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A New Wave of Terrorism on the Horizon? A Comparative Analysis on the Rise of Right-Wing Extremism

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Declaration

1. I hereby declare that I have compiled this thesis using the listed literature and resources only.
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3. I fully agree to my work being used for study and scientific purposes.

In Prague on May 4\textsuperscript{th}, 2021                     Jonathan Collins

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Dedication:
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Abstract

The rise of right-wing terrorism incidents is a novel phenomenon proliferating throughout the western world. Highlighting this emergence is the exponential increase of incidents connected to far-right assailants within the past five years. The thesis uses David Rapoport’s seminal theory on the modern waves of terrorism to examine these growing occurrences. Rapoport argues that determinable cycles of extremism are formed from underlining societal, ideological, and political pressures. Therefore, using Rapoport’s measurement criteria, the project focuses on determining whether the increase in far-right violence constitutes a new wave within terrorism. Providing an extensive analysis using the Global Terrorism Database, the study interlinks research dedicated to understanding domestic occurrences of right-wing terrorism with the encompassing patterns and themes happening across the western world. Furthermore, the cross-national (Germany, Scandinavia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) comparative nature of the investigation examines right-wing extremist cases by assessing the characteristics of assailants and incidents in diverse socio-national environments. Concluding from the mixed-methods empirical analysis, the thesis contends that the data’s common themes and patterns fulfil Rapoport’s distinctive wave conditions within the phenomenon’s international nature, amount of activity, prompting cause, and common predominant energy. Moreover, the research demonstrates the existence of multiple interconnecting and encompassing themes between the selected countries, including the mainstreaming of hate, unaffiliated terrorism, transnationalism, lone-wolf terrorism, copycat syndrome, cumulative radicalisation, and the connections between the American and European experiences. Therefore, in satisfying Rapoport’s conditions and connecting these findings to recent scholarly literature, this thesis argues that far-right extremism does constitute the next wave of terrorism.

Title: A New Wave of Terrorism on the Horizon? A Comparative Analysis on the Rise of Right-Wing Extremism

Keywords: Violent Extremism, Far-Right, Political Extremism, Political Violence, Terrorism, Radicalism, Conservatism
Abstrakt

Nárůst pravicových teroristických incidentů je nový fenomén, který se šíří po celém západním světě. Zvýrazněním této události je exponenciální nárůst incidentů spojených s krajně pravicovými útočníky za posledních pět let. Práce využívá k prozkoumání těchto rostoucích výskytů klíčovou teorii Davida Rapoporta o moderních vlnách terorismu. Rapoport tvrdí, že určitelné cykly extremismu jsou tvořeny podtržením společenských, ideologických a politických tlaků. Proto se projekt pomocí Rapoportových kritérií zaměřuje na zjištění, zda nárůst extrémně pravicového násilí představuje novou vlnu terorismu. Studie poskytuje rozsáhlou analýzu s využitím Globální databáze terorismu a propojuje výzkum zaměřený na porozumění domácímu výskytu pravicového terorismu s obecnými vzory a tématy probíhajícími v západním světě. Nadnárodní (Německo, Skandinávie, Spojené království a USA) srovnávací povaha pátrání dále zkoumá pravicově extremistické případy hodnocením charakteristik útočníků a incidentů v různých socio-národních prostředích. Závěrem z empirické analýzy smíšených metod je, že společná témata a vzorce dat splňují Rapoportovi charakteristicky vlnové podmínky v rámci mezinárodní povahy fenoménu, množství aktivity, pobídky a společně převládající energie. Výzkum navíc prokazuje existenci mnoha vzájemně propojených a zahrnujících témat mezi vybranými zeměmi, včetně mainstreamingu nenávisti, nepřidruženého terorismu, transnacionalismu, terorismu osamělých vlků, copycat syndromu, kumulativní radikalizace a propojení mezi americkými a evropskými zkušeností. Po splnění Rapoportových podmínek a spojování poznatků s nedávnou odbornou literaturou tato práce tvrdí, že krajně pravicový extremismus představuje další vlnu terorismu.

Název: Nová vlna terorismu na obzoru? Srovnávací analýza vzestupu pravicového extremismu

Klíčová slova: Násilný Extremismus, Krajní Pravice, Politický Extremismus, Politické Násilí, Terorismus, Radikalismus, Konzervativmus
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Introduction
The rise of right-wing extremism (RWE) incidents is a novel phenomenon proliferating throughout the western world (Auger 2020). Highlighting this emergence is the exponential increase (320%), showcased by the Institute for Economics and Peace, of incidents connected to far-right assailants within the past five years (Global Terrorism Index 2019). Multiple studies couple these findings to various themes, including the movement’s mainstreaming of hateful rhetoric, the re-emergence of far-right populist parties, the scapegoating of targeted minorities and communities, and the idolisation of far-right mass murderers (Ackerman, Peterson 2020; Am, Weimann 2020; Berlet, Sunshine 2019; Bjørgo, Ravndal 2019; Sardar, Serra, Jordan 2019). Additionally, the recent mass casualty incidents in Hanau, El Paso and Christchurch related to right-wing ideologies reaffirm the need to improve our understanding of why these attacks are rising. One proposed avenue of analysis is to use Rapoport’s modern waves of terrorism theorem. Rapoport argues that underlining political and ideological forces shape distinct patterns of terrorism (Auger 2020). The patterns form in cyclical waves, helping researchers to understand and identify the different themes precipitating the respective cycle. Therefore, this thesis’ guiding question, using Rapoport’s theory, is to determine whether RWE constitutes a new wave within terrorism. Historically, studies involving RWE have predominantly focused on singular high fatality occurrences rather than the general trends. Thus, this study aims to fill this literature gap by providing an extensive analysis, using the “most comprehensive database of terrorist incidents”, and interlinking research dedicated to understanding domestic occurrences of RWE with the encompassing patterns and themes happening across the western world (Miller, LaFree, Dugan 2020).

The thesis contains the following sections, which will help guide the analysis of the recent rise of RWE. First, the introduction includes the literature review providing an overview of political
extremism, RWE academic literature, the inspiration for this analysis, justification in the selected countries for cross-examination, and the research target. The intricacies of David Rapoport’s wave theory is explained in the theoretical section. The methodology, operationalisation, and analytical technique segment helps outline how Rapoport’s theory is used in conjunction with the cross-national comparative methodology to produce usable data, trends, and patterns. Describing the critical elements of working with the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) follows in the empirical data portion, including the database’s limitations. Next, analysing the data produces key figures and tables with a write-up of essential details. Subsequently, the discussion encompasses all previous sections to interlink the research target with the study’s fundamental question – whether the rise of RWE constitutes the next wave of terrorism. Finally, the thesis concludes with a summary of the previous sections, including the basic guiding principles, findings, and discussion points.

**Political Extremism**

Understanding RWE first requires a general examination of the political extremism concept, definition, and main drivers. Using Midlarsky’s ideological framing in combination with Koselleck and Sartori’s conceptualisation for a systematic analysis, Bötticher developed a “consensus definition” of the phenomenon (Bötticher 2017):

> Extremism is an ideological disposition used by anti-government movements, detailing politics as a battle for legitimacy and supremacy rather than a diplomatic competition. These movements exist at the peripheries of society and describes a struggle for power by creating narratives around inner and outer enemies. Therefore, extremism relies on an us vs them duality, with no compromise for diversity or alternatives. Moreover, extremism glorifies and legitimises conflict as a tool to oppose the majority population, the rule of law, and
human rights. The zero-sum game approach tends to lead to criminal activity and mass violence in their quests for control.

Although Bötticher’s definition receives traction within the scholarly community, the author admits a similar problem as with the definition of terrorism (one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter) (Ibid.). Therefore, reaching a consensus on the definition of extremism continues to plague scholarly research. However, academics agree that when extremists evoke violence and suffering, and ignore fundamental human rights, the movement must be fully examined and stopped (Hogg, Kruglanski, Bos 2013).

Precipitating the expanse of research on extremism is the diverse nature of ideologies, motivations, and driving factors leading individuals to the movement (Allan, Glazzard, Jesperson, Reddy-Tumu, Winterbotham 2015; Conway 2017; Hogg, Kruglanski, Bos 2013; Jasko, LaFree, Kruglanski 2017; Kruglanski, Jasko, Chernikova, Dugas, Webber 2017). For example, Hogg et al. examine the connection between societal and political insecurity of extremist individuals (Hogg, Kruglanski, Bos 2013). Their findings suggest that growing fundamentalism and anti-feelings – exemplified by terrorist organisations such as Al Qaeda and ISIS - facilitates a converse reaction from the West (Ibid.). These responses include the push to restrict civil rights, the rising popularity of populist movements in Europe, and general anxieties towards Muslim immigrants (Ibid.). In this scenario, extremism becomes a necessary tool to reduce and protect oneself from these uncertainties. Another study conducted by Jasko et al. examines the psychological needs of self-worth and meaning in the significance quest theory (Jasko, LaFree, Kruglanski 2017). The theory suggests that when individuals perceive to lose feelings of self-worth, they are more likely to adopt extremist behaviour to reclaim a personal significance (Ibid.). Therefore, in this scenario, extremism presents itself as an effective means of self-reclamation in demonstrating an absolute
commitment to the cause. In broader terms, Kruglanski et al. examine the motivational imbalances leading individuals to extremism (Kruglanski, Jasko, Chernikova, Dugas, Webber 2017). The study outlines the spectrum of extremist violence individuals are willing to commit based on multiple factors. The model of violent radicalism is depicted as a process with various affecting factors, including loss of significance, the individual’s ideological narrative, social network, and a cognitive rational of their social environment (Ibid.). Finally, Allan et al. provide a summary of findings related to drivers of political violence. Their results for motivations into extremism include the search for group identity or community, the powerful expressionism in religious or ethnic identities, government failure in providing basic human necessities, the absence of peace and security, and the existence of a socio-political and or economic marginalisation (Allan, Glazzard, Jesperson, Reddy-Tumu, Winterbotham 2015). Therefore, political extremism is a complex subject with many different interpretations, motivations, and narratives that compel individuals to join society’s peripheries.

The use of political extremism as a tactic is not a recent phenomenon. David Rapoport’s *The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11* signified the start of modern-day political extremism in the 1880s with what he deemed as the “Anarchist Wave” (Rapoport 2002). However, since institutionalising the study of terrorism in the 1970s and following the attacks on September 11, research in the field of RWE has been routinely undermined (Görder, Chavannes 2020). The religious wave or “new terrorism” discourse that followed 9/11 has transformed the public and political viewpoints and their previous connotations of “traditional terrorism” (Gofas 2012). Among other developments, popular western political language has presupposed “new terrorism” – Jihadism – as the polar opposite to “old terrorism” – secular extremism (Ibid.). Consequently, these contentions often characterise religious terrorism as international actors seeking extreme
violence that threatens the current world order (Ibid.). Conversely, RWE has taken on the form of the less violent, domestic actor keeping continued political order (Ibid.). Lost in the categorising and securitisation of this novel phenomenon, is the neglected research for RWE. A recent study conducted by The Hague Institute for Security Studies suggests that Muslim perpetrators received (357%) significantly more press coverage than far-right individuals within the US (Görder, Chavannes 2020). These findings are not exclusive to public discourse. Academic attention for RWE received (0.6%) peer-reviewed publications out of the (4458) articles on domestic terrorism (Koehler 2019). These statistics are against the fact that there are twice as many incidents involving right-wing terrorists in western countries (Görder, Chavannes 2020). Nevertheless, researchers have only recently redirected their attention to the growing phenomena of far-right attacks.

**Right-Wing Extremism**

The far-right, right-wing extremism and the radical right are often used interchangeably to denote political actors associated with committing or planning terrorism acts based on a right-wing ideology (Bjørgo, Ravndal 2019). However, dependent on the article, the definition of RWE can vary considerably (Mudde 2002). For instance, Cas Mudde’s seminal work in defining RWE is frequently referenced due to its novel findings combining 26 definitions into recurrent commonalities (Mudde 1995). These definitions can range from a “shopping size list” of various characteristics and features to a simple set of factors (Mudde 2002). Notably, the study establishes five common characteristics in over half of the definitions – racism, nationalism, xenophobia, anti-democracy, and a strong state (Mudde 1995). More recently, Carter uses the same framework to incorporate 15 different scholarly definitions deemed “authoritative and influential” within the field into a simplified explanation (Carter 2018). According to Carter, combining the different elements produces “an ideology that encompasses authoritarianism, anti-democracy and
exclusionary and/or holistic nationalism” (Ibid.). Most scholars agree that by creating a usable definition, researchers can identify parties and individuals belonging to the extreme right family and account for future add-ons. Nevertheless, there is only a basic consensus on the movement that focuses primarily on the ideology, which is right-wing – an inegalitarian viewpoint that believes in societal inequalities (Ibid.).

Therefore, perhaps a more effective means of understanding RWE is in examining the recent dominating narratives within the community. According to the study conducted by Bjørø and Ravndal, current right-wing signalling factors can differ from cultural, ethnic and or racist nationalism but share inherent commonalities (Bjørø, Ravndal 2019). Cultural nationalism is rhetoric often used to combat and protect against the “repressive and backward” culture of Muslims (Ibid.). This movement focuses on the cultural differences in groups, and fronts that western culture is the only appropriate way of life. Conversely, ethnic nationalism refers to the perceived threat of mixing different ethnicities into a homogenous community. Instead, this set of nationalists believes that these groups should be kept separate to preserve the “uniqueness” of each community (Ibid.). Oftentimes these narratives are intermixed with concepts like the “great replacement” or “white genocide” conspiracy theories, detailing the loss of a white ethnic legacy (Ibid.). Finally, racial nationalism underpins white superiority, with beliefs that all other races must be “subjugated, deported or exterminated” (Ibid.). The movement embraces a narrative of racial purity and adopts a wide-array of conspiracy theories against Jews, immigrants, and racial mixing (Ibid.). Moreover, an impending race war dominates racial nationalist worldviews. Elements of these three subgroupings may include fascism, anti-immigration, nativism, chauvinism, Islamophobia, and anti-Semitism (Auger 2020). Consequently, the extensive array of motivations allows assailants to “cherry-pick” ideas which best fit the individual’s preconceived worldviews.
(Ong 2020). Therefore, RWE represents a multifaceted, adapting and overlapping group of individuals adopting interrelated ideologies which seek to protect their communities from perceived threats.

Engrossing this emerging connectivity is the recent scholarly investigations into the transnational character of right-wing extremist groups and participants (Pasieka 2017; Doerr 2017; Caiani, Kröll 2015). These findings are related to the ideological movement's presence in various online milieux and the ability to diffuse content across borders (Conway, Scrivens, Macnair 2019). This transnational behaviour is best represented in the organisation Stormfront. This forum's attractiveness as a funnel site for RWE is in part due to the different regional sub-forums – Europe, Downunder, Francais, Italia – containing 343000 active members (Ibid.). Within the common modus operandi of the English language, material is readily shared across sites with individuals interacting and sharing viewpoints. Additionally, this medium is only one of the many different hosting websites for extremist discourse and content diffusion. Other platforms include major social media outfits (Twitter, Facebook and Youtube), "fringe platforms" (8Chan, 4Chan, Telegram) and encrypted messaging sites (Gab, Discourse, WhatsApp) (Ibid.). As one of the first adopters of the internet to produce radical content, the right-wing extremist movement continues to prosper, aided by the growing dissatisfaction towards handling of the Refugee Crisis, the Brexit movement, Donald Trump's presidency, and the threat of ISIS/Jihadist terrorism (Ibid.). Therefore, these groups can capture a broad spectrum of ideologies and use contemporary and controversial issues to arouse their base (Pantucci, Ong 2021). Multiple cases of RWE across North America and Europe note the international communications implemented before the attacks (Ibid.). These include the recent events at Capitol Hill, Hanau shisha bars, and Christchurch (Ibid.).
Consequently, the “new” right-wing extremist movement’s fundamental character is the internet’s growing role in precipitating violent extremism (Bliuc, Betts, Vergani, Iqbal, Dunn 2020; Conway 2017; Post 2015). In Daniel Koehler’s analysis on radicalisation and the online domain, he describes the effects of the internet in fostering extremists. The study suggests various connected symptoms, including the ease of communication, anonymity, sharing of information otherwise publicly inaccessible, a basis for “ideological development”, perception of groupthink and togetherness, and ease of adaptation to group needs (Koehler 2015). Additionally, building on Conway, Scrivens and Macnair’s work, Baele et al. examine this relationship as an ecosystem – an adapting medium of components whose narratives and connection are in continuous evolution (Baele, Brace, Coan 2020). The research depicts an incredibly “vast and multidimensional” community that uses “every stretch” and mechanism on the internet to disseminate ideologies and mobilise participants (Ibid.). Consequently, far-right online communities are particularly dangerous for individuals seeking significance and group identity (Jasko, LaFree, Kruglanski 2017; Bliuc, Betts, Vergani, Iqbal, Dunn 2020). Within this threat, adherence to a collective goal among members allows individuals to temporarily forget the psychological limitations that usually prohibits violence between humans (Jasko, LaFree, Kruglanski 2017). Therefore, in creating a common set of values, norms, and beliefs, it allows these online communities to foster unconstrained individuals devoid of their human inhibitions (Bliuc, Betts, Vergani, Iqbal, Dunn 2020). As a result, with an adapting medium of violence, different inspirations for actors and targets, a transnational communication network, and the growing use of the internet, RWE is a growing threat for western communities.
**Key Source of Inspiration**

This project’s inspiration for examining the rise of RWE within the western world stems from the recent work of Vincent Auger – a researcher in the field of international conflict management and terrorism. In his journal article *Right-wing Terror: A Fifth Global Wave?* Auger develops on recent data stipulating the rise of RWE worldwide (Auger 2020). Expounding on the upwards trend of far-right violence, the Western Illinois professor compares the phenomena with David Rapoport’s famous modern waves of terrorism theory. The approach, defined loosely as a cycle of activity of international character within a specific time frame, gives a basis to researchers attempting to predict the next wave (Ibid.). With Rapoport’s characteristics to determine distinct terrorism waves, Auger applies those same criteria to the recent patterns of RWE. These criteria of enlargement of activity, an activating cause, a global character and “common predominant energy” were all briefly outlined succinctly within the article (Ibid.). Moreover, Auger refutes arguments which suggest RWE is either part of the religious wave or is a continuous ripple throughout the study of terrorism. He maintains that the movement is exclusive of religion apart from the mechanisms of Christian language and symbols for recruitment and propaganda (Ibid.). Furthermore, using the study conducted by Rasler and Thompson, Auger demonstrates that subsequent waves considerably overlap with one another (Rasler, Thompson 2009; Auger 2020). The research *Looking for Waves of Terrorism* also includes a visual depiction of the previous waves, verifying Rapoport’s wave theory (Rasler, Thompson 2009). These findings suggest that the religious wave does not need to end before the right-wing wave can begin (Ibid.).

The thesis focuses on Auger’s outlined measurement tools used throughout the article to understand and examine the “new wave” of RWE (Auger 2020). Subsequently, the criteria for evaluation (international nature, amount of activity, prompting cause, “common predominant
energy”) are used as the study’s assessment tools. They allow for the systematic collection of data through operationalising the criteria which are otherwise not directly observable. Ultimately, increasing the project’s understanding of why the recorded phenomenon is happening requires an interlinkage between the escalating political violence and Rapoport’s/Auger’s evaluation criteria.

Case Selection

A mandatory process for this investigation is the selection of western world countries affected by RWE. Considering various academic resources, Scandinavia (Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark), Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States of America were selected. Each respective case is selected due to an enlargement in right-wing extremist events, reactionary journal articles, and for their locations spread across the research area. A brief examination of each is included to reaffirm the choice and highlight the region’s respective responses to the evolving threat. Moreover, the study provides a summary of each nation’s action plan, and preventative policy.

Germany:

Researcher Daniel Kohler, an expert on radicalisation and terrorism, captures both past and present trends for extremism within Germany. Composing a database that includes all political violence incidents post-WW2 to 2011, Kohler depicts a nation troubled by RWE throughout the decades (Koehler 2014). Many of these occurrences were against the Jewish population, leftist political members, and government officials (Ibid.). Moreover, Kohler deconstructs the more recent outbreak of political violence into what he prescribes as “Hive Terrorism” (Koehler 2018). Hive Terrorism refers to individuals who had no previous involvement with extreme political groupings but were spurred on by their personal ideological sentiments (Ibid.). Predominantly, the recurrent trends of far-right violence and media attention within Germany spurns “ordinary” people towards
acts of terrorism (Ibid.). Extraordinary cases of “respected individuals” committing violence – arson, explosives, knife attacks or terrorist plots – against visible minorities became an increasingly alarming norm (Ibid.).

*The Federal Government Strategy to Prevent Extremism and Promote Democracy* projects the threat of RWE. The policy outlines the attacks posed against refugees and their social institutions, the “hate-filled and racist agitation” of extremist community members online and offline, and the subsequent political movements that challenge the core of the German constitution (German Federal Government 2016). Threats to the German populace from RWE include increased Islamophobia and violence against Muslims, the attacks and prejudice against the Jewish community, an acute hatred of immigrants and the Roma people, and acts of aggression against the LGBTQ community (Ibid.). The Federal Government also reiterates the need to create more effective confrontation mechanisms against the rise of RWE and tackle these “long underestimated dangers” (Ibid.). The action plan “Live Democracy! Active against RWE, Violence and Hate” creates the framework for preventing and deradicalizing participants in far-right channels (Ibid.). This action plan aims to compromise the following work areas, including political and democratic education, civil societal participation, counselling, and monitoring, use of the internet, and international cooperation (Ibid.).

Scandinavia (Finland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark):
Research in Nordic countries on RWE is sparse. Academics have associated this issue to the relatively low levels of political violence in the region and the undermining of the threat in scholarly institutions (Malkki, Fridlund, Sallamaa 2018). Consequently, incidents including Anders Breivik’s attack have received a limited amount of research dedicated to the phenomenon – (3) journal articles as of 2018 (Ibid.). However, this is contrary to recent data showing Sweden
as holding the highest per capita fatality rate for far-right incidents (Ibid.). Therefore, researchers question the gap between the growing threat of RWE and scholarly research within the region (Mulinari, Neergaard 2012). Mulinari and Neergard, feminist and gender studies scholars, produce some explanations for this case. Their findings point to a denial or the act of being “shocked” out of reasonability, referencing researchers and the public’s ignorance towards RWE activity in their country (Ibid.). Additionally, they argue that violence against minorities is not a novel phenomenon throughout Scandinavia. Persecution against outsiders has long existed within the political system, with extreme right-wing parties polling “well-above 10%” in nationwide elections (Ibid.).

Finland’s *National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violence Radicalisation and Extremism 2019-2023* details the effects of the RWE community on society and their counter-radicalisation strategies. The policy begins by outlining the predominate neo-Nazi group, the Nordic Resistance Movement, as the most visible cause of concern (Finland Ministry of the Interior 2019). The organisation exhibits the highest potentials for violence as it targets portions of the population ideologically pinned as enemies (Ibid.). The other predominant groups involved within Finland are the Soldiers of Odin, an anti-immigration cohort who patrol the streets searching for potential targets (Ibid.). These groups take advantage of incidents involving refugees that capture media attention and use these events to help evoke their base. A common tactic involves creating hate campaigns against immigrants, using refugee crime as a signifier to ostracise the asylum community (Ibid.). General aims to combat the enduring threat to Finnish society include detecting and investigating hate crimes, decreasing the impact of extremism on local communities, and promoting inclusion within society with a focus on youth (Ibid.).
The Danish Government briefly outlines the threat of RWE in their policy *Prevention of radicalisation and extremism action plan*. The strategy focuses on the problems of right-wing online communications and the threat of radicalisation within prison networks (The Danish Government 2014). To reduce the risks from FRE, Denmark takes advantage of EXIT FRYHUSET – a Swedish NGO. This organisation attempts to help individuals “break free” from right-wing extremist ideologies and provide a sense of community, meaning and identity outside of the radical group (Ibid.). The scheme also includes further international cooperation between nations experiencing similar issues.

*Actions to Make Society More Resilient to Violent Extremism* outlines the Swedish Government’s initiatives to stop RWE. According to the report, the greatest danger for political violence in Sweden is the use of organised racism by RWE individuals to “assert the supremacy of the white race” (Löfven 2015). Therefore, the paper’s focal point concerning RWE is the participant’s racial attitudes towards creating an ethnically standardised country (Ibid.). The government outlines the extremist community’s belief system that all outsiders, including immigrants, mixed races, Jews, Muslims, threats to the heterogeneous nuclear family, socialist society, and LGBTQ present a threat to Swedish culture and society (Ibid.). *Actions to Make Society More Resilient to Violent Extremism* measures focus on safeguarding democracy, encouraging individuals to leave violent extremism, and strengthening Nordic and international sharing of knowledge (Ibid.).

The final policy report in the Scandinavian series is the Norwegian *Action plan against Radicalisation and Violent Extremism*. This blueprint details the mutual influencing radicalisation factors between Jihadism and RWE (Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security 2014). Moreover, the paper outlines right-wing extremists’ worldview as being hostile to Islam or immigration (Ibid.). The strategy continues in explaining Norway’s concerns that incidents
involving either Jihadist inspired, or RWE could potentially set off a corresponding reaction from the other base (Ibid.). Preventative practices include the establishment of a Nordic network to share valuable resources and research, fostering local preventative measures, develop competences in the psychology sector for deradicalisation, foster dialogues with youth, improve educational sector training and teaching resources, enhance police involvement in the community and establish efforts to prevent and educate against hate on online platforms (Ibid.).

United Kingdom:
The United Kingdom (UK) has become accustomed to incidents of domestic terrorism scattered throughout their regions. Whether citing the political terrorism in Northern Ireland and the IRA or a more recent influx in Jihadist inspired assailants, the UK provides an interesting outlook as a continuously developing security landscape (DeLeeuw, Pridemore 2018). Furthermore, with the recent developments following Brexit, right-wing extremist ideologies, including nativism and islamophobia, have been bolstered. Evidence of this is demonstrated in the June 23, 2017 attack by far-right party – Britain First – member Marek Zakrocki. Driving his vehicle into an Indian restaurant, Marek stated, “I am going to kill a Muslim. I am doing this for Britain. This is the way I am going to help the country” (Jones 2018). This incident is on the backing of a massive influx of British-born Muslims turned ISIS-inspired assailants (Ibid.).

Contest, The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism, covers the current threats and mechanisms to prevent terrorism within the UK. Moreover, the report outlines the “growing threat” the extreme right community poses to British citizens (UK Home Department 2018). Since 2014, Contest portrays RWE’s expansion of activities across different membership organisations coinciding with increased far-right ideological arrests. Motivations to conduct acts of terrorism include globalisation anxieties, the relationship between conflict and migration – specifically
orientated towards Syria – and the “need to protect” the local population (Ibid.) Broadly defining the community’s insecurities towards outsiders, RWE participants attempt to extend its appeal by advocating a “protect the native population” narrative (Ibid.). Reinforcing these development plans are the networks of communications on the domestic and transnational level (Ibid.) Therefore Contest and its proponents Prevent and Pursue propose various mechanisms to combat RWE. Prevent looks to disengage and deradicalise individuals already involved with extremist ideologies, safeguard, and support those most at risk of radicalisation, and tackle the underlying causes of radicalisation in the local community (Ibid.). Pursue uses a criminology focus and purports to investigate terrorist activity, disrupt terrorist plots and incidents, and detect and understand extremism (Ibid.).

United States:
The US domestic terrorist environment is continuously changing and inspired by a variety of sources. CSIS attempts to provide the most comprehensive examination of the current situation. Their research includes the findings citing RWE as the dominant form of extremism within the country (Jones, Doxsee, Harrington 2020). CSIS also concludes that in the past decade, the incidents involving RWE have continued to rise (Ibid.). Predominant perpetrators include white supremacists, anti-government activists, and the involuntary celibate movement (incels) (Ibid.). Comparable to the United Kingdom, influential media figures and domestic policies have invoked political violence. These instances include the rhetoric used by Donald Trump, for example, the “Hispanic invasion of Texas” advertising campaign run by the current administration (Ibid.). Moreover, the threat of RWE, pertaining to casualty rates per attack, within the United States escalates with the ability to obtain firearms.
The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) released in 2019 the *Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence*. Evaluating the “evolving nature” of domestic terrorism, the DHS demonstrates the present dangers US society faces against RWE (US Department of Homeland Security 2019). What the Department calls “white supremacist violent extremism” or “ethnically-motivated violent extremism”, represents the largest driving force for acts of domestic terrorism (Ibid.). The US characterises these individuals in a broader movement with hatred against immigrants, and ethnic minorities—often in combination anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic ideologies (Ibid.). Connecting these individuals are the aforementioned online communication mechanisms, with specific reference to Gab, 8chan, and EndChan (Ibid.). The deadliness of these individuals acting as lone-wolves or together continues to be a concern. In 2018 alone, (27) mass attacks were executed, killing (91) people (Ibid.). The *Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence* presents various guiding principles to help prevent extremist activity. These measures include adapting to the new threat environment, understanding dangerous uses of online technologies, collaborating with international partners, providing local-based solutions, and upholding rights (Ibid.).

**Research Targets and Questions**

The thesis interlinks the phenomenon of RWE within the multi-case study to investigate the emergence of a new wave of global terrorism for the western world. By interweaving the various patterns found in the Global Terrorism Database, the study addresses the literature gap between research dedicated to understanding domestic occurrences of RWE and encompassing worldwide trends. Moreover, through the process of outlining the phenomenon, the investigation adds to the existing literature on the transnational narratives, motives, and patterns of RWE. Using Auger’s findings indicating a significant increase of far-right events after 2008, the study is conducted
within the time span of 10 years between 2009 and 2018 (Auger 2020). The measuring criteria for this investigation is the outlined characteristics defined by David Rapoport and re-examined by Vincent Auger. These include an international nature, amount of activity, prompting cause and “common predominant energy.” Each of these conditions must be statistically pronounced within the selected dataset for the ability to successfully measure whether RWE constitutes a new wave of terrorism.

RQ1 – What are the principal arrangement of characteristics of RWE incidents within Scandinavia, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States?

RQ2 – Is there comparable data in the examined fundamental characteristics between assailants within Scandinavia, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States?

RQ3 – If there is comparable data between the selected cases, using Rapoport’s criterium, is there enough evidence to suggest the formation of a new wave in terrorism?

Theoretical Framework

The guiding theory for this thesis is David Rapoport’s “Four Waves of Modern Terror” (Rapoport 2002). Rapoport defines a wave as a “cycle of activity in a given period – a cycle characterised by expansion and contraction phases” (Auger 2020). In his historical analysis, the four modern waves take the form of anarchy (1880s – 1920s), nationalist/anti-colonialism (1920s – 1960s), leftist (1960s – 1980s) and finally, the religious (1980s – current) (Rapoport 2002). The theory connects these seemingly indiscriminate clusters of events using the criteria before mentioned. Importantly, these waves display similarities of ideological principles, stratagem, and a distinct starting point (Rapoport 2020). For example, starting in 1979 at the beginning of a new Muslim calendar, Rapoport outlines the importance of religion for the Middle East in political affairs starting with
the Iranian Revolution (Ibid.). What Rapoport deems the “religious wave,” saw faith as the justifier and organising principle for new world order (Ibid.) Moreover, the work emphasises the destruction and motivational patterns encapsulating the religious wave through the martyrdom/suicide bomber phenomenon. Consequently, for his ground-breaking works, the wave theory remains one of the most influential articles in the field of studying terrorism.

With each wave of terrorism’s respective life cycle averaging around forty years, researchers have presupposed an ensuing novel phenomenon (Honig, Yahel 2019; Auger 2020). Rapoport himself articulates the possibilities of new and unexpected inspirational causes to form the next wave (Rapoport 2002). Using the defining features of an extremist movement, characterised by Rapoport for his compartmentalisation of modern terrorism, this thesis attempts to identify the next cycle as RWE. As discussed, Rapoport includes four criteria to measure a wave of terrorism. The global character examines the transnational nature of terrorist activities. The expanse of activity measures the number of individuals involved and the characteristics of attacks over an identified period. The prompting or inciting cause depicts an “unanticipated international political transformation” that produces extremist and radical reactions (Auger 2020). Finally, “common predominate energy” examines the extremists’ ultimate goal towards how they identify and resolve the threat. Operationalising these four measurement mechanisms allows the multi-case study to simplify complex incidents and motivations into identifiable and comparable statistics.

Research Design and Data Collection

Operationalisation

The project operationalises Rapoport’s methods for defining a wave of terrorism. Through this process, the thesis aims to incorporate Rapoport’s defining features and measuring indicators within the research questions. Therefore, the method of categorising the theoretical guidelines into
statistically quantifiable and observable data forms the crux of this investigation. Moreover, the operationalisation combines understanding the theories’ critical criteria in conjunction with data available on the GTD. Thus, following the sorting of the data into the final working dataset, the project outlines the four following measurement tools:

1. **International Nature** – The general trends of RWE incidents for the selected cases.

2. **Amount of Activity** – Number of incidents per selected case study, including the target type, the method of violence, the type of weaponry used and the frequency of events.

3. **Prompting Cause** – Detailing the motives behind each incident. Includes the ideologies or triggers used to justify the assailant’s actions and measures the lethality per ideological grouping.

4. **“Common Predominant Energy”** – Comparing and providing interlinkages of common themes spanning the included case selections.

The creation of the tools of measurement allows for the subsequent analytical techniques in use.

**Research Methodology**

The research methodology in use is the comparative cross-national analysis. This practice examines a “particular phenomenon” with the intentions of likening their “manifestations in different socio-national settings” (Bryman 2008). Using this method (multi-case selection or small-N cross-national comparison) allows for the natural collection of predominant terrorism cases within the international system (Esser, Vliegenthart 2017). The technique provides the basis for country choice and comparison of key findings. As discussed previously, selection of cases is due to their influx of RWE, locations across the western world, and available research articles. Moreover, the intensive nature and in-depth evaluation of the cases proposed by cross-national comparison matches the research’s intentions to better understand the RWE phenomenon (Bryman
2008). In developing functional equivalents of terrorism incidents and classifying these cases into groupings of identifiable and shared characteristics, the thesis offers a comprehensive evaluation of the multi-faceted problem (Esser, Vliegenthart 2017). Subsequently, to measure the different systems, the GTD is reworked into a feasible dataset of classifications to reduce the complexity in the number of variables. These classifications also produce distinct categories with recognisable and collective characteristics between assailants (Ibid.). Additionally, this method is beneficial for evaluation since it allows for comparisons on both the qualitative and quantitative level (Ibid.). Thus, the GTD’s extensive catalogue of data in combination with the cross-national comparison method provides the essential mixed-media approach between “variable-based logic and case-based interpretation” (Ibid.). The paper describes the use of these two distinct techniques of evaluation below.

The thesis utilizes forms of descriptive statistics for the sections involving quantitative variable-based analysis. This method is designed to help organize, display, and describe data in a simple format (Shafer, Zhang 2012). The thesis applies this technique to focus on numerically detailing the phenomenon happening within the selected dataset (Holcomb 2017). This deductive process involves matching the operationalised measurement tools with the defined variables in the GTD. A section is provided below to establish the variables used and their key characteristics. With the considerable amount of data in the GTD, descriptive statistics simplifies results into observable patterns between cases (Ibid.). This simplification is captured by converting the textual data into pivot charts and using the variety of functions Excel provides to conveniently sort large sets of categorical data (Shafer, Zhang 2012). Furthermore, examining the variables best matching the outlined description allows for the categorisation of data into discernible fields. These fields, using the descriptive statistics framework for analysis, produce a basic set of categorical findings. For
the purpose of this study, the results are measured with frequency, comparative averages, and summative equations for the cases’ typology. The use of graphs also provides the reader with a basic visual representation of the RWE phenomenon. Therefore, by simplifying results into numerical trends and graphics, the findings can be tested against sections of David Rapoport’s wave theorem.

However, investigating the linkages between David Rapoport’s theory and RWE is challenging using only numerical data. This obstacle is due to quantitative data’s inability to capture the complexities behind incidents of terrorism (Braun, Victoria 2012). Therefore, understanding the rise of RWE in the western world requires both a qualitative and quantitative research framework. Subsequently, Rapoport’s criteria for evaluation, including the prompting cause, corresponds to the qualitative data incorporated into the created GTD dataset. For example, the provided summary below evokes a better understanding of the feelings, justifications, and ideologies of the assailant (Global Terrorism Database 2019):

“06/16/2016: An assailant shot and stabbed Jo Cox in Birstall, England, United Kingdom. Cox, a Labour Party Member of Parliament, was killed and a bystander who intervened was injured in the assault. Tommy Mair, a neo-Nazi supporter, claimed responsibility for the incident and stated “put Britain first” as he attacked Cox, who supported Britain remaining in the European Union. Moreover, in court Mair identified himself as “Death to traitors, freedom for Britain.””

Therefore, the study uses inductive thematic analysis to expand on numerically outlined trends and patterns for case-based interpretation (Braun, Victoria 2012). This method provides another systematic way to identify, organise and offer insights into particular patterns and meanings (Ibid.). Notably, it also allows significant amounts of flexibility based on the individual’s interpretation.
of the dataset to compliment the quantitative information of the study (Ibid.). Therefore, using the semantic approach – observation of explicit language – under the thematic analysis framework, the paper can analyse complex summaries of individual cases and inductively observe broad patterns (Ibid.). This method, supplemented with secondary literature for specific highlighted incidents, offers a complementary tool for this investigation. Emphasised cases in the study relate to the statistical reoccurrences of themes for RWE motives within the prompting cause empirical analysis section. Moreover, the study focuses on incidents with large volumes of casualties (a set number of three or more), and or summaries providing details of the assailant’s essential characteristics and motivations.

**Empirical Data**

The primary source allowing for the detailed breakdown of each event of RWE is the open-source database created by START – A department of Homeland Security project led by the University of Maryland (Miller, LaFree, Dugan 2020). This resource is used by different outlets (analysts, policymakers, scholars) to disseminate trends and patterns. The usefulness of the Global Terrorism Database for academics and government officials pertains to its extensive collection of over 190000 terrorist attacks since the 1970s (Ibid.). The organisation uses an open-source method of collection for media articles which fuels their massive accumulation of data. Using computer modelling the database sifts through over two million articles per day and collects relevant information (Ibid.). This process involves the use of a Metabase Application Programming Interface which isolates close to 400,000 potentially relevant articles per month (START 2019). This is further refined by removing duplicates and irrelevant material. Finally, six separate coding GTD teams manually sort through approximately 15000 articles per month to identify cases for addition (Ibid.). To ensure validity of the data, only articles acquired from trusted primary “high-
quality” sources without bias are used (Ibid.) The substantiality of the system means the dataset comprises over 100 variables characterising each attack from tactics, targets, weapons, and casualties to more summarised descriptions of the assailants and their motives (Miller, LaFree, Dugan 2020). Therefore, START provides the most comprehensive worldwide database for incidents of terrorism mandatory for the investigation. Methodologically sorting and filtering an initial GTD of 101295 unique terrorism cases between 2009 – 2018 produced 433 unique RWE incidents shared between the United States, United Kingdom, Scandinavia, and Germany (Global Terrorism Database 2019).

**Key Components of Data Selection and Sorting**

Necessary in the study is the selection of relevant variables. Each categorical variable used in the analysis was deductively selected to best represent the operationalised characteristics detailed by Rapoport. The following section includes a list of this investigation’s defining features (START 2019):

*Summary* – A brief narrative of the essential elements of the terrorist attack. Includes the who, what, where, when, and why. The thematic sorting process frequently used the *summary* to provide a label for the assailant’s motives when unknown.

*Attacktype1* – The general method of attack which reflects a broad class of different tactics in terrorism. This category further consists of nine distinct categories.

*Facility/Infrastructure Attack* – The primary intention is to cause harm to non-human targets (buildings, monuments, vehicles). The incident may include incidental harm to people. However, the central aim is damaging property.
*Armed Assault* – The objective is to cause physical harm or death against a target through the use of firearms, incendiaries, or sharp instruments (lethal). Does not include the use of fists or handheld devices (rocks, sticks) considered non-lethal.

*Bombing/Explosion* – A device upon activation creates an intense pressure wave causing physical damage to the surrounding environment. Can include both “high and low explosives.”

*Unarmed Assault* – The objective is to cause physical harm or death against a target without using the weapon types mentioned above. These attacks include chemical and or biological weapons, along with other non-lethal items.

*Targtype1* – The general type of target/victim for terrorists. The variable consists of 22 different categories, reflecting the broadness of target types. When the *summary* did not provide adequate information, the *Targtype1* was used in conjunction with *Gname* and *Gsubname* to establish *motives* categorised as unknown.


*Gname* – Lists the name of the group that carried out the attack. Often, this was standardised labelling for the assailant’s general ideological grouping.

*Gsubname* – When available, provides the specific terrorist faction to which the assailant belongs.

*Motive* – When available, provides the specific motive for the assailant’s actions. May also include the relevant ideology used to justify the attack (Social, Economic, Political, and or Religious). As mentioned, when the particular *motive* was unknown, values were taken from other fields to evaluate the best fit. The study uses several variables to characterise a singular best fit per case.
White Supremacy – A descriptor for the motive variable. Assailants are described as white supremacy when the GTD source confirms their involvement in a white supremacist organisation.

Anti-Islamic – A descriptor for the motive variable. Includes all attacks on facilities, private property and individuals belonging to the Islamic faith. Used as a basic signifier when Gname and Gsubname are unknown.

Anti-Refugee – A descriptor for the motive variable. Includes all attacks on facilities, private property and individuals defined as refugees or asylum seekers. Used as a basic signifier when Gname and Gsubname are unknown.

Anti-Government (Anti Gov.) – A descriptor for the motive variable. Includes all attacks on government personnel, property, and infrastructure. Also comprises attacks on law enforcement.

The Definition of Terrorism

An evaluation point for any qualitative or quantitative study involving terrorism is defining the act. As discussed however, defining terrorism and extremism continues to be a heavily debated topic between policymakers, governments, and private institutions (Miller 2019). Therefore, the crux for this thesis is finding a common denominator which spans each case. For this investigation, the GTD’s criterion for extremist violence provides the simplest and most effective evaluation tool. GTD defines an act of terrorism as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation” (START 2019). Subsequently, the organisation’s definition includes the following set of attributes (Ibid.):

1. Intentionality – The perpetrator intended their actions.
2. Inclusion of “some” level of violence – This includes both violence against property and people.
3. **Sub-national actors** – The database excludes all terrorism-related to the state. Additionally, a subsection requiring two out of the three following criteria provides further filtering for evaluation in the GTD (Ibid.):

1. **There is a political, economic, religious, or social goal motivating the act** – Aspirations must be for systematic change rather than individual pursuits of profit.

2. **Evidence needs to exist, demonstrating the perpetrator’s intentions to coerce, intimidate or relay a message to the broader public rather than with the immediate target.**

3. **Acts of terrorism must be outside the setting of legitimate warfare** – Otherwise deemed outside the boundaries of international humanitarian law.

An important caveat is that both unacted terrorist plots and or conspiracies do not feature within the dataset. The act of terrorism must be attempted by the assailant, successful or not, for inclusion.

**Limitations**

As noted in the section detailing the START organisation’s data collection methodology, some potentials exist for inaccuracies. The first possible problem occurs with the algorithmic assemblage and sorting of sources. Although using a computational model increases the collection of incidents, there still exists the capacity for the system to miss certain events (START 2019). This concern also transcends to the data coding teams at the START institute. Whilst the individuals are trained and prepped for data analysis, there remains the potential for cases to be either inappropriately added or removed.

Another aspect of the dataset is the inconsistency in data availability per individual incident. Unfortunately, some of the incidents of terrorism are lacking information, which leads the study to infer certain labelling based on the available evidence. This aspect affects both the descriptive statistics and thematic analysis section. Therefore, the results should be understood as the best fit
per individual incident. Fortunately, significant events of RWE (high fatality incidents and or significant media attention) receive sufficient description for use in the qualitative and quantitative analysis portions of the study.

An additional worry in connection to the database and the selected countries are the incidents of RWE occurring outside the scope of the open-source material. Meaning that depending on how media sources perceive the incident, lack of incident recording/reporting, or labelling as another type of crime, can affect the dataset’s accuracy. This is especially concerning since the definitions of terrorism differ per selected country. However, without a collective database within each country documenting every potential incident, the GTD provides the most encompassing measurement tool.

David Rapoport’s four waves of modern terrorism theory is a historical or generational analysis that provides a timeline of previous terrorism activity. The method of analysis in use by Rapoport is not predictive, rather it is an investigation using a social history framework. Therefore, in utilizing the theory to predict the next wave of terrorism, the study is retrofitting Rapoport’s methodology. Thus, criticisms may arise to suggest the inapplicability of the theory for current phenomena. However, many recent publicised studies’ using a similar theoretical framework alleviates these concerns (Post 2015; Kaplan 2012; Honig, Yahel 2019; Gallagher 2017; Auger 2020). For example, Jerrold Post applies Rapoport’s wave theory to measure the potential “lone-wolf wave” of terrorism (Post 2015). In his analysis, Post argues that this new phase reflects the communication revolution and the recent dominant nature of social media communications (Ibid.). With individuals searching for group identity and belonging, ostracized “loners and losers” find commonality in their negative depictions of society (Ibid.). Therefore, the theory's applicability to
contemporary concerns provides a simple mechanism for evaluating new trends and patterns within terrorism studies.

The final limitation of the study is in defining the terrorist’s exact motives for the selected cases. Unfortunately, it is impossible to get a complete representation of every assailant within the scope of this study. Although a singular motive notes the best fit per incident, the act of terrorism is inspired by a variety of causes and triggers unique to each individual. Nevertheless, procedurally sorting the incidents using the context, the target, and the individual’s ideological grouping provides the best-case scenario in understanding the motive for that particular case. Supplementing example incidents within the prompting cause indicator with external sources also helps to exhibit the findings.

Empirical Evaluation:

**International Nature**

The international nature of RWE highlights the growing rise in the selected case countries. This measurement criterion is the simplest to examine within Rapoport’s four mechanisms since it only requires a general overview of the amount of RWE activity. The study utilises two different line charts to demonstrate the occurring phenomenon.

Figure 1 provides the initial representation of RWE occurrences in the dataset between the selected range. Amid 2009 and 2011, RWE incidents for the nominated cases is relatively low. Only the United States exceeds over (5) incidents per year in this time scale, with Germany (3), Scandinavia (2), and the United Kingdom (2) registering comparatively less. From 2011 to 2014, extremism occurrences spike in three out of the four countries. The US jumps from (5) to (17) cases and continues to climb after 2014 finishing this period with (19). Both Germany and the United Kingdom see similar increases in activity, with incidents jumping from (1) to (11) and (0) to (13),
respectively. The greatest increase in activity is in 2015. This year witnesses Germany (61) and Scandinavia (41) experiencing an exponential growth of RWE activity. However, this growth is not consistent throughout the countries, with the US and the UK remaining relatively stable for incidents per year. Moreover, the US and UK continue to follow along the same increasing incident trendline until 2018, where the UK experiences a slight drop off. After the massive spike in 2015, extremism incidents in Scandinavia and Germany decline, and both finish at (6) incidents per respective country. Although case numbers are seeing a general decrease in the last year of the study, they continue to far surpass incidents at the start of the research period.

The summary of total RWE incidents within the selected countries demonstrated in figure 2 provides a complimentary visual representation of the study. The initial case numbers are generally small, ranging from (8) to (11) between 2009 and 2011. Afterwards, there is a gradual increase from 2012 (20), 2013 (22), and 2014 (35). The most considerable upsurge in RWE events occurs in 2015, peaking at a total of (126) unique incidents. These numbers are halved in the following year at (65) but remain relatively stable through to 2018 (62). The inclusion of figure 2 provides a different understanding of the current phenomenon. Whereas figure 1 shows the general decline
in case numbers in the selected countries, figure 2 demonstrates the drastically higher number of cases between the opening and ending analysed period. The data points evaluating the overall projections of RWE are consistent with findings detailing the same growth across the western world in the last decade (Institute for Economics and Peace 2019; Institute for Economics and Peace 2019; Auger 2020).

![Figure 2. Summary of total RWE incidents for the study’s selected countries between 2009-2018](image)

**Amount of Activity**

The amount of activity captures the number of incidents per selected case, including the weapon type, fatality rates and targets for each country in the study. The tables which follow in each section provide an in-depth evaluation of the characteristics of RWE incidents and a means to cross-compare the individual case’s datasets. The variables in the GTD used for David Rapoport’s second criterion for evaluation include *Attacktype1, Targtype1, Weapontype1*. Presenting the number of cases and percentages per incident category within a data table illustrates the common reoccurrences between unique RWE incidents.
Table 1. Summary of methods and targets for expected RWE assailants, the number of cases, the percentage per target, the weapon type, and percentage per method in Germany between 2009-2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Methods of Violence &amp; Specific Targets</th>
<th># of Cases</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Weapon type</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Facility/Infrastructure Attack</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>61.3%</td>
<td>Incendiary</td>
<td>95.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee (Camps/IDP/Asylum Seeker)</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>37.8%</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place of Worship (Islamic)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Property</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomatic Personnel</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Building/Facility/Office</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Party Member/Rally</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Personnel</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Armed Assault</strong></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>23.4%</td>
<td>Incendiary</td>
<td>61.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee (Camps/IDP/Asylum Seeker)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td>Firearms</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place of Worship (Islamic)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>Melee</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Party Member/Rally</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>Explosives</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of State</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown Civilian/Unspecified</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bombing/Explosion</strong></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>Explosives</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee (Camps/IDP/Asylum Seeker)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place of Worship (Islamic)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protester</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unarmed Assault</strong></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>Melee</td>
<td>80.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee (Camps/IDP/Asylum Seeker)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Party Member/Rally</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assassination</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>Explosives</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Party Member/Rally</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>Melee</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of State</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>111</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 provides the breakdown of RWE incidents for Germany. Predominant in the analysis is the composition of attacks targeting physical infrastructure rather than a populace group. Standout figures include the (61.3%) of total incidents directed towards the facilities of targeted populaces – namely buildings associated with refugees and asylum seekers (37.8%), and places of Islamic worship (7.2%). Assailants mostly take advantage of incendiary devices (95.7%) to light the amenities on fire and make a quick getaway before potential identification. This tactic of terrorism accommodates for (73%) of total weapon methodology within Germany. Another notable figure
is the use of improvised explosive devices (9.9%). Moreover, the disproportionate number of attacks on individuals affiliated or holding refugee and or asylum-seeking status is evident throughout Germany’s table 1 dataset. In total, (63%) of the dataset for table 1 is directed towards either refugees or asylum seekers. Furthermore, attacks against private property (5.4%) can also be categorised as violence against community members of either first-generation or second-generation immigrants of targeted refugee populations. Additionally, this particular targeting phenomenon is consistent with attacks on government officials. Most attacks on either government facilities or personnel are due to the individual’s association with pro-refugee or immigrant reforms (7.2%).

Scandinavia:
Scandinavia provides a similar RWE experience as featured in table 2, pertaining to attacks on refugee affiliated facilities, individuals, and others connected to the Islamic community. Out of the total (86) incidents scattered between Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland, (67) unique RWE cases were directed against the refugee population. These figures include (58.1%) targeting refugee infrastructure or religious institutions affiliated with Islamic teachings. A further (7%) of directed attacks focused on Jewish businesses and synagogues. Unique to the Scandinavian case is the wide-scale range of targets related to immigrant facilities. These include attacks on educational institutions (2.3%), cultural centres (2.3%) and social services offices (3.5%). The findings correspond with attacks against government personnel who promote the pro-refugee institutions of Scandinavia (9.3%). Furthermore, the ease and subsequent continued use of incendiary devices is evident within the table 2 dataset. This method of attack, involving hit and run tactics, makes up for (65) out of the total (86) incidents. The use of IED explosives details a similar result to Germany, with (10.5%).
Table 2. Summary of methods and targets for expected RWE assailants, the number of cases, the percentage per target, the weapon type, and percentage per method in Scandinavia between 2009-2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Methods of Violence &amp; Specific Targets</th>
<th># of Cases</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Weapon Type</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Facility/Infrastructure Attack</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>68.6%</td>
<td>Incendiary</td>
<td>96.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee (Camps/IDP/Asylum Seeker)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>46.5%</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Party Member/Rally</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memorial/Cemetery/Monument</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Figures/Institutions</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Institution</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Assault</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>Incendiary</td>
<td>53.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee (Camps/IDP/Asylum Seeker)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>Firearms</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procession/Gathering</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>Melee</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion Identified</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unnamed Civilian/Unspecified</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Figures/Institutions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Institution</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorists/Non-State Militia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombing/Explosion</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>Explosives</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee (Camps/IDP/Asylum Seeker)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborer/Occupation Identified</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Museum/Cultural Center</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Figures/Institutions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unarmed Assault</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>Vehicle</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protester</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

United Kingdom:

Whereas the previous two cases predominantly exhibited attitudes towards the refugee population, according to table 3, the UK’s RWE activity is distributed differently against the embedded Muslim community. Incidents involving the targeting of ethnically Muslim individuals or Islamic figures and institutions amounted to (33) out of the (59) total unique cases. Violence against immigrants or visibly non-white minorities (71.2%) is the most apparent standout within the dataset. Besides the evident makeup of assaults against the Muslim population, other ethnic and religious minorities were also targeted. Incidents involving Jewish facilities, individuals and
private property accounted for (10.2%) of total cases. Additionally, non-British businesses were another focal point for RWE in the UK, with Indian and Eastern European falling victim (8.5% together). A continued commonality in the weapon type is the primary use of incendiaries (41) out of the total (59) incidents. A potential threat emerging from these cases is the rudimentary and regularly available weaponry in use by RWE. Along with incendiary devices’ adaptation, assailants increasingly use melee weaponry (11.9%) – typically either a knife or fists – to assault targets. Another developing phenomenon is the use of vehicles (3) in striking crowded streets.

Table 3. Summary of methods and targets for expected RWE assailants, the number of cases, the percentage per target, the weapon type, and percentage per method in the United Kingdom between 2009-2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Methods of Violence &amp; Specific Targets</th>
<th># of Cases</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Weapon Type</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Facility/Infrastructure Attack</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>62.7%</td>
<td>Incendiary</td>
<td>97.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish Facilities</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>Melee</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Churches</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Facilities and Property</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>28.8%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Facilities</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence of a Syrian Family</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shed of Polish Civilians</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business (Immigrant Owned)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Personnel and Property</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Assault</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
<td>Incendiary</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Figures/Institutions</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>Melee</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Citizens</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Identity</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence of Refugees</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business (Immigrant Owned)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Institution</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unarmed Assault</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>Vehicle</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Facilities and Property</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>Chemical</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Identity</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombing/Explosion</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>Explosives</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Facilities and Property</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostage Taking</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>Melee</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assassination</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>Firearms</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Personnel and Property</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4. Summary of methods and targets for expected RWE assailants, the number of cases, the percentage per target, the weapon type, and percentage per method in America between 2009-2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Methods of Violence &amp; Specific Targets</th>
<th># of Cases</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Weapon Type</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armed Assault</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>37.4%</td>
<td>Firearms</td>
<td>80.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Figures/Institutions</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>Melee</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Citizens &amp; Property</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
<td>Incendiary</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Property and Personnel</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Institution</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facility/Infrastructure Attack</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>34.5%</td>
<td>Incendiary</td>
<td>91.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Figures/Institutions</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>Firearms</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Citizens &amp; Property</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>Chemical</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Property and Personnel</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>Vehicle</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Institution</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombing/Explosion</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>Explosives</td>
<td>93.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Figures/Institutions</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>Chemical</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Citizens &amp; Property</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Property and Personnel</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Institution</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists &amp; Media</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unarmed Assault</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>Melee</td>
<td>58.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Figures/Institutions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>Biological</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Citizens &amp; Property</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>Vehicle</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Property and Personnel</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostage Taking (Barricade Incident)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>Firearms</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Institution</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists &amp; Media</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assassination</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists &amp; Media</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4’s makeup of the methods, targets and weapon types for the United States provides the most diverse cataloguing of findings. Whereas attacks on different infrastructures related to
immigrants or refugees dominate the results from the previous cases, the United States’ largest violence methodology are in the form of armed assaults. Consequently, many of these incidents involve the use of firearms (33.3%) compared to the previously noted incendiaries (32.8%). Thus, modes of violence are vastly differing amongst cases. These findings are reiterated with further diversified use in chemical (3), biological (3) and explosive (31) weaponry. Rudimentary weapon styles, including melee (10.3%) and vehicles (1.7%), round-off the remaining weapon types. Furthermore, RWE specific targets in the US include an array of victims. Target types range from Muslims (25.9%), Jews (5.2%), immigrants (4.0%), educational institutions (5.7%), women (5.7%), abortion-related (8.1%), government personnel (13.8%) and a catalogue of other unmentioned individuals/property. Therefore, anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic sentiments continue to standout in attacks against individuals and religious infrastructure, but the overall targeted population is more diverse. RWE incidents within the United States are heterogeneous and represent the mixed bag of ideologies present in the extremist grouping.

**Prompting Cause**

The prompting cause for the study examines the different ideological factors, triggers, and motives to each incident. The following questions encompass the purpose of this section: what are the motivations behind each incident? What ideologies or RWE organisations are the assailants linked to? How dangerous are these motives? To provide the answers for each query, individual cases are highlighted to exhibit the prominent ideologies and their subsequent risk to western society. As mentioned, the *motive* variable underscores the pervasive ideology per individual case and external sources are referenced for greater detail.
Germany:

A characteristic of many of the cases involving attacks on refugee, asylum seekers and Islamic infrastructure are the linkages with ideologically far-right organisations. Moreover, a common group listed within the GTD is the Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident (PEGIDA) (Global Terrorism Database 2019). Playing on society’s anxieties towards globalisation, the organisation uses an increasing catalogue of tools to fabricate paranoia and fear amongst the population (Druxes 2016). Common mechanisms include the labelling of Muslims as sexual predators, sending death threats to popular pro-refugee political figures, and promoting turnouts of street protestors to incite violence (Ibid.). For example, the threats against politicians culminated when one linked assailant, Frank S., attacked mayoral candidate Henriet Reker and four others. The database details the extremist’s motivations as, “I had to do it. I am protecting you all” (Global Terrorism Database 2019). He continues explaining his actions during the attack “because she betrayed our country” concerning Reker’s immigration policies (Ibid.). A similar incident occurred on November 27th 2017, when Werner S. attacked major Hollstein and injured another, exclaiming, “you’re letting me die of thirst, but you bring 200 refugees to Altena” (Ibid.) However, PEGIDA is not the only RWE organisation to exist in Germany. Incidents within the dataset catalogue various groups with similar anti-immigration and anti-Islamic creed – Gruppe Freital, Der III. Weg, and Combat 18 (Ibid.).

Consequently, the assailants with the highest fatality rates within Germany are those connected to white supremacy groups. The exceptional incident in the dataset involves the attack at a Munich shopping mall which killed (9) and injured (27) people. The assailant, Ali David Sonboly, during the attacks, yelled, “I am German” in reference to his racially driven assault (Ibid.) Respondents noted his hatred for Turkish and Arab individuals, where his manifesto against “foreign
infiltration” provides a wealth of information for the investigation. Taking inspiration from Anders Behring Breivik, Sonboly carried out the terrorist attack on the fifth anniversary of the 2011 incident (Abbas 2017). His writings portrayed similar sentiments to those of Breivik and emphasised his subscription to the ideology of “pure racial identity” (Ibid.). The manifesto also notes his admiration of Adolf Hitler and his belonging to the Aryan race in contrast to his Turkish familial upbringing (Langman 2017).

As demonstrated by Koehler’s study on *hive terrorism*, a factor to note is the majority of incidents (67.5%) occurred without any indication of RWE group belonging (Global Terrorism Database 2019). Whereas far-right groups tended to claim the attacks on refugees, many of the incidents continue to be unlinked (Ibid.). These findings are consistent with Koehler’s analysis suggesting an increasing duality between affiliated far-right members and a second group of mobilising “ordinaries” unknown to security personnel (Koehler 2018).
Scandinavia follows a similar line of findings with comparison to Germany. A reoccurring phenomenon throughout the grouping’s dataset is the attacks on refugee and Islamic infrastructure through assailants linked (17.5%) and unlinked (81.4%) to a particular RWE organisation (Global Terrorism Database 2019). Incidents which are connected are oftentimes linked to the Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM). The NRM is a far-right organisation with branches in Finland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Iceland (Bjørgo, Ravndal 2020). The group focuses their operations on a future race war, procuring weapons and conducting street fights to train for the foretold phenomenon (Ibid.). Through a careful recruitment process, the NMR looks for individuals committed to the cause concerning race and the “Jewish question” (Ibid.). This RWE group has caused other interconnected organisations to form in Scandinavia, including the Finnish and Danish Resistance Movement (Ibid.). Moreover, this group represents only a particular strand of RWE groups proliferating throughout Scandinavia.
The infamous case committed by Anders Breivik is an important incident for this study. Accounting for (93.9%) of the total killed and (72.1%) of the total wounded within Scandinavia’s cases, his acts of terrorism continue to be the most potent example of the threat western society faces against RWE and has inspired subsequent copycat incidents. Multiple investigations about Breivik’s motives, thought process, and reviews of his manifesto provides the examination with different perspectives on the incident (Richards 2014; Ranstorp 2013; Hemmingby, Bjørgo 2018). In Breivik’s 1500-page manifesto, he devotes over half the pages to attacking the Muslim religion (Richards 2014). He believed that the world was undergoing an Islamification process, and that the Christian west was consequently under threat (Ibid.). Through thorough planning, Breivik accumulated a stockpile of weaponry and explosives to assault the pro-refugee government. Hemmingby and Bjørgo denote his motivations as a double enemy image (Hemmingby, Bjørgo 2018). He attacked the individuals linked to the government instead of Muslims because the inner enemy or Cultural Marxist political elite accepted and justified refugees coming to Norway (Ibid.). Underlying Breivik’s attacks is the lone warrior or martyr mentality (Ranstorp 2013). Facilitating and reinforcing these extremist ideals were the communication networks or echo-chambers that connected him with likeminded individuals (Ibid.). This culmination of cognitive factors and triggers resulted in one of the worst recorded far-right extremist events in the western world.

Another example of these anti-Islamic and anti-refugee sentiments manifests in the Kronan School attack in Trollhattan. Anton Ludin Pettersson targeted the institution due to the extensive makeup of refugee students (90%) (Erlandsson, Reid Meloy 2018). Dressed in Nazi apparel, he killed three visible minority teens before being shot by police (Ibid.). Like Breivik, Pettersson was against the rise of immigrants within the country, linking his life failures to the influx of refugees and Muslims.
(Ibid). He idolised similar right-wing radical individuals to the point where Swedish authorities reported the incident as a “copy-paste ideology” (Ibid.).

United Kingdom:
The first reoccurring theme within the United Kingdom is single-issue terrorism. Whereas previous incidents were triggered through a catalogue of built-up aggression towards Muslims and foreigners, the cases of revenge present a unique manifestation. These RWE incidents provide the basis for reciprocal radicalisation – a concept that denotes a counter-reaction to terrorism incidents affiliated with an enemy group (Lee, Knott 2020). Lee and Knott study this phenomenon within the UK RWE movement against the backdrop of IS-inspired terrorism incidents – Westminster attack 2017, Manchester Arena Bombing 2017, London Bridge attack 2017 – and discovered that the IS-related incidents proliferated hate amongst far-right communities against the Muslim community rather than Salafi-Jihadists (Ibid.). These findings are consistent with the included cases within this study’s UK dataset. The first group of reciprocal violence occurred after the murder of British soldier Lee Rigby. Three related events involving attacks against Islamic mosques and businesses saw singular motives for assailants dedicated to avenging the soldier’s death. These include the perpetrators, John Parkin, who asked police after the incident whether “[they] like Muslims” (Global Terrorism Database 2019). Moreover, following the London Bridge attacks, assailant Darren Osborne accumulated the largest injury rate (55.0%) after ramming his vehicle into pedestrians. In the court proceedings which followed, the case provided evidence including essential quotes from the assailant “I want to kill you, I want to kill more Muslims,” “I accelerated a big van for about 20ft into people,” and that he was “flying solo” (United Kingdom/R...
Throughout the trial, it was clear that the assailant processed a “perverted hatred of Muslims” (Ibid.).

Figure 5. Summary of motivations, and the number of casualties for RWE incidents within the United Kingdom between 2009 - 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number of Cases</th>
<th>Number of Casualties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Immigrant</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other*</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Semitic</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Supremacist</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenge**</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Islamic</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Incidents that do not fall under any of the labelling categories due to difficulty establishing the motive.

**Incidents described as reciprocal reactions from assailants predominantly motivated by IS-related attacks.

As is prevalent with the other countries in the study, many RWE events within the UK have connections with larger extremist organisations. The most common affiliation of cases relates to the English Defence League (EDL) (Global Terrorism Database 2019). The group’s motives are to “counter the Jihad” movement in Europe and mimics the fears of Islamisation deeply concerning Anders Breivik (Meleagrou-Hitchens, Brun 2013). Moreover, similar to PEGIDA, the EDL network branches across Europe in an attempt to solidify support against migration from locations deemed undesirable (Ibid). An example incident of a follower of EDL in the dataset is Marek Zakrocki. Zakrocki, mimicking his compatriot Osborne’s words and actions, attempted to run over a curry shop owner in London, England. After the attack, he told police, “I’m going to kill a
Muslim. I’m doing this for Britain. I am going to do it my way because that is what I think is right” (Jones 2018).

A final case involving the assassination of Jo Cox deserves examination. In Thomas Mair’s lethal attack against the Labour Party Member, he shouted to “put Britain first” in response to Cox’s pro-immigration stance (Global Terrorism Database 2019). Like other mentioned cases, Mair was inspired by the terrorist attacks committed by Breivik and collected an assortment of neo-Nazi publications and manifestos on the topic of white supremacy (Bergen, Sterman, Salyk-Virk 2019). Consequently, the court notes that the murder was intended to advance a racial and political cause corresponding to white supremacist and xenophobic beliefs (Judiciary of England and Wales/R v Thomas Mair 2016).

United States
The United States presents the most extraordinary incident diversity, ideological belonging and lethality compared to the study’s other cases. For Scandinavia, Germany, and the United Kingdom, most motivations are interlinked with anti-Islamic, or anti-refugee ideologies. In contrast, the US exhibits a wide array of hatred from anti-Islamism, white supremacism, anti-government, anti-abortion, involuntary celibates, and anti-Semitism (Global Terrorism Database 2019). Moreover, the rate of persons injured or killed per incident (7.0) demonstrates RWE’s deadliness within the country.

For the United States, the general trends of hatred against refugees are replaced by encompassing anti-Islamism. Case motives vary in specific target types from infrastructure to private citizens, but most incidents within the dataset mention a variation of Islamophobia as the leading cause of terrorism (Ibid.). These findings include multiple attacks on what assailants called “punish a Muslim day”, the murder of three Muslims at their home of residence by Craig Stephen Hicks, and
Richard Lloyd who wanted to “run Arabs out of the country” (Ibid.). A common theme within the anti-Islamic narrative is the association of Muslims with the extremist movements in the Middle East. On multiple occasions, the assailants justified their actions by claiming the victim’s affiliation with Jihadi terrorism. This rationale was the case in an attack against an Islamic Centre, a Muslim food vendor in New York, and a Bangladesh migrant (Ibid.). In another example, KC Tard attacked a Sikh individual because he believed that the victim was a “terrorist” and “suicide bomber” (Ibid.).

However, paranoia by right-wing extremists within the US does not only exist against Muslim targets. According to the dataset, a more dangerous phenomenon occurs with motivations against US government personnel and infrastructure. The most remarkable example of this is the attack committed by Stephen Paddock at the Route 91 Harvest Festival concert in Las Vegas, which saw (58) people killed and (851) injured. According to the dataset, Paddock was deeply concerned with the government’s potential to “confiscate his guns” and that “somebody has to wake up the American public and get them to arm themselves” (Ibid.). However, Paddock had zero connections to far-right extremist groups, no prior criminal record, and seems to have self-radicalised due to his paranoia of the US government (Norris 2020).

Centred around this culture of distrust amongst right-wing extremists in the United States is the adaptation of various conspiracy theories that evoke Islamisation, perceptions of a “white genocide”, and anti-Semitic discourse. An example of how hateful rhetoric directed towards the Jewish population shapes perpetrator motives is Robert Bowers’ case, who attacked a Pittsburgh Synagogue killing (11) and injuring (7). Presenting his ideologies against Jews as a threat to society on the social media platform Gab, Bowers states, “I can’t sit by and watch my people get slaughtered. Screw your optics, I’m going in” (Global Terrorism Database 2019). These words are
in reference to the believed conspiracy that Jews are the ring-leaders in the creation of multi-cultural societies. The findings on his online accounts suggest that Bowers was compelled to violence to defend the perceived threat against whites and subscribed to language involving the othering of external threats (Jackson 2019).

Consistent with the other cases is white supremacy groups’ dangerous activity in spreading hatred and conducting acts of terrorism. Accounting for (26%) of total killed within the US dataset, the proliferation of these groups in different sub-movements diversifies the threat for US policymakers and security services. The GTD refers to numerous RWE organisations, including the United Aryan Empire, Sovereign Citizen and Ku Klux Klan, while other cases are more broadly related to white supremacy (Global Terrorism Database 2019). Significant incidents include Wade Page’s
attack on a Sikh place of worship, killing (6) and injuring (4). Page, with connection to the transnational neo-Nazi group Volksfront, was radicalised within the army against domestic Iraqi civilians (Ahuja 2012). However, the targets for white supremacist groups greatly varied. For example, when counter-protestors showed up to a Unite the Right rally, assailant James Fields rammed his vehicle into them, injuring (28) and killing (1) (Global Terrorism Database 2019). Another case involved the school shooting at Santa Fe High School conducted by Dimitrios Pagourtzis, a self-identified admirer of Nazism, who killed (10) and injured (14) (Ibid.). An additional school shooting committed by Nikolas Cruz in Parkland killed (17) and injured (17) entailed Cruz’s idolisation of Hitler and frequent drawing of swastika symbols during class (Ibid.).

A unique phenomenon within the United States case is the assailants motivated by involuntary celibate (incels) ideologies and or hatred for women. Kyler Ong demonstrates an inclusion of white supremacist, anti-Semitic, and racist ideologies into their hyper-masculine narratives (Ong 2020). Although the frequency of cases is relatively low compared to other RWE motives, incidents involving incels had a rate of (6.3) casualties per event (Global Terrorism Database 2019). For instance, assaulting a women’s aerobics class, killing (3) and injuring (9), George Sodini intermixed his resentment for women with racist remarks against black men who “have their choice of best white women” (Global Terrorism Database 2019). In a similar case, Elliot Rodger murdered (6) and wounded (13) and detailed his justifications within a lengthy manifesto (Ibid.). Through his online forum writings, he outlined a misogynistic and white supremacist narrative and self-identified as a member of the involuntary celibate movement (Ibid.) Part of the same virtual community of incels was Christopher Harper-Mercer, who communicated similar justifications as Rodger, when he slaughtered (9) and injured (7) others (Ibid.).
Common Predominant Energy

The purpose of producing a quantitative and qualitative analysis is to examine comparable and appropriate patterns that span the cross-national cases of Germany, Scandinavia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Therefore, the final measurement tool of common predominant energy compounds the previous three operationalised mechanisms’ results into discernible themes. Moreover, the following thematic findings stimulate the argument towards a perceptible wave of RWE and provide the foundation for the discussion in the following section.

Figure 7. Aggregate of target types, and attack types for the study’s selected countries between 2009 - 2018

Combining the findings between the international nature and amount of activity gives the study a general outlook on the type of RWE activity. The exponential growth of cases after 2014 (360% increase) seems to correlate to Europe’s sudden influx of refugees during the height of the Refugee Crisis. The cross-national comparison supports these findings in Germany (63%), Scandinavia (77.9%), and United Kingdom (55.9%) relating to attacks against Muslim individuals, Islamic facilities, or refugee centres. To a lesser extent, the United States (25.9%) targeting of Muslims is
a more muted response to the migration crisis’ effects and is directed towards Islamic terrorism. Thus, there exists a commonality in target types for RWE. Moreover, many of these incidents targeted infrastructure (48.8%) as opposed to the next most frequent type in armed assaults (24.6%). Similar results concerning the assailant’s weapon method is observed, wherein the average across cases in the use of incendiary devices equals (68.4%).

Comparing these results to the qualitative case study of individual assailants provides a complimentary but complex picture of extremist motives. Bridging the outlined cases is the recurrent narrative that outsiders – according to the dataset, predominantly Muslim individuals – threaten the ideological cores and safety of right-wing extremist communities (Global Terrorism Database 2019). Thus, on multiple occasions, assailants either targeted the Islamic populace, asylum complexes, or government officials who promoted pro-refugee policies. These grievances are showcased in the motives captivating Anders Breivik, Frank S., Werner S., Ali David Sonboly, Anton Pettersson, Darren Osborne, Marek Zakrocki, Thomas Mair, Hicks and Lloyd, and KC Tard
(Ibid.). Perhaps the most alarming finding is the copycat ideological interpretations that have followed after Breivik’s mass terrorism incident in 2011. Using Breivik as a martyr, the RWE community is justifying and inspiring others to conduct similar large-scale attacks on society (Am, Weimann 2020). Moreover, this syndrome of mimicking extremist events also transcends to the ideologically connected school shooting and involuntary celibate movement predominantly occurring within the United States.

Connecting the incidents of RWE between the selected cases is the transnational character of their organisations’ networks. The white supremacist associations forming between the countries interlinks similar ideologies against foreign infiltration and Islamisation of the western world. Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident, Britain First, English Defence League, and NRM (and subcommunities) represent a similar category of groups against refugees. These organisations share ongoing communications, propaganda, racist content, and tactics to prevent Islamisation (Burke 2018).

Discussion
Underlining the basis of the study is whether RWE, according to the operationalised mechanisms of David Rapoport’s wave theory, establishes an emerging cycle of terrorism in the selected cases. Developing the crux of the analysis involves answering the three main research questions: what is the principal arrangement of characteristics of RWE incidents within Scandinavia, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States? Is there comparable data in the examined fundamental characteristics between assailants within Scandinavia, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States? If there is comparable data between the selected cases, using Rapoport’s criterium, is there enough evidence to suggest the formation of a new wave in terrorism? The study answers the initial two questions through the quantitative and qualitative approaches dictated by Rapoport’s
operationalised mechanisms. The selected cases’ results include the overall trend of RWE, methods of violence, specific targets, weapon types, assailant’s motivation, and casualties per motivation type. The qualitative aspects incorporated in prompting cause supplements the findings by providing a better understanding of far-right terrorist incidents. The analysis presents common characteristics of findings throughout each operationalised mechanism relating to hate against refugees and Muslims, transitional white supremacist groups, and the copycat nature of mass killings by far-right terrorists.

These results culminate towards the research question of whether the recent rise of RWE establishes a new wave of terrorism. This study contends that the qualitative and quantitative data’s common themes and patterns within the international nature, amount of activity, prompting cause, and common predominant energy fulfils all Rapoport’s measurement criteria. Therefore, in demonstrating these conditions within the previous section, this thesis contends that far-right extremism does constitute the next wave of terrorism. The following subsections reinforce these findings with prominent academic research to highlight the interconnected nature of characteristics and demonstrate that a new wave of terrorism is approaching.

The Ostensible Other & Unaffiliated Terrorism

The basis for right-wing justification and a collective external threat exhibited within the dataset are Muslims – in different forms from religion to refugees. This fear of Islamisation, or that the western Christian world is experiencing a "white genocide" permeates in far-right extremist discourse across the cases (Greene 2019). The expression has become a tool for imagery, content creation and hatred directed towards Muslim communities (Ibid.). Moreover, multiple studies demonstrate Islamophobia, hate against refugees or asylum seekers, and paranoia around the Muslim community in the selected countries (Sunar 2017; Sardar, Serra, Jordan 2019; Acim 2019).
Acim's research outlines the influx of Islamophobia stemming from 9/11, the subsequent war on terror and the more recent European refugee crisis (Acim 2019). To combat the threat, "othering" is becoming a popular rhetoric that dictates a societal belonging and alienates everyone else (Ibid.). Moreover, political discourse around the collective other of Islam is mainstreaming far-right parties, leading to increased support for their campaigns against refugees (Sardar, Serra, Jordan 2019). Reflective of this phenomenon is the popularisation of nationalist parties within Europe (Ibid.). Results of support of far-right parties include (21%) Danish People's Party, (4.7%) Alternative for Germany, (13%) Sweden Democrats, (18%) The Finns, and (16%) Fatherland Party (Norway) (Ibid.). This phenomenon of collective othering and Islamophobia stems across the western world. Deep-seated xenophobia within the US penetrates social and political discourse (Sunar 2017). Additionally, Donald Trump and his administration’s chastising against Islam intensifies hateful rhetoric (Ibid.). His mobilisation of support against Muslims, using various tactics, including the Muslim ban in 2016, has become a powerful tool for gaining political support within the US (Ibid.). Therefore, mainstreaming the collective other of Islam is enabling and promoting far-right parties and organisations in the western world.

Capitalising on the insecurity against refugees, asylum seekers and Muslims, right-wing extremists create provocative narratives to evoke the mainstream population (Ackerman, Peterson 2020). This process of securitising Muslims and Islamisation turns ‘ordinary’ civilians onto far-right beliefs. Subsequently, the phenomenon of regular civilians attacking minority communities without direct links to far-right organisations is generating an entirely new field of study within political extremism called “unaffiliated terrorism” (Sweeney, Perliger 2018; Koehler 2018). After highlighting the phenomenon briefly in combining Koehler’s findings with similar results within the dataset, this segment further elaborates on the developing threat. The concept of unaffiliated
terrorism, hive extremism or spontaneous hate crime evokes the notion that individuals commit acts of violence on a psychological impulse (Sweeney, Perlinger 2018). Connecting this impulse for violence is the panic and fear generated against the ostensible other (Koehler 2018). For many of the cases against refugees, assailants are individually acting out in an attempt to spread a political message and force asylum seekers to leave the country (Ibid.) Studying the available information on attackers from these incidents produces interesting results. First, demographic areas experiencing race diversification are more prone to spontaneous far-right incidents (Sweeney, Perlinger 2018). The similar rise between refugee flows in Europe in the mid 2010’s, and the spike of extremist incidents outlined in figure 1 and 2 in the same timeframe supports these claims. Moreover, the Federal Criminal Police Office of Germany discloses that only (33%) of incidents involving attacks against refugees (individuals or infrastructure) related to far-right organisations (Koehler 2018). These findings are comparable to the (64%) of cases demonstrated in table 5 relating to anti-refugee motives without connection to white supremacy groups. Unconnected individuals present a particular challenge to authorities since they operate away from known perpetrators or communities. However, Koehler notes that most culprits demonstrate “clear right-wing extremist ideologies” either through social media or other communication forums (Ibid.). Therefore, the successful implantation of mainstreaming Islamophobic and anti-refugee discourse is popularising nativist far-right organisations in their purported claims to protect the population against foreigners.

**Xenophobic Defence Leagues, White Supremacy Organisations & Transnationalism**

A recurrent pattern in the dataset is the frequent reference to assailants associated with a European “Defence League” or white supremacist organisations (Global Terrorism Database 2019). These types of far-right communities include the NRM’s various subsets, English Defence League and
Britain First, PEGIDA, and the United Aryan Empire (Ibid.). Adjoining these groups under a common cause is the alleged desire to defend the homeland against foreign invaders. First, PEGIDA presents the most unprecedented right-wing movement of a population against refugees, with peak protests reaching (25000) participants (Vorländer, Herold, Schäller 2018). The turnout relates to far-right ideologies intermixing with the German populace’s fears about the influx of migrants (Ibid.). Moreover, this group’s success is attributed to the ability in adopting terminology and phrasing that is mainstreamed in political discourse. In connection, both the Britain First and English Defence League movement revolve around the threat of Islamification and manipulation of real-world terrorist events to enhance their anti-Islamic narratives (Burke 2018). Members of the organisation frequently conduct “Christian patrols” that often harass Muslim business, vandalise religious facilities and intimidate locals (Ibid.). These coercive tactics are also common for the NRM (Finland Ministry of the Interior 2019). However, there is a distinct contrast in ideology wherein the Scandinavian far-right group bases its claims against the Jewish population as the main threat and wishes to maintain and conserve the Nordic population’s cultural and racial identity (Ravndal 2018). The fear-provoking tendencies of Defence League organisations encapsulate the reasoning behind why ‘ordinary’ individuals, with no previous linkages to far-right networks, are adopting cognitive and behavioural radicalised positions against Muslims, Jews, and refugees. These communities abuse the populaces’ insecurities and create a simple scapegoating narrative which could fix the issue (Ackerman, Peterson 2020). This securitised framing can explain the unaffiliated nature of many far-right assailants within the dataset (Global Terrorism Database 2019).

White supremacist organisations present the greatest depiction of weaponizing insecurities into a problem of race and culture. Many individuals (13%) within the multi-case study associated
themselves with these organisations, although many of these incidents do not directly reference a specific group (Ibid.). An inherent concept of their collectiveness is the frequent mention of white genocide. The claim is that the white European populations’ declining birth rate, combined with mass immigration, is replacing the western world’s racial and cultural elements (Moses 2019). Neo-Nazi groups, in particular, capture the “white thymos” of rage, resentment and anger associated with losing the perceived Caucasian entitlement of the world (Ganesh 2020). Ganesh’s research examines these organisation’s activities online, documenting the type of language in use. The most frequent word occurrences relate to love, country, family, and religion that set the basis for protection (Ibid.). Conversely, discourse concerning the loss and destruction of the country and the hope to return it back to a particular glory period is frequent (Ibid.). These views have resulted in a catalogue of hate crimes and political violence scattered throughout the dataset, including countless attacks against refugees and asylum seekers in Europe, assassination attempts against pro-immigrant politicians and mass shootings in Germany and the United States (Global Terrorism Database 2019).

Encapsulating the Defence Leagues and white supremacist groups is the international nature of their communities and cross-national communications. This ability to form connections across the western world through various social media platforms, online forums, and real-world events underlines Rapoport’s defining criteria in global nature. Multiple studies are available, highlighting the linkages between global far-right communities (Caiani 2018; Caiani, Kröll 2015; Doerr 2017; Ivenäs 2017). The framework for far-right content is the previously discussed notion of ostensible others, a sense of community, and lone-wolf extremist idolisation. However, this basis for connectivity takes many different forms. Doerr outlines various visual mediums bridging language barriers and communication problems across western Europe (Doerr 2017).
right’s content model involves the subtle inclusion of racist rhetoric that portrays a narrative of us vs them (Ibid.). For example, the German neo-Nazi party NPD, combined with the Lega Nord of Italy and SVP of Switzerland, published an illustration detailing their parties as kicking out the country’s black sheep – in reference to the skin colour of immigrants (Ibid.). Caiani outlines a different phenomenon in the increased mobilisation of far-right communities in hosting various events on the international level (Caiani 2018). These networking events – concerts, parties, political rallies, and educational training – are interlinking and connecting the different ideologies and various perceived threats of far-right communities (Ibid.).

Furthermore, the use of the internet is an expanding strategic avenue for right-wing extremists to exploit. Besides the virtual manufacturing of a shared identity, the online domain is a medium to conduct supranational activities without the threat of detection (Caiani, Kröll 2015). These actions can include the spread of racist imagery, the targeting and harassment of individuals on social media, and the promotion of lone-wolf attackers. Consequently, spreading online propaganda, bridging the language barrier through visual mediums, hosting international events, and communicating through different encrypted channels forms the basis for the transnational networks of RWE. By forming cross-national bonds, the threat of RWE is transcending the narrative of a domestic issue and is becoming a wide-ranging western world threat. Moreover, these communities’ formation creates a breeding-grounds for radicalised individuals who are willing to commit mass atrocities in the pursuit for a sense of identity and belonging.

**Lone-Wolf Terrorism and Copycat Syndrome**

The analysis section outlines the far-right assailants labelled lone-wolves and the destructive nature of their attacks. These incidents include the attempted mass killings in the dataset committed by Anders Breivik, Ali David Sonboly, Anton Pettersson, Darren Osborne, Wade Michael Page,
Elliot Rodger, Christopher Harper-Mercer, James Fields Jr., Stephen Paddock, Nikolas Cruz, Dimitrios Pagourtzis, and Robert Bowers (Global Terrorism Database 2019). Understanding the connection these perpetrators carry between ideologies, motives, and other determinants is an important step to countering this phenomenon.

The first point of interest is the growing use of manifestos by right-wing extremists. These writings detail a type of “ideological convergence” between assailants willing to commit mass murder (Ong 2020). Consequently, the ICCT documents similar themes as portrayed in the dataset. These include ethnicity, the threat to Europe as a western cultural base, the current political climate, and the justification of terrorism as a last resort and self-defence (Ware 2020). Perpetrators make use of common language and popularised phrases spread throughout the alternative right and far-right content. For instance, the case of Brenton Tarrant, the Christchurch terrorist, focused on rhetoric around “white genocide,” the “great replacement,” the threat of immigrants to society, and the “Zionist empire” which controls the world (Ibid.). This type of phrasing creates a sense of community for individuals portrayed as lone-wolves (Bouhana, Corner, Gill, Schuurman 2018). Importantly, these manifestos spewing various ideologies are posted and spread across different right-wing social media platforms (Bjørgo, Ravndal 2019). Therefore, the degree of fame and attention associated with lone-wolf perpetrators helps to inspire the assailant to commit the terrorist act, provides the individual with a sense of belonging and support, and simultaneously motivates the future assailants to commit a similar act (Langman 2017). This three-fold phenomenon occurs in the attack committed by Patrick Crusius, who stated he supported “the Christchurch shooter and his manifesto” before publishing his manifesto online and killing (22) in El Paso, Texas (Ware 2020). Therefore, the creation and dissemination of manifestos produce a cyclical pattern of lone-wolf terrorist incidents in RWE.
These manifestos and other extremist material proliferate throughout various online forums across the western world (Bjørgo, Ravndal 2019). The popularity of these perpetrators in promoting far-right ideological commonality in their online communities presents a particular challenge. In combination with the notion of “leaderless resistance,” the extreme right goes to great efforts to martyr and adulate the lone-wolf terrorists mentioned within the dataset (Am, Weimann 2020). Moreover, these individuals become a rallying point to assemble members and reinforce ideologies to foster other copycats (Ibid.). The organisations create various symbolised content and imagery catered around the idolised lone wolves. Typical imagery includes Breivik as a crusading knight, Bowers as a “Chad” or popular individual, and Tarrant’s canonisation as a saint (Ibid.). This type of content creation for inspiring violent extremists is what researchers deem copycat terrorism.

The popularity of mimicking or copying previous terrorist attacks is a novel phenomenon of study. Assailants that cite previous right-wing inspired terrorist attacks as motivation include Sonboly, Pettersson, Osborne, Mair, Pagourtzis, and Harper-Mercer (Global Terrorism Database 2019). Langman defines the mimicking activity as radicalised individuals looking to the infamous far-right terrorists as role models and for proof of popularity (Langman 2017). Within the study, multiple follow-up perpetrators revered the “god-like” stature of previous attackers and conducted lengthy research on these assailants (Ibid.). The findings also suggest the need for some to mimic exact actions and honour dates, as David Sonboly did on the fifth anniversary of Breivik’s atrocities (Ibid.). As noted in the analysis, the copying of language is also a common feature of these attacks (Ibid.). Examples include the repeated phrases of protecting the country against “foreign infiltration”, the “want to kill Muslims”, and putting the native population “first” (Global Terrorism Database 2019). However, copycat dynamics are still extremely unique to the individual
and the field requires significantly more research to embody the complexities behind a terrorist’s motives.

**Cumulative Radicalisation & Revenge Extremism**

The term *cumulative extremism* – coined by Roger Eatwell in 2006 – or *reciprocal radicalisation* is a concept concerning the psychological basis for some individuals committing acts of extremism (Eatwell 2006). The term denotes the interaction and interpretation of events conducted by extremists’ group that differentiate in ideology and overall objectives (Ibid.). Alternatively, cumulative extremism signifies the quid pro quo relationship between extremist groups, wherein one act of extremism is met with a counter act against the organisation or associated communities. Subsequent research expanding on the phenomenon, following Eatwell’s article, provides a far greater understanding and multi-dimensional outlook of the complex process. The research conducted by Bailey and Edwards outlines the reciprocal development of hatred as a steppingstone process of micro reactions (Bailey, Edwards 2017). Each movement towards conflict is precipitated by micro nudges from external threats adding to the individual’s insecurity about the safety of their community (Ibid.). Busher and Macklin reference 9/11, the attacks in Paris in 2015, and the killing of British soldier Lee Rigby in evoking right-wing violence (Busher, Macklin 2015). Their research outlines the groupings of interaction between extremist groups based around major events related to terrorism (Ibid.). For the purpose of this study, the main focal point is the reciprocal reactions following Islamic terrorism related incidents amongst the far-right community and right-wing leaning individuals is the main focal point.

The findings within the GTD suggest that incidents related to Islamic terrorism have created a reciprocal reaction by right-wing extremists. For cases in the United Kingdom, multiple Islamic inspired terrorism events triggered extremist responses from right-wing individuals. These results
include four interrelated incidents after the killing of the British soldier Lee Rigby. John Parkin lit a beer bottle on fire and threw it at a mosque in Rhyl town (Global Terrorism Database 2019). Four students lit fire to an Islamic boarding school in London (Ibid.). Clive Ceronne and Ashley Juggings worked together to set fires outside of a mosque in Gloucester. Pavlo Lapshyn detonated a pipe bomb outside of a mosque in Tipton (Ibid.). Moreover, following the Paris attacks in 2015, a group of unidentified individuals attacked a Muslim restaurant owner and his wife, shouting “anti-Muslim slurs” while referencing the Paris attacks (Ibid.). On June 2017, Darren Osborne drove his vehicle into Muslim pedestrians outside of a Welfare House, citing a retaliatory attack for the London Bridge incident (Ibid.). However, these reciprocal reactions are not limited to the United Kingdom. The United States demonstrates a variety of attacks, usually citing paranoia against Muslim looking individuals. These occurrences include a group of assailants shouting “ISIS, ISIS” while attacking a victim from Bangladesh, multiple attacks referencing the colour of an individual’s skin or the Islamic religion as a sign of being a “terrorist,” and the “punish a Muslim day” campaign (Ibid.). Therefore, terrorist incidents involving ISIS, either domestic or international, are manifesting a reaction from far-right participants. Ultimately, this phenomenon creates a negative cyclical pattern of hateful rhetoric and actions against the loosely based communities of these extremist groups.

American vs European Experiences
Given the differences between the United States and the rest of the dataset when comparing the various motives, target types, weapon types, and fatality rates some scholars could prescribe that these are two different phenomena occurring and therefore do not constitute a particular unified wave of RWE. However, this study argues that the variety of patterns found throughout the cross-national comparison provides a perfect representation of the multidimensional aspects of RWE.
(Baele, Brace, Coan 2020). The thesis maintains that the outlined themes within the analysis and discussion sections epitomise an evolving transnational movement with individual’s cherry-picking far-right ideologies that best fit their worldview. The following content will reaffirm this justification and demonstrate the interconnectivity of the unique United States’ right-wing extremist motives compared with the rest of the data.

A variety of motivations for committing acts of terrorism in the US at first may seem unrelated to the predominant outlined themes of right-wing ideologies (anti-Refugee, anti-Islamic, anti-Semitic, white supremacy and anti-government). Whereas these primary elements remained statistically relevant according to Table 8, other motivating factors include the aforementioned involuntary celebrate movement, anti-abortion, anti-LGBT, and Trump inspired extremism. Berlet and Sunshine provide the most comprehensive outline in connecting these events to the far-right. They argue the existence of a “rural consciousness” – which uses narratives to victimise other societal communities as “parasitic” – to provide a simple explanation to societal, economic, and political troubles (Berlet, Sunshine 2019). The movement is often referred to as the Christian Right or Tea Party – based on religious conservatism and Patriotism that blends nativist, anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim, homophobic, and anti-abortion rhetoric (Ibid.). These individuals mobilise in groups to demonstrate their sense of displacement by outsiders and abandonment by the government (Ibid.). Notably, Donald Trump’s frequent reference to minority groups appeals to the Christian Right’s scapegoating discourse against minorities (Ibid.). Thus, this community uses the common narratives found within far-right discourse and applies the same logic to their perceived misfortunes. Moreover, by blending religious values with right-wing ideologies, the Christian Right or Tea Party activists are using spiritual justifications for their actions against abortion clinics, the LGBTQ community, and other perceived threats. Therefore, these drivers are part of
the wide-ranging motivations, drivers and ideologies precipitating the far-right and should be considered as a subset movement within the encompassing ecosystem.

Conclusion

The thesis aimed to answer the question as to whether the recent rise of RWE constituted a new wave of terrorism. Purporting RWE as the next wave of terrorism in the western world requires the successful demonstration that all Rapoport’s criteria (international nature, amount of activity, prompting cause, and common predominant energy) are present within the evaluation. The process also required selecting regions (Germany, Scandinavia, the United Kingdom, the United States) to represent the phenomenon best. Through the operationalisation of the theory’s descriptive mechanisms for evaluating a wave, the study could analyse the phenomenon with defining variables within the GTD. Therefore, with this examination’s depiction of the four operationalised mechanisms and their common characteristics, this thesis agrees with Auger’s assessment which advocates for RWE as the next empirically observable wave of terrorism. Justifying the conclusion is a cross-comparative framework emphasising the transnational themes and patterns occurring throughout the dataset. A paramount set of commonalties is evident through this methodological framework and further explained and reaffirmed with scholarly literature.

Moreover, the thesis contends that there are five main common factors amongst the cases selected, precipitating the right-wing wave of terrorism. First is the mainstreaming of Islamisation that depicts the Muslim population and Islamic religion as an existential threat. The collective “othering” mobilises support for far-right parties and causes unaffiliated individuals to attack refugees, asylum seekers and Muslims. The formation of Defence Leagues and increasing participation in white supremacist organisations follows second. These organisation types use the Islamisation rhetoric to conduct acts of violence, intimidation and spread harmful narratives across
their transnational networks. The third factor represents the most lethal threat to western society in lone-wolf terrorism and the copycat syndrome. This concept denotes assailants who utilise typical far-right rhetoric (for example, the great replacement theory, white genocide, and Zionist empire) but remain mainly unconnected to the larger communities. Instead, these individuals form a virtual community, idolising past terrorists while validating each other to commit acts of terrorism. Infamous cases, including Breivik, Sonboly, Tarrant, and Crusius, are perfect examples of the lone-wolf terrorist virtual community’s mass killings potential. Fourth is the reciprocal radicalisation occurring against Islamic terrorist-related incidents. This phenomenon represents the quid pro quo relationship between extremist groups, wherein an attack against an extremist groups base receives a counteraction against the organisation or associated community. These findings suggest that the rise of Salafi-Jihadism and ISIS-inspired attacks is catalysing individuals towards the far-right. Finally, the thesis contends that the complex, multidimensional framework to RWE provides a perfect representation of the mass ecosystem of individuals involved within the community. Therefore, the movement provides individuals with the ability to cherry-pick ideologies that best fit their worldviews, effectively allowing all persons to join.

Based on the reoccurring patterns discussed above, more research in general needs to be directed towards RWE. This thesis calls for further examinations into understudied topics, including unaffiliated terrorism, reciprocal radicalisation, and the vast ecosystem of ideologies. Moreover, with COVID-19’s effects on the western world’s political, economic, and social functioning, there is a growing need to improve our understanding of the radicalisation mechanisms attracting ordinary citizens during times of insecurity. Ultimately, RWE presents a multidimensional challenge for researchers to unpack with various avenues to explore and comprehend. In outlining
the various trends throughout the dataset, this study hopes to inspire further research on an evolving and growing phenomenon.

Bibliography:


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