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Road to Camp David and beyond: Ripeness and Third-party Mediation of the Israeli-Egyptian Conflict

Master's thesis

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Year of the defence: 2021

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In Prague on May 4th 2021

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References

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Abstract

This thesis analyses the conflict resolution process between Israel and Egypt and provides a new angle for explaining the signing of the first Arab-Israeli peace treaty. Author uses a case study research method that facilitates an in-depth analysis of the topic and answers to three selected research questions: *Why did long-lasting hostile countries engage in the negotiations to resolve their conflict?*, *How did Jimmy Carter mediate the Camp David Summit?* and *What persuaded Israel and Egypt to finalize the peace treaty?*. The thesis is divided into two main analytical parts, according to the theoretical model used for its examination of the research questions. The first part makes use of William I. Zartman's theory of ripeness and its concept of a "mutually hurting stalemate" to explain why two opposing parties might become gradually open towards finding a "way out" from their protracted conflict. By analysing these conditions to reach a "ripe moment", the third-party may produce substantial proposals to resolve their dispute. The second part of this thesis focuses on the mediation process of the U.S. President Jimmy Carter between September 1978 and March 1979. The umbrella theory of third-party mediation is employed to elucidate the mediation strategies, potential biases and leverage of Jimmy Carter, who played a key role in successfully concluding the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. Combining the two chosen theories, enables the author to offer a complex analysis of the domestic push factors and suitable mediation strategies that persuaded the opposing parties to sign a peace treaty at that particular time.

Keywords

Israel, Egypt, Camp David, peace treaty, conflict ripeness, third-party mediation, Jimmy Carter, case study

Title

Road to Camp David and beyond: Ripeness and Third-party Mediation of the Israeli-Egyptian Conflict

Abstrakt

Diplomová práca sa zaoberá riešením konfliktu medzi Izraelom a Egyptom a poskytuje nový uhol pohľadu na podpísanie prvej Arabsko-Izraelskej mierovej zmluvy. Autor využíva výskumnú metódu prípadovej štúdie, ktorá umožňuje detailnú analýzu témy a sprostredkováva odpovede na tri vybrané výskumné otázky: *Prečo sa dlhoročné nepriateľské krajiny zapojili do rokovaní s cieľom vyriešiť ich vzájomný konflikt?*, *Ako sprostredkoval Jimmy Carter samit v Camp David?* a *Čo presvedčilo Izrael a Egypt, aby uzavreli mierovú zmluvu?*. Práca je rozdelená do dvoch analytických častí, podľa teoretického modelu použitého na analýzu výskumných otázok. Prvá časť sa zameriava na teóriu zrelosti Williama I. Zartmana a jej koncept "vzájomne bolestivého mŕtveho bodu" opozičných strán, ktorý ich prinúti hľadať "východisko" z zdĺhavého konfliktu. Rozbor týchto podmienok s cieľom dosiahnuť "zrelý okamih" umožní tretej strane predložiť vhodné návrhy na vyriešenie daného sporu. Druhá časť tejto práce sa venuje procesu mediácie, vedený americkým prezidentom Jimmym Carterom v období medzi septembrom 1978 a marcom 1979. Obsiahla teória mediácie tretej strany je použitá na objasnenie mediačných stratégií, potenciálnych predsudkov a vplyvu Jimmyho Cartera, ktorý zohral kľúčovú rolu pri uzavretí mierovej zmluvy medzi Izraelom a Egyptom. Kombinácia dvoch zvolených teórií umožňuje autorovi ponúknuť komplexnú analýzu domácich faktorov a vhodných mediačných stratégií, ktoré presvedčili opozičné strany, aby v konkrétnom čase podpísali mierovú zmluvu.

Kľúčové slová

Izrael, Egypt, Camp David, mierová zmluva, zrelosť konfliktu, mediácia treťou stranou, Jimmy Carter, prípadová štúdia

Názov práce

Cesta do Camp David a ešte ďalej: Zrelosť a Mediácia tretej strany v Izraelsko-Egyptskom konflikte

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List of Abbreviations

FDI – Foreign Direct Investments

GDP – Gross Domestic Product

GNP – Gross National Product

IDF – Israeli Defence Forces

IMF – International Monetary Fund

MEO – Mutually Enticing Opportunity

MHS – Mutually Hurting Stalemate

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

OPEC – Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

SWO – Sense of Way Out

UNEF – United Nations Emergency Force

U.S. – The United States of America

UN SC – United Nations Security Council

UNSCOP – United Nations Special Committee on Palestine

UNSCR – United Nations Security Council Resolution

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Introduction

The Arab-Israeli conflict can be traced back to the very establishment of the State of Israel. The idea of an independent Jewish state was born from decades of racial persecutions accompanied by the pogroms in Eastern Europe and the Holocaust, with more than 6 million Jewish casualties during World War II. As a result of these circumstances, Jews began to settle in the territories of Palestine, which represents the Holy Land of the Jewish biblical predecessors. At the end of World War II, approximately 31% of the Palestinian population were Jewish (Čejka, 2013: 61).

The question of the future of Palestine became one of the most complex issues in international politics, with heavy involvement of the United Nations. The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was founded, and in 1947 put forward the *Partition Plan* with the two-state solution for Palestine. The Arab Nations distanced themselves from the Committee and rejected any partition of the territory. They considered the UN activities to be a violation of the UN Charter which enshrined the right of nations' territoriality and sovereignty. Despite that, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 181 on November 29th 1947 that divided the territory of Palestine into the Arab state and Jewish state (Čejka, 2013: 67-68).

Accordingly, the independent State of Israel was declared on May 14th 1948 (Knesset, 2003). Since that day, the Arab Nations proclaimed the state of war with their new Jewish neighbour. Egypt, as the head of the Arab League and direct neighbour of Israel, stood as a key protector of Pan-Arabism and was determined to destroy Israel. The Israeli-Egyptian conflict manifested in a series of conventional wars: the 1956 Suez-Sinai war, the 1967 Six Day war, the 1967-1970 War of Attrition and the 1973 Yom Kippur war.

During the Cold War, Egypt became the main Soviet satellite in the Middle East. Israel, as the only regional democracy, was strongly backed by the Western countries. Nevertheless, the new Egyptian leadership under President Anwar Sadat realized that there was a need for a political shift toward the U.S. Sadat, as the only Arab leader, was favourable toward preventing any further war and establishing diplomatic relations with Israel. His unprecedented visit to Jerusalem in 1977 and the first Arab speech in front of the Israeli parliament signalled his inclination towards a conflict resolution. With the mediation support of the U.S., the long-lasting adversaries signed the first Arab-Israeli peace treaty on March 26th 1979 (Stein, 1999: 257).

Egypt's major shift toward the resolution of the conflict with its arch enemy of 30 years gave rise to many questions amongst international relations as well as security studies scholars. Although the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and particularly the Israeli-Egyptian relations, are well documented in the academic literature, there is still a gap in the analysis of why the parties ended up concluding the peace treaty given the domestic political and economic constraints, and why at that particular time.

This diploma thesis will be divided into three main chapters. The first chapter will introduce the theoretical and conceptual framework of the thesis. I use two theoretical models of ripeness and third-party mediation to analyse the historical event of the Israeli-Egyptian conflict resolution. Firstly, William I. Zartman's theory of "ripeness" provides a useful lens for the analysis of the theory's crucial conditions of "mutually hurting stalemate" and "sense of a way out" that pushed the opposing parties to engage in the mediated peace negotiations on the right time. Secondly, the third-party mediation theory will characterize the mediator's main attributes, potential biases, power over the disputing parties and various mediation strategies used during the negotiations process to successfully achieve a peace agreement.

The second chapter will be dedicated to the ripeness of the Israeli-Egyptian conflict. It will explain how Egypt suffered tremendous economic and military losses after the Six Day war which changed their perception on the conflict with Israel and co-operation with the U.S. Anwar Sadat initiated the peace agreement with Israel in 1971 but without any positive response. Egypt then began the Yom Kippur war that negatively influenced Israel. With both parties reaching the "hurting stalemate", there was a need for a mediator to come with a substantial proposal in order to find a "way out" of the conflict. The mediation of Henry Kissinger helped to achieve only two partial disengagement of forces agreements with no further possibility of the conflict resolution. The ripe moment for initiating the peace negotiations only came up with the engagement of the U.S. President Jimmy Carter and the invitation to the Camp David Summit on September 5th 1978.

The third chapter of the thesis will describe the mediation process in the period between 1978 and 1979, and elaborate on the importance of mediator's strategies during its proceedings. The procedural strategy of the Camp David Summit in 1978, as an open-ended summit in a neutral environment, provided Carter a unique opportunity to personally negotiate with President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin. By using the directive strategy and powers of threats, rewards or termination of the negotiation process, Carter developed the Camp David Accords, signed on September 17th 1978. However, the finalization

of the peace treaty lasted another six months because the U.S. mediation team without President Carter could not reach a compromise on a set of unresolved issues from Camp David. The chapter will analyse how and why the second round of Carter's personal mediation and shuttle diplomacy in March 1979 was able to conclude the first Arab-Israeli peace treaty, while committing the U.S. to provide vast amounts of financial aid to both states.

This diploma thesis draws on a rich array of primary and secondary qualitative sources. Primary sources include United Nations Security Council Resolutions, international peace treaties and memoirs of the key personnel present in the analysed historical events, such as Carter's *Keeping faith: Memoirs of a President*, Moshe Dayan's *Breakthrough: A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations* or Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *Egypt's Road to Jerusalem: A Diplomat's Story of the Struggle for Peace in the Middle East*. Secondary sources encompass a careful selection of evidence from peer-reviewed academic articles, books, and online sources. The most important secondary sources include books of William B. Quandt *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967* and *Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics*, Steven L. Spiegel *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America's Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan* or Kenneth W. Stein *Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace*.

1. Theoretical Introduction and Conceptual Framework

Human beings have witnessed conflicts throughout the history of mankind. J. F. Rioux characterized conflict as "an antagonistic relationship between two and more parties over intractable divergences regarding what is mutually significant to the parties involved" (Rioux, 2012: 2). Peter Wallensteen sees the conflict as "a social situation in which a minimum of two actors (parties) strive to acquire at the same moment in time an available set of scarce resources" (Wallensteen, 2019: 42). From different perspectives and definitions, it is certain that any conflict involves two or more parties that have conflicting objectives or opinions. Therefore, each part in any conflict tries to get what the other party desires, meaning that if the demands of one party are not met, a conflict starts to arise. A good example of such an international dispute that is still ongoing nowadays is the claim for sovereignty over the city of Jerusalem where Israel considers the entire city its capital while, on the other hand, Palestine wants Israel to relinquish East Jerusalem which it deems also the capital of their future state (Global Conflict Tracker, n.d.).

In the realm of international relations, conflicts have been a natural phenomenon (Bussmann, 2010). Whether they are intra-state or inter-state, actors of the conflicts tend to find themselves in need of starting to find solution to end the violence with the adversary at one time or another. Tensions and violence of actors may precede the conflict resolution (Wallensteen, 2019: 30). Wallensteen's research demonstrates that among 14 conflicts resolved during the Cold War, only two reached the signing of a peace agreement. First Arab-Israeli peace agreement received the most attention because of its uniqueness in the Middle East and beyond (Wallensteen, 2019: 139).

The development of the Israeli-Egyptian conflict and its eventual resolution is examined through the theoretical concepts of ripeness and third-party mediation. The diploma thesis will emphasize on a causality of military and economic losses that pushed long-lasting adversaries towards mediated peace agreement. As an important international actor with persisting presence in the Middle East, the United States will be shown to play an irreplaceable role during Israeli-Egyptian conflict management and its resolution. The performance of a mediator, namely the U.S. President Jimmy Carter, was unprecedented and stood behind the compromises reached during the peace process.

With regard to a research method, thesis will be conducted as a qualitative analysis, specifically a case study. A case study is "an effective methodology to investigate and understand complex issues in real world setting" whether it is an individual, group, event or

phenomenon (Harrison et. al, 2017: 1). Gillham (2000) refers to a case study as a "an investigation to answer specific research questions which seek a range of different evidences from the case settings" (Given, 2008: 309). This diploma thesis's goal is not to build a new theoretical model, but provide in-depth analysis of the Israeli-Egyptian conflict resolution as its primary interest of the exploration. Therefore, the chosen method is relevant to apply because "it provides a systematic way to collect data, analyse information, and report the results, thus understand a particular problem or situation in great depth" (Given, 2008: 309). According to Stake (2005), we may assume that our case study fits in the intrinsic category.

This qualitative analysis attempts mainly to understand and explore three research questions:

- 1. Why and how did long-lasting hostile countries engage in the negotiations to resolve their conflict?**
- 2. How did Jimmy Carter mediate the Camp David Summit?**
- 3. What persuaded both parties to finalize the peace treaty?**

The thesis will provide explanatory answers with its limitation on the time period between 1967 when Israel launched pre-emptive strikes against Egypt, Jordan and Syria leading to the Six Day War and 1973 Yom Kippur war which left Israel and Egypt in severe military and economic situation. The defining moment and the resolution of this conflict occurred during the Camp David Summit in 1978 and by the peace treaty signed in 1979 (Quandt, 2016: 4).

This chapter will explore two theoretical models and through them analyse individual steps of reaching resolution of this protracted conflict. By combining two chosen theories, it enables us to offer a broader and clearer approach to the topic as opposed to focusing only on one single theory and problem of the research. Firstly, Zartman's ripeness theory will explicate the first research question of **Why and how did long-lasting hostile countries engage in the negotiations to resolve their conflict?** via description of the key events that happened between Israel and Egypt in the selected period of time. Most importantly, how the consequences and the ongoing war of geopolitical influence between the U.S. and the Soviet Union affected the foreign policy of Egypt towards its adversary. Secondly, an umbrella theory of a third-party mediation will provide the answers for the second and third research question of **How did Jimmy Carter mediate the Camp David Summit?** and **What persuaded both parties to finalize the peace treaty?**. The analysis of a third-party mediation will elucidate various mediation strategies of the U.S. President Jimmy Carter, his potential bias and power over the

disputing parties during the mediation process between September 1978 and March 1979, when the first Arab-Israeli peace treaty was developed and signed.

1. 1 Zartman's Theoretical Framework

Zartman established his rational approach of understanding the conflict management and the resolution of international conflicts on "ripeness" of the situation. Therefore, his theoretical framework is also termed as the "ripeness theory" as it was formed by his studies that began in the 1980s. Zartman published various extended studies explaining the theory, some of the most reknown ones being published in 1986, 1989, 1995 and 2000. Author claims that realist paradigm in the International Relations explain the conflict by "the power as a force" but it is not useful for its resolution. "Furthermore, realism is taught and analysed as a form of structural determinism, leaving no room to explain ways of getting out of its grasp and of managing conflict" (Zartman, 2008a: 3). Since then, ripeness theory has become one of the most influential frameworks of conflict resolution in the international relations field (Coleman et al., 2008: 4).


Based on Zartman's publications, the author identified two most important factors in international conflict mediation efforts or negotiations: the substance of the proposal and the right timing. However, he opted to focus his research mainly on the timing aspect. In international conflict resolution, the ripe moment refers to the period in the course of a dispute when parties are more likely to enter into a negotiation (Zartman, 2008b: 22). Scholars also characterize it as "circumstances conducive for negotiated progress or even solution" (Haass, 1990: 6). An example of such a time is when both parties get militarily and economically exhausted or when they are beginning to relax their aggression due to domestic and international pressures (Zartman, 2015: 488). Ripeness thus remains an integral but not sufficient condition for starting a negotiation process, even if it is bilateral or mediated (Zartman, 2000: 227). In international conflicts, the role of mediators is to understand the context of a dispute and follow its development so that they can seize the right moment to initiate talks between the two adversaries. In addition, it is the role of the mediator to present a subjective perception depended on the objective evidence of why he/she identifies a period as ripe so that the parties can fully appreciate the moment and the opportunity to establish peace (Zartman, 2000: 229).

Due to the importance of ripeness, it is important to identify the elements necessary for the initiation of a productive negotiation. The first condition that can be described as ripe for international conflict resolution is Mutual Hurting Stalemate (MHS). Mutual hurting stalemate

is characterized as a situation where both parties are at a point where they are unable to win and the deadlock is hurting them. It is usually associated with the past, impeding or recently avoided disaster between the parties (Zartman, 2008b: 22). Therefore, knowing that parties are unable to progress, they begin looking for a solution out of this situation. MHS is thus a short or a protracted period of time characterized by violence and tension, where neither of the party is assured of coming out of this situation with unilateral victory. The typical situation of MHS is a state of military stalemate (Schrodt et al., 2003: 2-3). Zartman describes MHS also as a "plateau" where one party is not in a position to achieve its goals. Hence, a plateau is a ripe moment to initiate negotiation in international conflicts. In instances where the parties do not understand MHS perception, the mediator should help parties understand that they have reached such a moment. Based on ripeness theory, the mediator has a particularly critical role in bringing the parties to the negotiation table through persuasion (Zartman, 2008b: 23).

The second condition that dictates the ripeness of negotiation in international conflicts is their sense of Way out (SWO). In other words, negotiation would begin when both parties have to come to a place where they feel that they need to find a solution. However, in many occasions, parties feel that they want a way out but they lack a specific solution to this conflict (Zartman, 2000: 228). An example of such a situation is the MHS, where the parties realize that they are in a deadlock situation and are becoming receptive to the possibility of finding a way out. The greater the objective evidence, the greater the subjective perception of the hurting stalemate of a party. Nevertheless, the situation would not be ripe for a negotiation if it is only one party that perceives its situation as hurting stalemate. In such a scenario, the mediator should convince the other party that the moment is ripe for negotiation and to understand the MHS. To identify the sense of the way out is even more apparent when the adversaries are willing to compensate required concessions to one another (Zartman, 2000: 228-232).


Table no. 1: Theory of Ripeness



(Source: Zartman, 2000: 230)

Zartman in his extended studies also outlines the third potential element of the ripeness theory. A Mutually Enticing Opportunity (MEO) can be referred to a point in a conflict where both parties begin to feel that the prospects of peace are better than the current situation. For example, as a conflict grows older and becomes economically burdensome, the idea of finding a solution becomes more attractive. Therefore, the time in a conflict where parties begin realizing that there is no justification for having hostile relations with the other party is ripe for the initiation of a negotiation. MEO is an important aspect in the broader understanding of the negotiation process and ripeness theory, where the decision to negotiate reach the level of active participation on the peace talks (Zartman, 2000: 242). An example of a scenario where a MEO was successfully reached is the signing of Oslo Accords between Israel and Palestinian Liberation Organization in 1993 (Zartman, 2015: 484). MHS is a necessary push factor for commencing mediation or negotiation. However, it is not always a sufficient condition for the initiation of negotiation unless both parties have a clearer picture of other prospects how to be pulled out of the conflict. Therefore, the best way of truly harnessing the MHS is for negotiators to present a roadmap and an end plan that the two parties will deem enticing and worth pursuing. As Zartman postulates, mutually enticing opportunity can be a pull factor that helps to change the mentalities of key operatives and stakeholders in the journey towards reconciliation. Just like any reconciliation thrives when parties fundamentally alter their stance towards each other, a mutually enticing opportunity can be the factor that provides transformational possibilities in the process of international conflict resolutions (Zartman, 2000: 241-243).

Table no. 2: Conditions for successful outcome




(Source: Zartman, 2000: 242)

The emergence of substantive proposals is a viable moment for initiating negotiations in international conflicts. Indeed, when agreeable and resourceful mediators are found, the conflict fulfils what Zartman believes is a situation of wanting a way out. In many interstate conflicts, the international community often gets involved by agitating for a ceasefire or by imposing sanctions, among others (Wallenstein, 2019: 24-25). Therefore, these international actors, such as the U.S. in the case of the Israeli-Egypt conflict, can lead to the emergence of substantive proposals. When parties want a way out and are unaware of the solution, the mediator should ensure that he/she develops viable proposals that will give the two parties an idea of the way out. According to Zartman, ripeness can be a situation where the mediator perceives both parties as being in a position where they would develop interests about a peaceful solution. Therefore, the mediator needs to evaluate and present substantial alternatives to the two parties at this stage (Cantekin, 2016: 419).

Another possible situation that can be interpreted as ripe for initiating negotiations is when the leadership of the parties supports the idea of a way out. Leaders are fundamental figures in international conflicts. Indeed, in most of those situations, they are usually the face of the conflict. Moreover, even in situations where a successful negotiation takes place, like in the case of Israeli-Egypt conflict, it is the leaders who are often remembered for the positive developments. When leaders and other participants get to a point where they understand that they are causing a stalemate, they can start looking for a way out (Cantekin, 2016: 420). As in the case of the Israeli-Egypt conflict, Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat came to the realization that status quo was not sustainable anymore, but rather progressively mutually destructing. A

compromise on both sides can allow leaders to engage the members of the party as well as stakeholders that the interests of the government, state and public are being addressed. Such engagement can make their constituents supportive of this idea; it will also serve as a platform for establishing support networks for the commencement of such negotiations (Lieberfeld, 1999: 76-77). Another possible situation for initiating negotiations is when there is a change in internal political leadership that could also expose new strategies and perceive a way out of the conflict that previous leadership might have overlooked (Stedman, 1991).

Table no. 3: Expanded Theory of Ripeness



(Source: Podszun, 2011: 107)

1. 2 Third-party intervention: mediation

Having successfully reached a "ripe moment" in the conflict's duration, what follows is the initiation of the negotiation process to achieve a peace resolution (Zartman, 2000: 227-229). Traditional bilateral cases are likely to be hindered by the rejection or counterclaim by the parties during the mutual bargaining. The negotiations then can be reconstructed and mediated by the presence of a third-party (Jeong, 2000: 116). Mediation becomes "by far the most common form of peaceful third-party intervention in international conflicts" (Bercovitch and Gartner, 2009: 5). However, third-party mediation, as a theoretical concept, is based on the assumption that there is no "grand theory" and a universal solution applicable to all types of

conflicts. Each conflict takes place under specific, often unpredictable conditions, and its classification is not entirely clear. Thus, there is no universally appropriate method of conflict management or resolution. Nonetheless, the theory can make it easier to understand the nature of a conflict and help to find an appropriate solution.

The Uppsala University's conflict database defines a third-party entity as i) a participant to encourage the parties to regulate incompatibility, or ii) a mediator to regulate the level of violence between the adversaries. The third-party can also engage in the conflict militarily (UN operations, NATO interventions, peace enforcement) without automatically becoming a direct party to the conflict. A third-party can be represented by a state, an organization (non-governmental, regional or international), or an individual (e. g. former president). The most common activities of third-parties consists in a mediation, facilitating negotiations between parties and monitoring of a cease-fire or a peace treaty (UCDP, n. d.).

There is a whole spectrum of different interpretations of the third-party concepts by scholars, analysing the intervention techniques, strategies and goals, and also the type of actor who intervenes as a third-party. Fisher (1996) distinguishes between pacific strategies (peace-keeping missions, track-two diplomacy, consultations) and strategies where armed force is used (peace enforcement). The principles of a pacific conflict resolution are officially defined by the Article 2§3 of the UN Charter: "All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered" (UN, 1945: 3). The preferred methods of a peaceful intervention are outlined by the Article 33 as "negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice" (UN, 1945: 8).

Bercovitch and Jackson (2009) divide peaceful means into two categories i) diplomatic (negotiation, reconciliation, consultation, mediation), and ii) legal (adjudication, arbitration, legal settlement). Mediation belongs into the diplomatic category and is generally described as a participation or an assistance of a third-party with the purpose of suspending (conflict management) or resolving (conflict resolution) the dispute between the adversaries. Furthermore, a certain degree of flexibility exists in the participation, the choice of a mediator and the final settlement of the mutual agreement during the mediation process (Vuković, 2014: 61-63).

The definition of the mediation process can also vary. Mitchell (1981) refers to mediation as any "intermediary activity, undertaken by a third party with the primary intention

of achieving some compromise settlement of the issues at stake between the parties, or at least ending disruptive conflict behaviour" (Mitchell, 1981: 287). Blake and Mouton (1985) point out that the mediation process involves the "intervention of a third-party who first investigates and defines the problem and then usually approaches each group separately with recommendations designed to provide a mutually acceptable solution" (Blake and Mouton, 1985: 15).

On the contrary, Moore (1986) describes mediation as the continuation of the belligerents' own negotiation process by the "acceptable, impartial and neutral third-party" that does not hold a commanding power. Bercovitch et al. (1991) define mediation as a "process of conflict management" where the third-party does not resort to physical or law enforcement. Mediators engage in the conflict to manage the dynamics between the parties. Frazier and Dixon (2006) highlight the formation of feasible proposals or procedures that are "legally non-binding" for the parties to the conflict.

Other important feature of the mediation process is an outcome definition. Butler (2009) emphasizes the conceptual differences between conflict management and conflict resolution. Conflict management is based on the regulation of a conflict between the parties by reducing the more destructive effects on both sides. Conflict management is applied when the elimination of the causes of the conflict does not appear avoidable in the given situation and when there is a risk of escalation, against which the third-party could intervene due to the dynamics of the conflict (Butler, 2009: 13-14).

When it comes to conflict resolution, Butler (2009) refers to the importance of reconciliation of the grievances between the adversaries. Wallensteen (2019) proposes the definition of conflict resolution as "the situation where the conflicting parties enter into an agreement that solves their central incompatibilities, accept each other's continued existence as parties and cease all violent action against each other" (Wallensteen, 2019: 30). The author also points out the differences between conflict resolution and long-lasting peace. The two overlap in the absence or ending of violent actions but may differ in future perspectives of mutual cooperation, justice and integration (Wallensteen, 2019: 33).

The definitions of conflict management and conflict resolution are based mainly on the scholarly interpretations. Wallensteen sees a closer alignment between a truce agreement and a conflict management than conflict resolution, as it freezes a military status quo but does not have to result in a peace settlement (Wallensteen, 2019: 33). Consequently, conflict

management may or may not have a transformative force or a positive impact on the conflict resolution.

Since mediation is a voluntary process, the mediator cannot engage in the process unless they are "reasonable, acceptable, knowledgeable, and able to secure the trust and cooperation of the disputants" (Bercovitch and Regan, 2004: 258). The main goal of a mediator is to transform the hostile environment between the parties into negotiations and improve the chances of reaching a mutual settlement (Moore, 1986: 178). The role of a mediator can be assumed by a state, an organization or an individual (Bercovitch and Houston, 1993: 298). An individual mediator can take a more dominant position, when he/she is also representing a state, as it was in the case of Jimmy Carter during the Israeli-Egyptian mediation process.

The mediator's relationship with the disputing parties is considered a significant determinant of the outcome of the mediation process. Firstly, scholars such as Moore (1996) distinguish between neutrality and impartiality of the mediator. Impartiality is characterized as "the absence of bias or preference in favour of one or more negotiators, their interests, or the specific solutions that they are advocating" (Moore, 1996: 52). On the other hand, neutrality refers to "the relationship or behaviour between intervenor and disputants" (Moore, 1996: 52). However, neutrality may be also understood as the pre-condition for impartial behaviour (Wall and Dewhurst, 1991; Lim and Carnevale, 1990). Welton and Pruitt (1987) claim that a neutral mediator is concerned with the beneficial outcome for both parties to the conflict. Impartial or neutral mediators may have a greater predisposition for having their engagement accepted in the mediation process and also for reaching a successful agreement (Welton and Pruitt, 1987; Maoz and Terris, 2006).

Secondly, another group of the scholars tends to underline the importance of a biased mediator in reaching a successful outcome. Touval and Zartman (1985) argue that a biased mediator can exert greater influence over the conflict parties and induce them to make concessions. Carnevale and Arab (1996) add that the preferred party will make any concessions while the second one will collaborate with the mediator to win them over. Mediators may engage in the process due to protect or promote their own interests (Bercovitch, 1996: 9). With the considerable political and economic resources spent during the mediation process, it is plausible to argue that the third-party mediates the dispute not solely to the benefits of the adversaries, but because of their own self-interest (Princen, 1992; Touval and Zartman, 1985). Princen (1992) claims that the principal (biased) mediator may engage as an integral (direct) part of the negotiation process where he/she may form a coalition with one of the parties.

Whether a mediator is neutral or biased, his/her power (leverage) may affect one party's standpoint in the negotiations (Touval and Zartman, 1996: 455). Bercovitch and Houston (1996) argue that power represents more important determinant than impartiality. The stronger the mediator, the more resources available to spend on the change of disputant's perceptions and size of the concessions. Rubin (1992) offers six types of mediator's leverage that may help opposing parties to change behaviour: 1. reward power (ability to provide side-payments); 2. coercive power (using threats or sanctions); 3. expert power (knowledge capacity of a mediator); 4. legitimate power (legal aspect of mediation); 5. referent power (relationship between mediator and parties to the conflict); and 6. informational power (mediator as an in-between). Similarly, Touval and Zartman (1996) distinguish between: 1. persuasion (changing status quo to an action); 2. extraction (fostering agreeable propositions); 3. termination (threat of withdrawing from mediation process); 4. deprivation (suspending resources to one party); and 5. gratification (providing incentives to one or both parties).

Mediators individually choose the strategy they will use during the mediation process. Kolb (1983) defines the mediation strategy as "an overall plan, approach or method a mediator has for resolving a dispute ... it is the way the mediator intends to manage the case, the parties, and the issue" (Kolb, 1983: 249). Mediator chooses a strategy according to the nature of the conflict (Bercovitch and Lee, 2003: 3). Touval and Zartman (1985) identify three types of behaviour during the mediation process: 1. communication, 2. formulation, and 3. manipulation. These general categories allow practitioner easily analyse specific steps of a third-party during the mediation. However, Bercovitch and Lee (2003) presents three complex categories of mediation strategies, that diverge from low to high level of a third-party intervention to the conflict. Firstly, the *communication-facilitation strategy* fits into the low level of intervention because of the passivity of a mediator. Communicative mediator plays the role of a messenger between the two opposing parties and have no or little formal control over the mediation. Mediator may gain the trust of the parties and arrange the interactions between them. Facilitative mediator enables parties to have access to any information that are key to identify possible mutual agreements or to clarify the misunderstandings. On the other hand, mediator may personally develop a plan and encourage active negotiation process between the parties. Mediator should be impartial, taking no side during negotiation process (Bercovitch and Lee, 2003: 3-4; Beardsley et. al, 2006: 63).

Secondly, *procedural strategy* enables a mediator to structure the whole negotiations process. It also permits mediator to invite parties to a neutral environment. Mediator gains more

formal control over the process, such as selection of a meeting place, time management, structure of the agenda, media coverage and flexibility of interactions between the opposing parties. This strategy forms a favourable ambience to bring parties together (Bercovitch and Lee, 2003: 4). Mediator may act as a formulator and develop his own set of issues important to resolve. They can "convince each party that there are temporal constraints that necessitate immediate progress or that unilateral action is less beneficial than negotiation" (Beardsley et. al, 2006: 64).

Thirdly, *directive strategies* (or *manipulative*) stand on the high level of an intervention spectrum. Mediator shapes the agenda and outcome of the negotiation process. Mediator may use his/her leverage and provide financial or diplomatic support, guarantees or threats of sanctions to produce co-operative behaviour of the opposing parties to settle the conflict. Directive strategy allows mediator to make substantial proposals and demonstrate possible consequences of a non-agreement (Bercovitch and Lee, 2003: 4-5). However, manipulative mediation may also increase costs of conflict continuation between adversaries or costs in case of violating a peace agreement by one or all parties (Beardsley et. al, 2006: 65).

This chapter provided an overview of two theoretical models that will form the basis of understanding conflict resolution between Israel and Egypt. Firstly, William I. Zartman (2000) proposes the theory of ripeness, that focuses on the timing aspect of the international conflict resolutions. By analysing two main conditions of a "mutually hurting stalemate " and a "sense of way out", opposing parties may reach a ripe moment to initiate peace negotiations. Zartman describes MHS as a situation where both parties reached a military or economic stalemate that is hurting them. The period of MHS is also accompanied with the hostile tensions between the adversaries with no possibility of unilateral victory. SWO represents the condition, where parties are favourable towards finding a solution to their conflict. To support finding of a suitable way out, the engagement of a mediator might develop substantial proposals to create condition of "wanting a way out" and subsequently reach a SWO. Zartman also emphasizes on the importance of change in political leadership that may be willing to produce new strategies and form a SWO. In the extended studies, Zartman also proposes the third potential condition of "mutually enticing opportunities" that reaches a level of active participation in the peace talks and possibility to change the mentalities of adversaries towards reconciliation. Secondly, an umbrella theory of third-party mediation encompasses a set of definitions of understanding mediation process (Mitchell, 1981; Blake and Mouton, 1985; Moore, 1986; Bercovitch et. al, 1991) and interpretations on the outcome of mediation process that distinguishes between

conflict management (Butler, 2009) and conflict resolution (Butler, 2009; Wallensteen, 2019). The chapter focused also on a specific role of mediator and his/her relationship with parties to the conflict. Mediators can be impartial (Moore, 1996), neutral (Moore, 1996; Welton and Pruitt, 1987) or biased (Touval and Zartman, 1985; Carnevale and Arab, 1996; Princen, 1992). Whether a mediator's relationship with parties is neutral or biased, mediator may apply his/her powers of leverage to change disputants' perception on the conflict as Rubin (1992) or Touval and Zartman (1996) propose. During the mediation process, third-party individually chooses a strategy that will use to resolve or manage the conflict according to its nature. Touval and Zartman (1985) proposes three types of strategies: 1. communication, 2. formulation, and 3. persuasion. Bercovitch and Lee (2003) presents three complex mediation strategies, specifically communication-facilitation strategy, procedural strategy and directive strategy. The next chapter will provide an analytical research of the Israeli-Egyptian conflict resolution according to Zartman's theory of ripeness.

2. Ripeness and steps toward the peace negotiations

2. 1 1956 Suez Crisis

International conflicts might arise as a result of economic, environmental, political, or security factors (Wallensteen, 2019). The trigger for the Israeli-Egypt war of 1956 was the Suez Canal's nationalization by the Egyptian leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, in July 1956 (Čejka, 2013: 100). The Suez Canal was an important waterway for several countries, including Britain, France and Israel. Egypt, as the head of the Arab League, had hostile relationship with Israel from the beginning of its existence. Nasser, with his anti-Israel and anti-Western notions, made more enemies by nationalizing the canal since it meant it was no longer under the control of the Anglo-French (Voinea, 2011). Nonetheless, Israel mostly feared the consequences of the Egyptian-Czech arms deal signed in September 1955, which led to significant changes in Israel's security policy (Tal, 1996: 76). The Middle East war of 1956 began with the "Operation Kadesh", a surprise preventive military attack on Egypt on October 29th. Israel seemingly conducted the movement, but Britain and France secretly planned it and joined the operation on October 31st (Boyle, 2005: 553). The war resulted from a French-British-Israeli plan to overthrow the Egyptian president (Boyle, 2005: 558). The military victory of the underground allies in the war was inevitable; in days, Israel had occupied the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip, while France and Britain again dominated the canal. However, the occupation was short-lived,

primarily due to opposition from the superpowers, especially the U.S. President Eisenhower. After the pressure of the U.S., the Soviet Union and the United Nations, Israeli military troops withdrew from the Sinai in March 1957 and were replaced by the UNEF mission of 3 300 military personnel, also called "blue helmets". The Suez Canal was also re-opened. (Čejka, 2013: 101).

Only under the conditions of a "mutually hurting stalemate", according to the theory of Zartman (2000), does ripeness exist. There was no exact moment when both Israel and Egypt were in a "mutually hurting" position, and capable of finding their "way out" of the hostilities. The international crisis politically negatively affected mainly Britain and France (Boyle, 2005: 564). In addition to the Middle East's difficulties, the superpowers were faced with the possibility of another continental war after the outbreak of the Hungarian Revolution (Boyle, 2005: 565). Moreover, the U.S. did not want another war in the Middle East since the prolonged crisis would have been perceived as a "crisis requiring a response" (Voinea, 2011). The Suez Crisis did not present the right moment for any peaceful settlement or negotiations in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In spite of this, the U.S. played the moderating role to solve the crisis, and managed to enhance its relationship with Egypt (Voinea, 2011). Israel, after the threat of suspension of the U.S. assistance, imposition of UN sanctions and even the expulsion from the organisation, returned the occupied Sinai Peninsula to Egypt (Jewish Library, n.d.). Due to the lack of peace-keeping activities in the following years between the two states, relationship remained belligerent. The rising tensions and Egypt's anti-Israel notions caused the outbreak of the Six Day war in 1967 (Voinea, 2011).

2. 2 Wars of the 1967 and 1973

Political tensions in the Middle East had existed since the Suez Crisis (Čejka, 2014: 100). By the early 1960s, the region had become a hot spot for Cold War clashes as the U.S. and the Soviet Union were competing for global power and influence. In the spring of 1967, the Soviet Union misinformed the Syrian government that the Israeli forces were plotting in the Northern Israel to attack Syria. However, in reality, there was no such mobilization from the Israel's part. In response to a Syrian request for assistance, Egyptian troops entered the Sinai Peninsula and started a blockade of Israeli port in Eilat in May 1967. President Nasser also asked for an evacuation of UNEF mission from the Sinai. On June 5th 1967, Israel launched pre-emptive attacks on Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, sparking the Six Day war, which culminated in the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, Egyptian Sinai Peninsula and Syrian Golan

Heights. The war ended with a clear military victory for Israel on June 10th 1967 (Beinin and Hajjar, 2014: 17-18).

Psychologically, the 1967 war promoted supremacy and invincibility in the Israeli government, the army, and the public. However, for the Arab world, the war was a huge failure, leaving both public and political leaders shocked and in disbelief. After 1967, Arab countries' political discourse transformed from voicing sympathy with the Palestinians to emphasizing the restoration of the territory lost to Israel during the war. In Egypt, the ideals of pan-Arabism began to fade with the rising "hurting" domestic situation (Meek, 2016: 19).

For the Israelis, the circumstances after June 1967 war were not "hurting", and so they were better off preserving the status quo. Israel believed that the success of deterrence would be assured by preserving the status quo, even though the UN Security Council adopted resolution 242 (UNSCR 242) which called Israel to withdraw from all territories captured during the war, for the mutual respect for sovereignty and territoriality of the involved states and the need for demilitarized zone. Israel refused to adopt the UNSCR 242 and maintained its control on the occupied territories (UN SC, 1967; Kelly, 2008: 17). Territorial enlargement served Israel as the strategic depth against the Arab encirclement and provided the possibility of early-warning mobilization of forces in case of renewed attacks (Sudetic, 2014).

The upcoming period between Israel and Egypt's ongoing belligerent positions also negated the hope for a "ripe for peace" period. In the years of 1967-1970, Egypt conducted a series of minor attacks, called "War of attrition". These attacks were designed to cause economic and psychological damage on Israel and to expel their forces from the occupied Sinai (Čejka, 2013: 139-140). The policy of Arab nations at that time was determined by the Khartoum Summit Conference's premise of "three NOs": "no recognition, no negotiations and no peace" with Israel (Gat, 2012: 22).

A significant shift happened in 1970, after President Nasser's death. Anwar Sadat was appointed as the new president of Egypt. He maintained some of the late Nasser's military policies, but reversed few crucial political ones (Lesch, 2008: 240). Sadat knew, that Egypt could not have been dependent only on the Soviet Union, but needed to establish diplomatic ties also with the U.S. During the ongoing "War of attrition", Sadat initiated a proposal to sign a cease-fire with Israel in 1971, if they would return the Egyptian territories based on the UNSCR 242. Sadat suggested to make various concessions to persuade Israel into agreement. However, Israel's government under the Prime Minister Golda Meir was not incline to return any piece of the territory (Meek, 2016: 36-37).

To achieve the political goal of regaining the lost territory, Egypt and Syria conducted a joint surprise assault on Israeli troops on the Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights on October 6th 1973 (Čejka, 2013: 146). Sadat's will to go to war with Israel, despite the devastated domestic economy, was aimed at changing the political stalemate between the countries (Badri, Magdoub and Zohdy, 1978: 17). The Yom Kippur war was a surprise attack on Israel and the Arabs had an advantage over Israel because of this element. Egyptian forces successfully crossed the cease-fire line that provoked the U.S. government's political intercession, who contributed by extending their military support to Israel (Beinin and Hajjar, 2014: 20). Due to the U.S. military aid, Israel mobilized the majority of its forces and deterred the Egyptian onslaught on the Sinai in only three days. The war was terminated by the UN-brokered cease-fire with the support of the U.S. and the Soviet Union on October 22nd 1973 (Gawrych, 1996: 69-71). The lack of a definitive outcome of the 1973 conflict allowed the transition from bloodshed to diplomacy (Schulze, 1999: 52).

2. 3 Reaching the "hurting stalemate"

As Zartman (2000) explains, "mutually hurting stalemate" (MHS) is the first precondition to countries to realize they need the "way out" of the conflict. Whether it is a military or economic exhaustion that pushes parties to be stuck in at "hurting stalemate", leaders came to the point where they doubt pursuing actions that would result in renewed violence. In such a situation, the warring parties usually come to the conclusion that the negative effects linked to the occurrence of the war outweigh the benefits (Zartman, 2015: 488). In the case of Israel and Egypt, the MHS occurred when the two parties reached a situation where they both faced severe domestic challenges. Egypt reached the "hurting stalemate" already after the 1967 war, but could not have achieved the palatable compromise with Israel. Consequently, through the occurrence of mutually hurting factors in 1973, the two conflicting parties realized the need of the mediator to come out with the proposals for solving the conflict (Zartman, 2008b: 23).

2. 3. 1 Egypt

Egypt suffered colossal casualties during the 1967 war, both military and financial, which took a great deal of effort to recover (Kanovsky, 1968: 135). After the closure of the Suez Canal, attacks on manufacturing plants and anti-Western feelings that decreased overall tourism revenues and prevented Egypt from lending capital loans from international economic institutions, Egypt had to importantly rethink its economic policies to be able to finance defence expenditure as planned before the war broke out. Aziz Sedki, former Prime Minister of Egypt,

estimated economic damages at approximately \$25 billion (Al-Naggar, 2014). Most importantly, Egypt suffered tremendous losses in military casualties, more than 11 500 soldiers (Gawrych, 1996: 3). 80% of its ground capacities and 85% of its aircraft were demolished, and the Egyptian government had to find resources to buy replacements, which imposed an immense strain on their economic recovery (Gawrych, 1996: 3).

With the territorial loss of the Sinai Peninsula, Egypt was no longer able to collect the revenues from its oil and mineral reserves. Sinai oil production was estimated to earn almost \$56 million annually (Kanovsky, 1968: 138). However, for Egypt, the closing of Suez Canal was the most severe aspect of its post-war economy. In 1966, Suez Canal revenues reached \$219.2 million, almost 4 % of GDP for that year (Al-Naggar, 2014). The destruction of two Suez refineries was estimated at \$162 million, together with a \$2.3 million loss in stored oil (Kanovsky, 1968: 138). Tourism revenue from the Sinai Peninsula came to a halt because of the renewed Israeli occupation. Increasing Anti-Western feelings towards Egypt caused a decline in tourist numbers causing damage estimate at \$84 million per year (Al-Naggar, 2014).

During the war, several important production assets were temporarily or permanently disturbed. 17 large manufacturing plants were completely destroyed, at the loss of \$73 million (Al-Naggar, 2014). At the same time, the government sought to fund the military costs while reducing civilian imports. Meanwhile, they were addressing domestic consumption to focus Egypt's foreign currency on military procurement (Al-Naggar, 2014).

Egypt's government was aware that it was controlling a war economy, and did not shy away from enforcing the required policies. This included new taxation and raising existing taxes to maximize public revenues to cover the rapid increase in government expenses required to brace Israel for another military conflict. Since 1969/70, tax revenues rose up to 29.9%, from \$192 million to \$250 million in 1973 by indirect and tariff taxation (Al-Naggar, 2014). Since most people were seeking indirect taxation of goods and services, the task of financing preparations for the Yom Kippur war had been mostly shouldered by civilians. More capital, known as deficit financing, was printed to fund public spending (Al-Naggar, 2014).

Egypt's defence and war planning were domestically dependent upon public resolve to go to war at all costs to win against Israel. Government allocated around 5.5% of GDP annually during 1960-1965 to war spending. After the defeat in 1967, expenditure rose up to 21.5% as the country's army was enhancing its capabilities for Yom Kippur war. Western countries restricted imports of Egyptian goods, and the country lost the option to borrow money from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Egypt became highly dependent on Soviet

funding of war preparations, which gradually escalated into a military debt of \$2 billion and a non-military debt of \$2.7 billion after the Yom Kippur war (Al-Naggar, 2014).

Sadat's decision to go to the war in 1973 had an immense effect on all facets of the Arab-Israeli dispute. With respect to military losses, it resulted in almost 15 000 human casualties for Egypt (Los Angeles Times, 1991). Arab coalition lost 2 300 tanks, from which 400 were confiscated by Israeli soldiers, accompanied by 334 aircrafts and 19 naval vessels (Rabinovich, 2007: 496-497). Egypt's economy was at the "zero stage". President Sadat knew that the country was not able to service the mounting debts. Devastated economic situation pushed Sadat to change the economic policy from socialist towards liberalized investment policy open to capital from Western countries. In 1974, Sadat opened Egypt to Western world by the new "Open Door Policy", that also helped to build a political alliance with the U.S. and prevent another escalation with Israel (Monson, 1984: 57-60).

2. 3. 2 Israel

In comparison to economic and military consequences of Egypt after 1967, Israel profited from the victorious outcome significantly. Israel began oil trading from the captured Sinai Peninsula, with the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, which had positive long-term effects on the domestic economy. Access to the Golan Heights enabled Israelis to build water channels from the Lake Jordan and the Sea of Galilee (Gawrych, 1996: 5). After the war, United Nations adopted UNSCR 242 and France imposed total arms embargo on Israel. France, as the main supplier of weapons for Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), did not support pre-emptive attacks and the outbreak of the 1967 war, and initiated a partial embargo already during the war. Israel turned to the U.S. for weapons and military equipment and started to increase its own military production (Schein, 2017: 656-657). "Over the period from 1968 to 1972, the real product of manufactured metal goods grew by 142% or 19% per year. In 1972 the electric and electronics industry produced 232% more than in 1967, an average annual increase of 27%" (Plessner, 1994: 18). This war had mostly positive economic outcomes for Israel, and the country exited the state of recession with a GDP increase of 15,4% in 1968, in comparison of only 1% increase in 1966 (Schein, 2017: 656).

Military losses were calculated to have reached 776 IDF soldiers (IDF, n.d.). In the upcoming years, Israel expanded its defence spending to 9-12% of the country's GDP. During the period of 1967-1972, the annual ratio increased up to 20% (Schein, 2017: 658). By 1973, more than half of defence spending was channelled towards the modernization of the air forces. The number of military aircrafts increased from 275 in 1967 to 432 in 1972, mostly thanks to

the U.S. supplies of 150 Skyhawks and 140 F-4 Phantoms (Gawrych, 1996: 7). Regardless of the flourishing economy in the period of 1967-1973, Israel was from its very establishment profoundly dependent upon Western funding. Israel's non-military debt rose up to \$6.792 billion. Official U.S. aid to Israel was estimated at around \$4.312 billion in the same period of time, including \$1.655 billion which were granted to the state (Al-Naggar, 2014).

However, Israel ended up in a very different situation after the outbreak of the Yom Kippur war. 2 671 IDF soldiers were killed and more than 7 500 wounded, causing a major psychological set back amongst the public (IDF, n.d.; Gawrych, 1996: 75). Nonetheless, Israel was militarily triumphant by the end of the war and retained control over much of the pre-war territories. However, the country's predominance came at a high expense as opposed to the outcomes of the 1967 war. The daily war expenditure rose up to \$238 million and in total cost approximately 2/3 of Israel's GNP in 1973 (Schein, 2017: 657). Israeli army lost 804 tanks and 114 aircrafts were destroyed (Orme, 1996: 121). The damage of military equipment and the suspension of production and exports, due to the mobilization, cost Israel nearly \$7 billion (Chapin, 1988). Nevertheless, the war pushed Israeli government to invest even further into defence spending (Schein, 2017: 658). The balance of payment deficit increased from \$1 billion before the war to \$3-4 billion afterwards. The U.S. government committed \$2-3 billion in annual financial aid to Israel in the following 5 years, and Israel became even more dependent on the U.S. aid than in previous period (Crittenden, 1979: 1007).

Yom Kippur war formed not only the unpleasant economic situation, but most importantly military "hurting stalemate" after the international cease-fire with no unilateral victory. The people of Israel protested the unpreparedness of the government and the army due to the intelligence failures. Israel was prevented to make any military progress in the Suez and, with the infeasibility of the winning, had to agree on the negotiation process of the conflict (Pruitt, 2005: 9). The policy makers needed to formulate appropriate measures that could protect them from the more severe effects of the war, on the national and also international level. As a result of the post-war disturbances the Prime Minister Golda Meir and Minister of Defence Moshe Dayan stepped down in April 1974 (Stein, 1999: 157).

Estimated numbers of casualties of the wars:

1967

Table no. 4 – Combat readiness

Belligerents	Number of Troops	Tanks	Aircrafts
Israel	250 000	1 000	275
Arab Coalition	300 000	2 000	500

(Source: Gawrych, 1996: 3)

Table no. 5 – War Casualties

Belligerents	Killed	Wounded
Israel	776*	2 811***
Egypt	11 500**	(undefined)
Jordan	700**	6 000**
Syria	1 000***	(undefined)

(Sources: * Lorch, n.d.; ** Gawrych, 1996: 3; *** Los Angeles Times, 1991)

1973

Table no. 6 – Combat readiness

Belligerents	Number of Troops	Tanks	Aircraft	Naval vessels
Israel	375 000*	2 100**	358**	37**
Arab Coalition	650 000*	4 350**	498**	137**

(Sources: * Rabinovich, 2007: 54; ** IDF, n.d.)

Table no. 7 – War Casualties

Belligerents	Killed	Wounded
Israel	2 691*	7 500**
Egypt	15 000***	30 000***
Syria	3 500***	21 000***

(Sources: * IDF, n.d.; ** Gawrych, 1996: 75; *** Los Angeles Times, 1991)

2. 4 Political transformation of Egypt

To understand Egypt's foreign policy elements, one has to focus on its leadership, national interests and country's geography (Chen, 2011). The vital political change occurred when Anwar Sadat was appointed as the new Egyptian President after the death of Gamal Nasser. Nasser's regime was closely associated with the radical nationalism and the restoration of Arab-Islamic identity after the years of Western imperialism by the establishment of "Non-Aligned Movement" (Chapin, 1990). After the World War II, Egypt became subject of a contest between the two superpowers. The U.S. wanted to include Egypt in its defensive strategy to contain the Soviet Union by funding the Aswan Dam and providing economic aid to the country. Nonetheless, the U.S. aid was provided slowly and insufficiently (Rubin, 1982: 74). The relations between the two states deteriorated even more after Nasser had recognized the Communist China (Rubin, 1982: 87-88).

After the Suez crisis, Egypt strengthened its role of the principal defender of Arab nationalism and pan-Arabism (Voinea, 2011). However, the favourable relations between the U.S. and Egypt did not last longer because of the U.S. support of Israel in the Six Day War. Meanwhile, Egypt's government strengthened its diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union that helped finance post-war military replacements and preparations for possibly renewed hostilities. Egypt became a symbol of influence of the Soviet Union in the Middle East (Al-Naggar, 2014).

In 1967, Nasser accepted the UNSCR 242. This was the first time, that Arab countries were willing to officially recognize the existence of Israel. However, Israel stayed present on the occupied territories. Nasser wanted to begin negotiations with the U.S. to withdraw Israel from its territory as it happened in 1957. He did not believe in sole diplomatic solution in case of the Sinai and simultaneously launched the "War of attrition" (Chapin, 1990).

Nixon administration signed the U.S. Secretary of State Rogers in 1969 to curtail the hostilities between Egypt and Israel. He initiated the so-called Rogers Plan, which was predominantly based on the UNSCR 242. Delegates of Israel and Egypt agreed to meet the UN Representative Gunnar Jarring to discuss the cease-fire conditions (Pemberton, 2016: 13-16). The cease-fire was signed on August 7th 1970, but lasted only a few weeks (Gawrych, 1996: 9).

The change in the belligerent's leadership is one of the crucial independent variables in the ripeness theory and also in the very progress of the Israel-Egypt conflict. The new leader should be able to initiate new strategies and provide concessions to the opposing party in which

might help to find the "way out" of the conflict (Stedman, 1991). In general, the presidency of Anwar Sadat shifted the foreign policy of Egypt significantly towards the U.S. diplomacy (Chapin, 1990). Sadat's policy was mostly dedicated to come out of the "hurting stalemate".

In February 1971, after the unsuccessful cease-fire, Rogers called for negotiations with the UN Representative Jarring, Golda Meir and Anwar Sadat to find an acceptable compromise (Pemberton, 2016: 23-24). Sadat proposed the re-opening of the Suez Canal for Israeli shipping in return for the occupied Sinai (Meek, 2016: 36-37). His "New Egyptian initiative" captured the attention of the U.S. who noticed that new leadership significantly deviated from the old regime. Sadat conveyed his readiness to conclude an agreement with Israel. However, the then National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger secretly supported Israel in maintaining the territories. Israel then, with the notion of the U.S. blessing, refused the conditions of the cease-fire and rejected the Rogers Plan. Internal discrepancies between Rogers and Kissinger caused incoherent U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East (Pemberton, 2016: 23-24).

Egypt's need for military recovery persuaded Sadat to sign the Soviet-Egyptian "Treaty of Friendship" in May 1971. However, Sadat was convinced, that only the U.S. were diplomatically capable of resolving the dispute with Israel. Increasing political-military dilemma made Egypt's sympathy towards the Soviet Union diminish. Only one year after the signing of the "Treaty of Friendship", Sadat expelled more than 20 000 Soviet technicians to reinforce the alliance with the United States (Meek, 2016: 39-40). The expulsion persuaded the U.S. and Israel to believe that Egypt was not strong enough and willing to initiate another war (Pemberton, 2016: 45).

Nonetheless, after the rejection of two peace proposals and no political engagement of the U.S. after the expulsion of the Soviets, Egypt did not see any other option than to gain its territories back militarily once again (Kelly, 2008: 18). Sadat's tactic succeeded in a triumphant crossing of the Bar-Lev Line in Sinai in a surprise attack of 1973. Meanwhile, the U.S. pledged to increase their arms supplies and again helped Israel into an advantageous position (Pemberton, 2016: 40). Sadat had visited Saudi Arabia and other members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), to solicit their support in the upcoming war by using "oil weapon" on the U.S. in case of the Israeli support. If implemented, the prices of oil would rise up to 70% and the oil production would reduce by 5% every month of the Israeli occupation of Arab territories (Garavani, 2011: 474). There were only two possible situations that could have happened. The oil embargo could have either forced the U.S. to intervene in the war because of the Arab destruction (economic and military) or to become a mediator to achieve

concessions for the permanent cease-fire (Lesch, 2008: 245). After the 1973 war, the stalemate was destroying all involved states of the conflict. Egypt had no options other than to rely on the United States and their diplomatic intervention (Pemberton, 2016: 44-45).

2. 5 The U.S. mediation and finding a "way out"

Important aspect of the ripeness theory is a role of mediator who may present substantial proposals to the opposing parties and subsequently develop a "sense of way out" from a mutual conflict (Cantenkin, 2016: 419). As it was explained earlier in this chapter, peace-keeping initiatives between Israel and Egypt may be traced back to the adoption of the UNSCR 242 in 1967, which Israel fully ignored (Kelly, 2008: 17). The United States, and particularly Henry Kissinger, failed to bring about the Israeli-Egyptian peace during the pre-1973-war period as well (Pemberton, 2016: 23-24). In fact, not only did the U.S. not avert the war, it also catalysed its occurrence. Egypt discarded finding the "way out" of its hurting situation diplomatically. Sadat launched the war and prepared the oil embargo, after he had learned that the U.S. had little genuine interest in forcing Israel to withdraw from the Sinai (Pemberton, 2016: 44-45).

2. 5. 1 Henry Kissinger

The U.S. administration after the Yom Kippur war aimed to pursue three main goals. Firstly, they needed a foreign engagement to distract the public from Nixon's Watergate affair. Secondly, the U.S. had to stop the Soviet influence and arms race in the Middle East and thirdly, the U.S. mediation in the Arab-Israeli conflict would have helped in the lifting of the Arab oil embargo which was damaging the U.S. economy (Quandt, 2005: 130-131).

Henry Kissinger, as the newly appointed U.S. State Secretary, decided to co-operate with the Soviet Union to put an end to the Yom Kippur war. Both superpowers agreed on the immediate cease-fire and implementation of the UNSCR 242 (Gawrych, 1996: 69-71). On October 22nd 1973, the UN Security Council, based on the U.S.-Soviet proposal, adopted the resolution 338 (UNSCR 338) and neither side scored a decisive victory (Sheehan, 1996: 13).

Therefore, Israel reinforced their position in the Suez City and encircled the Egyptian Third Army, isolating them from the supplies. In the meantime, the UN Security Council passed the resolution 340 (UNSCR 340) with the urgent need of the cease-fire, return of the positions to October 22nd lines, presence of the UN peace-keeping observers and implementation of the UNSCR 338 (Quandt, 2005: 124). Regardless of international pressure, Israel used its military

presence to constrain Egypt to release war prisoners and to end the blockade of Bab al-Mandab Strait (Quandt, 2005: 135).

Kissinger's approach after the internationally implemented cease-fire was to personally engage in the negotiation process to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. He began the first round of the so-called "shuttle diplomacy" to Egypt. Kissinger used his persuasive tactics to explain to Sadat the reality, that it was too soon for the Israeli withdrawal to October 22nd lines (Sheehan, 1996: 16). Sadat expressed a strong preference for peace and accepted Kissinger's argument to solve primarily the problem of the Third Army (Quandt, 2005: 136-138). Sadat knew that the active role of the U.S. is crucial due to their "patron-client" relations with Israel (Stein, 1985: 332). On November 9th, a new cease-fire plan was adopted and war prisoners were released. Israel and Egypt signed the "six-point agreement" on November 11th on the crucial road to Cairo known as Kilometer 101. The agreement also removed the imminent risk of renewed fighting (Safty, 1991: 287).

The "six-point agreement" represented the first mediated assistance of the U.S. in Arab-Israeli conflict and convinced both parties that the "way out" was possible. The agreement was officially submitted by the Israeli Prime Minister Meir. Kissinger's manipulative tactic of presenting the substantial proposal as his own to "make it more palatable" was successful (Hopmann and Druckman, 1981: 215). In despite of that, Kissinger needed to gain Sadat's trust to build a commitment for the continuation of the mediation process (Mandell and Tomlin, 1991: 48).

The U.S. foreign policy under President Nixon focused on avoiding any diplomatic steps that would have provided a final settlement in the Middle East (Stein, 1999: 117). Kissinger was aware, that the comprehensive peace agreement was not ripe at that time. Otherwise, the administration highly supported the narrative of "secured borders" for Israel (Bakke and Waage, 2018: 550). To sustain effective role of the U.S., Kissinger pursued the step-by-step policy to prevent negotiations from freezing (Brams, 2003: 92). Most importantly, he hoped to reach the consensus on the Israeli-Egyptian disengagement of forces (Mandell and Tomlin, 1991: 48).

The U.S. together with the Soviet Union hosted the Geneva Conference on December 31th, under the auspices of the UN (Knesset, 2008). The multilateral conference, which aimed to bring about a comprehensive Middle East agreement, did not produce any further results due to the absence of Syria and sole Palestinian representation (Spiegel, 1985: 272-273). Nevertheless, Kissinger enforced the role of the U.S. as the head of the peace mediation of the

Arab-Israeli conflict. He promoted the step-by-step policy and, with the support of the UN, military working groups were formed to supervise the disengagements (Stein, 1999: 145).

Kissinger now faced the challenge of concluding the disengagement agreements on the Israeli-Egyptian front. Israel was suffering from an economic crisis due to the ongoing mobilization and possibility of renewed attacks with Syria. Sadat was nervous about saving the Third Army and pushed by the public hoping to see the war helped reclaim Egypt its lost territory (Spiegel, 1985: 273). He began to trust Kissinger, who promised him that none of the sides would get military advantage. Before the Geneva Conference, Kissinger flew to Israel to discuss the conditions with Golda Meir, who proposed limited Egyptian force on the eastern side of the Suez Canal. Egypt demanded full withdrawal of Israeli forces accompanied by the strategic Mitla and Gidi passes, and hesitated on the extent of force limitation (Quandt, 2005: 141-142). Kissinger purposely suggested to Meir and Dayan to slow down the pace of the negotiations with Egypt, thereby to mitigate Sadat's conditions (Spiegel, 1985: 271).

On January 4th 1974, Kissinger met Dayan in Washington who proposed to him a "five-zone" concept for disengagement, which included the UN buffer zone between armies, the number and the type of limitation of forces. Dayan accepted the Israeli withdrawal from the east of the Suez Canal but without the strategic passes. Few days later, Sadat accepted Dayan's proposal and rushed Kissinger to conclude the disengagement (Quandt, 2005: 142-143). Israelis made a map of how the disengagement would look like. However, Sadat was rather reluctant about the extent of the force limitation, so Kissinger suggested to define them further in a separate document exchanged between President Nixon and him. After days of the shuttle, on January 18th, the first disengagement agreement was signed at Kilometer 101, known as Sinai I (Sheehan, 1976: 32-34). President Nixon then sent several more documents to both Sadat and Meir dealing with partial amendments. By signing them, both sides guaranteed the fulfilment of their obligations to the U.S. and not to one another (Sachar, 1998: 600-601). Kissinger's bargaining tactic of pressure was successful and the agreement was reached, mostly based on the Israeli demands (Quandt, 2005: 143).

After the election of the new U.S President Gerald Ford, Kissinger remained the key person in the U.S. foreign policy and continued with his shuttle diplomacy. In Israel, after the resignation of the former Prime Minister Meir, Yitzak Rabin was appointed as the new Prime Minister. During Rabin's first visit to Washington, he demonstrated willingness to make constructive steps with Egypt (Bakke and Waage, 2018: 558).

In March 1975, Kissinger came back to the Middle East to negotiate the conditions for the second Israeli-Egyptian disengagement. He knew, that his step-by-step strategy had to continue, otherwise his credibility would be lost (Mandell and Tomlin, 1991: 49). However, this shuttle ended up with the impasse in the negotiation process (Quandt, 2005: 163). Egypt demanded the Israeli withdrawal from the Mitla and Gidi passes and from the occupied oil fields (Stein, 1999: 173). Sadat suggested to make the second disengagement based on military concessions, not political. On the other hand, Israel wanted to separate Egypt from the rest of the Arab world and demanded the state of non-belligerency. Sadat rejected the formulation of non-belligerency and proposed to use "non-use of force" (Safty, 1991: 287). It was evident, that the mistrust between the two countries was still prevailing and that the moment was not ripe for any further settlement (Quandt, 2005: 164).

Ford's administration announced a "reassessment of the U.S. policy toward the Middle East" to pressure Israel to make concessions (Quandt, 2005: 164). President Ford blamed the Israeli government for the non-cooperation in negotiations and suspended military and economic aid to Israel. Kissinger feared that the relations with Rabin were too divided and that the step-by-step policy was at its end. The collapse of the mediation process could have destroyed the positive image of the U.S. and the cease-fire between Israel and Egypt (Spiegel, 1985: 292-293).

Kissinger leaving the Middle East pushed both parties to re-evaluate possible costs of the conflict stalemate (Mandell and Tomlin, 1991: 49). Sadat unexpectedly announced the opening of the Suez Canal on June 5th. In return, Israel withdrew its troops from the limited zone (Spiegel, 1985: 297). The Sinai II was signed in Geneva on September 4th 1975. The agreement provided the Israeli withdrawal to the east of the Gidi and Mitla passes. The passes did not fall directly to the Egyptians, but according to Kissinger's proposal, they became the UN-monitored buffer zone. The U.S. installed early-warning stations for an impending attack operated by U.S. technicians. Israel also withdrew from the oil fields, in return for a three-year agreement of "non-use of force". The compromise solution helped to bridge the mistrust of both parties, but at high expense of the U.S. as Kissinger promised the military supplies worth up to \$2.6 billion to Israel and multi-billion economic aid to Egypt (Isaacson, 1992: 635; Sullivan, 1996: 1). Kissinger also committed that the U.S. would not consult any future proposals with Arabs without the Israeli consent (Stein, 1985: 335).

Kissinger's power of persuasion as a mediator significantly influenced the negotiation procedures, the nature of the agreements and even the timing of the concessions that produced

the two instances of the disengagement of forces between Israel and Egypt. He gained trust from both parties and became agreeable and resourceful mediator who produced a condition of "wanting a way out" of the conflict. He was prone to use any tactics that at the time seemed useful to yield concessions. However, Kissinger acted mostly as the "engineer" of the agreements (Brams, 2003: 92-93). Even though he was able to conclude only partial agreements, the opposing parties continued in the negotiation process in order to find a proper "way out" and achieve a final conflict resolution when the time was ripe.

2. 5. 2 Jimmy Carter

Jimmy Carter was elected in the 1977 as the new democratic U.S. president. Unlike the previous two republican leaders, he decided to pursue a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East. Carter became the first U.S. president, who took the Palestinian issue very seriously. He believed that the Palestinian question constituted as essential of the Arab-Israeli conflict and that they were entitled to have their own homeland (Bailey, 1990: 350-351). While previous administrations considered Egypt to be the key ally in the region and maintaining the Soviet influence as the main goal, Carter's administration focused on Saudi Arabia and energy security (Spiegel, 1985: 315- 322).

President Carter heavily relied on the U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. Brzezinski and other senior advisors of the President were associated with the Brookings Institution. The think-tank's expertise was sought to prepare the recommendations for the future peace deal in the Middle East. The Brookings report suggested Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders, with possible minor territorial adjustments, in return for the peace agreement with the neighbouring countries. The report also recommended Palestinian self-determination in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and an option of creating independent Palestinian state (Mahmood, 1985: 63-64).

In 1977, elections were held in Israel. Menachem Begin, the chairman of the right-wing Likud party, became the new Prime Minister. He was known as the "hawk" and called for the permanent detention of the West Bank. Both the U.S. and Egypt feared that the new Israeli administration would have made the peace process completely inconceivable (Spiegel, 1985: 334-336). Israel continued to build settlements in the occupied territories despite international pressure (Bailey, 1990: 351). However, Begin was prepared to make limited territorial concessions to preserve peace in the Middle East (Bar-Siman-Tov, 1994: 23-24).

A major turning point in the U.S. foreign policy came with the announcement of the renewed Geneva Conference, co-chaired by the Soviets. Israel and Egypt were displeased with

the presence of the Soviet Union and the unified Arab delegation (Safty, 1991: 290). Israel mostly feared the pressure from the Soviet Union and Syria to support the sole PLO representation and its political goals. Sadat wished to reclaim the whole Sinai back, but feared that the unified Arab delegation would have made the political stalemate in the negotiation process with Israel. The U.S. administration believed that the joint conference with the Soviets would push Syrians and Palestinian to make greater concessions (Spiegel, 1985: 338-340).

The stagnating mediation process pushed Sadat to enter into the bilateral talks with Israel. The urgency of negotiations was needed due to worsening Egyptian domestic situation accompanied by riots, strikes and growing political opposition. Israel was dealing with an increasing economic crisis. Moshe Dayan secretly met with Hassan Tuhami, the Deputy Prime Minister of Egypt, in Morocco to negotiate the conditions for bilateral peace agreement (Gross Stein, 1989: 413-415). Even though the meeting did not conclude with agreeing on a final set of terms and principles, Tuhami reported Sadat about Israeli willingness to return the whole Sinai for the permanent peace (Sachar, 1998: 637). However, Egypt's demands did not include Palestinian self-determination (Safty, 1991: 291).

With no further progress in months, Sadat decided to take unprecedented measures and visit Jerusalem, as the first Arab leader ever. He was convinced, that the gesture would bring the final deal. After receiving the official invitation, Sadat landed in Israel on November 19th 1977. The next day, he spoke to the Israeli Knesset about the importance of a multilateral peace between Israel and Arab neighbours and affirmed the peace-for-land concept. Late private conversations with Begin did not reach any progress in the negotiations (Spiegel, 1985: 340). Greig (2001) argues, that this unilateral act created an incentive for the U.S. to perceive a ripe moment for launching Camp David process.

Sadat realized that the bilateral negotiations fell apart on major issues. In December 1977, he invited the U.S., the Soviet Union, the Arab states and Israel to a conference in Cairo. The Soviet Union with the Arab states boycotted the conference. The Israeli delegation rejected a proposal for the full withdrawal from the occupied territories in return of the permanent peace (Mahmood, 1985: 71). The U.S. stood only as an observer of negotiations and did not engage with any mediation tactics to produce the final agreement (Gross Stein, 1989: 411). Begin then visited Ismailia to offer Sadat a separate peace proposal that was still very limited and unacceptable. Israeli settlements would have remained and Israel would have taken control under the strategic airports on the Sinai. Palestinians would have limited autonomy but without an option of "Palestinian citizenship" (Sachar, 1998: 640). After the visit, Israeli government

approved to build four new settlements in the Sinai to push Sadat to agree on their proposal. The plan counted on the "great concession" of dismantling them after achieving the deal (Safty, 1991: 294).

Sadat's regime was weak and there was no other option left than to ask Carter to actively engage in the peace negotiations (Mahmood, 1985: 72). The bilateral period of negotiations showed the pivotal minima that was needed for settling the peace deal between the states. The U.S. abandoned the idea of a comprehensive resolution and focused on Israel and Egypt, with the possibility of reaching interim agreement on the Palestinian issue (Gross Stein, 1989: 424-426). In the following months, the U.S. administration launched a strong public campaign to pressure Israel to make concessions. Carter promised Sadat that he would get directly involved in the negotiations and defend Egyptian position on the UNSCR 242 and illegitimacy of the Israeli settlements (Mahmood, 1985: 73). Nonetheless, Begin rejected Carter's "nine-point proposal" and the U.S.-Egyptian strategy did not manage to persuade Israel to settle (Quandt, 2005: 195-197)

Carter invited the Israeli and Egyptian Foreign Ministers to a conference in the Leeds Castle in July 1978, where Dayan once again rejected the full Israeli withdrawal based on the UNSCR 242. He suggested to make a final deal on the West Bank after the interim period of 4-5 years. The conference had produced an informal, mutual understanding about the crucial aspects of the agreement (Stein, 1999: 250). However, Sadat was not satisfied with the limited progress in Leeds and threatened Israel to expel the UNEF mission from the Sinai and renew violence after the expiration of "non-use of force" in the Sinai II (Spiegel, 1985: 350). Egypt was also pressured by Saudi Arabia to cancel the negotiations or to be boycotted (Stein, 1999: 247). Sadat rejected the invitation for the discussion with Israel and the U.S. and publicly labelled Begin "the only obstacle" in the peace settlement (Spiegel, 1985: 352). In the meantime, Begin faced the public and political pressure from the peace supporters organizing massive demonstrations (Gross Stein, 1989: 434).

The increasing "mutually hurting stalemate" of both states persuaded Carter that the peace settlement could be achieved. He set up a secret planning group under Vance to develop a U.S. proposal and suggested to convene a summit with Sadat and Begin personally. The U.S. government feared another Middle East war with worse consequences than in 1973. Carter considered an open-ended summit as the last option to force both sides to conclude the peace agreement. Both Begin and Sadat accepted an invitation to Camp David (Quandt, 2005: 197). They were ready to make compromises on the Palestinian issue (Stein, 1999: 251). None of the

three leaders could afford to fail on the summit, mostly because of the domestic turmoil. The U.S. was experiencing high levels of unemployment, inflation and rising energy prices. Israel's economy also suffered from inflation, rising up to 35 % (Wright, 2013: 51). The IMF did not approve further investments to Egypt because of its budget deficit. The perception of the "way out" pushed Carter and Sadat to limit the agenda to facilitate the peace agreement with Begin. The uncertainty of not reaching agreement prevailed from the beginning of the summit, but due to Carter's mediation strategy and economic inducements towards both states, Camp David Summit perceived as the "ripe moment" for the Israeli-Egyptian conflict resolution (Gross Stein, 1999: 38-39).

This chapter applied the theory of ripeness to explain the Israeli-Egyptian conflict resolution process between 1967 and 1978. The theory's first condition, reaching a "mutually hurting stalemate", was perceived by Egypt and Israel only after the Yom Kippur war in 1973, when both parties reached a point when none of them could unilaterally win the war. The devastating economic and military casualties pushed both parties to accept the engagement of a mediator, as both parties were finding a "way out", as described by Zartman's theory. As a result, a window of opportunity for a third-party mediator to give the parties an idea of a "way out" was created. However, mediation led by Henry Kissinger delivered only two partial agreements that did manage the dispute, but did not resolve it. As Zartman emphasizes, a change in the Egyptian leadership and the following shift in the country's foreign policy helped the process of finding a "way out" of the conflict. The "ripe moment" for the conflict resolution came during the 1978 Camp David Summit, mediated by Jimmy Carter. The next chapter will analyse the mediation process of 1978 and 1979, where the emergence of the final proposal was reached to resolve this protracted conflict. The umbrella theory of third-party mediation will be drawn on to examine the mediator's strategies, potential biases and leverage that helped in developing the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty in 1979.

3. Mediating the first Arab-Israeli peace treaty

3.1 Mediation during the Camp David Summit

The summit at Camp David, the U.S. presidential summer retreat, was held on September 5th 1978 and lasted for thirteen days (Quandt, 2005: 198-199). As it was explained in the previous chapter, President Carter primarily aimed to convene the summit to save the negotiation process between Israel and Egypt and to design an agreeable framework for a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. The period between Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November 1977, and the invitation to Camp David did set the limitation of the agenda for reaching the peace agreement, but there were still major issues to be deal with.

The Camp David Summit procedural aspects were under the control of President Carter. The neutral setting of the presidential retreat enabled a reduction in leaking of information to the public and allowed him to maintain a control over the negotiation process (Karčić, 2017: 2). Given the summit's open-ended format, no formal schedule of the negotiations was settled. The press was banned from the summit's site and the only information they could have received was through an authorized press person, specifically from the White House spokesperson Jody Powell. Carter also proposed an informal dress code and various leisure time activities during the conference to build trust and ease tensions between the delegations (Spiegel, 1985: 353).

The U.S. foreign policy team prepared a few preliminary documents (so-called "briefing book") before the meeting at Camp David, as a possible framework for the peace agreement in case of mutual compromise between Israel and Egypt could have not been reached. The document encompassed the ideas of both parties discussed during months of pre-negotiations. The American proposal dealt mainly with the interim status of the West Bank and Gaza and the extent of Palestinian self-government over them. It also proposed the re-opening of the negotiation process after the interim period to settle the issues over their sovereignty, borders and Palestinian rights according to the UNSCR 242 (Quandt, 2016: 218-219). However, the proposal excluded the issue of the Sinai withdrawal due to the notion of overcoming any difficulties with its settlement (Quandt, 2016: 223).

The team of advisors, consisted of the Vice-President Walter Mondale, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Under Secretary of State Harold Saunders, National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, Middle East expert William Quandt, the U.S. Ambassadors to Israel and Egypt, Samuel Lewis and Herman Eilts and other state personnel, was also brought to the Camp

David Summit at the instigation of President Carter to support his leading mediation (Wright, 2014: 51).

On September 5th, the first delegation that arrived to the summit was from Egypt. The delegation included President Anwar Sadat, Deputy Prime Minister Hassan Tuhami, Foreign Minister Muhammad I. Kamel, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Boutros Boutros-Ghali and others. The Israeli delegation involved the Prime Minister Menachem Begin, Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan, Defence Minister Ezer Weizmann, Supreme Court Justice Aaron Barak and several other advisors (Hare and Naveh, 1984: 302-303).

The mediation process may be divided into four main phases according to the different approaches used by President Carter during thirteen days in Camp David:

Phase 1 – Tripartite meetings

Phase 2 – The American plan

Phase 3 – Sinai Stalemate

Phase 4 – Developing the final frameworks

3. 1. 1 Tripartite meetings

During the first days of the summit, Jimmy Carter mediated direct negotiations with Begin and Sadat who presented their proposals to each other and focused on the type of an intermediary Carter would play during the negotiation process. President Sadat required an active role of a mediator ("full partner") because he relied on the U.S.- Egyptian mutual strategy formed in the beginning of the year (Eisenberg and Caplan, 2010: 43). Nonetheless, Sadat aimed to prevent an American proposal to be put forward and present his own proposal. In case of Begin's rejection, Carter could have suggested a compromise framework according to the demands agreed by Sadat in advance (Telhami, 2001: 12).

On the other hand, Begin insisted on the limited role of a mediator and handed Carter a letter from the former President Gerald Ford, signed during the Sinai II negotiations, that committed the U.S. to consult any future proposal with Israel in advance. "Ford's pledge gave Begin a powerful veto over any proposal and compromised the American posture of being an impartial broker" (Wright, 2014: 60). Begin feared the U.S. pressure during the Camp David due to American-Egyptian partnership and suggested to produce two separate agreements, the most important one with the U.S. to strengthen their commitment and the one with Egypt (Carter, 1982: 366).

Despite the circumstances, President Carter in his memoirs wrote that he "saw no possibility of progress if the United States should withdraw and simply leave the negotiations to the Egyptians and the Israelis" (Carter, 1982: 367). He was convinced that the peace settlement at Camp David could have been reached and was prepared to use any forceful tactics to finalize an agreement (Carter, 1982: 337).

On September 6th, Carter oversaw the first tripartite meeting. Sadat presented his detailed proposal "Framework for a Comprehensive Peace" with very strict and traditional Arab positions. The proposal entailed: 1) Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories; 2) Dismantling of Israeli settlements; 3) Signing of Non-proliferation of the nuclear weapons; 4) Authority of Jordan and Egypt over the West Bank and Gaza during the transitional period (Recognition of Palestinian self-determination); 5) Return and Compensation of Palestinian refugees; 6) Israeli withdrawal from East Jerusalem; and 7) Repatriations for war casualties and oil from the Sinai (Bar-Siman-Tov, 1994: 117). In case of Israeli approval, Egypt would in exchange recognize the existence of Israel by signing the peace treaty and accept Israeli security and religious measures over Jerusalem (Quandt, 2016: 228- 229). Sadat eventually warned Carter, that his proposal aimed to push Begin to make wider concessions and handed him a list of possible modifications that would have been also agreeable for Egypt (Karčić, 2017: 8; Carter, 1982: 340).

According to Bercovitch (2003), Carter acted mostly as a *facilitator* during the first phase of the negotiation process and aimed to bring both parties together and to explore their demands (Karčić, 2017: 7). However, the third day generated a need for a new approach to the mediation. Even though, Begin did not present any new proposal, he denounced every point of the Egyptian framework. Israeli standpoint was still directed to the Autonomy plan proposed in Ismailia and Begin markedly rejected any removal of the settlements from the Sinai. The meeting changed into the outburst of accusations and anger (Wright, 2014: 77-78).

The collapse of the negotiations persuaded Carter that format of face-to-face negotiations between Sadat and Begin had to be transformed into the separate meetings (Hare and Naveh, 1984: 304). The U.S. delegation together with Carter suggested to develop an American framework to narrow the differences between the parties. Sadat and the Israeli advisory team, headed by Dayan and Weizmann, supported the idea (Bar-Siman-Tov, 1994: 119; Carter, 1982: 368).

3. 1. 2 The American plan

The first weekend of the Camp David Summit was directed to developing the central elements of the U.S. proposal. Carter participated in the drafting of the proposal as a formulator along with his team of Saunders, Quandt, Lewis and Eilts. They refined the preliminary document to be more realistic and moderate, so that it would help the heated situation in the Camp David (Spiegel, 1985: 355). Carter did not want to conflict with Sadat's basic principles, but needed to impress the Israeli delegation to approve it. The drafting team excluded the controversial issue of dismantling the Israeli settlements in the Sinai in its first version (Carter, 1982: 371).

The American proposal was divided into two main issues. The **first part** was dedicated to the elements of the future Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, specifically:

1. "an end to war;
2. permanent peace;
3. free transit by Israel through all international waterways;
4. secure and recognized borders;
5. a full range of normal relations between nations;
6. phased withdrawal by Israel from the Sinai;
7. demilitarization of that area;
8. monitoring stations to ensure compliance with this agreement;
9. termination of blockades and boycotts;
10. a procedure for settling future disputes and a three-month period to complete a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel" (Carter, 1982: 371).

The **second part** addressed the Palestinian question: "the extension of the principles to future agreements between Israel and its other neighbours; rapid granting of full autonomy to the Palestinians, followed by a five-year transition period for determining the permanent status of the West Bank and Gaza; withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the West Bank into specified security locations and a prompt settlement of the refugee problem"(Carter, 1982: 371).

The shift towards the bilateral agreement rather than comprehensive Middle East settlement was palpable. Henceforth, President Carter advocated that the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty became his prime concern and that the agreement about the West Bank and Gaza could have been reached parallelly (Quandt, 2016: 234).

The U.S. delegation presented the proposal firstly to the Israelis. Begin was frustrated mostly with the adjustments mentioned in the proposal: call for freezing the establishment of

Jewish settlements for the period of five years in the occupied territories, withdrawal from all territories occupied in 1967 "by war" as it was stated in the UNSCR 242 and thus recognition of the UNSCR 242 as the final status of the West Bank and Gaza (Dayan, 1981: 165-168). The Israeli delegation suggested to revise the American proposal with their propositions that Carter would agree on and present it to Sadat (Hare and Naveh, 1984: 306).

On the other day, the Israeli delegation handed the revised proposal to Carter and Vance. Some of the modifications were implemented into the draft and presented to Sadat (Spiegel, 1985: 356). However, the Egyptian delegation disagreed on the aspects according the Sinai arrangements, because it did not call for the immediate Israeli withdrawal and dismantling of the settlements. Israel should have returned the Sinai in the stages and removed settlements during the three-year period. Israel could have remained its control over the airfields in the Sinai for the same period of time (Boutros-Ghali, 1997: 141). Sadat was highly displeased with the proposal and threatened to leave Camp David (Spiegel, 1985: 356).

Carter came up with the idea to separate two main issues of the Sinai settlement and the status of West Bank/Gaza into two single frameworks (Spiegel, 1985: 356). Based on the Dayan's suggestion to negotiate one issue at the time, the step-by-step procedure emerged as the turning point of the summit and persuaded Sadat to stay in Camp David (Quandt, 2016: 237). Since then, President Carter engaged personally in the negotiations also with the members of advisory teams of both parties (Telhami, 2001: 19).

3. 1. 3 Sinai Stalemate

Following days predicted the failure of the mediation process and the end of the Camp David Summit. The Egyptian delegation was concerned with many aspects of the American proposal. Foreign Minister Kamel condemned the proposal because of its lack of amendments to the Palestinian issue. Others did not support the range of diplomatic relations with Israel in the future, specifically the establishment of the embassies and exchange of the diplomats. On the other hand, Sadat was inclined to accept the U.S. proposal but feared the negative reaction and its consequences from other Arab States, mainly Saudi Arabia (Telhami, 2001: 20-21).

Carter established a special team of the Egyptian advisor Osama el-Baz and the Israeli advisor Aaron Barak as both of them were lawyers and capable of rephrasing the general framework to bring the mutual understanding. The drafts were "shuttling" back and forth to the delegations (Hare and Naveh, 1985: 130-133). However, the ongoing negotiations were stuck on the Sinai settlements. The Israeli delegation agreed with the general references of the UNSCR 242 but persistently opposed any adjustments on dismantling of the settlements. They

preferred the status quo of the West Bank and Gaza which caused unavoidable deadlock of the conference (Carter, 1982: 387-390)

After eleven days in Camp David, Carter admitted that the negotiations might end without an agreeable conclusion. President suspended any media reports to be published and wrote a joint statement that called for the *termination* of the conference (Telhami, 2001: 21). All three mediating parties were exposed with high pressure. Israeli and Egyptian primary goal of the summit was to strengthen their diplomatic relations with the U.S. Carter utilized the special relationship with both leaders to present them possible consequences of not reaching an agreement (Karčić, 2017: 8-9).

He expressed his decision to blame Israel for disrupting the negotiations in the U.S. Congress speech because of their unwillingness to come to a compromise on the Sinai settlements in exchange for the peace treaty with its long-lasting adversary. Carter repeatedly coerced Begin to make compromise by the *threats of withholding* the U.S. political, economic and military aid (Bar-Siman-Tov, 1998: 251). However, this move would be "politically painful for the president" (Telhami, 2001: 24).

Nevertheless, seeing the Egyptian delegation packing, Carter adopted coercive tactics also on Sadat and blamed him for "unilaterally" breaking the negotiations should he had left the conference. Sadat's reputation and the unprecedented visit to Jerusalem would suffer high political ramifications in the Arab world without any settlement on the future of the West Bank and Gaza. President also threatened Sadat with *freezing* the American-Egyptian relations (Carter, 1982: 392; Telhami, 1999: 382).

After all, Carter was personally confronted with the domestic and foreign political failure that might prevent him from the presidential re-election (Oakman, 2002: 5). He promised Sadat, that if he would stay and conclude the peace treaty with Israel there would be better conditions to continue negotiating on the wider issues during his second presidential term (Mahmood, 1985: 77-78). Accordingly, Carter's *directive strategy* of explaining the costs and benefits to the parties was bolstered by the leverage of the U.S. to finalize the Israeli-Egyptian peace framework.

3. 1. 4 Developing the final framework

Carter's *coercive power* was a successful tool that persuaded both parties to continue with the negotiation process for another two days. However, the negotiations were conducted predominantly between the Israeli delegation and Carter due to the need of their concessions on two remaining key issues of the Sinai settlements and Palestinian question (Telhami, 2001:

23). Sadat did not attend any of the meetings, but put the future of peace agreements in the hands of the U.S. President (Siniver, 2006: 819).

Weizmann delivered Carter information that they were willing to withdraw from the two airfields in the Sinai in exchange for new air bases funded by the U.S. government in the Negev Dessert. However, the withdrawal would start after their construction was finished (Bar-Siman-Tov, 1994: 126). The proposal was accepted and Carter committed to provide \$3 billion to establish Israeli air bases (Bar-Siman-Tov, 1998: 251). President promised *side-payments* to Israel as the U.S. "vast economic and military resources help to change the calculus of benefit and risk for the parties to the conflict by making bilateral commitments to them" (Quandt, 1986: 359).

However, the issue of the Sinai settlements still remained unresolved. The Israeli delegation was inclined to support the dismantling of the settlements but Begin still hesitated. Weizmann suggested to consult the issue with the "architect of Israeli settlement program" Ariel Sharon who assured Begin that the evacuation of settlements did not increase any danger to the security of Israel (Wright, 2014: 197). Begin accepted the withdrawals from the airfields and made a deal with Carter that within two weeks he would conduct a voting in the Israeli parliament to decide the outcome of the settlements (Bar-Siman-Tov, 1994: 128; Schindler, 2013: 161).

The final negotiations focused on the last key issue of the West Bank and Gaza. The U.S. delegation modified a preliminary document that now consisted of three stages. The first stage was directed to the general principles including the establishment of Palestinian governance and the termination of the Israeli military authority over the territories. Secondly, the draft proposed transitional period over the occupied territories and involvement of Jordan in further negotiations. Lastly, it suggested that the transitional period would last three years and the negotiation process would include representatives of Palestine, Egypt, Jordan and Israel to settle the final status of the territories. The whole interim period would be concluded in no more than five years based on the UNSCR 242 (Quandt, 2016: 250-251).

After the Israeli repeated disapproval, Vance with Aaron Barak re-wrote the formulation of the proposal that stood on the vague language and no timetable for the final resolution of the Palestinian issue. They suggested to divide the last stage of the U.S. draft into two separate sets of negotiations, first one dealing with the peace agreement between Israel and Jordan and second one between Israel and Palestinian representatives about the West Bank and Gaza. The U.S. delegation also agreed on the re-formulation of the UNSCR 242 principles to be

implemented only to the "negotiations" and not to the "results of the negotiations" (Quandt, 2005: 202). Carter together with Sadat required to suspend the Israeli settlement building indefinitely because of its illegality and possibility of providing an obstacle during transitional period. As Carter recalled, he thought that Begin accepted their demand in its full extent but later Begin argued that he only accepted the suspension for the three-month period until Israeli-Egyptian negotiation process would be finalized (Shindler, 2013: 162). However, the resolution of this issue came after the Camp David Summit was dismissed and was not included in the final framework (Telhami, 2001: 27).

During the last day of conference, Sadat was convinced by Carter that the final framework was acceptable for making a peace with Israel (Spiegel, 1985: 361). Nevertheless, there was a need to mediate another obstacle produced by the Israeli delegation about the Arab authority over East Jerusalem. Israelis referred to Jerusalem as to a "unified city" and the U.S. delegation had to promptly revise the paragraph to meet their demands or they would leave the conference. As Carter and Sadat conceded, the main text of the agreement would not include an explicit reference to Jerusalem and the individual positions on the issue would be attached to it separately (Telhami, 2001: 28).

3. 1. 5 Summary of the Camp David Summit

After thirteen turbulent days of mediation, Israel and Egypt managed to develop the Camp David Accords on September 17th and signed them in the White House (Wright, 2014: 219). To summarize, twenty-three revisions on the Palestinian issue and eight on the Israeli-Egyptian framework for peace were submitted under Carter's control (Stein, 1985: 241). The Camp David Accords contained two separate documents and a preamble. The preamble involved the adaptation of the UNSCR 242 calling for the Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories captured during the Six-day war in 1967. Despite that, the formulation complied with the Israeli conditions, stating that "future negotiations between Israel and any neighbour prepared to negotiate peace and security with it are necessary for the purpose of carrying out all the provisions and principles of Resolutions 242 and 338" (MFA IL, n.d.).

The first document of the Camp David Accords – **The framework for Peace in the Middle East** – included the mutual agreements on the future of the West Bank and Gaza. The framework called for "elected self-governing authority" to be followed by an interim period of five years over the occupied territories (MFA IL, n. d.). During that period, the security was to be operated by: 1) Israeli forces over the West Bank and Gaza until its withdrawal to "specified security locations"; 2) "strong local police force" including Jordanians; and 3) border controls

provided by Israelis and Jordanians (MFA IL, n. d.; Spiegel, 1985: 360). However, the general statements were not precisely defined with the ultimate conditions, thus providing an opportunity to various interpretations (Quandt, 2016: 262). There was neither the schedule for the Israeli withdrawal from the territories, nor for the establishment of Palestinian authority. The document outlined the need for further negotiations about the sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza and without any violation of the agreement enabled the status quo to remain (Shindler, 2013: 161; Stein, 1999: 253-254). Therefore, the Palestinian rights were not secured and the problem of refugees remained unsettled. The Jerusalem issue was mentioned only in the appended letters to the Accords as they did not express any legal commitment (Dayan, 1981: 177-178).

The second document – **Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel** – required the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai including the airfields and the evacuation of more than 4 500 settlers within the three-year period (Dayan, 1981: 180). Israel would be officially recognized by Egypt and the full diplomatic and commercial relations between the two countries would be established. The document also insisted on the demilitarization of the Sinai and appointed the UN forces to monitor its process and to prevent potential aggression. The limitation and deployment of the forces was also specified in the framework and early warning stations were allowed. The parties set a three-month period to sign a peace treaty (MFA IL, n. d.).

The Camp David Accords would not be broker without the mediation of Jimmy Carter. Nevertheless, Carter represented the U.S. government with a bias of patron-client relationship with Israel, he did not favour any party to the conflict during the negotiation process. It might be seen that Israel was in charge of repeatedly redrafting of the proposals, but the final frameworks visibly represented major concessions on both sides. Egypt demanded wider arrangements on the Palestinian question to satisfy the Arab states and Israel was forced to accept "peace for land". To reach the signing of the final framework, Carter used the U.S. leverage to pressure and reward Israel to make appropriate concessions to meet at least Sadat's basic principles. On the other hand, he also forced Sadat to stay in the summit by threatening to cancel the U.S.-Egyptian diplomatic relations. To conclude, Carter fulfilled Moore's (1996) definition of an ultimate *impartial mediator*. Sadat gained the authority over the whole Sinai and Begin secured its demilitarization and the future peace treaty with the first Arab country.

3. 2 Post-Camp David mediation and ratification of a peace treaty

The Camp David Accords did not represent a final peace agreement because their validity was conditional upon the approval of the Israeli parliament and the ratification by the Egyptian parliament (Dayan, 1981: 179-178). After Begin arrived back to Israel, he initiated voting on September 27th about the dismantling the Israeli settlements. The majority of the Knesset (84 members) supported the Accords, 19 voted against and 17 abstained. Despite of that, Begin's party Herut was greatly divided about the withdrawals, and only 57% voted for its implementation (Bar-Siman-Tov, 1994: 147; Shindler, 2013: 163). Due to the overall positive outcome of the Israeli voting, the U.S. Secretary of Defence Brown prepared a letter of commitment promising U.S. funding of the airfields in the Negev Desert. Carter hoped that the negotiation process would continue as soon as it was possible to settle the details of the final treaty (Quandt, 2005: 209).

The U.S. team decided to continue with the Camp David procedure of the central American proposal with a possibility of revisions from both parties. However, these negotiations differed in their form and the selection of delegates. During the first phase of the negotiation process, President Carter could not be actively involved due to the urgency of other foreign policy issues, such as the SALT II. He appointed Cyrus Vance to lead the mediation process instead, together with the U.S. ambassador Alfred Atherton (Quandt, 2005: 211). However, the U.S. mediation team could not have provided Carter the final agreement, so Carter had to engage personally during the second phase of post-Camp David negotiations to finalize a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt (Quandt, 2016: 304).

The Egyptian delegation changed after the Camp David, because Minister of Foreign Affairs Kamel resigned before the Accords were signed in September (Telhami, 2001: 27). The delegation was headed by the new Foreign Minister Kamal Hassan Ali, accompanied by Osama el-Baz, Boutros Boutros-Ghali and also the newly appointed Prime Minister Mustafa Khalil. The Israeli delegation remained mostly unchanged, yet Begin still strengthened his authority in the team as the Israeli cabinet wanted to be informed of every step (Quandt, 2005: 211).

3. 2. 1 From Blair House to deadlock

The first phase of the follow-up negotiations started on October 12th in Blair House, Washington. During the conference, the Israelis were represented only by Weizmann and Dayan and the Egyptians by Kamal Hassan Ali. This delayed the meeting because they needed approval from Begin and Sadat regarding any key issue that was subject to negotiations (Spiegel, 1985: 364). President Carter had met with the Israeli and Egyptian delegations only

before the negotiations began and expressed his willingness to conclude a peace treaty by the end of the conference (Quandt, 2005: 212). He feared that during the Baghdad Summit on November 2nd the Arabs would prevent Sadat to sign a peace treaty with Israel. Blair House talks were dismissed on October 21th however, the negotiations on various levels continued till the end of February 1979 (Spiegel, 1985: 363-364). Each party pushed for numerous revisions of the Accords after being blamed for its formulation by the domestic constituents (Berenji, 2016: 3).

The conference and associated meetings opened up many unresolved issues from the Camp David Summit that Israel and Egypt could not come to a mutual agreement on:

1. *Timeline of the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai.* Israel demanded at three-year period to complete the withdrawal from their settlements. However, Egypt insisted on returning the El Arish airfield within six months after the signing of a peace agreement. Israel did not trust the Egyptians intentions because, according to the Camp David Accords, the withdrawal from the airfields should have been accomplished within nine months (Dayan, 1981: 233-234, MFA IL, n.d.).
2. *Timeline of the establishment of full diplomatic relations between the states.* Israel demanded to establish diplomatic relations on the level of ambassadors after the first stage of its withdrawal from the Sinai, specifically to the El Arish-Ras Mohammad line. On the other hand, Egypt insisted on the step-by-step establishment of the diplomatic relations during the three-year period. The first step would be the Egyptian diplomatic recognition of Israel and exchange of charges d'affaires. Egypt claimed that the diplomatic exchange on the level of ambassadors would be possible after the election to the Palestinian council (Dayan, 1981: 212; Boutros-Ghali, 1997: 165).
3. *Linkage between the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty and Palestinian issue.* Israel insisted on the bilateral peace treaty and the agreement about the Palestinian autonomy to be separate. They feared, in case of limited progress in the negotiations about the issue, that the peace treaty would lose its legitimacy. Therefore, the Israelis wanted to revise the preamble of the Accords again to specifically define the peace treaty not to be dependent on the outcomes of the negotiations with Jordan and Egypt about the Palestinian issue. However, Egypt rejected the Israeli revision given to the unshakable Arab opposition to the treaty during the Baghdad Summit that could have led Egypt into geopolitical isolation. Sadat demanded to incorporate the

preamble statement into the main text of the treaty to make it more legitimate (Dayan, 1991: 206-212; Boutros-Ghali, 1997: 211-212).

4. *Timeline for the negotiations about the Palestinian issue.* Egypt demanded a six-month period for the negotiation process about the Palestinian autonomy and its subsequent implementation. However, Israel rejected any settled schedule (Dayan, 1981: 237).
5. *Legitimacy of the Arab treaties that obliged Egypt to be involved in any Arab military attacks against Israel.* Israel demanded Egypt's written commitment that their peace agreement was superior to the ones previously signed with the Arabs. However, Egypt considered it unacceptable, because it might have invalidated more than fifty treaties between the Arab states, such as the Collective Arab Defence Agreement (Stein, 1999: 257; Dayan, 1981: 211-212).
6. *Oil trades.* After the full withdrawal from the Sinai, Israel insisted on Egypt's commitment to supply oil to them. Israelis also required a price responsive to the developments on the international market. Nevertheless, Egypt did not guarantee Israel any special conditions of the oil supplies (Boutros-Ghali, 1997: 169-171).
7. *Deployment of the UN peacekeeping forces in the Sinai.* Israel worried about the Soviet veto in the UN Security Council, which could block the UN forces from the Sinai. Israel demanded the supervision of the international forces, not Egypt's alone (Spiegel, 1985: 364; Dayan, 1981: 213).
8. *Amendments to the security arrangements in the Sinai.* The Egyptians claimed that the possibility of amending the security arrangements after the five-year period should be accepted. Israel refused to agree with any schedule of possible revisions and insisted on its maintenance (Dayan, 1981: 277; Boutros-Ghali, 1997: 166-167).
9. *Liaison officers in Gaza.* Egypt requested to send liaison officers to Gaza to present to its inhabitants the project of the Palestinian autonomy. Israel argued that this issue was not part of the Camp David Accords and disagreed (Dayan, 1981: 278; Boutros-Ghali, 1997: 166-167).
10. *The U.S. commitment to Israel.* Israel requested the U.S. assistance and \$3.37 billion in financial aid during the removal of settlements from the Sinai (Quandt, 2005: 217). Israel also required a written commitment of the U.S. to supervise the implementation of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty (Dayan, 1981: 214).

The first phase of the negotiation process was full of intense bilateral and trilateral meetings on ministerial-level in Blair House, Brussels (23th-24th December 1978) and Camp David (21th-22th February 1979) and shuttles to the Middle East (Bailey, 1990: 358; Quandt, 2016: 305). The unwillingness of both parties to find a suitable compromise to the aforementioned mutual issues caused the mediation to prolong by six months (Bailey, 1990: 358). Carter decided to "continue to move aggressively" in negotiating the Israeli-Egyptian treaty and joined the U.S. mediation team (Quandt, 2016: 304).

3. 2. 2 From deadlock to ratification

The procedures of the second phase of negotiations changed into the active participation of the U.S. President Carter and personal meetings with both leaders. At first, Carter decided to invite Begin and Sadat to attend another tripartite conference to finalize the treaty. However, neither of them accepted to personally appear at the conference. They were more inclined to meet Carter privately to consult the agreement (Spiegel, 1985: 369).

On March 1st 1979, Begin arrived in Washington without any delegate, what Carter saw as a huge disadvantage. Nevertheless, the four-day meeting produced an important Israeli concession on the Egyptian obligations towards the Arab treaties. Begin allowed its vague interpretation saying that the peace treaty "did not prevail over" the Arab ones (Quandt, 2016: 310). Concessions were made also on other key issue of the treaty linkage with the agreement on the Palestinian autonomy, also based on the interpretative formulation (Vance, 1983: 243-245). However, the problem of the oil supplies and the schedule of exchanging diplomats still loomed large. Carter with his mediation team played role of formulators to reach a particular agreement with Begin. However, President described the U.S. proposal as "an act of desperation" to save the negotiations (Carter, 19982: 416). Begin insisted on the submission of the new U.S. proposal to his cabinet for approval. Before his departure, Begin's statements to the press about the predicted collapse of negotiations pushed Carter to reconsider his next steps (O'Heffernan, 1991: 15-16).

Subsequently, the Israeli cabinet approved a new draft of the U.S. proposal (Quandt, 2016: 312). However, the Egyptian delegation ran out of patience because of slow progress. Sadat sent a message to President Carter that he would travel to the U.S. and speak to the media, the U.S. Congress and also the UN about the remaining Israeli demands that were stopping the process of reaching a final settlement (Bailey, 1990: 359; Carter, 1982: 416).

The U.S. needed to intensify pressure on both leaders by strengthening president's engagement in the negotiations. Carter decided to resume the shuttle diplomacy to Israel and

Egypt. However, he feared that a "non-productive trip by the President of the United States to the Middle East would greatly dramatize the failure" (Carter, 1982: 416). Nevertheless, before Carter's departure to the Middle East, Brzezinski visited Sadat who backed the new U.S. proposal and came up with the possible "secret weapon" – oil pipeline from the Sinai to Israel – in case of Carter's success with the Israelis (Quandt, 2016: 312).

Carter's first shuttle led to Egypt on March 8th, with no intention to persuade Sadat to other concessions but on the contrary to propose future strengthening of the U.S.-Egyptian ties in case the treaty would have been signed. President promised to Egypt a significant number of *rewards* in the form of military and economic aid and also committed the U.S. private sector to invest in the country. Carter also pledged that he would use his leverage to persuade Jordan and Saudi Arabia to support a *fait accompli*. Sadat also authorized Carter to conclude the agreement on his behalf (Quandt, 2016: 313).

On March 10th, the U.S. delegation arrived in Israel. Begin welcomed Carter with the harsh statement that a peace treaty would not be concluded during his visit. Begin insisted on the cabinet's and Knesset's approval of any further changes in the proposal. Carter needed to persuade the Israelis, that the wording about the treaty linkage should be revised to fulfil Sadat's demands. Carter also proposed that the Egyptians required the liaison officers in Gaza. Begin rejected the new draft arguing that the majority of these issues were solved in Washington (Quandt, 2016: 313-316). The negotiations did not produce any agreement despite Carter's *directive tactics* of repeated pressure (Bar-Siman-Tov, 1994: 176). However, one of the successful strategies was Carter delivering his speech in front of the Knesset. Begin became infuriated with the content of the speech because it indicated that only the leaders were preventing its realization (Bar-Siman-Tov, 1994: 176).

Afterwards, the delegations found appropriate formulation for the linkage issue, but two key problems still remained on the table – oil supplies and the Egyptian liaison officers in Gaza (Quandt, 2016: 319). The Israelis did not want to change their standpoint and Begin handed Vance a joint communiqué that even though some agreements were settled, there was a need to continue negotiating on other disputes. Carter called for a *termination* of the talks, and prepared for his departure later that day (Quandt, 2016: 320). Nevertheless, the impasse was resolved during the consultations between Vance and Dayan and new proposals were made: 1) Israel would be able to buy oil from Egypt as a regular customer. If the supplies could not be delivered, the U.S. guaranteed to provide oil to Israel; and 2) The issue of liaison officers would be

postponed during the negotiation process about the Palestinian autonomy (Bar-Siman-Tov, 1994: 178).

The final U.S. proposal of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty was accepted by Sadat during Carter's visit. On March 13th, the Israeli cabinet also supported its interpretation by vast majority (Bar-Siman-Tov, 1994: 179). On March 22th, Knesset approved the first Arab-Israeli peace agreement by 95 members in favour, 18 members against and 2 abstentions (Stein, 1999: 257). The U.S. mediation team headed by President Carter resolved all the remaining issues that prevented the treaty from being signed:

1. *Timeline of the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai.* The withdrawal was divided into two stages. Firstly, the Israelis withdrew "behind the line from east to El Arish to Ras Muhammed" in a period of nine months. Secondly, the full process would be completed in no more than three years (Article 1§3). Israel also agreed on its earlier withdrawal from the city and airfield of El Arish within two months (Appendix to Annex 1, Article 2§1a). In exchange, Egypt allowed the non-military cargo transit through the Suez Canal to Israel and vice-versa (Article 5§1).
2. *Timeline of the establishment of full diplomatic relations between states.* Egypt accepted to establish full diplomatic relations on the level of ambassadors after the first stage of the Israeli withdrawal (Annex 3, Article 1).
3. *Linkage between the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty and Palestinian issue.* The main body of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty did not contain any legal commitments neither to a comprehensive peace nor the further negotiations with Jordan and Palestinian representation. There was only a brief reference, stating that " the provisions of Article VI shall not be construed in contradiction to the provisions of the framework for peace in the Middle East agreed at Camp David" (Agreed Minutes, Article 6(2)).
4. *Timeline for the negotiations about the Palestinian issue.* The "Joint Letter to President Carter" provided a one-year period to negotiate future aspects of the Palestinian authority over the West Bank and Gaza (The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, 1979: 21).
5. *Legitimacy of the Arab treaties that obliged Egypt to be involved in any Arab military attacks against Israel.* Article 6§5 provided some degree of legal commitment for Israel, stating that " in the event of a conflict between the obligation of the Parties under the present Treaty and any of their other obligations, the obligations under this Treaty will be binding and implemented". Accordingly, "it is agreed by the Parties that there is no

assertion that this Treaty prevails over other Treaties or agreements or that other Treaties and agreements prevail over this Treaty" (Agreed Minutes, Article 6(5)).

6. *Oil trades*. According to Annex 3, both parties established economic relations providing Israel with the possibility of buying Egyptian oil on the same terms as others (The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, 1979: 15). The treaty also included the "Memorandum of Agreement between the Governments of the U.S. and Israel" that committed the U.S. to provide the oil supplies to Israel until 1990 if circumstances would have prevented its purchase (ibid: 25).
7. *Deployment of the UN peacekeeping forces*. The UN forces and observers would be present in a buffer zone and zones of limited forces. Only by the decision of the UN SC could forces be withdrawn from their positions. If the UN SC did not approve the peacekeeping forces, the U.S. would deploy a multinational alternative (Annex 1, Article 4; Letters from President Carter, The Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty: 23).
8. *Amendments to the peace arrangements in the Sinai*. The parties settled upon a mutual agreement in the case of modifying any arrangements (Article 4§4).
9. *Liaison officers in Gaza*. Sadat ceded his demand on the liaison officers, thus no reference to this issue was included into the peace treaty.

The Egyptian president Anwar Sadat and the Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin signed the first Arab-Israeli peace treaty in the White House on March 26th 1979 (Stein, 1999: 257). Subsequently, the peace treaty was ratified on April 25th. The biggest regional adversaries committed to end a state of war, that prevailed from 1948 (Bar-Yacoov, 1980: 238-239).

Jimmy Carter continued with his *directive strategy* of pressure, threats, termination of negotiations and rewards to both parties to achieve conflict resolution. The U.S. committed itself to supervise the preservation of the peace treaty in case of the Egyptian violation and signed with Israel special "Memorandum of Agreement". "The Special International Security Assistance Act of 1979" provided military and financial aid to both Israel and Egypt at 3:2 ratio (Sharp, 2018: 23). The U.S. granted Israel rewards of \$3 billion for constructing the airfields in the Negev and \$800 million in financial aid (Quandt, 2016: 324). Carter promised Sadat \$2 billion in financial and more than \$1.5 billion in military assistance during the next three years (Raj, 1980: 245). However, Israel received approximately \$10.2 billion from the U.S. in total. The Carter's presidency exceeded the amount of foreign aid to Israel like none of the previous U.S. governments (Bar-Siman-Tov, 1998: 251).

In sum, this chapter applied an umbrella theory of third-party mediation to analyse the mediation strategies, potential biases and leverage of the U.S. President Jimmy Carter. The first part was opened by placing the mediation process into the context of the Camp David Summit. According to Bercovitch's (2003) division of mediation strategies, the chapter has showed that Carter utilized all the three types. The communication-facilitation strategy was used during the tripartite meetings with Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin to explore their opening demands. The procedural strategy of Camp David, as an open-ended summit in neutral environment chosen personally by President Carter, provided a greater degree of flexibility during the mediation process. The central American proposal and the step-by-step approach used during the negotiations with the members of the advisory teams of both states were equally part of such strategy. To conclude the final frameworks of the Camp David Accords, Carter employing a directive strategy, using Rubin's (1992) coercive and reward powers, and Touval and Zartman's (1996) powers of persuasion and termination. President Carter was successful in fulfilling a role of an ultimate impartial mediator during the Camp David Summit, as proposed by Moore (1996), because both parties ended up making great concessions and none of them was favoured during the negotiation process. The second part of the chapter shed light on post-Camp David mediation, where the process was divided into two phases according to the used procedure. The central American proposal remained the main approach. However, the first phase was headed by Cyrus Vance, without the the participation of President Carter, and ended with only a list of unresolved issues that prolonged a conflict resolution process. Nevertheless, Carter's personal engagement and shuttle diplomacy in March 1979 helped to resolve all the remaining problems. By using a directive strategy and most importantly the U.S. economic and security commitments, Jimmy Carter successfully finalized the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty.

Conclusion

This thesis aimed to fill a gap in the academic literature by providing an analysis of the conflict resolution process between Israel and Egypt with a particular focus on the timing aspect of the parties' engagement in the negotiation process. By combining two theoretical models, the theory of ripeness and an umbrella theory of third-party mediation, this thesis provided a new angle elucidating the domestic and international push factors that helped facilitate the first Arab-Israeli peace agreement. This approach contrasts with most of the analyses of the conflict resolution process offered by the academic literature, which lack an in-depth assessment of the domestic as well as international political developments, while neglecting the importance of the timing at which their occurred.

Firstly, William I. Zartman's theory of ripeness, specifically the key concepts of a "mutually hurting stalemate" and of a "sense of way out", helped answer the first research question of **Why and how did the long-lasting adversaries engage in the negotiations to resolve their conflict?** The first key driver of Egypt's openness towards the conflict resolution process was the military defeat in the 1967 Six Day war. The Egyptian forces lost more than 11 500 soldiers in the war, together with 80% and 85% of ground and aircraft capacities, respectively. Israel captured the territory of the Sinai Peninsula, depriving Egypt of its oil production representing \$56 million in exports annually. In fact, the closure of the Suez Canal came to constitute the largest disruption to the Egyptian post-war economy, causing an estimated revenue loss equal to 4% of the country's GDP. In total, Six Day war cost Egypt more than \$25billion. The surge of anti-Western feelings after the war also depressed Egypt's tourism revenues, causing losses of approximately \$84 million per year, and prevented the country from borrowing from international lenders, such as the IMF and World Bank.

The second key driver of Egypt's willingness to resolve the conflict surfaced with the election of the new Egyptian leadership under Anwar Sadat. His policy was dedicated mostly to solving the destructive domestic situation by regaining the lost territory. As a result, the old Egyptian narrative of Pan-Arabism started to fade, and Egypt's foreign policy shifted towards the engagement with the U.S. and openness to FDI. Sadat's first crucial diplomatic step came in 1971, when he proposed the re-opening of the Suez Canal to Israel in exchange for returning the Sinai Peninsula, according to the UNSCR 242 adopted after the 1967 war. However, Israel backed by the U.S. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger declined his proposal and Sadat had no other option than to conduct another war to break the impasse with Israel. The Egyptian defence spending increased from 5.5% to 21.5% of GDP, and Egypt became highly dependent

on the Soviet funding for war preparations. Despite of that, Sadat's "New Egyptian Initiative" ended up capturing the attention of the U.S.

However, the Yom Kippur war of 1973 led to a hurting domestic situation on the side of Israel, too. In spite of the Israeli military predominance in the war, Israel lost 2 671 IDF soldiers, while 804 tanks and 114 aircrafts were demolished. The daily military expenditure rose up to \$238 million, and in total cost more than 2/3 of Israel's GNP of the same year. After the Six Day war, Israel became highly dependent on Western funding, particularly U.S. aid, that rose up to \$6.792 billion in non-military debt. The Yom Kippur war caused not only a severe economic downturn while exerting a scarring psychological effect on the Israeli government and the public, but most importantly it led to a military stalemate after the implementation of the international cease-fire based on the UNSCR 338. The domestic turmoil accompanied by huge public protests pushed the Israeli government to agree on a mediated negotiation process with Egypt to settle their dispute.

As Egypt and Israel both reached a "mutually hurting stalemate", Egypt succeeded in breaking the impasse with Israel. Moreover, Egypt imposing an Arab oil embargo on the U.S. pushed the latter to be actively involved in the Israeli-Egyptian conflict resolution. Henry Kissinger, as the newly appointed U.S. State Secretary, became the first third-party mediator who had the chance to develop substantial proposals to the opposing parties in order to create a "sense of way out" from the conflict, as put forward by Zartman's theory. However, his shuttle diplomacy and a step-by-step approach to the negotiations achieved three partial agreements between Israel and Egypt. The first U.S. assistance in managing the Israeli-Egyptian conflict came with the signing of the "six-point agreement" on November 11th 1973. Israel agreed on enabling transports of the daily supplies to the encircled Egyptian Third Army, while Egypt released their war prisoners. Kissinger persuaded Sadat based on the subjective perception that Israel was not ready to apply neither the UNSCR 338 nor the UNSCR 340 in its full extent.

Subsequently, Kissinger achieved the signing of two disengagement of forces between Israel and Egypt. The Sinai I, based on the Israeli "five-zone" concept, was signed on January 18th 1974. Israel committed to expel their forces from the Suez Canal however, without leaving the Mitla and Gidi passes. Both states agreed on the limitation of forces in the Sinai in the separate documents, pledging the fulfilment of the obligations to the U.S., rather than to one another.

During the mediation process of the Sinai II, Kissinger found himself unable to reach a compromise between the parties, and terminated the negotiation process. The newly elected

U.S. government under President Ford announced a "reassessment of the U.S. policy toward the Middle East" to pressure Israel to make the necessary concessions. The unpleasant situation created by the U.S. pushed both parties to equally reassess the costs and benefits of the stalemate. Compromise was reached on September 4th 1975 by signing the Sinai II agreement. Israel withdrew from the passes that fell under the control of the U.S. Egypt committed to a "non-use of force" principle for a three-year period that prevented future hostilities between the countries. However, the Sinai II mediation process cost the U.S. vast amounts of military aid to Israel, worth about \$2.6 billion, in addition to multi-billion financial aid to Egypt. Kissinger only formed a condition of "wanting a way out" and the mediation process continued with the election of the new U.S. leadership in 1977.

President Jimmy Carter played a role of a key mediator in the Israeli-Egyptian conflict resolution. Carter's foreign policy focused on pursuing a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace settlement together with the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. However, his active participation in the mediation process only came a year later. With the worsening domestic situation in both countries and the announcement of a renewed Geneva Conference, Israel and Egypt started to negotiate bilaterally. The first secret meeting in Morocco left an impression on both delegations that the bilateral talks might succeed in facilitating a peace agreement. Accordingly, President Sadat was the first Arab leader to visit Israel on November 19th 1977. Nevertheless, the Israelis were shocked by his speech about a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East and peace-for-land concept, so the negotiations did not move any further.

The breakdown of bilateral negotiations required Carter's personal engagement in the conflict resolution process. After the failure of the U.S.-Egyptian strategy accompanied by the strong U.S. campaign against Israel, Carter invited the Israeli and Egyptian Foreign Ministers to the Leeds Castle in July 1978. The Israelis repeatedly rejected a full withdrawal from the Sinai based on the UNSCR 242 and suggested to settle the issue of the West Bank after the interim period of 4-5 years. Sadat, pressured by the domestic turmoil and members of the Arab League, threatened to expel the UNEF mission from the Sinai and renew violence with Israel after the expiration of "non-use of force" declared in the Sinai II.

The "mutually hurting stalemate" of the states and potential outbreak of another Arab-Israeli war persuaded President Carter to personally invite the main representative, Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin, to a trilateral summit in Camp David on September 5th 1978. The bilateral period of talks framed the agenda for the final proposal that would form a "way out"

from the protracted conflict. However, the uncertainty of making a compromise during the Camp David Summit prevailed from its beginning, Jimmy Carter reached a "ripe" time to initiate a peace settlement between Israel and Egypt.

The second research question of **How did Jimmy Carter mediate the Camp David Summit?** was answered by drawing on the umbrella theory of third-party mediation; more specifically theories, which help elucidate the mediation strategies (Bercovitch and Lee, 2003), potential biases (Moore, 1996; Welton and Pruitt, 1987; Touval and Zartman, 1985) and the leverage (Rubin, 1992; Touval and Zartman, 1996) of the U.S. President Jimmy Carter, who successfully achieved the signing of the Camp David Accords.

According to Bercovitch and Lee's (2003) division of mediation strategies - the procedural strategy, communication-facilitation strategy and directive strategy - it is plausible to conclude that President Carter used all three of them. Firstly, the *procedural strategy* was applied during all the proceedings of the Camp David Summit, which was exclusively under the control of Jimmy Carter. The neutral meeting place at the presidential summer retreat enabled the reduction of information leaks to the public. The press could have received information only from the White House spokesperson Jody Powell. The conference was conducted as an open-ended summit with no strict schedule that provided Carter a great degree of flexibility. The leisure time activities and informal dress-code aimed to create a pleasant ambience and ease the tensions between the delegations.

The Camp David Summit might be divided into four main phases according to the different procedures used by Jimmy Carter. In the first phase, Carter oversaw the tripartite meetings with Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin. From that point onwards, the leaders did not negotiate personally. During the second phase, Carter with the U.S. mediation team formulated the American proposal that came to constitute the central document of the whole negotiation process. Although, the delegations were allowed to revise certain points based on the mutual compromises. According to the proposal, the main concern of the conference shifted from a comprehensive to a bilateral Israeli-Egyptian peace settlement with reaching an agreement on the Palestinian question in parallel. The third phase was dedicated to the initiation of a step-by-step procedure and Carter's engagement in the negotiations with the members of the advisory teams of both parties to settle the conflict. Last phase of the mediation process was conducted predominantly between the Israeli delegation and Jimmy Carter due to a need of their concessions on the two key issues of the Sinai settlements and Palestinian question.

Secondly, the *communication-facilitation strategy* was also used during the first phase of tripartite meetings with Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin. Carter, playing the role of a facilitative mediator, explored the opening demands of both leaders and clarified the misunderstandings of the presented proposals.

Lastly, the *directive strategy* enabled to finalize the Camp David Accords. Carter utilized directive strategies in a way, similar to what Touval and Zartman (1996) label "powers of termination and persuasion" and what Rubin (1992) describes as "coercive and reward powers of leverage". During the third phase, the mediation process reached a deadlock because of Israel's unwillingness to fully withdraw from the Sinai. Carter therefore prepared a joint statement that called for the *termination* of the Camp David Summit and expressed his decision to blame Israel in front of the U.S. Congress. By using Rubin's (1996) *coercive power*, Carter threatened to suspend the U.S. economic, military and political aid to Israel, which were fundamental resources to the state at the time. However, Carter had to adopt this approach on Sadat as well, because of his decision to leave Camp David without reaching an agreement. Carter blamed him for "unilaterally" breaking the negotiations and threatened him with freezing the American-Egyptian relations.

As Carter applied Rubin's (1992) *reward power*, Israel agreed on the withdrawal from the strategic airfields in the Sinai in exchange for the U.S. commitment of \$3 billion to build the two new air bases in the Negev Dessert. Carter, utilizing Touval and Zartman's (1996) *power of persuasion*, convinced Sadat that the compromises were acceptable and to agree on the Camp David Accords in its full extent. After thirteen days in Camp David, twenty-three revisions on the Palestinian issue and eight on the Israeli-Egyptian Framework for Peace, the Camp David Accords were finalized and signed by both leaders on September 17th 1978.

Based on an evaluation of the mediator's potential biases, the research showed that Jimmy Carter fulfilled the definition of an *impartial mediator* as Moore (1996) proposes. He did not favour any party or its particular solutions during the negotiation process in Camp David. However, the U.S. had a long-term patron-client relationship with Israel, Carter used Rubin 's (1992) coercive and reward to fulfil Sadat's basic demands in order to conclude the Camp David Accords. The final frameworks involved major concessions on both sides. Egypt ceded their hard-line position on the Palestinian question and Israel was forced to fully withdraw from the Sinai in the space of three years. To put it differently, Egypt regained the whole territory of the Sinai, exactly what the country aimed to achieve with the outbreak of

1973 war. Israel succeeded in its demilitarization and in reaching the first peace treaty with an Arab country which was to be concluded in the period of three months.

The last research question of **What persuaded Israel and Egypt to finalize the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty?** was also answered by using the umbrella theory of third-party mediation, specifically by analysing the mediator's strategies (Bercovitch and Lee, 2003) and powers of leverage (Rubin, 1992; Touval and Zartman, 1996). Firstly, the *procedural strategy* enabled the division of the post-Camp David mediation process into two separate phases. The first phase of the mediation process was led by the U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, due to Carter's urgent participation in other foreign policy matters. The U.S. mediation team stuck with the American proposal as the central document for the negotiations, with the possibility of amendments. The second phase included an active engagement of President Carter accompanied by individual meetings with Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin and by resuming the shuttle diplomacy to the Middle East.

However, the first phase of the post-Camp David mediation process only produced a deadlock on several unresolved issues that prolonged the conflict resolution settlement from three to six months. To conclude the peace agreement with Israel, Jimmy Carter applied the *directive strategies* to resolve the remaining problems set during the first phase of mediation. By utilizing Rubin's (1992) *coercive power* of pressure, Carter pushed Menachem Begin into making concessions, most significantly during his broadcasted speech in front of the Israeli parliament, saying that only the leaders were preventing the settlement of conflict resolution. However, with the slow progress with the Israelis, Carter repeatedly called for the *termination* of negotiation process, as proposed by Touval and Zartman (1996). Eventually, by applying Rubin's (1992) *reward power*, the compromise on the key issue of the oil supplies was reached based on the U.S. commitment of providing oil to Israel over a period of fifteen years, if the supplies could not be delivered. The U.S. commitment of \$3 billion for constructing the airfields in the Negev entered into force and Carter promised to provide \$800 million in further financial aid for Israel. By signing the "Memorandum of Agreement between the Governments of the U.S. and Israel", Carter promised to supervise the fulfilment of the peace treaty's obligations in case of the Egyptian violation.

In case of Egypt, Carter applied Touval and Zartman's (1996) *power of persuasion* to moderate the Egyptian demands and convince Sadat to cede the key request of the liaison officers in Gaza. As a *reward* for finalizing the peace agreement, Carter committed to strengthen the U.S.-Egyptian relations and increase the flows of U.S. FDI in the country. The

U.S. promised to provide \$2 billion in financial and \$1.5 billion in military assistance during the period of three years. Due to the passing of "The Special International Security Assistance Act of 1979", Egypt and Israel became the largest recipient of the U.S. aid. The successful implementation of mediation strategies and powers of leverage enabled Jimmy Carter to conclude the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty on March 26th 1979 during the signing ceremony in the White House. The Egyptian President Anwar Sadat together with the Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin established the first Arab-Israeli diplomatic and commercial relations and committed to end the state of war between the countries that lasted for past 30 years.

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