahara through Algeria (the cities Tamanrasset and Maghnia belong to the greatest African migration hubs)¹⁰⁷ and splits in northern Morocco (the city of Oujda). Here, they can continue to Western Sahara and further to Canary Islands by boat, or they

¹⁰⁵ van Moppes, D. (2006). *The African Migration Movement: Routes to Europe* (p. 9). Nijmegen: Radboud University. Retrieved December 2, 2007, from the World Wide Web:

<http://www.ru.nl/socgeo/html/files/migration/migration5.pdf>

¹⁰⁶ van Moppes, D. (2006). *The African Migration Movement: Routes to Europe* (p. 10). Nijmegen: Radboud University. Retrieved December 2, 2007, from the World Wide Web:

<http://www.ru.nl/socgeo/html/files/migration/migration5.pdf>

¹⁰⁷ Frontex (2006). *African and Mediterranean Irregular Migration Routes*. Retrieved December 13, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.frontex.europa.eu/gfx/frontex/files/mtmmmapen.pdf>

go to the Moroccan coasts and further transfer to Melilla, Malaga or Almeria. In spite of Ceuta being the nearest point, it is the most dangerous journey due to the reinforced patrols.¹⁰⁸

The fourth possibility is the *Eastern Sahara route*. This route also starts in Agadez, but then it continues to Tunisia (coast near Tunis) and Libya (from the city of Shebha to the Tripolis). Tunisia is known as an important hub for the human trafficking networks. Pressure for stricter supervision of borders is put on Libya as well, while 31.6% of immigrants intercepted in the EU territory left from Libya.¹⁰⁹ The arrival destinations are then Lampedusa, Sicily, Pantelleria, Linosa¹¹⁰ and Malta. However, the political environment implies that any talks with Tripolis seem to be far more distant to the real action than those with Rabbat.

The last option is the *Eastern route* that leads from Addis Abeba, through Sudan to the southeast of Libya (the city of Al Jawf) and further to Libyan coasts (Tripolis). Few travel from Sudan to Egypt (Cairo).¹¹¹ Most of these migrants come from the Horn of Africa, mainly Somalia and Ethiopia.

It is important to clarify that not all migrants that try to get from Africa to Europe are necessarily Africans. Lots of these people come from China, Pakistan or Sri Lanka and Africa is just a transitional station. However, Sub-Saharan Africans still represent a considerable source of migration, with the potential to grow.

3 The EU policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa- the main trends and perspectives

3.1 EU as a destination for Sub-Saharan African immigrants

Since the early 1990s, the number of Africans, attempting to get to Europe, has increased. In general, migration from North Africa is more common than Sub-Saharan migration. The

¹⁰⁸ van Moppes, D. (2006). *The African Migration Movement: Routes to Europe* (p. 11). Nijmegen: Radboud University. Retrieved December 2, 2007, from the World Wide Web:

<http://www.ru.nl/socgeo/html/files/migration/migration5.pdf>

¹⁰⁹ van Moppes, D. (2006). *The African Migration Movement: Routes to Europe* (p. 11). Nijmegen: Radboud University. Retrieved December 2, 2007, from the World Wide Web:

<http://www.ru.nl/socgeo/html/files/migration/migration5.pdf>

¹¹⁰ All four islands belong to Italy.

¹¹¹ Frontex (2006). *African and Mediterranean Irregular Migration Routes*. Retrieved December 13, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.frontex.europa.eu/gfx/frontex/files/mtmmmapen.pdf>

former one is higher in France (primarily from Senegal, Mali and Côte d'Ivoire), Belgium, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands, while the latter is more significant in Portugal¹¹² (from Angola and Cape Verde) and the UK (from Ghana and Nigeria) and refers to the former colonial links.¹¹³ The language factor, or the language proximity, plays an important role in the Sub-Saharan immigration to Europe. On the other hand, the patterns of migration are changing. For example, flows from Senegal to Spain increased by 25% per year to 5,700 people, or in the case of Nigeria by 15% per year to 5,300 people. The OECD statistics show that among the EU countries, Germany, France and United Kingdom are the main destinations for asylum seekers. The top country of asylum seeking from Africa is the Democratic Republic of Kongo, with 4,400 asylum requests in France and the UK. DRC is followed by Somalia, with 3,400 requests in the UK and the Netherlands.¹¹⁴

The last decades of the EU immigration policies were characterized by the stringent admission rules and the zero immigration policies, as a reaction to the previous decades. Labour recruitment programmes that were stopped at the beginning of 70's, enabled a lot of migrants to cross the European borders. However, relatively benevolent approach characterized the policies of the family reunification.¹¹⁵ Early 90's were a period that brought new patterns into the European immigration: "refugees, asylum seekers, displaced persons and family members of migrants already established in the Union, migrant workers and growing numbers of business migrants. The flows have become more flexible and dynamic – short-term and cross-border movements in particular have increased."¹¹⁶ However, the massive inflows of asylum seekers also lead to the misuse of the residence legalization and together with the failure of immigrant integration contributed to the stricter admission rules and policies.

¹¹² 54% of the foreign born population in Portugal originates in Africa. OECD (2007). *Annual Report. International Migration Outlook*. Sopemi Edition (p. 47). Paris: OECD Publications. Retrieved December 10, 2007, from the World Wide Web:

http://www.oecd.org/document/25/0,3343,en_2649_34487_38797017_1_1_1_1,00.html (password protected site)

¹¹³ OECD (2007). *Annual Report. International Migration Outlook*. Sopemi Edition (p. 46). Paris: OECD Publications. Retrieved December 10, 2007, from the World Wide Web:

http://www.oecd.org/document/25/0,3343,en_2649_34487_38797017_1_1_1_1,00.html (password protected site)

¹¹⁴ OECD (2007). *Annual Report. International Migration Outlook*. Sopemi Edition (p. 46- 47). Paris: OECD Publications. Retrieved December 10, 2007, from the World Wide Web:

http://www.oecd.org/document/25/0,3343,en_2649_34487_38797017_1_1_1_1,00.html (password protected site)

¹¹⁵ Castles, S., Miller, M. J. (2003). *The Age of Migration* (p. 96). New York: Guilford Press.

¹¹⁶ IOM (2003). Towards a Common Migration Policy of the European Union. In *World Migration 2003* (p. 4). Geneva: International Organisation for Migration.

Nowadays, the efforts aim to the more flexible policies, dependent on the needs of the labour market and with a regard to the ageing and declining population that is typical for most of the EU countries. Several countries even indicate the population growth due to the immigration. In March 2000, the EU Heads of States and Governments agreed to make the EU “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion,” known as a Lisbon Strategy.¹¹⁷ Although some progress was made on rebuilding Europe's economy, there is a valid concern that the reform process is not going fast enough and that the ambitious targets will not be reached. On another hand, the negative demographic indicators have to be taken into account. It is broadly accepted that migration, if well- managed, might serve as one part of the solution. Currently, the trend says that the EU rather prefers temporary and selected (educated and highly- skilled) workers to permanent labour migrants, or permanent labour force in limited numbers.¹¹⁸ More than systematic recruitment of the labour immigration, this approach aims at shortages in certain occupations, or sectors.

The total fertility rate in the EU-25 belongs to the lowest in the world in comparison to Sub-Saharan Africa that has the highest rates.¹¹⁹ On the other hand, the EU faces increasing life expectancy in contrast to Africa that indicates the lowest numbers. “As a result, in most countries the number of people above 65 years of age is projected to increase until the years 2025 by 10 to 100% and, until the year 2050, by 30 to 150%.”¹²⁰ For better understanding, in 2002 there were 63.4 million of people aged 65 and more.¹²¹ Therefore, it is necessary to develop accurate strategies that would help to fill the labour gap and recruit the economically active population. As a result, European countries are shifting to the higher retirement thresholds and try to launch the social security system transformations. Another strategy might focus on immigrants as a possible solution,

¹¹⁷ EurActive. (2007). *Lisbon Agenda*. Retrieved May 3, 2007, from the World Wide Web:

<http://www.euractiv.com/en/agenda2004/lisbon-agenda/article-117510>

¹¹⁸ IOM (2003). International Labour Migration and Demographic Change in Europe. In *World Migration 2003* (p. 9). Geneva: International Organisation for Migration.

¹¹⁹ EC (2006). *Population Statistic* (p. 37). Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications for the European Communities.

¹²⁰ IOM (2003). International Labour Migration and Demographic Change in Europe. In *World Migration 2003* (p. 5). Geneva: International Organisation for Migration.

¹²¹ IOM (2003). International Labour Migration and Demographic Change in Europe. In *World Migration 2003* (p. 6). Geneva: International Organisation for Migration.

however with a respect to the European labour market needs and apparently with the willingness to choose the destination country on other than personal criteria.¹²²

In addition to the demographic trends, after the last two accessions of the EU, migration itself has also changed slightly. It is important to stress that losing the primacy in the immigration tables does not automatically mean a downturn in volume! Generally, African diaspora in Europe (EU-11, without Ireland, Luxembourg and Austria) consists of 1,042,897 non-nationals from the Sub-Saharan Africa, according to the IOM statistic from the 2000.¹²³ IOM illustrates situation in the EU countries with the Eurostat 2002 data that map the situation in 2000. France is the country with the most populous Sub-Saharan African diaspora, consisting of 274,538 people and is followed by the UK with the stock of 249,720 Sub-Saharan Africans. Germany that belongs to the top countries of asylum applications, indicates 156,564 people from the Sub-Saharan African region.¹²⁴

Taking into account the Population Statistics of Eurostat, the constant regress of asylum applications has been noticed, to approximately 0.3 million of applications in comparison to the period 1998-2002 with 0.4 million of applications.¹²⁵ This stands in a clear contrast to the increased net migration in the EU that has been registered in the new millennium.¹²⁶ However, this is not surprising in the light of the strict admission policies that apply to both: labour migration as well as forced migration (refugees, asylum seekers) in order to fight against irregular migration.

Talking about the external immigration from the Sub-Saharan Africa, there is a very special example- Cape Verde. In 2000, the population on the islands reached the number 430,000 while the diaspora reached 520,000 in 1998. There is a numerous Cape Verdean diaspora in Europe. 80,000 Cape Verdeans live in Portugal, followed by France (25,000), Netherlands (17,000), Spain (12,000) and Italy (10,000).¹²⁷

¹²² IOM (2003). International Labour Migration and Demographic Change in Europe. In *World Migration 2003* (p. 7). Geneva: International Organisation for Migration.

¹²³ IOM (2004). *Migration for Development in Africa* (p. 5). Geneva: International Organisation for Migration. Retrieved April 1, 2007 from the World Wide Web: http://www.aracorporation.org/files/20_mida.pdf

¹²⁴ IOM (2004). *Migration for Development in Africa* (p. 6). Geneva: International Organisation for Migration. Retrieved April 1, 2007 from the World Wide Web: http://www.aracorporation.org/files/20_mida.pdf

¹²⁵ Examining the period 1991-2005; 5,192,000 asylum applications were made in the EU 15, which makes an average of 346,000 applications per year. EC (2006). *Migration and Public Perception* (p. 25). Retrieved October 10, 2006, from the World Wide Web: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/policy_advisers/publications/docs/bepa_migration_final_09_10_006_en.pdf

¹²⁶ EC (2006). *Population Statistic* (p. 95). Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications for the European Communities.

¹²⁷ Ndione, B. (ed.) (2005). *Les Statistiques des travailleurs migrants en Afrique de l'Ouest; Synthèse sous-regionale*. Projet: Migration de main- d'oeuvre pour l'integration et le

3.1.1 Impacts of the Sub-Saharan migration on the EU- Case study of the Netherlands: Sub-Saharan African community in Netherlands

In Netherlands, one part of immigrant group has its origin in Sub-Saharan Africa. The most populous groups are the Somalians (28,000), followed by Cape Verdeans (16,000), Ghanians (13,000), Ethiopians/Eritreans (9,000), South Africans (6,000), Congolese (5,000), Angolans (3,500), Nigerians (3,000), Sudanese (2,000), Liberians (2,000) and Kenyans (1,500).¹²⁸

Language is usually the first obstacle to a successful integration into the society. Paying attention to the first- generation immigrants, studies show that the majority of them have difficulties in speaking, reading and talking Dutch. Even though when they take 500-600 hours of language lessons, they are not enough prepared to enter the labour market. Henceforth, people of this generation tend to rely on the younger ones and not on themselves. The following second and third- generation seems to have better position, but in comparison to Dutch, they still do not show the same level of proficiency.¹²⁹

The recent sub-Saharan African immigrants tend to *settle down* in one of the four biggest cities: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht. In general, some of the public blames the minorities for housing shortages, unemployment and imperfect education.¹³⁰ If migrants are unemployed, they are easily perceived as those, who do not contribute to the welfare of the society.¹³¹ Although, it is necessary to say that Sub-Saharan African minority is rather small in comparison to Surinamese, Antillean, Moroccan or Turkish minority and therefore does not represent such a threat in the eyes of public.

developpement en Afrique (p. 41- 44). Dakar: ILO.

¹²⁸ ter Haar, G. (2000). *Afrikanen in Nederland: Ein inleiding/Africans in the Netherlands: An introduction*. In I. van Kessel & N. Tellegen (Eds.), *Afrikanen in Nederland* (p. 11–41). Amsterdam: Koninklijk Instituut de Tropen.

¹²⁹ Blakely, A. (2005). African Diaspora in the Netherlands. In *Encyclopedia of Diasporas, Immigrant and Refugee Cultures around the World*. Springer Science+Business Media, Inc.

¹³⁰ Blakely, A. (2005). African Diaspora in the Netherlands. In *Encyclopedia of Diasporas, Immigrant and Refugee Cultures around the World*. Springer Science+Business Media, Inc.

¹³¹ Letting the numbers speak, “in the second quarter of 2005, 8.9% (8.4% men and 9.5% women) of the native active population was unemployed in the European Union, while this rate was 17.0% (16.5% men and 17.6% women) among third country nationals (23.1% among the young between 15 and 24 years of age, 11.2% among the total of 15-24 year olds).“ EC (2006). *Migration and Public Perception* (p. 18).

Retrieved October 10, 2006, from the World Wide Web:

http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/policy_advisers/publications/docs/bepa_migration_final_09_10_006_en.pdf

Economic activities of Sub-Saharan Africans are represented in statistics only in a quite insufficient way. Those from the very late 1990s showed that “the majority of Somalian adults were registered as unemployed and on public assistance, perhaps as high as 70% at least without a formal job. Most of the young men who are employed work in jobs beneath the level they enjoyed in Somalia, and mainly in unskilled labour in factories and other jobs found through employment agencies.”¹³² Maybe not as high, but comparable data apply to the other groups. Despite the existence of highly skilled African immigrants, the majority still has low skilled and low paid jobs, like house-keeping, working in factories, in flower industry, in hotels, construction works, or airport menial jobs.¹³³ Migrants are often willing to perform the work that is of no attraction for the domestic labour force. On the other hand, irregular migrants might have problem to find any job. In the case they lose it, it is much harder to find a new one, while they are not a part of the social system and can't get any financial support. Being in a social and material hardship, many times lead to increased criminality and social unrests in the immigrant community. Unofficial economy also plays an important role for the African community, whether focusing on the legal activities (f.e.nannies), or activities like provision of false residency papers, travel agencies, money changing, auto repair, drug trafficking or prostitution.¹³⁴ This also creates the generally negative image of the community.

3.2 EU immigration policy in a time line

The formation of a common approach towards the immigration issue has already developed a long way; however, the current position is not further than half way. The first important milestone happened in 1985 when France, Germany and the countries of Benelux signed an agreement to remove internal border controls and at the same time tighten the controls of external border. This created the Schengen area which came into force in 1996. This step was followed by the Single European Act (SEA) that declared the interest of states to cooperate within a single market and to improve coordination on the field of foreign policy. SEA came into force in 1987. The Treaty on European Union, also

¹³² Blakely, A. (2005). African Diaspora in the Netherlands. In: *Encyclopedia of Diasporas, Immigrant and Refugee Cultures around the World*. Springer Science+Business Media, Inc.

¹³³ Blakely, A. (2005). African Diaspora in the Netherlands. In: *Encyclopedia of Diasporas, Immigrant and Refugee Cultures around the World*. Springer Science+Business Media, Inc.

¹³⁴ Tellegen, N. (2000). *Afrikanen op de Nederlandse arbeidsmarkt: Een eerste verkenning/ Africans in the Dutch labor market: A preliminary exploration*. In I. van Kessel & N. Tellegen (Eds.), *Afrikanen in Nederland* (p. 165–181). Amsterdam: Koninklijk Instituut de Tropen.

known as The Maastricht Treaty, approved new cooperative arrangements for foreign and security policy, especially in the issues of asylum and immigration policy, and came into effect at the end of 1993. Not accidentally, this meant a creation of the third pillar, with immigration and asylum recognized as a common issue, while the number of immigrants was peaking. In 1999, the Amsterdam Treaty obliged to improve EU's ability to act internationally, concerning mainly foreign and security policy. Being more specific, the main objectives were the integration of existing immigrants and asylum seekers, however with opt-outs of three countries: Denmark, Ireland and the UK.¹³⁵

The Tampere European Council, held in October of the same year, brought forward the so called "Tampere Milestones" that opened a new era of cooperation between member states and thus, more attention was paid to this event. In order to improve affectivity, cooperation focused on four main areas:

1. Partnership with countries of origin
2. Common policy for asylum as a separate issue
3. Fair treatment of third country nationals
4. Management of migration flows.¹³⁶

The third point claimed for: " [...] more vigorous integration policy" and "aim at granting legally resident third country nationals rights and obligations comparable to those of EU citizens."¹³⁷ Proposals of the Commission dealt with minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers, as well as for treatment of TCNs. According to Urth, this provides just a very basis of rights as a consequence of unanimous voting within the Council.¹³⁸

The Commission's *Communication on Immigration, Integration and Employment* that resulted from the Tampere Milestones and was adopted in 2003, walked hand in hand with the ambitious Lisbon Strategy and headed toward the competitive and dynamic

¹³⁵ Stalker, P. (2002). Migrations Trends and Migration Policy in Europe. *International Migration*, 40 (5), p.151-179. Retrieved October 10, 2006, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-2435.00215?journalCode=imig> (password protected site).

¹³⁶ Urth, H. (2005). Building a Momentum for the Integration of the Third- country Nationals in the European Union. *European Journal of Migration and Law*, 7 (2), p. 165. Retrieved October 10, 2006, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/mnp/emil/2005/00000007/00000002/art00004> (password protected site).

¹³⁷ EU (1999). *Presidency Conclusions. Tampere European Council, par. 18*. Retrieved January 10, 2007, from the World Wide Web: http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/oct99/oct99_en.htm#milestones

¹³⁸ Urth, H. (2005). Building a Momentum for the Integration of the Third- country Nationals in the European Union. *European Journal of Migration and Law*, 7 (2), p. 167. Retrieved October 10, 2006, from the World Wide Web: <https://commerce.metapress.com/content/xh18125tgh8273w0/resource-secured/?target=fulltext.pdf&sid=c1qwae3hygjwrmymlgjukid&sh=springerlink.metapress.com> (password protected site).

environment, stressing the importance to combine integration of existing immigrants with comprehensive policy towards future migration. Hence, there was a call for increased migrant stocks, to fill the gap caused by a demographical decline and an aging population. On the contrary to the Lisbon targets, Communication rather favours mobilisation of existing immigrants.¹³⁹

In 2001, the Nice Treaty was signed, looking much more like a set of compromises than was originally planned. The Charter of Fundamental Rights was included, although outside of the legal framework of the EU. At least, cutting on a veto in a matter of closer cooperation was perceived as a positive step. What more, the Laeken Conference in the same year did not successfully lead towards agreement on common immigration and asylum policy (CIAP) and seemed to be a step backwards.¹⁴⁰ In 2004, the five-year period of the Tampere mandate came to an end and the European Council adopted a new strategy, known as the Hague Programme. This programme is concerned with the progress on CIAP, especially immigrant integration.

Concerning the EU-African relations, another treaty is crucial to mention- the Cotonou Agreement, signed in 2000, in the capital of Benin, between the EU and 77 countries located in Africa and the Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACPs), which came into effect in 2003. This cooperation included the migration issue, while labour migration became one of the determinant aspects of the EU- ACP relations. Migration management, based on the principle of equality, contained three main points:

- Respect of the human rights of migrants with the legal residence on both sides
- Strategies to fight against the root- causes of massive migration, stressing the proper access to the education for ACP students
- Tackling irregular migration, including the return and re- admission of the migrants.¹⁴¹

¹³⁹ Urth, H. (2005). Building a Momentum for the Integration of the Third- country Nationals in the European Union. *European Journal of Migration and Law*, 7 (2), p. 167. Retrieved October 10, 2006, from the World Wide Web: <https://commerce.metapress.com/content/xh18125tgh8273w0/resource-secured/?target=fulltext.pdf&sid=c1qwae3hygiwrmymlgigukid&sh=springerlink.metapress.com> (password protected site).

¹⁴⁰ Stalker, P. (2002). Migrations Trends and Migration Policy in Europe. *International Migration*, 40 (5), p. 167. Retrieved October 10, 2006, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-2435.00215?journalCode=imig> (password protected site).

¹⁴¹ IOM (2003). Towards a Common Migration Policy of the European Union. In *World Migration 2003* (p. 3). Geneva: International Organisation for Migration.

Since 2004, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has been serving as a tool for bilateral cooperation between the EU countries and countries with geographical proximity, however outside of the EU region. This also involves North African states, namely: Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Libya and Tunisia, in order to achieve mutual benefits in a form of good relations, of both an economic and politic nature.¹⁴² These countries form the biggest resource of African immigration, acting as the transitional stage, or directly as the resource stage. Thus, it is in the best interest of the EU, to assist their development. “Thus, the predominant strategy within the Mediterranean region is now bilateral cooperation in coastal areas and along land borders; the signing and effective implementation of readmission agreements with non-EU countries of transit; and the construction of immigration controls in neighboring non-EU countries, in order that they control transit migration as well as emigration.”¹⁴³

3.3 EU’s response to the Sub-Saharan migration

Until 2001, the official dialogue on irregular migration lacked a platform to deal with this growing problem. The Mediterranean Transit Migration Dialogue (*MTM Dialogue*) was implemented by ICMPD in 2001, with the financial support of the EU. Basic goal of the project is to combat irregular migration and to create conditions for legal migration, in a common cooperation of: Arab Partner States (APS)¹⁴⁴, European Partner States (EPS)¹⁴⁵, Frontex and Europol.¹⁴⁶ After 2003, migration flows evolved rise of Sub-Saharan Africans as the transit migrants within the region and Sub-Saharan Africa became a part of the project.¹⁴⁷ Since 2003, Spain and Morocco and to a lesser extent Italy and Libya launched to collaborate in border patrolling and since 2006, Spain received a limited support from Frontex, the EU external control agency, to control the western migration route.

¹⁴² EC (2007). *The Policy: What is the European Neighbourhood Policy?* Retrieved January 10, 2007, from the World Wide Web: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/policy_en.htm

¹⁴³ Migration Information Source. (2004). *The Changing Mosaic of Mediterranean Migrations*. Retrieved January 10, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=230>

¹⁴⁴ Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia.

¹⁴⁵ EU member states and Norway, Switzerland and Turkey.

¹⁴⁶ ICMPD (2002). *Dialogue on Mediterranean Transit Migration*. Retrieved December 10, 2007, from the World Wide Web:

[http://www.icmpd.org/706.html?&no_cache=1&tx_icmpd_pi1\[article\]=922&tx_icmpd_pi1\[page\]=926](http://www.icmpd.org/706.html?&no_cache=1&tx_icmpd_pi1[article]=922&tx_icmpd_pi1[page]=926)

¹⁴⁷ Frontex (2006). *African and Mediterranean Irregular Migration Routes*. Retrieved December 13, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.frontex.europa.eu/gfx/frontex/files/mtmmmapen.pdf>

The *Euro African Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development*, lastly held in Libya in November 2006, formulated the first joint approach to migration between Europe and Africa and symbolizes the latest steps made to tackle irregular transit migration.¹⁴⁸ Participators agreed on closer cooperation on common EU labour migration policy aiming to match the demand and supply needs instead of insisting on preferential principles. Improvement of access requires the setting up of regional economic organisations. As indicated earlier, a crucial point of the Euro-African partnership is the convergence towards African stability, referring to the fact that the most comprehensive solution of the African problem is in the development of its own facilities.¹⁴⁹ This principle served as a signpost in the three conferences, in Lisbon, Tripolis and in Rabat. The above mentioned *Rabat Ministerial Conference* approved the so called *Action Plan* to stress as follows:

“...[a] comprehensive approach, by bringing together countries of origin, transit and destination. Partnership between these countries is essential to achieve positive results in linking migration and development; combating illegal immigration; protecting the rights of migrants and refugees, as well as improving cooperation over legal migration that can be in the interests of all sides. The European Neighborhood Policy provides a flexible framework in North Africa, to respond to the specific needs of our individual partners,” quoted from Benita Ferrero-Waldner, The Commissioner for External Relations and the European Neighborhood Policy.¹⁵⁰ Concretely, the Action Plan approved to support the Malian governments’ capacity to manage migratory flows and to create a centre for Malians living abroad (*Maison des Maliens de l’Extérieur*), as well as migration information and management centre.¹⁵¹ “The main tasks of these Malian institutions will be to collect and disseminate information on migration, and in particular on: working conditions, job opportunities and

¹⁴⁸ 15% of the EU population thinks that fighting irregular migration belongs to the top three actions that the EU should follow priority. EC (2006). *Eurobarometer 64: Public Opinion in the European Union* (p.99). Retrieved December 10, 2007, from the World Wide Web:

http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb64/eb64_en.pdf

¹⁴⁹ EU (2006). *Euro- Africa Conference on Migration and Development: the EU and West, Central and North African countries expected to agree concrete cooperation*. Retrieved January 10, 2007, from the World Wide Web:

<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/954&type=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>

¹⁵⁰ EU (2006). *Euro- Africa Conference on Migration and Development: the EU and West, Central and North African countries expected to agree concrete cooperation*. Retrieved January 10, 2007, from the World Wide Web:

<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/954&type=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>

¹⁵¹ EU (2007). *EU- Mali high- level meeting on migration and development*. Retrieved April 10, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/167&format=HTML&age>

training at national, sub regional and European level, the hazards of illegal migration and accompanying measures to facilitate the reintegration of returning migrants.¹⁵² The choice of Mali was not random, although Mali has turned out to be the largest source of irregular immigration to Europe, especially concerning Spain. According to the Memo Dutch Embassy in Dakar, 2,188 irregular immigrants from Mali were intercepted in Spanish waters between the years 2002/2003. The second place of this rating is taken by 1,308 Gambians.¹⁵³ It is estimated that about 200,000 Malians live in Europe, most of which live in France. However, the most common migration route begins at Sahara, continues through Algeria and ends in Italy.¹⁵⁴

In 2007, the Spanish initiative established a partnership between Spain and Senegal. “The programme, promoted by Spanish and Senegalese governments, aims to bring hundreds of workers to Spain with renewable one-year visas and jobs.”¹⁵⁵ Another Spanish initiative applied to Gambia and Mali. Spain invested € 1,000,000 into training programmes for those, who might be recruited for work programmes.¹⁵⁶ On the other hand, more restrictive policies have been applied in France. So called selective immigration system brings stricter rules in the area of family immigration and irregular immigration in order to support employment-driven immigration.¹⁵⁷

On December 8-9, 2007, *EU- Africa Summit* was held in Lisbon and ended up with the *Joint Strategy* and the *Lisbon Declaration*. The debate focused on the trade and development issue, human rights issue, as well as on migration (mainly irregular migration and the brain drain issue) and terrorism issue. French president Sarkozy implored Sudanese president al-Beshir to allow the deployment of the UN- peacekeeping force to stem the bloodshed in the western Darfur region. Also, Zimbabwe was criticized for ongoing human rights violations and economy downfall. The final declaration on migration adopted strategies that stem the

¹⁵² EU (2007). *EU- Mali high- level meeting on migration and development*. Retrieved April 10, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/167&format=HTML&age>

¹⁵³ van Moppes, D. (2006). *The African Migration Movement: Routes to Europe* (p. 14). Nijmegen: Radboud University. Retrieved December 2, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.ru.nl/socgeo/html/files/migration/migration5.pdf>

¹⁵⁴ afrol News. (2006). *Migration produces the EU deal for Mali; Bissau next*. Retrieved April 10, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.afrol.com/articles/21604>

¹⁵⁵ Migrants: Development Package. (2007, September). *Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural Series*, 44 (8), 17213c- 17214 b.

¹⁵⁶ Migrants: Development Package. (2007, September). *Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural Series*, 44 (8), 17213c- 17214 b.

¹⁵⁷ Murphy, K. (2006). *France’ s New Law: Control Immigration Flows, Court the Highly Skilled*. Retrieved December 12, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=486>

flows of irregular migration to Europe by promoting and better managing the legal channels. This involves the remittances facilitation and closer cooperation in the matter of the migration process awareness.¹⁵⁸ This implies the MTM Dialogue reinforcement.

3.3.1 Response to conflicts: Darfur and Somalia

According to the US 2006 Annual Human Rights report, the genocide in Darfur was ranked as the clearest example of human rights abuse.¹⁵⁹ The EC “has provided funds to organizations with an international mandate to protect vulnerable civilians. Following a ceasefire agreement between government and rebel forces in April 2004, it agreed to provide €12 million to support African Union peace keeping efforts.”¹⁶⁰

In June 2006, the International Contact Group for Somalia was established, in order to support the peace keeping process and reconciliation efforts in Somalia. The group consists of the European Union, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Tanzania, United Kingdom and the United States as well as from other representatives like the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the League of Arab States, invited to participate as observers. The main ambition of the group is the implementation of the Transitional Federal Charter and Institutions and improvement of socio-economic and humanitarian environment.¹⁶¹ “In line with recent statements by this Presidency, by Commissioner [Louis] Michel and High Representative [Javier] Solana, and by the International Contact Group meeting in Cairo, the European Union wishes to reiterate its concern regarding the humanitarian situation unfolding in southern Somalia, and to appeal to you personally to intervene as a matter of utmost urgency,” said Walter Lindner, the EU president and Germany's representative in April 2007.¹⁶²

¹⁵⁸ EU (2007). *Lisbon Declaration of the EU- Africa Summit*. Retrieved December 13, 2007, from the World Wide Web: http://www.eu2007.pt/UE/vEN/Noticias_Documentos/20071209declaracaolisboa.htm.

EU (2007). *The Africa- EU Strategic Partnership: A Joint Africa- EU Strategy*. Retrieved December 13, 2007, from the World Wide Web: http://www.eu2007.pt/NR/rdonlyres/D449546C-BF42-4CB3-B566-407591845C43/0/071206jsapenlogos_formatado.pdf

¹⁵⁹ United Press International. (2007). *US Slams Sudan for Human Rights Abuse*. Retrieved April 10, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.upi.com/InternationalIntelligence/view.php?StoryID=20070306-011543-1567r>

¹⁶⁰ EC (2004). *Crisis in Darfur: The European Commission's response* (p. 1). Retrieved April 20, 2007, from the World Wide Web: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/pdf_files/leaflets/darfur.pdf

¹⁶¹ Norway Mission to the UN. (2006). *International Somalia Contact Group*. Retrieved April 1, 2007, from the World Wide Web: http://www.norway-un.org/News/20060615_somalia.htm

¹⁶² allAfrica. (2007). *Somalia: UN, EU Urge Humanitarian Action*. Retrieved May 3, 2007, from the World Wide Web: <http://allafrica.com/stories/200704250725.html>

However, there is a significant difference between the two cases. In Darfur, peace efforts have taken a multilateral approach, with an important role of the hybrid UN/AU peace force that might indicate a shy movement forward. On the other hand, in Somalia, the peace efforts have been unilateral, and it seems that the country sinks ever deeper into chaos.

Conclusion

The migration issue has undoubtedly taken place among the most urgent global problems. Even though humankind has migrated through out the centuries, the high dynamics of migratory flows determines that the issue is a subject of continual changes. It is not random that the Sub-Saharan African region was chosen as the focus of interest. Currently, this region posses the highest migratory potential due to the percentage of young in the population; this being supported by the high fertility rates that predict a continuing development of the phenomenon, which can only cause a big surplus of the population in the productive age.

Certainly, people migrate with intensions to improve their current standards, whether it is a voluntary decision to leave the country of origin, or it is a question of life and death that results into the forced migration. One of the strongest push factors that influence the decision to migrate is armed conflicts. The two of them, in Darfur and Somalia, represents the biggest source of displaced people, both internally and internationally. Environmental disasters also belong to the strong push factors of forced migration. On the other hand, voluntary movement is mainly caused by the intension to improve the economic situation, or may be caused by personal and family related reasons. Although the patterns of female migration and, in general, the position of women in the society is changing, it is still more typical that migration is caused by family related reasons.

The role of pull factors is not less important. Referring mainly to the labour migrants, their decision making depends on the cultural proximity that applies chiefly to the language proximity and also on the admission policies of the desired country. However, a relatively high percentage of migrants lack the realistic information on the situation in the chosen country. This does not only cause their disillusionment, but what

is, more importantly, it might be a capital obstruction to their admission process. The darker side of the Sub-Saharan African migration is the negative impact that results in the further deepening of the HIV/AIDS problem, significantly influenced by the movement of the labour migration (sector of mining industry) and the brain drain issue that causes serious gaps in the health care and education sectors. Particularly, these are the two reasons that create the circle of despair when talking about the migration management in Africa.

The attitudes of the EU have been strongly influenced by the event in September 2001 and have led to a greater securitization of the migration issue. Currently, the attention is mainly paid to the fight against irregular migration. It is also a consequence of the stringent EU policies, which is clearly visible in the decreased number of asylum applications registered in the last years. The issue of irregular migration, due to its booming potential, is also a media-inspiring topic and constitutes an ambivalent attitude of the general public. However, irregular immigration is not only a problem of Africans that sail to reach the southern coasts of Europe. It is rather a problem of overstaying the limits of legal permits.

Various signals have been sent out by the European Union concerning the basic principles in the process to solve the problem. The EU representatives do not forget that the population is facing a demographical decline. The EU member states have already started to reform their social security systems and increase the threshold of the retirement age as one part of the solution. The second part of the solution takes into account the migration management. The *Communication on Immigration, Integration and Employment* issued by the European Commission in 2003, hand in hand with the Lisbon Strategy, favors mobilization of the existing immigrant community rather than massive inflows of immigrants through the less stringent admission policies.

Another important tool in the hands of the EU is the European Neighborhood Policy that supports the North African states, often serving as the first stage in migratory flows from the Sub-Saharan region. This also means an increased attention paid to the issue of transition migration, showed through the example of the Centre for Malians living abroad, a project supported by the EU in order to empower the fight against irregular migration.

To sum up, it can be expected that the EU will enforce efforts to improve the immigrants' integration and their mobilization instead of extensive recruitment steps. On

the field of immigrants' admission, the focus will be paid to the more flexible forms of policies, like selective migration in order to fill the labor gaps in certain sectors, enabling the skilled ones to cross the EU borders. As well, the trends show that the EU is relatively willing to offer some opportunities to the short-term migrants that usually come to do seasonal works. What is far more difficult to predict, is whether the policies will be able to bring down the irregular immigration or not. Common EU policy on immigration will still be mainly influenced by the national interests of the member states and its internal politics. On the other hand, the ageing population will put the pressure on the EU to open its labor market to the immigrants. However, the ability to integrate the immigrants into the social environment of the EU states could prove to be the main assessment of how the common EU policy is developed.

Summary

Sub-Saharan African migration is a very dynamic process that constantly faces shifts and changes of its patterns. This is a result of a fragile and unstable situation that makes the whole continent even more vulnerable towards any of these changes. The importance of the colonial links is regressing and traditional destinations are being replaced with the new ones. The inner structure of migration is being changed as well- women that used to migrate to accompany their mostly male family members, slowly take the role of the breadwinners and actively enter the labour market. Armed conflicts that happen to be a part of African daily life caused that traditionally women sectors like education or health care are deeply suffering from the lacking manpower. Another root- cause is ongoing pandemic of AIDS/HIV that also influences the situation of lacking personnel and creates a vicious circle of African migration. Unstable political situation, poverty, extreme climate conditions and natural disasters, all of these boost the migration potential.

Increase of the Sub-Saharan African migration is well- known for general public especially through the scenes of mass transportations by boats, heading towards the European coasts. However, this forms a very narrow and simplified view. The aim of this thesis was to elaborate on the background of the migratory process in a broader fashion, focusing on the above mentioned root- causes as well as the intensions of migrants themselves, set in the context of the current policy- making trends within the European Union. EU faces the demographical decline that might indicate the entire lack of labour force in certain sectors. African population is very young, with high migration potential and therefore, in the near future, even higher dynamics in the migratory process can be expected. Hence, the topic was chosen due to its actual character.

According to the possible future development, it can be expected that the EU will enforce the efforts to improve the immigrants' integration and their mobilization instead of extensive recruitment steps. On the field of immigrants' admission, the focus will be paid to the more flexible forms of policies, like the selective migration in order to fill the labor gaps in certain sectors, enabling the skilled ones to cross the EU borders. As well, the trends show that the EU is relatively willing to offer some opportunities to the short-term migrants that usually come to do the seasonal works. What is far more difficult to predict, is whether the policies will be able to bring down the illegal. Common EU policy

on immigration will still be mainly influenced by the national interests of the member states and its internal politics. On the other hand, the ageing population will put the pressure on the EU to open its labor market to the immigrants. However, the ability to integrate the immigrants into the social environment of the EU states could prove to be the main assessment of how the common EU policy is.

Resumé

Africká migrácia je mimoriadne dynamický proces, ktorý v poslednom čase prechádza neprehliadnuteľnými zmenami. Dôležitosť väzieb z čias kolonializmu klesá, tradičné destinácie sú nahradzované novými. Mení sa aj vnútorná štruktúra migrácie- ženy, ktoré v minulosti doprevádzali svoje rodiny, postupne preberajú rolu živičky rodiny a aktívne vstupujú na pracovný trh. Stalo sa tak aj v dôsledku konfliktov, majúcich dopad na tradične ženské sektory ako napríklad školstvo či zdravotníctvo. Ďalším neprehliadnuteľným dôvodom je stále sa šíriaca pandémia HIV/AIDS, majúca za následok chýbajúci personál v zdravotníctve, či školstve a tiež snahu dostať sa z bludného kruhu, ktorý šíriaci sa vírus vytvára. Nestabilná politická situácia, chudoba a extrémne klimatické podmienky, to všetko zvyšuje migračný potenciál.

Vzostup africkej migrácie sa dostal do povedomia verejnosti zábermi z masových lodných transportov, smerujúcich k európskym brehom. Európska únia čelí populačnému poklesu, a sním spojenému problému nedostatku pracovnej sily. Africká populácia je mimoriadne mladá a do budúcnosti sa tak dá očakávať ešte väčšia dynamika v migračných procesoch.

Vo vzťahu k budúcnosti je možné predpokladať, že Európska únia sa skôr zameria na integráciu existujúcich komunit migrantov ako by poľavila v súčasných imigračných politikách. Relatívne otvorený prístup sa dá očakávať smerom ku kvalifikovanej pracovnej sile a krátkodobým kontraktným pracovníkom, vzhľadom na negatívny demografický vývoj v rámci EÚ. Na druhej strane nie je úplne možné predpovedať, či tieto postupy pomôžu v boji proti ilegálnej migrácii. Je to aj dôsledok toho, že spoločná imigračná politika členských štátov naďalej vo veľkej miere podlieha národným záujmom. Avšak, schopnosť integrovať imigrantov do prostredia Európskej únie, môže slúžiť ako dobrý ukazovateľ toho, akým smerom sa spoločná imigračná politika bude uberať.

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List of appendixes


Annex No. 1: Africa: Highly Qualified Citizens with Overseas Education (map)

Annex No. 2: African and Mediterranean Irregular Migration Routes (map)

Annex No. 3: Ten top Sub-Saharan African countries according to remittances received in 2004 (chart)

Annex No. 4: Sub-Saharan Migrants Detained in Morocco (chart)

Appendix No. 2: African and Mediterranean Irregular Migration Routes



Source: ICMPD, Europol, Frontex, November 2006, <http://www.frontex.europa.eu/gfx/frontex/files/mtmmappen.pdf> (Retrieved December, 2007, from the World Wide Web)

Appendix No. 3**Ten top Sub-Saharan African countries according to remittances received in 2004**

Ranking	Country	Remittances (millions USD)	Percent of GDP
1	Nigeria	\$ 2,751	3,6
2	Sudan	1,403	7
3	South Africa	521	0,2
4	Senegal	511	6,7
5	Kenya	494	3,3
6	Lesotho	355	25,9
7	Uganda	291	3,7
8	Mauritius	215	3,4
9	Mali	154	3,1
10	Togo	149	7,2

Source: Population Division, UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs,
http://www.un.org/migration/presskit/factsheet_sub_sahara.pdf

Appendix No. 4**SUB-SAHARAN MIGRANTS DETAINED IN MOROCCO IN 2001**

Countries of Origin	Number of migrants arrested
Sierra Leone	2,245
Mali	1,625
Senegal	1,177
Nigeria	798
Guinea	519
Ghana	480
Congo	149

Source:
Identification mission in Morocco, July/October 2002, European Commission,
final report.